Grice loves to illustrate.
He offers a number of examples of what he called 'conversatio' -- a dyad of an utterance by A and a response by B.
conversātĭo , ōnis, f. converso (not ante-Aug.). *
I. Frequent use, Sen. Ben. 3, 2, 2; cf. Cod. Th. 11, 21, 1 al.—
II. Frequent abode in a place, Plin. 10, 33, 51, § 100; Dig. 11, 7, 12, § 1.—
III. Intercourse, conversation (so most freq.): “licentiosior cum viris,” Sen. Exc. Contr. 6, 8: “hominum,” Vell. 2, 102, 3: “multorum,” Sen. Ep. 7, 1; Quint. 6, 3, 17; Tac. A. 12, 49; id. Or. 9: “inter servos,” Quint. 1, 2, 4.
He often doubted about using "A" and "B," and stuck to "U" for utterer and "A" for addressee, even if their roles get reversed in the 'conversatio.'Grice divides the 'conversationes' in three groups.
GROUP A
Examples in which no conversational maxim is violated, or at least in which it is not clear that any maxim is violated
CONVERSATIO I
A is standing by an obviously immobilized car and is approached by B.
The following exchange takes place:
A: I am out of petrol.
B: There is a garage round the corner.
U1: I'm out of petrol.
U2: There is a garage round the corner.
Gloss:
The utterer U would be infringing one of the conversational maxims falling under the principle of conversational helpfulness, 'Be relevant,' unless the utterer U thinks, or thinks it possible, that the garage is open, and has petrol to sell.
Therefore, the utterer conversationally implies that the garage is, or at least may be open, etc.)
In this example, unlike the case of a remark like "Oh, just fine; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been to prison yet" as a response to "How is Smith doing at his new job at the bank?" implying he is potentially dishonest or his colleagues are, the unstated connection ('enthymema,' to use Aristotle's parlance, the ending with 'eta' is not Latinate enough) between U's remark and the immediately preceding remark by the co-utterer U is SO OBVIOUS (but of course never explicit) that, to make a fine philosophical point, even if we, qua philosophers, interpret the desideratum of conversational clarity ('Be perspicuous [sic]') as applying not only to the 'expression' of what is explicitly conveyed but also to the connection of what is explicitly conveyed with this or that adjacent remark, there seems be no case for regarding that desideratum as infringed in this example.
So let's note that Grice needs a PARTICULARISED scenario:
"Agent A is standing by an obviously immobilized car and is approached by Agent A'"
The following 'conversatio' takes place:
A: I am out of petrol.
A': There is a garage round the corner.
U1: I'm out of petrol.
U2: There is a garage round the corner.
Gloss:
The utterer U would be infringing one of the conversational maxims falling under the principle of conversational helpfulness, 'Be relevant,' unless the utterer U thinks, or thinks it possible, that the garage is open, and has petrol to sell.
Therefore, the utterer conversationally implies that the garage is, or at least may be open, and has petrol to sell.)
Is the co-agent being co-operative?
Is he being cooperative?
Answer: Unqualified yes.
Surely there's cancellation:
A: You told me there was a garage round the corner. But you surely knew that they've been out of business for six months, the sign said.
B: I never explicitly conveyed that the garage was open and with petrol to sell.
Or
"You must have known that the town has been out of petrol for one week!"
Or the most guarded initial response:
A: I'm out of petrol.
B: There's a garage round the corner; mind, it's 4:00 a.m, so it might well be closed.
A: I'm out of petrol.
B: There's a garage round the corner, but I cannot assure you that it has petrol to sell. There's been a shortage of petrol in the area for one week now.
A: I'm out of petrol.
B: There's a garage round the corner, but I think they are short on petrol. There is another one ten blocks down, which is sure to have petrol, if you don't mind the walk.
Grice's second example is perhaps a little less clear in this respect about the desideratum of conversational clarity:
(2)
A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days.
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.
U conversationally implies that Smith has, or may have, a girlfriend in New York.
A gloss is unnecessary in view of that given for the example of the garage around the corner.
In both conversationes, or rather, in each conversatio, the utterer conversationally implies that q, where q is that which the utterer must intend his addressee to assume the utterer believes in order to preserve the assumption that he is observing the principle of conversational helpfulness.
I use q, for surely, if there's a conversational implicatum, q, there must be a conversational EXPLICITUM, p.
Smith has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately
MEANS p:
By uttering "Smith has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately," U explicitly conveys that p.
