H. P. Grice, "'Subjecctive' conditions and intentions"

Intention and subjectivity.

Preferred citation:

H. P. Grice (1970). Intention and subjectivity, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9, Folder 15, ""Subjective" conditions and intentions," BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library.

Keywords: intention, subjective condition. 

Cf. his dispositional account to 'intending.' A subjective condition takes into account the intender's, rather than the ascriber's, point of view: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees. Given my present state, I should do what is fun. Given my present state, the best thing for me to do would be to do what is fun. For me in my present state it would make for my well-being, to have fun. Having fun is good (or, a good). Climbing a mountain would be fun. Climbing the Everest would be/make for climbing fun. So, I’ll climb the Everest. Even if a critic insisted that practical syllogism is the way to represent our finding something to be appealing, and that it should be regarded as a respectable evaluation, the assembled propositions will not do the work of a standard argument. The premises do not support or yield the conclusion as in a standard argument. The premises may be said to yield the conclusion, or directive, for the particular agent whose thought process it is, only on the basis of a subjective condition: that the agent is in a certain subjective state, e.g. feels like going out for dinner-fun. Rational beings (the agent at some other time, or other individuals) who don’t have that feeling, will not accept the conclusion. They may well accept as true ‘It is fun to dine out’, but will not accept it as a directive unless they feel like it now. Someone wondering what to do for the evening might think that if she were to go to dinner she would find it fun or pleasant, but right now she does not feel like going out. That is in general the end of the matter. The alleged argument lacks normativity: it is not authoritative or directive unless there is a supportive argument that she needs/ought to do something diverting/pleasant tonight. Practical arguments are different. Even if an agent did not feel like going to the dentist, an agent would think ‘I ought to have a dental check up yearly, now is the time, so I should see my dentist’ to be a directive with some force. It articulates a practical argument. Perhaps the strongest attempt to reconstruct (acceptable or rational) thought transitions as standard arguments is to treat the subjective condition, ‘I feel like having dinner-fun tonight’, as a premise, for then the premises would support the conclusion. But the individual, whose thought transition we are examining, does not regard a description of her inner state as a consideration that supports the conclusion. It will be useful to look more closely at a pair of closely related examples to note when it is appropriate to reconstruct thinking in the form of argument. Bloggs, hiking with a friend in the Everest, comes to a difficult spot and says, ‘I don’t like the look of that, I am frightened. I am going back’. That is usually enough for Bloggs to return, and for the friend to turn back with him. Bloggs’s action of turning back, admittedly motivated by fear, is, while not acting on reasons, nonetheless rational unless we judge his fear to be irrational. Bloggs’s subjective condition can serve as a premise, but only in a very different situation. Bloggs resorts to reasons. Suppose that, while his friend does not think Bloggs’s fear irrational, the friend still attempts to dissuade Bloggs from going back. After listening and reflecting, Bloggs may say ‘I am so frightened it is not worth it. I am not enjoying this climbing anymore’. Or ‘I am too frightened to be able to safely go on’. Or ‘I often climb the Everest and don’t usually get frightened. The fact that I am now is a good indication that this is a dangerous trail and I should turn back’. These are reasons, considerations implicitly backed by principles, and they could be the initial motivations of someone. But in Bloggs’s case they emerged when he was challenged by his friend. They do not express his initial practical reasoning. Bloggs was frightened by the trail ahead, wanted to go back, and didn’t have any reason not to. Faced with his friend’s objections, however, Bloggs needed justification for acting on his fear. He reflected and found reason(s) to act on his fear.