H. P. Grice
St.
John's, Oxford
H. P. Grice, M. A. Lit. Hum., F. B. A, Tutorial Fellow in
Philosophy, St. John's, Oxford.
1938.
Negation and privation, negation, 1961, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II
(Essays), Carton 4-Folders 10-11, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The
University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: “not,” negation, privation,
verificationism, introspection, sense data, sense datum, logical form, unary
operator, knowledge.
Grice
starts with Aristotle's "apophasis" in Int.17a25 ("The
potentialities of joint endeavours continues to lure me. The collaboration with
Strawson was followed by other collaborations of varying degrees of intensity,
with (for example) Austin on Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione
[...]." This is
So
what does Aristotle say in "De interpretatione"? Aristotle
has: "ἀ. ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος ἀπό τινος,
"a predication of one thing away from another,
i.e. negation of it. Grice's reflection, in a
verificationist vein, of two types of utterance: "I don't hear a
noise" (or "I do not hear a noise," to get "not" in
full, or "I do not hear *that* the bell is ringing", or in a non-Anglo-Saxon
continuous-tense variant Grice gives, "I am not hearing *that* the bell is
ringing," and "I am not hearing a noise," fearing the simple-
present form might trigger the wrong implicatum), and "I do not see *that*
the pillar box is blue" (or "I am not seeing *that* the pillar box is
blue," or "That is not blue.") Surely, each is co-related to
some affirmative counterpart, viz.: "I hear *that* the bell is
ringing" (or "I am hearing *that* the bell is ringing", "I
hear a noise," "I am hearing a noise") and "I see *that*
the pillar box is red" (or "That is red"). But associates each
with a psychological state, attitude, or stance. In the case of an
utterer U uttering "I do not hear *that* the bell is ringing," the
source or reason, ground or knowledge upon which an utterer bases his
utterance is the *absence* (absentia, privatio), 'verified' by introspection,
of the same psychological state, stance, or attitude, co-related to the
affirmative counterpart, "I hear that the bell is ringing,"
which does *not* feature the "not" operator. Grice co-relates
"I do *not* see *that* the pillar box is blue" (or "That is not
blue") with "I see that the pillar box is red" (or "That is
red"), which does *not* feature "not," and is alleged by
Grice to be the source or reason for Utterer U to utter "I do not see that
the pillar box is blue" (or "That is not blue," on the ground of
U's seeing that the pillar box is red. In the "hear" example, unlike
that of the *visual* sense-datum example, Grice thinks he needs not appeal to a
different experience ("I hear that the bell is silent"), but to the
utterer's felt absence (absentia or privatio) of the experience, which is
thereby negated. The utterance featuring "not" is explained with
the aid of an introspection, ultimately related to the utterer's confronted
with the absence or privation of an experience involving the auditory sense
datum ('The bell is ringing,' 'noise'). The utterance involving a
'colour' term (denotating a visual sense datum), and featuring "not"
("I do not see that the pillar box is blue") is thus explained in
terms, not of an absence or privation of the experience, but of an experience
involving a different colour word (denotating a different visual sense datum).
There are parallels that allow for a unified account. Each pair of affirmative
and negative utterance -- involves a perceptual verb, in two modes: auditory
(U's hearing) and visual (U's seeing), generalisable in terms of U's sensing
("I do not sense that the alpha is phi") vs. the absence of a
possible experience "I sense that the alpha is phi" or the presence
of the experience involving a different sense daum ("I sense that the
alpha is phi-2"). The keyword then would be the philosophy of
perception, which will prove to be a long-standing interest of Grice's, and his
colse collaborator G. J. Warnock. The important distinction as Grice observes,
is that by uttering "That is not red," U does not explicitly convey
(but merely implies) the perceptual verb attached to the agent-based first
person (cf. 'sight unseen'). By uttering "I do not hear that
the bell is ringing," the U explicitly conveys the perceptual verb
attached to the agent-based first person and thus seem like a more natural
utterance to receive a direct introspective analysis, even if in the slightly
negative-loaded concept of 'absentia' or 'privatio' of a possible experience.
In relying on introspection as a basis of knowledge -- 'introspective
knowledge,' indeed -- Grice is being very Oxonian in the best empiricist
tradition. Grice's attempt, via reductive-reductionist analysis, to 'eliminate'
"not" along verificationist lines succeeds. "Someone" (for
surely "I" can always be replaced by the less informative
"someone"), i.e. "U does not see that the pillar box is
blue" is based and uttered on the ground of "U sees *that* the pillar
box is red". "U does not hear that the bell is ringing" is based
and uttered on the *absence* (absentia, privatio) of an introspection, or the
absence (absentia, privatio) of a possible (but not actual) experience arrived
by introspection whose content involves the utterer hearing that the bell is
ringing. Grice is involved in serious philosophical studies under the tutelage
of Hardie at Corpus. While his socialising is limited ("having
been born on the wrong side of the tracks"), first at Corpus, and
then at Merton, and ending at St. John's, he fails to attend Austin's seminal
Thursday-evening "Play Group of the Seven" meetings at All Souls with
A. J. Ayer, I. Berlin, S. N. Hampshire, H. L. A Hart, D. MacDermott, D.
MacNabb, and A. D. Woozley. But Grice learns all about the "linguistic
botany" methodology on his return from the navy. At St. John's, he has
Strawson as his tutee -- which starts a life-long friendship and collaboration.
Indeed, Grice turns back to the topic of negation in seminars later at
Oxford (vide Grice 1961) in connection with Strawson's cursory treatment of
"not" in "Introduction to logical theory." Grice indeed
includes "not," naturally, as the first item, qua unary
satisfactory-value-functor (unlike "and," "or," and
"if") in his list of vernacular counterparts to this or that 'formal
device' -- in this case, "~." In the fourth William James lecture,
Grice explores a role for negation along the lines of Cook Wilson's Statement
and Inference. Grice's 'Vacuous names' contains Gentzen-type syntactic
inference rules for the introduction (+,~) and elimination (-,~) for negation,
and the correlative value assignation. He adds a subscript device on
"~", for cases like "It The climber of Mt. Everest on hands and
knees is not to atttend the party in his honour." In
"Presupposition," he adds "Do not [arrest the intruder]!,"
the square-bracket device for assigning common-ground status, In "Method
in philosophical psycholgoy" he plays with the internalisation of
"not" within the scope of a psychological verb denotating a
psychological state, tance, or attitude. In the Kant lectures on aspects of
reasoning, he explores "not" within the scope of this or that mode
operator, as in an imperatival (or boulomaic) utterance ("Don't do
it!" "Don't arrest the intruder!") and this or that mixed-mode
utterances, and in connection with the minor problem of presupposition
("Smith has not ceased from eating iron").within the scope of an operator
other than the indicative mode ("Don't do it!" "Don't
arrest the intruder!"). In his commentary in P. G. R. I. C. E., he
expands on this metaphysical construction routine of Humeian projection with
the pre-intuitive concept of negation, specifying four stages the
intuitive concept undergoes until it becomes fully rationally
recostructed, as "something like a Fregeian sense. Grice is interested in
applying Cook Wilson's "Statement and inference" to explore what the
role of 'not' might be. And he succeds in finding one. It is explained in
terms of the conversational implicatum. By uttering "Smith has not been to
prison yet" U implies that some utterer has, somewhere, sometime,
expressed the contrary opinion. Is there a strict conceptual distinction,
as Grice suggests, between ‘negation’ and ‘privation’? If ‘privation’ involves
or presupposes negation, one might appeal to something like Modified Occam’s
Razor, do not multiply negations beyond necessity. In his choice of examples,
Grice seems to be implicating that an empirically verifiable, observational
utterance, such as “U does not see that the pillar box is blue” not because U
does not exist, but on the basis of U's knowing that the pillar box is red, is
a ‘negation,’ while an utterance arrived via introspection, such as “U does not
hear that the bell is ringing” on the basis of his knowing that he is aware of
the absence of an experience to that effect, is a ‘privation.’ Or not! Of
course, Grice is ultimately looking for the rationale behind the conversational
implicatum in terms of a principle of conversational helpfulness underlying his
picture of conversation as rational co-operation. To use his pirotological
jargon in "Method," in Pirotese, Pirot-1 utters “x” explicitly
conveying that p; Pirot-2 feels like negate that. By uttering x2, U2 explicitly
conveys that ~p. Or Pirot-1 volunteers x3, explicitly conveying that ~p
("Not raining!"). Surely a “rational creature” should be capable
to deny this or that, as Grice puts it in "Indicative Conditionals."
Interestingly, Grice does not consider (as Gazdar does) the other possible
unitary functors (three in a standard binary assignation of values) – just
negation, which reverses the satisfactory-value of the radix, or neustic.
In terms of systematics, it may be convenient to regard Grice’s view on
negation (and privation) as his outlook on the operators this or that procedure
by the utterer endows him with this or that basic expressive, operative power
(in this case, his proficiency with "not") as co-related with this or
that device in general -- whose vernacular expression will bear a 'formal'
counterpart. Many of his comments addressed to this more general topic
(satisfactoriness-preserving operators) thus apply to "not," and
raise the question about the EXPLICITUM or explicatum of "not." A
Griceian should not be confused. The fact that Grice does not explicitly
MENTION negation, but ‘formal device’ in general, does not mean that what he
says about formal device may not be particularised to apply to negation. His
big concession is that Whitehead and Russell are right about the explicitum or
explicatum of "not" being "~" (Or, more formally, "by
uttering "Not!", the utterer explicitly conveys that ~p. Any
divergence is explained via the 'implicatum.' "Not" utterances are
horribly uninformative, and not all of them are of philosophical interest.
Grice joked with Searle's "He's not lighting the cigarette with a
twenty-dollar bill," 'he' being a Texas oilman in his club, and thus, the
implicatum is usually to the effect that someone thought otherwise. In terms of
Cook-Wilson, the role has more to do with the expressive power of a rational
creature to deny a molecular utterance such as "p.q." Grice's two
examples involving an auditory and a visual sense datum "I do not hear
that the bell is ringing" from the absence of the experience of hearing
it, and "I do not see that the pillar box is blue" from U's sensing
that the pillar box is red, depend on Kant's concept of the "synthetic a
priori" with which Grice tests with his children's playmates, "Can a
sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed!" ("Can this
pillar box be blue and red all over? Cf. Ryle's symposium on negation with
Mabbott, for the Aristotelian Society, a source for Grice's reflexion. As a
conversational implicatum, Grice’s examples can be re-phrased, “I’m unhearing a
noise” and "That's unred." This point is particularly important,
since it shows that 'negation' and "not" are not co-extensive. First,
"not," is hardly pure Anglo-Saxon (being the abbreviation of
'ne-aught;' 'ne' was the proper Anglo-Saxon negation). Second, Grice's view of
conversation as rational co-operation, as displayed in this or that
conversational implicatum NECESSITATES that the implicatum is NEVER attached to
this or that expression (here "not," since Strawson used it) when the
vernacular "provides a wealth of expressive ways to be negative!"
Grice possibly chose 'negation' NOT because, as with this or that 'nihilistic
philosopher,' such as Schopenhauer, he found the concept a key one. But one may
well say that this is the Schopenhauerian in Griceian: approaching
"not" in linguistic or conceptual key. If his priority is for
"By uttering x (by which U explicitly conveys that ~p), U implicitly
conveys that q." The essay thus is an elaboration on 'q.' For the record,
"nihilism" was coined by philosopher Friedrich Heinrich
Jacobi. "Negatio" was already an item in the philosophical
lexicon. nĕgātĭo ,
ōnis, f. nego, I. a denying, denial, negation, Cic. Sull.
13, 39: “negatio inficiatioque facti,” id.
Part. 29, 102.— II. In partic., a word that denies, a
negative, App. Dogm. Plat. 3, p. 32, 38, as was 'privatio.' prīvātĭo ,
ōnis, f. privo, I.a taking away, privation of a
thing (class.): “doloris,” Cic. Fin. 1,
11, 37 and 38; “2, 9, 28: culpae,” Gell. 2, 6,
10. The negatio-privation distinction is perhaps not attested in
Greek. ἀπόφασις (A), εως, ἡ,
(ἀπόφημι). A.denial,
negation, opp. κατάφασις, Pl.Sph.263e; ἀ. ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος ἀπό τινος a
predication of one thing away from another,
i.e. negation of it, Arist.Int.17a25, cf.APo. 72a14; ἀ. τινός negation,
exclusion of a thing, Pl.Cra.426d; δύο ἀ. “μίαν κατάφασιν ἀποτελοῦσι” Luc.Gall.11.
Grice was not the first to explore philosophically 'negation,' but the
philosoher who most explored negation as occurring in a 'that'-clause followed
by a 'propositional complexus' that contains "~," and as applied to a
personal agent ("The utterer means that ~p."). In what ways is that
to be interpreted?Grice confessed to never been impressed by Ayer and
'"the crudities and dogmatisms that seemed too pervasive." Let's go
back to "This is not red" and "I am not hearing a
noise." Grice's suggestion is that the incompatible fact
offering a solution to this problem is the fact that the utterer of "I am
not hearing a noise" ENTERTAINS the POSITIVE (affirmative)
proposition, "I am hearing a noise," without having an
attitude of CERTAINTY towards it." More generally, he proposes,
"The A is not B." "To state 'I do not know that A is B is
to state," or iff as Grice would prefer: "Every present
mental process of mine has some characteristic incompatible with
knowledge that A is B." One may propose a doxastic weaker version,
replacing the dogmatic Oxonian 'know' with 'believe'. Grice's view of
'compatibility' reminds the Sheffer stroke that he'll later use in
accounts of "not". And the idea of the pregnant proposition
"I'm not hearing a nose" as pregnant with "I am hearing a
nose" was scholastic and mediaeval. Grice's main proposal may be
seen as DRAWING on Ayer's this or that
VERIFICATIONIST assumption. Grice's proposed analysis CAN be
subjected to a process of VERIFICATION, on the understanding that
perception through the senses ("It is green") and introspection
("every present mental process of
mine
...") are empirical phenomena. And there are subtleties to be drawn!
1941.
Personal identity, Mind, vol. 50, pp. 330-50, repr. in J. R. Perry, Personal
identity, University of California Press, Berkeley, David Hume, Hume's quandary
about personal identity, Hume on personal identity, Hume's account of
personal identity, personal identity, revisited, the logical-construction
theory of personal identity, 1977, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays),
Carton 4-Folder 12 and Series V (Topical), Carton 7-Folders 7-9, BANC MSS
90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Keywords: "I," personal identity, first person, first personal
pronoun, Locke, Hume, someone, somebody. Grice’s quandary about personal
identity: the implicata. Some philosophers have taken Grice as trying to
provide an exegesis of Locke. However, their approaches differ. What works for
Grice may not work for Locke. For Grice is is analytic that not PERSON 1 and
PERSON 2 may have the same experience. Grice explicitly states that he
"thinks" that his 'theory' is a 'modification' of Locke's theory, and
he does not seem too interested to find why it may not. His strategy seems to
dismiss Locke, as "not being clear" to Grice what Locke's answer to
Grice's question about "I" statements would be. Grice does quote
directly from the "Essay," when Locke states
that "For as far as any intelligent being CAN repeat the
idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and
with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same
personal self." He proposes to tackle the objections he sees Locke's
thesis may yield, namely four (circularity -- easily disposed by appealing to
'memory or introspection -- Reid, aboutness, circularity of "same"). Grice
is concerned with the implicatum involved in the use of the first person
singular ("I will be fighting soon") since his pre-war days at
Oxford! No wonder his choice of an example! The topic of 'personal identity'
(which label Austin found pretentious, and preferred to talk about the
illocutionary force of "I") had a special Oxonian pedigree that Grice
had occasion to study and explore for his M. A. Lit. Hum. Locke, a philosopher
with whom Oxford identifes most, famously defends a memory-based account of
"I" that received some alleged counter-example by some Scots
philosophers, notably Reid. And Hume! (Or "Home," if you must). In
fact, while he is not too specific about Hume in the "Mind" essay,
Grice will, due mainly to his joint investigations with J. C. Haugeland,
approach Hume's 'quandary,' too! In his own approach to "I," Grice
updates the time-honoured Lockeian analysis. Grice embraces a 'logical
construction' of "I" utterances, and relies on Gallie. In fact, Grice
is heterodoxical enough to use the taxonomy by Broad ('from the other place')
of "I" utterances, too. Grice deals with the Reid-type
counterexample, and comes up with a rather elaborate 'analysans' for a simple
"I" statement, such as "I am hearing a noise," the
affirmative counterpart of the focus of his earlier essay on negation ("I
am not hearing a noise"). In fact, Grice dismisses the 'indexical'
approach that will be made popular by J. R. Perry (who reprinted Grice's essay
in his influential collection for the University of California Presss). Grice
seems to be relying on 'reasoning which is too good': "I am hearing a
noise; therefore, someone is hearing a noise." Grice's attempt to reduce
"I" statements ("I am hearing a noise") in terms of a chain
of mnemonic states poses a few quandaries itself! While quoting from recent
philosophers such as Gallie and Broad, it is a good thing that Grice has
occasion to go back to, or 'revisit,' Locke and contest the infamous
counterexamples presented by Reid and Hume. Grice concludes on a methodological
note. The intricacy of one's analysis for an apparently simple utterance (cf.
his earlier essay on "I am not hearing a noise") should not be a
minus, but a plus. Much later, Grice later reconsiders, or revisits, indeed,
Broad's remark and re-titles his approach as "the" or "a"
"logical-construction theory of personal identity." It is indeed
Haugeland who has Grice re-consider Hume's vagaries with personal identity.
Unlike the more conservative Locke (that Grice favours), eliminationist Hume
sees "I" as a conceptual, indeed metaphysical chimaera. Hume presses
the point for an 'empiricist' verificationist account of "I." For, as
Russell would say, "what can be more direct that the experience of
myself?" The Hume Society should take notice of Grice's simplification of
Hume's implicatum on "I." As a matter of fact, Grice calls one of his
metaphysical construction routines "Humeian Projection," so it is not
too adventurous to think that Grice might have considered "I" as an intuitive
concept that needs to be 'metaphysically re-constructed' and be given a
legitimate Fregeian sense. Grice calls one of his metaphysical construction
routines "Humeian projection," since the 'mind,' as it were, 'spreads
over' its objects. But, by 'mind,' Hume does not necessarily mean the
"I." Cf. "The mind's I." Grice is especially concerned with
the poverty of Hume's criticism to Locke on personal identity. Grice opts to
revisit the Lockeian memory-based on "I" utterances that Hume rather
regards as 'vague,' and 'confusing.' Locke's approach to identity is NOT
eliminationist as Hume's is, and it is only natural that Grice would be
sympathetic to it. Grice explores these issues with J. C. Haugeland mainly at
seminars. One wonders why Grice spends so much time in a philosopher such as
Hume, with whom he agreed almost on nothing! One supposes Grice is trying to
save Hume at the implicatum level, at least! The phrase or term of art,
"logical construction" is Broad's, but Grice loved it. Rational
reconstruction is not too dissimilar, but Grice prefers Broad's more
conservative label. This is more than a terminological point. If Hume is right
and there is NO 'intuitive' concept of "I," one cannot strictly
re-construct it, only 'construct' it! Ultimately, Grice shows that, if only at
the implicatum level, we are able to provide an analysandum for an
"I" utterance WITHOUT using "I," by implicating only
'mnemonic' concepts, which belong, naturally, in a theory of philosophical
psychology. The topic of personal identity unites various interests of Grice.
The first is ‘identity,' simpliciter. Instead of talking of the meaning of “I,”
as, say, Anscombe would, Grice sticks to the traditional category, or keyword,
for this, i. e. the theory-laden, ‘PERSONAL identity.’ Personal identity is a
type of identity, but what does ‘person’ add? Consciousness? Grice plays with
the soul/body distinction ("I fell from the stairs"). Some
"I" utterances are purely 'bodily,' some are purely 'soully,' and
some are mixed! At the time of his "Mind" essay, he was unaware of
the complications that the concept of a ‘person’ (as attached in adjective form
to 'identity') may bring. Ayer did, and Strawson will, and Grice learns much
from Strawson (a person as a complex for a body-soul spatio-temporal continuant
substance. Ultimately, Grice finds a theoretical counterpart here. A pirot may
become a human, but that is not enough. A pirot must aspire, via metousiosis,
to become a PERSON. Thus, 'person' becomes a technical term in Grice’s grand
metaphysical scheme of things. "Someone heard a noise" is
analysed as "A past hearing of a noise is an element in a total
temporary state which is a member of a series of total
temporary states such that every member of the series would, given
certain conditions, contain as an element a memory of some experience
which is an element in some previous member, or contains as an
element some experience a memory of which would, given
certain conditions, occur as an element in some subsequent member;
there being no sub-set of members which is independent of the
rest." -- which Grice 'simplifies' as "A past hearing of a
noise is an element in a member of an interlocking series of memorative
and memorable total temporary states". Was his "Personal
identity" ever referred to? Indeeed, P. Edwards includes a reference to
Grice's Mind essay in the entry for "Personal identity," as a
reference to Grice et al on "Metaphysics," is referenced in Edwards's
encyclopaedia entry for 'metaphysics.' Grice does not attribute privileged
access or incorrigibility to "I" or the first person. He always
hastens to add that "I" can always be substituted, salva veritate (if
baffling your addressee) by "someone," if not "somebody."
His agency-based approach requires that: "I am rational provided YOU are,
too." By explicitly saying he is a Lockeian, Grice surely will NOT like to
see himself as the first to consider this or that problem about "I; i.e.
someone." But he was the philosopher who most explored the 'reductive
analysis' of "I, i.e. someone." He needs the reductive analysis,
because human agency (philosophically, rather than psychologically interpreted)
is key for his approach to philosophy ("By uttering x, U means that he or
someone is hearing a noise," or even "By uttering "I, i.e.
someone is hearing a noise, U means that the experience of a hearing of a
noise is an element in a total temporary *state* which is a member of
a series such that each member would, given certain conditions, contain as
an component one memory of an experience which is a component in a pre-sequent
member, or contains as a component some *experience* a memory of
which would, given certain conditions, occur as a component in a
post-sequent member; there being no sub-set of members which is
independent of the rest." For Grice, a person is a logical
construction out of this or that experiences. Whereas in Russell, as Broad
notes, the logical construction is a philosophical concept to an IMPROVED
conception (and thus not 'preserves' meaning), this is not so for Grice.
Grice intends to be making explicit, through analysis, the concept we
already have.
1946. The sceptic’s implicatum,
common sense and scepticism, repr. in Studies in the Way of
Words, Part II, Explorations in semantics and metaphysics, as Essay
8, and 'G. E. Moore and Philosopher's Paradoxes,' as Essay 9, 1953, The H.
P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 4-Folder 13, BANC MSS 90/135c, The
Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: common
sense, scepticism, implicatum, the sceptic's implicature, philosopher's
paradox, paradox, G. E. Moore, ordinary language, 'ordinary-language'
philosophy, Norman Malcolm. The sceptic’s implicatum. While Grice groups
these two essays as dealing with one single theme, strictly, only this or that
philosopher's paradox (not all) may count as 'sceptical.' This or that
philosopher's paradox may well NOT be 'sceptic' but rather 'dogmatic' at all.
In fact, Grice defines 'philosopher's paradox' as anything "repugnant to
common sense," shocking, or extravagant -- to Malcolm's eyes, that
is! While it is, strictly, slightly odd to quote this as
"(1946)" just because, by a stroke of the pen, Grice writes that
date in the Harvard volume, we will follow the practice! This is vintage Grice!
Grice always took the sceptic's challenge seriously, as any serious
philosopher should! In his later reflections, Grice's took the sceptic's
impicatum as a very affront to our idea of rationality, conversational or
other. Vide: "Conversations with a sceptic: Can he be slightly more
conversational helpful?" Hume's sceptical attack is partial, and
targeted only towards practical reason, though. Yet, for Grice, reason is
one; so you cannot really attack 'practical' reason without attacking
'theoretical' or doxastic reason, too! There is something like a more general
'rational acceptance,' to use Grice's term, that the sceptic is getting at!
Grice liked to play with the idea that ultimately all syllogism is 'practical.'
If, say, a syllogism by Einstein looks doxastic, that is because Einstein cares
to 'omit the practical tail,' as Grice puts it! And Einstein is not even a
philosopher, they say! Grice is here concerned with a Cantabrigian topic
popularised by G. E. Moore. As Grice recollects, "Some like Witters,
but Moore's my man." Unlike Cambridge analysts such as
Moore, Grice sees himself as a 'linguistic-turn' *Oxonian* analyst. So it is
only natural that Grice would connect time-honoured scepticism (yes, of the
Stoa infame) and common sense with 'ordinary language', so mis-called, the
elephant in Grice's room. If scepticism attacks common sense and fails,
Grice seems to be implicating, ‘ordinary-language’ philosophy is a good
antidote to scepticism, too! Since what language other than 'ordinary
language' does common sense speak? ("Well, strictly, common sense doesn't
speak!"). In fact, Grice re-addresses this topic in a strictly Mooreian
way in a later essay, also repr. in Studies: "G. E. Moore and
Philosopher's paradoxes, repr. in Studies in the Way of Words. As
with his earlier 'Common sense and scepticism,' Grice tackles Moore's and
Malcolm's claim that 'ordinary language,' so-called, solves a few of
"Philosopher"'s paradoxes. "Philosopher" is Moore's
attempt at humour to symbolise "any" philosopher, especially of the
type he found eccentric, the sceptic included. Grice finds problems in this
overarching Cantabrigian manoeuvre, as over-simplifying a pretty convoluted
terrain. While Grice treasured Austin's "Some like Witters, but
Moore's MY man!" perhaps he found Moore too Cantabrigian to his taste!
While an Oxonian thoroughbred, Grice was a bit like Austin, "Some
like Witters, but Moore's my man." While Grice would agree that Moore
goes 'above' Witters, if that's the expression ('even if some like him'), we
should find the Oxonian equivalent to Moore. Grice would NOT name Ryle, since
he saw him almost every day! "There is something apostolic about Moore
that I enjoy," Grice would say, referring to the fact that Moore was one
of the apostles. Grice spends some time exploring what Malcolm, a follower of
Witters, as it were, has to say about Moore in connection with that
particularly "Oxonian" turn of phrase, "ordinary
language." For Malcolm's Moore, a 'paradox' by a 'philosopher' arises
when 'Philosopher' fails to abide by the dictates of Ordinary
Language. That Moore was not too happy with Malcolm's criticism can be
witnessed by just a glimpse at Moore's "Reply to Norman Malcolm"!
Grice is totally against this view that Malcolm ascribes to Moore as being TOO
BROAD to even claim to be true! Perhaps Grice's implicature is that Malcolm is
appealing to Oxonian turns of phrase ('ordinary language') but not taking
proper Oxonian care (in clarifyng the nuances and stuff) in dealing with,
admittedly, a non-Oxonian philosopher such as Moore! When dealing with Moore,
Grice is not necessarily concerned with scepticism. “Time is unreal,” for
example, is hardly a sceptic utterance, yet Grice lists as one of philosopher's
paradoxes. So, there are various keywords to consider here. Grice would start
with “common sense.” In his “Preface” and “Retrospective Epilogue” to Studies
in the Way of Words, that’s how he organizes the themes and strands. “Common
Sense” is one keyword there. Scepticism is another. In his two essays opening
Part II, “Explorations in semantics and metaphysics” in Way of Words, it seems
it’s MALCOLM who interests Grice most. While Grice would provide exegeses of
Moore’s dicta, and indeed, Moore’s response to Malcolm, he seems to be more
concerned with applications of his own views. Notably in “Philosopher’s Paradoxes.”
The ‘fatal’ objection Grice finds for the paradox-propounder (not necessarily a
sceptic, although a sceptic may be one of the paradox propounders) rests on
Grice's analysis of meaning. Grice elaborates on circumstances that he’ll later
take up in the “Retrospective Epilogue” (“I find myself not understanding what
I mean” – dubiously acceptable). If meaning, Grice is saying, is about an
utterer intending to get his addressee to believe something, the utterer must
think there is a good chance that the addressee will recognise what he is
supposed to believe, by being aware of the utterer’s practice or by a
supplementary explanation. In which case, the utterer CANNOT be meaning what
Malcolm claims he might mean, because no utterer would intend his addressee to
believe what is ‘conceptually impossible,’ or incoherent, or blatantly false
(“Charles I’s decapitation willed Charles I’s death.”). Grice edits the
“Philosopher’s Paradoxes” essay. It’s only the FINAL objection which is
reprinted in Studies, but he provides a good summary of the previous sections.
Grice will use Moore’s example on two later occasions, at least. In “Causal
Theory,” he lists, as a THIRD philosophical mistake, the opinion by Malcolm
that Moore did not know how to use ‘know.’ Grice brings up the same example
again in “Prolegomena.” The use of Moore may well be a misuse. While at
lecturing at that eccentrically-constructed hall at Madison, Wisconsin, -- with
indirect lighting simulating actual sun rays, the hall, not the state -- Moore
infamously said, “I know THERE is a window behind that curtain,” when there
wasn’t! In 1987, Grice uses “M” to abbreviate Moore’s fairy godmother – along
with G (Grice’s), A (Austin’s), R (Ryle’s) and Q (Quine’s)! One simple way to
approach Grice's quandary with Malcolm's quandary with Moore is to focus on
"know." How can Malcolm claim that Moore is guilty of misusing
"know"? The most extensive exploration is in Grice's third William
James lecture. "The examinee knows that the battle of Waterloo was fought
in 1815." Nothing odd about that, nor about Moore's use, "I know
these are my hands." Grice is perhaps the only one of the Oxonian
philosophers of Austin's play group who took 'common sense' so seriously! For
him, common sense = ordinary language, whereas for the typical Austinian,
"ordinary language" = the language of the ordinary man.
1948.
Peirceian reflections, Grice’s rhapsody on a theme by Peirce, intending,
intender, agency, meaning, repr. in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II,
Explorations in semantics and metaphysics, as Essay 14, The Oxford
Philosophical Society, The Philosophical Review, vol. 66, pp.
377-88, C. S. Peirce's theory of signs, cf. meaning revisited, philosophical
psychology, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (The Essays of H. P. Grice),
Carton 1-Folder 16 and Carton 4-Folder 5, and Series V (Topical), Carton
8-Folder 29, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. Keyword: sign, meaning, intention, Peirce, Stevenson,
Welby, Ewing, Ogden, Richards. The Peirce in Grice’s soul. "Meaning"
provides an excellent springboard to Grice to centre his analysis on
'psychological' or 'soul-y' verbs as involving the agent and the first person:
smoke only figuratively 'means' fire, and the expression 'smoke' only figuratively
"MEANS" fire: it's this or that utterer (say, Grice) who means, say,
by uttering "Where there's smoke there's fire," or
"ubi Fumus, Ibi Ignis," that where there's smoke there's
fire. "A meantNN something by x" is (roughly) equivalent to
"A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by
means of the recognition of this intention"; and we may add that to ask
what A meant is to ask for a specification of the intended effect (though, of
course, it may not always be possible to get a straight answer involving a
"that" clause, for example, "a belief that . . .")."
As he notes, he provides a more specific example involving the 'that'-clause at
a later stage, when he writes: "By uttering x the utterer U means THAT *ψ p
iff (Ǝ .φ) (Ǝ. f) (Ǝ .c): I. U utters x intending x to be such
that anyone who has φ will think that (i) x has f (ii) f is
correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p (iii) (Ǝ .φ'):
U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ' will think, via
thinking (i) and (ii), that U ψ-s that p (iv) in view of (3),
U ψ-s that p; and II (operative only for certain
substituends for '*ψ'). U utters x intending that,
should there actually be anyone who has φ, he will, via thinking (iv),
himself ψ that p; and III. It is not the case that, for
some inference-element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who
has φ will both (i') rely on E in coming to ψ (or
think that U ψ-s) that p and (ii') think that (Ǝ .φ'): U intends
x to be such that anyone who has φ' will come to ψ (or
think that U ψ-s) that p without relying on E." Besides St. John
The Baptist, and Salome, Grice cites few names in "Meaning." But he
makes a point about C. L. Stevenson! For Stevenson, smoke 'means' fire.
“Meaning" develops out of an interest by Grice on the philosophy of C. S.
Peirce. In his essays on Peirce, Grice quotes from many other authors,
including, besides Peirce himself (!), C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, and A. C.
Ewing, or "A. C. 'Virtue is not a fire-shovel' Ewing," as Grice
called him, and this or that cricketer! Grice had no intention to submit
"Meaning" to publication! Bennett, however, guessed that Grice had
decided to publish it in 1957, just a year after his "Defence of a
dogma." Bennett's argument is that "Defence of a dogma"
pre-supposes some notion of 'meaning.’ However, a different story may be told,
not necessarily contradicting Bennett's! It is Strawson who submits the essay
by Grice to "The Philosophical Review." Strawson had attended Grice's
talk on Meaning for The Oxford Philosophical Society, and liked it! Since
"In defence of a dogma" WAS co-written with Strawson, the intention
Bennett ascribes to Grice may well have been Strawson's! Oddly, Strawson later
provides a famous alleged counter-example to Grice on meaning in
"Intention and convention in speech acts," which has Grice dedicating
a full William James lecture (No. 5) to it! An interesting fact, that confused
a few, is that H. L. A. Hart quotes from Grice's "Meaning” in his critical
review of Holloway for The Philosophical Quarterly. Hart quotes Grice
pre-dating the publication of "Meaning.” Hart's point is that Holloway
should have gone to Oxford! In "Meaning," Grice may be seen as a
practitioner of 'ordinary-language' philosophy: witness his explorations of the
factivity or lack thereof of various uses of "to mean." The second
part of the essay, for which he became philosophically especially popular,
takes up an intention-based approach to semantic notions. The only authority
Grice cites, in typical Oxonian fashion, is Stevenson, who, from The New World
(and via Yale, too!) had been defending an emotivist theory of ethics, and
making a few remarks on how "to mean" is used, with scare quotes, in
something like a 'causal' account ("Smoke 'means' fire."). After its
publication Grice's account received "almost as many alleged
counterexamples as rule-utilitarianism" (B. J. Harrison), but mostly
outside Oxford, and in The New World. New-World philosophers seem to have seen
Grice's attempt as reductionist and as oversimplifying. At Oxford, the sort of
counterexample Grice received, before Strawson, was of the Urmson-type:
refined, and subtle ("I think your account leaves bribery behind!").
On the other hand, in the New World -- in what Grice calls the "Latter-Day
School of Nominalism," Quine is having troubles with empiricism.
“Meaning" was reprinted in various collections, notably in P. F.
Strawson's Philosophical Logic (and it should be remembered that it was
Strawson who had the thing typed and submitted for publication!). Why
"Meaning" should be reprinted in a collection on "Philosophical
Logic" only Strawson knows! But Grice does say that his account may help
clarify the meaning of '... entails...'! It may be Strawson's implicature that
Parkinson should have reprinted (and not merely credited) Grice's Meaning in
HIS series for Oxford on "The theory of meaning"! The preferred
quotation for Griceians is of course Grice 1948, seeing that Grice recalled the
exact year when he gave the talk for the Philosophical Society at Oxford! It is
however, the publication in The Philosophical Review, rather than the quieter
evening at the Oxford Philosophical Society, that occasioned a tirade of
alleged counter-examples by New-World philosophers. Granted, one or two
Oxonians -- Urmson and Strawson -- fell in! Urmson criticises the sufficiency
of Grice's account, by introducing an alleged counter-example involving
bribery. Grice will consider a way out of Urmson's alleged counter-example in
his fifth Wiliam James Lecture, rightly crediting and thanking Urmson for this!
Strawson's alleged counter-example was perhaps slightly more serious, if
regressive. It also involves the sufficiency of Grice's analysis. Strawson's
"rat-infested house" alleged counter-example started a chain which
required Grice to avoid, ultimately, any 'sneaky' intention by way of a
recursive clause to the effect that, for utterer U to have MEANT that p, all
meaning-constitutive intentions should be 'above board.' But why this obsession
by Grice with 'mean'? He is being funny. Spots surely don't mean -- They don't
have a mind! Yet Grice opens with a SPECIFIC sample: THOSE spots mean, to the
doctor, that you, dear, have measles. “Mean"? Yes, dear, 'mean,' doctor's
orders. Those spots 'mean' measles. But how does the doctor KNOW? Can't he be
in the wrong? Not really, "mean" is factive, dear! Or so Peirce
thought! Grice is amazed that Peirce thought that some meaning is factive. “A
bullet went through this cloth," is one of Peirce's examples.
“Surely," Grice notes, "this is an unhappy example. The hole in the
cloth may well have caused by something else, or 'fabricated.'" Yet, Grice
was having Oxonian students aware that Peirce was krypto-technical! Grice chose
for one of his pre-"Meaning" seminars (i.e. 1947) on Peirce's theory
of signs. Peirce, rather than the Vienna circle, becomes, in vein with Grice's
dissenting irreverent rationalism, important as a source for Grice's attempt to
'English' Peirce. Grice's implicature seems to be that Peirce, rather than
Ayer, cared for the subtleties of 'meaning' and 'sign', never mind a
verificationist theory about them! Peirce ultra-Latinate-cum-Greek taxonomies
have Grice very nervous, though. He knew that his students were proficient in
the classics, but still! Grice thus proposes to reduce all of Peirceian
divisions and sub-divisions ("one sub-division too many") to 'mean.'
In the proceedings, he quotes from Ogden, Richards, and Ewing. In particular,
Grice was fascinated by Peirce's correspondence with Lady Viola Welby, as
reprinted by Ogden/Richards in, well, their study on the 'meaning' of meaning!
Grice thought "the science of symbolism" pretentious, but then he
almost thought Lady Viola Welby "slightly pretentious, too" --
"if you've seen her" -- "Beautiful lady!" It is via Peirce
that Grice explores examples such as those spots 'meaning' measles. Peirce's
obsession is with weathercocks (almost as Ockham was). Old-World Grice's use of
New-World Peirce is illustrative, thus, of the Oxonian linguistic turn focused
on 'ordinary language.' While Peirce's background was not philosophical, Grice
thought it comical enough! He would say that Peirce is an 'amateur,' but then
he said the same thing about Mill, whom Grice had to study by heart to get his
B. A. Lit. Hum.! Plus, as Watson commented, "What's wrong with 'amateur'?
Give me an amateur philosopher ANY day, if I have to choose from 'professional'
Hegel!" In finding Peirce krypo-technical, Grice is ensuing that his
tutees, and indeed any Oxonian philosophy student (he was university lecturer)
be aware that 'to mean' should be more of a priority than this or that jargon
by this or that (New World?) philosopher!? Partly! Grice wanted his students to
think on their own, and draw their own conclusions! Grice cites A. C. Ewing,
Ogden/Richards, and many others. A. C. Ewing, while Oxford-educated, had ended
up at Cambridge (Scruton almost had him as his tutor!) and written some points
on "Meaninglessness"! “Those spots mean measles." Grice finds
Peirce 'krypto-technical' and proposes to "English" him into an
'ordinary-language' philosopher. Surely it is not 'important' whether we
consider a measles spot a 'sign,' a 'symbol,' or an 'icon.' “I may well find a
doctor in London who thinks those spots 'symbolic'!" If Grice feels like
Englishing Peirce, he does not altogether fail! 1957. Meaning, reprints,
of 'Meaning' and other essays, a collection of reprints and offprints of
Grice's essays. Meaning becomes a central topic of at least two strands in
“Retrospective epilogue.” The first strand concerns the idea of the centrality
of the utterer. What Grice there calls “meaning BY” (versus meaning TO), i.e.
as he also puts it, ‘active or agent’s meaning.’ Surely he is right in
defending an agent-based account to ‘meaning.’ Peirce need not, but Grice must,
because he is working with an English root, ‘mean,’ that is only figurative
applicable to non-agentive items (“Smoke ‘means’ rain”). On top, Grice wants to
conclude that only RATIONAL creatures (like persons) can meanNN properly.
Non-human animals may have a correlate. This is a truly important point for
Grice since he surely is seen as promoting a NON-convention-based approach to
‘meaning,’ and also defending from the charge of circularity in the
non-semantic account of propositional attitudes. His final picture is a
rationalist one. Pirot 1 wants to communicate about a danger to Pirot 2. This
presupposes there IS a danger (item of reality). Then Pirot 1 *believes* there
is a danger, and communicates to Pirot 2 that there is a danger. This simple
view of conversation as rational co-operation underlies Grice’s account of
meaning too, now seen as an offshoot of philosophical psychology, and indeed
biology, as he puts it. Meaning as yet another survival mechanism. While Grice
would NEVER use cognates like ‘significance’ in his Oxford Philosophical
Society talk, he eventually starts to use such Latinate cognates at a later
stage of his development. In "Meaning," Grice does not explain his
goal. By sticking with a root that the Oxford curriculum did not necessarily
recognised as 'philosophical' (amateur Peirce did!), Grice is implicating that
he is starting an 'ordinary-language' botanising on his own repertoire! Grice
was amused by A. C. Ewing's reliance on very Oxonian examples CONTRA Freddie
Ayer: "Surely "Virtue ain't a fire-shovel" is perfectly meaningful,
and if fact true, if, I'll admit, somewhat misleading and practically
purposeless at Cambridge." Again, Grice's dismissal of "natural"
meaning is due to the fact that "natural meaning" prohibits its use
in the first person and followed by a 'that'-clause. "I mean-N that
p" sounds absurd, no communication-function seems in the offing. Grice found, with Suppes, PRIMACY in utterer's meaning. In 1987, he goes back to the topic:
1949. Ryle publishes "Conccept of Mind" and Grice writes "Disposition and intention," citing Ryle. The essay has a verificationist ring to it. Recall Ayer and the verificationists trying to hold water with concepts like 'fragile' and the problem of counterfactual conditionals vis-a-vis observational and theoretical concepts. Grice's essay has two parts: one on 'disposition' as such, and the second, the application to a type of psychological disposition, which would be 'phenomenalist' in a way, or verificationist, in that it derives from introspection of, shall we say, empirical phenomena. Grice is going to analyse, "I want a sandwich." One person wrote in his manuscript, "There is something with the way Grice goes to work." ... Still. Grice says that "I want a sandwich" is problematic, for analysis, in that "it seems to refer to experience that is essentially private and UNVERIFIABLE." "The dispositional analysis solves this: A wants a sandwich if he'd open the fridge and get one: disposition to act." This Grice opposes to the 'special episode' account. An utterance like 'I want a sandwich" DESCRIBES this or that private experience, this or that private sensation. This or that sensation may take the form ofa highly specific psychological entity, like what Grice calls a 'sandwich-wanting-feeling." And he is dismissive of Ryle's behaviourism, which would describe the utterance in terms purely of this or that observable response." The problem is
with
the first-person. Surely I don't need to wait to observe myself heading
for the fridge before I am in a position to know that I
am hungry. Grice poses a problem for the protocol-reporter. You
see or observe Smith wanting a sandwich. You ask for evidence. But when it
is _you_ who want it, Grice melodramatically puts it, "I am NOT
in the audience, not even in the front row of the stalls; I am on the
stage." Genial you'll agree. Grice goes on to offer an analysis
of 'intend' -- his basic attitude -- which he had used to analyse Peirce's
"mean" and which relies on dispositional
evidence
without divorcing itself completely from the privileged status of
introspective knowledge. In "Intention and uncertainty," Grice will
weaken his position on 'intending' (from neo-Stoutian, based on 'certainty,' or
'assurance,' to neo-Prichardian, based on predicting). And while in
"Intention and uncertainty," he allows that 'willing that...' may
receive a 'physicalist' treatment, qua state, he'll later turn a
'functionalist' in his "Method in philosophical psychology").
1953.
A pint of philosophy, Grice on Gordon, a pint of philosophy, by Alfred Brook
Gordon, includes notes by Grice, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V
(Topical), Carton 8, Folder 27, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Gordon. A
pint of philosophy with Grice! Figurative! "I always loved Alfred Brook
Gordon!" -- H. P. Grice.
1954.
Identity, category, predicable, categories: Aristotle and beyond, categories,
with J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson, Categoriae, Aristotle's Categoriae, 1955,
1956, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice, IA
-- Code), Carton 1-Folders 5-6, Series II (Esssays), Carton 4-Folders 6-7,
Series III (The Doctrines), Carton 5-Folder 22, and Series
V (Topical), Carton 6-Folders 15 and 23, Carton 7-Folder 10, and
Carton 9-Folder 13, BANC MSS 90/a35c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. Keywords: Grice, Code, izzing,
hazzing. category, Aristotle, Strawson, Austin, category shift,
Categoriae, identity, relative identity, the Grice-Myro theory of identity,
metaphysics, Myro, Code. Grice’s category shift. Grice would give joint
seminars at Oxford with J. L. Austin on the first two books of Aristotle's
Organon: "Categories" and "De Interpretatione." Grice found
Aristotle's use of a 'category,' κατηγορία, a
bit of a geniality. Aristotle is using legalese (from 'kata,' against,
on, and 'agoreuô' [ἀγορεύω], speak in public), and uses it to
designate both the prosecution in a trial and the attribution in a
logical proposition — that is, the questions that must be asked with regard to
a subject, and the answers that can be given. As a representative of the
'linguistic turn' in philosophy, Grice is attracted to the idea that a category
can thus be understood variously, as applying to the realm of reality
(ontology), but also to the philosophy of language (category of expression) and
to philosophical psychology (category of representation). Grice kept his
explorations on categories under two very separate, shall we say, categories:
his explorations with J. L. Austin (very serious), and those with P. F.
Strawson (more congenial). Where is Smith's altruism? Nowhere to be seen.
Should we say it is idle (otiose) to speak of altruism? No, it is just an
ATTRIBUTE, which, via category shift, can be made the subject of your sentence,
Strawson. It's not spatio-temporal, though, right? Not really. -- I don't
particularly like your 'trouser words.' The essay is easy to date since Grice
notes that Strawson reproduced some of the details in his
"Individuals," dated 1959. Grice thought Aristotle was the best! Or
at any rate almost as good as Kantotle! Aristotle saw Categoriae, along with De
Interpretatione as part of his 'Organon.' However, philosophers of
language tend to explore these topics without a consideration of the later parts
of the Organon dealing with the syllogism, the tropes, and the topics --
"the boring bits!" The reason Grice is attracted to the Aristotelian
category (as Austin and Strawson equally were) is that 'category' allows for a
'linguistic-turn' reading. Plus, it's a nice, pretentious (in the Oxonian way)
piece of philosophical jargon! (Aristotle couldn't find 'category' in the
'koine,' so he had to coin it!). While meant by Aristotle in a primarily
ontological way, Oxonian philosophers hasten to add that a 'category of
expression,' as Grice puts it, is just as valid a topic for philosophical
exploration. His tutee Strawson will actually publish a book on subject and
predicate in grammar! ("Trivial, Strawson!"). Grice will later add an
intermediary category, which is the subject of his philosophical psychology. As
such, a category can be construed ontologically, or representationally: the
latter involving philosophical psychological concepts, and expressions
themselves. For Aristotle, as Grice and Austin, and Grice and Strawson, were
well aware as they educated some of the poor at Oxford ("Only the poor
learn at Oxford" -- Arnold), there are (at least -- at most?) ten
categories. Grice doesn't (really) care about the number. But the first are
important. Actually the VERY first: THERE's 'substantia prima,' such as Grice.
And then there's 'substantia secunda,' such as Grice's rationality. The
'essentia.' Then there are various types of 'attributes.' But, as Grice sharply
notes, even 'substantia secunda' may be regarded as an 'attribute.' Grice's
favourite game with Strawson was indeed "Category Shift," or
"Subject-ification," as Strawson preferred. Essence may be introduced
as a sub-type of an attribute. We would have 'substantia prima' AND
'attribute,' which in turn gets divided into 'essential' (the izzing) and
'non-essential' (the hazzing). While Austin was not so fun to play with,
Strawson is. "Banbury is a very altruist person." Where is his
altruism? Nowhere to be seen, really. Yet we may sensically speak of Banbury's
altruism. It's just a matter of a 'category shift'! (Grice scores). Grice was
slightly disappointed, but he perfectly understood, that Strawson, who had
footnoted Grice as 'the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about logic' in
"Introduction to Logical Theory," fails to acknowledge that MOST of
the research in Strawson's "Individuals: an essay in descriptive (not
revisionary) metaphysics" derives from the conclusions reached at his
joint philosophical investigations with Grice. Grice will later elaborate on
this with A. D. Code -- who was keen on Grice's other game, "The hazz and
the hazz not, the izz." But then "the tutor from whom I never ceased
to learn about metaphysics" sounds slightlier clumsier, as far as the
implicature goes! Categories, 1973, The Grice-Myro theory of identity, Relative
identity, Grice on "=," The Grice-Myro theory of identity, identity,
notes, with G. Myro, metaphysics, philosophy, 1974, 1977, 1980, with A. D.
Code, Grice izz Grice – or izz he? The idea that "=" is unqualified
requires qualification. Whitehead and Russell ignored this. Grice and Myro
didn't! Grice wants to allow for “It is the case that a = b /t1” and “ It is
not the case that a = b /t2.” The idea is intuitive, but philosophers of a
Leibnizian bent are too accustomed to deal with "=" as an absolute.
Grice applies this to 'human' vs. 'person.' A human may be identical to a
person, but cease to be so. Grice makes Peano feel deeply Griceian, as Grice
lists his “=” postulates, here for consideration. Note the use of alethic
modalities for necessity and possibility, starting with (11). 1. ⊢ (α izz α) 2. ⊢ (α
izz β ∧ β izz γ) ⊃ α
izz γ 3. ⊢ α hazz β ⊃ ~(α
izz β) 4. ⊢ α hazz β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(α hazz x ∧ x
izz β) 5. ⊢ (∀β)(β is a universal ⊃ β
is a form) 6. ⊢ (α hazz β ∧ α
is a particular) ⊃ (∃γ)(γ≠α ∧ α izz β) 7. ⊢ α is predicable of β ⊃⊂ ((β izz α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazz x ∧ x
izz α) 8. ⊢ α is essentially predicable of β ⊃⊂ β izz α 9. ⊢ α
is accidentally predicable of β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(β hazz x ∧ x
izz α) 10. ⊢ α = β ⊃⊂ α
izz β ∧ β izz α 11. ⊢ α
is an individual ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(β izz α ⊃ α izz β) 12. ⊢ α
is a particular ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(α is predicable of β ⊃ (α izz β ∧ β
izz α)) 13. ⊢ α is a universal ⊃⊂ ◊(∃β)(α is predicable of α ∧ ~(α
izz β ∧ β izz α) 14. ⊢ α
is some-thing ⊃ α is an individual 15. ⊢ α is a form ⊃ (α
is some-thing ∧ α is a universal) 16. ⊢ α is predicable of β ⊃⊂ (β izz α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazz x ∧ x
izz α) 17. ⊢ α is essentially predicable of α 18. ⊢ α is accidentally predicable of β ⊃ α ≠ β 19. ⊢ ~(α
is accidentally predicable of β) ⊃ α
≠ β 20. ⊢ α is a particular ⊃ α
is an individual 21. ⊢ α is a particular ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x
izz α) 22. ⊢~ (∃x)(x is a particular ∧ x
is a form) 23. ⊢ α is a form ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x
izz α) 24. ⊢ x is a particular ⊃ ~(∃β)(α izz β) 25. ⊢ α
is a form ⊃ ((α is predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ β
hazz α) 26. ⊢ α is a form ∧ β
is a particular ⊃ (α is predicable of β ⊃⊂ β hazz A) 27. ⊢ (α
is a particular ∧ β is a universal ∧ β
is predicable of α) ⊃ (∃γ)(α ≠ γ ∧ γ
is essentially predicable of α) 28. ⊢ (∃x) (∃y)(x is a particular ∧ y
is a universal ∧ y is predicable of x ⊃ ~(∀x)(x is a universal ∧ x is some-thing) 29. ⊢ (∀β)(β is a universal ⊃ β
is some-thing) 30. ⊢ α is a particular) ⊃ ~∃β.(α ≠ β ∧ β
is essentially predicable of α) 31. ⊢ (α
is predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ α
is accidentally predicable of β. The use of alethic modalities, necessity and
possibility, starting with (11) above, make this a good place to consider one
philosophical mistake Grice mentions in "Causal Theory": "What
is actual is not also possible." He is criticising a 'contemporary' (if
'dated') form of 'ordinary-language' philosophy, where the philosopher detects
a nuance, and embarks risking colliding with the facts, rushing ahead to
exploit it before he can clarify it! Grice liked to see his explorations on "="
as belonging to metaphysics, as the Series on his "Doctrines" at the
Grice Collecction testifies. While Grice presupposes the use of "="
in his treatment of 'the' king of France, he also explores a relativisation of
"=." His motivation was an essay by Wiggins, almost Aristotelian in
spirit, against Strawson's criterion of space-time continuancy for the
identification of the 'substantia prima.' Grice wants to apply '=' to cases
were the time continuancy is made explicit. This yields that "a = b"
in scenario S, but that it may not be the case that "a = b" in a
second scenario S'. Myro had an occasion to expand on Grice's views in his
contribution on the topic for Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions,
Categories, Ends, or P. G. R. I. C. E. for short. Myro mentions his System Ghp,
a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of Grice's System Q, "in
gratitude to” to Grice. Grice explored also the logic of izzing and hazzing
with A. D. Code. Grice and Myro developed a Geach-type of 'qualified identity.'
The formal aspects were developed by Myro, and also by Code. Grice discussed
Wiggins's "Sameness and substance," rather than Geach (cf. Wiggins
and Strawson on Grice for the British Academy). At Oxford, Grice was more or
less given free rein to teach what he wanted. He found the New World slightly
disconcerting at first. At Oxford, he expected his tutees to be willing to
'read' the classics in the vernacular Greek. His approach to teaching was
diagogic, as Socrates's! Even in his details of 'izzing' and 'hazzing.'
"Greek enough to me!," as a student recalled! 1980, correspondence
with A. D. Code, Grice sees in Code an excellent Aristotelian. They
collaborated on an exploration of Aristotle's underlying logic of essential and
non-essential predication, for which they would freely use such verbal forms as
'izzing' and 'hazzing.' 1980, izzing and hazzing, The Grice Papers, A. D. Code
on the significance of the middle book in Aristotle's Metaphysics, keywords:
Aristotle, metaphysics, the middle book. Very middle. Grice never knew
what was middle for Aristotle, but admired Code too much to air this! The
organisation of Aristotle's metaphysics was a topic of much concern for
Grice. With Code, Grice coined 'izzing' and 'hazzing' to refer to
essential and non-essential attribution. Izzing and hazzing, Aristotle on the
multiplicity of being, Aristotle on multiplicity, The Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly, 1988, posthumously ed. by B. F. Loar, keywords:
Aristotle, multiplicity, izzing, hazzing, being, good, Code. Grice offers a
thorough discussion of Owen’s treatment of Aristotle as leading us to the
'snares' of ontology. Grice distinguishes between 'izzing' and 'hazzing,' which
he thinks help in clarifying, 'more axiomatico,' what Aristotle is getting at
with his remarks on 'essential' versus 'non-essential' predication. Surely, for
Grice, 'being,' nor indeed 'good,' should not be multiplied beyond
necessity, but izzing and hazzing *are* already multiplied. The Grice
Papers contains drafts of the essay eventually submitted for publication
by Loar “in memoriam” Grice.' Note that the Grice Papers contains a typically
Griceian 'un-publication,' entitled "Aristotle *and* multiplicity,"
simpliciter. Rather than "Aristotle *on*," as the title for The
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly piece goes. Note also that, since it's
'multiplicity' simpliciter, it refers to Aristotle on two key ideas: being and
the good. As Code notes in his contribution to P. G. R. I. C. E., Grice
first presents his thoughts on izzing and hazzing publicly at Vancouver. R.
B. Jones has developed the axiomatic treatment favoured by Grice. For
Grice there is 'multiplicity' in both 'being' and 'good' (ton agathon), both
accountable in terms of conversational implicata, of course. If in
"Prolegomena," Grice was interested in criticising himself, in essays
of historical nature like these, Grice is seeing Aristotle's "Athenian
dialectic" as a foreshadow of the "Oxonian dialectic," and
treating him as an equal. Grice is yielding his razor: "Senses are not to
be multiplied beyond necessity." But then Aristotle is
talking about the 'multiplicity' of '... is ...' and '... is
good.' Surely, there are ways to turn Aristotle into the monoguist
he has to be! There is a further item in the Grice collection that
combines Aristotle on being with Aristotle on good, which is relevant in
connection with this. Aristotle on being and good ("ἀγαθός"),
1970, keywords: Aristotle, being, good (agathon), "ἀγαθός." As
from this folder, the essays are ordered alphabetically, starting with
"Aristotle,” Grice will explore Aristotle on 'being' or "is" and
"good" ("ἀγαθός") in
explorations with A. D. Code. Grice comes up with 'izzing' and 'hazzing'
as the two counterparts to Aristotle's views on, respectively, essential and
non-essential predication. Grice's views on Aristotle on 'the good'
(strictly, there is no need to restrict Arisstotle's use to the neuter form,
since he employs "ἀγαθός") connect
with Grice's Aristotelian idea of 'eudaimonia,' that he explores elsewhere.
