H. P. Grice on the logical-construction theory of "I": on co-personal experience --

Is it possible, within the framework of Locke's theory, to discover a workable criterion for determining the experiential boundaries of a given person at a given time? 

Let us explore the solution proposed by Grice.

The experience E1 and the experience E2 belong to the same state of consciousness

 means, according to Grice, that 

the experience E1 and the experience E2 would, given certain conditions, be known, by memory or introspection, to be *simultaneous*.

It may be argued that if a definiens contains a stipulation that a state of affairs occurs or will occur given certain conditions , the definition utilizing that definiens will suffer from vagueness and emptiness. 

Experiences which do NOT belong to a single person would be known, by memory or introspection, to be simultaneous, given certain conditions which do not in fact prevail, i.e. , given the condition that they are experiences of one person. 

But let us see if Grice's suggestion can be adapted in a way that suits our purposes. 

Perhaps we could say that E and E2 belong to the same state of consciousness 

if and only if 

there is an E3 such that E3 is an experience (or meta-experience) of the relation of *simultaneity* which holds between E1 and E2.

If we think that there are any experiencessuch as we have described E3 to be, this approach might hold out some hope. 

However , the workability of the solution is dependent upon the (analytic, conceptual, for Grice) assumption that no experience may belong to more than one person. 

For if the assumption does not hold good, the existence of E3 will guarantee only that there is some person who experiences E1 and E2 as parts of a single state of consciousness. 

It will not exclude the possibility that E1 may also belong to another person who fails to experience either E2 or E3. 

And hence it will not insure that E1 and E2 are invariably *co-personal* experiences. 

Now it is a feature of Locke's theory of the person, as we shall reconstruct it, that person P1 and person P2 may have temporal parts in common and hence that a given experience may be an experience belonging to more than one person. 

Consequently a Grice-type solution is not feasible for Locke. 


Given Locke's assumptions, I must confess myself unable to discover any way of determining which, experiences may properly be said co 208 belong toa particular state of consciousness. 