Assuming the utterer is being conversationally helpful, i.e. abiding with the principle of converational helpfulness, the addressee will calculate 'q':
Smith seems to have a girlfriend in New York
----
Therefore, Smith has been paying a lot of visits to New York.
Or
Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days, as is unlike his wont.
Smith has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately (new information provided by allegedly co-operative conversational partner).
----
Conclusion:
I am going to infer that either he goes to New York to see her (or to do things he can do without a girlfriend -- these frequent trips making him to busy to even consider having a girlfriend in Greenwich).
But Greenwich is SO CLOSE!!
By choosing the idiom, "pay a visit" the utterer implicates a romantic encounter. It doesn't seem to imply 'being busy with other stuff' (do things Smith can do or should do WITHOUT a girlfriend).
On top, by uttering the initial remark, "Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend THESE DAYS," the utterer conversationally implies that he is surprised about this, seeing that Smith is a 'girlfriend' boy -- even if he keeps trading them.
In any case, Grice thinks these two examples of 'conversatio' illustrates the first GROUP A.
***
GROUP B:
Each is an example in which a conversational maxim is violated, rendering the utterer prima facie UN-co-operative, but where this unreasonable assumption is soon trumped by the utterer making it EXPLICITLY obvious (even if we are talking of what he is IMPLYING) that the violation of this or that conversational maxim, falling under the principle of conversational helpfulness, is to be explained by the supposition of a CLASH with another conversational maxim which the utterer deems it is more reasonable for him to follow.
In this way, while the principle of conversational helpfulness is a Kantian universalisable categoric imperative, each maxim it might comprise is not.
They all operate ceteris paribus.
GROUP B--Conversatio 1
REQUIRED PARTICULARISED SCENARIO:
Smith is planning with Jones an itinerary for a holiday in the Italian riviera.
Both know that Smith wants to see his friend Williams, if to do so would not involve too great a prolongation of his journey:
(3)
A: Where does Williams live? I know he lives somewhere in the area, right? I haven't been in as close a contact I would have wished.
B: Oh, Williams does live somewhere in the Riviera di Ponente, or Rivëa de Punènte, if you must!
A: But that's a long stretch! Can't you be more specific. Remember we intend to make the villa in Bordighera our basis
Gloss:
There is no reason to suppose that Jones is opting out of the operation of the principle of conversational helpfulness, by his choice of the indefinite "somewhere," logical form (Ex)xP and xRP
"x is a place in the Riviera di Ponente."
Jones's answer is, as he himself should well know, less informative than is required to meet Smith's needs, unless it isn't.
Smith: Oh, that's good. Since we are staying in at Bordighera, that won't be a long stretch, surely! Plus, we have the car!
This infringement, if you thus want to call it, of this or that maxim enjoining that the exchange of information -- one of the two sub-goals the principle of conversational helpfulness is supposed to serve -- is MAXIMAL (maximally giving and maximally giving information -- can be reasonably explained (or 'rationalised') only by the supposition that Jones IS aware that to be more informative (and strictly specific as to what 'comune' Williams is living in) would be to say something that infringed the desideratum of conversational candour (be truthful, and more specfically, 'Thou shalt refrain from conveying anything for which you lack a ground, including, obviously, this or that relevantly adequate piece of relevant evidence).
Therefore, the utterer conversationally implies that he does not know in which comune Williams currently resides.
Note the cancellation:
"Oh, somewhere in the Riviera di Ponente, as it happens -- ain't that wonderful?! Ventimiglia, to be precise. Which is just next to where we'll be staying at!"
"Brilliant!"
For some reason Grice thinks that one conversatio makes a GROUP. So we're in Group C now.
***
GROUP C:
Each example of 'conversatio' involves 'exploitation,' i. e., a rational intentional procedure about the mechanism underlying 'implying' by which a conversational maxim falling under the principle of conversational helpfulness is BLATANTLY flouted for the purpose of 'getting in' something else (q) which is derivable, even in a cancellable fashion, from what the utterer explicitly conveys (p).
The conversational implicatum is thus generated by means of, or by the convoluted mechanism of, something of the nature of a figure of speech, or rhetorical figure that so much fascinated Cicero!
In each example of 'conversatio,' then, though some conversational maxim is, strictly, violated (or infringed) at the ground-floor, primary level of what the utterer explicitly conveys, his addressee is intended and indeed entitled to assume that that conversational maxim, or, for all he cares, at least the overall overarching principle of conversational helpfulness, is observed at the level that matters, which is what U 'in the end' conveys, including what the utterer conversationally implies, i.e. that q.
