J writes in comment to Modalitaet:
"Denotation would seemingly be assertoric, and thus under "Modalität". Or Apodeictic, if tautological or universal. But that's what's odd about Kant's table--many types of judgments might overlap. Affirmative statements could be something like assertoric, couldn't they? Again, Reality may not be as discrete as Kant wanted (or...Aristotle, ultimately). The relation between the judgment and categories also a bit puzzling--YET I tend to think the judgments includes the categories; the rather important necessity/contingency distinction is found under categories, not judgment. Sort of a ..refinement. That said, it's a handy ontological chart .
Yet...Grice, and other ord-lang people certainly allowed for...something like connotation, did they not. Not sure where that fits on table. Perhaps possibility (moglichkeit)."
Mmm. Let's revise with the wiki:
We have
I Quantity
a. Universal
b. Particular
c. Singular
II Quality
a Affirmative
b Negative
c Infinite
III Relation
a. Categorical
b. Hypothetical
c. Disjunctive
IV Modality
a. Problematical
b. Assertoric
c. Apodictic
---
Quantity
-Unity
-Plurality
-Totality
Quality
-Reality
-Negation
-Limitation
Relation
-Inherence and Subsistence (substance and accident)
-Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)
-Community (reciprocity)
Modality
-Possibility
-Existence
-Necessity
----
"Denotation would seemingly be assertoric,"
Well, the way to go is:
S is P.
and what does it mean to say that "S" denotes? I don't think the schema by Kant is meant to cover THAT?
"and thus under "Modalität". Or Apodeictic, if tautological or universal."
Yes, we don't want that. I may denote my dog by calling him Spots. But surely that's not tautological (he may be a white poodle) and UNIQUE!
"But that's what's odd about Kant's table--many types of judgments might overlap."
Yes. The very idea of "table" is obscene. A table is to drink tea. Not to draw triads of mainly nonsense.
"Affirmative statements could be something like assertoric, couldn't they?"
Yes, as when a lesbian says,
"I'm a lesbian". That's affirmative. But surely she perhaps doesn't KNOW that she is a lesbian. In fact, some would say that it's NEGATIVE really, because 'lesbians' get defines by not being 'straight'. Kant possibly ignored this fact.
"Again, Reality may not be as discrete as Kant wanted (or...Aristotle, ultimately)."
Yes. Reality must be a joke. Imagine teaching philosophy and writing
--- R E A L I T Y
in the blackboard! Obscene! Most people don't have any idea what reality is! Evita Peron who married a military type, Peron, used to say, "The only truth is reality". I once proved that he was wrong!
J goes on:
"The relation between the judgment and categories also a bit puzzling--YET I tend to think the judgments includes the categories;"
Yes, but recall that the idea of 'category' is Aristotelity. As Hobbes would say: that's not philosophy. That's Aristotelity! There's no real need for the NOTION of a 'category' as such. Class seems to do. And in fact, a judgement seems more direct than a category:
"It rains" expresses a judgement.
The idea that "it" is the S that Kant needs for his schematisms is enough to want to skip the eighteenth century and go straight to Frege! At least he used the right symbols!
J goes on:
"the rather important necessity/contingency distinction is found under categories, not judgment. Sort of a ..refinement."
Yes. But imagine. You cannot keep necessity and contingeny in a room, or in the fridge. You need to SAY something which is necessary or contingent. Aristotle was so confused about this, that I want to blame the Greek language for it:
"Tomorrow there will be a naval battle."
As uttered by Churchill it could WELL be apodeictic! The poor Grice almost died because Churchill was planning naval battles every other weekend.
It was a good thing he was transferred to the Admiralty. Alas, he never learned to type, so what he did there was mainly keep charts of things.
J goes on:
"That said, it's a handy ontological chart."
Provided you get lost in the universe. As Jorge Luis Borges signs one of his books, "The history of Eternity", I think, "reflections of an argentine lost in metaphysics."
----
J goes on:
"Yet...Grice, and other ord-lang people certainly allowed for...something like connotation, did they not. Not sure where that fits on table. Perhaps possibility (moglichkeit).""
Denotation and connotation I prefer to call "Salt and Pepper".
No, I don't think it's moglichkeit.
It's more like Tweedledee and Tweedledum.
Surely you need BOTH. How can you have JUST denotation -- the 'dum'. Surely you need the 'dee'.
Apparently, these two characters were parody of Handel and an Italian composer back in the early 1700s when nobody could distinguish one tune from the other.
