--- This section is better known since it has been reprinted by Ostertag in "Definite Descriptions: A Reader" (Massachusets Institute of Technology).
Grice overlaps a bit his discussion with Hans Sluga which I have referred to elsewhere, "Shuga-free".
Grice writes, in a way overlaping with his lecture on "Presupposition and Conversational Implicature" now repr. in WoW:
"It is a familiar fact that there are least
TWO WAYS in which a notation for
representing definite descriptions may
be developed within a classical system"
--- recall that the seventh item in the pair of logical formal devices is:
"the" means 'ix' ("Logic and Conversation", first paragraph).
Grice writes:
"One may represent
'The haberdasher of Mr. Spurgeon is bald'
either by
(1) G(ix.Fx)
or by
(x)(ix.Fx)Gx.
"One may, that is, treat "ix.Fx" either
as a term or as being analogous to
a (restricted) quantifier".
---- by the order of presentation in "Logic and Conversation", the latter interpretation seems more natural.
Grice goes on:
"The first method does NOT allow for the representation
of scope differences, so a general decision will have
to be taken with regard to the scope of
definite descriptions, for example that they are to have
MAXIMAL scope."
------
"The second method does provide for scope-
distinctions; there will be a distinction
between , for example,
(ix.Fx)~Gx
and
~(ix.Fx)Gx."
"The apparatus of [G], however, will allow us,
if we wish, to combine the first
method, that of representing definite
descriptions by terms, with the representation
of differences of scope."
"We can, if we like, distinguish between, e.g.
~2G1ix3
and
~4G1ix2
"and ensure that from the first
formula we may, and from the second we may not
derive E!xix3F1x2."
----
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Well, the scope's the issue in a sense . Russell's iota notation compresses a statement (as you are probably aware), into the ix, but that can be a bit ambiguous w/o the full notation (as with yr example...what predicate stands for the baldness? I can piece it together, but Grice sort of takes liberty with some difficult issues. The real issue was the ambiguity between saying someone (ie king of France) was nonbald, or saying it was false KoF was bald----ie Existence (not included by Herr Grice). The latter's correct, since KoF doesn't exist...
ReplyDeleteYet...I think there was a certain sly attempt to make logic...truth-functional (as in, true statements about the world, ie confirmed, verified, etc), and in a sense, I object to that, ..I think. The truth of premises a different issue than the validity of arguments; ie, I don't think anyone has to be committed to the existence of...anything, unless that's sort of a stipulation, a priori as it were (ie, empirical research, evidentiary methods, etc).
Excellent points, J. Grice does say something pretty kryptic about 'exists' in "Vacuous Names" -- well, it's the topic! But surely I want to see in System G something more than a mere attempt to fulfil the desiderata which I agree with Jones are not as revolutionary as one expects. I will copy what he says about 'exists' soon, I hope.
ReplyDeleteI find Grice's WoW Essay, "Presupposition and conversational implicature" much clearer than "Vacuous Names" when it comes to his attack of Strawson's truth-value gaps. Also, that essay, "Presupposition and conversational implicature" fits nicely with the account in terms of the 'conversational maxims', since he needs to specify a 'new' maxim that makes "The king of France isn't bald" quite a rather cryptic thing to say if there is no king of France (while of course literally true). In "Presupposition and Conversational implicature" the issue is clear, "The king of France is bald" ENTAILS there is a king of France; "the King of France isn't bald" only implicates it.
Interesting. I should read more (or obtain his texts, perhaps)--my reading's been limited to "Logic and Conv." and the essay contra-Quine, a bit of other online material.
ReplyDeleteThe point was just that ix is shorthand (scuzi the pedantic): something like ∃x (Fx & (y)(Fy -> x=y) & Gx) (or Bx, for baldness). Right? So, the ix just applies to the unique Fx, with the property of Gx (baldness); when negated, Russell's "narrow scope" of Def.Des.'s holds--in effect you just say the unique x doesn't exist (I don't note Grice saying anything about uniqueness), not really anything about baldness. Recalling a discrete math course I did years ago. But..anytime a name or "The..." used with ∃x points at something...vague or unknown ("the purported...gangland boss," etc), then something like verification is involved (as you probably are aware). In that sense, Russ's descriptions seem a bit ...sly.
Perhaps the best source there would be: "Definite descriptions: a reader", ed. Ostertag. Ostertag, as I say, rather slyly, but I blame MIT, reprinted only the half bit of the Grice 'contra'-Quine -- not the Grice/Strawson, "In defense" but Grice, "Vacuous Names" -- the last bit of which is dedicated to 'ix'. Grice cares to quote from Donnellan in a footnote, to the effect that while he would agree with two uses of descriptions, he is not sure he wants to follow the whole hog as far as the consequences -- very odd ones -- that Donnellan draws from them. Grice's system, he thinks, is more intuitive. He would distinguish between:
ReplyDeletethe king of France is bald.
and
THE KING OF FRANCE is bald.
In the first, the Russellian expansion holds. It's a mere non-idenficatory use, as I think he calls it. The second is more like 'referential' and not just attributive, and thus, a claim to some sort of identification is being made by the utterer.
He also points that his system should be expanded to yield for predicates like '... is believed ...' and so on. I'll consider your other points in different blog posts. Thanks for input.