Strictly: Aristotle on being and the good. If that had been Grice's
case, he would have used the definite article. Otherwise, 'good' may well
translate as masculine, "ἀγαθός" --
the agathetic implicatum. Grice at his jocular best. If he is going
to be a Kantian, he will. He uses Kantian jargon to present his theory of
conversation. This he does only at Harvard. The implicature being that talking
of vaguer assumptions of helpfulness would not sound too convincing. So he has
the maxim, the super-maxim, and the sub-maxim. A principle and a maxim is
Kantian enough. But when he actually ECHOES Kant, is when he introduces what he
later calls the CONVERSATIONAL CATEGORIES – the keyword here is ‘conversational
category,' as 'categoria' is used by Aristotle and Kant -- or Kantotle. Grice
surely knew that, say, his “Category of Conversational Modality” had NOTHING to
do with the Kantian Category of Modality. Still, he stuck with the idea of FOUR
categories (versus Aristotle's 'ten,' 'eight' or 'seven,' as the text you
consult may tell you): category of conversational quantity (which at Oxford he
had formulated in much vaguer terms like ‘strength’ and informativeness and
entailment), the category of conversational quality (keyword: principle of
conversational TRUST), and the category of conversational relation, where again
Kant’s ‘relation’ has NOTHING to do with the maxim Grice associates with this
category. In any case, his Kantian joke may be helpful when considering the
centrality of the concept ‘category’ SIMPLICITER that Grice had to fight with
with his pupils at Oxford – he was lucky to have Austin and Strawson as
co-lecturers! Grice was irritated by Liddell and Scott defining 'kategoria' as
"category," -- "I guess I KNEW that." He agreed with their
second shot, "predicable." Ultimately, Grice's concern with
'category' is his concern with 'person,' or 'prote ousia,' as used by
Aristotle, and as giving a rationale to Grice's agency-based approach to the
philosophical enterprise. Aristotle used kategorein in the sense of
to predicate, assert something of something, and kategoria. The prote
ousia is exemplified by 'o tis anthropos.' It is obvious that Grice
wants to approach Aristotle's semantics and Aristotle's metaphysics "at
one fell swoop." Grice reads Aristotle's Metaphysics, and finds it
'understandable.' Consider the adjective 'French' (which
Aristotle does NOT consider) -- as it occurs in phrases such as
Michel Foucault is a French citizen. H. P. Grice is not a French citizen
Michel Foucault once wrote a nice French poem. J. O. Urmson once wrote a
nice French essay on pragmatics. Michel Foucault was a French
professor. Michel Foucault is a French professor. Michel Foucault
is a French professor of philosophy. The following features are
perhaps significant. The appearance of the adjective 'French' (or
Byzantine, as the case might be -- cfr. "I'm feeling French tonight")
in these phrases is what Grice calls 'adjunctive' rather than 'conjunctive,' or
'attributive.' A French poem is not necessarily something which
combines the separate features of being a poem and being French, as a tall
philosopher would simply combine the features of being tall and of being a
philosopher. 'French' in 'French poem,' occurs
_adverbially_. 'French citizen' _standardly_ means "citizen of
France." 'French poem' _standardly_ means "poem in
French". But it is a _mistake_ to suppose that this fact _implies_
that there is this or that _meaning_ (or, worse, this or that Fregeian _sense_)
of the expression 'French'. In any case, only METAPHORICALLY can
we say that 'French' means or has sense. An utterer MEANS. An utterer MAKES
SENSE. Cf. R. Paul's doubts about capitalizing 'major.'
'French' means, and figuratively at that, only one thing, viz. 'of or
pertaining to France.' And 'English' only means 'of or
pertaining to England.' 'French' may be what Grice (unfollowing his
remarks on "The general theory of context") call
'context-sensitive'. One might indeed say, if you like, that while
'French' means -- or 'means' only this or that, or that its only sense is this
or that, 'French' still means, again figuratively, a VARIETY of things.
'French' means-in-context "of or pertaining to France.
Symbolise that as Expression E 'means'-in-context that
p. Expression E 'means-in-context C2 that p2.
"Relative to Context C1 'French' means 'of France'; as in the phrase
'French citizen.' Relative to context C2, 'French' means 'in the
French language, as in the phrase, 'French poem'." -- whereas
'history' does not behave, like this. Whether the focal item
is a universal or a particular is, contra Aristotle, quite irrelevant to the
question of what this or that related adjective "means," or what its
sense is. The medical art is no more what an utterer means when he
utters the adjective 'medical', as is 'France' what an utterer means by the
adjective 'French'. While the attachment of this or that context
may suggest an interpretation in context of this or that expression as uttered
by the utterer U, it need not be the case that such a suggestion is
indefeasible. It might be e.g. that 'French poem' would have to mean,
"poem composed in French", unless there were counter indications,
that brings the utterer and the addressee to a different context C3.
In which case, perhaps what the utterer means by 'French poem' is 'poem
composed by a French competitor' in this or that competition.
For 'French professor' there would be two obvious things an utterer might
mean. "Disambiguation" will depend on the wider
expression-context or in the situtational context attaching to the this
or that circumstance of utterance.
1955. Please, agreebleness, leasure,
Aristotle on pleasure, Aristotle: pleasure, hedonism, The H. P. Grice Papers,
Series II (Essays), Carton 4, Folder 8, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: hedonism, pleasure,
Aristotle, agreeableness, happiness, system of ends, ends, end, desire,
satisfaction, delight. Griceian pleasures! ἡδονή,
Dor. ἁδονά (or
in Trag.chorus ἡδονά S.OT1339), ἡ,
(ἥδομαι). A. enjoyment,
pleasure, first in Simon.71, S.l.c., Hdt.1.24,
al.; prop. of sensual pleasures, αἱ τοῦ σώματος or περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡ., X.HG 4.8.22,6.1.4; αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡ. Pl.R.328d; σωματικαὶ ἡ. Arist.EN 1151a13; αἱ περὶ πότους καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡ. Pl.R.389e;
but also ἀκοῆς ἡ. Th.3.38; ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡ. Pl.R.582b;
of malicious pleasure, ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, ἐπὶ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἡ., Id.Phlb.50a, D.18.138; ἡδονῇ ἡσσᾶσθαι, ἡδοναῖς χαρίζεσθαι,
to give way to pleasure, Th. l.c., Pl.Lg.727c; κότερα ἀληθείη χρήσομαι ἢ ἡδονῆ;
shall I speak truly or so as to humour you? Hdt.7.101; εἰ ὑμῖν ἡδονὴ τοῦ ἡγεμονεύειν ib.160; ἡ. εἰσέρχεταί τιϝι εἰ .
. one feels pleasure at the thought that . ., Id.1.24; ἡδονὴν ἔχειν τινός to
be satisfied with. , S.OC 1604; ἡδονὴν ἔχει, φέρει, Pherecr.145.2, Alex.263.6; ἡδονὴ ἰδέσθαι (like θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι),
of a temple, Hdt.2.137:
with Preps. in Adv. sense, “δαίμοσιν πρὸς ἡδονήν” A.Pr.494; ὃ μέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡ. D.18.4; πρὸς ἡ. λέγειν to
speak so as to please another, S.El.921, Th.2.65;
“δημηγορεῖν” D.4.38;
“οὐ πρὸς ἡ. οἱ ἦν τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα” Hdt.3.126;
“πάντα πρὸς ἡ. ἀκούοντας” D.8.34;
later “πρὸς ἡδονῆς εἶναί τινι” Parth.8.8, Lib. Or.12.1;
“καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν κλύειν”
καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι ib.65; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἐστί τινι it
is a pleasure or delight to another, Hdt.4.139;
folld. by inf., E.IT494;
by acc. et inf., Hdt.7.15; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἔχειν τινάς to
take pleasure in them, Th.3.9; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες,
opp. οἱ λυπηροί, Id.1.99;
“μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς” Id.4.19;
“ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς” S.Ant.648,
etc.; ὑπὸ τῆς ἡ. Alex.24, 110.23:
as dat. modi, ἡδονᾷ with
pleasure, S. OT1339 (lyr.),
cf. Hdt.2.137 (f.l.). 2. concrete, a
pleasure, S.El. 873 (pl.),
Ar.Nu.1072 (pl.); ἡδοναὶ τραγημάτων sweetmeats, Sopat.
17. 3. Pl., desires after pleasure, pleasant lusts, X.Mem.1.2.23, Ep.Tit.3.3,
al. II. in Ion. Philosophers, taste, flavour, usu. joined
with χροιή,
Diog.Apoll.5, Anaxag.4 (pl.), cf. Arist.PA660b9, Thphr. HP4.4.7, LXX Nu.11.8, Eudem. ap. Ath.9.369f,
Mnesith. ap. eund.8.357f.
Note that Aristotle uses "somatike hedone." As a Lit. Hum.
Oxon., and especially as a tutee of Hardie at Corpus, Grice is almost too well
aware of the centrality of 'hedone' in Aristotle's system! "Pleasure"
is rendered "placitum" (as in "ad placitum") in scholastic
philosophy, but that's because scholastic philosophy is not as Hellenic as it
should be! Actually, Grice prefers 'agreeable.' One of Grice's requisites for
an ascription of 'eudaimonia' ('to have a fairy godmother') precisely has the
system of ends an agent chooses to realise to be an 'agreeable' one. One form,
or 'mode,' of agreeableness, as Grice notes, is, unless counteracted,
automatically attached to the attainment of an object of desire, such
attainment being *routinely* a source of satisfaction. The generation of such a
satisfaction thus provides an independent ground for preferring one system of
ends to another. However, some *other* 'mode' of agreeableness, such as being a
source of *delight*, for example, which are _not_ *routinely* associated with
the fulfilment of this or that desire, could discriminate, independently of
other features relevant to such a preference, between one system of ends and
another. Further, a system of ends the operation of which is *specially*
agreeable is stable not only vis-à-vis a rival system, but also against the
somewhat weakening effect of incontinence, or 'akrasia,' if you mustn’t! A disturbing
influence, as Aristotle knew from experience, is more surely met by a
*principle* _in consort with a supporting attraction_ than by the principle
alone! Grice's favourite 'hedonistic' implicatum was "Please!"
1955. Can
I have a pain in my tail?, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS
90/135c. Keywords: pain, tailbone pain. A discussion of a category
mistake. Cf. Grice: "I may be categorically mistaken but I'm not
categorically confused." It is only natural that if Grice was interested
on Aristotle on 'pleasure' he would be interested on Aristotle on
'pain.' λύπη, ἡ, A. pain
of body, opp. ἡδονή, Id.Phlb. 31c,
etc.; also, sad plight or condition, Hdt.7.152. 2. pain
of mind, grief, ib.16.“ά; δῆγμα δὲ λύπης οὐδὲν ἐφ᾽ ἧπαρ προσικνεῖται” A.Ag.791 (anap.); τί γὰρ καλὸν ζῆν βίοτον, ὃς λύπας φέρει; Id.Fr.177,
cf. S.OC 1217 (lyr.),
etc.; “ἐρωτικὴ λ.” Th.6.59;
“λύπας προσβάλλειν” Antipho
2. 2.2;
“λ. φέρειν τινί” And.2.8;
opp. χαρά, X.HG7.1.32.
1955. Metaphysics, with P. F. Strawson and D. F. Pears, in D. F. Pears, The nature of metaphysics, proceedings of the BBC Third programe lectures, Macmillan, London, Metaphysics, in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, London, Macmillan, Metaphysics, while the Macmillan came out in 1957, the broadcast was in 1955. The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7-Folders 26-27 and Carton 8-Folder 2, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: metaphysics, presupposition, Aristotle, Kant, Hume, Collingwood. “Some like Hegel, but Collingwood's *my* man!” -- Grice. Grice participated in two consecutive evenings of the series of programmes on metaphysics organised by D. F. Pears. Actually, charming Pears felt pretentious enough to label the meetings to be about 'the NATURE of metaphysics'! Grice ends up discussing, as he should, Collingwood on presupposition. Metaphysics remained a favourite topic for Grice's philosophical explorations, as it is evident from his 1988 essay on "Metaphysics, Philosophical Eschatology, and Plato's Republic," reprinted in his Studies in the Way of Words. Possibly Hardie is to blame, since he hardly tutored Grice on metaphysics! Grice's two BBC lectures are typically dated in tone. It was the ("good ole") days when philosophers thought they could educate the non-elite by dropping names like Collingwood and stuff! The Third Programme was extremely popular, especially among the "uneducated ones at London," as Pears almost put it, as it was a way for Londoners to get to know "what is going on" down at Oxford, the only place an uneducated (or educated, for that matter) Londoner at the time was interested in displaying some interest about! I mean, Johnson is right: if a man is tired of the nature of metaphysics, he is tired of life! Since the authorship is Grice/Strawson/Pears, "Metaphysics," in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, The BBC Third Programme, it is somewhat difficult to identify what paragraphs were actually read by Grice (and which ones by Pears and which ones by Strawson). But trust the sharp Griceian to detect the correct implicature! There are many ("too many") other items covered by these two lectures: Kant, Aristotle, in no particular order. *And* in The Grice Collection, for that matter, that cover the field of metaphysics. In the New World, as a sort of tutor in the 'graduate' programme, Grice was expected to cover the discipline at various seminars. "Only I dislike 'discipline'!" Perhaps his clearest exposition is in the opening section of his "Metaphysics, philosophical eschatology, and Plato's Republic," reprinted in his Studies in the Way of Words, where he states, bluntly: “All you need is -- metaphysics!" 1980, metaphysics, Miscellaneous, metaphysics notes, Grice would possible see metaphysics as a class – ‘category’ figuring large. He was concerned with the METHODOLOGICAL aspects of the metaphysical enterprise, since he was enough of a relativist to allow for one metaphysical scheme to apply to one area of discourse (one of Eddington’s tables) and another metaphysical scheme to apply to another (Eddington’s other table). In the third programme for the BBC Grice especially enjoyed criticising John Wisdom's innovative look at metaphysics as a bunch of 'self-evident falsehoods' ("We're all alone"). Grice focuses on Wisdom on the knowledge of other minds. He also discusses Collingwood's presuppositions, and Bradley on the reality-appearance distinction. Grice's reference to Wisdom was due to A. C. Ewing's treatment of Wisdom on metaphysics. Grice's main motivation here is defending metaphysics against Ayer. Ayer thought to win more Oxonian philosophers than he did at Oxford, but he was soon back in London. Post-war Oxford had become conservative and the would stand to the nonsense of Ayer's claiming that metaphysics is nonsense, especially, as Ayer's implicature also was, that philosophy is nonsense! Perhaps the beset summary of Griceian metaphysics is his "From Genesis to Revelations: a new discourse on metaphysics."
1956. Grice defends a topdogma of empiricism. In defence of a 'dogma,' in Studies in the Way of Words (London: Harvard University Press, 1989), with P. F. Strawson, the analytic-synthetic distinction, in defence of a dogma, from The Philosophical Review, vol. 66, pp. 141-58, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6-Folders 13-14, and 31, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: analytic-synthetic distinction. The locus classicus for the 'ordinary-language' philosophical response to Quine in "Two dogmas of empiricism." Grice and Strawson claim that '... is analytic" does have an 'ordinary-language' use, as attached two a type of behavioural conversational response. To an analytically false move (such as "My neighbour's three-year-old son is an adult") the addressee A is bound to utter, "I don't understand you! You are not being figurative, are you?." To a synthetically false move, on the other hand (such as "My neighbour's three-year-old understands Russell's Theory of Types"), the addressee A will jump with, "Can't believe it!" The topdogma of 'analyticity' is for Grice very important to defend. Philosophy depends on it! He knows that to many his claim to fame is his "In defence of a dogma," the topdogma of analyticity, no less. He eventually turns to a 'pragmatist' justification of the distinction. This pragmatist justification is still in accordance with what he sees as the use of 'analytic' in 'ordinary language'. His infamous examples: "My neighbour's three-year old understands Russell's Theory of Types." A: Hard to believe, but I will. "My neighbour's three-year old is an adult." Metaphorically? No. Then I don't understand you, and what you've just said is, in my scheme of things, analytically FALSE. Ultimately, there are 'conversational' criteria, based on this or that principle of conversational helfpulness. Grice is also circumstantially concerned with the 'synthetic a priori,' and he would ask his children's playmates: "Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed!" The distinction is ultimately Kantian, but it had brought to the fore by the 'linguistic turn,' Oxonian and other! In defence of a dogma, In defence of a dogma, 'Two dogmas of empiricism,' Keywords: the analytic-synthetic distinction. For Quine, there are two. Grice is mainly interested in the first one: that there is a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. Grice considers Empiricism as a monster on his way to the Rationalist City of Eternal Truth. Grice came back time and again to explore the analytic-synthetic distinction. But his philosophy remained constant. His sympathy is for the practicality of it, its rationale. He sees it as involving formal calculi, rather than his own theory of conversation as rational co-operation which does NOT presuppose the analytic-synthetic distinction, even if it explains it! Grice would press the issue here: if one wants to PROVE that such a theory of conversation as rational co-operation HAS TO BE seen as ‘philosophical,’ rather than some other way, some idea of ‘analyticity’ may be needed to justify the philosophical enterprise. Cfr. the SYNTHETIC A PRIORI, that fascinated Grice most than anything Kantian else! “Can a sweater be green and red all over? No stripes allowed.” With "In defence of a dogma," Grice and Strawson attack a New-World philosopher. Grice had previously collaborated with Strawson in an essay on 'Metaphysics' (actually a three-part piece, with D. F. Pears as the third author). The example Grice chooses to refute Quine's attack of the top-dogma is the Aristotelian idea of the peritrope, as Aristotle refutes Antiphasis in "Metaphysics" (vide Ackrill, Burnyeat and Dancy). Grice explores chapter Γ 8 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In Γ 8, Aristotle presents two self-refutation arguments against two theses, and calls the asserter "Antiphasis": (T1) Everything is true (T2) Everything is false (Metaph. Γ 8, 1012b13–18). Each thesis is exposed to the stock objection that it eliminates itself. An utterer who explicitly conveys that everything is true also makes the thesis opposite to his own true, so that his own is not true (for the opposite thesis denies that his is true), and any utterer U who explicitly conveys that everything is false also belies himself. Aristotle does not seem to be claiming that, if everything is true, it would also be true that it is *false* that everything is true and, that, therefore, “Everything is true” must be false: the final, crucial inference, from the premise (p→¬p) to the conclusion ¬p, is missing. But it is this extra inference that seems required to have a formal refutation of Antiphasis’s T1 or T2 by 'consequentia mirabilis.' The nature of the argument *as* a purely dialectical “silencer” of Antiphasis is confirmed by the case of T2, “Everything is false." An utterer who explicitly conveys that everything is false unwittingly concedes, by self-application, that what he is saying must be false too. Again, the further and different conclusion ‘Therefore; it is false that everything is false’ is missing. That proposal is thus self-defeating, self-contradictory (and comparable to Grice's addressee using 'adult' to apply to three-year old, without producing the 'creature'), oxymoronic, and suicidal. This seems all that Aristotle is interested in establishing through the self-refutation stock objection. This is not to suggest that Aristotle did not believe that ‘Everything is true’ or ‘Everything is false’ is false, or that he excludes that he can prove its falsehood. Grice notes that this is not what Aristotle seems to be purporting to establish in 1012b13–18. This holds for a περιτροπή (peritrope) argument, but not for a περιγραφή (perigraphe) argument ("συμβαίνει δὴ καὶ τὸ θρυλούμενον πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις, αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς ἀναιρεῖν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πάντα ἀληθῆ λέγων καὶ τὸν ἐναντίον αὑτοῦ λόγον ἀληθῆ ποιεῖ, ὥστε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἀληθῆ (ὁ γὰρ ἐναντίος οὔ φησιν αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ), ὁ δὲ πάντα ψευδῆ καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτόν.") It may be emphasized that Aristotle’s argument does not contain an explicit application of "consequentia mirabilis." Indeed, no extant self-refutation argument before Augustine, Grice is told by Mates, contains an explicit application of "consequentia mirabilis." This observation is a good and important one, but Grice has doubts about the consequences one may draw from it. One may take the absence of an explicit application of "consequentia mirabilis" to be a sign of the purely dialectical nature of the self-refutation argument. This is questionable. The formulation of a self-refutation argument (as in Grice's addressee, "Sorry, I misused 'adult.'") is often compressed and elliptical and involves this or that implicatum. One usually assumes that this or that piece in a dialectical context has been omitted and should be supplied (or worked out, as Grice prefers) by the addressee. But in this or that case, it is equally possible to supply some other, non-dialectical piece of reasoning. In Aristotle’s arguments from Γ 8, e.g., the addressee may supply an inference to the effect that the thesis which has been shown to be self-refuting is not true. For if Aristotle takes the argument to establish that the thesis has its own contradictory version as a consequence, it must be obvious to Aristotle that the thesis is not true (since every consequence of a true thesis is true, and two contradictory theses cannot be simultaneously true). On the further assumption (that Grice makes explicit) that the principle of bivalence is applicable, Aristotle may even infer that the thesis is false. It is perfectly plausible to attribute such an inference to Aristotle and to supply it in his argument from Γ 8. On this account, there is no reason to think that the argument is of an intrinsically dialectical nature and cannot be adequately represented as a non-dialectical proof of the non-truth, or even falsity, of the thesis in question. It is indeed difficult to see signs of a dialectical exchange between two parties (of the type of which Grice and Strawson are champions) in Γ 8, 1012b13–18. One piece of evidence is Aristotle’s reference to the person, the utterer, as Grice prefers who explicitly conveys or asserts (ὁ λέγων) that T1 or that T2. This reference by the Grecian philosopher to the Griceian utterer or asserter of the thesis that everything is true would be irrelevant if Aristotle's aim is to prove something about T1's or T2's propositional content, independently of the act by the utterer of uttering its expression and thereby explicitly conveying it. However, it is not clear that this reference is essential to Aristotle’s argument. One may even doubt whether the Grecian philosopher is being THAT Griceian, and actually referring to the asserter of T1 or T2. The *implicit* (or implicated) grammatical subject of Aristotle's "ὁ λέγων" (1012b15) might be λόγος, instead of the utterer qua asserter. "λόγος" is surely the implicit grammatical subject of "ὁ λέγων" shortly after ( 1012b21–22. 8). The passage may be taken to be concerned with λόγοι -- this or that statement, this or that thesis -- but not with its asserter. In the "Prior Analytics," Aristotle states that no thesis ("A three-year old is an adult") can necessarily imply its own contradictory ("A three-year old is not an adult") (2.4, 57b13–14). One may appeal to this statement in order to argue for Aristotle's claim that a self-refutation argument should NOT be analyzed as involving an implicit application of "consequentia mirabilis." Thus, one should deny that Aristotle’s self-refutation argument establishes a necessary implication from the self-refuting thesis to its contradictory. However, this does not explain what other kind of consequence relation Aristotle takes the self-refutation argument to establish between the self-refuting thesis and its contradictory (although "dialectical necessity" has been suggested). Aristotle’s argument suffices to establish that “Everything is false” is either false or (liar-) paradoxical. If a thesis is (liar-) paradoxical (and Grice loved, and overused the expression), the assumption of its falsity leads to contradiction as well as the assumption of its truth. But “Everything is false” is only (liar)-paradoxical in the unlikely (for Aristotle perhaps impossible) event that everything distinct from this thesis is false. So, given the additional premise that there is at least one true item distinct from the thesis “Everything is false,” Aristotle can safely infer that the thesis is false. As for Aristotle's "ὁ γὰρ λέγων τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀληθῆ ἀληθής,", or eliding the "γὰρ," "ὁ λέγων τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀληθῆ ἀληθής," (ho legon ton alethe logon alethe alethes) may be rendered as either:, 'The statement which states that the true statement is true is true,' or, more alla Grice, as '*He who says* (or explicitly conveys, or indicates) that the true thesis is true says something true.' It may be argued that it is quite baffling (and figurative or analogical or metaphoric) in this context, to take "ἀληθής" to be predicated of the Griceian utterer, a person ("true" standing for "truth teller", "trustworthy"), to take it to mean that HE SAYS something true, rather than his statement STATING something true, or his STATEMENT *being* true. But cf. Liddell/Scott: ἀληθ-ής [α^], Dor. ἀλα_θής , ές, (λήθω, of persons, truthful, honest (not in Hom., v. infr.), “ἀ. νόος” Pi.O.2.92; “κατήγορος” A.Th.439; “κριτής” Th.3.56; οἶνος ἀ. `in vino veritas', Pl.Smp.217e; “ὁ μέσος ἀ. τις” Arist.EN 1108a20. Admittedly, this or that non-Griceian passage in which it is "λόγος," and not the utterer, which is the implied grammatical subject of "(ὁ) λέγων" can be found in Metaph. Γ 7, 1012a24–25; Δ 6, 1016a33; Int. 14, 23a28–29; De motu an. 10, 703a4; Eth. Nic. 2.6, 1107a6–7. 9). So the topic is controversial. Indeed such a non-Griceian exegesis of the passage is given by Alexander of Aphrodisias (in Metaph. 340.26–29):9, when Alexander writes: "The statement [i.e. not the utterer] that says that everything is false [ὁ δὲ πάντα ψευδῆ εἶναι λέγων λόγος] negates itself [not himself], because if everything is false, this very statement, which [rather than, by which the utterer] says that everything is false, would be false [and how can an utterer be FALSE?], so that the statement which [rather than the utterer WHO] negates it, saying that not everything is false, would be true [and surely an utterer cannot be 'true']." Does Alexander misrepresent Aristotle’s argument by omitting every Griceian reference to the asserter or utterer qua rational personal agent, of the thesis? If the answer is negative, even if the occurrence of "ὁ λέγων" at 1012b15 refers to the asserter, or utterer, qua rational personal agent, this is merely an accidental feature of Aristotle’s argument that cannot be regarded as an indication of its dialectical nature. None of this is to deny that some self-refutation argument may be of an intrinsically dialectical nature; it is only to deny that every one is This is in line with Burnyeat’s view that a dialectical self-refutation, even if qualified, as Aristotle does, as "ancient," is a subspecies of self-refutation, but does not exhaust it. Granted, a dialectical approach may provide a useful interpretive framework for many an "ancient" self-refutation argument. A statement like “If proof does not exist, proof exists” -- that occurs in a anti-sceptical self-refutation argument reported by Sextus Empiricus -- may receive an attractive "dialectical" re-interpretation. It may be argued that such a statement should not be understood at the level of what is EXPLICATED, but should be regarded as an elliptical reminder of a complex dialectical argument which can be described as follows. "If thou claimest that proof doth not exist, thou must present a proof of what thou assertest, in order to be credible, but thus thou thyself admitest that proof existeth." A similar point can be made for Aristotle’s famous argument in the Protrepticus that one must philosophise. A number of sources state that this argument relies on the implicature, “If one must not philosophize, one must philosophize.” It may be argued that this implicature is an elliptical reminder of a dialectical argument such as the following. If thy position is that thou must not philosophise, thou must reflect on this choice and argue in its support, but by doing so thou art already choosing to do philosophy, thereby admitting that thou must philosophise." The claim that every instance of an "ancient" self-refutation arguments is of an intrinsically dialectical nature is thus questionable, to put it mildly (See also 340.19–26, and Arthur Madigan, trans. and comm., Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle’s “Metaphysics” 4 (Ithaca, N.Y.), 139 and 181 n. 983. 10. Burnyeat, “Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Later Greek Philosophy," 59. Grice's implicature is that Quine should have learned Greek before refuting Aristotle ("But then *I* don't speak Greek!," Strawson refuted).
1958. Oxford philosophy and linguistic botanising, rev. 1970, post-war Oxford philosophy, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II: Explorations in semantics and metaphysics, Essay, philosophy and ‘ordinary’ language, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 1-Folder 19, Carton 3-Folder 6, Carton 4-Folder 15, and Series V (Topical), Carton 8-Folder 3, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Oxford philosophy, linguistic botanising, 'ordinary language' philosophy. What were Grice's first impressions when arriving at Oxford. He was going to LEARN! "Only the poor learn at Oxford" was an adage he treasured, since he wasn't one! Let's start with an alphabetical listing of Grice's Play Group companions: J. L. Austin, A. G. N. Flew, P. L. Gardiner, H. P. Grice, R. M. Hare, H. L. A. Hart, S. N. Hampshire, P. H. Nowell-Smith, D. F. Pears, A. M. Quinton, P. F. Strawson, J. F. Thomson, J. O. Urmson, G. J. Warnock. Grice’s main Oxonian association is St. John's, Oxford. By "Oxford Philosophy," Grice notably refers to J. L. Austin's Play Group, of which he was a member. But Grice had Oxford associations pre-war, and after the demise of Austin. But back to the Play Group, this, to some, infamous, playgroup, met on Saturday mornings at different venues at Oxford, including Grice's own St. John's -- apparently, Austin's favourite venue. Austin regarded himself and his 'kindergarten' as 'linguistic' or 'language' *botanists*. The idea was to list various 'ordinary' uses of this or that 'philosophical notion." Austin: "They say philosophy is about language; well, then, let's botanise!" Grice's involvement with "Oxford philosophy" of course predated his associations with Austin's play group. He always said he was fortunate of having been a tutee to Hardie at Corpus. Corpus, Oxford. Grice would occasionally refer to the emblematic pelican, so prominently displayed at Corpus. Grice had an interim association with the venue one associates most directly with philosophy, Merton --: Grice, Merton, Oxford. While Grice loved to drop Oxonian names, notably his 'rivals,' such as Dummett or Anscombe, he knew when not to. His "Post-war Oxford philosophy," as opposed to more specific items in The Grice Collection, remains 'general' in tone, and intended as a defense of the 'ordinary-language' approach to philosophy. Surprisingly, or perhaps not (for those who knew Grice), he takes a pretty idiosyncratic characterisation of conceptual analysis. Grice's philosophical problems emerge with Grice's idiosyncratic use of this or that expression. Conceptual analysis is meant to solve HIS problems, not others'! Repr. in Grice, Studies in the Way of Words. Grice finds it important to reprint this since he had updated thoughts on the matter, which he displays in his "Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy." The topic represents one of the strands he identifies behind the unity of his philosophy. By "post-war Oxford philosophy," Grice meant the period he was interested in. While he had been at Corpus, Merton, and St. John's in the pre-war days, for some reason, he felt that he had made history in the post-war period. The historical reason Grice gives is understandable enough. In the pre-war days, Grice was the good student and the new fellow of St. John's -- the other one was Mabbott. But he had not been able to engage in philosophical discussion much, other than with other tutees of Hardie. AFTER the war, Grice joins Austin's "Saturday mornings." Indeed, for Grice, 'post-war' means "all philosophy after the war," (and not just say, the forties!) since he never abandoned the methods he developed under Austin, which were pretty congenial to the ones he had himself displayed in the pre-war days, in essays like "Negation" and "Personal Identity." Grice was an EXPERT on Oxonian philosophy. He saw himself as a member of the school of analytic philosophy, rather than the abused term 'ordinary-language' philosophy. This is evident by the fact that he contributed to such polemic -- but typically Oxonian -- volumes such as Butler, Analytic Philosophy, published by Blackwell (of all publishers). Grice led a very social life at Oxford, and held frequent philosophical discussions with philosophers such again in alphabetical order, as Austin, Gardiner, Hampshire, Hart, Nowell-Smith, Pears, Quinton, Strawson, Thomson, Urmson, Warnock, and many others. Post-war Oxford philosophy, 1958, miscellaneous, Oxford philosophy, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and Metaphysics, Essay. By Oxford philosophy, Grice meant his own! Grice went back to the topic of philosophy and ‘ordinary language,’ as one of his essays is precisely entitled, "Philosophy and ‘ordinary language,'" 1970, philosophy and 'ordinary' language,’ keywords: 'ordinary-language' philosophy, linguistic botanising. Grice is not really interested in 'ordinary' language as a philologist might. He SPOKE 'ordinary' language, he thought. The point had been brought to the fore by Austin. "If they think philosophy is a play on words, well then, let's play the game." Grice's interest is methodological. Malcolm had been claiming that 'ordinary language' is incorrigible. While Grice agreed that 'language can be clever,' he knew that Aristotle was possibly right when he explored 'ta legomena' in terms of the 'many' and the selected 'wise,' 1960, philosophy and 'ordinary language,' philosophy and 'ordinary language,' keywords: philosophy, 'ordinary language'. At the time of writing, "'ordinary-language' philosophy" had become, "even within Oxford," a bit of a term of abuse. Grice tries to defend Austin's approach to it, while suggesting ideas that Austin somewhat ignored, like what an utterer implies by the use of an 'ordinary-language' expression, rather than what the expression itself does. Grice is concerned, contra Austin, in explanation (or 'explanatory adequacy'), not taxonomy (or 'descriptive adequacy'). Grice disregards Austin's piecemeal approach to 'ordinary language,' as Grice searches for 'the big picture of it all.' Grice never used 'ordinary language' seriously. The phrase was used, as he explains, by those who HATED 'ordinary-language' philosophy. There's no such thing as 'ordinary language.' Surely you cannot fairly describe the idiosyncratic linguistic habits of an Old Cliftonian as even 'remotely' 'ordinary.' "Extra-ordinary" more likely! As far as the 'philosophy' bit goes, this is what Bergmann jocularly described as the 'linguistic turn.' But as Grice notes, the linguistic turn involves both the 'ideal language' and the 'ordinary language.' Grice defends Austin's choice of the 'ordinary' seeing that 'it was what he had to hand!' While Grice seems to be in agreement with the tone of his Wellesley talk, his idioms there in (“You’re crying for the moon! Philosophy need not be grand!”) seem to contrast with his more grandiose approach to philosophy. His struggle was to defend the minutiae of linguistic botanising, that had occupied most of his professional life, with a grander view of the discipline. He blamed Oxford for that: “Never in the history of philosophy had philosophers shown such an attachment to ordinary language as they did in post-war Oxford!” Having learned Greek and Latin at Clifton, Grice saw in Oxford a way to go back to English! He never felt the need to explore ‘Continental’ modern languages like German or French. Aristotle was of course cited in Greek, but Descartes is almost not cited, and Kant is cited in the translation available to Oxonians then. Grice is totally right that never has philosophy experienced such a fascination with 'ordinary' use except at Oxford. "The ruthless and unswerving association of philosophy with ordinary language has been peculiar to the Oxford scene." While many found this attachment to 'ordinary usage' insidious, as Warnock put it, "it fit me and Grice to a T," implicating you need a sort of innate disposition towards it! Strawson perhaps never had it! And that's why Grice's arguments CONTRA Strawson rest on further minutiae whose detection by Grice never ceased to amaze his tutee! In this way, Grice felt he WAS Austin's heir! While Grice is associated with, in chronological order, Corpus, Merton, and St. John's -- it is ONLY ST. JOHN'S that counts for the Griceian! For it is at St. John's he was a Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy! And we love him as a philosopher!
1961.
The causal theory of perception, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II,
Explorations in semantics and metaphysics, Essay (without the excursus on
implication), 1989, repr. from The Aristotelian Society, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 35, no. 1, pp. 121-153. repr. in G.
J. Warnock, The philosophy of perception, 1968, Symposium with A. R. White.
Chair: R. Braithwaite, Cambridge, with R. O. Warner, 1975, knowledge and
belief, 1977, Causation colloquium, causality, cause, Stanford, 1980, The H. P.
Grice Papers, Series III (The Doctrines), Carton 5-Folder 18, Series IV
(Associations), Carton 6-Folder 7, and Series V (Topical), Carton 6-Folder 22
and Carton 8-Folders 21 and 25, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Price, seeming that,
perceiving that, sensing that, causal theory of perception, implicature,
perception, pirotology, knowledge, belief, doxastic, epistemic, Urmson,
entailment. Note that Price is also cited by Grice in "Personal
identity." Grice: That pillar box seems red to me. The locus classicus in
the philosophical literature for Grice's implicatum. Grice introduces a
'dout-or-denial' condition for an utterance of a 'phenomenalist' report
("That pillar-box seems red to me"). Grice attacks
neo-Wittgensteinian approaches that regard the report as _false_. In a long
excursus on 'implication,' he compares the phenomenalist report with utterances
like “He has beautiful handwriting" (He is hopeless at philosophy), a
particularised conversational implicatum; “My wife is in the kitchen or the
garden" (I have non-truth-functional grounds to utter this), a generalised
conversational implicatum; “She was poor but she was honest" (a Great-War
witty (her poverty and her honesty contrast), a 'conventional' implicatum; and
“Have you stopped beating your wife?" -- an old Oxonian conundrum -- (You
have been beating your wife), a presupposition. More importantly, he considers
different tests for each concoction! Those for the conversational implicatum
will become crucial: cancellability, calculability, non-detachability, and
indeterminacy. In the proceedings he plays with something like the principle of
conversational helpfulness, as having a basis on a view of conversation as
rational co-operation, and as giving the rationale to the implicatum. Past the
excursus, and back to the issue of perception, he holds a conservative view as
presented by Price at Oxford. One interesting reprint of Grice's essay is in
Davis's volume on "Causal Theories," since this is where it belongs!
White's response is usually ignored, but shouldn't. White is an interesting
Australian philosopher at Oxford who is usually regarded as a practitioner of
'ordinary-language' philosophy. However, in his response, White hardly touches
the issue of the 'implicature' with which Grice is primarily concerned. Grice
found that a full reprint from the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in a
compilation also containing the William James Harvard would be too repetitive.
Therefore, he omits the 'excursus' on 'implication.' However, the way Grice
re-formulates, in 1987, what that 'excursus' covers is very interesting. There
is the conversational implicatum, particularised ("Smith has beautiful
handwriting") and generalised ("My wife is in the kitchen or in the
garden"). Then there is the praesuppositum, or presupposition ("You
haven't stopped beating your wife"). Finally, there is the CONVENTIONAL
implicatum ("She was poor, but she was honest"). Even at Oxford,
Grice's implicature goes, philosophers -- even Oxonian philosophers -- use
'imply' for all those 'different animals'! Warnock had attended Austin's
"Sense and Sensibilia" (not to be confused with Austen's Sense and
Sensibility). But Warnock, for obvious reasons, preferred philosophical
investigations with Grice. Warnock: "Grice once told me, not on a Saturday
morning, either, 'How clever language is'” For they had found that 'ordinary
language' does NOT need the concept of a visum. Grice and Warnock spent lovely
occasions exploring what Oxford has as "the philosophy of
perception." While Grice later came to see philosophy of perception as a
bit or an offshoot of 'philosophical psychology,' 'the philosophy of
perception' is concerned with that treasured bit of the Oxonian philosopher's
lexicon, the sense-datum, always in the singular! The 'cause' involved is
crucial. Grice plays with an ‘evolutionary’ justification of the ‘material’
thing as the denotatum of a perceptual judgement. If a material thing causes
the sense-datum of a nut, that is because the squarrel (or squirrel) will not
be nourished by the sense datum of the nut; only by the nut! There are many
other items in the Grice Collection that address the topic of perception –
notably with Warnock (on ‘vision,’ cf. ‘visa’ -- ‘taste’, and ‘perception,’ in
general – And we should not forget that Grice contributed a splendid essay on
the distinction of the senses to Butler’s “Analytic philosophy,” which in a
way, redeemed a rather old-fashioned discipline by shifting it to the idiom of
the day. 1959. The philosophy of perception: a retrospective, with G. J.
Warnock, the philosophy of perception, keywords: perception, the philosophy of
perception, visum. Warnock was possibly the only philosopher at Oxford Grice
felt congenial enough to engage in different explorations in the so-called
'philosophy of perception.' Their joint adventures involved the disimplicature
of a 'visum.' Grice later approached sense data in more 'evolutionary' terms: a
material thing is to be vindicated transcendentally, in the sense that it is a
material thing (and not a sense datum or collection thereof) that nourishes a
creature like a human. Grice was particularly grateful to Warnock. By
reprinting the full symposium on "The Causal Theory of Perception" in
his influential series of Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Warnock had spread
Grice's lore of implicature all over! In some parts of the draft he uses
"more on visa," 1959, vision, 1969, vision, with G. J. Warnock, Keywords:
vision. Of the five senses, Grice and Warnock are particularly interested
in 'seeing.' As Grice will put it later, 'see' is a factive. It presupposes the
existence of the event reported after the 'that'-clause. A 'visum,' however, as
an intermediary between the material thing and the perceiver does not seem
necessary in 'ordinary' discourse. Warnock will reconsider Grice's views too
("On what is seen," in Sibley). While Grice uses 'vision,' he knows
he is interested in Philosopher's paradox concerning 'seeing,' notably Witters
on 'seeing as.' 1959, vision, taste and the philosophy of perception, Series V
(Topical), Carton 8-Folders 21-22, keywords: vision, seeing. As an Oxonian
philosopher, Grice was of course more interested in 'seeing' than in 'vision.'
He said that Austin would criticise even the use of things like 'sensation' and
'volition'! 1959, taste, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8-Folders
21-22, keyword: taste, the objects of the five senses, the philosophy of
perception, perception, the philosophy of perception, Series V (Topical),
Carton 8-Folders 21 -22, keywords: philosophy of perception, vision, taste,
perception. Mainly with Warnock. Warnock reprinted Grice's
"Causal Theory of Perception" in his influential Reading in Philosophy,
"The philosophy of perception," 1959, perception, with G. J. Warnock
(folders 23-24), with R. O. Warner (folder 25), Series V (Topical), Carton
8-Folders 23-24, keywords: perception. Warnock learned about perception
much more from Grice than from Austin! 1959, taste, in Series V (Topical),
Carton 8, 1960, The philosophy of perception, the philosophy of perception,
notes with G. J. Warnock on visum, keywords: visum, Warnock, Grice, the
philosophy of perception. Grice kept the lecture notes to
a view of publishing a retrospective. Warnock recalled Grice
saying, "How clever language is!" Grice took the offer by
Harvard University Press, and it was a good thing he reprinted part of “Causal
theory.” However, the relevant bits for his theory of conversation as rational
co-operation lie in the excursus which he omitted. What is Grice’s implicature:
that one SHOULD consider the TOPIC rather than the METHOD here. Keywords being
‘sense datum,’ and ‘causation,’ rather than conversational helpfulness. After
all, “That pillar box seems red to me,” does not SOUND very helpful. But the
TOPIC of ‘Causal Theory’ is CENTRAL for his view of conversation as rational
co-operation. Why? Pirot 1 gets an impression of DANGER as caused by the danger
out there. He communicates the danger to Pirot 1, CAUSING in Pirot 2 some
behaviour. Without ‘causation,’ or causal links, the very POINT of offering a
theory of conversation as rational co-operation seems minimized. On top, as a
metaphysician, he was also concerned with ‘cause’ simpliciter. He was especially
proud that Price’s ‘Casual Theory of Perception’ had been reprinted along with
his essay in the influential volume by Davis on “Causal Theories.” In “Actions
and events,” he further explores ‘cause’ now in connection with Greek ‘aitia’.
As Grice notes, the original usage of this very Grecian item is the one we find
in ‘rebel without a cause.’ CAUSE TO, rather than CAUSE BECAUSE. The
two-movement nature of ‘causing’ is reproduced in the conversational exchange:
a material thing CAUSES a sense datum which causes an expression which gets
communicated, thus CAUSING a psychological state which will cause a behaviour.
This ‘causation’ is almost ‘representational’. A material thing or a situation
CANNOT govern our actions and behaviours, but a REPRAESENTATUM of it MIGHT.
“Govern our actions and behaviour” is Grice’s correlate of what a team of
North-Oxfordshire cricketers can do for North-Oxfordshire: what North
Oxfordshire cannot do for herself, “namely, engage in a game of cricket”! In
Retrospective Epilogue he casts doubts on the point of his causal approach. It
is a short paragraph that merits much exploration. Basically, Grice is saying
his causalist approach is hardly an established thesis. He also proposes a
similar serious objection to his view in “Some remarks about the senses,” the
other essay in the philosophy of perception in Studies. As he notes, both
engage with “some fundamental questions in the philosophy of perception,” which
is hardly the same thing as saying that they provide AN ANSWER to each
question! Grice: The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be
thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are
several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined
in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis
which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general
kind. Examples which occur to me are the following: (1) You cannot see a knife
as a knife, though you may see what is not a knife as a knife. (2) When Moore
said he knew that the objects before him were human hands, he was guilty of
misusing the word "know". (3) For an occurrence to be properly said
to have a cause, it must be something abnormal or unusual. (4) For an action to
be properly described as one for which the agent is responsible, it must be the
sort of action for which people are condemned. (5) What is actual is not also
possible. (6) What is known by me to be the case is not also believed by me to
be the case. I have no doubt that there will be other candidates besides the
six which I have mentioned. I must emphasize that I am not saying that all
these examples are importantly similar to the thesis which I have been
criticizing, only that, for all I know, they may be. To put the matter more
generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of
manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of
philosophizing. I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre; I am merely suggesting
that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts.
Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detectcd,
we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuanccs they
are.” The Causal Theory of Perception, Knowledge and belief, 1977, Series
III (Doctrines), Carton 5-Folder 18, keywords: knowledge, belief, philosophical
psychology. Grice: the doxastic implicatum. “I know” IMPLICATES “I don’t
believe.” (Philosopher’s mistake: “What is known by me to be the case is NOT
also believed by me to be the case.”) The topic had attracted the attention of
some Oxonian philosophers such as J. O. Urmson in "Parenthetical
verbs." Urmson speaks of a 'scale': "I know" can be used parenthetically,
as "I believe" can. For Grice, to utter "I believe" is
obviously to make a weaker conversational move than you would if you utter
“I know.” And in this case, an approach to informativeness in terms of
entailment *is* in order, seeing that “I know” ENTAILS “I believe.” The
addressee is thus allowed to infer that the utterer is not in a position to
make the stronger claim. The mechanism is explained via his principle of
conversational helpfulness. Philosophers tend two over-use these two basic
psychological states, attitudes, or stances. Grice is concerned with
Gettier-type cases, and also the 'factivity' of 'know' versus the non-factivity
of 'believe.' Grice follows Hintikka's lexicological innovations: the logic of
belief is 'doxastic;' the logic of knowledge is 'epistemic.' The last thesis
that Grice lists in "Causal Theory" that he thinks rests on a big
mistake he formulates as: “What is known by me to be the case is NOT also
believed by me to be the case." What are his attending remarks? Grice writes:
“The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine
point, but it is certainly not an isolated one." “There are several
philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order
to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have
been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind." “An
example which occurs to me is the following: What is known by me to be the case
is not also believed by me to be the case.” “I must emphasise that I am not
saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been
criticising, only that, for all I know, it may be." “To put the matter
more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a
type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of
philosophizing." “I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre." “I am
merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision
with the facts." “Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic NUANCES
which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what
SORT of nuances they are!” The ætiological implicatum. Grice. "For an
occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be something abnormal
or unusual." This is an example Grice lists in "Causal theory"
but NOT in "Prolegomena." "For an occurrence to be properly said
to have a cause, it must be something abnormal or unusual." Similar
commentary to his example on 'responsible'/condemnable apply. The objector may
stick with the fact that he is only concerned with PROPER utterances. Surely
Grice wants to go to a pre-Humeian account of causation, possible Aristotelian.
KEYWORD: Aetiologia. Where EVERYTHING has a cause, except, for Aristotle, God!
What are his attending remarks? Grice writes: “The issue with which I have been
mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an
isolated one." “There are several philosophical theses or dicta which
would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are
sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable
to treatment of the same general kind." “An example which occurs to me is
the following: What is known by me to be the case is not also believed by me to
be the case.” “I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is
importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for
all I know, it may be." “To put the matter more generally, the position adopted
by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is
characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophising." “I
am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre." “I am merely suggesting that to
embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts."
“Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic NUANCES which we have detected,
we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what SORT of nuances they
are!” Causal theory, cause, causality, causation, conference, colloquium,
Stanford, 1980, Series IV (Associations), Carton 6-Folder 7, keywords: cause,
metaphysics, the abnormal/unusual implicatum, aetiology, aetiological
implicatum. Grice: the ætiological implicatum. Grice's explorations on 'cause'
are very rich. He is concerned with some alleged misuse of 'cause' in ordinary
language. If as Hume suggests, to cause is to will, one would say that
"The decapitation of Charles I willed his death," which sounds harsh,
“if not ungrammatical, too!” Grice later relates 'cause' to the Greek 'aitia,'
as he should. He notes collocations like 'rebel without a cause.' For the
Greeks, or Grecians, as he called them, and the Griceians, it's a CAUSE TO
which one should be involved in elucidating. A "cause to..."
connects with the idea of 'freedom.' Grice was constantly aware of the threat
of MECHANISM, and his idea was to provide philosophical room for the idea of
'finality,' which is NOT 'mechanistically derivable.' This leads him to
discussion of overlap and priority of, say, a physical-cum-physiological versus
a psychological theory explaining this or that piece of rational behaviour.
Grice can be Wittgensteinian when citing Anscombe's translation: No
psychological concept without the behaviour the concept is brought to explain.
It is best to place his later treatment of cause with his earlier one in
“Causal Theory.” It’s surprising Grice does not apply his example of a
philosopher’s mistake to the ‘causal’ bit of his ‘causal theory.’ Grice states
the philosophical mistake as follows: "For an occurrence to be properly
said to have a cause, it must be something abnormal or unusual." This is
an example Grice lists in "Causal theory" but NOT in
"Prolegomena."“For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause,
it must be something abnormal or unusual." A similar commentary to his
example on 'responsible'/condemnable applies: The objector may stick with the
fact that he is only concerned with PROPER utterances. Surely Grice wants to
embrace a pre-Humeian account of causation, possible Aristotelian -- KEYWORD:
Aitiologia. — where EVERYTHING has a cause, except, for Aristotle, God! What
are his attending remarks? Grice writes: “The issue with which I have been
mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an
isolated one." “There are several philosophical theses or dicta which
would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are
sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable
to treatment of the same general kind." “One example which occurs to me is
the following.” “For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must
be something abnormal or unusual." “I must emphasise that I am not saying
that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been
criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be." “To put the matter
more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a
type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of
philosophizing." “I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre." “I am
merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision
with the facts." “Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic NUANCES
which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what
SORT of nuances they are!” Re: responsibility/condemnation – cfr. Mabbott,
“Flew on punishment,” Philosophy, 30, 1955. And also Hart. At Corpus, Grice
enjoyed his tutor Hardie’s resourcefulness in the defence of what may be a difficult
position, a characteristic illustrated by an incident which Hardie himself once
told Grice about himself. “Hardie had parked his car and gone to a
cinema.”“Unfortunately, Hardie had parked his car on top of one of the strips
on the street by means of which traffic-lights were, at the time, controlled by
the passing traffic.” “As a result, the lights are jammed, and it requires
*four* policemen to lift Hardie’s car off the strip.” “The police decides to
prosecute.” Grice indicated to Hardie that this hardly surprised him and asked
him how he fared. “‘Oh,’ Hardie says, ‘I got off.’” Then Grice asks Hardie how
on earth he managed that! “Quite simply,” Hardie answered. “I just invoked
Mill’s method of difference.” “The police charged me with causing an
obstruction at 4 p.m.” “I told the police that, since my car was parked at 2
p.m., it could not have been *my* car which caused the obstruction at *4* p.m.”
This relates to an example in "Causal Theory" that he Grice does not
discuss in "Prolegomena," but which may relate to H. L. A. Hart, and
closer to Grice, to J. D. Mabbott's essay, "A. G. N. Flew on
punishment," in Philosophy, vol. 30. Grice states the philosophical
mistake as follows: "For an action to be properly described as one for
which the agent is responsible, it must be thc sort of action for which people
are condemned." As applied to Hardie. Hardie was IRRESPONSIBLE? In any
case, while condemnable, he was not! Grice writes: “The issue with which I have
been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly
not an isolated one." “There are several philosophical theses or dicta
which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are
sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable
to treatment of the same general kind." “An example which occurs to me is
the following: For an action to be properly described as one for which the
agent is responsible, it must be the sort of action for which people are
condemned." “I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is
importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for
all I know, it may be." “To put the matter more generally, the position
adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is
characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing." “I
am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre." “I am merely suggesting that to
embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts." “Before
we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic NUANCES which we have detected, we
should make sure that we are reasonably clear what SORT of nuances they are!”
The modal example (“What is actual is NOT also possible”) discussed under
“Indicative conditonals,” 1967. Grice on Macbeth’s implicature:
seeing a dagger as a dagger. Grice elaborates on this in
"Prolegomena," but the austerity of "Causal theory" is
charming, since he does not give a quote or source. OBVIOUSLY: Witters! Grice
writes: Witters might say "You can*not* see a knife *as a knife*, though
you may see what is *not* a knife as a knife." Grice writes: “The issue
with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but
it is certainly not an isolated one." “There are several philosophical
theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether
or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been
discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind." “An
example which occurs to me is the following: "You can*not* see a knife *as
a knife*, though you may see what is *not* a knife as a knife."" “I
must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is importantly similar to
the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may
be." “To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my
objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of
more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing." “I am not condemning
this kind of manoeuvre." “I am merely suggesting that to embark on it
without due caution is to risk collision with the facts." “Before we rush
ahead to exploit the linguistic NUANCES which we have detected, we should make
sure that we are reasonably clear what SORT of nuances they are!” Is this a
dagger which I see before me,/The handle toward my hand? Come, let me clutch
thee./I have thee not, and yet I see thee still./Art thou not, fatal vision,
sensible/To feeling as to sight? or art thou but/A dagger of the mind, a false
creation,/Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain?/I see thee yet, in form as
palpable/As this which now I draw./Thou marshall'st me the way that I was
going;/And such an instrument I was to use./Mine eyes are made the fools o' the
other senses,/Or else worth all the rest; I see thee still,/And on thy blade
and dudgeon gouts of blood,/Which was not so before. There's no such thing:/It
is the bloody business which informs/Thus to mine eyes./Now o'er the one
halfworld/Nature seems dead, and wicked dreams abuse/The curtain'd sleep;
witchcraft celebrates/Pale Hecate's offerings, and wither'd murder,/Alarum'd by
his sentinel, the wolf,/Whose howl's his watch, thus with his
stealthy pace./With Tarquin's ravishing strides, towards his design/Moves
like a ghost. Thou sure and firm-set earth,/Hear not my steps, which way they
walk, for fear/Thy very stones prate of my whereabout,/And take the present
horror from the time,/Which now suits with it. Whiles I threat, he lives:/Words
to the heat of deeds too cold breath gives.[a bell rings] I
go, and it is done; the bell invites me./Hear it not, Duncan; for it is a
knell/That summons thee to heaven or to hell. The Moore example is used both in
"Causal Theory" and "Prolegomena." But the use in
"Causal Theory" is more austere: PHILOSOPHICAL MISTAKE: Malcolm:
"When Moore said he knew that the objects before him were human hands, he
was guilty of misusing the word "know"." Grice writes: “The
issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine
point, but it is certainly not an isolated one." “There are several
philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order
to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have
been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind." “An
example which occurs to me is the following: "When Moore said he knew that
the objects before him were human hands, he was guilty of misusing the word
"know"." "I must emphasise that I am not saying that this
example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing,
only that, for all I know, it may be." “To put the matter more generally,
the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre
which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of
philosophizing." “I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre." “I am
merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision
with the facts." “Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic NUANCES
which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what
SORT of nuances they are!” So SURELY Grice is MEANING: "I know that the
objects before me are human hands" as uttered by Moore is possibly TRUE!
Grice was amused by the fact that while at Madison, Wisc., Moore gave the
example: "I KNOW that behind those curtains there is a window."
"ACTUALLY he was WRONG, as he soon realised when the educated Madisonians
corrected him with a roar of unanimous laughter!" “You see, the lecture
hall of the University of Wisconsin at Madison is a rather, shall we say,
striking space.” “The architect designed the lecture hall with a parapet
running around the wall just below the ceiling, cleverly rigged with *indirect*
lighting to create the illusion that sun light is pouring in through windows
from outside.” “So, G. E. Moore comes to give a lecture one sunny day.”
“Attracted as he was to this eccentric architectural detail, Moore gives an
illustration of certainty as attached to common sense.” “Pointing to the space
below the ceiling, Moore utters.” "We know more things than we think we
know.” “I *know*, for example, that the sunlight shining in from outside proves
..." “At which point he was somewhat startled (in his reserved
Irish-English sort of way) when his audience burst out laughing!” “Is that a
proof of anything?” Grice is especially concerned with "I seem..." He
needs a paradeigmatic sense-datum utterance, and intentionalist as he was, he
finds it in "I seem to see a red pillar box before me." He is relying
on G. A. Paul. Grice would generalise a sense datum by "phi." "I
seem to perceive that the alpha is phi." He agrees that while 'cause' may
be too much, any sentence using 'because' will do: At a circus: "You seem
to be seeing that an elephant is coming down the street because an elephant is
coming down the street." Grice found the causalist theory of perception
particularly attractive since its objection commits "one same mistake
twice": he mischaracterises the cancellable implicatum of both "seem"
and "cause"! While Grice is approaching the philosophical item in the
philosophical lexicon, 'perceptio,' he is at this stage more interested in
vernacular "that-" clauses such as "sensing that", or even
more vernacular ones like "seeming that," if not seeing
that"! perceptĭo ,
ōnis, f. perceptio, as used by Cicero (Ac. 2, 7, 22) translating
"catalepsis," I.a taking, receiving; a
gathering in, collecting. I. Lit., Ambros. in
Luc. 4, 15: “frugum fruetuumque reliquorum,” Cic. Off. 2,
3, 12: “fructuum,” Col. 1, 3, 2.— II. Trop., perception, comprehension (cf.:
“notio, cognitio): animi perceptiones,” notions, ideas, Cic.
Ac. 2, 7, 22: cognitio aut perceptio, aut si verbum e verbo volumus
comprehensio, quam κατάληψιν illi
vocant, id. ib. 2, 6, 17. Philos., direct apprehension of
an object by the mind, Zeno Stoic.1.20, Luc.Par.4,
al.; “τῶν μετεώρων” Philostr.Her.10.9; ἀκριβὴς κ. certainty, Herod.Med. ap. Aët.9.37:
pl., perceptions, Stoic.2.30, Luc.Herm.81,
etc.; introduced into Latin by Cicero, Plu.Cic.40.
