Grice vs Meinong

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After allowing for

"There is something such that it is not the case that it flies" -- with the weaker 'is', even --

Grice is eager to disassociate from Meinong. In Grice's words:

"Immediately, ... it must be made clear that

to accept [my natural deduction system] (as

a model of natural discourse) is NOT to accept

a Meinongian viewpoint."

--- Why?

Well, because

"it is NOT to subscribe to the idea of a duality,

or indeed plurality, of 'modes of being'"

----

Here Grice goes on to distinguish

Pegasus from Bertrand Russell, existing at the time of Grice writing.

A Meinongian viewpoint is beyond the mark.

Acceptance of Grice's natural deduction system "as a model of natural discourse"

might, Grice notes, 'be expected to lead one to

hold that while

some sentences of the form

"Bertrand Russell ------"

are interpretable in which a way as to be true and to entail not merely that 'there is something which---' but also as 'there EXISTS something which ----',

sentenes of the form

-- "Pegasus ----" (e.g. flew)

"will, if interpreted so as to be true,

ENTAIL ONLY 'there is someething which ---" (i.e. did not fly, or failed to fly).

-- Yet:

From this, "it would be quite illegitimate" to conclude that

while Bertrand Russell exists and has being (i.e. is), Pegasus

only is (i.e. has being).

---

And why?

Well, because "exists" does have a

licensed occurrence BOTH in the expression,

'there exists something which ---"

but also in the expression

'a exists'.

---- There is a disanalogy or asymmetry here:

While 'exists' has these two licensed occurrences, corresponding ones are not forthcoming for 'is'.

"is" only has has a licensed occurrence, Grice holds,

in the expression,

"there is something which ---"

but NOT in 'a is' -- if a is not, that is.

---

Grice sums up this by noting that his natural deduction system, well in consonance with one of the natural inclinations set at the beginning of the essay, 'creates no ontological jungle'.

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