H. P. Grice on Reichenbach

On the assumption that this or that problem which originally prompted Davidson's
analysis are at least on their way towards independent solution, we may perhaps
turn out attention to the possibility of providing a constructivist treatment
of [things] which might perhaps have more intuitive appeal than Davidson's
realist approach. We begin with a class H of 'happenstance-attributions', which
will be divided into (b) *basic* happenstance-attributions, i.e. ascriptions to
a subject-item of an attribute which is METABOLICALLY EXPRESSIBLE, and (b)
*non-basic* happenstance-attributions, in which the attributes ascribed, though
not themselves metabolically expressible, are such that their possession by a
subject-item is suitably related to the possession by that or by some other
subject-item, of attributes which _are_ metabolically expressible."

"The members of class H of happenstance attributions may be used to SAY what
'happens' (or 'happens to be the case') without talking about any special
entities belonging to a class of happenings or happenstances."

Grice continues:

"My next stage will involve the introduction of the Reichenbach-operator
("...consists of the fact that...). This operator, when prefixed to a sentence S
which makes a happen-stance attribution to a subject-item, yields a PREDICATE
which will be SATISFIED by an ENTITY which IS a happenstance, provided (a) that
sentence S is true, and (b) provided that some FURTHER METAPHYSICAL CONDITION
obtains, which ensures the metaphysical NECESSITY of the introduction INTO
REALITY of the category of happenstances -- thereby ensuring that this new
category is not just a class of fictions."

As far as the slingshot of Davidson (and the 'hideous consequence' that all
facts become identical -- to one Great Big Fact), Grice comments:

"In the light of my defence of Reichenbach against Davidson's attack, I can
perhaps be reasonably confident that this metaphysical EXTENSION OF REALITY
will NOT saddle us with any intolerable paradox." [_pace_ Helzerman's observation
that the slingshot is not contradictory in the sense that a paradox is, but
merely an unexpected consequence -- not seriously hideous, at that. JLS]

Grice goes on: "What the metaphysical condition mentioned above would be
which would JUSTIFY the metaphysical extension remains, alas, to be determined. It
is tempting to think that it would be connected with a THEORETICAL NEED to
have happenstances as items in, say, causal relations."

Incidentally, I could not find any Google hit for 'salva facticitate', which
makes it a very original and welcoming expression. Also incidentally, I wonder
if Neale's book (Facing Facts) cites Grice's reference -- 'Actions and
Events', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 67, pp. 1-35).