As for 'causa,' he was even more sure he was exploring a time-honoured
philosophical topic: causa (by
Cicero, and also a little after him, caussa , Quint. 1, 7,
20; so Fast. Praenest. pp. 321, 322; Inscr. Orell. 3681; 4077; 4698
al.; in Mon. Ancyr. 3, 1 dub.), ae, f. perh. root cav- of caveo, prop. that
which is defended or protected; cf. cura, I.that by, on
account of, or through which any thing takes place or is
done; a cause, reason, motive, inducement; also,
in gen., an occasion, opportunity (opp.
effectis, Quint. 6, 3,
66; 7, 3, 29:
“factis,” id. 4, 2, 52; 12, 1, 36 al.;
very freq. in all periods, and in all kinds of discourse. In its different
meanings syn. with ratio, principium, fons, origo, caput; excusatio, defensio;
judicium, controversia, lis; partes, actio; condicio, negotium, commodum, al.).
Correlated to "aition," or "aitia," cause, “δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν” Hdt.Prooem.,
cf. Democr.83, Pl.Ti.68e, Phd.97a sq.,
etc.; on the four causes of Arist. v. Ph.194b16, Metaph.983a26:—αἰ. τοῦ γενέσθαι or
“γεγονέναι” Pl.Phd.97a;
“τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία ἡ κοινωνία” Id.R.464b:—dat. αἰτίᾳ for
the sake of, “κοινοῦ τινος ἀγαθοῦ” Th.4.87,
cf. D.H.8.29:—αἴτιον (cf.
“αἴτιος” 11.2)
is used like αἰτία in
the sense of cause, not in that of accusation.
1962. Some remarks about the
senses, in Studies in the Way of Words, in Part II, Explorations in
semantics and metaphysics, Essay, 1989, from R. J. Butler, Analytic
Philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 133-53, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series
II (Essays), BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. Keywords: the objects of the five senses. The five
senses, as Urmson notes, are "to see that the sun is shining",
"to hear that the car collided", "to feel that her pulse is
beating", "to smell that something has been smoking" and
"to taste that." An interesting piece in that it was commissioned by
Butler, who knew Grice from his Oxford days. Grice cites O. P. Wood and R.
Albritton. Grice is concerned with a special topic in the philosophy of
perception, notably the identification of the traditional 'five' senses: vision, audition,
taste, smell, and tact. He introduces what is regarded in the philosophical
literature as the first 'thought-experiment,' in terms of the senses that
Martians may have. They have two pairs of eyes: are we going to allow that they
'see' with both pairs? Grice introduces a sub-division of seeing: a Martian x-s
an object with his upper pair of eyes, but he y-s an object with the lower pair
of eyes. In his exploration, he takes a 'realist' stance, which respects the
'ordinary' discursive ways to approach issues of perception. A second
interesting point is that in allowing this to be reprinted in Butler's
"Analytic philosophy," Grice is demonstrating that 'analytic
philosophers' should NOT be obsessed with 'ordinary language.' Butler's compilation,
a rather dry one, is meant as a response to the more linguistic oriented ones
by A. G. N. Flew (Grice's first tutee at St. John's, as it happens), also
published by Blackwell, and containing pieces by Austin, and company. One
philosopher who took Grice very seriously on this was Coady, in his "The
senses of the Martians." Grice provides a serious objection to his own
essay in “Retrospective Epilogue” “We see with our eyes.” I.e. ‘eye’ is
teleologically defined. He notes that his way of DISTINGUISHING the senses is
hardly an established thesis. Grice actually advances this topic in his earlier
"Causal Theory": "I see nothing absurd in the idea that a
non-specialist concept should contain, so to speak, a blank space to be filled
in by the specialist; that this is so, e.g., in the case of the concept of
"seeing" is perhaps indicated by the consideration that if we were in
doubt about the correctness of speaking of a certain creature with peculiar
sense-organs as "seeing" objects, we might well wish to hear from a
specialist a comparative account of the human eye and the relevant sense-organs
of the creature in question." He returns to the point in
"Retrospective Epilogue" with a bit of 'doxastic humility."
"We see with our eyes" is analytic -- but philosophers should take
that more seriously. Grice tested the playmates of his
children, aged 7 and 9, with "Nothing can be green and red all
over". Instead, Morley Bunker preferred
philosophy undergrads. Ain't that boring? To give examples,
"Summer follows Spring" was judged ANALYTIC
by Morley-Bunker's informants, as cited by Sampson, in "Making
sense" (Clarendon) by highly significant majorities in each group of
subjects, while "We see with our eyes" was given near-even split
votes by each group. Over all, the philosophers were somewhat more consistent
with each other than the non-philosophers. But that global finding conceals
results for individual sentences that sometimes manifested the
opposed tendency. Thus, "Thunderstorms are electrical disturbances in the
atmosphere" was judged ANALYTIC by a highly significant majority of the
non-philosophers, while a (non-significant) majority of the philosophers deemed
it SYNTHETIC. In this case, it seems, philosophical training (surely not
brain-washing) induces the realisation that well-established results of
contemporary science are not necessary truths. In other cases, conversely,
cliches of current philosophical education impose their own mental blinkers on
those who undergo it: "Nothing can be completely red and green all over”
was judged ANALYTIC by a significant majority of philosophers but only by a
non-significant majority of non-philosophers. All in all, Morley-Bunker's
results argue strongly against the notion that our inability to decide
consistently whether or not some statement is a necessary truth DERIVES
FROM LACK OF SKILL IN "ARTICULATING" OUR UNDERLYING KNOWLEDGE OF THE
RULES OF OUR LANGUAGE. Rather, the inability comes from the fact that the
question as posed is UNREAL. We CHOOSE to treat a given statement as open to
question or as unchallengeable in the light of the overall structure
of beliefs which we have INDIVIDUALLY EVOLVED in order to make sense of
our INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE. Even the cases which seem "clearly"
analytic or synthetic are cases which individuals judge alike because the
relevant experiences are SHARED by the whole community, but even for such cases
one can invent hypothetical future experiences which, if they should be
realised, would cause us to revise our judgements. Nota Bene. This is not intended
to call into question the special status of the "truths of
logic", such as either "Either it is raining or it is not."
Unlike Katz, I am inclined to accept the traditional view according to which
"logical particles" such as "not" and "or" are
distinct from the bulk of the vocabulary in that the former REALLY are governed
by clear-cut inference rules. I shall not expand on this point here.
(Sampson, op. cit. p.70ff).
1962. Grice
at Cornell, the Cornell Seminar, Grice's Seminar at Cornell, 1966, The Grice
Papers, Series III (Doctrines), Carton 5-Folder 1, BANC MSS 90/135c, The
Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords:
philosophy of action. Historically important in that they predate his
Harvard William James lectures which made of him a household name in New-World
philosophy. Harman cites a seminar by Grice on trying at Brandeis, 1962.
1963. Grice's three lectures on trying at Brandeis.
1964.
Logic and conversation, Oxford, rev. 1967, conversational implicature, 1965,
The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 1-Folders 21-23
and Carton 4-Folder 9, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The
University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: logic, conversation,
implicature, principle of conversational helpfulness, desideratum of
conversational clarity, desideratum of conversational candour, principle of
conversational self-interest, principle of conversational
benevolence. Reprinted in revised form as Part I of Studies in the
Way of Words. Grice felt the need to go back to his 'explantion' of the
nuances about 'seem' and 'cause' ("Causal theory of perception.") He
had used Smith's "My wife is in the kitchen or the bedroom" as
relying on a requirement of discourse. But there must be more to it. Variations
on a theme by Grice: "Make your contribution such as is required, at
the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk
exchange in which you are engaged." Variations on a theme by
Grice. "I wish to represent a certain subclass of non-conventional
implicaturcs, which I shall call conversational implicaturcs, as
being essentially connected with certain general features of discourse; so my
next step is to try to say what these features are." "The following
may provide a first approximation to a general principle. Our talk exchanges do
not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be
rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least,
cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a
common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction.
This purpose or direction may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial
proposal of a question for discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange;
it may be fairly definite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very
considerable latitude to the participants (as in a casual conversation). But at
each stage, SOME possible conversational moves would be excluded as
conversationally unsuitable. We might then formulate a rough general principle
which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make
your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you
are engaged. One might label this the Co-operative
Principle." "We might then formulate a rough general principle
which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to
observe, namely: "Make your contribution such as is required,
at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the
talk exchange in which you are engaged." One might label this the
Cooperative Principle." Strictly, the principle itself is not
co-operative: conversants are. Less literary variant: Make your move
such as is required by the accepted goal of the conversation in which you are
engaged. But why “LOGIC” and conversation? "Logica" had been
part of the 'trivium' for ages -- "Although they called it 'dialectica,'
then." Grice on the seven liberal arts. Moved by P. F.
Strawson's treatment of the 'formal' devices in "Introduction to Logical
Theory," Grice targets these, in their 'ordinary-discourse' counterparts.
Strawson indeed characterizes Grice as his ‘logic’ tutor – Strawson was
following a P. P. E., and his approach to logic was practical. His ‘philosophy’
tutor was Mabbott. For Grice, with a M. A. Lit. Hum.the situation was
different. He knew that the Categoria and De Interpretatione of his beloved
Aristotle were part of the Logical Organon which had been so influential in the
history of philosophy. Grice attempts to reconcile Strawson's observations
with the idea that the 'formal' devices reproduce some sort of 'explicatum,' or
'explicitum,' as identified by Whitehead and Russell in "Principia
Mathematica." In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general
features of discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation. The
alleged divergence between the 'ordinary-language' operators and their 'formal'
counterparts is explained in terms of the conversational implicata, then.
I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has to
ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal
device and its alleged 'ordinary-language' counterpart, while still assuming
that U is engaged in a co-operative transaction. The utterer and his
addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation -- the
exchange of information and the institution of decisions -- and judging that
conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and rational) if
conducted under some form of principle of 'conversational
helpfulness.' "The observation of a principle
of conversational helpfulness is reasonable (rational) along
the following lines: anyone who cares about the goals that are central to
conversation/communication (such as giving and receiving information,
influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an
interest, given suitable circumstances, in participating in a conversation that
will be profitable ONLY on the assumption that it is conducted in general
accordance with a principle of conversational helpfulness." In
titling his seminar "Logic and Conversation," Grice is thinking
Strawson. After all, in the seminal "Introduction to Logical Theory,"
that every Oxonian student was reading, Strawson had the cheek to admit that he
never ceased to learn logic from his tutor, Grice. Yet he elaborates a totally
anti Griceian view of things. To be fair to Strawson, the only segment where he
acknwoledges Grice's difference of opinion is a brief footnote, concerning the
'strength' or lack thereof, of this or that quantified utterance. Strawson uses
an adjective that Grice will seldom do, 'pragmatic'. On top, Strawson
attributes the adjective to 'rule.' For Grice, in Strawson's wording, there is
this or that 'pragmatic rule' to the effect that one should make a stronger
rather than a weaker conversational move. Strawson's Introduction was published
BEFORE Grice aired his views for the Aristotelian Society. In this seminar then
Grice takes the opportunity to correct a few misunderstandings. Important
in that it is Grice's occasion to introduce the principle of conversational
helpfulness as generating implicata under the assumption of rationality. The lecture
makes it obvious that Grice's interest is methodological, and not
'philological.' He is not interest in conversation per se, but only as the
source for his principle of conversational helpfulness and the notion of the
conversational implicatum, which springs from the distinction between what an
utterer implies and what his expression does, a distinction 'apparently denied
by Witters and all too frequently ignored by Austin.' 'Logic and
conversation,' an Oxford seminar, 1964, keywords: implicatum, principle of
conversational helpfulness, eywords: conversational implicature, conversational
implicatum. "Conversational Implicature" Grice's main
invention, one which trades on the distinction between what an utterer IMPLIES
and what his expression does. "A distinction apparently denied by
Witters, and all too frequently ignored by, of all people,
Austin." Grice is implicating that Austin's sympathies were for the
'subjectification' of "Linguistic Nature." Grice remains an
obdurate individualist, and never loses sight of the distinction that gives
rise to the conversational implicatum, which can very well be
hyper-contextualised, idiosyncratic, and perfectly particularised! His
Oxonian example: "I can very well mean that my tutee is to bring me a
philosophical essay next week by uttering "It is raining."" As
Grice notes: “Since the object of the present exercise is to provide
a bit of theory which will explain, for a certain family of
cases, why is it that a particular implicature is present, I
would suggest that the final test of the adequacy and utility of this
model should be: – can it be used to construct [an] explanation[…]
of the presence of such [an] implicature[…], and – is it
more comprehensive and more economical than any rival? b) [is] the no
doubt pre-theoretical explanation[…] which one would be prompted to
give of such [an] implicature[…] consistent with, or better still [a]
favourable pointer[…] towards the requirements involved in the model?” “Far
otherwise: whoever disputes with you will find those protagonists of heresy,
the Stoics, Cynics, and Peripatetics, shattered with their own arms and their
own engines [emphasis mine]; for their [heathen] followers, if they
resist the doctrine and spirit of Christianity, will, under your teaching, be
caught in their own familiar entanglements, and fall headlong into their
own toils; the barbed syllogism of your arguments will hook the
glib tongues of the casuists, and it is you who will tie
up their slippery questions in categorical clews, after the
manner of [a] clever physician[…], who, when compelled by reasoned thought,
prepares antidotes for poison even from a serpent.”“qvin potivs experietvr
qvisqve conflixerit stoicos cynicos peripateticos hæresiarchas propriis armis
propriis qvoqve concvti machinamentis nam sectatores eorum Christiano dogmati
ac sensvi si repvgnaverint mox te magistro ligati vernaculis
implicaturis in retia sua præcipites implagabvntur syllogismis tuæ
propositionis vncatis volvbilem tergiversantvm lingvam inhamantibvs dum spiris
categoricis lubricas qvæstiones tv potivs innodas acrivm more medicorvm qui
remedivm contra venena cum ratio compellit et de serpente conficivnt.” If
Grice lectured on “Logic and Conversation” on implicature he must have thought
that Strawson’s area was central. Yet, as he had done in “Causal theory” and as
he will at Harvard, Grice kept collecting philosophers’ mistakes. So it’s best
to see Grice as a methodologist, and as using “logic and conversation” as an
illustration of his favourite manoeuvre, indeed, central philosophical
manoeuver that gave him a place in the history of philosophy. Restricting this
manoeuvre to just an area minimises it. On the other hand, there has to be a
balance: surely ‘logic and conversation’ is a topic of intrinsic interest, and
we cannot expect all philosophers – unless they are Griceians! – to keep a
broad unitarian view of philosophy as avirtuous whole!
(“Philosopher, like virtue, is entire. – Destructive implicature to it: “Mr.
Puddle is our man in aesthetics” implicates He is not good at it). What is
important to Grice is that the mistakes of these philosophers (notably
Strawson!) arise from some “linguistic phenomena,”or, since we must use
singular expressions this or that “linguistic phenomenon.” Or as Grice puts it,
it is this or that ‘linguistic phenomenon’ which provides the MATERIAL for the
philosopher to make his mistake! So, to solve it, his theory of conversation as
rational co-operation is posited – technically, as a way to EXPLAIN (never
merely describe, which Grice found boring) these phenomena – his principle of
conversational helpfulness and the idea of a conversational implicatum. The
latter is based not so much on rationality per se, but on the implicit/explicit
distinction that he constantly plays with, since his earlier semiotic-oriented
explorations of Peirce. But back to this or that linguistic phenomenon, while
he would make fun of Searle for providing this or that “linguistic phenomenon”
that “no philosopher would ever feel excited about,” Grice himself was a bit of
a master in illustrating this a philosophical point with this or that
“linguistic phenomenon” that would not be necessarily connected with
philosophy. He rarely quotes authors, but surely the section in “Causal theory”
where he lists seven philosophical theses (which are ripe for an
implicatum treatment) would be familiar enough for anybody to be able to drop a
name to attach to each! At Harvard, MOST of his examples of this or that
linguistic phenomenon are UN-authored (and sometimes he expands on his OWN view
of them, just to amuse his audience – and show how committed to this or that
thesis he was), but some are not unauthored. And they all belong to ‘the
linguistic turn’: He quotes from Gilbert Ryle (who thought he knew about
‘ordinary language’), Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin (he quotes him in great
detail, from “Pretending,” “Plea of excuses,” and “No modification without
aberration,”), P. F. Strawson (in “Introduction to Logical theory” and on
‘Truth’ for Analysis), H. L. A. Hart (as “I have heard him expand on this”), J.
R. Searle, and B. S. Benjamin. He implicates Hare (on ‘good’). Etc. When we
mention the ‘explicit’/’implicit’ distinction as source for the implicatum, we
are referring to Grice’s own wording in “Retrospective Epilogue” where he
mentions an utterer as conveying in “some EXPLICIT fashion” this or that, as
opposed to a ‘gentler’ way, via implicature, or implIciture, if you mustn’t! It
may be worth exploring how this connects with RATIONALITY. His point would be
that that an assumption that the rational principle of ‘conversational
helpfulness’ is in order allows Pirot 1 not just to convey “in a direct
explicit fashion” that p, but “in an implicit fashion” that q. Where “q” is the
implicatum. The principle of conversational helpfulness as GENERATOR of this or
that ‘implicata,’ to use Grice’s word (‘generate’). Surely, “He took off his
boots and went to bed; I won’t say in which order” sounds HARDLY in the vein of
conversational helpfulness – but provided Grice does not see it as ‘logically
incoherent,’ it is still a rational (if not reasonable) thing to say. The
‘point’ may be difficult to discern, but you never know. The utterer may be
conveying, “Viva Boole!” Grice’s point about ‘rationality’ is mentioned in his
later “Prolegomena,” on at least two occasions. “Rational behaviour” is the
phrase he uses (as applied first to ‘communication’ and then to ‘discourse’)
and in stark opposition with a convention-based approach he rightly associates
with Austin. Grice is here less interested here as he will be on 'rationality,'
but coooperation as such. Helpfulness as a reasonable EXPECTATION, a mutual one
"between decent chaps," as he puts it. His charming "decent
chap" is SO Oxonian! His pupil would expect no less (and no more!)
1966.
Certainty, Descartes on clear and distinct perception, in Studies in
the Way of Words, Part II, Explorations on semantics and metaphysics, Descartes
on 'clear and distinct perception,' in Studies in the Way of Words, Part
II: Explorations on Semantics and metaphysics, The H. P. Grice
Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 1, Folder 20, and Series V (Topical),
BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley. Keywords: Descartes, clear and distinct perception, certainty.
Grice's immediate trigger is Ayer on 'sure that,' and 'having the right to be
sure.' He was also concerned with Stout's rather hasty UNphilosophical remarks
about 'assurance' in practical concerns. He knew too that he was exploring an
item of the philosopher's lexicon ("certus") that had been brought to
the forum when Anscombe and von Wright translate Witter's German
expression "Gewißheit" in "Über
Gewißheit" as "Certainty." The Grecians were never sure
about being sure. But the modernist turn brought by Descartes meant that Grice
now had to deal with 'incorrigibility' and 'privileged access' to this or that
pirot, notably himself ("When I intend to go, I don't have to observe
myself, I'm on the stage, not in the audience," or "Only I can say
"I will to London," expressing my intention to do so. If you say,
"You will go " you are expressing YOURS!" Grice found
Descartes very funny -- in a French way! Grice is interested in contesting
A. J. Ayer and other Oxford philosophers, on the topic of a criterion for
'certainty.' In so doing, Grice choses Descartes's time-honoured criterion
of 'clarity' and 'distinction,' as applied to perception. Grice does
NOT quote Descartes in French! In the proceedings, Grice distinguishes
between two 'kinds' of certainty apparently ignored by Descartes: (a)
OBJECTIVE CERTAINTY: Ordinary-language variant: "It is certain
that p," whatever "it" refers to. (b) SUBJECTIVE
CERTAINTY: Ordinary-language variant: "I am certain that
p." "I" being, of course, Grice, "in my bestest days,
of course!" There are further items on Descartes in the Grice
Collection, notably in the last series, of topics arranged
alphabetically. Grice never cared to publish his views on Descartes until
he found an opportunity to do so when compiling his Studies in the Way of Words. Grice
is NOT interested in an exegesis of Descartes's thought. He doesn't care to
give a reference to any edition of Descartes's oeuvre. But he plays with
'certain'. "It is certain that p" is objective certainty, apparently.
"I am certain that p" is subjective certainty, rather. Oddly, Grice
will turn to UNcertainty as it connects with intention in his British Academy
lecture. Grice's interest in Descartes connects with Descartes's search
for a criterion of 'certainty' in terms of 'clarity' and 'distinction' of this
or that perception. Having explored the philosophy of perception with
Warnock, it's only natural he wanted to give Descartes's rambles a second and
third look! 1966, Descartes on clear and distinct perception, in Studies in the
Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and Metaphysics, Essay, "Descartes on
clear and distinct perception and Malcom on dreaming," The Grice Papers,
Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folder 26, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft
Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keyword: perception,
Descartes, clear and distinct perception, Malcolm, dreaming. Descartes
meets Malcolm, and vice versa. Descartes on 'clear and distinct
perception,' in Studies in the Way of Words, Carton 6, Folders
27-28, "Descartes on clear and distinct perception," 1966, Descartes
on clear and distinct perception, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II,
Semantics and Metaphysics, Essay, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton
6, Folders 27 and 28, BANC MSS 90/135c, The University of California, Berkeley.
Grice gives a short overview of Cartesian metaphysics for the BBC third
programme. The best example, Grice thinks, of a metaphysical
snob is provided by Descartes, about whose idea of certainty Grice had
philosophised quite a bit, since it’s in total contrast with
Moore’s! Descartes is a very scientifically
minded philosopher, with very clear ideas about the proper direction for science. Descartes,
whose middle name seems to have been “Euclid,” thinks that mathematics,
and in particular geometry, provides the model for a
scientific procedure, or method. And this determines
all of
Descartes’s thinking in two ways. First, Descartes
thinks that the fundamental method in science is
the axiomatic
deductive method of geometry, and this Descartesconceives (as
Spinoza morality “more
geometrico”) of as rigorous reasoning from
a self-evident axiom (“Cogito, ergo
sum.”). Second, Descartes thinks that the subject
matter of physical science, from mechanics to medicine, must be fundamentally the same as the subject
matter of geometry! The only characteristics that the
objects studied by geometry poses are spatial characteristics.
So from the point of view of science in general, the only important features of things in the physical world were also their spatial characteristics,
what he called ‘extensio,’ ‘res extensa.’ Physical science in general is a kind
of dynamic, or kinetic,
geometry. Here we have an exclusive preference for a certain type of scientific method, and a certain type of scientific explanation: the method is deductive, the type of explanation mechanical. These
beliefs about the right way to do science are exactly reflected in Descartes's
“ontology” – one of the two branches of metaphysics; the other is philosophical
eschatology, or the study of categories), and it is reflected
in his doctrine, that is, about what “really”
exists. Apart from God, the divine substance, Descartes
recognises just two kinds of substance, two types of real entity. First, there
is material substance, or matter; and the belief that
the only scientifically important
characteristics of things in the physical world are their spatial characteristics goes over, in the language of “metaphysics,”into the doctrine that these are their only
characteristics. Second, and to Ryle’s horror, Descartes recognizes
the mind or soul, or the
mental substance, of which the essential characteristic
is
thinking; and thinking itself, in its pure form at least, is
conceived of as simply the intuitive grasping of
this
or that self-evident axiom and this or that of
its deductive consequence. These restrictive doctrines about reality and knowledge naturally call for adjustments elsewhere in our
ordinary scheme of things. With the help of
thedivine substance, these are duly provided.
It is not always obvious that the metaphysician's scheme involves this kind of “ontological”
preference, or favoritism, or prejudice, or snobbery this tendency, that is, to
promoteone or two categories of entity to the rank of the real, or of the ultimately real, to the exclusion of others,
Descartes’s ‘entia realissima.’ One is taught at Oxford that epistemology
begins with the Moderns such as Descartes, which is not true. Grice was
concerned with 'certain,' which was applied in Old Roman times to this or that
utterer: the person who is made certain in reference to a
thing, certain, sure: “certi sumus periisse omnia,” Cic. Att. 2,
19, 5: “num quid nunc es certior?” Plaut. Am. 1,
1, 191: “posteritatis,”
i. e. of posthumous fame, Plin. Ep. 9,
3, 1: “sententiae,” Quint. 4, 3,
8: “judicii,” Sen. Ep. 45,
9: “certus de suā geniturā,” Suet. Vesp.
25: “damnationis,” id. Tib. 61:
“exitii,” Tac. A. 1, 27:
“spei,” id. H. 4, 3:
“matrimonii,” id. A. 12, 3:
“certi sumus, etc.,” Gell. 18, 10,
5.—In class. prose mostly in the phrase certiorem facere aliquem (de
aliquā re, alicujus rei, with a foll, acc. and inf., with
a rel.-clause or absol.), to inform, apprise one of a
thing: “me certiorem face,” Ter. Phorm.
4, 3, 69: “ut nos facias certiores,” Plaut. Curc.
5, 2, 32: “uti se (sc. Caesarem) de his rebus certiorem faciant,” Caes. B. G.
2, 2: “qui certiorem me sui consilii fecit,” Cic. Att. 9,
2, a, 2: “Caesarem certiorem faciunt, sese non facile ab oppidis vim hostium prohibere,” Caes. B. G.
1, 11: “faciam te certiorem quid egerim,” Cic. Att. 3,
11, 1.— With subj. only: “milites certiores facit, paulisper intermitterent proelium,” Caes. B. G.
3, 5 fin.—Pass.: “quod crebro certior per me fias de omnibus rebus,” Cic. Fam. 1,
7, 1; so Caes. B. G.
1, 7; Sall. J. 104,
1: “Caesar certior factus est, tres jam copiarum partes Helvetios id flumen transduxisse,” Caes. B. G.
1, 12; so id. ib. 1, 21; 1, 41; 2, 1; Sall. J. 82,
2; Nep. Att. 12,
3: “factus certior, quae res gererentur,” Caes. B. C.
1, 15: “non consulibus certioribus factis,” Liv. 45, 21,
4.—Also in posit., though rarely: “fac me certum quid tibi est,” Plaut. Ps. 1,
1, 16; 4, 6, 35; Verg. A. 3,
179: “lacrimae suorum Tam subitae matrem certam fecere ruinae,” Ov. M. 6, 268.—
1966.
Eudaimonia, eudaemonia, "a philosophy of life," happiness, notes,
some reflections about ends and happiness, in Aspects of reason, Clarendon,
Correspondence with R. O. Warner, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series I
(Correspondence), Carton 1-Folder 9, Series II (Essays), Carton 4-Folder 16,
Series V (Topical), Carton 7-Folder 6, and Carton 8, Folder 28, BANC MSS
90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords:
ends, 'telos,' happiness, Kantotle, eudaimonia, philosophical biology,
philosophical psychology, eudaemon, fairy godmother, Warner. H. P. Grice’s
fairy godmother. Grice took 'life' seriously: philosophical biology!
"Philosophy of life" is dated 1966 in P. G. R. I. C. E. Grice’s fairy
godmother. “Much the most plausible conjecture regarding what Greek eudaimonia
means, is namely that ‘eudaimonia’ is to be understood as the name for that
state or condition which one’s good daemon would, if he could, ensure for one.”
“And my good daemon is a being motivated, with respect to me, solely by concern
for my well-being or happiness." "To change the idiom,
"eudaemonia" is the general characterization of what a full-time and
unhampered fairy godmother would secure for you." Grice is concerned with
the specific system of ends that 'eudaimonia' consists for for both Kant and
Aristotle (or Kantotle for short). Grice borrows, but never returns, some
reflections by his fomer tuttee at St. John's, J. L. Ackrill. Ackrill's point
is about the etymological basis for 'eudaimonia,' from 'eudaimon,' or good
daemon, as Grice prefers. Grice thinks the metaphor should be disimplicated,
and taken quite 'literally.' Grice concludes with a set of ends that justify
our ascription of 'eudaimonia' to the agent. For Grice, as for Aristotle, and
indeed Kant (Kantotle, in short), a 'telos' and 'eudaimonia' are related in
subtle ways. For 'eudaimonia' we cannot deal with just ONE end, but a system of
ends (Although such a system may be a singleton). Grice specifies a subtle way
of characterising 'end' so that a particular ascription of an 'end' may ENTAIL
an ascription of 'eudaimonia.' Grice follows the textual criticism of his
former tutee, J. L. Ackrill, in connection with the Socratic point that
'eudaimonia' IS literally related to the 'eudaimon.' Warner has explored
Grice's concept of 'happiness,' notably in P. G. R. I. C. E. Warner was
especially helpful with Grice's third difficult Carus lecture, a metaphysical
defence of absolute value. Warner also connected with Grice in such topics as
the philosophy of perception (seen in an evolutionary light) and the
Kantotelian idea of happiness. In response to Warner's overview of Grice's
oeuvre for the festschrift (that Warner co-authored with Grandy), Grice refers
to the editors by the collective name of "Richards." While Grice felt
he had to use 'happiness,' he is always having Aristotle's 'eudaimonia' in
mind! The implicata of “Smith is happy" are more complex than Kantotle thought!
Austen knew! (“You decide if you’re happy!” — Emma). Ultimately, for Grice, the
rational life is the happy life! Grice took 'life' seriously: philosophical
biology! Grice is clear when reprinting the Descartes paper in Studies (where
he does quote from Descartes sources quite a bit, even if he implicates he is
“no Cartesian scholar” – what Oxonian would? --: it concerns ‘certainty.’ And
certainty was originally Cantabrigian (Moore), but also Oxonian, in parts. Ayer
was saying that ‘to know’ is to ‘assure’ that one is CERTAIN or sure. So he
could connect. Grice will at various stages of his development play and explore
this AUTHORITATIVE voice of introspection: incorrigibility and privileged
access. He surely wants to say that a declaration of an intention is authoritative.
And he plays with “meaning,” too when provoking Malcolm in a don recollection:
Grice: I want you to bring me a paper tomorrow. Strawson: You mean a newspaper?
Grice: No, a philosophical essay. Strawson: How do you KNOW? Are you CERTAIN
you mean that? Grice finds not being certain about what one means Strawsonian
and otiose! (“Tutees!”). Grice loved to place himself in the role of the
philosophical hack, dealing with his tutee’s inabilities, a whole week long –
until he could find refreshment in para-philosophy on the Saturday morning!
Now, the LOGICAL form of ‘certain’ is a trick. Grice would symbolize it as
numbering of operators. If Pirot ψs p, Pirot ψs ψs
p, and Pirot ψs ψs ψs
p, and so ad infinitum. This is a bit like certainty. But not quite! When he
explores TRUST, he considers something like a backing for it. But does
conclusive evidence yield certainty? He doesn’t think so. Certainty, for Grice
should apply to any psychological attitude, state or stance. And it is just
clever of him that when he had to deliver that lecture at London he chose
“INTENTION and ***UNCERTAINTY*** as its topic, just to provoke! (Not
surprisingly, the “Intention and Uncertainty” piece opens with “the sceptic’s
challenge.” And he won’t conclude that the intender is CERTAIN. Only that
there’s some good chance (p greater than 0.5) that what he intends will get
through! "When there is a will, there is a way," “When there is a
neo-Prichardian WILLing, there is a palaeo-Griceian WAYing!" Perhaps by
‘know’ Moore means “CERTAIN.” Grice was amused by the fact that Moore THOUGHT
he knew that behind the curtains at the lecture hall at the University of
Wisconsin at Madison, there was a window, when there wasn’t. He uses Moore’s
misuse of ‘know’ – according to Malcolm – both in “Causal theory” and
“Prolegomena.” And of course this relates to the topic of the sceptic’s
implicature, 1946 above, with the two essays “Scepticism and Common sense” and
“Moore and Philosopher’s Paradoxes” reprinted (one partially) in Studies.
1966. Dreaming, The H. P. Grice
Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8-Folder 26, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft
Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Malcolm, dreaming,
Descartes, implicatum Grice dreaming. Malcolm argues in “Dreaming and
Skepticism” and in his Dreaming that the notion of a dream qua conscious
experience that occurs at a definite time and has definite duration during
sleep, is "unintelligible." This contradicts the views of
philosophers like Descartes (and indeed Moore!), who, Malcolm holds, assume
that a human being may have a conscious thought and a conscious experience
during sleep. Descartes claims that he had been deceived during sleep.
Malcolm’s point is that ordinary language contrasts consciousness and sleep.
The claim that one is conscious while one is sleep-walking is "stretching
the use of the term." Malcolm rejects the alleged counter-examples based
on sleepwalking or sleep-talking, e.g. dreaming that one is climbing stairs
while one is actually doing so is not a counter-example because, in such a
case, the individual is not sound asleep after all. "If a person is in any
state of consciousness, it logically follows that he is not sound asleep."
The concept of dreaming is based on our descriptions of dreams after we have
awakened in "telling a dream." Thus, to have dreamt that one has a
thought during sleep is not to have a thought any more than to have dreamt that
one has climbed Everest is to have climbed Everest. Since one cannot have an
experience during sleep, one cannot have a mistaken experience during sleep,
thereby undermining the sort of scepticism based on the idea that our
experience might be wrong because we might be dreaming. Malcolm further argues
that a report of a conscious state during sleep is unverifiable. If Grice
claims that he and Strawson saw a big-foot in charge of the reserve desk at the
Bodleian library, one can verify that this took place by talking to Strawson
and gathering forensic evidence from the library. However, there is no way to
verify Grice’s claim that he dreamed that he and Strawson saw a big-foot
working at the Bodleian library. Grice's only basis for his claim that he
dreamt this is that Grice says so after he wakes up. How does one distinguish
the case where Grice dreamed that he saw a big-foot working at The Bodleian
Library and the case in which he dreamed that he saw a person in a big-foot
suit working at the library but, after awakening, mis-remembered that person in
a big-foot suit as a bigfoot proper? If Grice should admit that he had earlier
mis-reported his dream and that he had actually dreamed he saw a person in a
big-foot suit at The Bodleian, there is no more independent verification for
this new claim than there was for the original one. Thus, there is, for
Malcolm, no sense to the idea of mis-remembering one’s dreams. Malcolm here
applies one of Witter's ideas from his “private language argument,":
"One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right.
And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’." For a similar
reason, Malcolm challenges the idea that one can assign a definite duration or
time of occurrence to a dream. If Grice claims that he ran the mile in 3.4
minutes, one could verify this in the usual ways. If, however, Grice says he
dreamt that he ran the mile in 3.4 minutes, how is one to measure the duration
of his dreamt run? If Grice says he was wearing a stopwatch in the dream and
clocked his run at 3.4 minutes, how can one know that the dreamt stopwatch is
not running at half speed (so that he really dreamt that he ran the mile in 6.8
minutes)? Grice might argue that a dream report does not carry such a
conversational implicata. But Malcolm would say that just admits the point. The
ordinary criteria one uses for determining temporal duration do not apply to
dreamt events. The problem in both these cases (Grice dreaming one saw a
bigfoot working at The Bodleian library and dreaming that he ran the mile in
3.4 minutes) is that there is no way to verify the truth of these dreamt events
— no direct way to access that dreamt inner experience, that mysterious glow of
consciousness inside the mind of Grice lying comatose on the couch, in order to
determine the facts of the matter. This is because, for Malcolm, there are no
facts of the matter apart from the dreamer’s report of the dream upon
awakening. Malcolm claims that the empirical evidence does not enable one to
decide between the view that a dream experience occurs during sleep and the
view that they are generated upon the moment of waking up. Dennett agrees with
Malcolm that nothing supports the received view that a dream involves a
conscious experience while one is asleep but holds that such issues might be
settled empirically. Malcolm also argues against the attempt to provide a
physiological mark of the duration of a dream, for example, the view that the
dream lasted as long as the rapid eye movements. Malcolm replies that
"there can only be as much precision in that common concept of dreaming as
is provided by the common criterion of dreaming." These scientific
researchers are misled by the assumption that the provision for the duration of
a dream "is already there, only somewhat obscured and in need of being
made more precise." However, Malcolm claims, it is not already there (in
the ordinary concept of dreaming). These scientific views are making “radical
conceptual changes” in the concept of dreaming, not further explaining our
ordinary concept of dreaming. Malcolm admits, however, that it might be natural
to adopt such scientific views about REM sleep as a convention. Malcolm points
out, however, that if REM sleep is adopted as a criterion for the occurrence of
a dream, "people would have to be informed upon waking up that they
had dreamed or not." Malcolm does not mean to deny that people have dreams
in favour of the view that they only have waking dream-behaviour (Pears, 1961,
145). "Of course it is no misuse of language to speak of ‘remembering a
dream’." His point is that since the concept of dreaming is so closely
tied to our concept of waking report of a dreams, one cannot form a coherent
concept of this alleged inner (private) something that occurs with a definite
duration during sleep. Malcolm rejects a certain philosophical conception of
dreaming, not the ordinary concept of dreaming, which, he holds, is neither a
hidden private something nor mere outward behaviour. Malcolm’s account of
dreaming has come in for considerable criticism. Some argue that Malcolm’s
claim that occurrences in dreams cannot be verified by others does not require
the strict criteria that Malcolm proposes but can be justified by appeal to the
simplicity, plausibility, and predictive adequacy of an explanatory system as a
whole. Some argue that Malcolm’s account of the sentence “I am awake” is
inconsistent. A comprehensive programme in considerable detail has been offered
for an empirical scientific investigation of dreaming of the sort that Malcolm
rejects. Others have proposed various counterexamples and counter arguments
against Malcolm’s account of dreaming. Grice's emphasis is in Malcolm's easy
way out with statements to the effect that 'implicata' do or do not operate in
dream reports. "They do in mine!" Grice considers, “I may be
dreaming” in the two essays opening the Part II: Explorations on semantics and metaphysics
in Studies in the Way of Words.
1967. Logic and conversation,
repr. in Studies in the Way of Words, Part I, in revised form
(1987). The William James Memorial Lectures on Logic and Conversation,
Harvard. The William James Memorial Lectures on Logic and Conversation, in
Studies in the Way of Words, as Part I, “Logic and Conversation,” The William
James lectures on logic and conversation, The H. P. Grice
Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 1-Folders 24, 25, and 26, BANC MSS
90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley. Keywords: logic, conversation, implicature. A set of seven
lectures, entitled as follows. Lecture 1, 'Prolegomena;' Lecture 2: 'Logic and
Conversation;' Lecture 3: 'Further notes on logic and conversation;' Lecture 4:
'Indicative conditionals;' Lecture 5: 'Utterer's meaning and intentions;'
Lecture 6: 'Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning;' and Lecture
7: 'Some models for implicature.' "I hope they don't expect me to lecture
on James!" Grice admired James, but not vice versa. Grice
entitled the set as being "Logic and Conversation." That is the
title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing that it was
way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the second
lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and Harman, The
Logic of Grammar. The content of each lecture is indicated below. In
the first, Grice manages to quote from Witters. In the last, he
didn't! The original set consisted of seven lectures. To wit:
Prolegomena, Logic and conversation, Further notes on logic and conversation,
Indicative Conditionals, Utterer's meaning and intentions, Utterer's meaning,
sentence-meaning, and word meaning, and Some models for implicature. They were
pretty successful at Oxford. While the notion of an 'implicatum' had been
introduced by Grice at Oxford, even in connection with a principle of
conversational helpfulness, he takes the occasion now to explore the type of
rationality involved. Observation of the principle of conversational
helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who
cares about the two central goals to conversation (give/receive information,
influence/be influened) is expected to have an interest in participating in a conversation
that is only going to be profitable given that it is conducted along the lines
set by the principle of conversational helpfulness. In "Prolegomena"
he lists Austin, Strawson, Hare, Hart, and himself, as victims of a disregard
for the implicatum. In the third lecture he introduces his razor, "Senses
are not to be muliplied beyond necessity." In "Indicative
conditionals" he tackles Strawson on 'if' as not representing the
horse-shoe of Whitehead and Russell. The next two lectures, "Utterer's
meaning and intentions" and "Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and
word-meaning" refine his earlier, more austere, account of this
particularly Peirceian phenomenon. He concludes the lectures with an
exploration on the relevance of the implicatum to philosophical
psychology. Grice was well aware that many philosophers had become
enamoured with the series, and would love to give it a ‘continuous perusal.’
The set is indeed grandiose. It starts with a “Prolegomena” to set the scene:
He notably quotes himself in it, which helps, but also Strawson, which sort of
justifies the general title. In the second lecture, “Logic and Conversation,”
he expands on the principle of conversational helpfulness and the
explicitum/implicatum distinction – all very rationalist! The third lecture is
otiose in that he makes fun of Ockham: Senses are not to be multiplied beyond
necessity. The fourth lecture, on “Indicative conditionals,” is indeed on MOST
of the formal devices he had mentioned on Lecture II, notably the functors (rather
than the quantifiers and the iota operator, with which he deals in
“Presupposition and conversational implicature,” since, as he notes, they refer
to reference). THIS IS THE CENTRAL lecture of the set. In the fifth lecture, he
plays with ‘mean,’ and discovers that it is attached to the IMPLICATUM or the
IMPLICITUM. In the sixth lecture, he becomes a ‘nominalist,’ to use Bennett’s
phrase, as he deals with ‘dog’ and ‘shaggy’ in terms of this or that
‘resultant’ procedure – “don’t ask me what they are!” --. Finally, in “Some
models for implicature,” he attacks the charge of circularity, and refers to
“nineteenth-century explorations” on the idea of ‘thought without language’
alla Wundt. I don’t think a set of William James lectures had even been so
comprehensive!
1967. Prolegomena, in Studies in the
Way of Words, Part I, "Logic and Conversation," Essay 1, the first
William James lecture, ifs and cans, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays)
and Series V (Topical), Carton 7-Folders 11-12, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft
Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: meaning, use,
implicatum, Austin, Strawson. A discussion of Oxonian philosophers
of Grice's play group, notably J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, H. L. A. Hart, and
R. M. Hare. He adds himself for good measure ("A causal theory of
perception"). Philosophers, even at Oxford, have to be careful with the
attention that is due to 'general principles of discourse.' Grice quotes
philosophers of an earlier generation, such as Ryle, and some interpreters or
practitioners of Oxonian analysis, such as Benjamin and Searle. He even manages
to quote from Witters's "Philosophical investigations," on seeing a
banana as a banana. There are further items in the Grice collection that
address Austin’s manoeuvre, 1970, Austin on ifs and cans, Ifs and cans,
keywords: conditional, power. Two of Grice's favourites. He opposed
Strawson's view on 'if.' Grice thought that 'if' was the horseshoe of Whitehead
and Russell, provided we add an IMPLICATUM to an ENTAILMENT. The 'can' is
merely dispositional, if not alla Ryle, alla Grice! 1970. Ifs and cans,
keywords: Austin, intention, disposition. Austin had brought the topic to
the fore as an exploration of free will. D. F. Pears had noted that
'conversational' implicature may account for the conditional perfection ('if'
yields 'iff'). Cf. M. R. Ayers on Austin on 'if' and 'can.' If he calls it
“Prolegomena,” he is being jocular. “Philosophers’ Mistakes” would have been
too provocative. B. S. Benjamin erred, and so did Gilbert Ryle, and Ludwig
Witters, and ‘my friends’, J. L. Austin (the mater that wobbled), and in order
of seniority, H. L. A. Hart (“I heard him defend this about ‘carefully’ –
‘stopping at every door in case a dog comes out at breakned speed’), R. M. Hare
(To say “good” is to approve), and Strawson (Introduction to Logical theory:
“To utter “if p, q” is to implicate some inferrability”, To say “True!” is to
endorse – Analysis). If he ends with Searle, he is being jocular. He quotes
Searle from an essay in “British philosophy” in Lecture I, and from an essay in
“Philosophy in America” in Lecture V. He loved Searle, and expands on the Texas
oilmen’s club example! We may think of Grice as a linguistic botanizer or a
‘meta-linguistic’ botanizer: his hobby was to collect philosophers’ mistakes,
and he catalogued them. In “Causal theory” he produces his first list of seven:
1: the pillar box seems red to me; 2. You cannot see a dagger as a dagger; 3.
Moore didn’t know that the objects before him were his own hands; 4. What is
actual is not also possible. 5. For someone to be called ‘responsible,’ his
action should be condemnable; 6. A cause must be given only of something
abnormal or unusual (cf. aetiology). 7. If you know it, you don’t believe it.
In the Prolegomena, the taxonomy is more complicated. Examples A (the use of an
expression, by Ryle, Wittgenstein, Austin, Hart, and Benjamin), Examples B
(Strawson on ‘and,’ ‘or,’ and especially ‘if’), and Examples C (Strawson on
‘true’ and Hare on ‘good’ – the ‘performative theories’). But EVEN if his
taxonomy is more complicated, he makes it more SO by giving OTHER examples as
he goes on to DISCUSS how to assess the philosophical mistake (cf. his
elaboration on ‘trying,’ “I saw Mrs. Smith cashing a cheque.” “Trying to cash a
cheque, you mean.” – or cf. his remarks on ‘remember,’ and ‘There is an analogy
here with a case by Wittgenstein.” In summary, he wants to say. THE PHILOSOPHER
makes a big mistake. He has DETECTED, I think it’s the word he used, some
CONVERSATIONAL NUANCE. Now he wants to EXPLOIT it. But BEFORE RUSHING AHEAD TO
EXPLOIT the conversational nuance he has detected, or identified, or collected
in his exercise of linguistic botanising, the philosopher should let us know
with CLARITY what type of a nuance it is. For Grice wants to know that THE
NUANCE depends on a general principle (of goal-directed behaviour in general,
and MOST LIKELY rational) governing discourse – that participants in a
conversation should be aware of, and not on some minutiae that has been identified
by the philosopher making the mistake, unsystematically, and merely
descriptively, and taxonomically, but without ONE drop of explanatory adequacy.
The fact that he directs this to his junior Strawson is the sad thing. The rest
are all Grice’s seniors! The point is of PHILOSOPHICAL interest, rather than
other. And he keeps citing philosophers, Tarski or Ramsey, in Lecture III to
elaborate the point about ‘true’ in “Prolegomena.” He never seems interested in
ANYTHING but an item being “of philosophical interest,” even if that means HIS
and MINE! On top, he is being Oxonian: “Only at Oxford my colleagues were so
obsessed, as it has never been seen ANYWHERE else, about the nuances of
conversation. Only they were all making a BIG mistake in having no clue as to
what the underlying theory of conversation as rational co-operation would
SIMPLIFY things for them – and how! If I introduce the explicatum as a
concession, I shall hope I will be pardoned!” Was Grice's intention epagogic,
or diagogic in "Prolegomena"? Was he trying to EDUCATE Strawson, or
just delighting in proving Strawson wrong? We think the former. The fact that
he quotes himself shows that Grice is concerned with something he STILL sees
(and for the rest of his life will see) as a valid philosophical problem (If
philosophy generated no problmes it would be dead).
1967.
Logic and conversation, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part I,
"Logic and Conversation," Essay 2, from Davidson/Harman, The
Logic of Grammar, pp. 64-75, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), BANC
MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley. An elaboration of his Oxonian seminar on "Logic and
conversation." There's a principle of conversational helpfulness, which
includes a desideratum of conversational candour and a desideratum of
conversational clarity, and the sub-principle of conversational self-interest
clashing with the sub-principle of conversational benevolence. The whole point
of the manoeuvre is to provide a rational basis for a conversational
'implicatum,' as his term of art goes. Observation of the principle of
conversational helpfulness is rational/reasonable along the following lines:
anyone who is interested in the two goals conversation is supposed to serve --
give/receive information, influence/be influenced -- should only care to enter
a conversation that will be only profitable under the assumption that it is
conducted in accordance with the principle of conversational helfpulness, and
attending desiderata and sub-principles. Grice takes special care in listing
tests for the proof that an implicatum is 'conversational' in this rather
technical usage: a conversational implicatum is RATIONALLY calculable (it is
the content of a psychological state, attitude or stance that the addressee
assigns to the utterer on condition that he is being helpful), non-detachable,
indeterminate, and VERY cancellable, thus never part of the 'sense' and never
an 'entailment' of this or that piece of philosophical vocabulary. Logic and
conversation, in Davidson and Harman, The Logic of Grammar (1975), also in Cole
and Morgan (1975), repr. in a revised form in Grice (1989), 1967, Logic
and conversation, the second William James lecture, keywords: principle of
conversational helpfulness, implicatum, cancellability. While the essay
was also reprinted by Cole and Morgan, Grice always cited it from the
Davidson's and Harman's two-column reprint in The Logic of Grammar. Most people
without a philosophical background first encounter Grice through this essay. Philosophers
usually get first acquainted with his "In defence of a dogma," or
"Meaning." In "Logic and Conversation," Grice
re-utilises the notion of an implicatum and the principle of
conversational helpfulness that he had introduced at Oxford to a more select
audience. Grice's idea is that the observation of the principle of
conversational helfpulness is rational (reasonable) along the
following lines: anyone who is concerned with the two goals which are
central to conversation (to give/receive information, to influence/be
influenced) should be interested in participating in a conversation that
is only going to be profitable on the assumption that it is conducted
along the lines of the principle of conversational helfpulness. Grice's
point is methodological. He is not at all interested in conversational
exchanges as such. Unfortunately, the essay starts "in media res,"
and skips Grice's careful list of Oxonian examples of 'disregard' for the
key idea of what a conversant IMPLICATES by the conversational move he
makes. His concession is that there is an EXPLICATUM or EXPLICITUM
(roughly, the logical form) which is beyond pragmatic constraints. This
concession is easily explained in terms of his overarching irreverent,
conservative, dissenting rationalism. This lecture alone had been read by
a few philosophers leaving them confused. I don’t know what Davidson and Harman
were thinking when they reprinted JUST THIS in “The logic of grammar.” I mean:
it’s obviously ‘in media res.’ Grice starts with the ‘logical devices,’ and
never again takes the topic up. Then he explores metaphor, irony, and
hyperbole, and surely the philosopher who bought “The logic of grammar” must be
left puzzled! He had to wait sometime to see the thing in full completion.
Oxonian philosophers WOULD, out of etiquette, HARDLY quote from ‘unpublished’
material! Cohen had to rely on memory, and that’s why he got all his Grice
wrong! And so did Strawson in “If and the horseshoe.” Even Walker responding to
Cohen is relying on memory. FEW *philosophers* quoted from The logic of
grammar. At Oxford, everybody knew what Grice was up to. Hare was talking
‘implicature’ in Mind in 1967, and Pears was talking ‘conversational
implicature’ in “Ifs and cans.” And Platts was dedicating a full chapter to
“Causal Theory of Perception.” It seems the Oxonian etiquette was to quote from
“Causal Theory.” It was obvious that Grice’s implication excursus had to read
‘implicature’! In a few dictionaries of philosophy, such as Hamlyn’s, under
‘implication,’ a reference to Grice’s locus classicus “Causal Theory” is made –
Passmore quotes from “Causal theory” in “Hundred years of philosophy.” Very few
Oxonians would care to buy a volume published in Encino! NOT many Oxonian
philosophers ever quoted "The logic of grammar," though. At Oxford,
Grice's implicata remained part of the unwritten doctrines of a few. And
philosophers would NOT cite a cajoled essay in the references.
1967. Further
notes on logic and conversation, in Studies in the Way of
Words, published in Peter Cole, Pragmatics, for Academic Press,
London, in Part I, "Logic and Conversation," Essay 3, from P.
Cole, Pragmatics, pp. 113-27, The H. P Grice Papers, Series II (Essays),
Carton 2-Folder 24, and Series V (Topical), Carton 7-Folder 13, 'Irony,
Stress, and Truth,' BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The
University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Modified Occam's
razor, implicature. The essay had circulated since the Harvard days, and
it was also reprinted by Peter Cole in his Pragmatics for Academic
Press. "Personally, I prefer 'dialectica.'" -- Grice. This
is the third William James lecture at Harvard. It is particularly useful
for Grice's introduction of his 'razor,' "M. O. R.," or
"Modified Occam's Razor," jocularly expressed by Grice
as: "Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.” An Englishing
of the Ockham's Latinate, "Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter
necessitatem." But what do we mean 'sense'. Surely Occam was right
with his Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. We need to translate
that alla 'linguistic turn.' Grice jokes: "Senses are not be multiplied
beyond necessity." He also considers irony, stress, and truth, which the
Grice Papers have under a special folder in the Series V (Topical). Three
topics where the IMPLICATUM helps. "He is a scoundrel" may well
be the IMPLICATUM of "He is a fine friend." But cfr. the
pretense theory of irony. Grice, being a classicist, loved the etymological
connection. With Stress, he was concerned with anti-Gettier uses of
emphatic 'know': "I KNOW." (Implicatum: I do have conclusive
evidence"). "Truth" (or "... is true") sprang
from Grice's attention to that infamous Bristol symposium between Austin and
Strawson. Grice wants to defend Austin's correspondence theory against
Strawson's 'performative' approach. If "... is true" IMPLICATES
"someone previously affirmed this," that does not mean a 'ditto'
IMPLICATUM is part of the ENTAILMENT of a "... is true"
utterance. 1967 -- 1978. Further notes on logic and conversation, in
Peter Cole (1978), repr. in a revised form in Grice (1989), 1967, further notes
on logic and conversation, keywords: Modified Occam's Razor, irony, stress,
truth. The preferred citation should be Grice 1967:III. This is
originally the third William James lecture, in a revised form. In that
lecture, Grice introduced the "M. O. R.," or Modified Occam's
Razor: "Senses are not be multiplied beyond necessity."
The point is that "ENTAILMENT-CUM-IMPLICATUM" does the job
that MULTIPLIED SENSES should not do! The Grice Papers contains in a
different folder the concluding section for that lecture, on irony, stress, and
truth. Grice went back to the Modified Occam’s razor, but was never able
to formalise it! It is, as he concedes, almost a ‘vacuous’ methodological
‘thingy’! It is interesting that the way he DEFINES the alethic value of true
alrady cites 'satisfactory': " I shall use, to name such a property,
not 'true' but 'factually satisfactory'." Grice's sympathies don't
lie with Strawson's Ramsey-based redundance-theory of truth, but rather with
Tarski's theory of correspondence. He goes on to claim his trust in the
feasibility of such a theory. It is, indeed, possible to construct a
theory which treats truth as (primarily) a property, not 'true' but 'factually
satisfactory'." One may see that point above as merely verbal and not
involving any serious threat. Let's ALSO assume that it will be a
CONSEQUENCE, or theorem, of such a theory that there will be a class C of
utterances (utterances of affirmative subject-predicate sentences [such as snow
is white or the cat is on the mat of the dog is hairy-coated such that each
member of C designates or refers to some item and indicates or predicates some
CLASS (these verbs to be explained within the theory), and is factually
satisfactory if the item belongs to the class.Let us also assume
that there can be a method of introducing a form of expression, 'it is true
that ...'/'it is buletic that ...' and linking it with the notion of
"factually or alethic or doxastic satisfactory," a consequence of which
will be that to say 'it is true that Smith is happy' will be equivalent to
saying that ANY utterance of class C which designates Smith and indicates the
class of happy people is factually satisfactory (that is, any utterance which
assigns Smith to the class of happy people is factually satisfactory. Mutatis
mutandis for Let Smith be happy, and buletic satisfactoriness. The move is
Tarskian. The two standard truth definitions are at first glance not
definitions of truth at all, but definitions of a more complicated relation
involving assignments of objects to variables: "a satisfies the
formula F, where the symbol ‘ where FF’ is a
placeholder for a name of a particular formula of the object language). In fact
satisfaction reduces to truth in this sense: aa satisfies the
formula FF if and only if taking each free variable in FF as a name of the object assigned to it by aa makes the formula FF into a true
sentence. So it follows that our intuitions about when a sentence is true can
guide our intuitions about when an assignment SATISFIES a formula. But none of
this can enter into the formal definition of truth, because ‘taking a variable
as a name of an object’ is a semantic notion, and Tarski’s truth definition has
to be built only on notions from syntax and set theory (together with those in
the object-language); In fact Tarski’s reduction goes in the other direction:
if the formula FF has no free variables, to say
that FF is true is to say that every assignment SATISFIES
it. The reason why Tarski defines SATISFACTION directly, and then deduces a
definition of truth, is that 'satisfaction obeys recursive conditions in
the following way. if FF is a compound
formula, to know which assignments satisfy FF, it’s enough to know
which assignments satisfy the immediate constituents of FF. Here are two typical examples: The
assignment a satisfies the formula ‘ F and GG’ if and only if aa satisfies FF and aa satisfies GG. The
assignment aa satisfies the formula ‘For all xx, GG’ if and only if for
every individual ii, if bb is the
assignment that assigns ii to the
variable xx and is otherwise exactly like aa, then bb satisfies GG. We have to use a different approach for atomic
formulas. But for these, at least assuming for simplicity that LL has no function symbols, we can use the
metalanguage copies #(R)#(R) of the predicate
symbols RR of the object language. Thus The assignment aa SATSIFIES the formula R(x,y)R(x,y) if and only if #(R)(a(x),a(y))#(R)(a(x),a(y)). (Warning: the
expression ## is in the meta-meta-language, not in the
meta-language MM. We may or may not be able to find a
formula of MM that expresses ## for predicate
symbols; it depends on exactly what the language LL is.). Subject
to this or that mild reservation, Tarski’s definition of SATISFACTION is compositional,
meaning that the class of assignments which SATISFY a compound
formula FF is determined solely by (1) the
syntactic rule used to construct FF from its
immediate constituents and (2) the classes of assignments that satisfy these
immediate constituents. This is sometimes phrased loosely as: 'satisfaction' is
defined recursively. But this formulation misses the central point, that the
above don’t contain any syntactic information about the immediate constituents.
