H. P. Grice on G. F. Stout

In 'Voluntary Action' (Mind, vol. 5], G. F. Stout argues that if this or that voluntary action is to be distinguished from this or that *involuntary* action in terms of 'volition', it is necessary to offer a unique account of volition, distinguishing it, perhaps, from will or desire.


Stout suggests that in the case of volition, but not of simple desire, there is necessarily, as Stout puts it (p. 356), 

"a certain kind of judgement or belief," 

viz. that 

"so far as in us lies, we shall bring about the attainment of the desired end."

Variants in first person and in second person. 



Indeed, if there IS  this or that doubt about the outcome of the volition, expressed by means of an utterance incorporating the "if' (horseshoe) operator, this or that doubt must refer to this or that circumstance outside the agent's 
control."

This explains the difference between 'willing' something and merely 'wishing'
for it.

However, there is another crucial distinction between an involuntary action and a voluntary action.

In the case of the voluntary action, the action takes place precisely BECAUSE of
the relevant belief.

A voluntary action happens BECAUSE the agent judges that he *will* do it.


This may seem circular in that 'will' is involved, if only as an 'auxiliary' (etymologically not!)


An *in*-voluntary action may be one the agent judges that is going to take place, but
only because this or that other factor have already determined this.

Grice starts as a neo-Stoutianian and ends up a neo-Prichardian.

In "Disposition and intention," a first criterion for a reductive analysis of 'intending,' akin to Stout's approach in the "Mind" essay, is formulated by Grice as follows.

The utterer's freedom from doubt that the intended action will take place is NOT dependent on any empirical evidence.

It is a negative clause:

It is NOT the case that the agent's freedom from this or that doubt (that his willing will go 'unsatisfied,' or that his intended acting occurs [radix: "The door is closed"] depends on empirical evidence.

This is a bit clumsy.

Freedom depending on evidence?

Grice is subtler. 

It is the agent's BELIEF that is not dependent on empirical (meaning 'external') evidence.

Grice allows for 'introspection' providing evidence.

And what belief is it that is not dependent on 'external', 'sensory,' empirical evidence?

The agent's belief that he is FREE from doubt that his will be done.

I.e. 

The agent holds a belief which is NOT dependent on sensory evidence.

The belief is may be formulated as:

"I am certain THAT p."

Not: "I KNOW that p," because that would be FACTIVE (entailing "p" -- which is anti-Aristotelian.

If in "Causal theory" Grice speaks of a 'doubt' implicatum.

Here is a 'absence of doubt' implicatum.


There is an interesting point with the Stoutian view that may have motivated Grice, just to provoke, to become a neo-Prichardian.

Hamphsire's and Hart's claims in THEIR "Mind" essay, "Decision, intention, and certainty" (vol. 66) are similar to those of Stout.

I. e. Hampshire and Hart are neo-Stoutians.

This should give Grice enough reason to become a neo-Prichardian!


The prefix "neo-" is very appropriate here.

Especially as it applies to Hampshire and Hart!

Stout is representative of a style of Oxford philosophy, that some regarded as complete with sweeping generalisations and moralistic musings.

On top, Grice would hardly regard Stout as a 'philosopher.' Like William James, Stout is more of a 'psychologist,' and aiming to be a 'scientific,' rather than a 'philosophical psychologist,' at that!

A quote from his "Manual of psychology" (or "Immanuel of Psychologia Rationalis," as Grice dubbed it) where he refers to the 'true self,' in ways that sort of underestimate what D. F. Pears will later say about Freud's id, ego, and superego -- may testify to this.

In discussing the tendency of voluntary
determination to endure over time and again obstacles, Stout comments:

"If we
are weak [as per 'akrasia'] and vacillating [doubtful, UNCERTAIN, as per title of Grice's neo-Prichardian update] no one will depend on us."

"We shall be viewed
with a kind of contempt."

"Mere vanity may go far to give fixity to the will." 
(p.359 ).

In any case, Grice ended up, as we say, developing a neo-Prichardian line to the
alternate, shall we say, neo-Stoutian view he had endorsed in his early
"Disposition and intention" and which he perceived in Hampshire's and Hart's
"Decision, intention, and certainty", and which will have him providing a yet
different analysis of 'intention' in his own "Intention and Uncertainty".

The Stout connection is made prominent by Harman, too, who has
studied these things under Grice, when Grice visited Princeton. Harman would not travel -- much, but he does cite a seminar he attended at Brandeis by Grice on 'trying': "The athlete who pushes a wall is not trying to topple it, just to gain muscle, so one can very well say that he TRIES without intending to succeed!" 

Vide Harman's contribution to the Grice festschrift, "Willing
and intending", in Grandy/Warner, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality:
Intentions, Categories, Ends.

Or not!