by J. L. Speranza
for the Grice Club.
Perhaps rather disrespectfully, Grice compares Lord Russell with Pegasus.
Grice is considering Meinong's views, only partially known in Oxford due to the lack of a good English translation. But Grice knew his Meinong alright, since he always found that Aristotle didn't (vide Grice, "Aristotle on the multiplicity of being", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1988).
Grice writes:
"To accept [my natural deduction system -- GHP] is NOT
to accept a Meinongian viewpoint: it is NOT to subscribe
to the idea of a duality, or [worse] plurarity, of
'modes of being'."
"Acceptance of [G] as a model [FOR NATURAL DISCOURSE] might
be expected to lead one to hold that while
some sentences of the form (a)
----- (a) Betrand Russell ------.
will be interpretable in such a
way as
(i) to be true,
and
(ii) to ENTAIL not merely 'there is something which _______'
but also 'there EXISTS something which ________', sentences of the
form
------ (b) Pegasus _________. [(e.g. didn't fly)]
will be interpreted so as to be true,
entail only 'there is something which _______'."
---
BIG CAVEAT:
"But from this, it would be QUITE illegitimate
to conclude that
while Bertrand Russell both exists AND is (or has being),
Pegasus merely is (or has being)"
-----
(p. 129, in Davidson/Hintikka).
At the time of Grice writing, in 1967, Lord Russell was 97. He ceased, alas, to exist, a few years later -- in 1972.
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