Cicero is well aware of the mechanism.
SOMETHING OF THE NATURE OF A RHETORICAL FIGURE.
Utterer explicitly conveys that p
---- There is a figure of rhetoric to the effect that 'p' yields 'q'
Utterer conversationally implies that q
(la)
A flouting of the first maxim of Quantity
At Collections, an Oxford don, a tutorial fellow in philosophy, as it happens, is giving a testimonial about his tutee.
All the don says is:
"Smith has beautiful handwriting and his English is grammatical."
Gloss: The don cannot be opting out, since if he wished to be uncooperative, why collect at all?
He cannot be unable, through ignorance, to say more, since the man is his tutee; moreover, he knows that more information than this is wanted.
He must, therefore, be wishing to impart information that he is reluctant to convey explicitly.
This supposition is tenable only if the don thinks that Smith is no good at philosophy.
This, then, is what he conversationally implies.
I.e., he utterer conversationally implies that Smith is no good at philosophy.
Note the cancellation:
"Of course I don't mean to imply that he is no good at philosophy."
Somewhat extraordinary tutorial behaviour at Collections, but otherwise 'impeccable.'
If perhaps involved in a meta-rethorical figure. Does he want to be BELIEVED, or is he being ironical?
In any case, 'q' cannot strictly be said to have been implied if conjoined with its own cancellation!
Here topical apositeness is to be considered. Cf.
Smith's essays have been well-reasoned.
Therefore, he is good at philosophy.
We may consider this in connection with 'explicitly conveying,' since 'being good at philosophy' MEANS, definitionally, to supply this or that well-reasoned essay.
The aesthetic qualities of Smith's handwriting (unless it's totally illegible) and his misuse of Hegelianisms might be pardoned.
The figure of rhetoric here is "damn with faint praise," first used by Cicero in Latin.
The concept of 'damn by faint praise' can be found in the work of the Roman sophist and philosopher Favorinus (c. 110 AD) who observes that faint and half-hearted praise is more harmful than loud and persistent abuse (as reported by Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, xix, 3, 1)
Turpius esse dicebat Favorinus philosophus exigue atque frigide laudari, quam inseotanter et graviter vituperari." Aulus Gellius. Noctes Atticae, XIX., 3, 1.
So the concept IS philosophical!
Commented by Walsh, William Shepard. (1908).
The explicit phrasing of the modern English idiomic expression was first published by Alexander Pope in his 1734 poem, "Epistle to Dr Arbuthnot" in Prologue to the Satires.[4]
-
- Damn with faint praise, assent with civil leer,
- And without sneering, teach the rest to sneer;
- Willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike,
- Just hint a fault, and hesitate dislike.
-
- — "Epistle to Dr Arbuthnot" by Alexander Pope (1688–1744)[5]
-
According to William Shepard Walsh, "There is a faint anticipation in William Wycherley's Double Dealer, "and libels everybody with dull praise."
But a closer parallel is in Phineas Fletcher, —"
-
- When needs he must, yet faintly then he praises,
- Somewhat the deed, much more the means he raises:
- So marreth what he makes, and praising most, dispraises.
-
- — "The Purple Island" by Phineas Fletcher[6]
-
The inversion "praising with faint damns" is a more modern coinage,[7] though it certainly goes as far back as 1888.[8]
The concept was widely used in literature in the eighteenth century, for example in Tobias Smollet's Roderick Random - "I impart some of mine to her - am mortified at her faint praise".
Examples[edit]
- H. P. Grice gives an example of conversational implicature:
A tutorial fellow at Collections, testifying about his tutee:
"Smith has beautiful handwriting and his English is grammatical."
-- Oxford, in a lecture delivered at Cambridge, and published in The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
(Grice is interested in exploring types of 'implying' in the course of an exploration of Wittgenstein's criticism to "That pillar box seems red to me.")
- 2009, interview with Encyclopædia Britannica president Jorge Cauz in the Sydney Morning Herald:
- ". . . [Cauz] said a big problem was that many users considered Wikipedia to be 'fine' or 'good enough'."
- 1917, Lucy Maud Montgomery, "The Alpine Path: The Story Of My Career":
- "They wrote that “Our readers report that they find some merit in your story, but not enough to warrant its acceptance.”
- 2010, The Way They Were, The New York Times:
- ". . . when [George] W. [Bush] could avoid it no longer, he mentioned Vice [President Dick Cheney], damning with faint praise: “Dick Cheney’s advice was consistent and strong.”"