Compositionality explains why Tarski switches from 'true' to 'satisfied.' You
can’t define whether ‘For all x,Gx,G’ is true in terms
of whether GG is true, because in general GG has a free variable xx and so it isn’t
either true or false. The reservation is that Tarski’s definition of
satisfaction in Tarski's essay doesn’t in fact mention the class of assignments
that 'satisfy' a formula FF. Instead, as we saw,
he defines the relation ‘aa 'satisfies' FF’, which determines what that class is. This is probably
the main reason why some people (including Tarski himself in conversation have
preferred NOT to describe the definition as compositional. But the class
format, which is compositional on any reckoning, does appear in an early
variant of the truth definition in Tarski’s essay on definable sets of real
numbers. Tarski had a good reason for preferring the format ‘aa satisfies FF’ in his essay, viz.
that it allowed him to reduce the set-theoretic requirements of the truth
definition. He spells out these requirements carefully. The name
‘compositional(ity)’ first appears in papers of Putnam in 1960 (published 1975)
and Katz and Fodor in 1963 on natural language semantics. In talking about
compositionality, we have moved to thinking of Tarski’s definition as a
semantics, i.e. a way of assigning ‘meanings’ to formulas. Here we take the
meaning of a sentence to be its truth value. Compositionality means essentially
that the meanings assigned to formulas give at least enough
information to determine the truth values of sentences containing them. One can
ask conversely whether Tarski’s semantics provides only as much
information as we need about each formula, in order to reach the truth
values of sentences. If the answer is yes, we say that the semantics is fully
abstract (for truth). One can show fairly easily, for any of the
standard languages of logic, that Tarski’s definition of satisfaction is in
fact fully abstract. As it stands, Tarski’s definition of
"satisfaction" is not an explicit definition, because
"satisfaction" for one formula is defined in terms of
"satisfaction" for other formulas. So to show that it is formally
correct, we need a way of converting it to an explicit definition. One way to
do this is as follows, using either higher order logic or set theory. Suppose
we write SS for a binary relation between assignments and
formulas. We say that SS is a satisfaction
relation if for every formula G,SG,S meets the
conditions put for SATISFACTION of GG by Tarski’s
definition. For example, if GG is ‘G1G1 and G2G2’, SS should satisfy the following condition for every
assignment aa: S(a,G) if and only
if S(a,G1) and S(a,G2).S(a,G) if and only
if S(a,G1) and S(a,G2). We can define
‘'SATISFACTION' relation’ formally, using the recursive clauses and the
conditions for atomic formulas in Tarski’s recursive definition. Now we prove,
by induction on the complexity of formulas, that there is exactly one
satisfaction relation SS. (There are some
technical subtleties, but it can be done.) Finally we define aa satisfies FF if and only if:
there is a satisfaction relation SS such that S(a,F)S(a,F). It is then a technical exercise to show that
this definition of satisfaction is materially adequate. Actually one must first
write out the counterpart of Convention TT for satisfaction
of formulas, but I leave this to the reader. The remaining truth
definition in Tarski’s 1933 paper – the third as they appear in the paper – is
really a bundle of related truth definitions, all for the same object
language LL but in different
interpretations. The quantifiers of LL are assumed to
range over a particular class, call it AA; in fact they are
second order quantifiers, so that really they range over the collection of
subclasses of AA. The class AA is not named explicitly in the object language, and
thus one can give separate truth definitions for different values of AA, as Tarski proceeds to do. So for this section of the
paper, Tarski allows one and the same sentence to be given different
interpretations; this is the exception to the general claim that his object
language sentences are fully interpreted. But Tarski stays on the straight and
narrow: he talks about ‘truth’ only in the special case where AA is the class of all individuals. For other values
of AA, he speaks not of ‘truth’ but of ‘correctness in the
domain AA’.These truth or correctness definitions don’t fall out
of a definition of "satisfaction." In fact they go by a much less
direct route, which Tarski describes as a ‘purely accidental’ possibility that
relies on the ‘specific peculiarities’ of the particular object
language. there is no hope of giving a definition of satisfaction by
recursion on the complexity of formulas. The remedy is to note that the explicit form
of Tarski’s truth definition in Section 2.1 above didn’t require a recursive
definition; it needed only that the conditions on the satisfaction
relation SS pin it down uniquely. For
Henkin’s first style of language this is still true, though the reason is no
longer the well-foundedness of the syntax. For Henkin’s second style of
language, at least in Hintikka’s notation (see the entry on independence friendly logic),
the syntax is well-founded, but the displacement of the quantifier scopes means
that the usual quantifier clauses in the definition of satisfaction no longer
work. How can we analyze atisfaction? The answer to this question is in
some ways reminiscent to our answer of how to construct a theory of truth for a
language with only finitely many sentences. So see how, first suppose that our
language has only three names and three predicates, ‘Bob’, ‘Jane’, and ‘Nancy’
and ‘is nice’, ‘is mean,’ and ‘is lazy.’ We can then give the following
analyses of designation and satisfaction
for
the language: Definition of satisfaction an object o satisfies a predicate p
≡df [(p=“is nice” and o is nice) ∨
(n=“is mean” and o is mean) ∨ (n=“is lazy” and o is lazy)] You
should notice that there is an analogy between the material adequacy constraint
which Tarski set on the theory of truth, and similar constraints which we
should expect our definitions of designation and satisfaction to meet. Just as
a theory of truth for a language should imply every instance of ‘S’ is true in
L iff S so we should expect our theories of designation and satisfaction to
imply every instance of the following two schemata: ‘n’ designates o in L iff o
= n o satisfies ‘is F’ in L iff o is F Tarski’s definition as a definition of
truth, designation, and satisfaction for a language which makes no use of
concepts other than those employed in the language itself. H
1967. Indicative conditionals, the fourth William James lecture, in Studies in the Way of Words. Indicative conditionals, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part I ("Logic and Conversation"), Essay IV, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6-Folder 29, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: unary functor, not, binary functor, and, or, if, Cook Wilson. In "Prolegomena," Grice had quoted verbatim from Strawson's infamous idea that there is a SENSE of inferrability with 'if.' While the lecture covers much more than 'if' ("He only said 'if';" "Oh, no, he said a great deal more than that!," the title was never meant to be original. Grice in fact provides a rational justification for the three connectives ("and," "or," and "if") and before that, the unary functor "not." Embedding, Indicative conditionals: embedding, 1971, "Not" and "If," Michael Sinton on "Grice on Denials of Indicative Conditionals," keywords: "not," "if." Strawson had elaborated on what he felt was a divergence between Whitehead's and Russell's 'horseshoe,' and 'if.' Grice thought Strawson's observations could be understood in terms of ENTAILMENT + IMPLICATUM ("Robbing Peter to Pay Paul"). But problems, as first noted to Grice, by L. J. Cohen, of Oxford, remain, when it comes to the scope of the implicatum within the operation of, say, 'negation.' Analogous problems arise with implicata for the other earlier dyadic functors, "and" and "or," and Grice looks for a single explanation of the phenomenon. The qualification 'indicative' is modal. "Ordinary language" allows for 'if' utterances to be in modes other than the imperative. "Counter-factual," if you need to be philosophical krypto-technical, 'subjective' is you are more of a classicist! Grice took a cavalier to the problem: Surely it won’t do to say “You couldn’t have done that, since you were in Seattle,” to someone who figuratively tells you he’s spend the full summer cleaning the Aegean stables. THIS IS THE CENTRAL PIECE of the lectures. Grice takes good care of “not,” “and,” “or,” and concludes with the “if” of the ‘title.’ For each, he finds a métier, alla Cook Wilson in “Statement and Inference.” And they all connect with RATIONALITY. So he is using material from his Oxford seminars on the principle of conversational helpfulness. Plus Cook Wilson makes more sense at Oxford than at Harvard! The last bit, citing Kripke and Dummett, is meant as jocular. What is important is the ‘teleological’ approach to the operators. AND A NOTE SHOULD BE MADE ABOUT DYADICITY. In “Prolegomena,” when he introduces the topic, he OMITS “not” (about which he was almost obsessed!). He just gives an example for “and” (He went to bed and took off his dirty boots”), one for “or” (the garden becomes Oxford and the kitchen becomes London, and the implicatum is in terms, oddly, of ‘ignorance’: “My wife is either in Town OR Country,”making fun of “Town AND Country”), and “if”. His favourite illustration for “if” is Cock Robin: "If the Sparrow did not kill him, the Lark did!” This is because Grice is serious about the EROTETIC (i.e. question/answer) format Cook Wilson gives to things, but he manages to bring Philonian and Megarian into the picture, just to impress! MOST IMPORTANTLY, he introduces the SQUARE BRACKETS! He’ll use them again in “Presupposition and Conversational Implicature” and turns them into subscripts in “Vacuous Names.” This is CENTRAL. For he wants to impoverish the idea of the implicatum. The explicitum is minimal, and any divergence is syntactic-cum-pragmatic ‘import’. The scope devices are syntactic and eliminable, and as he knows: what the eye no longer sees, the heart no longer grieves for! The modal implicatum. Since Grice uses ‘indicative,’ for the title of his third William James lecture ("Indicative Conditionals") surely he implicates 'subjunctive' -- i.e. that someone might be thinking that he should give an account of indicative*-cum-subjective* 'if.' This relates to an example Grice gives in “Causal Theory,” that he does not reproduce in “Prolegomena." Grice states the philosophical mistake as follows: “What is actual is *not* also possible.” Grice seems to be suggesting that a subjective conditional would involve “one or other of the modalities,” he is NOT interested in exploring! On the other hand, J. L. Mackie has noted that Grice’s conversationalist hypothesis (Mackie quotes verbatim from Grice’s “principle of conversational helpfulness”) allows for an explanation of the subjective “if” that does not involve Kripke-type paradoxes involving possible worlds, or other. In “Causal Theory,” Grice writes: “The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one." “There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind."“An examples which occurs to me is the following.’ "What is actual is *not* also possible." “I must emphasise that I am not saying that [this example is] importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, [it] may be." “To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing." “I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre." “I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts." “Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic NUANCES which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what SORT of nuances they are!”
1967. Utterer's meaning and
intentions, repr. in Studies in the Way of Words, Utterer's meaning and
intentions, the fifth William James lecture, Part I, "Logic and
conversation," Essay 5, The Philosophical Review, vol. 72 (issue
2), pp. 147-77, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays) Carton
1-Folders 28-30, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. Keywords: utterer's meaning, intention. Grice
is not an animist. While he allows for natural phenomena to mean ("smoke means
fire"), 'meaning' is best ascribed to some utterer, where this 'meaning'
is nothing but the intentions behind his utterance. This is the fifth
William James lecture. Grice was careful enough to submit it to "The
Philosophical Review," since it is a strictly philosophical development of
the views expressed in "Meaning" which Strawson had submitted on
Grice's behalf to the same "Review" and which had had a series of
responses by various philosophers. Among these philosophers is Strawson himself
in "Intention and convention in the the theory of speech acts," also
in "The Philosophical Review." Grice quotes from very many other
philosophers in this essay, including: J. O. Urmson, D. W. Stampe, P. F.
Strawson, S. R. Schiffer, and J. R. Searle. P. F. Strawson is
especially relevant since he started a series of alleged counter-examples with
his infamous example of the 'rat-infested house.' Grice particularly
treasured Stampe's alleged counter-example involving his beloved bridge! Anita
Avramides wrote her Oxon D. Phil on that, under Strawson! This is Grice's
occasion to address some of the criticisms -- in the form of alleged
counter-examples, typically, as his later reflections on epagoge versus diagoge
note -- by J. O. Urmson, P. F. Strawson,and other philosophers associated with
Oxford, such as J. R. Searle, D. W. Stampe, and S. R. Schiffer. The final
'analysandum' is pretty complex (of the type that he did find his analysis of
"I am hearing a sound" complex in "Personal identity" -- "hardly
an obstacle for adopting it!" --), it became yet another target of attack
by especially New-World philosophers in the pages of Mind, Nous, and other
journals. 1967. Utterer’s meaning and intentions, The
Philosophical Review, repr. in Grice (1989), 1967, utterer's meaning and
intentions, The Philosophical Review, keywords: utterer's meaning,
intention. This is officially the fifth William James lecture. Grice takes up
the analysis of 'meaning' he had presented back in 1948 at the Oxford
Philosophical Society. Motivated mainly by J. O. Urmson's and Strawson's attack
in "Intention and convention in speech acts," that offered an alleged
counter-example to the sufficiency of Grice's analysis, Grice ends up
introducing so many intention that he almost trembled. He ends up seeing 'meaning'
as a 'value-paradeigmatic' concept, perhaps never realisable in a sublunary
way. But it is the analysis in this particular essay where he is at his formal
best. He distinguishes between protreptic and exhibitive utterances, and also
modes of correlation (iconic, conventional). He symbolises the utterer and the
addressee, and generalises over the type of psychological state, attitude, or
stance, "meaning" seems to range (notably indicative vs. imperative).
He formalises the 'reflexive' intention, and more importantly, the 'overtness'
of communication in terms of a self-referential recursive intention that
disallows any 'sneaky' intention to be brought into the picture of
meaning-constitutive intentions. By uttering x the utterer U means that *psi p
iff (E.phi) (Ef) (Ec): I. The utterer U utters x intending x to be such that
anyone who has phi will think that (i) x has f (ii) f is correlated in
way c with psi-ing that p (iii) (E.phi'): U intends x to be such that
anyone who has phi' will think, via thinking (i) and (ii), that U psi-s that
p (iv) in view of (3), U psi-s that p; and II (operative only
for certain substituends for "*psi") U utters x intending that,
should there actually be anyone who has phi, he will, via thinking (iv),
himself psi that p; and III. It is not the case that, for some
inference-element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has phi will
both (i') rely on E in coming to psi (or think that U psi-s) that p
and (ii') think that (E. phi'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has
phi' will come to psi (or think that U psi-s) that p without relying on
E. Grice thought he had dealt with “Logic and Conversation” enough! So he
feels of revising his “Meaning.” After all, Strawson had had the cheek to
publish Grice’s Meaning and then go on to criticize it in “Intention and
Convention in Speech Acts.” So this is Grice’s revenge, and he wins! He ends
with the most elaborate theory of ‘mean’ that an Oxonian could ever hope for.
And to provoke the informalists such as Strawson (and his ‘disciples’ at Oxford
– “led” by Strawson) he pours existential quantifiers like the plague! He
manages to quote from J. O. Urmson, whom he loved! No word on Peirce, though,
who had originated all this! His implicature: “I’m not going to be reprimanted
‘in informal discussion’ about my misreading Peirce at Harvard!” The concluding
note is about ‘artificial substitutes’ for iconic representation, and meaning
as a ‘human institution.’ Very grand!
1967. Utterer's meaning,
sentence-meaning, and word-meaning, repr. in Studies in the Way of Words,
the sixth William James lecture, Part I, "Logic and conversation,"
Essay 6, The Foundations of Language, pp. 225-42, The H. P. Grice
Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 1-Folder 27, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft
Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: utterer's meaning,
sentence-meaning, word-meaning. The phrase 'utterer' is meant to provoke.
Grice thinks that 'speaker' is too narrow. "Surely you can mean by just
UTTERING stuff!" This is the sixth William James lecture, as
published in "The Foundations of Language." As it happens, it became
a popular lecture, seeing that J. R. Searle selected this from the whole set
for his Oxford reading in philosophy, "The philosophy of language.” It is
also the essay cited by Chomsky in his influential John Locke
lectures. Chomsky takes Grice to be a 'behaviourist,' even along Skinner's
lines, which provoked a reply by Suppes, later reprinted in P. G. R. I. C. E.,
or Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends. (In
The New World, the "H. P." was often given in a more
"simplified" form.). Grice wants to keep on playing. In
"Meaning," he had said "x means that p" is surely reducible
to utterer U means that p. In this lecture, he lectures us as to how to
proceed. In so doing he invents this or that procedure: some basic, some
resultant. When Chomsky reads the reprint in Searle's Philosophy of Language,
he cries: "Behaviourist! Skinnerian!" It was Suppes who comes to
Grice's defence. "Surely the way Grice uses expressions like 'resultant'
procedure are never meant in the strict 'behaviourist' way." Suppes
concludes that it is much fairer to characterise Grice as an 'intentionalist.'
1967. Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning,' published in
The Foundations of Language, ed. by J. F. Staal, The Grice Papers, Repr.in
J. R. Searle, The Philosophy of Language, Oxford, 1967, Utterer's meaning,
sentence-meaning, and word-meaning, the sixth William James Lecture,
Foundations of Language, keywords: utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning,
word-meaning, resultant procedure, basic procedure. Staal asked Grice to
publish the sixth William James lecture for a newish periodical publication of
whose editorial board he was a member. The fun thing is Grice complied! This is
Grice’s shaggy-dog story. He does not seem too concerned about ‘resultant’
procedures. As he’ll later say, “Surely I can create Deutero-Esperanto and
become its master!” For Grice, the primacy is the idiosyncratic, particularized
utterer in THIS or THAT occasion. He KNOWS a philosopher CRAVES for generality,
so he provokes the generality-searcher with divisions and sub-divisions of
‘mean.’ But his heart does not seem to be there, and he is just being
overformalistic and technical for the sake of it. “I am glad that Putnam, of
all people, told me in an aside, “You’re being too formal, Grice”. I stopped
with symbolism since!”
1967. Some models for implicature,
in Studies in the Way of Words, the seventh William James
lecture, Part I, "Logic and Conversation," Essay VI, The H. P.
Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. A rather obscure exploration on the connection of
semiotics and philosophical psychology. Grice is aware that there is an allegation
in the air about a possible 'vicious' circle in trying to define 'category of
expression' in terms of a 'category of representation.' He does not provide a
solution to the problem which he'll take up in his "Method in
philosophical psychology," in his role of President of the American
Philosophical Association. It is THE IMPLICATURE behind the lecture that
matters, since Grice will go back to it, notably in the Retrospective Epilogue.
For Grice, it’s all rational enough. There’s a pirot, in a situation, say of
Danger – a bull --. He perceives the bull. The bull’s attack CAUSES this
perception. “Bull!” the pirot screams, and causes in Pirot 2 a rearguard
movement. So where is the circularity? Some pedants would have it that “Bull”
cannot be understood in a belief about a BULL which is about a BULL. Not Grice!
It is nice that he brought back ‘implicature,’ which had become obliterated in
the lectures, back to ‘title’ position! But it is also noteworthy, that these
are not explicitly RATIONALIST models for implicature. He had played with a
‘model,’ and an explanatory one at that, for implicature, in his Oxford
seminar, in terms of a principle of conversational helpfulness, a desideratum
of conversational clarity, a desideratum of conversational candour, and two
sub-principles: a principle of conversational benevolence, and a principle of
conversational self-interest! Surely Harvard could be spared of the details!
1969.
Identificatory and non-identificatory uses of definite description, Grice on
“the,” Grice on “not,” “System G,” Vacuous names, in Davidson and
Hintikka, Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V.
Quine, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 118-45. The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II
(Essays), Carton 1-Folder 31, and Carton 2-Folders 1-4, BANC MSS 90/135c, The
Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords:
vacuous name, identificatory, non-identificatory, definite
description. Grice's favourite vacuous name is
Bellerophon. This is an essay commissioned by Donald Davison and
Jaako Hintikka for "Words and objects: essays in the work of W. V.
Quine" for Reidel. "Words and objects" had appeared
(without Grice's contribution) as a special issue of "Synthese."
Grice's contribution, along with Quine's "Reply” to Grice," appeared
only in the reprint of that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht. Grice
cites from various philosophers (and logicians -- this was the time when logic
was starting to be taught OUTSIDE philosophy departments, or 'sub-faculties'),
such as G. Myro, B. Mates, K. S. Donnellan, P. F.
Strawson, Grice was particularly proud to be able to quote Mates "by
mouth or book." Grice takes the opportunity, in his tribute to Quine,
to introduce one of two of his syntactical devices to allow for conversational
implicata to be given maximal scope. The device in "Vacuous
Names" is a subscription device to indicate the ordering of introduction
of this or that operation. Grice wants to give room for utterances of a
special 'existential' kind be deemed rational/reasonable, provided the principle
of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the addressee to be followed by
the utterer. "Someone isn't attending the party organised by the
Merseyside Geographical Society." "That is Marmaduke Bloggs, who
climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees." "But who, as it
happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at the Merseyside
Newsletter." 1969, in Donald Davidson and Jaako Hintikka, Words
and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1969, Vacuous
names, The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), BANC MSS 90/135c, Berkeley,
keywords: identificatory use, non-identificatory use, subscript device.
Davidson and Hintikka were well aware of the 'New-World' impact of the
'Old-World' ideas displayed by Grice and Strawson in their attack to
Quine. Quine had indeed addressed Grice's and Strawson's 'sophisticated'
version of the paradigm-case argument in "Word and Object."
Davidson and Hintikka arranged to publish a special issue for a periodical
publication, to which P. F. Strawson had already contributed. It was only
natural, when Davidson and Hintikka were informed by Reidel of their interest
in turning the special issue into a separate volume, that they would approach
the other infamous member of the dynamic duo! Commissioned by Donald
Davidson and J. Hintikka for Words and objections: essays on the work
of W. V. Quine. Grice introduces a subscript device to account for
'implicata' of utterances like "Marmaduke Bloggs won't be attending
the party; he was invented by the journalists." In the later section,
he explores identificatory and non identificatory uses of 'the' without
involving himself in the problems Donnellan did! Some philosophers,
notably Ostertag, have found the latter section the most intriguing bit, and
thus Ostertag cared to reprint the section on Descriptions for his edited MIT
volume on the topic. The essay is structured very systematically with an
initial section on a calculus alla Gentzen, followed by implicata of vacuous
names such as "Marmaduke Bloggs," to end with definite descriptions
(repr. by Ostertag) and psychological predicates. It’s best to focus
on a few things here. First his imaginary dialogues on MARMADUKE BLOGGS,
brilliant! Second, this as a preamble to his “Presupposition and conversational
implicature.” There is a quantifier phrase (‘the’) and two uses of it: one is
an IDENTIFICATORY use (“the haberdasher is clumsy,” or “THE haberdasher is
clumsy,” as Grice prefers) and then there’s a derived, NON-IDENTIFICATORY use:
‘the’ haberdasher (whoever she was!) shows her clumsiness. The use of the
numeric subscripts were complicated enough to delay the publication of this.
The whole thing was a special issue of a journal. Grice’s contribution came
when Reidel turned that into a volume. Grice later replaced his numeric
subscript device by square brackets. Perhaps the square brackets are not subtle
enough, though. Grice’s contribution, ‘Vacuous Names,’ (later reprinted in
part in Ostertag’s volume on Definite descriptions) concludes with an exploration
of “the” phrases, and further on, with some intriguing remarks on the subtle
issues surrounding the scope of an ascription of a predicate standing for a
psychological state or attitude. Grice’s choice of an ascription now
notably involves an ‘opaque’ (rather than ‘factive,’ like ‘know’) psychological
state or attitude: ‘wanting,’ which he symbolizes as “W.” Grice
considers a quartet of utterances: Jack wants someone to marry him; Jack wants
someone or other to marry him; Jack wants a particular
person to marry him, and There is someone whom Jack wants to
marry him.Grice notes that “there are clearly at least *two*
possible readings” of an utterance like our (i): a first reading “in which,” as
Grice puts it, (i) might be paraphrased by (ii).” A second reading is
one “in which it might be paraphrased by (iii) or by (iv).” Grice
goes on to symbolize the phenomenon in his own version of a first-order
predicate calculus. ‘Ja wants that p’ becomes Wjap where ‘ja’ stands
for the individual constant “Jack” as a super-script attached to the predicate
standing for Jack’s psychological state or attitude. Grice writes: “Using the
apparatus of classical predicate logic, we might hope to represent,”
respectively, the external reading and the internal reading (involving an intentio
secunda or intentio obliqua) as (Ǝx)WjaFxja and Wja(Ǝx)Fxja.
Grice then goes on to discuss a slightly more complex, or oblique, scenario
involving this second internal reading, which is the one that interests us, as
it involves an ‘intentio seconda.’Grice notes: “But suppose that Jack wants a
specific individual, Jill, to marry him, and this because Jack has been
“*deceived* into thinking that his friend Joe has a highly delectable sister
called Jill, though in fact Joe is an only child.” The Jill Jack eventually
goes up the hill with is, coincidentally, another Jill, possibly
existent. Let us recall that Grice’s main focus of the whole essay is, as the
title goes, ‘emptiness’! “In these circumstances, one is inclined to say that
(i) is true only on reading (vii),” where the existential
quantifier occurs within the scope of the psychological-state or
-attitude verb, “but we cannot now represent (ii) or (iii), with
‘Jill’ being vacuous, by (vi),” where the existential quantifier (Ǝx)
occurs outside the scope of the psychological-attitude
verb, want, “since [well,] Jill does not really exist,” except as a
figment of Jack’s imagination. In a manoeuver that I interpret as ‘purely
intentionalist,’ and thus favouring by far Suppes’s over Chomsky’s characterisation
of Grice as a mere ‘behaviourist,’ Grice hopes that “we should be
provided with distinct representations for two familiar
readings” of, now: Jack wants Jill to marry him and Jack wants ‘Jill’ to marry
him. It is at this point that Grice applies a syntactic scope notation
involving sub-scripted numerals, (ix) and (x), where the numeric values
merely indicate the order of introduction of the symbol to which it is attached
in a deductive schema for the predicate calculus in question. Only the first
formulation represents the internal reading (where ‘ji’ stands for ‘Jill’): W2ja4F1ji3ja4 and
W3ja4F2ji1ja4. Note
that in the second formulation, the individual constant for “Jill,” ‘ji,’ is
introduced prior to ‘want,’ – ‘ji’’s sub-script is 1, while ‘W’’s sub-script is
the higher numerical value 3. Grice notes: “Given that Jill does not exist,”
only the internal reading “can be true,” or alethically satisfactory.
Grice sums up his reflections on the representation of the opaqueness of a verb
standing for a psychological state or attitude like that expressed by ‘wanting’
with one observation that further marks him as an intentionalist, almost of a
Meinongian type. He is willing to allow for ‘existential’ phrases in cases of
‘vacuous’ designata, provided they occur within opaque psychological-state or
attitude verbs, and he thinks that by doing this, he is being faithful to the
richness and exuberance of ‘ordinary’ discourse, while keeping Quine happy. As
Grice puts it, “we should also have available to us also three neutral,
yet distinct, (Ǝx)-quantificational forms (together with their isomorphs),” as
a philosopher who thinks that Wittgenstein denies a distinction, craves for a
generality! “Jill” now becomes “x.” W4ja5Ǝx3F1x2ja5, Ǝx5W2ja5F1x4ja3, Ǝx5W3ja4F1x2ja4.
As Grice notes, since in (xii) the individual variable ‘x’ (ranging over
‘Jill’) “does not dominate the segment following the ‘(Ǝx)’
quantifier, the formulation does not display any ‘existential’
or de re, ‘force,’ and is suitable therefore for representing the internal
readings (ii) or (iii), “if we have to allow, as we do have, if we want to
faithfully represent ‘ordinary’ discourse, for the possibility of expressing
the fact that a particular person, Jill, does not actually exist.” At least
Grice does not write, “really,” for he knew that Austin detested a ‘trouser
word’! Grice concludes that (xi) and (xiii) “will be derivable” from each of
(ix) and (x), while (xii) will be “derivable only” from (ix). Grice had been
Strawson’s logic tutor at St. John’s (Mabbott was teaching the grand stuff!)
and it shows! One topic that especially concerned Grice relates to the
introduction and elimination rules, as he later searches for 'generic'
satisfactoriness. Grice
wonders "[W]hat should be said of Takeuti's conjecture (roughly)
that the nature of the introduction rule determines the character of
the elimination rule? There seems to be
no particular problem about allowing an introduction rule which tells
us that, if it is established in X's 'personalized' system that φ, then
'it is necessary with respect to X that φ ' is true (establishable). The
accompanying elimination rule is, however, slightly less promising. If we
suppose such a rule to tell us that, if one is committed to the idea that it is
necessary with respect to X that φ, then one is also committed to whatever is
expressed by φ, we shall be in trouble; for such a rule is not acceptable; φ
will be a volitive expression such as "let it be that X eats his
hat"; and my commitment to the idea that X's system requires him to eat
his hat does not ipso facto involve me in accepting (volitively) "let X
eat his hat". But if we take the elimination rule rather as telling us
that, if it is necessary with respect to X that let X eat his hat, then
"let X eat his hat" possesses satisfactoriness-with-respect-to-X, the
situation is easier; for this version of the rule seems inoffensive, even for
Takeuti, we hope.
1969. Logico-semantic
paradoxes, The Grice Papers, BANC MSS
90/135c. Keywords: logico-semantic paradox. Some of the
paradoxes of entailment, entailment and paradoxes. This is not the first time
Grice uses 'paradox.' As a classicist, he was aware of the nuances between
'paradox' (or 'paradoxon,' as he preferred, via Latin 'paradoxum,' and
'aporia,' for example. He was interested in Strawson's treatment of this or
that 'paradox of entailment.' He even called his own paradox involving
"if" and probablility "Grice's paradox." In "Grice's
paradox," Grice invites us to supposes that two chess players, Yog
and Zog, play 100 games under the following conditions: (1) Yog is white
nine of ten times. (2) There are no draws. And the results are: (1)
Yog, when white, won 80 of 90 games. (2) Yog, when black, won zero of ten
games. This implies that: (i) 8/9 times, if Yog was white, Yog won.
(ii) 1/2 of the time, if Yog lost, Yog was black. (iii) 9/10 that either Yog
wasn't white or he won. From these statements, it might appear one could
make these deductions by contraposition and conditional disjunction: ([a]
from [ii]) If Yog was white, then 1/2 of the time Yog won. ([b] from [iii])
9/10 times, if Yog was white, then he won. But both (a) and (b) are
untrue—they contradict (i). In fact, (ii) and (iii) don't provide enough
information to use Bayesian reasoning to reach those conclusions. That might be
clearer if (i)-(iii) had instead been stated like so: (i) When Yog was
white, Yog won 8/9 times. (No information is given about when Yog was black.)
(ii) When Yog lost, Yog was black 1/2 the time. (No information is given about when
Yog won.) (iii) 9/10 times, either Yog was black and won, Yog was black and
lost, or Yog was white and won. (No information is provided on how the 9/10 is
divided among those three situations.) Grice's paradox shows that the
exact meaning of statements involving conditionals and probabilities is more
complicated than may be obvious on casual examination.
1970. “Smith has not ceased
from beating his wife,” presupposition and conversational implicature, in Peter
Cole, Radical pragmatics, Academic Press, London, 1981, pp. 183-97, repr. in a
revised form in Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, in Part II, Explorations in
semantics and metaphysics, Essay, presupposition and implicature, The H. P.
Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 2-Folder 25, and Series V (Topical),
Carton 9-Folder 3, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. Keywords: presupposition, conversational implicature,
implicature, Strawson. Grice: “The loyalty examiner won’t summon you, don’t
worry.” Grice's cancellation could be pretty subtle! “Well, the loyalty
examiner will not be summoning you at any rate.” "If," Grice notes,
"is is a matter of dispute whether the government has a very undercover
person who interrogates those whose loyalty is suspect and who, if he existed,
could be legitimately referred to as the loyalty examiner; and if, further, I
am known to be very sceptical about the existence of such a person, I could
perfectly well say to a plainly loyal person,” “Well, the loyalty examiner will
not be summoning you at any rate," “without, I would think, being taken to
imply that such a person exists." "Further, if I am well known to
disbelieve in the existence of such a person, though others are inclined to
believe in him, when I find a man who is apprised of my position, but who is
worried in case he is summoned, I could try to reassure him by saying,” “The
loyalty examiner won’t summon you, don’t worry." "Then it would be
clear that I said this because I was sure there is no such person." The
lecture given in 1970 was variously reprinted, but 1970 should remain the
preferred citation. There are divergences in the various drafts, though.
The original source of this exploration was a seminar. Grice is interested in
re-conceptualising Strawson's manoeuvre regarding 'presupposition' as involving
what Grice disregards as a metaphysical concoction: the truth-value gap. In
Grice's view, based on a principle of conversational 'tailoring' that falls
under his principle of conversational helpfulness -- indeed under the
desideratum of conversational clarity ("be perspicuous [sic]") --
'The king of France is bald' ENTAILS there is a king of France; while 'The king
of France ain't bald' merely IMPLICATES it. Grice much preferred
Collingwood's to Strawson's presuppositions! Grice thought, and rightly, too,
that if his notion of the conversational implicatum was to gain Oxonian
currency, it should supersede Strawson's idea of the 'prae-suppositum.'
Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with Quine's idea of a
'truth-value gap.' Grice shows that neither the metaphysical concoction of a
truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the 'prae-suppositum' is needed:
"The king of France is bald" ENTAILS 'There is a king of
France." "The king of France ain't bald” on the other hand, merely
IMPLICATES it, as a perfectly adequate cancellation, abiding with the principle
of conversational helpfulness" is in the offing: "The king of France
ain't bald. What made you think he is? For starters, he ain't real!" Grice
credits Hans Sluga for having pointed out to him the way to deal with
"the" formally. Grice opts for the Whiteheadian-Russellian standard
rendition, in terms of the iota operator. Grice's take on Strawson is a strong
one. "The king of France is bald" entails there is a king of France.
“The king of France ain't bald" does not; only implicates it. Grice knew
he was not exactly robbing Peter to pay Paul, or did he? It is worth placing
the 1970 lecture in context. Soon after delivering in the New World his
exploration on the implicatum, Grice has no better idea than to promote
Strawson's philosophy in the New World. Strawson will later reflect on the
colder shores of the Old World, so we know what Grice had in mind! Strawson's
main claim to fame in the New World (and at least Oxford in the Old World) was
his "On referring," where he had had the cheek to say that by
uttering, "The king of France is not bald," the utterer IMPLIES that
there is a king of France. Strawson later changed that to "the utterer
PRESUPPOSES." So Grice knew what and who he was dealing with! Grice and
Strawson had entertained Quine at Oxford, and Strawson was particularly keen on
that turn of phrase he learned from Quine, 'the truth-value gap.' Grice,
rather, found it pretty repulsive: “Tertium exclusum!" So, Grice goes on
to argue that by uttering 'The king of France is bald,' one of the ENTAILMENTS
of the proposition explicitly conveyed is indeed 'There is a king of France.'
However, in its negative co-relate, things change. By uttering 'The king of
France ain't bald,' the utterer merely IMPLICATES (in a pretty cancellable
format) that he believes there is a king of France. ("The king of France
ain't bald: there's no king of France!"). The loyalty examiner is like the
King of France, in ways! The piece is crucial for Grice’s re-introduction of
the SQUARE BRACKET device: [The king of France] is bald; [The King of France]
ain’t bald. Whatever falls within the scope of the square brackets is to be
read as having attained “common-ground status” and therefore, out of the
question, to use Collingwood’s jargon! Grice was VERY familiar with Collingwood
on presupposition, meant as an attack on Ayer. Collingwood’s reflections on
presuppositions being either relative or absolute may well lie behind Grice’s
metaphysical construction of absolute value! The earliest exploration by Grice
on this is his infamous, "Smith has not ceased from beating his
wife," discussed by Ewing in "Meaninglessness" for Mind in 1937!
Grice goes back to the example in the excursus on "implying that" in
"Causal Theory," and it is best to revisit this source. Note that in
the reprint in "Studies" Grice does NOT go, "one example of
presupposition, which eventually is a type of conversational implicature."
Grice's antipathy to Strawson's 'presupposition' is 'metaphysical': he dislikes
the idea of a 'satisfactory-value-gap,' as he notes in the second paragraph to
"Logic and Conversation." And his antipathy crossed the
buletic-doxastic divide! Using 'φ' to
represent a sentence in either mode, he stipulate that "~φ" is
satisfactory just in case ⌈φ⌉ is unsatisfactory. A 'crunch,'
as he puts it, becomes obvious: '~ ⊢The king of France is bald' may perhaps
be treated as equivalent to '⊢~(The king of France is bald).' But what about '~!Arrest
the intruder'?" "What do we say in cases like, perhaps, "Let it
be that I now put my hand on my head" or "Let it be that my bicycle
faces north", in which (at least on occasion) it seems to be that neither
'!p' nor '!~p' is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory?" If '!p' is
neither satisfactory nor unsatisfactory (if that make sense, which doesn't to
me), does the philosopher assign a *third* buletically satisfactory 'value'
(0.5) to '!p' (buletically 'neuter,' or 'indifferent'). Or does the philosopher
say that we have a buletically satisfactory value *gap*, as Strawson, following
Quine, might prefer? This may require careful consideration; but I cannot see
that the problem proves insoluble, any more than the analogous problem
connected with Strawson's doxastic presupposition is insoluble. The difficulty
is not so much to find a solution as to select the best solution from those
which present themselves."
1970. The
Urbana lectures, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2-Folders 5-8, and
Series V (Topical), Carton 8-Folder 20, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: semantics The Grice
Collection also contains a folder for "Odd ends: Urbana and
non-Urbana." Grice continues with the elaboration of a formal
calculus. He originally baptised it "System Q" in honour of
Quine. At a later stage, Myro will re-name it "System G," in a
special version, "System GHP," a highly powerful/hopefully plausible
version of System G," "in gratitude to Grice." Odd Ends: Urbana
and Not Urbana, 1970, Odds and ends: Urbana and not Urbana, or not-Urbana, or
Odds and ends: Urbana and non Urbana, or Oddents, urbane and not urbane,
keywords: semantics, Urbana lectures. The Urbana lectures were on language
and reality. Grice kept revising them, as these items show.
1970. Language
and reality, The University of Illinois at Urbana, The Urbana Lectures,
Language and reference, language and reality, The Urbana lectures, University
of Illinois at Urbana, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton
7-Folder 19, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. Keywords: language, reference, reality Grice
favours a transcendental approach to communication. Our beliefs worth
communicating have to be true. Our orders worth communicating have to
refer to our willings.
1970. The
'that'-clause, Davidson on saying that, 'Davidson's "On saying
that,"' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6-Folder 26,
BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley. Keywords: 'that'-clause. Grice had explored 'that'-clauses
with Staal. He was concerned about the viability of Davidson's initially
appealing etymological approach to the 'that'-clause in terms of 'demonstration.'
Grice had presupposed the logic of 'that'-clauses from a much earlier stage,
"Those spots mean that he has measles." The folder contains a copy of
Davidson's essay, "On saying that," 1980, the 'that'-clause, 1970,
the 'that'-clause, with J. F. Staal, The Grice Papers, Series III (The
Doctrines), Carton 6-Folder 3, BANC, MSS 90/135c, keywords:
'that'-clause. The 'that'-clause was brought to the fore by Davidson, who,
consulting the Oxford English Dictionary, reminds philosophers that the English
'that' is VERY cognate with the German idiom. More specifically, 'that' is
a DEMONSTRATIVE, even if the syntax, in English, hides this fact in ways which
German syntax doesn't. Grice NEEDS to rely on 'that'-clauses for his
analysis of 'mean,' 'intend,' and notably 'will.' He finds that Prichard's
genial discovery was the license to use 'willing' as pre-facing a
'that'-clause. This allows Grice to deals with 'willing' as applied to a
third person ("I will that he'll win the chess match."). Philosophers
who disregard this 'third-person' use may indulge in introspection and
subjectivism when they shouldn't! Grice said that Prichard had to be given
great credit for seeing that the accurate specification of willing should be
‘willing that’ and not ‘willing to.’ Analogously, following Prichard on
'willing,' Grice does not stipulate that
the radix for an 'intentional' (Volitive A) incorporate a reference to the
utterer ("be in the first person"), nor that the radix for an
'imperative' (Volitive B) or desiderative in general, incorporate a reference
of the addressee ("be in the second person"). "They shall not
pass" is a legitimate intentional as is the "You shall not get away
with it" (either involves Prichard's 'wills that ...,' rather than 'wills
to ...'). "And "The sergeant is to muster the men at dawn"
(uttered by a captain to a lieutenant) is a perfectly good imperative, again
involving Prichard's 'wills that ...,' rather than 'wills to ...' .
1970. Intention
and subjectivity, perspectivism, 'subjective' conditions and intentions, The H.
P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folder 15, BANC MSS
90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley. Keywords: intention, subjective condition. Cf. his
dispositional account to 'intending.' A subjective condition takes into
account the intender's, rather than the ascriber's, point of
view: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt. Everest on hands and knees.
Bloggs might reason: Given my present state, I should do what is
fun. Given my present state, the best thing for me to do would be to do
what is fun. For me in my present state it would make for my well-being,
to have fun. Having fun is good (or, a good). Climbing a mountain would be
fun. Climbing the Everest would be/make for climbing fun. So, I shall climb
the Everest. Even if a critic insisted that a practical syllogism is the
way to represent Blogg's finding something to be appealing, and that it should
be regarded as a respectable evaluation, the assembled propositions don't do
the work of a standard argument. The premises do not support or yield the
conclusion as in a standard argument. The premises may be said to yield the
conclusion, or directive, for the particular agent whose reasoning process it
is, only on the basis of a subjective condition: that the agent is in a
certain subjective state, e.g. feels like going out for dinner-fun. Rational
beings (the agent at some other time, or other individuals) who do not have
that feeling, will not accept the conclusion. They may well accept as true ‘It
is fun to climb Everest’, but will not accept it as a directive unless they
feel like it now. Someone wondering what to do for the summer might think that
if he were to climb Everest he would find it fun or pleasant, but right now she
does not feel like it.That is in general the end of the matter. The alleged
argument lacks normativity. It is not authoritative or directive unless there
is a supportive argument that he needs/ought to do something diverting/pleasant
in the summer. A practical argument is different. Even if an agent did not feel
like going to the doctor, an agent would think ‘I ought to have a medical check
up yearly, now is the time, so I should see my doctor’ to be a directive with
some force. It articulates a practical argument. Perhaps the strongest
attempt to reconstruct an (acceptable or rational) thought
transition as a standard arguments is to treat the subjective
condition, ‘I feel like having climbing fun in the summer’, as a premise, for
then the premises would support the conclusion. But the individual, whose
thought transition we are examining, does not regard a description of his
psychological state as a consideration that supports the conclusion. It
will be useful to look more closely at a variant of the example to note when it
is appropriate to reconstruct thinking in the form of argument. Bloggs,
now hiking with a friend in the Everest, comes to a difficult spot and
says: ‘I don’t like the look of that, I am frightened. I am going
back’. That is usually enough for Bloggs to return, and for the friend to
turn back with him. Bloggs’s action of turning back, admittedly motivated by
fear, is, while not acting on reasons, nonetheless rational unless we judge his
fear to be irrational. Bloggs’s subjective condition can serve
as a premise, but only in a very different situation. Bloggs resorts to
reasons. Suppose that, while his friend does not think Bloggs’s fear
irrational, the friend still attempts to dissuade Bloggs from going back. After
listening and reflecting, Bloggs may say ‘I am so frightened it is not worth
it. I am not enjoying this climbing anymore’. Or ‘I am too frightened to be
able to safely go on’. Or ‘I often climb the Everest and don’t usually get
frightened. The fact that I am now is a good indication that this is a dangerous
trail and I should turn back’. These are reasons, considerations implicitly
backed by principles, and they could be the initial motivations of someone. But
in Bloggs’s case they emerged when he was challenged by his friend. They do not
express his initial practical reasoning. Bloggs was frightened by the trail
ahead, wanted to go back, and didn’t have any reason not to. Note that
there is no general rational requirement to always act on reasons, and no
general truth that a rational individual would be better off the more often he
acted on reasons. Faced with his friend’s objections, however, Bloggs
needed justification for acting on his fear. He reflected and found reason(s)
to act on his fear. Grice plays with ‘subjectivity’ already in “Prolegomena.”
Consider the use of ‘carefully.’ Surely we must include the agent’s own idea of
this. Or consider the use of phi and phi’ – surely we don’t want the addressee
to regard himself under the same guise with which the utterer regards him. Or
consider “Aspects of Reason”: Nixon must be appointed professor of theology at
Oxford. Does HE feel the need? Grice raises the topic of subjectivity again in
the Kant lectures just after his discussion of ‘mode,’ in a sub-section
entitled, “Modalities: relative and absolute.” He finds the topic central for
his aequi-vocality thesis: subjective conditions seem necessary to both
practical and alethic considerations.
1970. Probability
and life, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folder 4, BANC
MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Keywords: life, probability. Evolutionary account of the pirot's
adaptability to its changeable environs. Grice borrows the notion of
probability from Davidson, whose early claim to fame was to provide the logic
of the notion. Grice abbreviates probability by "Pr." and
compares it to a boulomaic operator, "De." for desirability. A
rational agent must calculate both the probability and the desirability of his
action. For both probability and desirability, the degree is crucial.
Grice symbolises this by 'd': probability in degree d; probability in degree
d'. The topic of life Grice relates to that of adaptation and surival, and
connects with his genitorial programme of creature construction ("pirotology."):
life as continued operancy. Grice was fascinated with 'life' (Aristotle,
'bios') because 'bios' is what provides for Aristotle the definition (not by
genus) of 'psyche.'
1970. Heterological,
Russell and heterologicality, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical),
Carton 9-Folder 8, BANC, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. Keywords: Russell, heterological, Grelling, J. F.
Thomson. Grice and Thomson go ‘heterological.’ Grice was
fascinated by Baron Russell's remarks on 'heterological.' And its
implicata! Grice was particularly interested in Russell's philosophy
because of the usual Oxonian antipathy towards his type of
philosophising. Being an irreverent conservative rationalist, Grice found
in Russell a good point for dissent! If paradoxes were always sets of
propositions or arguments or conclusions, they would always be
meaningful. But some paradoxes are semantically flawed and some have
answers that are backed by a pseudo-argument employing a defective “lemma” that
lacks a truth-value. Grelling’s paradox, for instance, opens with a
distinction between autological and heterological words. An autological
word describes itself, e.g., ‘polysyllabic’ is polysllabic, ‘English’ is
English, ‘noun’ is a noun, etc. A heterological word does not describe
itself, e.g., ‘monosyllabic’ is not monosyllabic, ‘Chinese’ is not Chinese,
‘verb’ is not a verb, etc. Now for the riddle: Is ‘heterological’
heterological or autological? If ‘heterological’ is heterological, since
it describes itself, it is autological. But if ‘heterological’ is
autological, since it is a word that does not describe itself, it is
heterological. The common solution to this puzzle is that ‘heterological’,
as defined by Grelling, is not what Grice a genuine predicate --
""Gricing" is!"In other words, “Is ‘heterological’
heterological?” is without meaning. "That does not mean that an
utterer, such as Baron Russell, may implicate that he is being very witty by
uttering the Grelling paradox!" There can be no predicate that
applies to all and only those predicates it does not apply to for the same
reason that there can be no barber who shaves all and only those people who do
not shave themselves. Grice seems to be relying on his friend at Christ
Church, J. F. Thomson in “On Some Paradoxes”, in the same volume where
Grice published his “Remarks about the senses,” Analytical Philosophy, R.
J. Butler (ed.), Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 104–119. Grice thought that
Thomson was a “genius, if ever there is one!” Plus, Grice thought that, after
St. John's, Christ Church was the second most beautiful venue in the 'city' of
dreaming spires. "On top, it is what makes Oxford a city, and not, as
villagers call it, a 'town'!
1970. Grice's
Frege, Frege: words and sentences, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V
(Topical), Carton 7-Folder 2, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The
University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Frege, Fregean sense,
Fregeian sense, Farbung, aber, "She was poor but she was honest.” Freges
Farbung, Grices Implikatur. Frege was the topic of Dummett's
explorations. A tutee of Grice's once brought Dummett's "Frege"
to a tutorial and told Grice that he intended to explore this. "Have
you read it?" "No I haven't," Grice answered. And after a pause,
he went on: "And I hope I won't." "Hardly promising," the
tutee thought. Some authors, including Grice, but alas, not Frege, have
noted some similarities between Grice's notion of a 'conventional' implicature
and Frege's schematic and genial rambles on 'colouring.' "Aber Farbung,"
as Frege would state! Grice was more interested in the idea of a
"Fregeian" sense, but he felt that if he had to play with Frege's
'aber' he should! One of Grice's metaphysical construction-routines (Humeian
projection) is aimed at the generation of concepts, in most cases the 'rational
reconstruction' of an intuitive concept displayed in 'ordinary
discourse.' "We arrive at something like a Fregeian sense!"
Grice exclaimed, with an intonation of "Eureka!" almost. And then he
went back to Frege. Grice's German was good, so he could read Frege,
"in the vernacular." For fun, he read Frege to his children (Grice's,
not Frege's): "In einem obliquen Kontext," Frege says," Grice
says, "kann ja z. B. die Ersetzung eines „aber" durch ein „und",
die in einem direkten Kontext keinen Unterschied des Wahrheitswerts ergibt,
einen solchen Unterschied bewirken." "I'll make that easy for you,
darlings: 'und' is 'and,' and 'aber' is 'but.' "But surely, Papa, 'aber'
is not cognate with 'but'!" "It's not. That's Anglo-Saxon, for you.
'But' is strictly Anglo-Saxon short for 'by-out;' we lost 'aber' when we sailed
the North Sea." Grice went on: "Damit wird eine Abgrenzung von Sinn
und Färbung (oder Konnotationen) eines Satzes fragwürdig." "I. e. he
is saying that "She was poor but she was honest" only CONVENTIONALLY
IMPLICATES that there is a contrast between her poverty and her honesty."
"I guess he heard the ditty during the War?" Grice ignored that
remark, and went on: "Appell und Kundgabe wären ferner von Sinn und Färbung
genauer zu unterscheiden. Ich weiß so auf interessante Bedeutungs
Komponenten hin, bemüht sich aber nicht, sie genauer zu differenzieren, da er
letztlich nur betonen will, daß sie in der Sprache der Logik keine Rolle
spielen." "They play a role in the lingo," that is!"
"What do?" "Stuff like 'but'.” "But surely they are not
RATIONAL conversational implicata!?" "No, dear, just conventional
tricks you can ignore on a nice summer day!" Grice however was NEVER interested
in the CONVENTIONAL implicatum. He identifies it because he felt he must!
Surely, the way English speakers learn to use stuff like, “on the one hand,”
and “on the other,” (or how Grice learned how to use “men” and “de” in Greek),
or “so,” or “therefore,” or “but” versus “and,” is just to allow that he would
STILL use the verb ‘imply’ in such cases – but surely he wants ‘conversational’
to stick with ‘rationality’: ‘conversational maxim’ and ‘converational
implicatum’ ONLY apply to things which can be justified transcendentally, and
not idiosyncrasies of usage! Grice follows Alonzo Church in noting that Russell
misreads Frege as being guilty of ignoring the use-mention distinction, when he
doesn’t. One thing that Grice minimises is that Frege's "assertion
sign" is composite. That's why G. P. Baker prefers to use the dot '.' as
the doxastic correlative for the buletic sign "!" which is NOT
composite. The sign „├‟ is composite. Frege explains his
"Urteilstrich" -- the vertical component of his sign "├" as
"conveying assertoric force." The principal role of the *horizontal*
component as such is to prevent the appearance of assertoric force belonging to
a token of what does not express a thought (e.g. the expression
"22"). "─p" expresses a thought even if "p" does
not.) cf. Hare's four sub-atomic particles: phrastic (dictum), neustic
(dictor), tropic, and clistic, and cf. Grice on the 'radix' controversy:
"We don't want the '.' in 'p' to become a 'vanishing' sign!"
1971.
Intention and uncertainty, Proceedings of The British Academy, vol. 57,
pp. 263-79, also published separately as an offprint, Intention and
disposition, 1946, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton
2-Folders 9-10, and Series V (Topical), Carton 6-Folder 30,, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords:
intention, uncertainty, Prichard, willing, willing to vs. willing that, D. F.
Pears, Davidson, disimplicature, Hart, Hampshire, certainty, decision, Ansombe,
Kenny, disposition, Ryle. I shan’t but I’m not certain I won’t – Grice. How
*un*certain can Grice be? This is the Henriette Herz British Academy lecture,
and as such published in The Proceedings of the British Academy. Grice
calls himself a neo-Prichardian (after the Oxford philosopher) and cares to
quote from a few other philosophers -- some of whom he was not necessarily
associated with: such as Kenny and Anscombe, and some of whom he was, notably
D. F. Pears. Grice's motto: "Where there is a neo-Prichardian
willing, there is a palaeo-Griceian way!" Grice quotes Pears, of Christ
Church, as the philosopher he found especially congenial to explore areas in
what both called 'philosophical psychology,' notably the tricky use of
'intending' as displayed by a few philosophers even in their own circle, such
as Hampshire and Hart in "Intention, decision, and
certainty." The title of Grice's lecture is meant to provoke that
pair of Oxonian philosophers Grice knew so well and who were too ready to bring
in 'certainty' in an area that requires deep philosophical
exploration. This is the Henriette Herz Trust annual lecture. It
means it's delivered annually by different philosophers, not always Grice!
Grice had been appointed a FBA in 1966, but he took his time to deliver his
lecture. With your lecture, you implicate, "Hi!" Grice, and
indeed Pears, were motivated by Hampshire's and Hart's essay on intention and
certainty in "Mind." Grice knew Hampshire well, and had actually
enjoyed his "Thought and Action." He preferred Hampshire's
"Thought and action" to Anscombe's "Intention." "Trust
Oxford being what it is that TWO volumes on intending are published in the same
year! Which one shall I read first?" Eventually, neither -- immediately.
Rather, Grice managed to unearth some sketchy notes by Prichard (he calls
himself a neo-Prichardian) that Urmson had made available for the Clarendon
Press -- notably Prichard's essay on 'willing THAT.' "Only a genius
like Prichard will distinguish 'will to' (almost unnecessary) from 'will that'
(so crucial)." For Grice, '... wills that ...', unlike '... wills to...',
is properly generic, in that "p," that follows the 'that'-clause,
need NOT refer to the subject of the sentence. "Surely I can will that
Smith wins the match!" But Grice also quotes Anscombe (whom otherwise
would not count, although they did share a discussion panel at the American
Philosophical Association) and Kenny, besides Pears. Of Anscombe, Grice
borrows (but never returns) the 'direction-of-fit' term of art (actually
Austinian). From A. J. P. Kenny, Grice borrows (AND returns) the concept of
'voliting.' His most congenial approach was Pears's. Grice had of course
occasion to explore ‘disposition’ and ‘intention’ on earlier
occasions. Grice is especially concerned with a 'dispositional' analysis
to 'intending.' He will later reject it in "Intention and
uncertainty." But that was Grice for you! Grice is especially
interested in distinguishing his views from RYLE's over-estimated dispositional
account of intention, which Grice sees as 'reductionist,' and indeed
'eliminationist,' "if not boringly 'behaviourist,' even in analytic
key!" The logic of 'dispositions' is tricky, as Grice will later explore
in connection with 'rationality' (rational propension or propensity) and
metaphysics (the 'as if' operator). While Grice focuses on UNcertainty, he
is being funny! He knew that Oxonians like Hart and Hampshire were
OBSESSED with ‘certainty’. “I was so surprised that Hampshire and Hart
were claiming decision and intention are psychological states about which the
agent is 'certain,' that I decided on the spot that that could certainly
be a nice topic for my British Academy lecture!" Grice granted that in
some cases, a declaration of an intention can be authorative in a certain
‘certain’ way (“i.e. as implicating ‘certainty’”). But Grice wants us to
consider: “Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt. Everest.” “Surely he
can’t be certain he’ll succeed.” Grice used the same example at the
American Philosophical Association, of all places. To amuse Grice,
Davidson, who was present, said: “Surely that’s *just* an
implicature!” "*Just*?!' Grice was almost furious in his British
guarded sort of way. “Surely not *just*!” D. F. Pears, who was also
present, tried to reconcile: “If I may, Davidson, I think Grice would take
it that, if ‘certainty’ is implicated, the whole thing becomes too social to be
true.” They kept discussing implicature versus entailment. “Is
‘certainty’ ENTAILED then?” Davidson asked. “No, DISIMPLICATED!” was
Grice’s curt reply. The next day, he explained to Davidson that he had
invented the concept of ‘disimplicature’ just to tease him, and just one night
before, while musing in the hotel room! Talk of ‘UNcertainty” was thus for
Grice intimately associated with his concern about the misuse of ‘know’ to mean
‘certain, especially in the exegeses that Malcolm made popular about, of all
people, G. E. Moore! (vide “Scepticism and common sense” and “Moore and
philosopher’s paradoxes” above, and “Causal Theory” and “Prolegomena” for a
summary of Malcom’s misunderstanding Moore! Grice manages to quote from Stout
(“Voluntary action”) and Brecht. And he notes that not all speakers are as
sensitive as they should be (e.g. distinguishing modes, as realised by ‘shall’
vs. ‘will’). He emphasizes the fact that Prichard has to be given great credit
for seeing that the accurate specification of willing should be ‘willing that’
and not ‘willing to.’ Grice is especially interested in proving Stoutians (like
Hampshire and Hart) wrong by drawing from Aristotle's prohairesis-doxa
distinction, or in his parlance, the buletic-doxastic distinction. Grice quotes
from Aristotle: "[prohairesis] cannot be opinion [doxa]; for opinion is
thought to relate to all kinds of things, no less to eternal things and
impossible things than to things in our own power; and it is distinguished by
its falsity or truth, not by its badness or goodness, while choice is
distinguished rather by these. Now with opinion in general perhaps no one even
says it is identical. But it is not identical even with any kind of opinion;
for by CHOOSING OR DECIDING (prohairesis) what is good or bad we are men of a
certain character, which we are not by holding this or that opinion (doxa). And
we choose to get or avoid something good or bad, but we have opinions about
what a thing is or whom it is good for or how it is good for him; we can hardly
be said to opine to get or avoid anything. And choice is praised for being
related to the right object rather than for being rightly related to it,
opinion for being truly related to its object. And we choose what we best know
to be good, but we opine what we do not quite know; and it is not the same
people that are thought to make the best choices and to have the best opinions,
but some are thought to have fairly good opinions, but by reason of vice to
choose what they should not. If opinion precedes choice or accompanies it, that
makes no difference; for it is not this that we are considering, but whether it
is identical with some kind of opinion. What, then, or what kind of thing is
it, since it is none of the things we have mentioned? It seems to be voluntary,
but not all that is voluntary to be an object of choice. Is it, then, what has
been decided on by previous deliberation? At any rate choice involves a
rational principle and thought. Even the name seems to suggest that it is what
is chosen before other things." His final analysis of "A intends that
p" is in terms of (1) a buletic condition ("A wills that p"), and
(2) an attending doxastic condition ("A judges that (1) causes p").
