Grice invites us consider the sentence used by Reichenbach:
Arnundsen flies to the North Pole in May 1926.
which is represented in thing-splitting as:
f(x19~l,tl)
where f is 'flew' (or 'a flight'); xl is 'Amundsen'; yl is 'the North Pole' and tl is May
1926.
This, in turn, can be transformed into event-splitting in various ways.
One is using
the FACT-function [f(xl. yl. t1)]*.
ov)rfcx,, Yl. tl)l'rn (3.8)
and it is read a
A flight by Amundsen to the North Pole in May 1926 took place.
Or
There is an event which consists in the fact that Amundsen flew to the North Pole in
May 1926.
The second one is using the fact-function [f(xl, yl)]*.
(3v)[f(x1, yl)l*(v.tl) (3.9)
which is read as
A fligh-t by Amundsen to the North Pole took place in May 1926.
In
this representation, an event-unit is considered to be 'a flight by Amundsen to the North
Pole'.
Many things can be said about this event-unit and it serves as a unit of
quantification.
A third possibility is using the fact-function [f(xl)l*,
@~)[f(~l)~*(v,YlJl, (3.10)
expressed as
One of Amundsen's flights took place at the North Pole in May 1926.
Reichenbach allows us to express a sentence such as (40) using 3
different fact-functions.
These representations, Reichenbach thinks, are logically equivalent but they have
different logical forms to describe the same sentence.
These representations do not seem
to affect subsequent reference, that is, one can refer to the action(s) and/or event(s)
evoked by the sentence, no matter what kind of representation is chosen.
Friday, March 27, 2020
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