See also[edit]
References[edit]
- ^ Ichikawa, Sanki. (1964). The Kenkyusha Dictionary of Current English Idioms,pp. 153–154.
- ^ Ammer, Christine. (2001). The American Heritage Dictionary of Idioms, p. 153.
- ^
- ^ Walsh, William Shepard. (1909). Handy-book of Literary Curiosities, p. 211.
- ^ Pope, Alexander. (1901) The Rape of the Lock: An Essay on Man and Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, p. 97; n.b., see line 201 in "Epistle to Dr Arbuthnot."
- ^ Walsh, William Shepard, Handy-book of Literary Curiosities,pp. 211–212; n.b.,see Canto vii in "The Purple Island."
- ^ Example: Hattie, John and Peddie, R. (January 2003). "School reports: "Praising with faint damns"". Set: Research Information for Teachers. 3: 4–9.
- ^ Robert Ellis Thompson; Wharton Barker (1888). The American: A National Journal. American Company, Limited. p. 137.
- ^ Grice, H. P. The Aristotelian Society, also Logic and conversation
Sources[edit]
- Ammer, Christine. (1997). The American Heritage Dictionary of Idioms. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. ISBN 978-0-395-72774-4; OCLC 228041670
- Browne, William Hardcastle. (1900). Odd Derivations of Words, Phrases, Slang, Synonyms and Proverbs. Philadelphia: Arnold. OCLC 23900443
- Hirsch, Eric Donald Hirsch, Joseph F. Kett and James S. Trefil. (2002). The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. ISBN 978-0-618-22647-4; ISBN 978-0-9657664-3-2; OCLC 50166721
- Ichikawa, Sanki. (1964). The Kenkyusha Dictionary of Current English Idioms. Tokyo: Kenkyusha. OCLC 5056712
- Pope, Alexander and Henry Walcott Boynton. (1901). The Rape of the Lock. An essay on Man and Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co. OCLC 3147633
- Walsh, William Shepard. (1892). Handy-book of Literary Curiosities. Philadelphia: Lippincott.OCLC 247190584
- __________. (1908). The International Encyclopedia of Prose and Poetical Quotations from the Literature of the World. Toronto: C. Clark. OCLC 22391024
External links[edit]
 | Look up damn with faint praise in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. |
- Alexander Pope. "Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot," annotated text of the poem
An EXTREME example of a flouting of the conversational maxim
enjoining that the conversationalists should aim at the maximal exchange of information (maximally giving and maximally receiving information), one of the two sub-goals of the principle of conversational helpfulness, is provided by utterances of a patent blatant tautology like
"Women are women"
and
"War is war."
Or, to be more philosophical, as one should, Parmenides,
"The being is."
Or Whitehead's and Russell's:
a = a
(Granted, they are following Peano).
But we should prefer Parmenides:
Perhaps the best known saying of Parmenides is the one usually interpreted as an ... of a radical subjectivism: to gar auto noein estin te kai einai
το γαρ αυτο νοειν εςτιν τε και ειναι
το γαρ αυτό νοείν εστίν τε και είναι.
(Fragment 5). ... which Heidegger rejects as thoroughly “un-Greek,” Parmenides is expressing a ... Thus, to auto must be understood in the sense of Parmenides' theory of being as
In logic, the law of identity states that each thing is identical with itself. It is the first of the three laws of thought, along with the law of noncontradiction, and the law of excluded middle. However, no system of logic is built on just these laws, and none of these laws provide inference rules, such as modus ponens or DeMorgan's Laws.
In its formal representation, the law of identity is written
"a = a"
or "For all x: x = x", where a or x refer to a term rather than a proposition, and thus the law of identity is not used in propositional logic. It is that which is expressed by the equals sign "=", the notion of identity or equality. It can also be written less formally as A is A.
One statement of such a principle is "Rose is a rose is a rose is a roseENDTARGET."
"a = a"
or "For all x: x = x", where a or x refer to a term rather than a proposition, and thus the law of identity is not used in propositional logic. It is that which is expressed by the equals sign "=", the notion of identity or equality. It can also be written less formally as A is A.
One statement of such a principle is "Rose is a rose is a rose is a roseENDTARGET."
In logical discourse, violations of the law of identity result in the informal logical fallacy known as equivocation.[1]
That is to say, we cannot use the same term in the same discourse while having it signify different senses or meanings and introducing ambiguity into the discourse – even though the different meanings are conventionally prescribed to that term. The law of identity also allows for substitution, and is a tautology.