Grice ends this essay with a nod to D. F. Pears and an open point about the
JUSTIFIABILITY (other than evidential) for the ACCEPTABILITY of the agent's
deciding and intending versus the evidential justifiability of the agent's
PREDICTING that what he intends will be satisfied. It is important to note that
in his earlier "Disposition and intention," Grice dedicates the first
part to 'counterfactual' "if" IN GENERAL. This is a logical point.
THEN as an account for a 'psychological' concept ("psi"): "If A
does A [sensory input], A does B [behavioural output" (No "psi"
without the behavioural output that "psi" is meant to EXPLAIN). His
problem is with the first person: the functionalist "I" does not need
a 'black box.' The keywords here would be both incorrigibility and privileged
access. Pirotology only explains their 'evolutionary' import.
1971. Entailment, The American
Philosophical Association, joint symposium held by the American Philosophical
Association and the Association for Symbolic Logic, symposium with Dana Scott
and Robert K. Meyer. Dec. 27, 1971, Sixty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American
Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Statler Hilton Hotel, New York,
and P. F. Strawson, on G. E. Moore’s entailment. Grice takes a look at
Strawson's unpublication. 1971. Entailment, Paradoxes of entailment, Entailment
and paradoxes, Joint symposium held by The Association for Symbolic Logic and
the American Philosophical Association, The Statler Hilton, New York, The H. P.
Grice Papers, Series IV (Associations), Carton 6-Folder 4, and Series V
(Topical), Carton 6-Folder 33, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The
University of California, Berkeley. Keyword: entailment, paradoxes of
entailment, paradox. The symposium was held in New York with Dana Scott and R.
K. Meyer. The notion had been "mis-introduced" (according to
Strawson) in the philosophical literature by G. E. Moore. Grice is especially
interested in the "ENTAILMENT + IMPLICATUM" pair. A philosophical expression
may be said to be co-related to an ENTAILMENT (which is rendered in terms of a
reductive analysis). However, the use of the expression may co-relate to
this or that IMPLICATUM which is rendered 'reasonable' in the light of the
addressee's assumption that the utterer is ultimately abiding by a principle of
conversational helfpulness. Grice thinks many philosophers take an IMPLICATUM
as an ENTAILMENT when they surely shouldn't! Grice was more interested than
Strawson was in G. E. Moore's coinage of 'entailment' for logical consequence.
As an analyst, Grice knew that a true conceptual analysis needs to be reductive
(if not reductionist). The prongs the analyst lists are thus 'entailments' of
the concept in question. Philosophers, however, may misidentify what is an
entailment for an implicature, or vice versa. Initially, Grice was interested
in the second family of cases. With his coinage of 'disimplicature,' Grice
expands his interest to cover the first family of cases, too. Grice remains a
philosophical methodologist. He is not so much concerned with any area or
discipline or philosophical concept per se (unless it's rationality), but with
the misuses of some tools in the philosophy of language as committed by some of
his colleagues at Oxford. While 'entailment,' was, for Strawson
'mis-introduced' in the philosophical literature by Moore, 'entailment' seems
to be less involved in paradoxes than 'if' is. Grice connects the two, as
indeed his tutee Strawson did! As it happens, Strawson's "Necessary propositions
and entailment statements" is his very first published essay, with
"Mind," a re-write of an unpublication unwritten elsewhere, and which
Grice read. The relation of 'consequence' may be considered a meta-conditional,
where paradoxes arise. Grice's Bootstrap is a principle designed to
impoverish the metalanguage so that the philosopher can succeed in the business
of pulling himself up by his own! Grice then takes a look at Strawson’s very
first ‘publication’ (an unpublication he had written elsewhere). Grice finds
Strawson thought he could “provide a simple solution to the so-called
“paradoxes of entailment.” At the time, Grice and Strawson were pretty sure
that nobody then accepted, “if indeed anyone ever did and did make," the
identification of the relation symbolised by the horseshoe with the relation
which G. E. Moore calls "entailment". "p⊃q," i. e. "~(pΛ~q)," is rejected as an
analysis of “p entails q” because it involves this or that allegedly
paradoxical implicatum, as that any false proposition entails any proposition
and any true proposition is entailed by any proposition. It is a commonplace
that C. I. Lewis's amendment had consequences scarcely less paradoxical in
terms of the implicata! For if "p" is impossible (i.e. self-contradictory),
it is impossible that p and ~q. And if "q" is necessary,
"~q" is impossible and it is impossible that p and ~q; i. e., if “p
entails q” means “it is impossible that p and ~q” *any* necessary proposition
is entailed by any proposition and any self-contradictory proposition entails
any proposition. On the other hand, Lewis's definition of entailment (i.e. of
the relation which holds from p to q whenever q is deducible from p) obviously
commends itself in some respects. Now, it is clear that the emphasis laid on
the "expression-mentioning" character of the intensional contingent
statement by writing ‘pΛ~q’ is impossible instead of ‘It is impossible that p
and ~q’ does not avoid the alleged paradoxes of entailment. But it is equally
clear that the addition of some provision does avoid them: Strawson
proposes that one should use "... entails ..." such that no necessary
statement and no negation of a necessary statement can significantly be said to
entail or be entailed by any statement; i. e. the function “p entails q” cannot
take necessary or self-contradictory statements as arguments. The expression “p
entails q” is to be used to mean “‘p⊃q’
is necessary, and neither ‘p’ nor ‘q’ is either necessary or
self-contradictory,” or “‘pΛ~q’ is impossible and neither ‘p’ nor ‘q,’ nor
either of their contradictories, is necessary.” Thus, the paradoxes are
avoided. For let us assume that "p1" expresses a contingent, and
"q1" a necessary, proposition. ‘p1 and ~q1’ is now impossible because
‘~q1’ is impossible. But ‘q1’ is necessary. So, by that provision, ‘p1’ does
NOT entail ‘q1.’ We may avoid the paradoxical assertion that p1 entails q2 as
merely falling into the equally paradoxical assertion that “‘p1’ entails ‘q1’
is necessary.” For: If q is necessary, “‘q’ is necessary” is, though true, not
necessary, but a *contingent* *intensional* statement. Hence: “~(‘q’ is
necessary)” is, though false, possible. Hence “p1Λ~(‘q1’ is necessary)"
is, though false, possible. Hence "p1" does NOT entail "’q1’ is
necessary.” Thus, by adopting the view that an “entailment” statement (and
other intensional statements) are non-necessary, and that no necessary
statement or its contradictory can entail or be entailed by any statement,
Strawson thinks he can avoid the paradox that a necessary proposition is
entailed by any proposition, and indeed all the other associated paradoxes of
entailment. Grice objected that Strawson’s cure was worse than Moore’s disease!
The denial that a necessary proposition can entail or be entailed by any
proposition (and, therefore, that necessary propositions can be related to each
other by the entailment-relation) is too high a price to pay for the solution
of the paradoxes. And here is where Grice’s implicature is meant to do the
trick! Or not! When Levinson proposed "+>" for
conversationally implicature, he is thinking of contrasting it with "⊢". But things ain't that easy. Even the
grammar is more complicated: "By uttering "He is an adult," U
explicitly conveys that he is an adult. What U explicitly conveys ENTAILS that
he is not a child. What U implies is that he should be treated
accordingly.
1971. Formal semantics, Summer institute on philosophy of language, UC/Irvine, formal semantics.
1972. Reply
to G. E. M. Anscombe, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton
4-Folder 26, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. Keywords: intention, Anscombe. Anscombe's
views were often discussed by Oxonian philosophers. She had brought Witters to
the "Dreaming Spires," as it were. Grice was especially
connected with Anscombe's reflections on 'intention.' While Grice favoured
an approach such as Hampshire, in "Thought and Action," he borrows a
few points from Anscombe, notably that of 'direction of fit' (originally
Austin's). Grice explicitly refers to Anscombe in "Intention and
uncertainty," and in his reminiscences he hastens to add that Anscombe
would never attend any of Austin's Saturday mornings, as neither would
Dummett. Ryle's view is standardly characterised as a weaker or “softer”
version of behaviourism (Smith and Jones, 144). According to this standard
interpretation, Ryle's view is that statements containing psychological terms
can be translated, without loss of meaning, into subjunctive conditionals about
what the individual will do in various circumstances. So Ryle (on this account)
is to be construed as offering a dispositional analysis of psychological
statements into behavioural ones. It is conceded that Ryle does not confine his
descriptions of what the agent will do (under the circumstances) to purely
physical behaviour—in terms, say, of skeletal or muscular descriptions—but is
happy to speak of full-bodied actions like scoring a goal or paying a
debt. But the “soft” behaviourism attributed to Ryle still attempts an
analysis (or translation) of psychological statements into a series of
dispositional statements which are themselves construed as subjunctive
"if" describing what the agent will do (albeit under the relevant
action description) under various circumstances. Even this “soft” behaviourism
is bound to fail, however, since psychological vocabulary is not analysable or
translatable into behavioural statements even if these are
allowed to include descriptions of actions. For the list of conditions and
possible behaviour will be infinite since any one proffered translation can be
defeated by slight alteration of the circumstances; and the defeating
conditions in any particular case may involve a reference to facts about the
agent's mind, thereby rendering the analysis circular. In sum, the standard
interpretation of Ryle construes him as offering a somewhat weakened form of
reductive behaviourism whose reductivist ambitions, however weakened, are
nonetheless futile. But this characterisation of Ryle's programme is
simply wrong. Although it is true that Ryle was keen to point out the
dispositional nature of many psychological concepts, it would be wrong to
construe him as offering a programme of analysis of psychological predicates
into a series of subjunctive conditionals. The relationship between
psychological predicates and the "if" sentences with which we can
“unpack” them is other than that required by this kind of analysis. It
will be helpful to keep in mind that Ryle's target is the Official Doctrine
with its attendant ontological, epistemological, and semantic commitments. His
arguments serve to remind us that we have in a large number of cases ways of
telling or settling disputes, for example, about someone's character or
intellect. If you dispute my characterisation of someone as believing or
wanting something, I will point to what he says and does in defending my
particular attribution (as well as to features of the circumstances). But our
practice of giving reasons of this kind to defend or to challenge ascriptions
of mental predicates would be put under substantial pressure if the Official
Doctrine were correct. For Ryle to remind us that we do, as a matter of
fact, have a way of settling disputes about whether someone is vain or whether
she is in pain is much weaker than saying that a concept is meaningless unless
it is verifiable; or even that the successful application of mental predicates
requires that we have a way of settling disputes in all cases. Showing that a
concept is one for which, in a large number of cases, we have
agreement-reaching procedures (even if these do not always guarantee success)
captures an important point, however: it counts against any theory, say, of
vanity or pain that would render it unknowable in principle or in
practice whether or not the concept is correctly applied in every
case. And this was precisely the problem with the Official Doctrine (and is
still a problem, as I suggested earlier, with some of its contemporary
progeny). Ryle points out in a later essay that there is a form of dilemma
that pits the reductionist against the duplicationis:
those whose battle cry is “Nothing but…” and those who insist on “Something
else as Well…”. Ryle attempts a dissolution of these types of dilemma by
rejecting the two horns; not by taking sides with either one, though part of
what dissolution requires in this case, as in others, is a description of how
both sides are to be commended for seeing what the other side does not, and
criticised for failing to see what the other side does. The attraction of
behaviourism, he reminds us, is simply that it does not insist on occult
happenings as the basis upon which all mental terms are given meaning, and
points to the perfectly observable criteria that are by and large employed when
we are called upon to defend or correct our employment of these mental terms.
The problem with behaviourism is that it has a too-narrow view both of what
counts as behaviour and of what counts as observable.
1972.
Pirots karulise elatically, potching and cotching obbles, Pirotese, The H. P.
Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Pirotese, creature
construction, philosophical psychology. Grice was fascinated by Carnap's
"pirots" which karulise elatically. Grice adds 'potching' for
something like 'perceiving' and 'cotching' for something like
'cognising.'
1973. Mode,
modality, probability (doxastic), and desirability (buletic), probability,
desirability, and mode operators, conference on implicature, The H. P. Grice
Papers, Series II, Carton 2-Folder 11, and Series V (Topical), Carton 8-Folders
14-15, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley. Keywords: modality, probability, desirability, direction of fit,
the buletic-doxastic distinction, mode-marker, modal, acceptance,
acceptability. Grice had been freely using the very English 'mood' until J. M.
E Moravcsik, of all people, corrected him: "What you mean ain't a
'mood.'" "I shall call it 'mode' just to please you, J. M.
E." "The sergeant is to muster the men at dawn" is a perfect
'imperative.' "They shall not pass" is a perfect 'intentional.' A
version of this essay was presented in a conference whose proceedings were
published, except for Grice's essay, due to 'technical complications,' viz. his
idiosyncratic use of idiosyncratic symbology! By 'mode' Grice means
indicative or imperative. Following Davidson, Grice attaches probability to the
indicative, via the doxastic, and desirability to the indicative, via the
boulomaic. He also allows for mixed utterances. Probability is
qualified with a suboperator indicating a degree d; ditto for desirability,
degree d'. In some of the drafts, Grice kept using 'mode' until Moravsik
suggested to him that 'mode' was a better choice, seeing that Grice's
'modality' had little to do with what other authors were referring to as
'mood.' Probability, desirability, and modality, 1977, modality, desirability,
and probability, keywords: modality, probability, desirability He would
use 'mode operator.' Modality is the more correct term, for things like
'should,' 'ought,' and 'must,' in that order. One sense. The doxastic
modals are correlated to probability. The boulomaic modals are correlated to
desirability. There is probability to a degree d. But there is also
desirability to a degree d. They both combine in Grice's attempt to
show how Kant's categorical imperative reduces to the
hypothetical. Kant uses 'modality' in a way that Grice disfavours,
preferring 'modus.' Grice is aware that Kant's use of 'modality' is qua
category (Kant's reduction to four of Aristotle's original ten
categories). “Probability, desirability, and mode operators" is Grice
at his formal best. It predates the Kant lectures and it got into so much
detail that Grice had to leave it at that. So abstract it hurts. Going further
than Davidson, Grice argues that structures expressing probability and desirability
are not merely analogous. They can both be replaced by more complex structures
containing a common element. Generalising over attitudes using the symbol 'ψ,'
which he had used in 1967 -- repr. WoW:v, Grice proposes "X ψ (that)
p." Further, Grice uses 'i' as a dummy for sub-divisions of psychological
attitudes. Grice uses ""Op supra i sub α," read: "operation
supra i sub alpha," as Grice was fastidious enough to provide 'reading'
versions for these, and where 'alpha' is a dummy taking the place of either
"A" or "B," i. e. Davidson's "prima facie" and
"probably". In all this, Grice keeps using the 'primitive'
"!," where a more detailed symbolism would have it correspond exactly
to Frege's composite turnstile (horizontal stroke of 'thought' and vertical
stroke of 'assertoric force,' 'Urteilstrich') that Grice of course also uses,
and for which it is proposed, then: !─p. There are generalising movements here
but also merely specificatory ones. "α" is not generalised.
"α" is a dummy to serve as a blanket for this or that
specifications. On the other hand, "ψ" is indeed generalised. As for
"i," is it generalising or specificatory? "i" is a dummy
for specifications, so it is not really 'generalising'. But Grice generalises
over specifications. Grice wants to find 'boulomaic' or 'volitive' as he
prefers (I prefer the Greek root) for both his 'protreptic' and exhibitive
versions (operator supra A and operator supra B). Note that Grice (WoW:110) had
used the asterisk (*) as a dummy for either 'assertoric,' i.e., Frege's turnstile,
and 'non-assertoric, the "!─" 'imperative turnstile', if you wish.
The operators A are *not* mode operators; they are such that they represent
some 'degree' (d) or measure of acceptability or justification. I prefer
'acceptability' because it connects with "accepting that..." which IS
a psychological attitude (if a general one). Thus, Grice wants to
have "It is desirable that p" and "It is believable
that p" as understood, each, by the concatenation of three elements. The
first element is the A-type operator. The second element is the B-type
operator. The third element is the phrastic, root, content, or proposition
itself. "It is desirable that p" and "It is believable that
p" share the A-type operator and the neustic or proposition. They
only differ at the B-type operator (volitive/boulomaic or judicative/doxastic).
Grice uses "+" for concatenation", but it is best to use
"^", just to echo who knows who. Grice speaks in that mimeo (which he
delivers in Texas, and is known as Grice's "Performadillo" talk --
Armadillo + Performative) of various things. Grice speaks, transparently
enough, of "acceptance": V-acceptance" and
"J-acceptance."V" not for "Victory" but for
'volitional', and J for judicative. The fact that both end with
"-acceptance" would accept you to believe that both *are* forms of
'acceptance'. Grice irritatingly uses "1" to mean belief, and
"2" to mean 'desire'. But two years later, in 1975,
"Method", he defines '1' in terms of '2,' and CARES NOT to do otherwise
-- i. e. define 2 in terms of 1. So whenever he wrote '1' in 1973, read 2, and
vice versa. One may omits this arithmetic when reporting on Grice's use. Grice
uses two further numerals, though: 3 and 4. These, one may decipher – one finds
oneself as an archeologist in Tutankamon's burial ground, as this or that
'relexive' attitude. Thus, "3" i. e. "ψ3," where we
need the GENERAL operator, "psi", not just specificatory dummy, but
the idea that we ACCEPT something simpliciter. "ψ3" is standards for
the attitude of V-accepting which is iteself towards J-accepting [p] or
J-accepting [~p]. Why we should be concerned with "~p" is something
to consider. The pirot wants to decide whether to believe p (or not). I
find that very Gricean. Suppose I am told that there is a volcano in Iceland.
Why would I *not* want to believe it? It seems that one may want to decide
whether to believe p or not when p involves a tacit appeal to value. But Grice
notes that even when it does not involve value, Grice still needs trust and
volition to reign supreme. On the other hand, there's "4," as
attached to an attitude, "ψ4." This stands for an attitude of
V-accepting towards either the pirot V-accepts [p] or the pirot V-accepts
[~p]", i. e. the pirot wants to decide whether to *will*, now that p
or not. This indeed IS CRUCIAL, since, for Grice, morality does cash in DESIRE.
Grice smokes. He wills to smoke. But does he will to will to smoke? Possibly
yes. Does he will to will to will to smoke? Regardless of what Grice wills, one
may claim this holds for serious imperatives (not "You shalt not
smoke", but "Though shalt not kill", say) or for any
"p" if you must (because if you KNOW that 'p' causes cancer ('p'
stands for a proposition involving cigareete) you should know you are killing
yourself. But then Time also kills us, so what gives? So I would submit that,
for Kant, the categorial imperative is one which allows for an indefinite
chain, not of chain-smokers, but of good-willers. If, for some p, we find that
at some stage, the pirot does NOT will that he wills that he wills that he
wills that...', 'p' can NOT be universalisable. This is proposed in an essay
referred to in "The Philosopher's Index" but Marlboro Cigarettes took
no notice. One may go on to note Grice's obsession on 'make believe'. If I say,
I utter expression "e" because the utterer wants his addressee to
believe that the utterer believes that p, there is utterer and addresse, i. e.
there are TWO people here -- or things -- for my cat means things to me (he
even implicates: the other day he miaowed to me while I was in bed -- He utters
'miaow'. He means that he is hungry, he means (via implicatum) that he wants
food (as provided by me). On another occasion he miaowes explicating, "The
door is closed", and implicating "Open it, idiot". On the other
hand, today's Andy-Capp's cartoon read: "When budgies get sarcastic".
("Wild-life programmes are repeating"). One may note that one
can want some other person to hold an attitude. Grice uses U for utterer and A
for addressee. These are merely ROLES. The important formalism is indeed x and
y. x is one person; y is the OTHER person. Grice dislikes a menages a trois,
apparently, for he seldom symbolises a 'third' party, z. So, "X psi supra
3 sub A [p]" is true just in case "X psi supra 2 [x psi supra 1 [p]
or x psi supra 1 [~p]" is true. And -- here 'y' features: "x ψ³ sub B
[p]" is true just in case "x V-accepts (ψ²) [x V-accepts (ψ²) [x
J-accept (ψ1) [p] or x J-accept (ψ1) [~p]]]" is true. Grice seems to be
happy with having reached four sets of operators, corresponding to four sets of
propositional attitudes, and for which Grice provides the paraphrases. The
first set is the [doxastic] proper. It is what Grice calls 'judicative', and
which is either "indicative" or "informative," if addressed
to 'y', or addressee A, which is different from 'x,' for surely one cannot
inform oneself. The second is the [boulomaic] proper. What Grice dubs
'volitive,' but I prefer the Greek root. This are either self-addressed and it
is "intentional," or other-addressed, or addressee-addressed, or
"imperative," for surely one cannot say to oneself, "Don't
smoke, idiot!” The third is the doxastic-interrogative (how we create
"?" here is minimal compared to the vagaries of what I called the
"!─" (non-assertoric or 'boulomaic' turnstile), and which may be
symbolised by "?─p", where "?─" stands for the 'erotetic
turnstile'. Geach's and Altham's "erotetic" somehow Grice ignores, as
he seems to prefer the Latinate "interrogative." Surely more people
know what 'interrogative' means what 'erotetic' means", he would not say
-- but he would. This attitude comes again in two varieties: self-addressed,
'reflective' ("Should I go?") or again, addresee-addressed
'imperative' ("Should YOU go?" -- with a strong hint that the utterer
is expecting is addressee to make up his mind in the proceeding, not just
inform the utterer). Last but not least, there is the fourth kind, the
"volitive" or boulomaic cum erotetic. Here again, there is one
varietiy which is reflective (or autophoric, as I prefer, utterer-addressed) or
'inquisitive' (for which I'll think of a Greek pantomime), or
'addressee-addressed.' Grice regrets that Greek (and Latin, of which he had
"less" -- cfr. Shakespeare who had none) "fares better" in
this respect than Oxonian. But then you can't have everything. Where would you
put it? Grice: The
modal implicatum. Grice sees two different, though connected questions
about mode. First, there is the obvious demand for a characterisation, or
partial characterisation, of this or that mode as it emerges in this or that
conversational move (which is plausible to regard as mode's primary
habitat) both at the level of the explicatum or the implicatum (for surely an
'indicative' conversational move may be the vehicle of an 'imperatival'
implicatum. A second, question is how, and to what extent, the representation
of mode (Hare's 'neustic') which is suitable for application to this or that
conversational move may be legitimately exported into philosophical psychology,
or rather, may be GROUNDED on questions of philosophical psychology, matters of
this or that psychological state, stance, or attitude (notably desire and
belief, and their sub-specifications). We need to consider the second
question, the 'philosophico- psychological' question, since, if the general
'rationality' operator is to read as something like "acceptability"
(as in Utterer ACCEPTS, or Addressee ACCEPTS), the appearance of this or that
mode within its scope of "accepting" is proper only if it may
properly occur within the scope of a generic psychological verb "I accept
that...". The easiest way Grice finds to expound his ideas on the
first question is by reference to a schematic table or diagram ("Some have
complained that I seldom use a board, but I will today." Grice at
this point reiterates his temporary contempt for the use/mention
distinction, which which Strawson is obsessed (Perhaps my contempt is due to
his obsession!). Grice's exposition would make the hair stand on end in
the soul of a person especially sensitive in this area. "And I'm talking
to YOU, Sir Peter!" (He is on the second row). But Grice's guess
is that the only historical philosophical mistake properly attributable to
use/mention confusion is Russell's argument AGAINST Frege in "On
Denoting", and that there is virtually always an acceptable way of
eliminating disregard of the use-mention distinction in a particular case,
though the substitutes are usually lengthy, obscure, and tedious. Grice
makes three initial assumptions. He avails himself of two SPECIES of acceptance,
namely, volitive acceptance and judicative acceptance, which he, on occasion,
calls respectively "willing that p" and "willing that
p." These are to be thought of as technical or semi-technical,
theoretical or semi-theoretical, though each is a state which approximates to
what we vulgarly call "thinking that p" and "wanting that
p", especially in the way in which we can speak of a beast such as a
little squarrel as thinking or wanting something -- a nut, poor darling little
thing. Grice here treats each 'will' and 'judge' (and 'accept') as a
primitive. The proper interpretation would be determined by the role of
each in a folk-psychological theory (or sequence of folk-psychological
theories), of the type the Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy favours at Oxford,
designed to account for the behaviours of members of the animal kingdom, at
different levels of psychological complexity (some classes of creatures being
more complex than others, of course). As Grice suggests in "Utterer's
meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning," at least at the point at
which (Schema Of Procedure-Specifiers For Mood-Operators) in one's
syntactico-semantical theory of Pirotese, one is introducing this or that mode
(and possibly earlier), the proper form to use is a specifier for this or that
"resultant" procedure. Such a specifier would be of the general
form, "For the utterer U to utter "x" if
...," where the blank is replaced by the appropriate condition. Since
in the preceding scheme 'x' represents an utterance (or expression), and not a
sentence or open sentence, there is no guarantee that this or that actual
sentence in Pirotese will contain a perspicuous and unambiguous modal
representation. A sentence may correspond to more than one
modal structure. The sentence will then be structurally ambiguous
("multiplex" in meaning -- under the proviso that senses are not to
be multiplied beyond necessity) and will have more than one reading, or
parsing, as every schoolboy at Clifton knows when translating viva voce from
Greek or Latin, as the case might be! The general form of a
procedure-specifier for a modal operator involves a main clause and an
"antecedent" clause, which follows "if". In the schematic
representation of the main clause, "U" represents an utterer,
"A" his addressee, "p" the radix or neustic; and "Op-i
" represents that operator whose number is i (1, 2, 3, or 4). E.
g., "Op-3A" represents Operator 3A, which, since '? ⊢' appears in the Operator column for 3A)
would be "? A ⊢ p"
(This reminds one of Grandy's quessertions, for he did think they were iterable
("possibly")). The antecedent clause consists of a sequence
whose elements are a preamble, as it were, or preface, or prefix, a supplement
to a differential (which is present only in a B-type, or addressee-oriented
case), a differential, and a radix. The preamble, which is always present,
is invariant, and reads: "The Utterer U wills (that) Addressee A
judges (that) U ..." (For surely "meaning" is a species of
"intending" is a species of "willing that," alla
Prichard). The supplement, if present, is also invariant. And the
idea behind its varying presence or absence is connected, in the first
instance, with the volitive mode. The difference between an ordinary
expression of intention -- such as "I shall not fail," or
"They shall not pass" -- and an ordinary imperative (Like
"Be a little kinder to him") is accommodated by treating each as a
sub-mode of the volitive mode, relates to "willing that p") In
the 'intentional' case ("I shall not fail"), the utterer U is
concerned to reveal to his addressee A that he (the utterer U) wills that p. In
the imperative case ("They shall not pass"), the utterer U is
concerned to reveal to his addressee A that the utterer U wills that the addresee
A will that p. In each case, of course, it is to be presumed that
willing that p will have its standard outcome, viz., the actualization, or
realisation, or direction of fit, of the radix (from expression to world,
downwards). There is a corresponding distinction between two "uses"
of an indicative. The utterer U may be declaring or affirming that p,
in an exhibitive way, with the primary intention to get his addressee A to
judge that the utterer judges that p. Or the Utterer is telling (in a
protreptic way) one's addressee that p, that is to say, hoping to get his
addressee to judge that p. In the case of an indicative, unlike that of a
volitive, there is no explicit pair of devices which would ordinarily be
thought of as "sub-mode" marker. The recognition of the sub-mode
is IMPLICATED, and comes from context, from the vocative use of the name of the
addressee, from the presence of a speech-act verb, or from a sentence-adverbial
phrase (like "for your information," "so that you know,"
etc.). But Grice has already, in his initial assumptions, allowed for such
a situation. The exhibitive-protreptic distinction seems to Grice to be
also discernible in the interrogative mode ("?").
Each differentials is associated with, and serve to distinguish, each of
the two basic modes (volitive or judicative) and, apart from one detail in the
case of the interrogative mode, is invariant between 'A' (exhibitive) and 'B'
(protreptic) sub-modes of any of the two basic modes. They are merely
unsupplemented or supplemented, the former for an 'A' or exhibitive sub-mode
and the latter for a 'B' or protreptic sub-mode. The radix needs (one
hopes) no further explanation, except that it might be useful to bear in mind
that Grice does not stipulated that the radix for an 'intentional' (Volitive
exhibitive utterer-based) incorporate a reference to the utterer, or be in the
first person, nor that the radix for an 'imperative' (Volitive protreptic
addressee-based) incorporate a reference of the addresee, and be in the second
person. "They shall not pass" is a legitimate 'intentional,' as
is "You shall not get away with it"; and "The sergeant is to
muster the men at dawn," as uttered said by the captain to the lieutenant)
is a perfectly good imperative. Grice gives in full specifiers derived
from the schema. (1) Utterer U to utter to Addressee A "exhibitive
"⊢ p" if
U wills that A judges that U judges p. (2) U to utter to Addressee A
"! protreptic p" if U wills that Addressee A judges that U wills that
Addressee A wills that p. Since, of the states denoted by each
differential, only willing that p and judging that p are strictly cases of
accepting that p, and Grice's ultimate purpose of his introducing this
characterization of mode is to reach a general account of expressions which are
to be conjoined, according to his proposal, with an 'acceptability' operator,
the first two numbered rows of the figure are (at most) what he has a direct
use for. But since it is of some importance to Grice that his treatment of
mode should be (and should be thought to be) on the right lines, he adds a
partial account of the interrogative mode. There are two varieties of
interrogatives, a 'yes/no' interrogatives (for example, "Is his face
clean?" "Is the king of France bald?" "Is virtue a
fire-shovel?") and 'W' interrogatives ("Who killed Cock Robin?",
"Where has my beloved gone?", "How did he fix
it?"). The specifiers derivable from the schema provide only for
'Yes/No' interrogatives, though the figure could be quite easily amended so as
to yield a restricted but very large class of 'W' interrogatives. Grice
indicates how this could be done. The distinction between a volitive and a
judicative interrogative corresponds with the difference between a case in
which the utterer indicates that he is, in one way or another, concerned to
obtain information ("Is he at home?"), and a case in which the
utterer indicates that he is concerned to settle a problem about what he is to
do ("Am I to leave the door open?", "Is the prisoner to be
released?", "Shall I go on reading?"). This difference is
fairly well represented in grammar, and much better represented in the grammars
of some other languages. The protreptic-exhibitive difference may not
marked at all in this or that grammar, but it should be marked in Pirotese. The
submodes are, however, often quite easily detectable. There is
usually a recognizable difference between a case in which the utterer says,
musingly or reflectively, "Is he to be trusted?" (a case in which the
utterer might say that he is just wondering), and a case in which he utters the
same sentence as an enquiry. Similarly, we can usually tell whether an utterer
who utters "Shall I accept the invitation?" is just trying to make up
his mind, or is trying to get advice or instruction from his addressee. The
employment of the variable 'α' needs to be explained. Grice borrows a
little from an obscure branch of logic, once (but maybe no longer) practised,
called (Grice thinks) "proto-thetic" (why?), the main rite in which
was to quantify over (or through) connectives. 'α' is to have as its two
substituents "positively" and "negatively", which may
modify either 'will' or 'judge,' negatively willing or negatively judging that
p is judging or willing that ~p. The quantifier (∃1α) . . . has to be treated substitutionally. If,
for example, I ask someone whether John killed Cock Robin (protreptic case), I
do not want the addressee merely to will that I have a particular "Logical
Quality" in mind which I believe to apply. I want the addressee to have one
of the "Qualities" in mind which he wants me to believe to
apply. To meet this demand, supplementation must 'drag back' the
quantifier. To extend the schema so as to provide specifiers for a
'single' W-interrogative (i. e., a question like "What did the butler
see?" rather than a question like "Who went where with whom at 4
o'clock yesterday afternoon?"), we need just a little extra
apparatus. We need to be able to superscribe a 'W' in each interrogative
operator e.g., together with the proviso that a radix which follows a
superscribed operator must be an open radix, which contains one or more
occurrences of just one free variable. And we need a chameleon variable λ,
to occur only in this or that quantifier, so that (∃λ)Fx is to be regarded as a way of
writing (∃x)Fx, while (∃λ)Fy is a way of writing "(∃y)Fy. To provide a specifier for a
x-superscribed operator, we simply delete the appearances of 'α' in the
specifier for the corresponding un-superscribed operator, inserting instead the
quantifier (∃1λ) (...) at the
position previously occupied by (∃1α) (...). E.g. the specifiers for
"Who killed Cock Robin?," used as an enquiry, would be: U to utter to
A ' killed Cock Robin' if U wills A to judge U to will that (∃1λ) (A should will that U judges (x
killed Cock Robin))"; in which (∃1λ) takes on the shape (∃1x) since x is the free variable within
its scope. Grice compares his buletic-doxastic distinction to Aristotle's
prohairesis/doxa distinction in
"Ethica Nichomachea." Perhaps his simplest formalisation is via
subscripts: "I will-b but will-d not."
1973. The
power structure of the soul, with Judith Baker, The H. P. Grice
Papers. Keywords: soul, power structure. Grice preferred 'soul'
to 'mind,' since it was truer to his 'philosophical PSYCHO-logy! The idea is
Platonic. Keyword: tripartite soul. Freud challenged the ‘power structure’ of
Plato’s soul: it’s the libido that takes control, not the ‘logos.’ Grice takes
up this polemic. Aristotle takes up Plato's challenge, each type of 'soul' is
united to the next by the idea of 'life.' The animal soul, between the
vegetative and the rational, is not detachable.
1974. Yet
more misunderstanding, towards an analysis of 'intending,' Davidson on
intending, reply to Donald Davidson on 'Intending,' The H. P. Grice Papers,
Series II (Essays), Carton 2-Folders 17-18, BANC MSS 92/135c, The
Bancroft Library, The University of California at
Berkeley. Keywords: intention, intending, believing, implicature,
disimplicature, Davidson. In the William James lectures, Grice mentions the use
of "is" to mean "seem" (The tie is red in this light), and
"see" to mean "hallucinate." The reductive analyses of
being and seeing hold. We have here two cases of 'loose' use (or
disimplicature). Same now with his example in "Intention and
uncertainty": "Smith intends to climb Mt. Everest" +
[common-ground status: this is difficult]. Grice's response to Davidson's
pretty unfair use of Grice's notion of conversational implicature in Davidson's
analysis of intention caught a lot of interest. D. F. Pears loved Grice's
reply. Implicatum here is out of the question -- disimplicatum may not. Grice
just saw that his theory of conversation is TOO SOCIAL to be true when applied
to 'intending.' The doxastic condition is one of the ENTAILMENTS in an
ascription of an intending. It cannot be cancelled as an implicatum can. If it
CAN be cancelled, it is best seen as a DISIMPLICATUM, or a loose use by an
utterer meaning less than what he says or explicitly conveys to more careful
conversants. Grice and Davidson were members of "The Grice and
Davidson Mutual Admiration Society." Davidson, not being Oxonian, was
perhaps not acquainted with Grice's polemics at Oxford with Hart and Hampshire
(where Grice sided with Pears, rather). Grice and Pears hold a
'minimalist' approach to 'intending.' On the other hand, Davidson makes
what Grice sees as 'the same mistake' again of BUILDING 'certainty' into the
concept. Grice finds that to apply the idea of a conversational IMPLICATUM
at this point is 'too social to be true.' Rather, Grice prefers to coin
the conversational DISIMPLICATUM: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt
Everest on hands and knees. The utterance above, if merely reporting what
Bloggs thinks, may involve a 'loose' use of "intends." The
certainty on the agent's part on the success of his enterprise is thus cast
with doubt. Davidson was claiming that the agent's belief in the
probability of the object of the agent's intention was a mere conversational
IMPLICATUM on the utterer's part. Grice responds that the ascription of
such a belief is an ENTAILMENT of a strict use of 'intend,' even if, in cases
where the utterer aims at a conversational DISIMPLICATUM, it can be
'dropped.' The addressee will still regard the utterer as abiding by
the principle of conversational helpfulness. D. F. Pears was especially
interested in the Davidson. Grice polemic on intending.
1974. Disimplicature. Disimplicature, keywords:
disimplicature. Strictly, a section of his reply to Davidson. If Grice's
claim to fame is 'implicature,' he finds 'disimplicature' an intriguing notion
to capture those occasions when an utterer means LESS than he says. His
examples include: a loose use of 'intending' (without the entailment of the
doxastic condition), the uses of 'see' in Shakespeareian contexts
("Macbeth saw Banquo," "Hamlet saw his father on the ramparts of
Elsinore") and the use of "is" to mean "seems"
("That tie is blue under this light, but green otherwise," when both
conversants know that a change of colour is out of the question. He plays with
"You're the cream in my coffee" being an utterance where the
disimplicature (i.e. entailment dropping) is total. "Disimplicature"
does not appeal to a new principle of conversational rationality. It is
perfectly accountable by the principle of conversational helpfulness, in
particular, the desideratum of conversational candour. In everyday explanation we exploit, as Grice notes,
“an immense richness in the family of expressions that might be thought of as
the ‘wanting family.’ This ‘wanting’ family includes expressions like
"want,” "desire,” "would like to,” "is eager to,” "is
anxious to,” "would mind not…,” “the idea of ... appeals to me,” is
thinking of,” etc.' As Grice remarks, “The likeness and differences within this
“wanting” family demand careful attention.” In commenting on
Davidson's treatment of wanting in 'Intending', Grice notes: “It seems to me
that the picture of the soul suggested by Davidson's treatment of wanting is
remarkably tranquil and, one might almost say, computerized. It is the picture
of an ideally decorous board meeting, at which the various heads of sections
advance, from the standpoint of their particular provinces, the case for or
against some proposed course of action. In the end the chairman passes
judgement, effective for action; normally judiciously, though sometimes he is
for one reason or another over-impressed with the presentation made by some
particular member. My soul doesn't seem to me, a lot of the time, to be like
that at all. It is more like a particularly unpleasant department meeting, in
which some members shout, won't listen, and suborn other members to lie on
their behalf; while the chairman, who is often himself under suspicion of
cheating, endeavours to impose some kind of order; frequently to no effect,
since sometimes the meeting breaks up in disorder, sometimes, though it appears
to end comfortably, in reality all sorts of enduring lesions are set up, and
sometimes, whatever the outcome of the meeting, individual members go off and
do things unilaterally.” Could it be that Davidson, of the New World, and
Grice, of the Old World, have different ‘idiolects’ regarding ‘intend’? Could
well be! It is said that the New World is prone to hyperbole, so perhaps in
Grice’s more cautious use, ‘intend’ is RESTRICTED to the conditions HE wants it
to restrict it too! Odd that for all the generosity he displays in “Post-war
Oxford philosophy” (“Surely I can help you analyse YOUR concept of this or
that, even if my use of the corresponding expression does not agree with
yours”), he goes to attack Davidson, and just for trying to be nice and apply
the ‘conversational implicatum’ to ‘intend’! Genial Grice! It is natural
Davidson, with his naturalistic tendencies, would like to see 'intending' as
merely invoking in a weak fashion the idea of a strong psychological state as
'belief.' And it's natural that Grice hated that!
1975. Super-relation,
super-relatives, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folder
16, BANC MSS 90/135c. The Bancroft Library, University of California,
Berkeley. Keywords: super-relative. Very Super.
1974.
Type-progression in pirotology, method in philosophical psychology: from the
banal to the bizarre, in The Conception of Value, Clarendon, 1975,
Presidential address to the American Philosophical Association (Pacific
Division), Proceedings and addresses of the American Philosophical
Association, pp. 23-53, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays),
Carton 2-Folders 19-21, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University
of California, Berkeley. Keywords: philosophical psychology,
pirotology, immanuel. He notes in a footnote he delivered this as an earlier
lecture. Grice's "Method" is reprinted in The Conception of
Value. Grice was forever grateful to Carnap for having coined 'pirot.' "Or
having thought to have coined. Apparently, someone had used the expression
before him to mean some sort of exotic fish." Grice wasn't sure what
his presidential address to the American Philosophical Association will be
about. He chose "the banal" (i.e. the 'ordinary-language'
counterpart of something like a 'need' we ascribe to a squirrel to gobble nuts)
and the 'bizarre': the philosopher's construction of 'need' and other
'psychological,' now theoretical terms. In the proceedings, Grice creates
the discipline of 'pirotology.' He cares to mention very many
philosophers: Aristotle, D. K. Lewis, G. Myro, L. Witters, F. R. Ramsey, G.
Ryle, and a few others! The essay became popular when, of all people, Ned
Block, cited it as a programme in 'functionalism,' which it
is! Grice's method in functionalist philosophical psychology. Introduces
pirotology as a creature-construction discipline. Repr. in The Conception
of Value, it reached a wider audience. The essay is highly subdivided, and
covers a lot of ground. Grice starts by noting that, contra Ryle, he wants to
see psychological predicates as theoretical concepts. The kind of theory he is
having in mind is 'folksy.' The first creature he introduces to apply his
method is Toby, a squarrel, that is a reconstructed squirrel. Grice gives some
principles of pirotology. Maxims of rational behaviour compound to form what he
calls an immanuel, of which The Conversational Immanuel is a part. Grice
concludes with a warning against the Devil of Scientism, but acknowledges
perhaps he was giving much too credit to Myro's influence on this! 1975.
Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre, in The
Conception of Value, Clarendon, repr. from The Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association, Method in philosophical psychology: from
the banal to the bizarre, Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association, keywords: philosophical psychology, pirotology. The
IMMANUEL section is perhaps the most important from the point of view of conversation
as rational co-operation. For he identifies THREE types of generality: formal,
applicational, and content-based. Also, he ALLOWS for there being different
types of ‘imannuels.’ Surely one should be the conversational immanuel. Ryle
would say that one can have a manual, yet now know how to use it! And there’s
also the Wittgenstein-type problem: how do we say that the conversationalist is
FOLLOWING the immanuel? Perhaps the statement is too strong – cfr. ‘following a
rule’ – and Grice’s problems with resultant and basic procedures, and how the
former derive from the latter! This connects with Chomsky, and in general with
Grice’s antipathy towards ‘constitutive’ rules! In Intention and Uncertainty
Grice had warned that his interpretation of Prichard's "willing that
..." as a "state" should NOT preculde a "physicalist"
analysis, but in "Method" it's all AGAINST physicalism. Grice's concern is with every-day psychological
explanation, an explanation which employs this or that every-day psychological
principle. By such a principle Grice means a relatively stable body of
generally-accepted principles, of which the following are examples. If a person
desires p, and believes (p horseshoe q) other things being equal the person
desires q. If a person desires p and desires q, other things being equal, the
person acts on the stronger of the two desires if the person acts on either. If
a person stares at a coloured surface and subsequently stares at a white
surface, other things being equal-the person will have an after-image. Grice do
not intend to suggest that every-day principle is as simple and easy to
formulate as these examples. As Grice repeatedly emphasises, the principles we
explicitly or implicitly employ are many, varied, rich, and subtle. Take
desire. In every-day explanation we exploit 'an immense richness in the family
of expressions that might be thought of as the "wanting family"; this
family includes expressions like "want", "desire",
"would like to ", "is eager to", "is anxious to",
"would mind not ... ", "the idea of ... appeals to me",
"is thinking of", etc.'" Grice remarks that 'the likeness and
differences within this family demand careful attention'. The systematic
exposition of these likenesses and differences is itself an important (and not
unpleasant) philosophical task. But we are concerned with Grice's overall view
of psychological explanation, and, to see what Grice thinks, it will be useful
first to consider how we would explain the behaviour of a certain sort of
robot. Suppose we are presented with a rather peculiar robot, and a diagram
that we can use to predict and explain its behaviour. The robot is peculiar in
that it has a panel of lights on its forehead -- say sixty-four small lights in
an eight-by-eight pattern. Each square represents a possible configuration of
lights, and the diagram correlates possible configurations with each other.
Some squares are correlated with more than one other square. For
example, ClcC2 means that configuration C is followed by C 1 or C2.
The diagram describes a finite, non-deterministic automaton. No transition
probabilities are given. We can use the diagram to predict and explain the
configurations that appear on the robot's forehead because the robot is so
constructed that the configurations succeed one another in the ways
represented in the diagram. So, if we observe configuration C, we can predict
that C 1 or C2 will follow. If we observe Cl, we can explain its occurrence by
pointing out that C must have preceded it. All we can explain so far are
configurations of lights. Can we explain behaviour -- e.g., the robot's raising
its left arm? Suppose we are provided with a table which has entries like: if
configuraton C occurs at t, the robot raises its arm at t+1. We succeed in
predicting and explaining the robot's behaviour, except that occasionally our
predictions are falsified. The robot does not always work according to the
diagram. Temporary electronic defects and vagaries account for the falsified
predications. The diagram and table represent the way the robot is designed to
work, not the way it always does work. Apart from the infrequent
electronically-explained lapses, explanation and prediction proceed untroubled
until one day a large number of our predictions are falsified. Suspecting a
massive electronic disorder, we return the robot. The manufacturer explains
that the robot was programmed to be self-regulating. The robot has an internal
representation of the diagram and table we were given, and it was also
programmed to use this or that "evaluative" principle to determine
whether to operate in accord with the diagram and table. E.g., suppose the
robot is in configuration C and that the immediate successor of C is C 1. The
robot determines by this or that "evaluative" principle not to move into
Cl, but to arrive at C2 instead. The robot was engineered so that it will in
certain situations employ this or that "evaluative" principle, and so
its states will change, in accord with the results of its evaluations. When we
ask for the "evaluative" principle, it is given to us, but it does
not improve our predictive power as much as we may have hoped. First the robot
has the power to formulate a new subsidiary evaluative principle. It formulates
this new principle using its original evaluative principle plus information
about the environment and the consequences of its past actions. We may simply
not know, at any given time, exactly what subsidiary principle the robot is
employing. Second, the robot may -- to some extent -- revise or replace its
original evaluative principle, i.e., it may, in the light of a principles --
original or subsidiary -- plus information about its environment and past
actions, revise or replace its original principle. So we may not know exactly
what original principles the robot is using. When we complain that we have lost
our ability to predict and explain the robot's behaviour, we are told that
the situation is not so bad. First, in programming the robot, an evaluative
principle is made immune to revision and replacement, so we can always count on
the robot's operating with this principle. Second, we are not at a total loss
to determine what evaluative principle-subsidiary or otherwise-the robot
employs. We possess the diagram and table as well as knowledge of the original
evaluative principle. The robot uses the diagram, table, and principles to
arrive at a new principle, and we can replicate this process. Third, we can
replicate the processes that lead the robot to deviate from the diagram and
table. To the extent that we have identified the robot's evaluative procedure,
we can use it just as the robot does to determine whether it will act in accord
with the diagram and table. Of course, there is the problem of determining when
the robot will employ its evaluative principle, but we might be provided with a
new table with entries like: if C occurs at t, the robot will employ its
evaluative principle at t+1. Fourth, we can often predict and explain the
robot's behaviour just as we did before the evaluative principle complicated
the picture, for the robot does not always employ its evaluative principle to
diverge from the diagram and table. On the contrary, it was designed to
minimize the use of the principle since their use requires significant time and
energy. An important part of Grice's view of everyday psychological explanation
can be put this way. Such explanation is similar to the explanation and
prediction of the robot's behaviour. There are four points to note here. First,
an every-day psychological principle plays a role in explanation and prediction
that is similar to the role of the diagram and table. Think of the robot's
lights as representing a psychological state. Then the diagram and table
express relations among complexes consisting of a psychological state and
behaviour. An everyday psychological principle clearly expresses such a
relations (although this is not all it does). Second, people use an 'evaluative
principle' in ways analogous to the use the robot makes of his. This point is
an essential part of Grice's view of rationality. Grice holds that the picture
of rationality given us by Kantotle as something which essentially functions to
regulate, direct, and control a pre-rational impulse, an inclination, and a
disposition, is the right picture. One of the things an everyday psychological
principle give us is a specification of how a pre-rational impulse,
inclination, or disposition operates, just as the diagram and table represent
how the robot operates apart from employing its evaluative principle. People
can, through deliberation, rationally regulate, direct, control and monitor a
pre-rational pattern of thought or action just as the robot can regulate,
direct, control and monitor its operation in accord with the diagram and table.
So what is this 'evaluative principle' people employ? It is included among what
we have been calling an everyday psychological principle, for it does not
merely specify how our pre-rational part operates. Consider e.g: If a person
believes p and that p horseshoe q, and the person believes ~q, the person
should stop believing p or stop believing q. Conformity to this principle is a
criterion of rationality, although this is not to say that the principle may
not have exceptions in quite special circumstances. One important 'evaluative'
principle is the conception of 'eudaemonia.' Grice suggests that
'eudaemonia' consists in having a set of ends meeting certain conditions --
where an important necessary condition is that the set of ends be 'suitable for
the direction of life', and much of 'Some Reflections' is devoted to explaining
this condition. Grice suggests that if an individual asks what it is for him to
be happy, the answer consists in identifying a system of ends which is a
specific and personalized derivative, determined by that individual's character,
abilities, and situation in the world, of the system constitutive of eudaemonia
in general. This specific and personalized derivative figures prominently in
deliberation, for a person may use it to regulate, direct, control, and monitor
his pre-rational inclination. Third, recall that we imagined that the robot
could replace and revise its evaluative principle. Analogously, a person may
change his conception of what it is for him to be happy. But we also imagined
that the robot had some evaluative principles it could not change. On Grice's
view, a person has this 'evaluative principle' that cannot change. Not because
a person programmed in; rather, it is a principle a person cannot abandon if he
is to count as rational. E. g. it is plausible to suggest that a person must,
to count as rational, have and employ in deliberation at least some minimal
conception of what it is for him to be happy. Also it is plausible to suggest
that this conception counts as a conception of happiness only if it is a 'specific
and personalized derivative' of a conception of eudaemonia in general. So to
count as happy, a person would have to have and employ such a conception. These
examples do not, of course, exhaust the range of things one might hope to show
necessary to counting as rational. We should note here that our use of
'rational' may be a looser use than Grice himself would indulge in. Grice
regards 'rational' as a label for a cluster of notions he would distinguish.
Our looseness is an expositional convenience. Fourth, everday psychological
predictions and explanations are sometimes falsified-like the prediction and
explanations of the robot's behaviour. And, just as in the case of the robot,
this reveals no defect in everyday psychological explanation. How can this be?
In the robot example, the diagram and table specify how the robot is designed
to function; obviously, minor deviations from the design do not justify
regarding the information in the diagram and table as either false or useless.
Can anything similar be true of people? Something somewhat similar is true,
according to Grice, and this because everyday psychology has special status.
Grice argues that the psychological theory which I envisage would be deficient
as a theory to explain behaviour if it did not contain provision for interests
in the ascription of psychological states otherwise than as tools for
explaining and predicting behaviour, interests (e.g.) on the part of one
creature to be able to ascribe these rather than those psychological states to
another creature because of a *concern* for the other creature. Within such a
theory it should be possible to derive a strong motivation on the part of the
creature subject to the theory against the abandonment of the central concepts
of the theory (and so of the theory itself), a motivation which the creature
would (or should) regard as justified. Indeed, only from within the framework
of such a theory Girce think that matters of evaluation, and so, of the
evaluation of modes of explanation, can be raised at all. If he conjectures
aright, the entrenched system contains the materials needed to justify its own
entrenchment; whereas no rival system contains a basis for the justification of
anything at all. Suppose the entrenched system contains the materials needed to
justify its own entrenchment; whereas no rival system contains a basis for the
justification of anything at all. Then while everyday psychology (or some
preferred part of it) may not specify how we are designed to think and act, it
does specify how we *ought* to think and act; for there can be no justification
for failure to conform to (the preferred part) of everyday
psychology. There is another point which it is worth noting here in
passing. If everyday psychology is uniquely self-justifying in the way Grice
suggests, we must reject the suggestion that everyday psychology is just a
rough and ready theory that we will or could eventually abandon without loss in
favour of a more accurate and complete 'scientific' theory of behaviour. Grice
remarks that we must be ever watchful against the Devil of Scientism, who would
lead us into myopic over-concentration on the nature and importance of
knowledge, and of 'scientific' knowledge in particular; the Devil who is even
so audacious as to tempt us to call in question the very system of ideas
required to make intelligible the idea of calling in question anything at all;
and who would even prompt us, in effect, to suggest that since we do not really
think but only think that we think, we had better change our minds without
undue delay. Now let us turn to meaning. In 'Meaning Revisited', Grice sets out
to put one or two of the thoughts he had at various times into some kind of
focus, so that there might emerge some sort of sense about not merely what kind
of views about the nature of meaning he is inclined to endorse, but also why it
should be antecedently plausible to accept this kind of view. When Grice says
'antecedently plausible', he means plausible for some reasons other than that
the view in question offers some prospects of dealing with the intuitive data:
the facts about how I use 'mean', and so on. So I will be digging just a little
bit into the background of the study of meaning and its roots in such things as
philosophical psychology. It is worth emphasizing the point that the study has
its roots in philosophical psychology, for one trend in contemporary philosophy
has been to regard the study of meaning as 'first philosophy' (M. A. E.
Dummett), as providing the framework and the tools for any other philosophical
investigation. This is clearly not Grice's view. How can the roots of the study
of meaning be in philosophical psychology? Consider the utterer's meaning.
Grice employs his conception of everyday psychological explanation to provide a
certain kind of rationale for his account of utterer's meaning. The rationale
consists essentially of three claims. First, given our general psychological
make-up (specified by everyday psychology) and given our environment, it is
frequently highly conducive to realizing our ends that we be able to produce
beliefs in each other. E. g. suppose I need your help to escape the riptide
that is carrying me out to sea. You will help me if you believe I am caught in
the riptide. How can I ensure that you will believe that? Second, an especially
effective way to produce this belief is to do something m-intending thereby
that I am caught in the riptide. Consider what might happen if I do not have
such an m-intention. Suppose I just thrash about in the water. I intend you to
see that my swimming is ineffective, and to infer therefrom that I am caught.
But you might think that I was simply having a good time splashing about, or
that I was just pretending to be in trouble. If I can get you to realise that I
intend by what I am doing to produce in you the belief that I am caught, that
realization will give you a decisive reason to believe that I need help. So I
do have a good and decisive reason to m-intend that I am caught. And -- and
this is the third claim -- I have the ability to m-intend that I am caught. It
is an everday psychological fact that we can perform actions with the intention
(1) that the audience believe p; (2) that the audience recognize the intention
(1); (3) that this recognition be part of the audience's reason for believing
p. This is a fact about our pre-rational part, analogous to the facts about the
robot's behaviour which we can read off solely from the diagram and table
without any appeal to its evaluative procedures. We are just so 'designed' that
we M-intend things at various times. E. g., in the riptide case, I would utter
'I am caught in the riptide, m-intending you to think that I am caught. These
three points show that it is rational for us to be so 'designed'. That is, it
is rational for us to be pre-rationally structured so as to employ
m-intentions. To see why, consider what we are doing in working through the
three claims in question. We note that we have a certain pre-rational structure
involving an m-intention, and we ask what can be said in favour of it. Given
our ends and our environment, there is a good decisive reason to have such a
pre-rational structure. So we discover that the m-intending structure passes
rational muster. It does not have to be inhibited. Rather it should be
reinforced and guided. The air of paradox in a pre-rational structure's being
rational is easily dispelled. To label a structure pre-rational is merely to
see it as present and operative independently of any attempt to evaluate
whether and how it should be regulated, directed, and controlled. To call such
a structure rational is to say that on evaluation one finds a good
decisive reason to allow the structure to remain operative instead of
trying to inhibit or eliminate it. Grice sometimes expresses the fact that a pre-rational
structure is rational by saying that it has a genitorial justification. Suppose
we are demi-gods -- genitors, as Grice says -- designing creatures. We are
constructing them out of animal stuff, so we are making creatures that will
perceive, desire, hope, fear, think, feel, and so on. The question before us
is: exactly what psychological principles should our creatures obey? We want,
so to speak, to decide on a specific diagram and table for them. As we work on
this problem, we discover that we have a good and decisive reason to make them
such that they employ an m-intention, for we have built into them a desire for
eudaemonia, and as we survey their environment and their physical powers, it is
clear that they have little chance for eudaemonia (or even survival) unless
they employ an m-intention. And, as benevolent genitors, we want them to have
every chance of eudaemonia. In appealing to happiness in this way we have
departed somewhat from Grice's treatment of creature construction. This
deviation, which is expositionally convenient here, is corrected in the section
on ethics. So as genitors we have a good and decisive reason to make our
creatures M-intend. Grice infers from this genitorial myth that it really is
rational -- or, if one likes, that we really have a good reason-to be so
pre-rationally structured that we M-intend. And the inference is a good one,
for the technique of genitorial creature construction is a more picturesque way
of establishing that M-intending passes rational muster. Grice sometimes uses
this creature construction technique to discover what aspects of our
pre-rational structure are rational. The idea is that the question 'What should
we as genitors build into creatures with human psychological capacities living
in a human environment?' is easier to answer than the question 'What aspects of
our pre-rational structure are rational?' As we have seen, M-intending is, for
example, one structure that we can cite in answer to both questions. Consider
how surprising it would be if language had no word that stood for M-intending.