-----
Connotation is more like "sense" proper. The 'sense' of "Tweedle-dee", the 'sense' of "Tweedle-dum".
Salt and pepper relate in that you need both, most of the time.
Now, in extensionalist semantics, you can do without connotations, but in any case, the connotation is 'extensionally' provided. This Grice had a bit of a problem with, and considers it a minimalism.
But again, I would think that in a judgement
S is P
P must be part of the connotation.
"A man is an animal"
----- "animal" is part of the connotation of 'man'. Hey, it's part of its sense.
But with other words is more difficult.
"An occulist is an eye doctor"
really does not provide the connotation. Just rephrases the same thing.
Recall Frege:
Morning Star -- Evening Star.
Recall that it's Hesperos and Phosphoros in Greek: names, rather than descriptions.
Well, 'hesperos' and 'phosphoros' can be taken as descriptions IN GREEK. But in English they are just names -- so they shoudn't really, for Mill at least (System of Logic) have connotation.
Mill's example is the connotation of "London". He finds it lacks one.
----
I once HAD to study that boring System of Logic and found that Mill's analysis of the syncategoremata is fun:
"London is pretty but Stockholm is colder" is nonsensical, but Mill tries to analyse what 'frame' of mind gets expressed by all those particles. He becames pretty Gricean in parts. I hope I have the paper somewhere since I had to deliver it publicly.
So -- the point would be if denotatum and connotatum really belong in Kant's thing.
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ReplyDeleteMy comments like usual were a bit off the cuff, but in a sense denotation does something rather precise, unlike the Kantian jargon. Most of what works with IK's Tables is hardly different than Aristotle, anyway. So, term logic--which can be translated into predicate logic (Frege does that doesn't he??...applies quantifiers to the square of opposition). So All S are P -> for any x which is S, S is included in the class of P. Bada bing.
ReplyDeleteIt's the particulars which are trickier (then, also note that Kant distinguishes between particulars and...singular! a bit odd. aren't particulars singular?/ have to think about it). Regardless the ..modus ponens form, boring as it is, was not really used by Aristotle, tho' most college-town philosophasters haven't quite got that. All felines are mammals. yes. But not not "Mittens is a feline". IN ways term logic has a certain primitive elegance. Admit the singular statements , things get mucked up, tho' MP form works, as long as you don't think too much about the T-word (truth, premises, etc).
And for that matter, all logic which uses propositions and predicates is extentionalist, iddn't it?? I don't see where one could even DO "connotative logic", except loosely as with what are possible synonyms, ie substitutions. Lawyer for attorney, ok. But not say vague connotations-- "shyster" for lawyer--even if in a sense meaningful. then you're doing something...literary . Hey sounds a bit Quinean. But I don't agree with Two Dogmas, if yr askin'--synonymies, identities, tautologies hold, certainly logic/mathematically speaking. And ..semantically as well. At least in pragmatist terms (ie Quine betrays his own prag. roots in a sense).
Yes, you are very right about term logic and the rest of it.
ReplyDeleteI think Grice has them right when he speaks of neo-traditionalists, so I may post some excerpts by Grice on them.
You cannot keep necessity and contingeny in a room, or in the fridge. You need to SAY something which is necessary or contingent.
ReplyDeleteWell, that's sort of what Kant's suggesting as...synthetic a priori, right? Just call categories "givens"--say quantity (ie, numbers) vs. quality (affirmation, negation, etc)--humans deal with them, whether they are professors or cooks at el pollo loco. That said I understand some of Schopenhauer's critique of Kant, especially in regard to ..."bodiness" (one thing Schop. probably took from Hume, and western science for that matter..Schop. actually respects Hume and empiricists to some degree, a point lost on most philosophasters). Humans may have a priori categories, space-time, sense/intellect, but also...a body with specific needs and requirements (then Kant doesn't exactly deny sensual reality, but...it's just the starting point...). Schop. may not be quite an economic materialist ala Marx (or lefto hegelians), but in a sense.. a psychological realist. We cannot live on the a priori alone.
I didn't mean to suggest Kant's categories were bogus, but more like in need of clarification.
Yes -- I would like to think they ARE bogus, really! I mean, they are Aristotelian! Perhaps the clearest view I got from this was from that bio on Grice by Chapman -- she cares to quote directly from Aristotle. I will provide the text in a blog post, and you'll decide HOW extraordinarily UNoriginal Kant was being -- and no wonder Grice preferred to follow Ariskant.
ReplyDeleteWhat fascinated me is that Grice calls his four categories, "echoing Kant" and Kant says he is "echoing Aristotle"!