That is to say, we cannot use the same term in the same discourse while having it signify different senses or meanings and introducing ambiguity into the discourse – even though the different meanings are conventionally prescribed to that term. The law of identity also allows for substitution, and is a tautology.
History[edit]
Ancient philosophy[edit]
The earliest recorded use of the law appears to occur in Plato's dialogue Theaetetus (185a), wherein Socrates attempts to establish that what we call "sounds" and "colours" are two different classes of thing:
Medieval philosophy[edit]
Aristotle believed the law of non contradiction to be the most fundamental law. Both Thomas Aquinas (Met. IV, lect. 6) and Duns Scotus (Quaest. sup. Met. IV, Q. 3) follow Aristotle in this respect. Antonius Andreas, the Spanish disciple of Scotus (d. 1320), argues that the first place should belong to the law "Every Being is a Being" (Omne Ens est Ens, Qq. in Met. IV, Q. 4), but the late scholastic writer Francisco Suárez (Disp. Met. III, § 3) disagreed, also preferring to follow Aristotle.
Another possible allusion to the same principle may be found in the writings of Nicholas of Cusa (1431-1464) where he says:
Modern philosophy[edit]
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz claimed that the law of identity, which he expresses as "Everything is what it is", is the first primitive truth of reason which is affirmative, and the law of noncontradiction is the first negative truth (Nouv. Ess. IV, 2, § i), arguing that "the statement that a thing is what it is, is prior to the statement that it is not another thing" (Nouv. Ess. IV, 7, § 9). Wilhelm Wundt credits Gottfried Leibniz with the symbolic ENDTARGETformulation, "A is A".[5] Leibniz's Law is a similar principle, that if two objects have all the same properties, they are in fact one and the same: Fx and Fy iff x = y.
John Locke (Essay Concerning Human Understanding IV. vii. iv. ("Of Maxims") says:
Hamilton was one of the last to dedicate much to the "three laws"
Afrikan Spir proclaims the law of identity as the fundamental law of knowledge, which is opposed to the changing appearance of the empirical reality.[6]
George Boole, in the introduction to his treatise The Laws of Thought made the following observation with respect to the nature of language and those principles that must inhere naturally within them, if they are to be intelligible:
Objectivism, the philosophy founded by novelist Ayn Rand, claims to be grounded in the law of identity, "A is A".
Contemporary philosophy[edit]
Analytic[edit]
In the Foundations of Arithmetic, Gottlob Frege associated the number one with the property of being self identical. Frege's paper "On Sense and Reference" begins with a discussion on equality and meaning. Frege wondered how a true statement of the form "a = a", a trivial instance of the law of identity, could be different from a true statement of the form "a = b", a genuine extension of knowledge, if the meaning of a term was its referent.
Bertrand Russell in "On Denoting" has this similar puzzle: "If a is identical with b, whatever is true of the one is true of the other, and either may be substituted for the other without altering the truth or falsehood of that proposition. Now George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley; and in fact Scott was the author of Waverley. Hence we may substitute “Scott” for “the author of Waverley” and thereby prove that George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott. Yet an interest in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first gentleman of Europe.”
Continental[edit]
Gilles Deleuze wrote that "Difference and Repetition" is prior to any concept of identity.
See also[edit]
References[edit]
- ^ Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each.
- ^ Wang, Hao (2016). "From Mathematics to Philosophy (Routledge Revivals)". Routledge – via Google Books.
- ^ Thomas, Ivo (1 April 1974). "On a passage of Aristotle". Notre Dame J. Formal Logic. 15 (2): 347–348. doi:10.1305/ndjfl/1093891315 – via Project Euclid.
- ^ De Venatione Sapientiae, 23.
- ^ Curley, E. M. (October 1971). "Did Leibniz State "Leibniz'Law"?". The Philosophical Review. 8 (4): 497–501.
- ^ Forschung nach der Gewissheit in der Erkenntniss der Wirklichkeit, Leipzig, J.G. Findel, 1869 and Denken und Wirklichkeit: Versuch einer Erneuerung der kritischen Philosophie, Leipzig, J. G. Findel, 1873.
External links[edit]
 | Wikiquote has quotations related to: Law of identity |
I would wish to maintain that at the ground-floor primary, central, level of what is explicitly conveyed, in my favored way of using 'explicitly convey,' such a remark by Theaetetus, "Certainly red is identical to red," is totally non-informative and so, at that level, cannot but infringe the conversational maxim conjoining a maximal exchange of information in any conversational context, even a Socratic dialogue!