Our considerations reveal it not only as a rational, but as a very important,
prerational structure. Of course, Grice does think we have an expression here:
viz., 'mean'. This linguistic thesis combined with the identification of
M-intending as a rational pre-rational structure provides a justification of
Grice's account of utterer's meaning. The concluding section of
Grice's 'Meaning Revisited' is relevant here, as it further illuminates
the rational aspect of M-intending (or speaker meaning as Grice calls it in
'Meaning Revisited'). Grice begins by saying that, The general idea that he
wants to explore, and which seems to me to have some plausibility, is that
something has been left out, by me and perhaps by others too, in the analyses,
definitions, expansions and so on, of semantic notions, and particularly
various notions of meaning. What has been left out has in fact been left out
because it is something which everyone regards with horror, at least when in a
scientific or theoretical frame of mind: the notion of value. Though I think
that in general we want to keep value notions out of our philosophical and
scientific enquiries-and some would say out of everything else-we might
consider what would happen if we relaxed this prohibition to some extent. If we
did, there is a whole range of different kinds of value predicates or
expressions which might be admitted in different types of case. To avoid having
to choose between them, I am just going to use as a predicate the word
'optimal' the meaning of which could of course be more precisely characterized
later. Applying this idea to speaker-meaning (utterer's meaning, as we have
been saying), Grice makes two suggestions: first that, as a first
approximation, what we mean by saying that a speaker, by something he says, on
a particular occasion, means that p, is that he is in the optimal state with
respect to communicating, or if you like, to communicating that p. Second, that
the optimal state-the state in which he has an infinite set of intentions-is in
principle unrealisable, so that he does not strictly speaking mean that p.
However, he is in a situation which is such that it is legitimate, or perhaps
even mandatory, for us to deem him to satisfy the unfulfillable condition. The
optimal state is what the analysis of speaker meaning specifies.
Counter-examples advanced by Schiffer in Meaning suggest that this state is one
in which a speaker has an infinite number of intentions. We will not discuss
the counter-examples; we want to consider why it is reasonable to respond to
them by granting that the analysis of speaker meaning specifies an
unrealizable-but none the less ideal or optimal-state involving having an
infinite number of intentions. Consider an analogy. There is in sailing an
optimal setting for the sails-a setting that maximizes forward thrust. Any
reasonably complete text on sailing will explain at least some of the
relevant aerodynamic theory. Now this optimal setting is difficult if not
impossible to achieve while actually sailing-given continual shifts in wind
direction, the sudden changes of direction caused by waves, and the difficulty
in determining airflow patterns by sight. To deal with these practical
difficulties, the text supplies numerous rules of thumb which are relatively
easy to apply while sailing. Why not just drop the aerodynamic theory
altogether and just provide the reader/sailor with the rules of thumb? Because
they are rules of thumb. They hold (at best) other things being equal. To spot
exceptions and resolve conflicts as well as to handle situations not covered by
the rules, one needs to know what the aerodynamic optimum is. This optimum
plays a crucial role in guiding the use of the rules of thumb. Why should
common sense psychology not avail itself of various optima in this way? It is
plausible to think that it does given Grice's view of rationality as something
that plays an evaluative and guiding role with respect to pre-rational
inclinations and dispositions. Various optima would be especially suited to
such a role. And why should utterer's meaning not be such an optimum? Indeed,
there is some reason to think it is. Resultant procedures: What can we say
about sentence meaning? Is it possible to provide a rationale for the treatment
of sentence meaning in the context of Grice's philosophical psychology? The
account of sentence meaning has an explanatory role. Consider that a speaker of
a natural language can M-intend an extremely wide range of things, and
typically his audience will know what he M-in tends as soon as the audience
hears what is uttered. Attributing resultant procedures to language-users
explains these facts. There are two points to note: First, suppose U has the
procedure of uttering 'I know the route' if U wants A to think U thinks U knows
the route. What does it mean to suppose this? We can understand it as an
everday psychological principle. More precisely, the proposed principle is: if
a competent English speaker wants an audience to think the speaker knows the
route, then-other things being equal-the speaker may utter 'I know the route'.
This qualifies as an everyday psychological principle and-perhaps most
important-like (at least some) other everyday psychological principles this
principle has a normative aspect. Both knowledge of and conformity to this
principle are required if one is to count as a competent speaker. Turning
from utterers to audiences, it is, for similar reasons, plausible to suggest
that it is an everyday psychological fact that if a competent English speaker
hears 'I know the route', then he will-other things being equal-think the
utterer thinks he knows the route. (This principle could be derived from the
first plus the assumption that speakers are, about certain things,
trustworthy.) There is nothing mysterious about such everyday psychological
principles. They specify part of our psychological make-up, the way we are
'designed' -part of our pre-rational structure, and the fact that we are so
'designed', certainly explains the range of things we can M-intend and the ease
with which we employ such M-intentions. But-and this is the second point-we
might have hoped for much more by way of explanation, for there are mysteries
here. In particular, what is it for a person to have a resultant procedure? To
see what the question asks, imagine having an answer of the form: S has a
resultant procedure P if and only if where the dots are filled out by
specification of certain psychological and behavioural features. This would
provide us with an informative characterization of the psychological and
behavioural capacities underlying language use. Since there are infinitely many
resultant procedures, a reasonable way to provide answers would be (given any
natural language) to specify a finite set of basic procedures (for that
language), from which the infinitely many resultant procedures could be derived
(in some suitable sense of 'derived'). Then we would provide a finite set of
conditions of the form: S has basic procedure P if and only if where the dots
are replaced by a suitable condition. But what counts as a 'suitable
condition'? What psychological, behavioural, or other properties does one have
to have to count as possessing a certain basic procedure P? As we said, Grice
regards this as an open question. Of course, this is not to say that the
question is unimportant; on the contrary, it is of fundamental importance if we
want to know what capacities underlie language use. One problem about Grice's
account of meaning still remains: does the appeal to propositions not vitiate
the whole project? (Consider section on ethics). One crucial point to consider
is the PRIMACY (to use Suppes's qualification) of the buletic over the
doxastic. Grice was playing with this for some time (Journal of Philosophy,
vol. ). In Method, from the mundane to the recondite, he is playful enough to
say that primacy is 'no big deal,' and that, if properly motivated, he might
give a reductive analysis of the buletic in terms of the doxastic. But his
reductive analysis of the doxastic in terms of the buletic runs as follows:
"X judges that p" iff "X wills as follows. "Given any
situation in which (PROTASIS) 1. X wills some end E. 2. There are *two*
_non-empty_ classes, K1 and K2 of action-types, such that: the _performance_ (by
X) of an action-type belonging to K1 will realise E1 just in case p IS TRUE,
and the performance (by X) of an action-type belonging to of K2 will realise E
just in case p is *false*. 3. (Closure clause): There is _no_ third non-empty
class K3 of action-types such that the performance (by X) of an action type
belonging to will realise E whether p is true or p is false,---APODOSIS:
In such situation, X is to will that X performs some action-type belonging to
K1." Creature construction allows for an account of freedom that will metaphysically justify absolute value.
Grice writes: "My purpose in this section is to give a little thought to the question 'What are the general principles exemplified, in creature-construction, in progressing from one type of pirot to a higher type? What KINDS of steps are being made? The kinds of step with which I shall deal here are those which culminate in a licence to include, within the specification of the content of the psychological state of certain pirots, a range of expressions which would be inappropriate with respect to lower pirots; such expressions include connectives, quantifiers, temporal modifiers, mood indicators, modal operators, and (importantly) names of psychological states like "judge" and "will". Expressions, the availability of which leads to the structural enrichment of specifications of content. ... In general, these steps will be ones by which items or ideas which have, initially, a legitimate place outside the scope of psychological instantiables (or, if you will, the expressions for which occur legitimately outside the scope of psychological verbs) come to have a legitimate place within the scope of such instantiables: steps by which (one might say) such items or ideas come to be internalised. I am disposed to regard as prototypical the sort of natural disposition which Hume attributes to us, and which is very important to him; name, the tendency of the mind 'to spread itself upon objects' to project into the world items which, properly (or primitively) considered, are really features of our states of mind. I shall set out in stages the application of aspects of the genitorial programme.” We then start with a zero-order, with pirots equipped to satisfy unnested judging and willing (i.e. whose contents do _not_ involve judging or willing). We soon reach
Pirot-1. "It would be advantageous to pirots-0 if they could have judging and willing, which relate to their own judging or willing." Such pirots (pirots-1) could be equipped to control or regulate their own judgings and willings. They will presumably be already constituted so as to conform to the law that caeteris paribus if they will that p and judge that ~p, if they can, they make it the case that p in their 'minds'. To give them some control over their judgings and willings, we need only extend the application of this law to their judging and willing. We equip them so that caeteris paribus IF they will that they do not will that p and judge that they do will that p, (if they can) they make it the case that they do NOT will that p. And we somehow ensure that sometimes they CAN do this. It may be that the installation of this kind of control would go hand in had with the installation of the capacity for evaluation."
Pirot-2. Unlike it is the case with a pirot-1, a pirot-2's intentional efforts depend on the motivational strength of its considered desires at the time of action. We have been seeing the process by which conflicting considered desires motivate action as a broadly causal process, a process that reveals motivational strength. But a pirot-2 might itself try to weigh considerations provided by such conflicting desires in deliberation about the pros and cons of various alternatives. In the simplest case, such weighing treats each of the things desired as a prima facie justifying end. In the face of conflict it weighs such desired ends, where the weights correspond to the motivational strength of the associated considered desire. The outcome of such deliberation will match the outcome of the causal motivational process envisioned in our description of a pirot-2. But since the weights it invokes in such deliberation correspond to the motivational strength of the relevant considered desires (though perhaps not to the motivational strength of the relevant considered desires), the resultant activities will match those of a corresponding pirot-2 (*all* of whose desires, we are assuming, are considered). To be more realistic we might limit ourselves to saying that a pirot-2 has the capacity to make the transition from unconsidered to considered desires but does not always do this. But it will keep the discussion more manageable to simplify and to suppose that *all* its desires are considered.
Pirot-3. We shall not want these pirots-2 to depend, in each will and act in ways that reveal the motivational strength of considered desires at the time of action, but for a pirot-3 it will also be true that in some (though not all) cases it acts on the basis of how it weights the ends favoured by its conflicting considered desires. Pirot-3's considered desires will concern matters that cannot be achieved simply by action at a single time. Pirot-3 may, for example, want to nurture a vegetable garden, or build a house. Such matters will require organized and coordinated action that extends over time. What the pirot-3 does now will depend not only on what it now desires but also on what it now expects it will do later given what it does now. It needs a way of settling now what it will do later given what it does now. The point is even clearer when we remind ourselves that pirot-3 is not alone. It is, we may assume, one of some number of pirots-3; and in many cases it needs to coordinate what it does with what other pirots-3 do so as to achieve ends desired by all participants, itself included.
Pirots-4. These costs are magnified for a pirot-4 whose various plans are interwoven so that a change in one element can have significant ripple effects that will need to be considered. Let us suppose that the general strategies pirot-4 has for responding to new information about its circumstances are sensitive to these kinds of costs. Promoting in the long run the satisfaction of its considered desires and preferences. Pirot-4 is a somewhat sophisticated planning agent but it has a problem. It can expect that its desires and preferences may well change over time and undermine its efforts at organizing and coordinating its activities over time. Perhaps in many cases this is due to the kind of temporal discounting. So for example pirot-4 may have a plan to exercise every day but may tend to prefer a sequence of not exercising on the present day but exercising all days in the future, to a uniform sequence the present day included. At the end of the day it returns to its earlier considered preference in favour of exercising on each and every day. Though pirot-4, unlike pirot-3, has the capacity to settle on prior plans or plaices concerning exercise, this capacity does not yet help in such a case. A creature whose plans were stable in ways in part shaped by such a no-regret principle would be more likely than pirot-4 to resist temporary temptations.
Pirot-5. So let us build such a principle into the stability of the plans of a pirot-5, whose plans and policies are not derived solely from facts about its limits of time, attention, and the like. It is also grounded in the central concerns of a planning agent with its own future, concerns that lend special significance to anticipated future regret. So let us add to pirot-5 the capacity and disposition to arrive at such hierarchies of higher-order desires concerning its "will".
Pirot-6. This gives us a new creature, pirot-6. There is a problem with pirot-6, one that has been much discussed. It is not clear why a higher-order desire -- even a higher-order desire that a certain desire be one's "will" -- is not simply one more desire in the pool of desires (Berkeley God's will problem). Why does it have the authority to constitute or ensure the agent's (that is, the creature's) endorsement or rejection of a first-order desire? Applied to pirot-6 this is the question of whether, by virtue solely of its hierarchies of desires, it really does succeed in taking its own stand of endorsement or rejection of various first-order desires. Since it was the ability to take its own stand that we are trying to provide in the move to pirot-6, we need some response to this challenge. The basic point is that pirot-6 is not merely a time-slice agent. It is, rather, and understands itself to be, a temporally persisting planning agent, one who begins, and continues, and completes temporally extended projects. On a broadly Lockean view, its persistence over time consists in relevant psychological continuities (e.g., the persistence of attitudes of belief and intention) and connections (e.g., memory of a past event, or the later intentional execution of an intention formed earlier). Certain attitudes have as a primary role the constitution and support of such Lockean continuities and connections. In particular, policies that favour or reject various desires have it as their role to constitute and support various continuities both of ordinary desires and of the politicos themselves. For this reason such policies are not merely additional wiggles in the psychic stew. Instead, these policies have a claim to help determine where the agent -- i.e., the temporally persisting agent -- stands with respect to its desires. Or so it seems to me reasonable to say.
Pirot-7. So the psychology of pirot-7 continues to have the hierarchical structure of pro-attitudes introduced with pirot-6. The difference is that the higher-order pro-attitudes of pirot-6 were simply characterized as desires in a broad, generic sense, and no appeal was made to the distinctive species of pro-attitude constituted by plan-like attitudes. That is the sense in which the psychology of pirot-7 is an extension of the psychology of pirot-6. Let us then give pirot-7 such higher-order policies with the capacity to take a stand with respect to its desires by arriving at relevant higher-order policies concerning the functioning of those desires over time. Pirot-7 exhibits a merger of hierarchical and planning structures. Appealing to planning theory and ground in connection to the temporally extended structure of agency to be one's "will". Pirot-7 has higher-order policies that favour or challenge motivational roles of its considered desires. When Pirot-7 engages in deliberative weighing of conflicting, desired ends it seems that the assigned weights should reflect the policies that determine where it stands with respect to relevant desires. But the policies we have so far appealed to -- policies concerning what desires are to be one's will -- do not quite address this concern. The problem is that one can in certain cases have policies concerning which desires are to motivate and yet these not be policies that accord what those desires are for a corresponding justifying role in deliberation.
Pirots-8. A solution is to give our creature -- call it pirot-8 -- the capacity to arrive at policies that express its commitment to be motivated by a desire by way of its treatment of that desire as providing, in deliberation, a justifying end for action. Pirot-8 has policies for treating (or not treating) certain desires as providing justifying ends -- as, in this way, reason-providing -- in motivationally effective deliberation. Let us call such policies self-governing policies. We will suppose that these policies are mutually compatible and do not challenge each other. In this way pirot-8 involves an extension of structures already present in pirot-7. The grounds on which pirot-8 arrives at (and on occasion revises) such self-governing policies will be many and varied. We can see these policies as crystallizing complex pressures and concerns, some of which are grounded in other policies or desires. These self-governing policies may be tentative and will normally not be immune to change. If we ask what pirot-8 values in this case, the answer seems to be: what it values is constituted in part by its higher-order self-governing policies. In particular, it values exercise over nonexercise even right now, and even given that it has a considered (though temporary) preference to the contrary. Unlike lower pirots, what pirot-8 now values is not simply a matter of its present, considered desires and preferences. Now this model of pirot-8 seems in relevant aspects to be a (partial) model of us. (in our better moments, of course). So we arrive at the conjecture that one important kind of valuing of which we are capable involves, in the cited ways, both our first-order desires and our higher order self-governing policies. In an important sub-class of cases our valuing involves reflexive polices that are both first-order policies of action and higher-order policies to treat the first-order policy as reason providing in motivationally effective deliberation. This may seem odd. Valuing seems normally to be a first-order attitude. One values honesty, say. The proposal is that an important kind of valuing involves higher-order policies. Does this mean that, strictly speaking, what one values (in this sense) is itself a desire -- not honesty, say, but a desire for honesty? No, it does not. What I value in the present case is honesty; but, on the theory, my valuing honesty in art consists in certain higher-order self-governing policies. An agent's reflective valuing involves a kind of higher-order willing.
1975.
The criteria of intelligence, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (The
Doctrines), Carton 5-Folder 29, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The
University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: intelligence,
criteria. In "Aspects of reason," he mentions 'flat'
rationality, and certain other 'talents' that are more difficult for the
philosopher to conceptualise, such as 'nose' (i.e. intuitiveness), acumen,
tenacity, and such. Grice's approach is 'pirotological.' If Locke had used
'intelligent' to refer to Prince Maurice's parrot, Grice wants to find criteria
for 'intelligent' as applied to his favourite type of 'pirot,' rather
("intelligent, indeed rational.")
1976.
Meaning, revisited, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II: Explorations in
semantics and metaphysics, Essay, from N. V. Smith, Mutual knowledge,
Croom Helm, London, pp. 223-43, Remnants of meaning, Meaning revisited,
revisited, notes on Schiffer, philosophical psychology and meaning, meaning and
philosophical psychology, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton
1-Folders 17-18, and Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folder 9 BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords:
philosophical psychology, meaning. This is a bit like Grice: implicatum,
revisited. An axiological approach to meaning. Strictly a reprint of Grice
(1976), which should be the preferred citation. The date 1976 is given by Grice
himself, and he knew! Grice also composed some notes on Remnants on meaning, by
Schiffer. This is a bit like Grice's meaning re-revisited. S. R. Schiffer had
been Strawson's tutee at Oxford as a Rhode Scholar in the completion of
his D. Phil. on 'Meaning' (later published by Clarendon). Eventually, Schiffer
grew sceptic, and let Grice know about it! Grice did not find Schiffer's
arguments totally destructive, but saw the positive side to them. Schiffer's
arguments should remind any philosopher that the issues he is dealing are
profound and bound to involve much elucidation before they are solved. This is
a bit like Grice: implicatum, revisited. "Meaning revisited" (an ovious
nod to Evelyn Waugh's Yorkshire-set novel) is the title Grice chose for a
contribution to a symposium at Brighton organised by N. V. Smith. "Meaning
revisited" (although Grice has earlier drafts entitled "Meaning and
philosophical psychology") comprises three sections. In the first section,
Grice is concerned with the application of his "M. O. R.," or
"Modified Occam's Razor" now to the very lexeme, "mean."
Cf. How many 'senses' does 'sense' have? Cohen: The "Senses" of
Senses. In the second part, Grice explores an 'evolutionary' model of creature
construction reaching a stage of non-iconic representation. Finally, in the
third section, motivated to solve what he calls a 'major' problem -- versus the
'minor' problem concerning the transition from 'utterer's meaning' to
'expression meaning' -- Grice attempts to construct 'meaning' as a
'value-paradeigmatic' notion. A version was indeed published in the proceedings
of the Brighton symposium, by Croom Helm, London. Grice has a couple of other
drafts with variants on this title: philosophical psychology and meaning,
psychology and meaning. He kept, meaningfully, changing the order! It is not
arbitrary that Grice's fascinating exploration is in three parts. In the first,
where he applies his Modified Occam's razor to "mean," he is
revisiting Stevenson. "Smoke means fire" and "I mean love,"
don't need different 'senses' of 'mean.' And Stevenson was right when using
'scare' quotes for the "Smoke 'means' fire" utterance. Grice was very
much aware that that, the rather obtuse terminology of 'senses', was exactly
the terminology he had adopted in both "Meaning" and the relevant
William James lectures (V and VI) at Harvard! Now, it's time to revisit and to
echo Graves, say, 'goodbye to all that'! In the second part he applies
pirotology. While he knows his audience is not philosophical -- it's not Oxford
-- he thinks they still may get some entertainment! We have a pirot feeling
pain, simulating it, and finally uttering, "I am in pain." In the
concluding section, Grice becomes Plato. He sees 'meaning' as an 'optimum,'
i.e. a value-paradeigmatic notion introducing 'value' in its guise of
'optimality.' Much like Plato thought 'circle' works in his idiolect. Grice
played with various titles, in the Grice Collection. There's 'philosophical
psychology and meaning.' The reason is obvious. The lecture is strictly divided
in sections, and it's only natural that Grice kept drafts of this or that
section in his collection. In Studies in the Way of Words, Grice notes that he
re-visited his "Meaning re-visited" in 1980, too! And he meant it!
Surely, there is no way to understand at least the FOUR stages of Grice’s
development of his ideas about meaning (1948, 1967, 1976 and 1987) without
Peirce! It is obvious here that Grice thought that 'mean' TWO figurative
extensions of 'use.' Smoke 'means' fire AND "'Smoke' means smoke."
The latter is a transferred use in that 'impenetrability' "means"
'let's change the topic if Dumpty m-intends that it and Alice are to change the
topic.
1976.
The categorical imperative, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton
6-Folder 24, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. Keyword: categorical imperative. An exploration
of the logical form of Kant's concoction. Grice is interested in its
conceptual connection with the 'hypothetical' imperative, in terms of the type
of connection between the protasis and the apodosis. Grice spends the full
second Paul Carus lecture on the conception of value on this. Grice is
aware that the topic is central for Oxonian philosophers such as R. M. Hare (a
member of Austin's Play Group, too), who will regard the UNIVERSABILITY of an
imperative as a mark of its categorial, indeed, moral status. He would
refer to conversational maxims as contributing to a CONVERSATIONAL IMMANUEL, if
it can be shown that, qua items under an overarching principle of
conversational helpfulness, each displays qualities associated with conceptual,
formal, and applicational generality. Grice never understood what Kant meant by
the 'categoric imperative.' But FOR GRICE, from the acceptability of the the
immanuel you can deduce the acceptability of this or that maxim, and from the
acceptability of the conversational immanuel ("Be conversational helpful")
you can deduce the acceptability of this or that convesational maxim
1976. Type-progression
in pirotology, Philosophical psychology, philosophical psychology and meaning,
meaning and philosophical psychology, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V
(Topical), Carton 7-Folders 24-25, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The
University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: philosophical
psychology, meaning. Meaning is perhaps the psychological state, attitude,
or stance, per excellence. Grice coins "M-intention" for the
bunch of intentions a rational 'meaner' must mean before he even EXPLICATES
something! While not explicitly, Grice wants to supersede Peirce's merely
taxonomic approaches to the thing, more in the vein of Ogden and Richards.
Grice is being Aristotelian here. He wants the pirot to mean that p. In a lower
model of pirot, the pirot might NOT mean. Grice compares his 'evolutionary'
approach to "mean" to Aristotle's 'serial' approach to an item like
'soul' ("psyche") or 'number' or 'figure' -- 'three-sided,'
'four-sided,' etc. ("arithmos" and "skhematos")(414b20).
Soul is not strictly a genus. What holds the series together is not a
'definition' by genus, but the concept of 'life.' The series is finite and the
lowest (nutrient, phutos) and higher (rational, anthropos) types ARE separable
-- the middle type ("therios") isn't.
1977. Practical reason, The H. P.
Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folder 1, BANC MSS 90/135c, The
Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. "Practical
Reason." Keyword: reason, practical reason. With 'practical' Grice
means 'buletic.' "Praxis" involves 'acting,' and surely Grice
PRESUPPOSES acting. "By UTTERING -- i. e. by the ACT of uttering --
expression x, U m-intends that p." He occasionally refers to 'action' and
'behaviour' as the thing which an ascription of a psychological state EXPLAINS.
Grice prefers the idiom of 'soul.' There's the ratiocinative soul. Within the
ratiocinative, there's the executive soul and the merely administrative soul.
Cicero had to translate Aristotle into 'prudentia,' every time Aristotle talked
of 'phronesis.' Grice was aware that Kant's terminology can be confusing.
Kant had used "pure" reason for reason in the doxastic
realm. Kant's critique of practical reason is HARDLY symmetrical to his
critique of 'doxastic' reason. Grice, with his 'aequi-vocality' thesis of
'must' ("must" crosses the doxastic-boulomaic divide), Grice is being
more of a symmetricalist.
1977.
Epagoge, epagogic, Mill's induction, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V
(Topical) Carton 7-Folder 31, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Mill,
induction. Grice loved to reminisce an anecdote concerning his tutor
Hardie at Corpus when Hardie invoked Mill's principles to prove that
Hardie was not responsible for a traffic jam. In drafts on word
play, Grice would speak of not bringing "more Grice to your
Mill." Mill's System of Logic was part of the reading material for
his degree in Lit. Hum.at Oxford, so he was very familiar with it. Mill
represents the best of the English empiricist tradition. Grice kept an
interest on inductive methodology. In his "Life and opinions" he
mentions some obscure essays by Kneale and Keynes on the topic. Grice was
interested in Kneale's 'secondary induction,' since Grice saw this as an application
of a construction routine. He was also interested in Keynes's notion
of a 'generator property,' which he found metaphysically intriguing.
Induction. Induction -- Mill's Induction, keywords: induction, deduction,
abduction, Mill. More Grice to the Mill. Grice loved Hardie's playing with
Mill's Method of Difference with an Oxford copper. He also quotes Kneale and
Keynes on induction. Note that his seven-step derivation of 'akrasia' relies on
an 'inductive' step!
1977. The
Immanuel Kant Memorial Lectures, Aspects of reason,
Clarendon, Stanford, redelivered as The John Locke lectures, repr.
in Aspects of Reason, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, The Grice
Collection contains previous drafts of this, Aspects of Reason, The H. P.
Grice Papers, Series II (Essays) Carton 2-Folders 29-30, and Series IV
(Associations), Carton 6-Folders 5-6, and Series V (Topical), Carton 7-Folders
21-22, and Carton 9-Folder 6, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The
University of California, Berkeley. Keyword: reasoning. While each of the
four lectures credits their own entry below, it may do to reflect on Grice's
overall aim. Grice structures the lectures in the form of a philosophical
dialogue with his audience. The first lecture is intended to provide a bit
of 'linguistic botanising' for 'reasonable,' and 'rational.' In
later lectures, Grice tackles 'reason' qua noun. The remaining lectures
are meant to explore what he calls the "Aequi-vocality" thesis:
"must" has only ONE SENSE that crosses what he calls the
'doxastic' 'boulomaic' divide. He is especially concerned -- this being
the Kant lectures -- with Kant's attempt to reduce the categorical
imperative to a 'counsel of prudence.' Kant re-introduces the Aristotelian idea of
'eudaimonia.' While a further lecture on 'happiness' as the pursuit of a system
of ends is NOT strictly part of the either the Kant or the Locke lectures,
it relates, since eudaimonia may be regarded as the goal involved in the
relevant imperative. Aspects of reason, Clarendon. Carton
6, Folders 5-6, Stanford, The Immanuel Kant Memorial
Lectures, Aspects of reason, Clarendon, "Some aspects of
reason," The Immanuel Kant Memorial Lectures, Stanford, keywords: reason,
reasoning, reasons. The lectures were also delivered as the John Locke
lectures. Grice is concerned with the reduction of the categorical
imperative to the hypothetical imperative. His main thesis he calls the
"AEQUI-vocality" thesis: "must" has only ONE sense,
that crossed the 'boulomaic/doxastic' divide. Aspects of reason, Clarendon,
Grice, Aspects of reason, Clarendon, John Locke lecture notes, keywords:
reason. On aspects of reason. Including extensive language botany on
'rational', 'reasonable,' and indeed 'reason' (justificatory, explanatory, and mixed). At
this point, Grice notes that linguistic botany is INDISPENSABLE towards the
construction of a more systematic explanatory theory. It is an exploration
of a range of uses of 'reason' that leads him to his "Aequi-vocality"
thesis that 'must' has only one sense! 1977, Aspects of reason, Stanford.
Carton 5-Folders 10-13, The Kant Lectures, Stanford, 1977. Aspects of reason
and reasoning, in Grice, Aspects of Reason, Clarendon, The John Locke
Lectures, Aspects of Reason, Grice, Aspects of reason, The Kant Lectures,
Stanford, Clarendon, keywords: reason, happiness. While Locke hardly
mentions 'reason,' his friend Burthogge does, and profusely! It was
slightly ironic that Grice had delivered these lectures as the Rationalist Kant
lectures at Stanford. He was honoured to be invited to Oxford. Officially,
to be a John Locke lecture you have to be *visiting* Oxford. While Grice
was a fellow of St. John's, he was still most welcome to give his set of
lectures on reasoning at the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy. He quotes very
many authors, including Locke! In his "proemium," Grice notes that
while he was rejected the Locke scholarship back in the day, he was extremely
happy to be under Locke's aegis now! When preparing for his second lecture, he
had occasion to revise some earlier drafts dated 1966, 1966, reasons,
Grice, Aspects of reason, Clarendon, Reasons, keywords: reason,
reasons. Linguistic analysis on 'justificatory,' 'explanatory' and 'mixed'
uses of 'reason.' While Grice knows that the basic use of 'reason' is qua verb
(reasoner reasons from premise P to conclusion C), he spends some time in
exploring 'reason' as noun. Grice found it a bit of a roundabout way to
approach rationality. However, his distinction between 'justificatory' and
'explanatory' 'reason' is built upon his linguistic botany on the use of
'reason' qua noun. Explanatory reason seems more basic for Grice than
'justificatory' reason. Explanatory reason EXPLAINS the rational agent's
behaviour. Grice is aware of Freud and his 'rationalizations.' An
agent may invoke some 'reason' for his acting which is not
'legitimate.' An agent may convince himself that he wants to move to
Bournemouth because of the weather; when in fact, his reason to move to
Bournemouth is to be closer to Cowes and join the yacht club there.
1977. Reason and reasoning, the
first Kant lecture, Stanford, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The
Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: reason,
reasoning. Grice’s enthymeme. Grice, the implicit reasoner! As the title of the
lecture implies, Grice takes the verb, "to reason," as conceptually
prior. A reasoner reasons, briefly, from a premise to a conclusion. There are
types of reason: flat reason and gradual reason. He famously reports
Shropshire, another tutee with Hardie, and his proof on the immortality of the
human soul. Grice makes some remarks on 'akrasia' as key, too. The first
lecture is then dedicated to an elucidation, and indeed attempt at a
'conceptual' analysis in terms of intentions and doxastic conditions reasoner R
intends that premise P yields conclusion C and believes his intention will
cause his entertaining of the conclusion from his entertaining the premise. One
example of particular interest for a study of the use of 'conversational reason'
in Grice is that of the connection between IMPLICATUM AND REASONING. Grice
entitles the sub-section of the lecture as "Too Good to Be Reasoning"
which is of course a joke. Cf. "too much love will kill you,” and “There's
no such thing as too much of a good thing” (Shakespeare, As you like it). Grice
notes: "I have so far been considering difficulties which may arise from
the attempt to find, for all cases of actual reasoning, reconstructions of
sequences of utterances or explicit thoughts which the reasoner might plausibly
be supposed to think of as conforming to some set of canonical patterns of
inference." "I turn now to a DIFFERENT class of examples, with regard
to which the problem is not that it is difficult to know how to connect them
with canonical patterns, but rather that IT IS ONLY TOO EASY (or shall I say
'trivial') to make the connection." "Like some children (not many),
some cases of reasoning are too well behaved for their own good."
"Suppose someone says to me." It is VERY INTERESTING that Grice gives
'conversational examples.' A: Jack has arrived. "I reply: FIRST
EXAMPLE: B: "I conclude from that that Jack has arrived." "Or he
says (iii).” (iii) A: Jack has arrived AND Jill has *also* arrived. “And I
reply (iv).” iv. SECOND EXAMPLE: "I conclude that Jill has
arrived."(via Gentzen's conjunction-elimination). "Or he says (v).”
v. My wife is at home. "And I reply (vi).” vi. THIRD EXAMPLE: "B: I
reason from that that SOMEONE (viz. your wife) is at home." Grice:
"Is there not something very strange about the presence in my three
replies of the verb "conclude" (in example I and II) and the verb
"reason" (in example III)?" MISLEADING, BUT ALETHICALLY FINE,
professor! "It is true, of course, that if instead of my first reply I had
said (vii) vii. So Jack has arrived, has he? "the strangeness would have
been removed." "But here “so" serves not to indicate that an
inference is being made, but rather as part of a not that otiose way of
expressing surprise." “One might just as well have said (viii).” viii. Well,
fancy that! "Now, having spent a sizeable part of my life EXPLOITING it, I
am NOT UNaware of the truly fine DISTINCTION between a statement's being false
(or axiologically satisfactory), and its being true (or axiologically
satisfactory) but otherwise CONVERSATIONALLY or pragmatically misleading or
inappropriate or pointless, and, on that account and by such a fine
distinction, a statement, or an utterance, or conversational move which it
would be improper (in terms of the reasonable/rational principle of
conversational helfpulness) in one way or another, to make." GRICE'S
REACTION TO HIS OWN DISTINCTION: entailment is in sight! "But I do NOT
find myself lured by the idea of using that distinction here!" Because
ENTAILMENT, rather than IMPLICATUM is entailed. Or because EXPLICATUM, rather
than IMPLICATUM is involved. "Suppose, again, that I were to break off the
chapter at this point, and switch suddenly to this argument." ix. I have
two hands (here is one hand and here is another). If had three more hands, I
would have five. If I were to have double that number I would have ten, and if
four of them were removed six would remain. So I would have four more hands
than I have now. "Is one happy to describe this performance as
reasoning?" Depends who's one and what's happy!? "There is, however,
little doubt that I have produced a canonically acceptable chain of
statements." So surely that's reasoning, if only conversationally
misleadingly called so! "Or suppose that, instead of writing in my customary
free and easy style, I had framed my remarks (or at least the argumentative
portions of my remarks) as a verbal realization, so to speak, of sequences of
steps in strict conformity with the rules of a natural-deduction system of
first-order predicate logic." "I give, that is to say, an updated
analogue of a medieval disputation." Implicature: Gentzen is Ockham!
"Would those brave souls who continued to read be likely to think of my
performance as the production of reasoning, or would they rather think of it as
a CRAZY FORMALISATION of reasoning conducted at some previous time?"
Depends on 'crazy' or 'formalisation.' One is reminded of GRICE: If you cannot
formalise, don't say it; STRAWSON: Oh, no! If I can formalise it, I shan't say
it! Grice: "The points suggested by this stream of rhetorical questions
may be summarized as follows." (1) "Whether the samples presented
FAIL to achieve the title of "reasoning", and thus be DEEMED
'reasoning,' or whether the samples achieve the title, as we may figuratively
put it, by the skin of their teeth, perhaps does not very greatly matter."
"For whichever way it is, the samples seem to OFFEND against something
(different things in different cases, I'm sure) very central to our conception
of reasoning." "So central that Moore would call it entailment!"
(2) "A mechanical application of a ground rule of inference, or a
concatenation thereof, is reluctantly (if at all) called reasoning."
"Such a mechanical application may perhaps legitimately enter into (i.e.
form individual steps in) authentic reasonings, but they are not themselves
reasonings, nor is a string of them." (3) "There is a demand that a
reasoner should be, to a greater or lesser degree, the author of his
reasonings." "Parroted sequences are not reasonings when parroted, though
the very same sequences might be reasoning if not parroted." *Piroted*
sequences are another matter! (4) "Some of the examples I gave are
deficient because they are aimless or pointless." "Reasoning is
*characteristically* addressed to this or that problem: a small problem, a
large problem, a problem within a problem, a clear problem, a hazy problem, a
practical problem, an intellectual problem; but a problem!" (5) "A
mere flow of ideas minimally qualifies (or can be deemed) as reasoning, even if
it happens to be logically respectable." "But if it is directed, or
even monitored (with intervention should it go astray, not only into fallacy or
mistake, but also into such things as conversational irrelevance or otiosity!),
that is another matter!" (6) "Finicky over-elaboration of intervening
steps is frowned upon, and in extreme cases runs the risk of forfeiting the
title of reasoning." "In conversation, such over-elaboration will
offend against this or that conversational maxim, against (presumably) some suitably
formulated maxim conjoining informativeness." As Grice noted with regard
to ix. That pillar box seems red to me. That would be 'baffling' if the
addressee fails to detect the 'communication-point.' An utterance is supposed
to INFORM, and what is (IX) meant to inform its addressee? "In thought, it
will be branded as pedantry or neurotic caution!" If a distinction between
brooding and conversing is to be made! "At first sight, perhaps, one would
have been inclined to say that greater rather than lesser EXPLICITness is a
merit."Not that INexplicitness -- or IMPLICATUM-status, as it were -- is
bad, but that, other things being equal, the more explicitness the
better." "But now it looks as if proper explicitness (or
EXPLICATUM-status) is an Aristotelian *mean*, or mesotes, and it would be good
some time to enquire what determines where that mean lies." "The
burden of the foregoing observations seems to me to be that the provisional
account of reasoning, which has been before us, leaves out something which is
crucially important." "What it leaves out is the conception of
reasoning, as I like to see conversation, as a purposive activity, as something
with goals and purposes." "The account or picture leaves out, in
short, the connection of reasoning with the will!" "Moreover, once we
avail ourselves of the great family of additional ideas which the importation
of this conception would give us, we shall be able to deal with the quandary
which I laid before you a few minutes ago." "For we could say (for
example) that R reasons (informally) from p to c just in case R thinks that p
and intends that, in thinking c, he should be thinking something which would be
the conclusion of a formally valid argument the premisses of which are a
supplementation of p." "This will differ from merely thinking that
there exists some formally valid supplementation of a transition from p to c,
which I felt inclined NOT to count as (or deem) reasoning." "I have
some hopes that this appeal to the purposiveness or goal-oriented character of
authentic reasoning or good reasoning might be sufficient to dispose of the
quandary on which I have directed it." "But I am by no means entirely
confident that this is the case, and so I offer a second possible method of
handling the quandary, one to which I shall return later when I shall attempt
to place it in a larger context." "We have available to us (let us
suppose) what I might call a 'hard way' of making inferential moves."
"We in fact employ this laborious, step-by-step procedure at least when we
are in difficulties, when the course is not clear, when we have an awkward (or
philosophical) audience, and so forth." "An inferential judgement,
however, is a normally desirable undertaking for us only because of its actual
or hoped for destinations, and is therefore not desirable for its own sake (a
respect in which, possibly, it may differ from an inferential capacity)."
"Following the hard way consumes time and energy." "These are in
limited supply and it would, therefore, be desirable if occasions for employing
the hard way were minimized." "A substitute for the hard way, the
quick way, which is made possible by habituation and intention, is available to
us, and the capacity for it (which is sometimes called intelligence, and is
known to be variable in degree) is a desirable quality." "The
possibility of making a good inferential step (there being one to be made),
together with such items as a particular inferer's reputation for inferential
ability, may determine whether on a particular occasion we suppose a particular
transition to be inferential (and so to be a case of reasoning) or not."
"On this account, it is not essential that there should be a single
supplementation of an informal reasoning which is supposed to be what is
overtly in the inferer's mind, though quite often there may be special reasons
for supposing this to be the case." "So Botvinnik is properly
credited with a case of reasoning, while Shropshire is not!"
1977. Reason
and reasons, Aspects of reason, Clarendon, the second Kant lecture, The H.
P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California. Keywords: reason, reasons, justificatory reason, explanatory
reason, justificatory-cum-explanatory reason. Drawing from his
recollections of an earlier linguistic botany on 'reason' (Grice, 1966), Grice
distinguishes between 'justificatory' reason and 'explanatory' reason. There is
a special case of 'mixed' reason, 'explanatory-cum-justificatory.' The lecture
can be seen as the way an exercise that Austin took as 'taxonomic' can lead to
explanatory adequacy, too!
1977.
The boulomaic-doxastic divice, practical and alethic reasons, Aspects of
reason, Clarendon, the third Kant lecture, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS
90/135c, The Bancroft Library. Keywords: practical reason, alethic reason,
protrepic, exhibitive. The boulomaic (or volitive) is a part of the soul;
so is the doxatic (or judicative). Grice plays with co-relative operators:
desirability versus probability. Grice invokes the 'exhibitive'/'protreptic' distinction
he had introduced in the fifth William James lecture, now applied to
psychological attitudes themselves.
1977. The boulomaic-doxastic device, further remarks on practical and alethic reasons, Aspects of reason, Clarendon, the fourth Kant lecture, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: practical reason, alethic reason, counsel of prudence, categorical imperative, happiness, probability, desirability, modality. Grice's attempt is to tackle the Kantian problem in the Grundlegung: how to derive the categorical imperative from a counsel of prudence. Under the assumption that the protasis is "Let the agent be happy," Grice does not find it obtuse at all to construct a universalisable imperative out of a mere 'motive'-based counsel of prudence. Grice has an earlier paper on 'pleasure' which relates.
1977.
The type-token distinction, form, type, and implication, The H. P. Grice
Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7-Folder 1, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft
Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keyword: type-token
distinction. Grice was not enamoured with the 'type'/'token' or
'token'/'type' distinction. His thoughts on 'logical form' were
provocative: "If you can't put it in logical form, it's not worth
saying." Strawson infamously reacted, but with a smile: "Oh, no!
If you CAN put it in logical form, it's not worth saying." Grice refers to
the type-token distinction when he uses “x” for ‘token’ and “X” for type. Since
J. F. Bennett cared to call Grice a “meaning-nominalist” we shouldn’t CARE
about “Xs” anyway! He expands on this in "Retrospective Epilogue."
1977. Philosophy,
Carton 5-Folders 14-15, Philosophy, miscellaneous, with J. Baker,
The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folder 1, BANC MSS
90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley. Keywords: philosophy, Baker. Grice would give joint
seminars on philosophy with J. Baker. Oddly, Grice gives a nice example of
‘philosopher’ in 1967, “Addicted to general reflections about life.” In the
context where it occurs, Grice’s implicature is Stevensonian. If Stevenson had
said that an athlete is usually tall, a philosopher WILL occasionally be
inclined to reflect about life in general – a birrelist -! His other
definition: “Engaged in philosophical studies” seems circular. At least the
previous one defines philosophy by other than itself! Cfr. Quixote to Sancho:
“You are quite a philosopher” meaning ‘stoic,’ actually! Grice's idea of philosophy
was based on the the idea of philosophy that Lit. Hum. instills. It's a unique
experience! (unknown in the New World, our actually outside Oxford, or
post-Grice, where a 'classicist' is not seen as a serious philosopher! Becoming
a 'tutorial fellow in philosophy' and later 'university lecturer in
philosophy,' stressed his attachment. He had to been by this or that pupil as a
philosopher simpliciter (as oppoosed to a prof: the Waynflete is seen as a
metaphysician, the White is seen as moralist, the Wykeham is seen as a
logician, and the Wilde is seen as a philosophical psychologist! φιλοσοφ-ία , ἡ, A. love
of knowledge, pursuit there of, speculation, Isoc.12.209, Pl.Phd.61a, Grg. 484c, al.; “ἡ φ. κτῆσις ἐπιστήμης” Id.Euthd.288d; defined as ἄσκησις ἐπιτηδείου τέχνης, Stoic.
in Placit. 1 Prooem.2. 2. systematic,
methodical treatment of a subject, “ἐμπειρίᾳ μέτιθι καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ” Isoc.2.35; ἡ περὶ τὰς ἔριδας φ. scientific
treatment of argumentation, Id.10.6; ἡ περὶ τοὺς λόγους φ. the study of
oratory, Id.4.10: pl., “οἱ ἐν ταῖς φ. πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες” Pl.Tht.172c; “τέχναι καὶ φ.” Isoc.10.67. 3. philosophy, Id.11.22, Pl.Def.414b,
etc.; “ἱστορία φ. ἐστὶν ἐκ παραδειγμάτων” D.H.Rh.11.2:—Isoc. usu.
prefixes the Art., 2.51, 5.84, 7.45 (but cf. 2.35 supr.); sts. also
in Pl. and Arist., as Pl.Grg.482a, Arist. Metaph.993b20, EN1177a25, and so later, “διὰ τῆς φ. καὶ κενῆς ἀπάτης” Ep.Col.2.8; but more freq. without
Art., “τοῖς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν” Pl. Phd.68c, al., cf. Arist.Pol.1341b28, al. (cf. “Πλάτων καὶ φ.” Plu.2.176d);
exc. when an Adj. or some qualifying word is added to “ἡ θεία φ.” Pl.Phdr.239b; “ἐκείνου τῇ φ.” Id.Ly.213d; “ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φ.” Arist.EN1181b15; “ἡ τῶν Ἰταλικῶν φ.” Id.Metaph.987a31 (and
pl., αἱ εἰρημέναι φ. ib.29); so later “ἡ Ἰωνικὴ φ.” D.L.1.122; “ἡ δογματική, Ἀκαδημαϊκή, σκεπτικὴ φ.” S.E.P.1.4,
etc.; “ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς φ.” Plu.2.607c,
etc.; esp. “ἡ πρώτη φ.” metaphysic, Arist.Metaph. 1026a24,
cf. 18. Just one sense, but various
ambiguities remain in "philosopher," as per Grice's example
"Grice is addicted to general speculations about life," and
"Grice is a member of The Oxford Philosophical Society.
1977. Freedom,
teleology, and ethics, Hart on liberty, Kantian, Kant's ethics, Aristotle's
ethics, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (The Doctrines), Carton 5-Folders
16-17, and Series V (Topical), Carton 8-Folders 16-17, BANC MSS 90/135c, The
Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. P. G. R.
I. C. E. cites “Kant’s ethics,” and it is under this that most of Grice’s
material on Kant should be placed -- with a caveat to the occasional reference
to Kant’s epistemology, elsewhere. 1980. Aristotle's ethics, 1980,
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics" and "Aristotle's Ethics," keywords:
Aristotle, ethics. From Hardie. 1980. Freedom in
Kant's Grundlegung, freedom and morality in Kant's Grundlegung,
'Freedom and Morality in Kant's Foundations,' Series II (Essays), Carton
2, Folders 26, 27, and 28. Keywords: Grundlegung, freedom,
autonomy. Grice would refer to this, as Kantians do, as the
Grundlegung. Grice was never happy with 'eleutheria,' qua Greek
philosophical notion. "To literal to be true? By "Foundations,"
Grice obviously means Kant's essay.Grice preferred to quote Kant in English.
The reason being that Grice was practising "ordinary-language"
philosophy; and you cannot expect much 'linguistic botany' in a language other
than your own! Kant was not too 'ordinary' in his use of German,
either! The English translations that Grice used captured, in a way, all
that Grice thought was worth capturing in Kant's philosophy. Kant was not
your 'standard' philosopher in the programme Grice was familiar with: Lit. Hum.
Oxon. However, Kant was popular in The New World, where Grice lectured
profusely. 1980. Kant's ethics,Carton 5, Folders 5-6, Kant's Ethical
Theory. An exploration of the categorial imperative and its reduction to the
hypothetical one. 1980. KANT’S ETHICS. Carton 5, Folder
8, Philosophy, Kant, With J. Baker. Notably the
categorical imperative. Cf. Carton 5, Folder
9, "Kant's Ethics.” The crucial belief about a thing in itself that
Kant thinks only practical reason can justify concerns FREEDOM. Freedom is
crucial because, on Kant’s view, any moral appraisal presupposes that a human
is free in that he has the ability to do otherwise. To see why, consider
Kant’s example of a man who commits a theft (5:95ff.). Kant holds that
for this man’s action to be morally wrong (condemnable), it must have been
within his voluntary control (he is deemed responsible) in a way that it was
within his power at the time NOT to have committed the theft. If it is
NOT within his control at the time, while it may be useful to punish him in
order to shape his behaviour or to influence others, it nevertheless would be incorrect
to say that his action is morally wrong. Moral rightness and wrongness
apply only to a free agent who controls his action and has it in his power, at
the time of his action, either to act rightly or not. According to Kant
and Grice, this is just common sense. On these grounds, Kant rejects a type of
compatibilism, which he calls the “comparative concept of freedom” and
associates with Leibniz. Kant has a specific type of compatibilism in mind.
There may be types of compatibilism that do not fit Kant’s characterization of
that view. On the compatibilist view, as Kant understands it, an agent is free
whenever the cause of his action is within him. So an agent is not free only
when something external to him pushes or moves him, but he is free whenever the
proximate cause of his body’s movement is internal to him as an “acting being”
(5:96). If we distinguish between an involuntary convulsion and a
voluntary bodily movement, a free action is just a voluntary bodily
movement. Kant and Grice ridicule this view as a “wretched subterfuge”
that tries to solve an ancient philosophical problem "with a little
quibbling about words." This view, Kant and Grice say, assimilates
freedom to “the freedom of a turnspit,” or a projectile in flight, or the motion
of a clock’s hands (5:96–97). Grice's favourite phrase was the otiose
English 'free fall.' And he knew all the Grecian he needed to recognise the
figurative concept of 'eleutheria' as applied to 'ill' as "VERY
FIGURATIVE, almost implicatural!" The proximate cause of this movement is
internal to the turnspit, the projectile, and the clock at the time of the
movement. This cannot be sufficient for moral, rational responsibility.
Why not? The reason, Kant and Grice say, is ultimately that the cause of
this movement occurs in time. Return to the theft example. A compatibilist
would say that the thief’s action is free because its proximate cause is inside
him, and because the theft is not an involuntary convulsion but a voluntary
action. The thief decides to commit the theft, and his action flows from
this decision. According to Kant, however, if the thief’s DECISION is a
NATURAL phenomenon that occurs in time, it must be the effect of some cause
that occurred in a previous time. This is an essential part of Kant’s (if not Grice's
-- Grice quotes Eddington) Newtonian worldview and is grounded in the a priori
laws (specifically, the category of cause and effect) in accordance with which
our understanding constructs experience. Every event has a cause that begins in
an earlier time. If that cause too is an event occurring in time, it must
also have a cause beginning in a still earlier time, etc. Every natural
event occurs in time and is thoroughly determined by a causal chain that
stretches backwards into the distant past. So there is no room for
freedom in nature, which is deterministic in a strong way. The root of the
problem, for Kant, if not Grice, is time. For Grice it's SPACE and time!
Again, if the thief’s choice to commit the theft is a natural event in time, it
is the effect of a causal chain extending into the distant past. But the
past is out of his control now, in the present. Once the past is past, he
cannot change it. On Kant’s view, that is why his action would not be in
his control in the present if it is determined by events in the past.
Even if he could control those past events in the past, he cannot control them
now. But in fact past events were not in his control in the past either if they
too were determined by events in the more distant past, because eventually the
causal antecedents of his action stretch back before his birth, and obviously
events that occurred before his birth are not in his control. So if the
thief’s choice to commit the theft is a natural event in time, it is not now
and never was in his control, and he could not have done otherwise than to
commit the theft. In that case, it would be a mistake to hold him morally
responsible for it. Compatibilism, as Kant and Grice understand it, therefore
locates the issue in the wrong place. Even if the cause of the action is
internal to the agent, if it is in the past – e. g., if the action today is
determined by a decision the agent made yesterday, or from the character I
developed in childhood, it is not within the agent's control now. The real issue
is not whether the cause of the action is internal or external to the agent,
but whether it is in the agent's control now. For Kant, however, the cause of
action can be within the agent's control now only if it is not in time.
This is why Kant and Grice think that transcendental idealism is the only way
to make sense of the kind of freedom that morality requires. For
transcendental idealism allows that the cause of a action may be a "thing
in itself" outside of time: namely, the agetn's noumenal self, which is
free because it is not part of nature. No matter what kind of character the
agent have developed or what external influences act on him, on Kant’s view
every intentional, voluntary action is an immediate effect of the agent's
noumenal self, which is causally undetermined (5:97–98). The agent's
noumenal self is an uncaused cause outside of time, which therefore is not
subject to the deterministic laws of nature in accordance with which
understanding and pure reason constructs experience. Many puzzles arise on this
picture that Kant does not resolve, and Grice tries. E.g. if understanding
constructs every appearance in the experience of nature, not only an appearance
of an action, why is the agent responsible only for his action but not for everything
that happens in the natural world? Moreover, if I am not alone in the
world but there is another noumenal self acting freely and incorporating his
free action into the experience he constructs, how do two transcendentally free
agents interact? How do you integrate one's free action into the
experience that the other's understanding constructs? In spite of these
unsolved puzzles, Kant holds that we can make sense of moral appraisal and
responsibility only by thinking about human freedom in this way, because it is
the only way to prevent natural necessity from undermining both. Since Kant
invokes transcendental idealism to make sense of freedom, interpreting his
thinking about freedom leads us back to disputes between the two-objects and
two-aspects interpretations of transcendental idealism. On the face of
it, the two-*objects* interpretation seems to make better sense of Kant’s view
of transcendental freedom than the two-aspects interpretation. If morality
requires that the agent be transcendentally free, it seems that his true self,
and not just an aspect of his self, must be outside of time, according to
Kant’s argument. But applying the two-*objects* interpretation to freedom
raises problems of its own, since it involves making a distinction between the
noumenal self and the phenomenal self that does not arise on the two-aspects
view. If only one noumenal self is free, and freedom is required for moral
responsibility, one's *phenomenal* self is not morally responsible. But how are
the noumenal self and the phenomenal self related, and why is punishment
inflicted on the phenomenal self? It is unclear whether and to what extent
appealing to Kant’s theory of freedom can help to settle disputes about the
proper interpretation of transcendental idealism, since there are serious
questions about the coherence of Kant’s theory on either interpretation!
"Which is good," Grice would end his lecture with!
1978.
Ethics of virtue, arête, virtus, vitium, Aristotle, virtue, Philippa Foot on
virtues and vices, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folder
29. Keywords: Philippa Foot, virtue, vice, virtue ethics, virtus, vitium,
arete, kakon, flourishing. Grice admired Foot's ability to make the right
conceptual distinction. Foot is following a very Oxonian tradition best
represented by the work of G. J. Warnock. Of course, Grice was
over-familiar with the 'virtue' vs. 'vice' distinction, since Hardie had
instilled it on him at Corpus! For Grice, 'virtue' and 'vice' (and the
mesotes), display an interesting 'logical' grammar, though. Grice would say
that 'rationality' is a virtue; fallacious reasoning is a vice. Some
things Grice takes more of a moral standpoint about. To cheat is neither
irrational nor unreasonble: just plain 'repulsive.' As such, it
would be a 'vice' -- mind not getting caught in its grip! Grice is concerned
with 'vice' in his account of 'akrasia' or 'incontinentia.' If agent A KNOWS
that doing x is 'virtuous,' yet decides to do ~x, which is 'vicious,' A is
being 'akratic.' For Grice, akratic behaviour applies both in the doxastic
and the boulomaic realm. And it is part of the philosopher's job to
elucidate the conceptual intricacies attached to it. 1. pf(A,!p) V
pr(A,p). 2. pf(A and B,!p) V pr(A and B,p). 3. pf(A and B and C, !p)
V pr(A and B and C, p). 4. pf(all things before pirot,!p) V pr(all things
before pirot,p). 5. pf(ATC,!p) V pb(ATC,p). 6. !p V |- p. 7.
Reasoning pirot wills !p V Reasoning pirot judges p.
1978. Onto-genesis,
The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folder
10, "Semantics of Children's Language," BANC MSS 90/135c, The
University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: semantics, children's
language, ontogenesis, ontology, phylogeny, developmental pragmatics, learning,
acquisition. Interesting in that he was always enquiring his
children's playmates: "Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes
allowed!"
1979.
Proem to the John Locke Lectures, aspects of reason, Clarendon, The H. P. Grice
Papers, Series II (Essays), BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University
of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Locke, Locke scholarship, Locke
lecture, Oxford, town and gown. Grice’s Town and Gown. A special note, or
rather, a very moving proem, on Grice's occasion of delivering his lectures on
'Aspects of reason and reasoning' at Oxford as the John Locke Memorial Lectures
at Merton. Particularly apt in mentioning, with humility, his having failed,
*thrice* [sic] to obtain the John Locke lectureship (Strawson did, at once!),
but feeling safe under the aegis of "that great English philosopher"
(viz. Locke! always implicated, never explicited) now. Grice starts the proem
in a very moving, shall we say, emotional, way: “I find it difficult to convey
to you just how happy I am, and how honoured I feel, in being invited to give
these lectures.” Difficult, but not impossible. “I think of this university and
this city [it has a cathedral], which were my home for thirty-six years, as my
spiritual and intellectual parents." The almost majestic plural is Grice's
implicature to the 'town and gown'! "[W]hatever I am was originally
fashioned here;" I never left Oxford, Oxford made me, "and I find it
a moving experience to be, within these splendid and none too ancient walls,
once more engaged in my old occupation of rendering what is clear
obscure," by flouting the desideratum of conversational clarity and the
conversational maxim, 'avoid obscurity of expression,' under 'be perspicuous
[sic]!'. Grice's implicature on "none too ancient" seems to be
addressed to the TRULY ancient walls that saw "Athenian dialectic"!