This failure may be due merely to my shortcomings. But unless it can be made good by some more ingenious commentator, it is apparent that Locke's theory suffers from a fatal weakness. We shall be forced to understand a state of consciousness as being simply a non-empty set of experiences. What, then, is the property or properties making up the Aristotelian, essence of a person? Locke began by defining a person as a thinking being, thereby failing to make the distinction, later so important to him, between a soul and a person. But the doctrine that "it is that consciousness which always accompanies thinking, which makes everyone to be what he calls self" teaches us that it is Locke's real intention to define a person as a thought, or set of thoughts, attended by a consciousness of those thoughts. V/e may say that a temporal slice of a person is a state of consciousness characterized by first-order thoughts together v/ith a second-order awareness of them. b. The persistence criterion for persons . No one in his senses would want to say that the lifetime of a person was no longer than the duration of a particular thought or a state of consciousness. Locke was no exception to the rule. A person, conceived of as a temporally extended entity, is not a single state of consciousness but is, rather, composed of a series of such states, each of them characterized in the way just mentioned. By what principle is a series of states of consciousness bundled into a personal whole? What sort of relation do the later states in such a series need to bear to the earlier ones if they are to be parts of a single person? The key to the unity of a person at any given time, according to Locke, is his consciousness of his present thoughts. The unity of a person across time 209 is constituted by his continuing consciousness of his past thoughts. Foz' it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions, that it is self to itself now, and so will be the same self, as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come ... ^ Locke’s most succinct statement of his persistence criterion for persons is as follows: ... as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past paction with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action: so far it is the same personal self Locke, of course, conceives of this persistence criterion as a criterion of identity for persons picked out as existing at different times. In this he has been followed by all of his commentators and critics. So the standard way of rendering his criterion is as follows: (2) B at tp is the same person as A at t^ if and only if (a) A and B are persons (b) It is possible for B to remember at t^ having performed some act or having had some experience which A performed or experienced at t^.31 It is this formulation of Locke’s persistence principle, certainly a natural one in view of the language he employed, that has been the source of most of the paradoxes associated with his theory. Ultimately we shall reconstruct it as a criterion stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for the co-membership of temporal segments in a series of states of consciousness composing a person. But for the time being and for purposes of exposition we shall employ the "personal identity" terminology. Locke uses the terras "memory,.?! "consciousness of past actions," and "ideas of 210 past actions," interchangeably. To repeat the idea of a past action with the same consciousness one had of it at first is to remember oneself performing the action in question. When Locke says that B at t is the same self as A at t^ if B can repeat an idea of A's action at t^ , by "can" he clearly has in mind something stronger than mere logical possibility. The test of whether I can remember a past experience is whether , under appropriate circumstances and with appropriate stimulation, I do remember it. If I am in fact unable to recall events in which my childhood body participated, or the recent actions committed by my adult body while drunk or drugged, I am not the same person as the one who participated in those events or committed those actions, although, because of the continuity between my body as it existed at those times and as it exists now, I am the same man. This is a consequence of which Locke was fully aware and which he vras prepared to accept. Locke next raises the question as to whether personal identity is dependent upon or entails identity of substance. It is clearly immaterial substance, the soul, that he is referring to here, although it is equally true that he would refuse to base personal identity on sameness of body or material substance. His answer is; "... whether we are the same thinking thing, i.e.the same substance or no »<><, concerns not personal identity at all."'''2 Locke's reason for refusing to equate the person with his soul is based upon his contention, which we have already discussed at length, that no one can know with certainty whether his soul of the present moment is the same as the soul which was the subject of the past experiences he now remembers. But everyone can know that he is the same person as the person who had the experiences he now remembers. 211 For, it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself • to himself , personal identity depends on that only ...5-5 The conclusion, not drawn explicitly by Locke, is that the soul and the person are not the same thing. In an alternative version of the argument, Locke says that it is always possible that an intellectual substance have represented to it "as done by itself, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other agent But such false representations cannot be made to the person. "For the same consciousness being preserved ... the 34 personal identity is preserved."'' c „ Person and soul . For Locke the relationship between the self and the soul, is exactly parallel to that which is ordinarily conceived of as prevailing between soul and body. Hence it makes sense for him to ask whether the self (the person) can retain its identity even although the soul does not. This is a question which he answers affirmatively. Insofar- as I retain my memories, my consciousness of my own past experience, I remain myself and am the same person I was before, even although these memories have been grafted upon a different soul. Conversely, if the memories properly belonging to another soul, let us say the soul of Lucretia Borgia, are grafted upon my soul and conjoined with my memories, then that lady and I become the same person. Insofar as I remember her misdeeds as though they were my own, 1 am punishable for them, even although my soul was in no way responsible for their commission. It is logically possible that transferal of this sort might come to pass, Locke thinks, because of the fact that memories are not self-certifying in the way present sensations are.. Because of their representativ e nature, they may always be delusive. Consequently my soul may be decieved into be- 212 lieving that it committed the poisonings, etc. that were actually not its actions, but the actions of Lucretia's soul, and it may even be deluded into believing that it remembers those actions as its own. For assurance that such terrible events will not occur, we must trust to the goodness of God, Locke says, "who, as far as the happiness or misery of any of his sensible creatures is concerned in it, will not, by a fatal error of theirs, transfer from one to another that consciousness which draws reward 35 or punishment with it." ^ If, then, divine intervention does not prohibit it, there is no logical, reason why one person may not be constituted out of the experiences of several souls. Having attempted to show that the person-soul association may instantiate a one-many relation, Locke next seeks to demonstrate that there is no logical absurdity in assuming that several distinct persons may be associated with a single soul. If a soul should be stripped of all its memories and its consciousness of its past existence, and in this state should then commence a new life, it would "make" a new person. If my soul is numerically identical with that once possessed by Lucretia Borgia, but I have no recollection whatsoever of her acts and experiences, then I am not the same person as Lucretia, nor am I punishable for her wrongdoings. Moral responsibility is a function of personality and is determined by memory. If an individual commits a crime which later he is wholly incapable of recollecting, he is the same man as the wrongdoer; his soul is identical with that of the wrongdoer; but he is not the same person as the wrongdoer. Hence divine justice will not punish him. Human laws hold such an individual responsible, because they have no way of determining whether His plea of forgetfulness is genuine or spurious. 213 But in the Great Day, wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no , one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of „.. >0 If a limb is amputated from the body, says Locke, the original owner no longer regards it as a part of himself and is indifferent as to what becomes of it. But if it should be the case that when a finger is cut off, consciousness goes along with the finger and leaves the rest of the body, then one would be concerned only for the finger and not for the remainder of the body. This every intelligent being, sensible of happiness or misery, must grant — that there is something that is himself , that he is concerned for, and would have happy ... In all which account of self, the same numerical substance is not considered as making the same self; but the same continued consciousness ... Person , as I take it, is the name for this self.37 ... happiness and misery being that for which every one is concerned for himself , and not mattering what becomes of any substance, not joined to, or affected with that consciousness.kS The soul has exactly the same instrumental status as does the body. Should consciousness be severed from its original spiritual substance, then the fate of that substance would be of no interest to the self. We see now that Locke was inconsistent in speaking of the transfer of guilt and liability to punishment from soul to soul as a tragedy which God would surely wish to prevent. Locke's position should be that it is a matter of indifference as to which soul is punished for any particular misdeed. The only thing that matters is that a person be held responsible exclusively for his own actions. Is it any wonder that this doctrine was responsible for much anger in theological circles? Does the concept of a soul or an immaterial mental substance serve for Locke any philosophical purpose whatever? I think it is evident that 214 the answer must be in the negative. This conclusion is by no means original with me. Laird points out that "his account of the soul shows how 39 useless that conception may be, if understood as Locke understands it." Gibson appears to be one of the few commentators actually to subscribe to Locke’s doctrine of personal identity. Hence his view on the status of mental substance is of interest, since presumably he views the problem in an authentically Lockian way. He says: Here, moreover, in the identity of self-consciousness, Locke has found a concrete unifying conception, in place of the empty thing-in-itself into which the idea of substance had finally resolved itself .... But a mental substance which is not only unknown, but has been shown to stand in no essential relation to the self of consciousness, can only be retained so long as it is not challenged. Nothing could show more con- clusively than the mere statement of such a position, the entire uiselessness of the traditional conception of substance for the interpretation of our self-conscious life."10 I am inclined to think that this was exactly what Locke intended to show.