Theaetetus's conversational move is, of course, informative at the higher level of what he conversationally implies, and the identification by his addressee, Socrates, in this case (who actually makes the question) of the informative content of Theaetetus's conversational move at this higher level (of what Theaetetus conversationally imples) is dependent on Socrates's ability to explain the Theaetetus's selection of this particular patent tautology, 'Red is red.'
It is slightly more complicated with Aristotle.
When A belongs to the whole of B and to C and is affirmed of nothing else, and B also belongs to all C, it is necessary that A and B should be convertible: for since A is said of B and C only, and B is affirmed both of itself and of C, it is clear that B will be said of everything of which A is said, except A itself.
Here, as in Peano, "A is A," is used as a premise in a proof.
( 1b)
An infringement of a conversational maxim or prohibition concerning OVER-informativeness:
"Thou shalt NOT be over-informative; indeed, you shalt not be over-ANYTHING, damn it!"
"Thou shalt not give more information than is required', on the assumption that the existence of such a maxim should be admitted.
For surely, if the sub-goal of the principle of conversational helpfulness is the maximally giving and maximally receiving information, what's wrong with volunteering unless it's Shakespeare's lady who protests too much?
Consider:
Smith wants to know whether p, and Jones volunteers not only the information that p, but information to the effect that it is certain that p, and also that HE is certain that p, and that the evidence for its being the case that p is so-and-so and such-and-such.
B's volubility and prolixity may be NOT meant to be 'communicated,' i.e. undesigned (as in "Emma," hence Knightley condemning Emma for being tasteless in embarrassing a conversational bore in public).
And if it is so regarded by Smith it may have a contrary effect, i.e. raise in Smith's mind a doubt as to whether Smith is as certain as he says he is.
Cf.
A: Methinks the lady doth protest too much.
B: Methinks thou art a chauvinist pig.
But if it is thought of as de-signed, i.e. as intended to be 'communicated,' or exchanged as a bit of psi-transfer, it would be rather oblique (as all implying is) way of conveying that it is to some degree controversial whether or not p.
Smith: p and q?
Jones: Yes, p. But mind: Most likely p and q. Indeed, I'm certain that p and q.
Smith: Thanks for pointing that to me. I was initially dubious, hence my question. Most people around here do think that it is rather controversial whether or not it is the case that p and q!
Jones: Which is just as well: everyone should mind his ps and qs.
It is, however, arguable that such an implicature could be explained by reference to a conversational maxim enjoining topical appositeness.
Cf. J. O. Urmson for the Aristotelian Society:
'Other things being equal, it is best to use the referring expression most likely to secure successful identification by the person(s) to whom the communication is addressed’,
cf. Grice on dossiers and identificatory and non-identificatory uses of definite descriptions based on an overlap of dossiers.
‘Other things being equal, when using a descriptive referring expression, it is best to use the one that is MOST APPOSITE to the TOPIC of discourse.'
J. O. Urmson, 'Criteria of intensionality.'
Urmson:
MAXIM 1
Other things being equal, it is best to use the referring expression most likely to secure successful identification by the person(s) to whom the communication is addressed.
Or:
Try to use a referring expression most likely to secure successful identification by your addressee.
cf. Grice on dossiers and identificatory and non-identificatory uses of definite descriptions based on an overlap of dossiers.
Urmson
MAXIM 2 (principle of conversational appositeness):
Be apposite!
‘Other things being equal, when using a descriptive referring expression, it is best to use the one that is MOST APPOSITE to the TOPIC of discourse.'
Try to use the referring expression that you judge most apposite to the topic of the conversation in which you are engaged!
-- without invoking or instilling on otherwise reasonable conversationalists too strong a conversational prohibition of over-informativeness.
"Emma" is again right here. She used to complain of her father, Mr. Wodehouse, "One cannot converse with her, either in playful conversation, or in rational conversation."
(2a)
This or that example of a 'conversatio' in which the conversational maxim or desideratum of conversational candour is blatantly flouted.
DISIMPLICATURE?
Irony.
But cf. the etymological source of this lovely Grecianism.
Smith, with whom Jones has been on close terms until now, has betrayed a secret of Jones's to a business rival.
Jones and his addressee, Williams, both know this.
Jones (with a shrug) Smith is such a fine friend!
Williams: Indeed: a TRULY fine'un!
Gloss:
It is perfectly obvious to Jones, the utterer, and his addressee Williams, that what the utterer, Jones, has said or 'has made as if to say' or explicitly convey, is something he does not believe.