On the other hand, Grice's funny variant on the 'obscurum per obscurius' --
what G. P. Baker found as Grice’s skill in rendering an orthodoxy into an
heterodoxy! Almost! By 'clear' Grice implicates Lewis and his 'clarity is not
enough!'. “I am, at the same time, proud of my mid-Atlantic [two-world] status,
and am, therefore, delighted that the Old World should have called me in, or
rather recalled me, to redress, for once, the balance of my having left her for
the New.” His implicature seems to be: “Strictly, I never left?” Grice
concludes his proem: “I am, finally, greatly heartened by my consciousness of
the fact that that great English philosopher, under whose aegis I am now
speaking, has in the late afternoon of my days extended to me his Lectureship
as a gracious consolation for a record threefold denied to me, in my early
morning, of his Prize. I pray that my present offerings may find greater favour
in his sight than did those of long ago.” They did! Even if Locke surely might
have found favour to Grice’s former offerings, too, I'm sure!
1980. Correspondence
with R. Wyatt, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H.
P. Grice), Carton 1-Folders 10-12, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The
University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Grice, Wyatt.
1980.
Mentalism, modest mentalism, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (Doctrines),
Carton 5-Folder 30, BANC, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of
California, Berkeley. Keywords: mentalism, philosophical
psychology. Grice would seldom use 'mind' (Grecian 'nous') or 'mental'
(Grecian 'noetikos' vs. 'aesthetikos'). His sympathies go for more over-arching
Grecian terms like the very Aristotelian 'soul,' (anima), i. e. the psyche and
the psychological.
1980. From Zeno to Socrates, topics for pursuit, Zeno, Socrates, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (The Doctrines), Carton 5, Folder 31, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Zeno, Socrates. Grice's review of the history of philosophy ("Philosophy is but footnotes to Zeno.")
1980. Semantics, phonetics, syntax, and semantics, with J. F. Staal, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (The Doctrines), Carton 6-Folders 1-2, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: semantics. Staal is particularly good at this type of 'formalistic' philosophy, which was still adequate to reflect the subtleties of 'ordinary language.
1980. Pirotese, Pirots, basic Pirotese, sentence semantics and syntax, pirots and obbles, methodology, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8-Folders 30-33, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: pirot, pirotese, pirotology, semantics, syntax, obble, creature construction, the genitorial programme. It all started when Carnap claimed to know that pirots karulise elatically. Grice as engineer. Pirotese is the philosopher's engaging in pirotology. Actually, pirotese is the lingo the pirots parrot. "Pirots karulise elatically." But not all of them. Grice finds that the pirotological talk allows to start from zero. He is constructing a language, "(basic) Pirotese," and the philosophical psychology and world that that language is supposed to represent or denote. An obble is a pirot's object. Grice introduces potching and cotching. To potch, in Pirotese, is what a pirot does with an obble: he perceives it. To cotch is Pirotese for what a pirot can further do with an obble: know or cognise it. Cotching, unlike potching, is factive.
1980. Semantics, language semantics, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7-Folder 20, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: semantics, Tarski. Language semantics, alla Tarski.
1980. A
philosopher's prospectus, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton
4-Folder 14, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. Keywords: prospectus.
1980. A seminar with Grice, seminar, Grice seminar, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series IV (Doctrines), Carton 5-Folders 2 and 8, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
1980. A philosophical talk, Philosophy, with J. Baker, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series IV (Associations), Carton 5-Folders 3-4, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
1980. “Amicus,” Kantotle, friendship, Aristotle, Aristotle's Ethica Nichomachaea, Aristotle's ethics, Aristotle on friendship, aporia, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 5- Folder 7, and Carton 6-Folder 16-18, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Aristotle, ethics. Grice was 'very fortunate' to have Hardie as his tutor. He overused Hardie's lectures on Aristotle, too, and instilled them on his own tutees! Keywords: Aristotle, friendship. Grice is concerned with Aristotle's rather cryptic view of the friend (philos, amicus) as the 'alter ego.' In Grice's cooperative, concerted, view of things, a friend in need is a friend indeed! Grice is interested in Aristotle finding himself in an aporia. In Nicomachean Ethics IX.ix, Aristotle poses the question whether the happy man will need friends or not. Kosman correctly identifies this question as asking not whether friends are necessary in order to achieve eudaemonia, but "why we require friends even when we are happy." The question is not why we need friends to become happy, but why we need friends when we are happy, since the eudaemon must be self-sufficient. Philia is required for the flourishing of the life of practical virtue. Aristotle’s solution to the aporia here, however, points to the requirement of friendships even for the philosopher, in his life of theoretical virtue. Aristotle’s solution to the aporia in Nicomachean Ethics IX.ix is opaque, and the corresponding passage in Eudeiman Ethics VII.xii is scarcely better. Aristotle thinks he has found the solution to this aporia. "We must take two things into consideration, that life is desirable and also that the good is, and thence that it is desirable that such a nature should belong to oneself as it belongs to them. If then, of such a pair of corresponding series there is always one series of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are in general constituted by their participation in the nature of the determined, so that to wish to perceive one’s self is to wish oneself to be of a certain definite character,—since, then we are not in ourselves possessed of each such characters, but only in participation in these qualities in perceiving and knowing—for the perceiver becomes perceived in that way in respect in which he first perceives, and according to the way in which and the object which he perceives; and the knower becomes known in the same way— therefore it is for this reason that one always desires to live, because one always desires to know; and this is because he himself wishes to be the object known."
1967. The desideratum of conversational candour, trust and rationality, rationality and trust, trust, trust, metaphysics, and value, with J. Baker, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folders 5 and 20, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: trust, rationality. Trust and rationality are pre-requisites of conversation. Cf. Grice's desideratum of conversational candour, subsumed under the over-arching principle of conversational helpfulness (formerly 'conversational benevolence-cum-self-interest'). Grice thinks that the principle of conversational benevolence has to be weighed against the principle of conversational self-interest. The result is the overarching principle of conversational helpfulness. Clarity gets in the picture. The desideratum of conversational clarity is a reasonable requirement for conversants to abide by. Grice follows some of Warnock's observations. The logical grammar of 'trust' (and indeed 'candour') is subtle, especially when we are considering the two sub-goals of conversation: giving and receiving information/influencing and being influenced by others. In both sub-goals, trust is paramount. The explorations of trust had become an Oxonian hobby, with authors not such like Warnock, but B. A. O. Williams, and others. Keywords: trust, metaphysics, value. Trust as a corollary of the principle of conversational helpfulness. The logical grammar of 'trust' is an interesting one. Grice used to speak of 'candour.' In a given conversational setting, assuming the principle of conversational helpfulness is operating, the utterer U is assumed by the addressee A to be 'trustworthy.' There are two dimensions for trust, which relate to the TWO goals which Grice assumes the principle of conversational helpfulness captures: -- giving and receiving information, and influencing and being influenced by others. In both sub-goals, trust is key. In the doxastic realm, trust has to do, not so much with 'truth' (with which the expression is cognate) but 'evidence.' In the boulomaic realm, 'evidence' becomes less crucial. Grice mentions attitudes of the boulomaic type that are not usually judged in terms of evidential support. However, in the 'boulomaic' realm, utterer will be assumed as 'trustworthy' if the conative attitudes he displays are 'sincere.' Cf. 'decency.' A cheater for Grice is not 'irrational,' just repugnant!
1980.
Philosophical psychology, needing, wanting, willing, intending, wants and
needs, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folders 30-31, BANC
MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley. Keywords: want, need, wanting, needing,
philosophical psychology, soul. "Want" etymologically means
"absence;" "need" should be preferred. The squarrel
(squirrel) Toby NEEDS intake of nuts, and you'll soon see gobbling them! There
is not much philosophical bibliography on these two 'psychological states'
Grice is analysing. Their logic is interesting: (i) Smith wants to play
cricket. (ii) Smith NEEDS to play cricket. Grice is concerned
with the propositional content attached to the 'want' and 'need'
predicate. "Wants that" sounds harsh; so does "need
that." Still, there are propositional attached to (i) and (ii):
"Smith plays cricket." Grice took a very cavalier attitude to
what linguists spend their lives analysing. He thought it was surely NOT
the job of the philosopher, especially from a prestigious university such as
Oxford, to deal with the arbitrariness of grammatical knots attached to this or
that English verb. He rarely used "English," but stuck with 'ordinary
language.' Surely, he saw himself in the tradition of Kantotle, and so,
aiming at grand philosophical truths: not conventions of usage, even his
own! 1. Squarrel Toby has a nut, N, in front of him. 2. Toby is short on
squarrel food (observed or assumed), so, 3. Toby wills squarrel food (by
postulate of Folk Pyschological Theory θ connecting willing with
intake of N). 4. Toby prehends a nut as in front (from (1) by Postulate of Folk
Psychological Theory θ, if it is assumed that "nut" and "in
front" are familiar to Toby). 5. Toby joins squarrel food with gobbling,
nut, and in front (i.e. Toby judges gobbling, on nut in front, for squarrel
food (by Postulate of Folk Psychological Theory θ with the aid of
prior observation. So, from 3, 4 and 5, 6. Tobby gobbles; and since a nut *is*
in front of him, gobbles the nut in front of him.
1980.
Diagoge/epagoge, Grice's audio-files, the audio-files, audio-files of various
lectures and conferences, some seminars with R. O. Warner and J. Baker, The H.
P. Grice Papers, Series IV (Associations), Audio files of various lectures and
conferences, Carton 10 -- No Folders -- BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: epagoge,
diagoge. A previous folder in the collection contains the transcripts.
These are the audio-tapes themselves, obviously not in folders. “The kind
of metaphysical argument which I have in mind might be said, perhaps, to
exemplify a ‘dia-gogic’ as opposed to ‘epa-gogic’ or inductive approach to
philosophical argumentation.” “Now, the more emphasis is placed on
justification by elimination of the rival, the greater is the impetus given to
refutation, whether of theses or of people.” “And perhaps a greater
emphasis on a ‘dia-gogic’ procedure, if it could be shown to be justifiable,
would have an eirenic effect.”
1980. Semantics, sentence semantics, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folder 11, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Truth-conditional, constructivist. While Grice is NOT concerned about the 'semantics' of utterer's meaning (how could he, when he analyses '... means ...' in terms of '... intends ...', he *is* about the semantics of SENTENCE meaning. Grice's second stage ('expression' meaing) of his programme about meaning begins with specifications of 'means' as applied to 'x,' a token of 'X.' He is having Tarski's and Davidson's elaborations of schemata like “"p" means that p.” "Snow is white" means that snow is white, and stuff! Grice was especially concerned with combinatories, for both unary and dyadic operators, and with multiple quantifications within a first-order predicate calculus with identity.
1980. Propositions as classes of propositional complexes, Proposition and propositional complex, sentence semantics and propositional complexes, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folder 12, BANC MSS 90/135c, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: propositional complex. Grice's propositional complex. Grice was keen on the concept of a 'propositional complex,' which allowed him NOT to commit to the abstract entity of a 'proposition,' if the latter is regarded as an extensional family of 'propositional complexes' (Paul saw Peter; Peter was seen by Paul). The topic of a propositional complex was one that Grice regarded as Oxonian in nature. C. A. B. Peacocke had struggled with the same type of problems, in his various essays on the theory of content. Only a perception-based account of content in terms of 'qualia' gets the philosopher out of the vicious circle of introducing linguistic entities to clarify psychological entities and vice versa. One way to discharge the obligation to give an account of a proposition is would involve, as its central idea, focusing on a primitive range of ‘simple’ statements, the formulation of which would involve no connective or quantifier, and treating each of these as ‘expressing’ a ‘propositional complex,’ which in such cases would consist of a sequence whose elements would be, first, a general item (a set or an attribute, according to preference) and, second, an ordered sequence of objects which might, or might not, instantiate or belong to the first item.”“The propositional complex associated with the sentence, ‘Grice is wise,’ might be thought of consisting of a sequence whose first ('general') member would be the set of wise persons, or (alternatively) the attribute wisdom, and whose second ('instantial' or 'particular') member would be Grice or the singleton of Grice; and the sentence, 'Strawson loves Grice', could be represented as expressing a propositional complex which is a sequence whose first element is love (considered either extensionally as a set or non-extensionally as an attribute) and whose second element is a sequence composed of Strawson and Grice, in that order.”“We can define a property of ‘factivity’ or ‘alethic satisfactoriness’ which will be closely allied to the notion of truth.”“A (simple) propositional complex will be factive or alethically satisfactory just in case its two elements (the general and instantial elements) are related by the appopriate predication relation, just in case (for example) the second element is a member of the set (possesses the attribute) in which the first element consists.”“A proposition may now, alla Chomsky, be represented as each consisting of a family of propositional complexes.”“The conditions for family unity may be thought of either as fixed or as variable in accordance with the context.”Grice's ontological views are-at least-liberal. As Grice says when commenting on the mind-body problem in 'Method in Philosophical Psychology', I am not greatly enamoured of some of the motivations which prompt the advocacy of psychophysical identifications; I have in mind a concern to exclude such 'queer' or 'mysterious' entities as souls, purely mental events, purely mental properties and so forth. My taste is for keeping open house for all sorts of conditions of entities, just so long as when they come in they help with the housework. Provided that I can see them work, and provided that they are not detected in illicit logical behaviour (within which I do not include a certain degree of indeterminacy, not even of numerical indeterminacy), I do not find them queer or mysterious at all. To fangle a new ontological Marxism, they work therefore they exist, even though only some, perhaps those who come on the recommendation of some form of transcendental argument, may qualify for the specially favoured status of entia realissima. To exclude honest working entities seems to me like metaphysical snobbery, a reluctance to be seen in the company of any but the best objects. [ 197 5, pp, 30-31.] One way entities can work is by playing a role in the explanation of what a proposition is. What would such an explanation look like? And, what sorts of entities would it put to work? Answering these questions will illustrate Grice's 'ontological Marxism' while clarifying the notion of a proposition. What work do the entities in a theory of propositions do? They are to produce a theory meeting three constraints. First, there are systematic relations between sentences and propositions. For example, the sentence 'Socrates runs' is correlated with the proposition that Socrates runs; the sentence 'snow is white' with the proposition that snow is white, and so on. There are two determinants of the proposition (or propositions) to which a sentence is related. One is the syntactic form of the sentence. The sentences 'Clearly, John spoke' and 'John spoke clearly' are related to different propositions by virtue of the different syntactic relations among their respective parts. The other determinant is the meaning of the parts of the sentence. The sentence 'snow is white' is correlated with the propositions that snow is white in part because 'snow' means what it does. On Grice's theory this correlation between sentences and propositions is effected by language-users resultant procedures. An adequate theory of propositions shoul explicitly characterize this systematic relation between sentences and propositions. Since there are infinitely many sentences, one would presumably give such a characterization recursively. The second constraint is that an account of what a proposition is should yield an adequate account of the relation of logical consequence that we exploit in everyday psychological explanation. For example, if you, by uttering an appropriate sentence, mean that you know the route and that Jones does as well, your audience may conclude that Jones knows the route. The conclusion, the proposition that Jones knows the route, is a logical consequence of the conjunctive proposition that you know the route and that Jones does as well. Given the assumption that you are trustworthy, your audience is entitled to the conclusion precisely because it is a logical consequence of the proposition you mean. We frequently exploit such relations of logical consequence in everyday psychological explanation, and an adequate theory of propositions should provide us with an adequate characterization of this relation. One may think (as we do) that this task is not really distinct from exhibiting the systematic relations between sentences and propositions, but it is worth stating the second constraint separately to emphasize the role of logical consequence in psychological explanation, and hence the relation of a theory of propositions to such explanation. The third constraint is that a theory of propositions should provide the basis, at least, for an adequate account of the relation between thought, action, and language on the one hand, and reality on the other. For example, one perceives the desk, walks over to sit at it, and utters sentences to mean things about it. Since propositions are the items we specify in specifying the content of a thought, perception, intention, act of meaning, and so on, an account of propositions should at least provide the basis for an account of the relation between mind and reality. Since Quine is the philosopher most generally associated with the rejection of propositions, it may be helpful briefly to compare his views with Grice's. Quine has two main arguments against propositions. The first is based on his arguments that synonomy is not a well-defined equivalence relation, the identity conditions for propositions are unclear and there is 'no entity without identity' (See, for example, W. V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, Prentice-Hall, 1970, pp. 2-10). On this issue, Grice is not committed to an equivalence relation of synonomy (thus his remark about indeterminacy) but he parts company with Quine over whether clear identity conditions are required for a kind of entity. If they work they exist, whether we can always tell them apart or count them or not. There are many respectable entities for which we do not have criteria of identity. Suppose Grice's favourite restaurant moves. Is it a new restaurant with the same name? Or suppose it changes owners and names but nothing else. Or that it changes menu entirely? Or that it changes chefs? It would be foolish to look for a single criterion to answer these questions -- the answers go different ways in different contexts. But surely the concept of a restaurant is a useful one and restaurants do exist. Quine's second objection is that propositions do not work. Grice denies this allegation. The main reason for disagreement is perhaps due to Quine's attitude that concepts such as desire and belief are of, at most, secondary importance in the unified canonical science that is his standard for ontology. Grice does not believe that everyday psychological discourse is a temporary pre-scientific expedient to be done away with as soon as possible. On the contrary, Grice believes that at least some psychological concepts and explanations play a fundamental role in both semantics and ethics. To quote the relevant passage a second time: The psychological theory which I envisage would be deficient as a theory to explain behaviour if it did not contain provision for interests in the ascription of psychological states otherwise than as tools for explaining and predicting behaviour, interests (for example) on the part of one creature to be able to ascribe these rather than those psychological states to another creature because of a concern for the other creature. Within such a theory it should be possible to derive strong motivations on the part of the creatures subject to the theory against the abandonment of the central concepts of the theory (and so of the theory itself), motivations which the creatures would (or should) regard as justified. Indeed, only from within the framework of such a theory, I think, can matters of evaluation, and so, of the evaluation of modes of explanation, be raised at all. If I conjecture aright, then, the entrenched system contains the materials needed to justify its own entrenchment; whereas no rival system contains a basis for the justification of anything at all (1975b, 52). Now suppose -- as Grice thinks -- certain ways of thinking, certain CATEGORIES, are part of what is entrenched: there are certain concepts or categories that we CANNOT AVOID applying to reality. The entities in these categories are ENTIA REALISSIMA. We discover these categories by discovering what parts of everyday psychology are entrenched. The idea that there are necessary categories plays a role in Grice's views about ethics; in discussing this views we see why certain principles of everyday psychology are self-justifying, principles connected with the evaluation of ends. If THESE SAME principles played a role in determining what we count as ENTIA REALISSIMA, metaphysics would be grounded in part in considerations about value (a not unpleasant project).
1980.
Rationality and akrasia, emotion and akrasia, emotions and incontinence, The H.
P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6-Folder 32, BANC MSS 90/135c, The
Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: akrasia,
emotion. The concept of 'emotion' needs a philosophical elucidation. Grice
was curious about a linguistic botany for that! Akrasia for Grice covers both
boulomaic and doxastic versions. The boulomaic version may be closer to the
concept of an emotion. Grice quotes from A. J. P. Kenny's essay on
"emotion." But Grice is looking for more of a linguistic botany. As
it happens, Kenny's essay has Griceian implicata. Kenny was a Fellow of St.
Benet's, and completed his essay on emotion under A. M. Quinton (who would
occasionally give seminars with Grice), and examined by two members of Grice's
Play Group: D. F. Pears and P. L. Gardiner. Kenny connects an emotion to a
'feeling,' which brings us to Grice on 'feeling boringly byzantine'! Grice
proposes a derivation of akrasia in conditional steps for both boulomaic and
doxastic akrasia.
1980.
Trust, decency, and rationality, Rationality, trust, and decency, The H. P.
Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6-Folder 18, BANC, MSS 90/135c, The
Bancroft Library. Keywords: trust, decency, rationality. Grice's idea
of 'decency' is connected to his explorations on 'rational' and 'reasonable'.
To cheat may be neither unreasonable nor rational. It's just
repulsive! Indecent, in other words. In all this, Grice is concerned
with 'ordinary language,' and treasures Austin's question to Warnock (when
Warnock was looking for a fellowship at Austin's college): "Warnock:
what would you say the difference is between (i) and (ii)?" i. Smith
plays cricket rather properly. ii. Smith plays cricket rather
incorrectly. "They spent the whole dinner over such
subtleties!" "And Warnock fell in love with
Austin." Grice's explorations on 'trust' are Warnockian in character
too. For Warnock, in "Object of morality," trust is key, indeed, the
very object of morality. Grice started to focus on trust in his Oxford seminars
on the implicatum. There is a desideratum of conversational candour. And a
subgoal of the principle of conversational helpfulness is that of giving and
receiving 'information.' "False 'information' is just no
information." Grice loved that Latin dictum, "tuus candor."
1980.
In the tradition of Kantotle, Kantotle, Immanuel Kant, Kant, Kant's ethics,
Kant, mid-sentences, freedom, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (The
Doctrines), Carton 5-Folders 14-18, and Series V (Topical), Carton 7-Folders
14-18, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley. Keywords: Kant, freedom, ethics. Grice was especially
concerned with Kant's having brought back the old Greek idea of 'eleutheria'
for philosophical discussion.
1980. Philosophy,
lectures, Berkeley group, team notes, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (The
doctrines), Carton 5-Folder 26, and Series V (Topical), Carton 6-Folder
21, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California,
Berkeley. Keywords: philosophy
1980. Kant's
ethics, Kant, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (The Doctrines), Carton
5-Folders 19-21, and Folder 23, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The
University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Kant, ethics. Grice knew how
to teach ethics. He taught Kant as if he were teaching Aristotle, and vice
versa. His students would say, "Here come [sic] Kantotle!" Grice was
obsessed with Kantotle. He would teach one or the other as an ethics
requirement. Back at Oxford, the emphasis was of course Aristotle, but he was
aware of some trends to introduce Kant in the Lit.Hum. curriculum, not with
much success! Strawson had done his share with Kant's "pure" reason
in "The bounds of sense," but White professors of moral philosophy
were usually not too keen on Kant's "pratical" reason!
1980. Metaphysics
and the language of philosophy, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (Doctrines),
Carton 5-Folder 24, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. Keywords: metaphysics, philosophical method. Grice had
been interested in the methodology of 'metaphysics' since his Oxford
days. He counts as one memorable experience in the area his participation
in two episodes for the BBC Third Programme on "The nature of
metaphysics" with the organiser, D. F. Pears, and his former tutee, P. F.
Strawson on the panel. Grice was particularly keen on Collingwood's views on
metaphysical presuppositions, "both absolute and relative!" Grice
also considers John Wisdom’s view of the metaphysical proposition as a ‘blatant
falsehood.’ Grice considers Bradley’s Hegelian metaphysics of the absolute, in
“Appearance and reality.”
1980. Freedom,
implicature-free, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (The Doctrines), Carton
5-Folder 25, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library. Keywords: freedom,
Kant, implicature'free. The topic of 'freedom' fascinated Grice, because it
merged the practical with the theoretical. Grice sees the conception of
freedom as crucial in his elucidation of a rational being. "Conditions of
freedom" are necessary for the very idea, as Kant was well aware. "A
thief who is FORCED to steal is just a 'thief'." Grice would engage in a
bit of language botany, when exploring the ways the adjective 'free' is used,
'freely,' in 'ordinary language': 'free fall,' 'alcohol-free,' 'sugar-free,'
and his favourite: 'implicature-free.' Grice's more systematic reflections deal
with 'pirotology, or 'creature construction'. A vegetals, for example is less
free than an animal, but more free than a stone! And Humans are more free than
non-human. Grice wants to deal with some of the paradoxes identified by Kant
about freedom, and he succeeds in solving some of them. There is a section on
freedom in "Action and events" for The Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly where he expands on 'eleutheria' and notes the idiocy of a phrase
like 'free fall.' Grice was irritated by the fact that his friend H. L. A. Hart
wrote an essay on liberty and not on freedom.
1980. Grice's Frege, Frege, Words, and Sentences, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7-Folder 2, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Frege, Farbung, aber. Frege was one of Grice's obsessions. A Fregeian sense is an explicatum, or implicitum, a concession to get his principle of conversational helpfulness working in the generation of conversational implicata, that can only mean progress for philosophy! "Fregeian senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity." The employment of the routine of Humeian projection may be expected to deliver for us, as its result, a concept – the concept(ion) of value, say, in something like a Fregeian ‘sense,’ rather than an object. There is also a strong affinity between Frege's treatment of 'colouring' (of the German particle "aber," say) and Grice's idea of a convetional implicatum ("She was poor, BUT she was honest,/and her parents were the same,/till she met a city feller,/and she lost her honest name," as the vulgar Great War ditty went). Grice does not seem interested in providing a philosophical exploration of conventional implicata, and there is a reason for this. Conventional implicata are NOT essentially connected, as conversational implicata are, with RATIONALITY. Conventional implicata CANNOT be 'calculable.' They have less of a philosophical interest, too, in that they are NOT cancellable. Grice sees cancellability as a way to prove some (contemporary to him, if dated) "ordinary-language" philosophers who analyse an expression in terms of 'sense' and 'entailment,' where a cancellable conversational implicatum is all there is (to it). He mentions B. S. Benjamin in "Prolegomena" (and is very careful in noting how Benjamin misuses a Fregeian sense. In his "Causal Theory," Grice lists another mistake: "What is known to be the case is not believed to be the case." Grice gives pretty few example of a conventional implicatum: 'therefore,' as in Jill's utterance: "Jack is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave." This is interesting because "therefore" compares to "so" which P. F. Strawson, in P. G. R. I. C. E., claims is the ASSERTED counterpart to "if." But Strawson was never associated with the type of linguistic botany that Grice was. Grice also mentions the idiom, "on the one hand/on the other hand," in some detail in "Retrospective Epilogue": "My aunt was a nurse in the Great War; my sister, on the other hand, lives on a peak at Darien." Grice thought that Frege had misused the use-mention distinction between Russell corrected that (Grice bases this on Alonzo Church).
1980. Kant's Grundlegung, Kant's Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics, Kant's foundation of the metaphysics of morals, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folders 3-4, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keyword: Grundlegung. While Grice can't read Kant in German, he uses the English vernacular. Note the archaic 'metaphysic' sic in singular. More Kant.
1980. Semantics, grammar and semantics, with R. O. Warner, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7-Folder 5, BANC MSS 90/135c The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Truth-conditional semantics and implicata.
1980. Causa finalis, to telos, finis, Teleology and unified science, teleology, the unity of science and teleology, unity of science and teleology, Hands Across the Bay and Beanfest, value, metaphysics, and teleology, finality, final cause (telos-aitia), with A. D. Code, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series IV (Associations), Carton 6-Folder 9, and Series V (Topical), Carton 6-Folder 38 and Carton 9-Folder 23, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: unity of science, teleology, unified science, value, metaphysics, telos, finality, mechanism, final cause (telos-aitia), Code. Grice’s métier. "Unity of science" was a very "New-World" expression that Grice did not quite buy. Grice was brought up in a world, the "Old World," indeed, as he calls it in his "Proem" to the John Locke lectures, of C. P. Snow's 'two cultures.' At the time of Grice's philosophising, philosophers such as Peter Winch (who indeed quotes fro Grice) were contesting the idea that science is unitary, when it comes to the explanation of rational behaviour. Since a philosophical approach to the explanation of rational behaviour, including conversational behaviour (to account for the conversational implicata) is his priority, Grice needs to distinguish himself from those who propose a 'unified' science, which Grice regards as eliminationist and reductionist. Grice is ambivalent about 'science' and also playful ("philosophia regina scientiarum"). Grice seems to presuppose, or implicate, that, since there is the devil of scientism, science cannot get at teleology. The devil is in the physiological details, which are irrelevant. The language Grice uses to describe his pirots as goal-oriented, aimed at survival and reproduction, seems 'teleological' and somewhat 'scientific,' though. But he means that ironically! As the scholastics use it, 'teleology' is a science, the science of 'telos,' or finality (cf. Aristotle on 'telos aitia,' causa finalis. The unity of science is threatened by teleology, and vice versa. Unified science seeks for a 'mechanistically derivable' teleology. But Grice's sympathies lie for 'detached' finality. Grice is obsessed with the Greek idea of a 'telos,' as "slightly overused" by Aristotle. Grice thinks that some actions are 'for their own sake.' "What is the telos of Oscar Wilde?" "Can we speak of Oscar Wilde's métier?" If a tiger is to tigerise, a human is to humanise, and a person is to personise. Grice thought that teleology is a key philosophical way to contest mechanism, so popular in The New World. Strictly, and Grice knew this, 'teleology' is constituted as a 'discipline.' "One term that Cicero was unable to translate!" For the philosopher, 'teleology' is that part of philosophy that studies the realm of the 'telos.' Informally, 'teleological' is opposed to 'mechanistic'. Grice is interested in the mechanism/teleology debate, indeed jumps into it, with a goal in mind! Grice finds some New-World philosophers too mechanistic-oriented, in contrast with the more 'two-culture' atmosphere he was familiar with at Oxford! Code is the Aristotelian, and he and Grice are especially concerned in the idea of 'causa finalis.' For Grice only detached finality poses a threat to Mechanism, as it should!
1980. Benevolentia,
metaphysics and ill-will, malevolentia, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V
(Topical), Carton 7-Folder 28. Keyword: Ill-will, goodwilll. A conceptual
elucidation. Interesting from a historical point of view seeing that Grice had
introduced a principle of conversational benevolence (i.e. conversational
goodwill) as early as 1964! Malevolentia was over-used by Cicero, translating
the Grecian.
1980. Myth,
method and myth, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton
7-Folder 30, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. Keywords: myth, method. A philosopher should be
allowed, as Plato was, to use a myth, if he thinks his tutee will thank him for
that! Grice loved to compare his "Oxonian dialectic" with Plato's
"Athenian" (strictly, "Academic") "dialectic." Indeed,
there is some resemblance between Plato's and Grice's use of 'myth' for
philosophical methodological purposes. Grice especially enjoyed a 'myth' in his
programme in philosophical psychology. In this, he was very much being a
philosopher. Non-philosophers usually criticise this methodological use of a
'myth,' but they would, wouldn't they?
1980. Kant's
ethics, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (The Doctrines), Carton
5-Folders 27-28, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. Keywords: Kant, ethics. Why was Grice attracted
to Kant's theory? First, the logical analysis of the imperatives. Second, as he
explored the Grundlegung, the metaphysical foundation of freedom, and finality.
While teleology is usually NOT associated with Kant, Grice did!
1980. Philosophy,
conferences, discussion, The American Philosophical Association, transcripts by
Randall Parker, from the audio-tapes contained in Carton 10 within the same
series IV (Associations), miscellaneous, Beanfest, transcripts and
audio-cassettes, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series IV (Associations), Carton
6-Folder 8, and Folder 10, and Series V (Topical), Carton 8-Folders 4-8,
BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley. Unfortunately, Parker typed ‘carulise’ for ‘karulise.’ Or
not.
1980.
Theory-theory, metaphysics and theorising, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series
II (The Essays), Carton 4-Folders 3-4, Series III (The Doctrines), Carton
5-Folder 31, and Series V (Topical), Carton 7-Folder 29, and Carton 9-Folder
14, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. Keywords: metaphysics, theorising,
theory-theory, eschatology, Plato, Socrates, Thrasymachus. Grice was
keen to theorise on theorising. He thought that Aristotle's 'first
philosophy' (prote philosophia) is best rendered as
"Theory-theory"! Grice kept using Oxonian English spelling,
'theorising,' except when he did not! Grice calls himself 'folksy': his
theories, even if subject to various types of Ramseyfication, are 'popular' in
kind! And ceteris paribus! Metaphysical construction is disciplined
and the best theorising the philosopher can hope for! The way Grice
conceives of his “Theory-theory” is interesting to revisit. A route by which
Grice hopes to show the centrality of metaphysics (as 'prote philosophia')
involves taking seriously a few ideas. First, that, if any region of
enquiry is to be successful as a rational enterprise, its deliverance
must be expressable in the shape of one or another of the possibly different types
of theory. Second, a characterisation of the nature and range of a
possible kind of theory θ is needed. Third, such a body of
characterisation must itself be the outcome of rational enquiry, and
so must itself exemplify whatever requirement it lays down for any theory θ in
general. Fourth, the characterisation must itself be
expressible as a theory θ, to be called ("if you
like," Grice politely puts it!) “theory-theory,” or meta-theory, θ2.
Now, the specification and justification of the ideas and material presupposed
by any theory θ, whether such account falls within the bounds of
Theory-theory, θ2 would be properly called 'prote philosophia'
('first philosophy') and may turn out to relate to what is generally accepted
as belonging to the subject matter of metaphysics. It might, for example,
turn out to be establishable that any theory θ has to relate to a
certain range of this or that subject item, has to attribute to each item this
or that predicate or attribute, which in turn has to fall within one or another
of the range of types or categories. In this way, the enquiry might lead
to recognised metaphysical topics, such as the nature of being, its range of
application, the nature of predication and a systematic account of
categories. 1980. Metaphysics, philosophical eschatology, and Plato's
Republic, Thrasymachus, social justice, Socrates, along with notes on Zeno, and
topics for pursuit, repr.in Part II, Explorations in semantics and
metaphysics to Studies in the Way of Words. Keywords: metaphysics, philosophical
eschatology, Plato's Republic, Socrates, Thrasymachus, justice, moral right,
legal right, Athenian dialectic. Philosophical eschatology is a sub-discipline
of metaphysics concerned with what Grice calls a 'category shift.' Grice,
having applied such a technique to Aristotle's aporia on 'philos' ('friend') as
alter ego, uses it now to tackle Socrates's view, against Thrasymachus, that
'right' applies primarily to 'morality,' and secondarily to 'legality.' Grice
has a specific reason to include this in his “Studies in the Way of Words.”
Grice’s exegesis of Plato on justice displays Grice's take on the fact that
metaphysics needs to be subdivided into ontology proper and what he calls
'philosophical eschatology,' for the study of things like 'category shift’ and other
construction routines. The exploration of Plato’s “Politeia” thus becomes an
application of Grice’s philosophically eschatological approach to the item
'just,' as used by Socrates ('morally just') and Thrasymachus ('legally just').
Grice has one specific essay on Aristotle (published in The Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly). So he thought Plato merited his own essay, too!
Grice's focus is on Plato's exploration of 'dike.' Grice is concerned with a
neo-Socratic (versus neo-Thrasymachean) account of 'moral' justice as
conceptually (or axiologically) prior to 'legal' justice. In the proceeding, he
creates 'philosophical eschatology' as the OTHER branch to metaphysics, along
with good ol' ontology. To say that 'just' crosses a categorial barrier
(from the moral to the legal) is to make a metaphysical, strictly
eschatological, pronouncement. The Grice Papers locate the Plato essay in
Series II, the Socrates essay in Series III, and the Thrasymachus essay, under
'social justice,' in Series V. Grice is well aware that in his account of
'fairness,' Rawls makes use of his ideas on 'personal identity.' The
philosophical elucidation of 'fairness' is of great concern for Grice. He had
been in touch with such explorations as Nozick’s and Nagel’s along
anti-Rawlsian lines. Grice's ideas on rationality guide his exploration of
'social justice.' Grice keeps revising the 'Socrates' notes. The Plato essay he
actually dates 1988. As it happens, Grice's most extensive published account of
Socrates is in this commentary on Plato's Republic: a 'eschatological'
commentary, as he puts it. In an entertaining fashion, Grice has Socrates, and
neo-Socrates, exploring the logic and grammar of 'just' against the attack by
Thrasymachus and neo-Thrasymachus. Grice's point is that, while the legal
'just' may be conceptually PRIOR to the moral 'just,' the moral 'just' is
evaluationally or axiologically prior.
1980. Value
systems, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folders
25-27, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley. Keywords: value system. The idea of a system of values (cf.
'system of ends') is meant to unify the goals of the agent in terms of the
pursuit of 'eudaemonia.'
1980. Semantic
theory, semantics, syntax and semantics, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V
(Topical), Carton 9-Folders 17-18, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: syntax,
semantics. Especially the former. Grice loved two devices of the
syntactic kind: subscripts and square brackets (for the assignment of
'common-ground status'). Grice is a conservative (dissenting
rationalist) when it comes to syntax and semantics. He hardly uses 'pragmatics'
albeit in a loose way ('pragmatic import,' 'pragmatic inference'), but was aware
of Morris's triangle. Syntax is presented along the lines of Gentzen, i.e.
a system of 'natural deduction' in terms of inference rules of introduction and
elimination for each formal device. Semantics pertains rather to Witters's
truth-values, i.e. the assignment of a satisfactory-valuation: the true and the
good.
1980. Philosophical
explanation, the why, the 'that' and the 'why,' metaphysics,
description/taxonomy vs. theoretical explanation, The H. P. Grice Papers,
Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folder 19, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: explanation,
description, 'why,' 'what'. Taxonomy, is worse than explanation,
always. Grice is exploring the 'taxonomy-description' vs. explanation
dichotomy. He would often criticise 'ordinary-language' philosopher Austin for
spending too much valuable time on linguistic botany, 'without an aim in his
head.' Instead, his inclination, a dissenting one, is to look for the 'big
picture of it all,' and disregard a piece-meal analysis. Conversation is a
good example. While Austin would subjectify 'Language' (Linguistic Nature),
Grice rather places rationality squarely on the behaviour displayed by utterers
as they make conversational moves that their addressees will judge as
'rational' along specific lines. Observation of the principle of
conversational helpfulness is RATIONAL (reasonable) along the following lines:
anyone who cares about the two goals which are central to conversation, viz.
giving and receiving information, and influencing and being influenced by
others, is expected to have an interest in taking part in a conversation which
will only be profitable (if not possible) under the assumption that it is
conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational helpfulness. Grice
is not interested in conversation per se, but as a basis for a THEORY that
explains the MISTAKES 'ordinary-language' philosophers are making. The case of
"What is known to be the case is not believed to be the case."
1981.
Philosophy, miscellaneous, topics, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical),
Carton 8-Folders 9-13, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University
of California, Berkeley. Keywords: philosophy. Grice was a
'meta-linguistic botanist.' His point was to criticise 'ordinary-language'
philosophers criticising philosophers. Say: Plato and Ayer say that 'episteme'
is a kind of 'doxa.' The 'contemporary,' if 'dated,' ordinary-language
philosopher detects a nuance, and embarks risking collision with the conversational
'facts' or data: rushes ahead to EXPLOIT the nuance without clarifying it, with
wrong dicta like: "What I known to be the case I don't believe to be the
case." Surely, a cancellable implicatum generated by the rational
principle of conversational helpfulness is all there is to the nuance. Grice
knew that unlike the 'ordinary-language' philosopher, he was not providing a
taxonomy or description, but a theoretical EXPLANATION!
1982. Reflections
on morals, meta-ethics, ethics, with J. Baker, ethics, North Carolina notes,
The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 4-Folders 17-25, and Series
V (Topical), Carton 6-Folders 34-36, and Carton 9-Folder 7, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords:
morals, meta-ethics. Grice's explorations on morals are language based. With a
substantial knowledge of the classical languages ("that are so good at
verb systems and modes like the optative, that English lacks"), Grice
explores modals like "should," (Hampshire) "ought to"
(Hare) and, "must" (Grice -- 'necessity'. Grice is well aware of
R. M. Hare's reflections on the 'neustic' qualifications on the 'phrastic.' The
"imperative" has usually been one source for the philosopher's concern
with the language of morals. Grice attempts to balance this with a similar
exploration on 'good,' now regarded as the 'value-paradeigmatic' notion par
excellence. We cannot understand, to echo Strawson, 'the concept of a
person' unless we understand the concept of a GOOD person, i.e. the
philosopher's conceptION of a good person. Morals is very Oxonian.
There were in Grice's time only *three* chairs of philosophy at Oxford: the
three W: The Waynflete chair of metaphysical philosophy, The Wykeham chair
of logic (not philosophy, really), and The White chair of moral
philosophy. Later, the Wilde chair of philosophical psychology was
created. Grice was familiar with Austin's cavalier attitude to morals as
White's professor of moral philosophy, succeeding Kneale. When R. M. Hare
succeeds Austin, Grice knows that it is time to play with the neustic
implicatum! Grice's approach to morals is very 'meta-ethical' and starts
with a fastidious (to use Blackburn's characterisation, not mine!) exploration
of 'modes' related to propositional phrases involving 'should,' 'ought to,' and
'must.' For Hampshire, 'should' is the moral word par excellence. For
Hare, it is 'ought.' For Grice, it is only "MUST" that preserves
that sort of necessity that, as a Kantian rationalist, he is looking for.
However, Grice hastens to add that whatever he'll say about the 'practical' or
boulomaic "MUST" must also apply to the 'doxastic' "must,"
as in "What goes up must come down." That he did not hesitate to use
'necessity' operators is clear from his axiomatic treatment, undertaken with A.
D. Code, on Aristotelian categories (izzing and hazzing). To understand
Grice's view on ethics, we should return to the idea of creature construction
in more detail. Suppose we are genitors-demigods-designing living creatures, creatures
Grice calls pirots. To design a type of pirot is to specify a diagram and table
for that type (plus evaluative procedures, if any). The design is implemented
in animal stuff-flesh and bones (typically). Let us focus on one type of
pirot-a very sophisticated type that Grice (borrowing from Locke) calls 'very
intelligent rational pirots'. (Think of them very roughly as creatures with the
capacities for thought and action characteristic of persons.) Being benevolent
genitors, we want to design these pirots so as to maximize their chances for
survival. As Grice recently pointed out in conversation-by talk of survival, he
does not, in the case of very intelligent rational pirots, mean simply staying
alive. A full explanation of what Grice has in mind here would require an
account of his views on teleology; however, for our purposes a full explanation
is unnecessary. We need note only the following points. First, in constructing
pirots we build in certain ends, and for our purposes we may imagine ourselves
as having a fairly free hand in deciding what ends to select. To build in an
end is to construct the diagram and table so that the pirots have that end as a
standing, constant end-an end where they strive to realize in all appropriate
circumstances. The restriction to appropriate circumstances is necessary for
two reasons. First, we will want to endow the pirots with a variety of ends,
and we will not want a pirot to try to realize each end at each moment of time.
We want them to schedule their pursuit of ends in a way that maximizes the
realization of the whole array in the long run. Second, we will, in the
case of very intelligent rational pirots, want to give them the (limited)
ability to eliminate (or inhibit for a long time the pursuit of) built-in ends
should circumstances prove especially inappropriate. Now we can explain what,
for present purposes, we mean by 'survival': to maximize chances for survival
is to maximize chances for the realization of built-in ends. How are we to
design the pirots so as to maximize their chances for realizing the built-in
ends? The answer would be easy if we could take as given a very detailed
specification of the environment in which the pirots live. Then we could tailor
the diagram and table to that specific environment by building in exactly the
responses that the environment demands. But we cannot assume such a specific
description of the environment; on the contrary, we know that the pirots will
face a variety of changing environments. So we need to design the pirots to function
effectively in the widest possible range of environments. We could, of course,
avoid this if we were willing to descend periodically from Olympus in order to
redesign the pirots in response to each significant change in the environment.
But there is a more efficient way to achieve the same result: we give the
pirots the ability to redesign themselves. There are two aspects to this
ability. First among the ends we build in is the end of being an end-setter. To
be an end-setter requires that one have the (limited) ability to adopt new ends
and to eliminate ends one already has. To have the end of being an end-setter
is to have the end of employing this ability to adopt and eliminate ends. This
is not, as we will see, a complete specification of what it is to be an
end-setter, but it will suffice for the moment. By making the pirots
end-setters we will enable them to redesign themselves by altering what they
aim at. Second, to enable pirots to determine when to use their end-setting
ability, we have given them an appropriate set of evaluative principles. These
principles incorporate in the pirots some of our wisdom as genitors. We do not
need to descend periodically to redesign them because in a sense we are always
present-having endowed them with some of our divine knowledge. What does this
have to do with ethics? Grice answers this question in 'Method in Philosophical
Psychology'. To interpret the reference to 'rational capacities and
dispositions' in the following passage, recall that, given the connection
between evaluative principles and rationality spelled out in section 4, we
have, in giving the pirots evaluative principles, given them a capacity for
rational evaluation. Let me be a little more explicit, and a great deal more
speculative, about the possible relation to ethics of my programme for
philosophical psychology. I shall suppose that the genitorial programme has
been realized to the point at which we have designed a class of pirots which,
nearly following Locke, I might call 'very intelligent rational pirots'. These
pirots will be capable of putting themselves in the genitorial position, of
asking how, if they were constructing themselves with a view to their own
survival, they would execute this task; and, if we have done our work aright,
their answer will be the same as ours .... We might, indeed, envisage the
contents of a highly general practical manual, which these pirots would be in a
position to compile .... The contents of the initial manual would have various
kinds of generality which are connected with familiar discussions of
universalizability. The pirots have, so far, been endowed only with the
characteristics which belong to the genitorial justified psychological theory;
so the manual will have to be formulated in terms of that theory, together with
the concepts involved in the very general description of livingconditions which
have been used to set up that theory; the manual will therefore have conceptual
generality. There will be no way of singling out a special subclass of
addressees, so the injunctions of the manual will have to be addressed,
indifferently, to any very intelligent rational pirot, and will thus have
generality of form. And since the manual can be thought of as being composed by
each of the so far indistinguishable pirots, no pirot would include in the
manual injunctions prescribing a certain line of conduct in circumstances to
which he was not likely to be subject; nor indeed could he do so even if he
would. So the circumstances for which conduct is prescribed could be presumed
to be such as to be satisfied, from time to time, by any addressee; the manual,
then, will have generality of application. Such a manual might, perhaps,
without ineptitude be called an IMMANUEL; and the very intelligent rational
pirots, each of whom both composes it and from time to time heeds it, might
indeed be ourselves (in our better moments, of course). [ 197 Sb, pp. 40-1.] We
can both explain and motivate this approach to ethics by considering three
objections. First, one may complain that the above remarks are extremely vague.
In particular, what are the evaluative principles-the rational capacities and
dispositions-with which we endow the pirots? These principles play a central
role in compiling the manual (Immanuel). How can we evaluate the suggested
approach to ethics until we are told what these evaluative principles are? This
complaint is somewhat unjust-in the context of 'Method in Philosophical
Psychology' at least, for there Grice labels his remarks as speculative. But,
more importantly, Grice has done a considerable amount of work directed toward
providing this objection with the information it demands; this work includes
investigations of happiness, freedom, reasoning, and teleology. While the
examination of these projects is unfortunately beyond the scope of our
introduction, we should comment briefly on Grice's work on happiness. In 'Some
Reflections about Ends and Happiness', Grice develops an account of happiness,
and on this account it is clear that the conception of happiness could
certainly function as a central 'evaluative principle' in endsetting. It is
also worth remarking here that Grice's views on happiness are very
Aristotelian; Grice emphasizes the Kantian aspect of his view in the passage
quoted, but when the views are worked out, one finds a blend of Kantian and
Aristotelian themes. The second objection is that Grice's approach makes it too
easy to escape the demands of morality. What can Grice say to a personor
pirot-who rejects the manual, rejects moral demands and constraints? Suppose,
for example, that a person reasons as follows: If I continue to heed the voice
of morality, I will continue on occasion to sacrifice my welfare and interests
in favor of another's welfare and interests. Why should I be such a fool? After
all, what am I after except getting as much as I can of what I want.
Thorough-going egoism is the path to take; I'll have to resist these impulses
to help others, in the way I resist sweets when I am dieting. Perhaps I will be
able to condition such impulses out of myself in time. Does Grice's approach
have a reply to the consistent thorough-going egoist? It does-as Grice pointed
out in a recent conversation; the considerations which follow are based on that
conversation. First we need to provide a more detailed account of end-setting.
When we give our pirots the end of end-setting we have a good reason for giving
them each of the evaluative principles in order to build in the capacity to
redesign themselves, and we build in that capacity in order to maximize their
chances of realizing their ends over the widest possible range of environments.
So we have a good reason for giving them each of the end-setting evaluative
principles: namely, each one contributes to the capacity of redesigning in a
way that maximizes the chances of realizing encls. The pirots themselves are
capable of recognizing that the evaluative principles make such a contribution,
so each pirot has (or can have) a reason for having the evaluative principles.
(We are assuming that contributing to the maximization of the realization of
ends constitutes a good reason; a defence of this assumption would require an
examination of Grice's view on teleology.) A second essential point is that we
design the pirots so that they do not simply adopt or eliminate ends at will;
rather, they do so only when they have good reasons to do so-good reasons
derived from the evaluative principles that govern end-setting. We design them
this way in order to maximize their chances for the realization of their ends.
We want them to use their ability for end-setting only when the evaluative
principles we have built in determine that a change of ends is called for in
order to maximize the overall realization of ends. (In the typical case at
least, an end-setter will only alter some of his ends as to maximize the
realization of all his (remaining and newly adopted) ends.) An end-setter then
has the end of adopting or eliminating ends when he has good reasons to do
so-where these reasons are provided by evaluative principles; and these
evaluative principles are such that he has a good reason for having each of
those principles. Let us call such an end-setter a Gricean end-setter.
Returning now to egoism, we can distinguish three different situations in which
one might try to reject the 'demands of morality'. Before going on, one may
insist on knowing what we mean by the 'demands of morality', but it is enough
for present purposes that we agree that morality demands at least that one does
not always treat others purely as means to one's own ends. It is this demand
that the egoist described earlier rejects. First, if the egoist is a Gricean
end-setter who wishes to remain a Gricean end-setter, then he cannot abandon
the non-egotistical principles since they are self-justifying and do not depend
on other premisses. Second, if the egoist envisioned is one who would cease to
be a Gricean end-setter, this too is impossible for a rational agent. Being a
Gricean end-setter is itself one of the self~ustifying ends, and thus it can be
abandoned only if one abandons reasoning. Finally, there is the question of
whether an agent who is not a Gricean end-setter can be an egoist. Again the
answer appears to be 'no', if the agent is rational and considers the question.
For being a Gricean end-setter can be seen on reflection to be a
self-justifying end, and thus must be adopted by any reflective rational agent.
Let this suffice as a brief indication of Grice's approach to the second
objection, and let us turn to the third and last objection. This objection
concerns what we have been calling 'the demands of morality'; the objection is
that the notion of demand is vague. What do we mean by 'demand' when we talk of
the 'demands of morality'? What kind of demand is this? What sort of claim is
it that morality has on us? Grice has done a considerable amount of work
relevant to this questionincluding 'Probability, Desirability, and Mood
Operators', the John Locke Lectures, and recent work on Kant. In explaining the
claim morality has on us, Grice employs distinctions and notation provided by
his theory of meaning. We can begin with the sentence 'Pay Jones the money!'
Grice assigns this sentence the following structure: ! + I pay Jones the money
where '!' is the imperative mood operator and 'I pay Jones the money' is a
moodless sentence radical. This structure is embeddable in other sentences. In
particular, it occurs in both 'I should pay Jones the money' and 'I should not
pay Jones the money'. Grice assigns these the following structures: Ace+ ! +I
pay Jones the money; Not+ Ace+ ! +I pay Jones the money, where 'Ace' may be
read as 'it is acceptable that'. So if we read '!' as 'let it be the case
that', the whole string, 'Ace + ! I pay Jones the money' may be read as: 'It is
acceptable that (let) it be the case that I pay Jones the money' (whole 'Not+
Ace+! +I pay Jones the money' may be read as 'It is not the case that it is
acceptable that (let) it be the case that I pay Jones the money'). In
'Probability, Desirability, and Mood Operators' Grice motivates this assignment
of structures by arguing (in effect) that the sentence 'I should pay Jones the
money' means-on the central and important reading-that it is acceptable that
(let) it be the case that I pay Jones the money. The argument rests on an
analysis of practical reasoning and on the analysis of sentence meaning.
Actually, Grice does not say that 'I should pay Jones the money' means what we
just said it means. In 'Probability, Desirability, and Mood Operators' he is
much more circumspect. After discussing probability inferences, he writes,
Bearing in mind the variety of interpretations to which sentences containing
'ought' and 'should' are susceptible, I find it natural to take, as practical
analogues to sentences like 'an invalid is likely to be in retirement',
sentences like 'it is desirable for an invalid to keep in touch with his
doctor'. For expositional purposes, we use 'should-sentences' since the
interpretation we want these sentences to bear is clear, and the use of
'should-sentences' highlights the connections with ordinary moral reasoning.
Suppose morality demands that I pay Jones the money; that is, I act morally
only if I pay Jones the money. Grice holds that this is true only if an
appropriate sentence (or thought) is derivable from my evaluative principles-a
sentence (or thought) whose underlying structure is 'Ace + ! + I pay Jones the
money'. I can, that is, derive that it is acceptable that (let) it be the case
that I pay Jones the money; in other words, that I should pay Jones the money. Grice
holds that since I derive this from evaluative principles, it is necessary;
that is, it is necessary that I should pay Jones the money. There are two
points to note in order to explain the claim morality has on us. First, Grice
holds that the self-justifying evaluative principles are necessarily true, and
he holds that I can show, e.g. that it is necessarily true that I should pay
Jones the money, by constructing a suitable derivation of 'I should pay Jones
the money' from my self-justifying evaluative principles. (These claims follow
from a general view Grice has of the nature of necessity, a view that we will
not consider here.) To be more precise, what I derive from my evaluative
principles is a sentence with the underlying structure: Ace+ 1 I pay Jones the
money, which we read as 'It is acceptable that (let) it be the case that I pay
Jones the money'. Since it is possible to construct an appropriate derivation
it is necessary that it is acceptable that (let) it be the case that I pay
Jones the money. This is how we should understand attaching 'necessary' to a
'should-statement'. The sentence 'Necessarily, I should pay Jones the money'
expresses the necessary acceptability of the imperative 'Pay Jones the money!'
(Since my derivation will involve contingent information about the
circumstances C, we should represent what I derive as 'I should in these
circumstances C pay Jones the money'; this will be what is necessary. We ignore
this detail.) Second, it does not follow from the fact that it is necessary that
I should pay Jones the money that I will pay him the money. Even if it is
necessary that it is acceptable that (let) it be the case that I pay Jones the
money, and even if I derive this, I may not act on it. It is true that I cannot
have a good reason not to act on it; after all, I have derived the necessity of
accepting the imperative, 'Pay Jones the money!'; and as a Gricean end-setter I
am committed to acting on such reasons; but this does not mean I will. A person
is capable of irrationality-even in the face of acknowledged necessity. Now we
are in a position to explain what we mean by talk of the demands of morality.
The demands of morality are expressed by necessary 'should-statements'. Or
perhaps we may want to say that they are expressed by a special subset of such
statements. We need not investigate this possibility since it would not alter
the point we are making here-which is that the demands of morality express the
necessity of rational agents accepting and acting on certain imperatives (in so
far as they act rationally). Consider the role elements of Grice's theory of
meaning play in the above discussion of ethics, we have in a way returned to
the startingpoint of our exposition of Grice's views. And it is certainly high
time we let the discoverer of M-intentions formulate some in response to what
we have written. High time but not quite time. For one thing, we should note
that the discussion of ethics resolves an issue we suppressed when discussing
psychological explanation. At one point in that section, we wrote, with respect
to M-intending, 'Given our ends and our environment, there is good and decisive
reason to have such a pre-rational structure.' We did not raise the question of
what makes those considerations into a reason; we tacitly assumed that
relations to happiness and survival secured that the considerations counted as
reasons. The ethics discussion points the way to detailed and informative
treatment of this issue. Not that the discussion suggests that we were wrong to
appeal tacitly to happiness and survival; on the contrary, it indicates that we
should explain the reason-giving force of such considerations by examining the
role they play for a Gricean-end-setter.
1982. Correspondence
with J. Baker, The Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice,
IA), Carton 1-Folder 2, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The
University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Grice, Baker. Grice
collaborated with Baker mainly on work on ethics seen as an offspring, alla
Kant, of philosophical psychology. Akrasia was one such topic. Baker
contributes to P. G. R. I. C. E. ("Philosophical Grounds of Rationality:
Intentions, Categories, Ends"), a festschrift for Grice, with an essay on
the purity, and alleged lack thereof, of morally evaluable motives. Do one's
motives have to be pure? For Grice morality cashes out in 'interest,'
or desire. Baker also contributes to a volume on Grice's honour published by
Palgrave, Meaning and analysis: essays on H. P. Grice. Baker is the
organiser of a symposium on the thought of Grice for the American Philosophical
Association, the proceedings of which are published in The Journal of
Philosophy, with J. F. Bennett as chair, and contributions by Baker, R. Grandy,
and comments by R. Stalnaker and R. Warner.
1982.
The alethic-practical divide, the buletic-doxastic divide, The Kantian problem,
miscellaneous, value sub-systems, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V
(Topical), Carton 9-Folders 25-27, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Kant's problem. More
than a value may co-ordinate in a system. One such is 'eudaemonia' (cf. 'system
of ends'). Kant's problem is the reduction of the categorical imperative to the
hypothetical imperative. For Kant, a value tends towards the
subjective. Grice, rather, wants to offer a 'metaphysical' defence of
'objective' value. Grice called the manual of conversational maxims the
Conversational Immanuel.
1982.