The utterer's addressee knows that the utterer knows that this is obvious to the addressee.
So, unless the utterer's utterance (or indeed himself) is (or is being) entirely pointless, the utterer must be trying to get across some other proposition, q, the implicatum, than, p ("Smith is such a fine friend") that he purports to be putting forward.
This must be some obviously related proposition, but there are qualifications here, as Rogers ("such a fine friend") Albritton knows!
The most obviously related proposition, q, is the contradictory of the one the utterer purports to be putting forward.
So, by uttering, "Smith is such a fine friend," the utterer conversationally implies that Smith is a scoundrel.
Metaphor.
An examples like
"You're the cream in my coffee."
-- as in the title of the 1929 hit,
implying, "You are my pride and joy."
characteristically involve categorial falsity, i.e. falsity due to what Ryle would call a 'category mistake.'
The contradictory of what the utterer has made as if to say will, strictly speaking, be a truism, almost like Parmenides's)
You're NOT the cream in my coffee.
So it cannot be THAT that such an utterer is trying to get across.
The most likely supposition is that the utterer is attributing to his addressee some feature or features in respect of which the addressee resembles (more or less fancifully) the mentioned substance.
It is possible to combine metaphor and irony by imposing on the addressee two stages of or steps in interpretation.
The utterer explicitly conveys, after the addressee has spilled cream over his tie, "You ARE the cream in my coffee, I tellya!" intending his addressee to reach, first, the metaphorical interpretant, if I may use Peirce's and Richards' jargon, 'You are my pride and joy' and then the irony interpretant 'You are my bane.'
My use of 'interpretant' is slightly different, and certainly more natural, than Peirce's.
He uses 'interpretant' for almost anything, and worse, thinking that his addressee will interpret him correctly!
But then 'to interpret' IS a trick!
Meiosis.
Of a man known to have broken up all the furniture, the utterer says
"Smith is a little intoxicated."
The utterer conversationally implies that Smith is intoxicated simpliciter.
Hyperbole.
"Every nice girl loves a sailor"
Since we are discussing song titles. This is an earlier one, a music-hall ditty made famous by a girl!
ALL THE NICE GIRLS LOVE A SAILOR A J Mill & B Scott from 'Ship Ahoy' (1909) When the man o' war or merchant ship comes sailing into port The jolly tar with joy, will sing out, Land Ahoy! With his pockets full of money and a parrot in a cage He smiles at all the pretty girls upon the landing stage... All the nice girls love a sailor All the nice girls love a tar For there's something about a sailor (Well you know what sailors are!) Bright and breezy, free and easy, He's the ladies' pride and joy! He falls in love with Kate and Jane, then he's off to sea again, Ship ahoy! Ship ahoy! He will spend his money freely, and he's generous to his pals, While Jack has got a sou, there's half of it for you, And it's just the same in love and war, he goes through with a smile, And you can trust a sailor, he's a white man (meaning: honest man) all the while! All the nice girls love a sailor All the nice girls love a tar For there's something about a sailor (Well you know what sailors are!) Bright and breezy, free and easy, He's the ladies' pride and joy! He falls in love with Kate and Jane, then he's off to sea again, Ship ahoy! Ship ahoy
"All the nice girls love a sailor, all the nice girls love a tar"
She implies: "For there's something about a sailor; well, you know what sailors are!"
Note that she is also aequivocating:
There is ONE sailor such that all the nice girls love, and there is ONE tar (different substance) such taht all the nice girls love.
(2b)
This or that example in which a conversational maxim, or desideratum of conversational candour ('be trustworthy', 'Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence'), or conversational prohibition of groundless contributions, is blatantly flouted are perhaps NOT easy to find, at least at Oxford.
But the following seems to be a specimen, if not a good one.
The utterer says of Smith's wife,
"She is probably, most likely, I should say, cheating Smith tonight, too."
In a suitable context, or with a suitable gesture or tone of voice, it may be clear that the utterer has no adequate reason for supposing this to be the case.
The addressee, to preserve the assumption that the conversational game is still being played, assumes that the utterer is getting at some related proposition, q, for the acceptance of which the utterer does have a reasonable basis or ground.
The metaphor of a game is not a metaphor.
There's the conversational game (versus the game of conversation), the conversational move, and the conversational rule (not Anscombe's!). And we are the players!
The related proposition, q, might well be that Mrs. Smith is given to deceiving Smith, OR possibly that Mrs. Smith is the sort of person who would not stop short of such conduct.
(3) Examples in which an implicature is achieved by real, as distinct from apparent, violation of the maxim of Relation are perhaps rare, but the following seems to be a good candidate. At a genteel tea party, A says Mrs. Xis an old bag. There is a moment of appalled silence, and then B says The weather has been quite delightful this summer, hasn't it? B has blatantly refused to make what he says relevant to A's preceding remark. He thereby implicates that A's remark should not be discussed and, perhaps more specifically, that A has committed a social gaffe. (4) Examples in which various maximsfalling under the supermaxim 'Be perspirnuus' are flouted Ambiguity. We must remember that we are concerned only with ambiguity that is deliberate, and that the speaker intends or expects to be recognized by his hearer. The problem the hearer has to solve is why a speaker should, when still playing the conversational game, go out of his way to choose an ambiguous utterance. There are two types of cases: (a) Examples in which there is no difference, or no striking difference, between two interpretations of an utterance with respect to straightforwardness; neither interpretation is notably more sophisticated, less standard. LOGIC AND CONVERSATION more recondite or more far-fetched than the other. We might consider Blake's lines: 'Never seek to tell thy love, Love that never told can be.' To avoid the complications introduced by the presence of the imperative mood, I shall consider the related sentence, I sought to tell my love, love that never told can be. There may be a double ambiguity here. My love may refer to either a state of emotion or an object of emotion, and love that never told can be may mean either 'Love that cannot be told' or 'love that if told cannot continue to exist.' Partly because of the sophistication of the poet and partly because of internal evidence (that the ambiguity is kept up), there seems to be no alternative to supposing that the ambiguities are deliberate and that the poet is conveying both what he would be saying if one interpretation were intended rather than the other, and vice versa; though no doubt the poet is not explicitly saying any one of these things but only conveying or suggesting them (cf. 'Since she [nature] pricked thee out for women's pleasure, mine be thy love, and thy love's use their treasure'). (b) Examples in which one interpretation is notably less straightforward than another. Take the complex example of the British General who captured the province of Sind and sent back the message Peccavi. The ambiguity involved ('I have Sind'/'I have sinned') is phonemic, not morphemic; and the expression actually used is unambiguous, but since it is in a language foreign to speaker and hearer, translation is called for, and the ambiguity resides in the standard translation into native English. Whether or not the straightforward interpretant ('I have sinned') is being conveyed, it seems that the nonstraightforward interpretant must be. There might be stylistic reasons for conveying by a sentence merely its nonstraightforward interpretant, but it would be pointless, and perhaps also stylistically objectionable, to go to the trouble of finding an expresion that nonstraightforwardly conveys that p, thus imposing on an audience the effort involved in finding this interpretant, if this interpretant were otiose so far as communication was concerned. Whether the straightforward interpretant is also being conveyed seems to depend on whether such a supposition would conflict with other conversational 313 requirements, for example, would it be relevant, would it be something the speaker could be supposed to accept, and so on. If such requirements are not satisfied, then the straightforward interpretant is not being conveyed. If they are, it is. If the author of Peccavi could naturally be supposed to think that he had committed some kind of transgression, for example, had disobeyed his orders in capturing Sind, and if reference to such a transgression would be relevant to the presumed interests of the audience, then he would have been conveying both interpretants; otherwise he would be conveying only the nonstraightforward one. Obscurity. How do I exploit, for the purposes of communication, a deliberate and overt violation of the requirement that I should avoid obscurity? Obviously, if the Cooperative Principle is to operate, I must intend my partner to understand what I am saying despite the obscurity I import into my utterance. Suppose that A and B are having a conversation in the presence of a third party, for example, a child, then A might be deliberately obscure, though not too obscure, in the hope that B would understand and the third party not. Furthermore, if A expects B to see that A is being deliberately obscure, it seems reasonable to suppose that, in making his conversational contribution in this way, A is implicating that the contents of his communication should not be imparted to the third party. Failure to be brief or succinct. Compare the remarks: (a) Miss X sang 'Home Sweet Home.· (b) Miss X produced a series of sounds that corresponded closely with the score of 'Home Sweet Home.' Suppose that a reviewer has chosen to utter (b) rather than (a). (Gloss: Why has he selected that rigmarole in place of the concise and nearly synonymous sang? Presumably, to indicate some striking difference between Miss X's performance and those to which the word singing is usually applied. The most obvious supposition is that Miss X's performance suffered from some hideous defect. The reviewer knows that this supposition is what is likely to spring to mind, so that is what he is implicating.)
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