Axiology, value and rationalism, values and rationalism, The H. P. Grice
Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folder 28, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft
Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: value,
rationalism, axiology. Grice arrives at value (optimum, deeming) via Peirce's
meaning. But then there's the 'truth-value.' The sorry story, as Grice
calls it, of Deontic logic faces Jørgensen's
dilemma. Jørgensen's dilemma is best seen as a trilemma," Grice
says. The following three claims are incompatible: An inference
requires that each element (the premise and the conclusion) has what Boole,
Peirce, and Frege call a truth "value."But an "imperative"
dos not have a truth-value. It is alleged that there may be an inference
between this or that imperative. Responses to this problem involve
rejecting one of the three premises. The input-output logics reject the
first premise. They provide inference mechanism on elements without
presupposing that these elements have a truth value. Alternatively, one
can deny the second premise. One way to do this is to distinguish between
the imperative itself and an indicative about the it. According to this
response, only the indicative about the imperative has a truth
value. Finally, one can deny the third premise. But this is to deny
that there is a logic of imperatives worth investigating. Grice preferred
to define 'value' =df 'satisfactoriness.' Thus, '.p' can be 0 or 1, '!p'
can be 0 or 1. "The form of the utterance will guide you as to how to
read 'satisfactoriness,' which is my jargon for 'value' applicable both to an
indicative and an imperative." With 'satisfactoriness,' Grice offers a
variant to Hofstadter and McKinsey's 'satisfaction.' In their "On the
Logic of Imperatives," a syntax is elaborated for the imperative mode,
using 'satisfaction.'' "We understand an imperative to be *satisfied* (as
'The door is closed' may also be said to be satisfied iff the door is closed)
iff what is commanded is the case. Thus the fiat “Let the door be closed!” is
satisfied if the door is closed. We shall thus refer to the satisfaction of an
imperative." According to Hofstadter and McKinsey, the function is a
satisfaction-function. This or that unary operator and this or that
dyadic operator become this or that satisfaction-function. As Grice puts it, "an inferential rule, which
flat rationality is the capacity to apply, is not an arbitrary
rule. An inferential rule picks out this or that transitions of
acceptance in which transmission of the predicate "satisfactory"
(buletic/doxastic) is guaranteed or (in this or that non-deductive
case) to be expected." As Grice notes, since the sentential form will
indicate what species of value is involved, he uses the generic
'satisfactory'. He imports into the object-language the phrase 'It is
buletically satisfactory that' and 'It is doxastically satisfactory that ...'
'!p is buletically satisfactory' just in case '!p' is buletically
satisfactory. '⊢p is doxastically satisfactory just in case '⊢ p' is doxastically satisfactory.' As Grice
introduces 'it is acceptable that' (with the syntactical provisions which he is
using); on the buletic side, 'It is acceptable that !p' is doxastically
satisfactory just in case ''!p' is buletically satisfactory' is doxastically
satisfactory. Grice
goes on to provide this or that generic or generalized versions of this
or that 'satisfactoriness-functor,' using 'φ' and 'ψ' to represent
sentences (in either mode). Using 1-b/d for satisfactory and 0-b/d for
unsatisfactory Grice stipulates. "φ 'AND' ψ" is 1-b/d just in
case "φ" 1-b/d and "ψ" is 1-b/d. "φ 'OR'
ψ" is 1-b/d just in case one of the pair, "φ and ψ", is
1-b/d. "'IF' φ, ψ" is satisfactory just in case either
"φ" is 0-b/d or "ψ" is 0-b/d. There are, however,
a number of points to be made. It is not fully clear to Grice just how strong
the motivation would be for introducing this or that mode-neutral connective --
"AND," "OR," and "IF" -- nor whether, if this or
that connective is introduced, this or that restriction should not be imposed.
The problematic examples are be, of course, the mixed-mode ones (those in which
one clause is buletic and the other doxastic). Grice, an Austinian at heart,
finds it natural to look for guidance from 'ordinary' language. "The beast
is filthy and don't touch it" (.p AND ~!p) and "The beast is filthy
and I shan't touch it" (.p AND ~!p) seem all right to Grice. But the
commutated "Don't touch the beast and it is filthy" (~!q AND .p)
seems dubious. "Touch the beast AND it will bite you" (!p AND .q),
while idiomatic, is not, at the IMPLICATUM level, a 'conjunction,' nor a
genuine invitation to touch the beast. "Smith is taking a bath OR leave
the bath-room door open" (.p OR !q) is, perhaps, intelligible. But the
commutated "Leave the bath-room door open or Smith is taking a bath"
(!q OR .p) seems considerably less so. It is perhaps worth noting that, in this
or that NON-mixed case, satisfactoriness is specifiable as buletic
satisfactoriness or doxastic satisfactoriness. But, for this or that mixed
case, no such specification would be available unless we make a special case,
as Grice does in "Method," for the buletic mode to be dominant over
the doxastic mode. The crunch comes, however, with "NOT", or
negation, one of the four possible unary satisfactoriness-functor, which Grice
has been carefully ignoring. "'NOT'⊢p' (~⊢p) might,
perhaps, be treated as satisfactoriness-functional/conditional equivalent to '⊢ not-p' (⊢~p). But what about ''NOT'!p' (~!p)? Should we treat is as
buletically-satisfactoriness-functionally/conditionally equivalent to
"!'NOT'p" (!~p)? And what do we say in a case like, perhaps,
"Let it be that I now put my hand on my head" (!p) or "Let it be
that my bicycle faces north" (!p), in which, at least on occasion, it
seems to be that neither '!p' nor '!~p' is either buletically satisfactory or
buletically unsatisfactory? And what buletic satisfactory value do we assign to
'~!p' (how do we INTRODUCE 'not'?) and to '~!~p' (how do we ELIMINATE 'not')?
Do we proscribe this or that form altogether, for every cases? But that would
seem to be a pity, since '~ ! ~p' seems to be quite promising as a
representation for 'you may (permissive) do alpha that satisfies p'; i.e., the
utterer explicitly conveys his refusal to prohibit his addressee A doing alpha.
Do we disallow embedding of (or iterating) this or that form? But that (again
if we use "~!p" and "~!~p" to represent 'may') seems
too restrictive. Again, if '!p' is neither buletically satisfactory nor
buletically unsatisfactory (the utterer could care less) do we assign a 'value'
other than 1 or 0 to '!p' ('buletically neuter,' 0.5). Or do we say, echoing
Quine, that we have a buletically satisfactoriness value 'gap'? These and other
such problems would require careful consideration. Yet Grice cannot see that
those problems would prove insoluble, any more than this or that analogous
problem connected with Strawson's presupposition ("Don't arrest the
intruder!") are insoluble. In Strawson's case, the difficulty is not so
much to find a solution as to select the best solution from those which present
themselves. Grice takes up the topic of a calculus in connection with the
introduction rule and the elimination rule of a 'modal' such as
"must." We might hope to find, for each member of a certain
family of modalities, an introduction rule and an elimination rule which would
be analogous to the rules available for classical logical constants.
Suggestions are not hard to come by. Let us suppose that we are seeking to
provide such a pair of rules for the particular modality of necessity -- 'necessary,' symbolised by □. For an
introduction rule (□, +) Grice considers the following (Grice thinks equivalent) forms: if 'φ' is demonstrable, '□φ' is demonstrable. Provided 'φ' is dependent on no assumptions, derive 'φ' from
'φ '". For an elimination rule (□, -), Grice considers "From
'□φ' derive 'φ'". It is to be understood, of course, that
the values of the syntactical variable 'φ' would contain either a buletic or a doxastic mode markers. Both
"!p" and ".p" would be proper substitutes for 'φ' but
"p" would not. Grice wonders: "[W]hat should be said of
Takeuti's conjecture (roughly) that the nature of the introduction rule
determines the character of the elimination rule? There seems to be no
particular problem about allowing an introduction rule which tells us that, if
it is established in P's 'PERSONalised' system that φ, 'it is necessary, with respect to P, that φ' is doxastically satisfactory. (establishable). The accompanying
elimination rule is, however, slightly less promising. If we suppose such a
rule to tell us that, if one is committed to the idea that it is necessary, with
respect to P, that φ, one is also committed to whatever is expressed by φ,
we shall be in trouble. For such a rule is not acceptable. φ will be a volitive
expression such as 'Let it be that Smith eats his hat.' And my commitment
to the idea that Smith's system requires him to eat his hat does not ipso facto
involve me in accepting (volitively) "Let Smith eat his hat". But if we
take the elimination rule rather as telling us that, if it is necessary, with
respect to X, that let X eat his hat, then "let X eat his hat"
possesses satisfactoriness-with-respect-to-X, the situation is easier. For this person-relativised version of the rule seems inoffensive, even for Takeuti, we hope. Grice, following Mackie, uses 'absolutism,' as
opposed to 'relativism,' which denies the rational basis to attitude
ascriptions (but cf. Hare on 'subjectivism'). Grice is concerned with the absence of a thorough discussion
of 'value' by English philosophers, other than Hare (and he is only responding to Mackie!). Continental philosophers, by
comparison, have a special discipline, 'axiology,' for it! Similarly, a
continental-oriented tradition Grice finds in The New World in philosophers of a
pragmatist bent, such as Carus. Grice wants to say that 'rationality' is a
value, because it is a faculty that a creature (human) displays to adapt and
survive to his changing environments. The implicature of the title is that
values have been considered in the English philosophical tradition, almost alla
Nietzsche, to belong to the realm 'irrational.' Grice grants that axiological
implicatum rests on a PRE-rational propension.
1982.
Rationality and akrasia, incontinentia, in M. Hintikka and B. Vermazen, Actions
and events: essays on the work of Donald Davidson, Clarendon, with a reply by
Davidson, 1985, Davidson on weakness of the will, akrasia, incontinence, the
paradox of akrasia, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton
2-Folders 22-23, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of
California, Berkeley. Keywords: akrasia, incontinence, incontinentia,
philosophical psychology, rationality. "Video meliora proboque deteriora
sequor." "We shouldn't be saying this, but we are saying it!" Grice
prefers 'akrasia,' but he is happy to use Cicero's translation, also negative,
of this: 'incontinentia,' "as if 'continentia' were a virtue!" For
Grice, the alleged paradox of 'akrasia,' both alethic and practical, has to be accounted
for by a theory of rationality from the start, and not be deemed a 'stumbling
block.' Grice is interested in both the common-or-garden 'boulomaic' version of
akrasia, involving the volitive 'soul'' -- in term of desirability -- and
'alethic' or doxastic 'akrasia,' involing the judicative soul proper -- in
terms of probability. Grice considers buletic akrasia and doxastic akrasia -- the latter yet distinct from Moore's paradox, "p but I don't want to believe that p," in symbols "p 'AND' ~
1982.
Axiology, objective value, the conception of value, Clarendon, objectivity and
value, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8-Folder 18, BANC MSS
1990/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley. Keywords: relative value, objective value. Some background
for his third Carus lecture. He tries to find out what J. L. Mackie means when
he says that a value is ultimately 'subjective'. What about inter-subjective,
and constructively 'objective'? Grice constructs absolute value out of relative value. But once a rational pirot constructs value, the pirot assigns absolute status to 'rationality' qua value. The pirot cannot then choose NOT to be rational at the risk of ceasing to exist (qua person, or essentially rationally human agent). For Grice, a 'human,' as opposed to a 'person,' assigns RELATIVE value to his rationality. A human is accidentally rational. A person is necessarily so. "Adistinction seldom made by Aristotle and some of his dumbest followers obsessed with the modal-free adage, "Homo rationale animal."
λογι^κ-ός , ή, όν, (λόγος). ζῶον λόγον ἔχον NE, 1098a3-5),"λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων" (man alone of all animals possesses speech) (from the Politics!)
1982. Axiology, the rational motivation for objective value, the conception of value, Clarendon, objective value, rational motivation, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8-Folder 19, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: value, axiology, rationality, objective value. As a matter of history, Grice reaches value (in its guises of 'optimum' and 'deeming') via his analysis of Peirce's meaning. Many notions are value-paradeigmatic. The most important of all philosophical notions, that of 'rationality,' presupposes objective value as one of its motivations. For Grice, 'ratio' can be understood 'cognoscendi' but also 'essendi.' "Rational motivation" involves both types of 'ratio.' While it's practical to restore 'axis' for Grice's 'value,' it's not easy to find Grecianisms for 'absolute,' (L. absolutus, from absolvere In rhet. lang., unrestricted, unconditional, absolute: “hoc mihi videor videre, esse quasdam cum adjunctione necessitudines, quasdam simplices et absolutas,” Cic. Inv. 2, 57, 170.— 'objective' (L. objectum, from obicio -- objectus , ūs, m. obicio,
I.a casting before, a putting against, in the way, or opposite, an opposing; or, neutr., a lying before or opposite (mostly poet. and in postAug. prose): dare objectum parmaï, the opposing of the shield, * Lucr. 4, 847: “vestis,” Col. 3, 19: “insula portum Efficit objectu laterum,” by the opposition, Verg. A. 1, 160: “cum terga flumine, latera objectu paludis tegerentur,” Tac. H. 3, 9: “molis,” id. ib. 5, 14: “regiones, quae Tauri montis objectu separantur,” Gell. 12, 13, 27: “solem interventu lunae occultari, lunamque terrae objectu,” the interposition, Plin. 2, 10, 7, § 47; cf.: eademque (terra) objectu suo umbram noctemque efficiat, Cic. Fragm. ap. Non. 243, 13 dub. (al. objecta soli): “hi molium objectus (i. e. moles objectas) scandere,” the projection, Tac. A. 14, 8.—
II. Transf., that which presents itself to the sight, an object, appearance, sight, spectacle, Nep. Hann. 5, 2 (al. objecto)) and if not 'categoric.' (This is analogous to Grice's overuse of psychoLOGICAL when he just means 'souly.' It is perhaps his use of 'psychological' for 'souly' that leads to take any souly concept as a theoretical concept within a folksy psychoLOGICAL theory.
1983. Axiology,
the conception of value, Clarendon, the Paul Carus lectures, Clarendon,
Oxford, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2-Folders 12-16, BANC MSS
90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords:
objectivity, value, relative value, absolute value, metaphysics, relative and
absolute value, categorical imperative, the axiological implicatum. Grice
reaches the notion of value through that of 'meaning.' If Peirce was
simplistic, Grice ain't! But his ultra-sophisticated analysis ends up being
'deemed' to hold in this or that utterer. And 'deeming' is 'valuing,' as is
'optimum.' While Grice rarely used 'axiology,' he should! A set of three
lectures, which are individually identified below. "I love Carus!”
Grice was undecided as to what his Paul Carus lectures were be on. He
explores 'meaning' under its 'value' "optimality" guise in
"Meaning revisited." Grice thinks that a 'value-paradeigmatic'
notion allows him to respond in a more apt way to what some critics were
raising as a possible 'vicious circle' in his approach to 'semantic' and
'psychological' notions. The Carus lectures are then dedicated to the
'construction,' alla Hume, of a 'value-paradeigmatic' notion in general, and
value itself. Grice starts by quoting Austin and J. L. Mackie, of
Oxford. The lectures are intended to a general audience, provided it is a
*philosophical* general audience! Most of the second lecture is Grice's
subtle exploration of Kant's categorical imperative, with which he had
struggled in the last John Locke lecture on aspects of reasoning, notably the
'reduction' of the categorical imperative to this or that 'counsel of prudence'
with an implicated protasis to the effect that the agent is aiming at 'eudaemonia.'
The three Paul Carus Lectures, Objectivity and value, Relative and
absolute value, and Metaphysics and value. There were three Paul Carus
lectures. The first lecture, "Objectivity and value," is
a review of J. L. Mackie's Inventing right and wrong; the second
lecture, "Relative and absolute value," is an exploration on the
categorical imperative, and its connection with a prior hypothetical
imperative; the third lecture, "Metaphysics and value," is a
metaphysical defence of absolute value. The collective citation should be
identified by each lecture separately, and this is done below.
1983. Objectivity and value, the first Paul Carus lecture, The conception of value, Clarendon, value and objectivity, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: objectivity, value, axiology, J. L. Mackie. Grice starts with 'subjectivity.' Objectivity can be constructed as non-relativised subjectivity. A discussion of J. L. Mackie's Inventing right and wrong. In the proceedings, Grice quotes the 'artless sexism' of J. L. Austin in talking about the 'trouser words' in Sense and Sensibilia. Grice tackles all the distinctions Mackie had played with: objective/subjective, absolute/relative, categorical/hypothetical. Grice quotes directly from R. M. Hare: "Think of one world into whose fabric values are objectively built; and think of another in which those values have been annihilated. And remember that in both worlds the people in them go on being concerned about the same things—there is no difference in the 'subjective' value. Now I ask, 'What is the difference between the states of affairs in these two worlds?' Can any answer be given except 'None whatever'?" Grice uses the Latinate 'objective' (from 'objectum') -- cf. Hare on what he thinks the oxymoronic 'SUB-jective value.'
1983.
Axiology, relative and absolute value, the second Paul Carus lecture,
in The Conception of Value, Clarendon, The H. P. Grice Papers,
BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California,
Berkeley. Keywords: relative value, absolute value. An
exploration on Paton on the categorical imperative. Grice had previously
explored the logical form of hypothetical imperatives in the Kant (and
later Locke) lectures, notably in Lecture IV, "Further remarks on
practical and alethic reasons." Here he considers topics related to Hare's
tropic-clistic neustic-phrastic quartet. What does it mean to say that
a command is conditional? The two successors of Grice's post as
Tutorial Fellow at St. John's, G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, will tackle the
same issue with humour, in "Sense and nonsense," published by
Blackwell (too irreverent to be published by the Clarendon). Is the
logical form of a maxim, p horseshoe !q, or !(p horseshoe q), etc. Kant thought that there is a special sub-class of
hypothetical imperative (which he called a "counsels of prudence")
which is like his class of technical imperative, except in that the end
specified in a full specfication of the imperative is the special end of
eudaemonia (the agent's eudaemonia). For Grice, understanding Kant's
first version of the categorical imperative involves understanding what a maxim
is supposed to be. Grice explores at some
length four alternative interpretations of an iffy buletic (as opposed to a non-iffy
buletic): three formal, one material. The first interpretation is the horseshoe
interpretation. A blind logical nose might lead us or be led to the
assumption of a link between an buletically iffy utterance and a
doxastically iffy utterance. Such a link no doubt exists, but the most
obvious version of it is plainly inadequate. At least one other
philosopher besides Grice has noticed that "If he torments the cat, have him
arrested!" is unlikely to express an buletically iffy utterance, and that even if one restricts oneself to this or that case in which the protasis specifies
a will, we find pairs of examples like "If you will to go to Chicago, travel by AA via Cleveland!" or "If
you will to go to Philadelphia, see a psychiatrist!" -- where it is plain
that one is, and the other is not, the expression of a buletically iffy
utterance. For fun, Grice does not tell which!. A less easily eliminable
suggestion, yet one which would still interprets the notion of a buletically
iffy utterance in terms of that particular logical form to which
"if", 'hypothetical' and 'conditional' attach, would be the following.
Let us assume that it is established, or conceded, as legitimate to formulate
an 'if' utterance in which not only the apodosis is couched in some mode other
than
the doxastic, as in this or that conditional
command. "If you see the whites of their eyes, shoot fire!" but also
the protasis or some part (clause) of them. In which case all of the following
might be admissible conditionals. Thus, we might have a doxastic protasis ("If
the cat is sick, take it to the vet”), or a mixed (buletic-cum-doxastic
protasis ("If you are to take the cat to the vet AND there's no cage
available, put it on Martha's lap!), and buletic protasis ("If you are to
take the cat to the vet, put it in a cage!”). If this suggestion seems
rebarbative, think of this or that quaint "if" utterance (when it is
quaint) as conditionalised versions of this or that
"therefore"-sequence, such as: buletic-cum-doxastic premises ("Take the
cat to the vet! There isn't a cage. Therefore; Put the cat on Martha's
lap!"), buletic premise (“Take the cat to the vet! Put it in a
cage!"). And then, maybe, the discomfort is reduced. Grice next considers
a second formal interpretation or approach to the buletically iffy/non-iffy
utterance. Among 'if' utterances with a buletic apodosis some will have, then,
a 'mixed’protasis (partly judicative,
partly volitival)
and some will have a purely doxastic protasis (“If
the cat is sick, take him to the vet!). Grice proposes a definition of the
iffy/non-iffy distinction. A buletically iffy utterance is an iffy utterance
the apodosis of which is buletic and the protasis of which is buletic or mixed (buletic-cum-dxastic)
or it is an elliptical version of such an iffy utterance. A buletically
non-iffy utterance is a buletic utterance which is not iffy or else, if it is
iffy, has a purely doxastic protasis. Grice makes three 'quick comments' on
this second interpretation. First, re: REAL IMPERATIVES: The structures which
are being offered as a way of interpreting an iffy and a non-iffy imperative do not, as they stand, offer any
room for the appearance this or that buletic modality like 'ought' and 'should'
which are so prominently visible in the standard examples of those kinds of
imperatives. The imperatives suggested by Grice are explicit imperatives. An
explicit buletic utterance is "Do such-and-such!"; not 'You/one ought
to do such and such'. Grice thinks one can modify this suggestion to meet the
demand for the appearance or occurrence of 'ought' (etc) if such occurrence is
needed. Second, it would remain to be decided how close the preferred reading
of Grice’s 'deviant' conditional imperatives would be to the accepted interpretation
of standard hypothetical imperatives. But even if there were some divergence,
that might be acceptable if the 'new' interpretation turns out to embody a more
precise notion than the standard conception. Third, NEUSTICAL vs TROPICAL protases.
There are, Grice thinks, serious doubts of the admissibility of conditionals with
a NON-doxastic protasis, which are for Grice connected with the very difficult
question whether the doxastic and the buletic modes are co-ordinate or whether the doxastic mode is in some crucial
fashion (but not in other) _prior_ (to
use Suppes’s qualification) to the buletic. Grice confesses he does not know
the answer to that question. A third formal interpretation links the iffy/non-iffy distinction to the
absolute-relative value distinction. An iffy imperatives would be
_end-relative_ and might be analogous to
an evidence-relative
probability. A non-iffy imperatives would not be end-relative.
Finally, a fourth Interpretation is not formal,
but _material_. This is close to part of what Kant says on the topic. It
is a distinction between
an imperative being
_escapable_ (iffy), through the absence of a
particular _will_ and
its not being escapable (non-iffy). If we
understand the idea of
escabability sufficiently widely, the following imperatives are all
escapable, even though their logical form is not in every case the same: "Give
up popcorn!," "To get slim, give up popcorn!", “If you will to
get slim, give up popcorn!" Suppose Grice has no will to get slim. One might
say that the first imperative (“Give up popcorn!”) is 'escaped',
provided giving up popcorn has nothing else to recommend it, by
_falsifying_ 'You should give up popcorn'. The second and the third imperatives (“To
get slim, give up pocorn!” and “If you will to get slim, give up popcorn!”) would
not, perhaps, involve _falsification_ but
they would, in the
circumstances, be _inapplicable_ to Grice – and inapplicability, too, counts, as escape. A
non-iffy imperative however, is in no way escapable. Re: the Dynamics
of Imperatives in Discourse, Grice then gives three examples which he had
discussed in _Aspects of Reason_, which concern _arguments_ (or
“therefore”-chains). This we may see as an
elucidation to grasp the
logical form of buletically iffy utterance (elided by the ‘therefore’, which is
an ‘if’ in the metalanguage) in its
dynamics in
argumentation. We should, Grice suggests, consider not merely imperatives
of each sort, together with the range of possible
characterisations, but also the possible forms
of _argument_ into which_particular_ hypothetical imperatives might enter. Consider: “ Defend the Philosophy
Department! If you are to defend the philosophy department, learn to use bows and arrows! Therefore, learn
to use bows and arrows!" Grice says he is using the dichotomy of original-derived
value. In this example, in the first premise, it is not specified whether the
will is original or derived, the second premise specifies 'conducive to'
(means), and the conclusion would involve a 'derived' will, provided the second
premise is doxastically satisfactory. Another example would be: “Fight for your
country! If you're to fight for your country, join up (one of the services)!
Therefore, join up!” Here, the first premise and the conclusion do not specify
the protasis. If the conclusion did, it would repeat the second premise. Then
there’s "Increase your holdings in oil shares! If you visit your father,
he'll give you some oil shares. Therefore, visit your father!” This argument
(purportedly) transmits value. Let us explore these characterisations by Grice with the aid of R. M. Hare's distinctions. For
Hare in a hypothetical imperative, "the protasis contains a
neustic/tropic" (_Language of Morals_, p.37). A distinction may be made
between 'hypothetical imperative' and a term used by Grice in his first interpretation of the hypothetical imperative, that of 'conditional
command ('If you see the whites of their eyes, shoot fire!”). A
hypothetical imperative can be distinguished from a _conditional_ imperative (“If
you want to make bread, use yeast!”, “If you see anything suspicious, telephone
the police!") by the fact that modus ponens is not valid for
it. One
may use 'conditional imperative' for an imperative which is grammatically conditional, and reserve
'conditional command' for a command which is conditional on the satisfaction of the protasis. Thus,on this view,
treating the major premise of the following
argument as a hypothetical
imperative, turns the “therefore”-chain invalid'. Major Premise as Hypothetical
Imperative (“If you will to make someone mad, give him drug D! You will to make Peter
mad; therefore, give Peter drug D!”). The hypothetical imperative tells one
only what _means_ to adopt to achieve a given _end_ in a way which does not necessarily _endorse_
the adoption of that end, and hence of the means
to it. Thus someone
might say, "If you will to make someone mad, give him
drug D!" But, of course, even if you will to do that, you must _not_ try to do
so. On
the other hand, the following is arguably valid
because the major premise is a
'conditional' imperative and not a mere hypothetical
one. Major Premise as
Conditional Imperative: “You will to make someone mad, give him drug D! Make Peter mad! Therefore, give Peter
drug D!”. We can explain this in terms of the presence of the neustic in the antecedent of the
imperative working as the major premise. The supposition that the protasis of a
hypothetical imperative contains a clause in the buletic mode neatly explains
why the argument with the major premise
as a hypothetical imperative
is not valid. But the argument with the major premise as a conditional
imperative is, as well as helping to
differentiate a hypothetical
imperative from a _conditional_ one. For, if the protasis of the major premise in the hypothetical
imperative is volitival, the mere fact that you will to make
Peter mad does not license
the inference of the
imperative to give him the drug; but this _can_ be
inferred from the major premise
of the hypothetical imperative _together with an imperative --
the minor premise in the conditional imperative
– to make Peter mad. In other
words, whether the subordinate clause
contains a neustic thus does have have a consequence as to the validity of inferences into which
the complex sentence enters. The Principle of Mode Constancy in Buletic and
Doxastic Inference. One may tries to elucidate Grice's ideas on the
logical form of the hypothetical imperative proper. His suggestion is, admittedly,
rather tentative. But it might be argued, in the spirit of it,
that a hypothetical imperative
is of the form "i. If !p, !q, .p, Therefore, !q.” But this violates a
principle of MODE CONSTANCY. A phrastic
must remain _in the same
mode_ (within the scope of the same _tropic_) throughout an argument.
A conditional imperative does not violate the principle of Modal
Constancy, since it is of the form “If p, !q, !p. Therefore, !q". The question of the
logical form of the hypothetical imperative is too obscure to base much on arguments concerning it. There is an
alternative to Grice’s account of the validity
of an argument featuring a conditional imperative. This is to treat the major premise of a
conditional imperative, "as some
have urged it should be" as an _indicative_ tantamount to "In order to make someone mad, you have
to give him drug D". Then an
utterer who EXPLICITLY conveys or asserts the major premise of a conditional imperative and
_commands_ the second premise is in consistency committed to commanding the conclusion. "If" does not
always connect phrastic with phrastic but sometimes connects two expressions consisting
of a phrastic and a tropic. Consider:
"If you walk past
the post office, post the letter!"
The antecedent of this
imperative states, it seems, the *condition* under which the imperative expressed becomes operative, and so can _not_ be construed
buletically, since by uttering a buletic utterance, an utterer cannot *explicitly convey* or assert that a condition obtains. Hence, the protasis ought
not be within the scope of
the buletic
"!", and whatever we take to represent the
form of the utterance
above we must not take "!(if p, q)" to do so. One way out.
On certain interpretation of the isomorphism or aequi-vocality Thesis between Indicative and
Imperative Inference the utterance has to
be construed as an
imperative (in the generic reading) to make the doxasatic conditional "If you will walk past the
post office, you will post the letter" satisfactory. Leaving aside issues
of the implicature of "if", that
the utterance can _not_
be so construed seems to be shown by the fact
that the imperative to make
the associated doxastically “iffy” utterance satisfactory is conformed with by one
who does not walk past the post office. But it seems strange at best to say
that the utterance is conformed with in the same
circumstances. This
'strangeness’ or ‘bafflingliness,’ as Grice prefers, is aptly explained away in
terms of the implicatum. At Oxford, Dummett
was endorsing this idea
that a conditional imperative be construed as an imperative to make
an indicative material conditional true.
Dummett urges to divide conditional imperatives into those whose antecedent is
"within the power of the addressee"
--- like the utterance in question -- and those in which it
is not. Consider: "If you go out, wear your coat!" One may be not so
much concerned with how to *escape* this, as Grice is, but how to *conform* it. A child may choose not to go out in order to comply with the imperative.
For an imperative whose protasis is_not_ within the power of the addressee ("If
anyone tries to escape, shoot him!”) it is indifferent whether we treat it as a
conditional imperative or not, so why bother. A small caveat here: If no one tries to escape, the imperative is *not violated*.
One might ask, might there not be an important practical difference bewteen saying that an imperative has not
been violated and that it has been complied with?
Dummett ignores this
distinction. One may feel
think there is much of a
practical difference there. Is Grice an intuitionist? Suppose that you are a frontier
guard and the antecedent has remained unfulfilled. Then,
whether we say that you complied with it, or simply did not *violate* it will make a great deal of difference if you appear
before a war crimes tribunal. For
Dummett, the fact that in the case of an
imperative expressed by a conditional imperative in which the antecedent is not within the
agent's power, we should *not* say that
the agent had obeyed just on the ground that the protassi is false, is no ground
for construing an imperative as expressing a conditional command: for there is no question of fixing
what shall constitute obedience independently of the determination of what
shall constitute disobedience. This complicates the issues. One may with Grice (and
Hare, and Edgley) defend imperative inference against other Oxonian
philosophers, such as A. J. P. Kenny or B. A. O. Williams. What is questioned
by the sceptics about imperative inference is whether if each one of a
set of imperatives is used with the force of a command, one can infer a _further_
imperative with that force from them.
Cf. Wiggins on Aristotle on the practical syllogism. One may be more
conservative than Hare, if not Grice. Consider “If you stand by Jane, don't
look at her! You stand by Jane; therefore, don't look at her!” This is valid.
However, the following, obtained by anti-logism, is not: “If you stand by Jane,
don't look at her! Look at her! Therefore, you don't stand by Jane." It
may seem more reasonable to some to deny Kant’s thesis, and maintain that anti-logism
is valid in imperative inference than it is to hold onto Kant’s thesis and deny
that antilogism is valid in the case in question. Then there’s the question of
the implicate involved in the ordering of modes. Consider: “Varnish every piece
of furniture you make! You are going to make a table; therefore, varnish it! This
is *prima facie* valid. The following, however, switching the order of the
modes in the premises is not. "You are going to varnish every piece of furniture
that you make. Make a table! Therefore; varnish it!" The connection between
the ‘if’ and the ‘therefore’ is metalinguistic, obviously – the validity of the
‘therefore’ chain is proved by the ‘associated’ “if” that takes the premise as,
literally, the protasis and the consequence as the apodosis. Conversational Implicature at the Rescue. Problems
with "or": Consider Ross's infamous example: “Post the letter!
Therefore, post the letter or burn it!” as 'invalid' (Ross 1944:38 -- endorsed
by B. Williams). To permit to do p or q
is to permit to do p and to permit to do
q. Similarly, to give permission to do
something is to lift a prohibition against doing it. Admittedly, Williams does not need this so we are stating his claim more strongly than he does. One may review Grice’s way out (defense of
the validity of the utterance above in terms of the implicatum. Grice claims that in
Ross’s infamous example (valid, for Grice), whilst (to state it roughly) the premise's
"permissive presupposition" (to use the rather clumsy
term introduced by Williams) is entailed by
it, the conclusion's is only *conversationally implicated*. Typically for an isomorphist, Grice says this is
something shared by indicative
inferences. If, being
absent-minded, Grice asks his wife, ‘What have I done with the letter?' and she
replies, ‘You have posted it or burnt it,’ she
conversationally implicates that she is not in a
position to say which Grice has done. She also conversationally implicates that Grice may
not have post it, so long as he has
burnt it. Similarly, the future tense
indicative, "You are going to post the letter" has the conversational
implicature "You may be not going
to post the letter so long as you are going to burn it". But this surely does not validate the
introduction rule for “OR,” to wit:
"p; therefore, p or q"" One _can_ similarly, say:
"Eclipse will win. He may not, of course, if it rains. And I *know* it
will *not* rain". Problems with "and.” Consider: “Put on your AND jump
out! Therefore, jump out!” Someone who _only_ jumps out of an aeroplane does not fulfil 'Put on your parachute and
jump out!' He has done only what is necessary,
but not sufficient to fulfil it. Imperatives do not differ from indicatives in
this respect, except that fulfilment takes the place of belief or ‘doxa’, which
is the form of acceptance apprpriate to
a doxasatic utterance, as the name implies. Someone who is told "Smith put on his
parachute AND jumped out" is
entitled to believe that Smith jumped out. But if he believes that this
is _all_ Smith did he is in error” (Cf. R. Edgley). One may discuss Grice’s
test of cancellability in the case of the transport officer who says: "Go
via Coldstream or Berwick!" It seems the transport officer's way of
expressing himself is extremely *eccentric*, or ‘conversationally baffling,’ as Grice prefers – yet ‘validly.’ If
the transport officer is not sure if a
storm may block one of the routes, what
he should say is “_Prepare_ to go via Coldstream or Berwick!" As for the application
of Grice's test of EXPLICIT cancellation here, it yield, in the circumstances,
the transport officer uttering "Go either via Coldstream or Berwick! But you may not go via Coldstream if you do
not go via Berwick, and you may not go via Berwick if you do not go via
Coldstream." Such qualifications -- what Grice calls ‘explicit cancellation
of the implicature’ -- seem to the addressee to empty the buletic mode of
utterance of all content and is thus reminiscent of Henry Ford's utterance to
the effect that people can choose what colour car they like provided it is
black. But then Grice doesn’t think Ford is being illogical, only Griceian and
implicatural!
1983. Axiology,
metaphysics and value, the third and last Paul Carus lecture, in The
Conception of Value, Clarendon, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays),
BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords:
metaphysics, value. A metaphysical defence of absolute value. The topic
fascinates Grice, and he invents a few routines to cope with it. Humeian
projection rationally reconstructs the intuitive concept 'being of
value.' Category shift allows to put a value such as Banbury's
disinterestedness in grammatical subject position (And does avoiding the answer
that his disinterestedness is in the next room -- since it's not a
spatio-temporal continuan 'prote ousia' (Smith is). But the most important
routine is that of "trans-substantion," or "metousiosis": a
human reconstructs as a rational personal being, and alla Kantotle,
whatever he judges is therefore 'of absolute value.' The issue involves
for Grice the introduction of a 'telos' qua 'aition,' 'causa finalis' (final
cause), role, or métier: the final cause of a tiger is 'to tigerise,' the
final cause of a reasoner is to reason, the final cause of a person is to
personise. And this entails absolute value, now metaphysically defended. The justification involves the idea of freedom.
A fourth point or item in Grice's shopping list involves the idea of value. "The precise nature of 'strong' freedom ..." turns out to consist, we hope, in 'the idea of action as the outcome of a certain kind of 'strong' valuation' -- where this strong valuation "would include the rational selection [as per, say, rational decision theory --] of ultimate ENDS." What Grice elsewhere calls outweighed or extrinsically weighed rationality,where it's the end that is rational, not the means towards the end ("Probability, desirability, and mood operators").
For the record, there is a different line, which Grice also pursues. "Action (full human action) calls for the presence ... of reasons ... which require that the actions for which they account should be the outcome of strong rational valuation." Both lines, Grice notes, "suggest that action requires both strong freedom and strong valuation." Grice then sets to consider how to adapt the desire-belief psychology to reach these goals. "In the case of ultimate ends," Grice writes (p. 35), "justification should be thought of as lying (directly, at least) in some outcome not of their FULFILMENT but rather of their PRESENCE-AS-ENDS." This may relate to his Kantian views on the good will (and the evil will). Grice had considered actions like 'giving Jones a job', by Smith. He was arguing that, in his idiolect, Smith may be deemed to have given Jones a job, whether or not Jones "actually gets the job". In a more general fashion then, it's the presence of an end (of a given action) that provides the justification of the end, and not its mere fulfilment. A second point involves: "My having such and such an end, E1, or such and such a combination of ends [E1 and E2], would be justified by showing that my having this end, ... will exhibit some desirable feature (... that the combo will be harmonious -- [for how can one combine one's desire to smoke with one's desire to lead a healthy life?]". Harmony is one of the six or so requirements for a 'happy life' -- essay on "happiness" in "Conception of Value". A third point involves "the desire-belief psychology" as being "back in business at a higher level". "The suggestions would involve an appeal, in the justification of ends, to HIGHER-ORDER ends which would be realised by having first-order ends, or lower-order ends of a certain sort. Such valuation of lower-order ends lie within reach of the desire-belief psychology." Grice has an important caveat at this point: "The higher-order ends involved in the defense would themselves stand in need of justification, and the regress ... might well turn out to be vicious" -- here one is recalled of Watson's further requirements to things like freedom and personal identity to overcome the alleged counterexamples to freewill provided by Harry Frankfurt. It is after the laying of a shopping list, as it were, and considerations such as those above that Grice concludes his "Actions and Events" with a defense of noumenalism, complete with the inner conflict that it brings. "So, attention to the idea of freedom may lead us to the need to resolve OR DISSOLVE the most important unsolved problem of philosophy. Namely: how we can be at the same time members both of the phenomenal and the noumenal world". "Or, "to put the issue less cryptically, to settle the internal conflict between one part of our rational nature -- the SCIENTIFIC part which calls or seems to call for the universal reign of deterministic law and the OTHER part which insists that not merely MORAL RESPONSIBILITY but EVERY variety of rational belief demands exemption from just such a reign." (p. 35).
1983.
Relative and absolute value, absolute value, aalues, morals, absolutes, and the
metapysical, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folder
24, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley. Keywords: relative and absolute value, metaphysics,
axiology. Grice uses 'relative' variously. His 'utterer's meaning,' for
example, is 'relative.' It is 'meaning' qua utterer-relativised, as he puts it.
The absolute, versus the relative, is constructed OUT of the relative, thought.
There is hardly a realm of UNconstructed reality. Grice is especially
concerned with J. L. Mackie's rather cavalier attitude towards the relative and
the absolute. Surely the 'absolute' IS a construction out of the
'relative.' Grice takes a Kantotelian attitude. We designate a proper
judge, the ratiocinative part of the soul of a personal being. Whatever is
'relative' to this particular creature attains, ipso facto, 'absolute
value.' Grice proposes a reduction of 'what is valuable-ABSOLUTE' to 'what
is valuable-RELATIVE,' and succeeds!
1984.
Reply to Richards, in Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions,
Categories, Ends, Clarendon, ed. R. E. Grandy and R. Warner, pp. 45-108,
prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of H. P.
Grice, Festschrift and Warner Notes, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II
(Essays), Carton 4-Folders 27-30, and Series V (Topical), Carton 6-Folder 37,
BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Keywords: autobiography. “The life and opinions of H. P. Grice,” by H. P.
Grice! P. G. R. I. C. E. had been in the works for awhile. Knowing this, Grice
is able to start his auto-biography, to which he later adds a specific 'reply'
to a few objections by the editors. The 'Reply' is divided in neat sections.
After a preamble displaying his gratitude for the volume in his honour, he
turns to his 'prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions
of H. P. Grice.' The third section is a reply to the editors's overview of his
work. This reply itself is itself subdivided into questions of meaning and
rationality, and questions of "Metaphysics, philosophical psychology, and
value." As the latter is reprinted in "The conception of value,"
Clarendon, it is possible to cite this sub-section from the 'Reply' as a
separate piece. Grice originally entitles his essay in a brilliant manner,
echoing the style of an English non-conformist, almost: "Prejudices and
predilections; which become, the life and opinions of H. P. Grice." With
his "Richards," a nice Welsh surname, Grice is playing with the first
name of both Grandy and Warner. Grice is especially concerned with what
'Richards' see as a commitment on Grice's part to the abstract entity of a
'proposition.' Grice also deals with the alleged insufficiency in his
conceptual analysis of 'reasoning.' He brings for good measure a point about a
potential 'regressus ad infinitum' in his account of a chain of intentions
involved in meaning and communicating in general. While one of the drafts is
titled 'Festschrift,' not by himself, strictly, it is not a festschrift in that
the name is hidden behind the acronym: P(hilosophical) G(rounds of) R
(ationality:) I(ntentions,) C(ategories,) E(nds). Notably on the philosophy of
perception. Also on the conception of value, especially that tricky third
lecture on a metaphysical foundation for objective value. Grice was
supposed to reply to the individual contributors, but does not. “I cancelled
the implicatum!” However, we may identify in his oeuvre points of contacts of
his own views with the philosophers who contributed. Most of this material is
reproduced verbatim, indeed, as the second part of his "Reply to
Richards," and it was a philosophical memoir of which Grice was rightly
proud! The life and opinions are, almost in a joke on Witters, distinctly
separated. Under 'Life,' Grice convers his conservative, irreverent rationalism
making his early initial appearance under the influence of his non-conformist
father, and fermented at his tutorials with Hardie at Corpus, and his
associations with J. L. Austin's Play Group on Saturday mornings. Also, his
joint philosophising with P. F. Strawson, D. F. Pears, and J. Thomson. Under
'Opinions,' Grice mainly expands on 'ordinary-language' philosophy and his way
to the City of Eternal Truth. "Metaphysics, Philosophical Psychology,
and Value, in The Conception of Value, is thus part of his
"Prejudices and predilections." The authors Grice quotes are many and
various. Grice spends some delightful time criticising the critics of 'ordinary-language'
philosophy such as Bergmann and Gellner. He also quotes from Jespersen! And
Grice includes a reminiscence of the bombshells brought from Vienna by Freddie
Ayer, the enfant terrible of Oxford philosophy. He recalls an air marshal at a
dinner with Strawson recalling Cook Wilson's adage, 'What we know we know.' And
more besides!
1983. The concept of universalium, Aristole on “to kath’holou,” universalia, universals, with M. Friedman, Group, Partial Working, Copy, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Associations), Carton 6-Folder 11-12, and Series V (Topical), Carton 9-Folder 21-22, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: universalia, universalium, universalium ante re, universalium in re. Universalia as abstrata. Grice's concern with 'universalia' can be traced back to his reading of Aristotle's "Categoriae." Other than the 'substantia prima,' it may be said that anything else -- attribute, etc. -- belongs in the realm of 'universalia' qua predicable. As such, a univeralium is not a spatio-temporal continuant. However, Grice's category shift allows a 'universalium' as a subject of discourse. The topic is approached formally by means of the notion of 'order.' First-order predicate calculus' ranges over this or that spatio-temporal continuant individual, in Strawson's use of the term. A higher-order predicate calculus ranges over this or that 'predicate' and beyond -- as such, a 'universalium' can only be 'referred to' in a second-order calculus. This is Grice's attempt to approach the Aristotelian and mediaeval problem in pragmatic key. A higher category (anything but 'prote ousia' is a universalium. This is Grice doing history of philosophy. His main concern is with a 'universalium in re' as an abstract entity. He proposes an exploration of 'universalium in re' as a response to Extensionalism, so fashionable, he thinks, in the New World, within what he calls "The School of Latter-Day Nominalists." (He is aware that Bennett has called him a 'meaning'-nominalist!)
1985. Correspondence
with P. Suppes, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H.
P. Grice, Sub-Series A), Carton 1-Folders 7-8, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft
Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Grice, Suppes,
utterer's meaning. Suppes was involved in the P. G. R. I. C. E., and
contributes an excellent "The Primacy of Utterer's Meaning," where he
addresses what he rightly sees as an unfair characterisations of Grice as a
behaviourist by three philosophers: Yu, Biro, and Chomsky. Biro is able to
respond to Suppes's commentary on Grice as proposing a reductive but not
reductionist analysis of meaning. Suppes rightly characterises Grice as
an 'intentionalist,' rather, and using such jargon as 'basic procedure in one's
repertoire' as 'informal' and 'colloquial,' rather than 'behaviouristically,'
as Ryle would.
1980. The Philosophy of Bealer, Bealer, Correspondence with G. P. Bealer, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice, 1A), Carton 1-Folder 4, and Series V (Topical), Carton 6-Folder 20, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Grice, Bealer, content. G. P. Bealer is one of Grice's most brilliant tutees! The Grice collection contains a full folder of correspondence with Bealer. Bealer refers to Grice in his influential Clarendon essay on content. Bealer is concerned with how 'pragmatic inference' may intrude in the ascription of a psychological state, attitude, or stance. Bealer loves to quote from Grice on definite descriptions "in Russell and in the vernacular," the implicature being that Russell is impenetrable!
1986. Actions and events, The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 3-Folders 1-5 and Series V (Topical), Carton 7-Folders 23 and 32, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: action, event, Davidson, logical form, freedom, cause. How do we define a Griceian action? How do we define a Griceian event? This is Grice's examination and criticism of Davidson, as a 'scientific' realist, followed by a Kantian approach to freedom and causation. Grice is especially interested in 'the logical form,' or explicitum, so that he can play with the implicatum! One of his favourite examples: "He fell on his sword," having tripped as he crossed the Galliae. Grice manages to quote from many and varied authors (some of which you would not expect him to quote) such as Reichenbach, but also Robinson (of Oxford), von Wright and Eddington! Grice offers a 'linguistic botanic' survey of 'free' ("sugar-free," "free fall", "implicature-free") which some have found inspirational. His favourite is Finnegan's “alcohol-free." “His obvious implicature is that everything is alcohol-laden.” Grice kept a copy of Davidson's 'The logical form of action sentences,' since surely Davidson, Grice thought, is making a primary philosophical point. Horses run fast; therefore, horses run. A Davidsonian problem, and there are more to come! Smith went fishing. Grice's category shift allows us to take Smith's fishing as the grammatical subject of an 'action sentence.' Cf. indeed the way to cope with entailment in 'The horse runs fast; therefore, the horse runs.' Grice's "Actions and events" is Davidsonian in motivation, but Kantian in method, one of those actions by Grice to promote a Griceian event! Davidson had published, Grice thought, some pretty influential (and provocative, anti-Quineian) stuff on 'actions' and 'events,' or 'events and actions,' actually, and, worse, he was being discussed at Oxford, too, over which Grice always keeps an eye! Davidson's point, tersely put, is that while “p.q” (e.g. “It is raining, and it is pouring”) denotes a concatenation of *events*, "Smith went fishing" denotes an 'action,' which is a kind of 'event,' if you are following him (Davidson, not Smith). However, Davidson is fighting against the intuition, if you are a follower of Whitehead and Russell, to symbolise the "Smith is fishing" as “Fs” — where 's' stands for Smith and F for 'fishing.' The logical form of a report of an 'event' or an 'action' seems to be slightly more complicated. Davidson's point specifically involves 'adverbs,' or adverbial modifiers, and how to play with them in terms of entailment. “The horse runs fast; therefore, the horse runs.” "Symbolise that!," as Davidson told Benson Mates! But Mates had gone to the restroom. Grice explores all these and other topics and submits the thing to "The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly." Grice quotes, as isn't his wont, from many and various philosophers, not just Davidson, whom he saw every Wednesday, but others he didn't, like Reichenbach, Robinson, Kant, and, again even a physicist like Eddington. Grice concludes that Davidson is into 'hypothesis,' or 'suppositio,' while he is, as he should, into 'hypostasis,' or 'substantia'! Grice on "grass is green." An ingenious argument may be summarised as follows. Let 'sigma' abbreviate the operator "...consists in the fact that...", which, when prefixes to a sentence, produces a predicate (or epithet). Let 'S' abbreviate 'Snow is white' and let 'G' abbreviate 'Grass is green.' Then, (1) x sigma S is 1 just in case (2), 'x sigma (y(y=y & S) = y(y=y)' is 1, since the PARTS of the sub-sentences which follow the sigma operator in the two main sentences are LOGICALLY EQUIVALENT. And (2) is 1 just in case (3) 'x sigma (y(y=y & G) = y(y=y)' is 1, since 'y(y=y & S)' and 'y(y=y & G) are singular terms, which, if S and G are both true, both refer to y(y=y), and are therefore co-referential and inter-substitutable. And (3) is true just in case (4) 'x sigma *G*' is 1, since 'G' and the sub-sentence which follows sigma in (3) are logically equivalent. So, this fallacy goes, provided that 'S' and 'G' are both 1, regardless of WHATTHEY SAY, any event which consists of the FACT that S also consists of the factthat G, and _vice versa_, i. e. any pair of randomly chosen events are identical. Grice hastens to criticise the slingshot argument: that a principle licensing the inter-substitution of this or that co-referential singular term and this or that logically equivalent sub-sentence is officially demanded because it is needed to license certain patently valid inferences. But, if in addition to providing this benefit, the principle SADDLES the philosopher with a commitment to this 'hideousconsequence', the rational course is to endeavour to find a way of retaining the benefit while eliminating the disastrous accompaniment, much as in set theory it seems rational to seek as generous a comprehension axiom as the need toescape this or that paradox permits. Grice proposes to retain the principle of co-reference but prohibit is use *AFTER* the principle of logical equivalence has been used. Such a measure would indeed have some intuitive appeal, since in the fallacy, the initial deployment of the principle of logical equivalence seems tailored to the production of a sentence which provides opportunity for trouble-raising application of the principle of co-referentiality. And if that is what the game is, why not stop it? On the assumption that this or that problem which originally prompts this or that analysis is at least on their way towards independent solution, Grice turns his attention to the possibility of providing a constructivist treatment of [things] which might perhaps have more intuitive appeal than a realist approach. We begin with a class H of 'happenstance-attributions', which will be divided into *basic* happenstance-attributions, i.e. ascriptions to a subject-item of an attribute which is METABOLICALLY EXPRESSIBLE, and *resultant* happenstance-attributions, in which the attributes ascribed, though not themselves metabolically expressible, are such that their possession by a ubject-item is suitably related to the possession by that or by some other subject-item, of attributes which _are_ metabolically expressible. The members of class H of happenstance attributions may be used to SAY what 'happens' (or 'happens to be the case') without talking about any special entities belonging to a class of happenings or happenstances." Grice's next stage involves the introduction of the an operator, "...consists of the fact that..." This operator, when prefixed to a sentence S which makes a happen-stance attribution to a subject-item, yields a PREDICATE which will be SATISFIED by an ENTITY which IS a happenstance, provided (a) thatsentence S is true, and (b) provided that some FURTHER METAPHYSICAL CONDITIONobtains, which ensures the metaphysical NECESSITY of the introduction INTOREALITY of the category of happenstances -- thereby ensuring that this new category is not just a class of fictions. As far as the slingshot fallacy (and the 'hideous consequence' that allfacts become identical -- to one Great Big Fact), Grice comments: In the light of a defence of Reichenbach against the realist attack, I canperhaps be reasonably confident that this metaphysical EXTENSION OF REALITYwill NOT saddle us with any intolerable paradox, pace the caveat that to some the slingshot is not contradictory in the sense that a paradox is, but merely an unexpected consequence -- not seriously hideous, at that. What the metaphysical condition mentioned above would be which would JUSTIFY the metaphysical extension remains, alas, to be determined. Itis tempting to think that it would be connected with a THEORETICAL NEED tohave happenstances as items in, say, causal relations. The essay contains a progression of linguistic botanising including "free":
1987. Conceptual analysis and the
province of philosophy, Studies in the Way of Words, Part II: Explorations in
semantics and metaphysics, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), BANC MSS
90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Keywords: conceptual analysis, philosophy. Grice was since his
"Negation" and "Personal identity" concerned with 'reductive
analysis.' How many angels can dance on a needle’s point? A needless point?
This is Grice's update to his "Post war Oxford Philosophy." More
generally concerned with the province of philosophy in general and conceptual
analysis beyond 'ordinary language.' It can become pretty technical. Note the
Roman overtone of 'province'! Grice is implicating that the *other* province is
perhaps science, but he also likes to play with the idea that a conceptual
enquiry need not be philosophical. Witness the very opening to "Logic and
Conversation," 'Prolegomena': “Surely not all inquiries need be
philosophical!" In fact, a "claim to infame" of Grice at the
Play Group is having once raised the infamous, most subtle, question, what is it
that makes a conceptual enquiry philosophically interesting or important? As a
result, Austin and his 'kindergarten' spend three weeks analysing the distinct
inappropriate implicata of adverbial collocations like "highly
depressed" to no avail! Grice's moralising implicature, by retelling the
story, is that since then he realised (as he hoped Austin knew) that there is
*no way* he or any philosopher can *dictate* to others, or himself, what is it
that makes a conceptual enquiry philosophically interesting or important!
1987. Retrospective epilogue, to Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard University Press, London, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 3-Folders 22-26 and Carton 4-Folders 1-2, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: latitudinal unity, meaning, conversational implicata, conversation as rational co-operation. Grice takes the opportunity of the compilation by Harvard of his 'studies in the way of words' -- "representative of the mid-60s" -- to review the idea of philosophical progress in terms of eight different 'strands' which display, however, a consistent and distinctive unity. Grice keeps playing with 'valediction,' 'valedictory', 'prospective' and 'retrospective,' and the different drafts are all kept in The Grice Papers. In the 'Retrospective Epilogue' he provides input for his eight strands, and concludes with a fairy tale about his fairy godmother, G*! As he notes, Grice had dropped a few words in the 'preface' explaining the ordering of essays in the compilation. He mentions that he hesitated to follow Bennett's suggestion that the ordering of the essays be thematic and chronological. Rather, Grice chooses to publish the whole set of seven William James lectures as Part I. Part II is organised more or less thematically, though. In the "Retrospective Epilogue," Grice takes up this observation in the "Preface" that two ideas (Theme A and Theme B) underlie his Studies: that of meaning, and that of assertion vs. implication. The "Retrospective Epilogue" is thus an exploration on eight 'strands' he identifies in his own philosophy. Grice’s choice of ‘strand' should not mislead. For Grice, philosophy, like virtue, is entire. All the strands therefore display some 'latitudinal,' and, he hopes, 'longitudinal' unity. By these two types of 'unity,' Grice means the obvious fact that all branches of philosophy (philosophy of language, philosophy of perception, philosophical psychology, etc.) interact and overlap, and that a historical regard for one's philosophical predecessors is a must.
1987. 'Preface'
to Studies in the Way of Words, foreword, preliminary valediction,
The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 9-Folder 2, BANC MSS
90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley. Grice quotes from J. F. Bennett. More importantly, Grice focuses
on the 'assertion'/'non-assertion' distinction. He overlooks the fact that for
this or that beloved 'imperative utterance,' asserting is out of the question.
He needs a dummy to stand for a psychological attitude of either boulesis or
doxa, as in 'conveying explicitly' that the addressee is to do A, or that p.
The explicatum or explicitum sometimes does the trick; sometimes it doesn't!
Grice in fact subdivides his Theme A into 'assertion' vs. 'implication,' or
explicitly conveying that p vs. 'By uttering x (thereby explicitly conveying
that p), the utterer U conversationally implies that q" -- and meaning
simpliciter.
1988. Studies in the way of words, Harvard University Press, London, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 3-Folders 7-21, BANC, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: implicature, rationality. The title Grice eventually chooses for his compilation of essays is a tribute to Locke, who, although obsessed with his "new way of ideas," left room for the scientist's 'way of things, and, more to the point, for this or that study in the way of words. The 'studies' are organised in two parts: "Logic and conversation" and "Explorations in semantics and metaphysics." It also includes a Preface and a very rich "Retrospective epilogue." From Part I, The William James lectures, only three had not been previously published: "Prolegomena," "Indicative conditionals," and "Some models for implicature." From Part II, a few essays had not been published before, but Grice, nodding to the longitudinal unity of philosophy, is very careful and proud to date them.
1988.
Rationality and Linguistic behaviour, correspondence with J. F. Bennett, of
Oxford, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice --
IA), Carton 1-Folder 1, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University
of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Grice, Bennett, "Linguistic
Behaviour." Oxford don, Christchurh, NZ-born Bennett quotes Grice in his
"Linguistic behaviour." Grice quotes Bennett in the
"Preface" to Studies in the Way of Words. Bennett has an earlier
essay on rationality, which evidences that the topic is key in Grice's Oxford.
Bennett has studied better than anyone the way Locke is Griceian: a word does
not just stand for idea, but for the utterer's intention to stand for it!
1988. General
correspondence, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P.
Grice, IB: General), Carton 1-Folders 10-14, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft
Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: philosophical
correspondence Grice was not precisely a good, or reliable, as The British
Academy puts it, correspondent. In the Oxford manner, Grice prefers a face-to-face
interaction, anyday. He treasured his Saturday mornings under Austin's
guidance, and he himself led the Play Group after Austin's demise, which, as
Owens reminisced, attained a kind of cult status.
1988. Grice
on Grice, essays on Grice, Griceana, Griceiana, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series
I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice, IB: General), Carton 1-Folder 15, BANC
MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley. Keyword: secondary literature. As one (even on the cold
shores of Oxford, as one of Grice's tutees put it) might expect, Grice is cited
by various Oxford philosophers! Perhaps the first to cite Grice in print is his
tutee, P. F. Strawson, in Introduction to Logical Theory. Early on, H. L. A.
Hart quotes Grice on meaning in his review in "The Philosophical
Quarterly" of John Holloway's "Language and Intelligence" before
Grice's "Meaning" had been published. Obviously, once Grice's and
Strawson's "In defense of a dogma" and Grice's
"Meaning" are published by The Philosophical Review, Grice is
discussed profusely. References to his 'implicature' start to appear in the
literature at Oxford in the mid-1960s. It is particularly intriguing to explore
those philosophers Grice picks up for dialogue, too, and perhaps arrange them
alphabetically, from Austin to Warncok, say. And Griceian references, Oxonian
or other, as they should, keep counting!
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment