H. P. Grice
St. John's, Oxford
H. P. Grice, M. A. Lit. Hum., FBA, Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, St. John's, Oxford.
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The H. P. Grice Papers
Oxford, etc.
Oxford, etc.
The number of containers is 10 cartons Linear feet: 12.5.
The H. P. Grice Papers consist of the publications, unpublications, and correspondence by English philosopher H. P. Grice, during his years at Corpus Christi, Merton, and St. John's, Oxford -- and beyond.
His published oeuvre includes Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, Mass. and London, Harvard University Press), The Conception of Value (Clarendon) and Aspects of Reason (Clarendon).
His essays are published in periodical publications such as, Mind, The Philosophical Review, The Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, The Foundations of Language, The Proceedings of The British Academy, The Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, and The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Many of Grice's essays are reprinted in compilations, including Warnock's The Philosophy of Perception, Butler's Analytic Philosophy, Perry's Personal Identity, Davidson's and Hintikka's Word and object, and Hintikka's and Vermazen, Actions and Events.
His published oeuvre includes Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, Mass. and London, Harvard University Press), The Conception of Value (Clarendon) and Aspects of Reason (Clarendon).
His essays are published in periodical publications such as, Mind, The Philosophical Review, The Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, The Foundations of Language, The Proceedings of The British Academy, The Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, and The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Many of Grice's essays are reprinted in compilations, including Warnock's The Philosophy of Perception, Butler's Analytic Philosophy, Perry's Personal Identity, Davidson's and Hintikka's Word and object, and Hintikka's and Vermazen, Actions and Events.
Included in the Grice Papers are extensive notes and research Grice conducts on theories of semantics and theories of reason, trust, and value.
Grice's most popular lectures, including The John Locke Lectures on Aspects of reason at Oxford, The William James Lectures on Logic and conversation at Harvrd, The Paul Carus Lectures on The Conception of Value, Urbana lectures, and The Immanuel Kant Lectures at Stanford are all documented both as drafts and finalised forms of transcripts, and also in audio files within the collection.
H. P. Grice's list of contributions during his philosophical career include The William James Lectures on Logic and Conversation at Harvard, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," in The Philosophical Review, "The Urbana Lectures," "Logic and Conversation" (in Davidson and Harman, "Logic and Grammar"), The Immanuel Kant Lectures at Stanford, The John Locke Lectures at Oxfford, and The Paul Carus Lectures on The Conception of Value.
Grice's publications and unpublications are compilations of his extensive research performed mainly in the philosophy of language, but also in metaphysics, Aristotelian philosophy, philosophical psychology, and ethics.
Grice is attributed with coining the word "implicature" to describe a dimension of utterer's meaning, and for defining his own paradox known as "Grice's paradox," introduced in Grice's "Studies in the Way of Words," a compilation of his essays.
Included in the H. P. Grice collection is Grice's research on Aristotelian philosophy with J. Baker and metaphysics with P. F. Strawson and G. Myro, his other research focusing on philosopical psychology, with D. F. Pears, with such subjects as perception, with G. J. Warnock, and intention.
Also included in The Grice Papers is documentation of Grice's involvement with The Aristotelian Society, The British Academy, and The American Philosophical Association.
Container List
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Series I
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The Correspondence of H. P. Grice
Physical Description:
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF H. P. GRICE
Carton 1
Folders 1-15.
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF H. P. GRICE
Carton 1
Folders 1-15.
The correspondence of H. P. Grice is arranged alphabetically according to surname of correspondent, followed by correspondence of a more general, sometimes administrative, kind.
Scope and Content
Note
Note
"Series I: The Correspondence of H. P. Grice" includes correspondence with philosophers such as J. Baker, G. P. Bealer, R. O. Warner, and R. Wyatt, addressing various forms of his research on philosophy.
Carton 1
Folder 1
Folder 1
Correspondenc with J. F. Bennett, of Oxford.
Carton 1, Folder 2
Bennett quotes Grice in his "Linguistic Behavioiur."
Grice quotes Bennett in the "Foreword" to Studies in the Way of Words.
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Bennett quotes Grice in his "Linguistic Behavioiur."
Grice quotes Bennett in the "Foreword" to Studies in the Way of Words.
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Correspondence with J. Baker
Carton 1
Folder 3
Grice and Baker collaborated mainly on work on ethics seen as an offspring, alla Kant, of philosophical psychology. Baker contributes to P. G. R. I. C. E., a festschrift for Grice ("Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends") with an essay on the purity, and alleged lack thereof of, of morally evaluable motives ("Do one's motives have to be pure?"). Baker also contributed to a volume on Grice's honour published by Palgrave, Meaning and analysis: essays on H. P. Grice.
Baker is the organiser of a symposium on the thought of H. P. Grice for the American Philosophical Association. Proceedings in The Journal of Philosophy -- The chair is J. F. Bennett, with contributions by Baker, R. Grandy, and comments by R. Stalnaker and R. Warner.
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Folder 3
Grice and Baker collaborated mainly on work on ethics seen as an offspring, alla Kant, of philosophical psychology. Baker contributes to P. G. R. I. C. E., a festschrift for Grice ("Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends") with an essay on the purity, and alleged lack thereof of, of morally evaluable motives ("Do one's motives have to be pure?"). Baker also contributed to a volume on Grice's honour published by Palgrave, Meaning and analysis: essays on H. P. Grice.
Baker is the organiser of a symposium on the thought of H. P. Grice for the American Philosophical Association. Proceedings in The Journal of Philosophy -- The chair is J. F. Bennett, with contributions by Baker, R. Grandy, and comments by R. Stalnaker and R. Warner.
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Correspondence with G. P. Bealer
Carton 1
Folder 4
Bealer refers to Grice in his influential Clarendon essay on content. Bealer is concerned with how 'pragmatic inference' may intrude in the ascription of a psychological state, attitude, or stance.
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Folder 4
Bealer refers to Grice in his influential Clarendon essay on content. Bealer is concerned with how 'pragmatic inference' may intrude in the ascription of a psychological state, attitude, or stance.
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Correspondence with A. D. Code
Carton 1
Folders 5-6
Grice saw in Code an excellent Aristotelian. They collaborated on an exploration of Aristotle's underlying logic of essential and non-essential predication, for which they would freely use such verbal forms as 'izzing' and 'hazzing.'
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Folders 5-6
Grice saw in Code an excellent Aristotelian. They collaborated on an exploration of Aristotle's underlying logic of essential and non-essential predication, for which they would freely use such verbal forms as 'izzing' and 'hazzing.'
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Correspondence with P. Suppes
Carton 1
Folders 7-8
Suppes was involved in the P. G. R. I. C. E., and contributed an excellent "The Primacy of Utterer's Meaning," where he addresses what he rightly sees as unfair characterisations of Grice as a behaviourist by three philosophers: Yu, Biro, and Chomsky. (Biro was able to reply to Suppes's commentary on Grice as proposing a reductive but not reductionist analysis of meaning).
Folders 7-8
Suppes was involved in the P. G. R. I. C. E., and contributed an excellent "The Primacy of Utterer's Meaning," where he addresses what he rightly sees as unfair characterisations of Grice as a behaviourist by three philosophers: Yu, Biro, and Chomsky. (Biro was able to reply to Suppes's commentary on Grice as proposing a reductive but not reductionist analysis of meaning).
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Correspondence with R. O. Warner,
Correspondence with R. O. Warner,
Carton 1
Folder 9
Warner was especially helpful with Grice's third difficult Carus lecture, a metaphysical defence of absolute value.
Warner also connected with Grice in such topics as the philosophy of perception (seen in an evolutionary light) and the Kantotelian idea of happiness.
In response to Warner's overview of Grice's oeuvre for the festschrift (that Warner co-authored with Grandy), Grice refers to the editors by the collective name of "Richards."
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Folder 9
Warner was especially helpful with Grice's third difficult Carus lecture, a metaphysical defence of absolute value.
Warner also connected with Grice in such topics as the philosophy of perception (seen in an evolutionary light) and the Kantotelian idea of happiness.
In response to Warner's overview of Grice's oeuvre for the festschrift (that Warner co-authored with Grandy), Grice refers to the editors by the collective name of "Richards."
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Correspondence with R. Wyatt
Carton 1
Folders 10-12
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Folders 10-12
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Correspondence: Other.
Carton 1
Folders 13-14
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Folders 13-14
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Correspondence: Other.
Carton 1, Folder 15
Various published essays on Grice.
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Series II
Some Selected Publications
Physical Description:
Carton 1 (folders 16-31)
Cartons 2-4.
Carton 1 (folders 16-31)
Cartons 2-4.
These essays by Grice are arranged chronologically.
However, for those "n. d." publications, the order is alphabetical by keyword and/or title.
However, for those "n. d." publications, the order is alphabetical by keyword and/or title.
Scope and Content
Note
Note
Series II, "Grice's Selected Publications" includes published essays.
The Series also contains drafts and notes that accompany the publication of the essays, some unpublished essays, along with their drafts and/or notes, and published transcripts of his various lectures (William James, Urbana, Carus, John Locke).
Also included in Series II is Grice's volume for Harvard University Press, "Studies in the Way of Words" a compilation of his most influential essays, including, "Meaning" (The Philosophical Review) "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions" (The Philosophical Review) and "Logic and Conversation" (in Davidson's and Harman's "Logic and Grammar.")
The Series also contains drafts and notes that accompany the publication of the essays, some unpublished essays, along with their drafts and/or notes, and published transcripts of his various lectures (William James, Urbana, Carus, John Locke).
Also included in Series II is Grice's volume for Harvard University Press, "Studies in the Way of Words" a compilation of his most influential essays, including, "Meaning" (The Philosophical Review) "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions" (The Philosophical Review) and "Logic and Conversation" (in Davidson's and Harman's "Logic and Grammar.")
Carton 1
Folder 16
Folder 16
"Meaning"
The Oxford Philosophical Society.
Published in "The Philosophical Review."
AUTHORS CITED:
STEVENSON, C. L.
"Meaning" develops out of an interest by H. P. Grice on the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. In his essays on Peirce, Grice quotes from many other authors, including, besides Peirce, Ogden and Richards, and Ewing.
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The Oxford Philosophical Society.
Published in "The Philosophical Review."
AUTHORS CITED:
STEVENSON, C. L.
"Meaning" develops out of an interest by H. P. Grice on the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. In his essays on Peirce, Grice quotes from many other authors, including, besides Peirce, Ogden and Richards, and Ewing.
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Carton 1
Folders 17-18
Folders 17-18
"Meaning Revisited"
This is the title H. P. Grice chose for a contribution to a symposium at Brighton organised by N. V. Smith.
It comprises three sections.
Grice is concerned with the application of his "M. O. R.," or "Modified Occam's Razor" to the lexeme, "mean."
The also explores an 'evolutionary' model of creature construction reaching a stage of non-iconic representation.
Finally, Grice attempts to construct 'meaning' as a 'value-paradeigmatic' notion.
A version was published in the proceedings of the Brighton symposium, by Croom Helm, London.
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This is the title H. P. Grice chose for a contribution to a symposium at Brighton organised by N. V. Smith.
It comprises three sections.
Grice is concerned with the application of his "M. O. R.," or "Modified Occam's Razor" to the lexeme, "mean."
The also explores an 'evolutionary' model of creature construction reaching a stage of non-iconic representation.
Finally, Grice attempts to construct 'meaning' as a 'value-paradeigmatic' notion.
A version was published in the proceedings of the Brighton symposium, by Croom Helm, London.
***
Carton 1, Folder 19
Oxford Philosophy
Linguistic Botanising
By "Oxford Philosophy," H. P. Grice notably refers to J. L. Austin's Play Group, of which he was a member.
This, to some, infamous, playgroup, met on Saturday mornings at different venues at Oxford, including Grice's own St. John's -- apparently, Austin's favourite venue.
Austin regarded himself and his 'kindergarten' as 'linguistic' or 'language' *botanists*.
The idea was to list various 'ordinary' uses of this or that 'philosophical notion."
Austin: "They say philosophy is about language; well, then, let's botanise!"
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Linguistic Botanising
By "Oxford Philosophy," H. P. Grice notably refers to J. L. Austin's Play Group, of which he was a member.
This, to some, infamous, playgroup, met on Saturday mornings at different venues at Oxford, including Grice's own St. John's -- apparently, Austin's favourite venue.
Austin regarded himself and his 'kindergarten' as 'linguistic' or 'language' *botanists*.
The idea was to list various 'ordinary' uses of this or that 'philosophical notion."
Austin: "They say philosophy is about language; well, then, let's botanise!"
***
Carton 1
Folder 20
Folder 20
"Descartes on 'Clear and Distinct Perception'"
H. P. Grice is interested in contesting A. J. Ayer and other Oxford philosophers, on the topic of a criterion for 'certainty.'
In so doing, Grice choses Descartes's time-honoured criterion of 'clarity' and 'distinction,' as applied to perception.
In the proceedings, Grice distinguishes between two 'kinds' of certainty apparently ignored by Descartes:
(a) OBJECTIVE CERTAINTY:
Ordinary-language variant:
"It is certain that p."
-- whatever "it" refers to.
(b) SUBJECTIVE CERTAINTY:
Ordinary-language variant:
"I am certain that p."
-- "I" being, of course, Grice, "in my bestest days, of course!"
***
Grice found Descartes very funny -- in a French way!
H. P. Grice is interested in contesting A. J. Ayer and other Oxford philosophers, on the topic of a criterion for 'certainty.'
In so doing, Grice choses Descartes's time-honoured criterion of 'clarity' and 'distinction,' as applied to perception.
In the proceedings, Grice distinguishes between two 'kinds' of certainty apparently ignored by Descartes:
(a) OBJECTIVE CERTAINTY:
Ordinary-language variant:
"It is certain that p."
-- whatever "it" refers to.
(b) SUBJECTIVE CERTAINTY:
Ordinary-language variant:
"I am certain that p."
-- "I" being, of course, Grice, "in my bestest days, of course!"
***
Carton 1, Folders 21-23
"Logic and Conversation"
"Logica" had been part of the 'trivium' for ages -- "Although they called it 'dialectica,' then."
Moved by P. F. Strawson's treatment of the 'formal' devices in "Introduction to Logical Theory," Grice targets these, in their 'ordinary-discourse' counterparts.
Grice attempts to reconcile Strawson's observations with the idea that the 'formal' devices reproduce some sort of 'explicatum,' or 'explicitum,' as identified by Whitehead and Russell in "Principia Mathematica."
In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general features of discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation.
The alleged divergence between the 'ordinary-language' operators and their 'formal' counterparts is explained in terms of the CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATA, then. I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has to ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal device and its alleged 'ordinary-language' counterpart, while still assuming that U is engaged in a co-operative transaction.
Utterer and addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation -- the exchange of information and the institution of decisions -- and judging that conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and rational) if conducted under some form of principle of 'conversational helpfulness.'
***
"Logica" had been part of the 'trivium' for ages -- "Although they called it 'dialectica,' then."
Moved by P. F. Strawson's treatment of the 'formal' devices in "Introduction to Logical Theory," Grice targets these, in their 'ordinary-discourse' counterparts.
Grice attempts to reconcile Strawson's observations with the idea that the 'formal' devices reproduce some sort of 'explicatum,' or 'explicitum,' as identified by Whitehead and Russell in "Principia Mathematica."
In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general features of discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation.
The alleged divergence between the 'ordinary-language' operators and their 'formal' counterparts is explained in terms of the CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATA, then. I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has to ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal device and its alleged 'ordinary-language' counterpart, while still assuming that U is engaged in a co-operative transaction.
Utterer and addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation -- the exchange of information and the institution of decisions -- and judging that conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and rational) if conducted under some form of principle of 'conversational helpfulness.'
"The observation of a principle of conversational helpfulness is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: anyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participating in a conversation that will be profitable ONLY on the assumption that it is conducted in general accordance with a principle of conversational helpfulness."
Carton 1, Folders 24-26
The William James Lectures
"I hope they don't expect me to lecture on James!"
Grice admired James, but not vice versa.
Grice entitled the set as being "Logic and Conversation." That is the title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing that it was way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the second lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and Harman, "Logic and Grammar."
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"I hope they don't expect me to lecture on James!"
Grice admired James, but not vice versa.
Grice entitled the set as being "Logic and Conversation." That is the title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing that it was way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the second lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and Harman, "Logic and Grammar."
***
Carton 1
Folder 27
Folder 27
"Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning"
The phrase 'utterer' is meant to provoke. Grice thinks that 'speaker' is too narrow. "Surely you can mean by just UTTERING stuff!"
This is the sixth William James lecture, as published in "The Foundations of Language."
As it happens, it became a popular lecture, seeing that J. R. Searle selected this from the whole set for his Oxford reading in philosophy, "The philosophy of language."
It is also the essay cited by Chomsky in his influential John Locke lectures.
Chomsky takes Grice to be a 'behaviourist,' even along Skinner's lines, which provoked a reply by Suppes, later reprinted in P. G. R. I. C. E., or Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends.
(In The New World, the "H. P." was often given in a more "simplified" form.)
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The phrase 'utterer' is meant to provoke. Grice thinks that 'speaker' is too narrow. "Surely you can mean by just UTTERING stuff!"
This is the sixth William James lecture, as published in "The Foundations of Language."
As it happens, it became a popular lecture, seeing that J. R. Searle selected this from the whole set for his Oxford reading in philosophy, "The philosophy of language."
It is also the essay cited by Chomsky in his influential John Locke lectures.
Chomsky takes Grice to be a 'behaviourist,' even along Skinner's lines, which provoked a reply by Suppes, later reprinted in P. G. R. I. C. E., or Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends.
(In The New World, the "H. P." was often given in a more "simplified" form.)
***
Carton 1
Folders 28-30
Folders 28-30
"Utterer's Meaning and Intentions"
Grice is not an animist. While he allows for natural phenomena to mean ("smoke means fire"), 'meaning' is best ascribed to some utterer, where this 'meaning' is nothing but the intentions behind his utterance.
This is the fifth William James lecture. Grice was careful enough to submit it to "The Philosophical Review," since it is a strictly philosophical development of the views expressed in "Meaning" which Strawson had submitted on Grice's behalf to the same "Review" and which had had a series of responses by various philosophers
Among these philosophers is Strawson himself in "Intention and convention in the the theory of speech acts," also in "The Philosophical Review."
Grice quotes from very many other philosophers in this essay, including:
J. O. Urmson
D. W. Stampe
P. F. Strawson
S. R. Schiffer
J. R. Searle
P. F. Strawson is especially relevant since he started a series of alleged counter-examples with his infamous example of the 'rat-infested house.'
Anita Avramides wrote her Oxon D.Phil on that, under Strawson!
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Grice is not an animist. While he allows for natural phenomena to mean ("smoke means fire"), 'meaning' is best ascribed to some utterer, where this 'meaning' is nothing but the intentions behind his utterance.
This is the fifth William James lecture. Grice was careful enough to submit it to "The Philosophical Review," since it is a strictly philosophical development of the views expressed in "Meaning" which Strawson had submitted on Grice's behalf to the same "Review" and which had had a series of responses by various philosophers
Among these philosophers is Strawson himself in "Intention and convention in the the theory of speech acts," also in "The Philosophical Review."
Grice quotes from very many other philosophers in this essay, including:
J. O. Urmson
D. W. Stampe
P. F. Strawson
S. R. Schiffer
J. R. Searle
P. F. Strawson is especially relevant since he started a series of alleged counter-examples with his infamous example of the 'rat-infested house.'
Anita Avramides wrote her Oxon D.Phil on that, under Strawson!
***
"Vacuous Names"
Grice's favourite vacuous name is Bellerophon.
This is an essay commissioned by Donald Davison and Jaako Hintikka for "Words and objects: essays in the work of W. V. Quine" for Reidel.
"Words and objects" had appeared (without Grice's contribution) as a special issue of "Synthese." Grice's contribution, along with Quine's "Reply to H. P. Grice," appeared only in the reprint of that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht.
Grice cites from various philosophers (and logicians -- this was the time when logic was starting to be taught OUTSIDE philosophy departments, or 'sub-faculties'), such as
G. Myro
B. Mates
K. S. Donnellan
P. F. Strawson
Carton 2, Folders 1-4
Grice's favourite vacuous name is Bellerophon.
This is an essay commissioned by Donald Davison and Jaako Hintikka for "Words and objects: essays in the work of W. V. Quine" for Reidel.
"Words and objects" had appeared (without Grice's contribution) as a special issue of "Synthese." Grice's contribution, along with Quine's "Reply to H. P. Grice," appeared only in the reprint of that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht.
Grice cites from various philosophers (and logicians -- this was the time when logic was starting to be taught OUTSIDE philosophy departments, or 'sub-faculties'), such as
G. Myro
B. Mates
K. S. Donnellan
P. F. Strawson
Carton 2, Folders 1-4
"Vacuous Names"
Grice takes the opportunity, in his tribute to Quine, to introduce one of two of his syntactical devices to allow for conversational implicata to be given maximal scope.
The device in "Vacuous Names" is a subscription device to indicate the ordering of introduction of this or that operation.
Grice wants to give room for utterances of a special 'existential' kind be deemed rational/reasonable, provided the principle of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the addressee to be followed by the utterer.
"Someone isn't attending the party organised by the Merseyside Geographical Society."
"That is Marmaduke Bloggs, who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees."
"But who, as it happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at The Merseyside Newsletter."
***
Grice takes the opportunity, in his tribute to Quine, to introduce one of two of his syntactical devices to allow for conversational implicata to be given maximal scope.
The device in "Vacuous Names" is a subscription device to indicate the ordering of introduction of this or that operation.
Grice wants to give room for utterances of a special 'existential' kind be deemed rational/reasonable, provided the principle of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the addressee to be followed by the utterer.
"Someone isn't attending the party organised by the Merseyside Geographical Society."
"That is Marmaduke Bloggs, who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees."
"But who, as it happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at The Merseyside Newsletter."
***
Carton 2, Folders 5-7
Urbana Lectures
Grice continues with the elaboration of a formal calculus. He originally baptised it "System Q" in honour of Quine.
At a later stage, Myro will re-name it "System G," in a special version, "System GHP," a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of System G," "in gratitude to Grice."
***
Grice continues with the elaboration of a formal calculus. He originally baptised it "System Q" in honour of Quine.
At a later stage, Myro will re-name it "System G," in a special version, "System GHP," a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of System G," "in gratitude to Grice."
***
Carton 2, Folder 8
Urbana Lectures (continued).
Carton 2, Folders 9-10
"Intention and Uncertainty"
This is the Henriette Herz British Academy lecture, and as such published in The Proceedings of the British Academy.
Grice calls himself a neo-Prichardian (after the Oxford philosopher) and cares to quote from a few other philosophers -- some of whom he was not necessarily associated with: such as Kenny and Anscombe, and some of whom he was, notably D. F. Pears.
Grice quotes Pears as a philosopher he found especially congenial to explore areas in what both called 'philosophical psychology,' notably the tricky use of 'intending' as made by a few philosophers even in their own circle (such as Hampshire and Hart in "Intention, decision, and certainty."
The title of Grice's lecture is meant to provoke those philosophers who were too ready to bring in 'certainty' in an area that requires deep philosophical exploration.
***
This is the Henriette Herz British Academy lecture, and as such published in The Proceedings of the British Academy.
Grice calls himself a neo-Prichardian (after the Oxford philosopher) and cares to quote from a few other philosophers -- some of whom he was not necessarily associated with: such as Kenny and Anscombe, and some of whom he was, notably D. F. Pears.
Grice quotes Pears as a philosopher he found especially congenial to explore areas in what both called 'philosophical psychology,' notably the tricky use of 'intending' as made by a few philosophers even in their own circle (such as Hampshire and Hart in "Intention, decision, and certainty."
The title of Grice's lecture is meant to provoke those philosophers who were too ready to bring in 'certainty' in an area that requires deep philosophical exploration.
***
Carton 2, Folder 11
"Probability, Desirability, and Mode Operators"
"Probability, Desirability, and Mode Operators"
Grice had been freely using the very English 'mood' until J. M. E Moravsik, of all people, corrected him:
"What you mean ain't a 'mood.'"
"I shall call it 'mode' just to please you, J. M. E."
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Carton 2, Folders 12-13
The Paul Carus Lectures on the conception of value.
"I
CARUS"
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"I
CARUS" ***
Carton 2
Folders 14-16
Folders 14-16
The Paul Carus Lectures on the conception of value.
Grice was undecided as to what his Paul Carus lectures were be on.
He had explored 'meaning' under its 'value' "optimality" guise in "Meaning revisited."
Grice thought that introducing 'value-paradeigmatic' notions would allow him to respond in a more apt way to what some critics were raising as a possible 'vicious circle' in his approach to 'semantic' and 'psychological' notions.
The Carus lectures are then dedicated to the 'construction,' alla Hume, of 'value-paradeigmatic' notions, and value itself.
Grice starts by quoting Austin and J. L. Mackie, of Oxford.
The lectures are intended to a general audience, provided it is a *philosophical* general audience!
Most of the second lecture is Grice's subtle exploration of Kant's categorical imperative, with which he had struggled in the last John Locke lecture on aspects of reasoning -- notably the 'reduction' of the categorical imperative to this or that 'counsel of prudence' with an implicated protasis to the effect that the agent is aiming at 'eudaimonia.'
***
Grice was undecided as to what his Paul Carus lectures were be on.
He had explored 'meaning' under its 'value' "optimality" guise in "Meaning revisited."
Grice thought that introducing 'value-paradeigmatic' notions would allow him to respond in a more apt way to what some critics were raising as a possible 'vicious circle' in his approach to 'semantic' and 'psychological' notions.
The Carus lectures are then dedicated to the 'construction,' alla Hume, of 'value-paradeigmatic' notions, and value itself.
Grice starts by quoting Austin and J. L. Mackie, of Oxford.
The lectures are intended to a general audience, provided it is a *philosophical* general audience!
Most of the second lecture is Grice's subtle exploration of Kant's categorical imperative, with which he had struggled in the last John Locke lecture on aspects of reasoning -- notably the 'reduction' of the categorical imperative to this or that 'counsel of prudence' with an implicated protasis to the effect that the agent is aiming at 'eudaimonia.'
***
Carton 2
Folders 17-18
Folders 17-18
"Reply to Davidson on 'Intending'"
Grice and Davidson were members of "The Grice and Davidson Mutual Admiration Society."
Davidson, not being Oxonian, was perhaps not acquainted with Grice's polemics at Oxford with Hart and Hampshire (where Grice sided with Pears, rather).
Grice and Pears hold a 'minimalist' approach to 'intending.'
On the other hand, Davidson makes what Grice sees as 'the same mistake' again of BUILDING 'certainty' into the concept.
Grice finds that to apply the idea of a conversational IMPLICATUM at this point is 'too social to be true.'
Rather, Grice prefers to coin the conversational DISIMPLICATUM:
Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees.
The utterance above, if merely reporting what Bloggs thinks, may involve a 'loose' use of "intends."
The certainty on the agent's part on the success of his enterprise is thus cast with doubt.
Davidson was claiming that the agent's belief in the probability of the object of the agent's intention was a mere conversational IMPLICATUM on the utterer's part.
Grice responds that the ascription of such a belief is an ENTAILMENT of a strict use of 'intend,' even if, in cases where the utterer aims at a conversational DISIMPLICATUM, it can be 'dropped.'
The addressee will still regard the utterer as abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness.
Keywords: INTENDING, BELIEVING.
***
Grice and Davidson were members of "The Grice and Davidson Mutual Admiration Society."
Davidson, not being Oxonian, was perhaps not acquainted with Grice's polemics at Oxford with Hart and Hampshire (where Grice sided with Pears, rather).
Grice and Pears hold a 'minimalist' approach to 'intending.'
On the other hand, Davidson makes what Grice sees as 'the same mistake' again of BUILDING 'certainty' into the concept.
Grice finds that to apply the idea of a conversational IMPLICATUM at this point is 'too social to be true.'
Rather, Grice prefers to coin the conversational DISIMPLICATUM:
Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees.
The utterance above, if merely reporting what Bloggs thinks, may involve a 'loose' use of "intends."
The certainty on the agent's part on the success of his enterprise is thus cast with doubt.
Davidson was claiming that the agent's belief in the probability of the object of the agent's intention was a mere conversational IMPLICATUM on the utterer's part.
Grice responds that the ascription of such a belief is an ENTAILMENT of a strict use of 'intend,' even if, in cases where the utterer aims at a conversational DISIMPLICATUM, it can be 'dropped.'
The addressee will still regard the utterer as abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness.
Keywords: INTENDING, BELIEVING.
***
Carton 2, Folders 19-21
"Method in Philosophical Psychology: from the banal to the bizarre"
Grice was forever grateful to Carnap for having coined 'pirot.' ("Or having thought to have coined. Apparently, someone had used the expression before him to mean some sort of exotic fish.")
Grice wasn't sure what his presidential address to the American Philosophical Association will be about.
He chose "the banal" (i.e. the 'ordinary-language' counterpart of something like a 'need' we ascribe to a squirrel to gobble nuts) and the 'bizarre': the philosopher's construction of 'need' and other 'psychological,' now theoretical terms.
In the proceedings, Grice creates the discipline of 'pirotology.'
He cares to mention very many philosophers: Aristotle, D. K. Lewis, G. Myro, L. Witters, F. R. Ramsey, G. Ryle, and a few others!
The essay became popular when, of all people, Ned Block, cited it as a programme in 'functionalism,' which it is!
***
Grice was forever grateful to Carnap for having coined 'pirot.' ("Or having thought to have coined. Apparently, someone had used the expression before him to mean some sort of exotic fish.")
Grice wasn't sure what his presidential address to the American Philosophical Association will be about.
He chose "the banal" (i.e. the 'ordinary-language' counterpart of something like a 'need' we ascribe to a squirrel to gobble nuts) and the 'bizarre': the philosopher's construction of 'need' and other 'psychological,' now theoretical terms.
In the proceedings, Grice creates the discipline of 'pirotology.'
He cares to mention very many philosophers: Aristotle, D. K. Lewis, G. Myro, L. Witters, F. R. Ramsey, G. Ryle, and a few others!
The essay became popular when, of all people, Ned Block, cited it as a programme in 'functionalism,' which it is!
***
Carton 2
Folders 22-23
Folders 22-23
"Incontinence"
"We shouldn't be saying this, but we are saying it!"
Grice prefers 'akrasia,' but he is happy to use Cicero's translation of this.
For Grice, 'akrasia' has to be accounted for by a theory of rationality from the start.
Grice is interested in both the common-or-garden 'boulomaic' version of akrasia, involving the volitive 'soul,' and 'alethic' or doxastic 'akrasia,' involing the judicative soul proper.
***
"We shouldn't be saying this, but we are saying it!"
Grice prefers 'akrasia,' but he is happy to use Cicero's translation of this.
For Grice, 'akrasia' has to be accounted for by a theory of rationality from the start.
Grice is interested in both the common-or-garden 'boulomaic' version of akrasia, involving the volitive 'soul,' and 'alethic' or doxastic 'akrasia,' involing the judicative soul proper.
***
Carton 2
Folder 24
Folder 24
"Further Notes on Logic and Conversation"
"Personally, I prefer 'dialectica.'" -- Grice.
"Personally, I prefer 'dialectica.'" -- Grice.
This is the third William James lecture at Harvard.
It is particularly useful for Grice's introduction of his 'razor,' "M. O. R.," or "Modified Occam's Razor," jocularly expressed by Grice as:
"Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity."
An Englishing of the Ockham's Latinate:
"Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem."
***
Carton 2
Folder 25
It is particularly useful for Grice's introduction of his 'razor,' "M. O. R.," or "Modified Occam's Razor," jocularly expressed by Grice as:
"Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity."
An Englishing of the Ockham's Latinate:
"Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem."
***
Carton 2
Folder 25
"Presupposition and Conversational Implicature"
Grice much preferred Collingwood's to Strawson's presuppositions!
Grice thought, and rightly, too, that if his notion of the conversational implicatum was to gain Oxonian currency, it should supersede Strawson's idea of the 'prae-suppositum.'
Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with Quine's idea of a 'truth-value gap.'
Grice shows that neither the metaphysical concoction of a truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the 'prae-suppositum' is needed:
"The king of France is bald"
ENTAILS 'There is a king of France."
"The king of France ain't bald."
on the other hand, merely IMPLICATES it, as a perfectly adequate cancellation, abiding with the principle of conversational helpfulness" is in the offing:
"The king of France ain't bald. What made you think he is? For starters, he ain't real!"
***
Grice much preferred Collingwood's to Strawson's presuppositions!
Grice thought, and rightly, too, that if his notion of the conversational implicatum was to gain Oxonian currency, it should supersede Strawson's idea of the 'prae-suppositum.'
Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with Quine's idea of a 'truth-value gap.'
Grice shows that neither the metaphysical concoction of a truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the 'prae-suppositum' is needed:
"The king of France is bald"
ENTAILS 'There is a king of France."
"The king of France ain't bald."
on the other hand, merely IMPLICATES it, as a perfectly adequate cancellation, abiding with the principle of conversational helpfulness" is in the offing:
"The king of France ain't bald. What made you think he is? For starters, he ain't real!"
***
Carton 2
Folders 26-28
Folders 26-28
"Freedom and Morality in Kant's Foundations"
Grice was never happy with 'eleutheria,' qua Greek philosophical notion. "To literal to be true?"
Grice was never happy with 'eleutheria,' qua Greek philosophical notion. "To literal to be true?"
By "Foundations," Grice obviously means Kant's essay.
Grice preferred to quote Kant in English. The reason being that Grice was practising "ordinary-language" philosophy; and you cannot expect much 'linguistic botany' in a language other than your own!
Kant was not too 'ordinary' in his use of German, either!
The English translations that Grice used captured, in a way, all that Grice thought was worth capturing in Kant's philosophy.
Kant was not your 'standard' philosopher in the programme Grice was familiar with: Lit. Hum. Oxon.
However, Kant was popular in The New World, where Grice lectured profusely.
***
Carton 2
Folders 29-30
Grice preferred to quote Kant in English. The reason being that Grice was practising "ordinary-language" philosophy; and you cannot expect much 'linguistic botany' in a language other than your own!
Kant was not too 'ordinary' in his use of German, either!
The English translations that Grice used captured, in a way, all that Grice thought was worth capturing in Kant's philosophy.
Kant was not your 'standard' philosopher in the programme Grice was familiar with: Lit. Hum. Oxon.
However, Kant was popular in The New World, where Grice lectured profusely.
***
Carton 2
Folders 29-30
John Locke Lectures "Aspects of Reason"
While Locke hardly mentions 'reason,' his friend Burthogge does, and profusely!
It was slightly ironic that Grice had delivered these lectures as the Rationalist Kant lectures at Stanford.
He was honoured to be invited to Oxford. Officially, to be a John Locke lecture you have to be *visiting* Oxford.
While Grice was a fellow of St. John's, he was still most welcome to give his set of lectures on reasoning at the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy.
He quotes very many authors, including Locke! In his "proemium," Grice notes that while he was rejected the Locke scholarship back in the day, he was extremely happy to be under Locke's aegis now!
While Locke hardly mentions 'reason,' his friend Burthogge does, and profusely!
It was slightly ironic that Grice had delivered these lectures as the Rationalist Kant lectures at Stanford.
He was honoured to be invited to Oxford. Officially, to be a John Locke lecture you have to be *visiting* Oxford.
While Grice was a fellow of St. John's, he was still most welcome to give his set of lectures on reasoning at the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy.
He quotes very many authors, including Locke! In his "proemium," Grice notes that while he was rejected the Locke scholarship back in the day, he was extremely happy to be under Locke's aegis now!
Carton 3, Folders 1-5
Actions and Events
Davidson had published some stuff on 'actions' and 'events,' or 'events and actions,' actually. Davidson's point was that
p.q
It is raining, and it is pouring.
denotes EVENTS. But "Smith went fishing" denotes an 'action,' which is a kind of 'event.'
However, Davidson is fighting against your intuition, if you are a follower of Whitehead and Russell, to symbolise the "Smith" sentence as:
Fs
where 's' stands for Smith and F for 'fishing.'
The logical form of 'event' reports and 'action' reports seems to be slightly more complicated. Davidson's point especially involved 'adverbs':
The horse runs fast
----
Therefore, the horse runs
Grice explores all these topics and submits the thing to "The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly."
He quotes vary many philosophers, not just Davidson, including: Reichenbach, Robinson, and Kant.
Carton 3, Folder 6
Postwar Oxford Philosophy
By "post-war Oxford philosophy," Grice meant the period he was interested in.
While he had been at Corpus, Merton, and St. John's in the pre-war days, for some reason, he felt that he had made history in the post-war period.
The historical reason Grice gives is understandable enough.
In the pre-war days, Grice was the good student and the new fellow of St. John's -- the other one was Mabbott.
But he had not been able to engage in philosophical discussion much, other than with other tutees of Hardie.
AFTER the war, Grice joins Austin's "Saturday mornings."
Indeed, for Grice, 'post-war' means "all philosophy after the war," since he never abandoned the methods he developed under Austin, which were pretty congenial to the ones he had himself displayed in the pre-war days, in essays like "Negation" and "Personal Identity."
By "post-war Oxford philosophy," Grice meant the period he was interested in.
While he had been at Corpus, Merton, and St. John's in the pre-war days, for some reason, he felt that he had made history in the post-war period.
The historical reason Grice gives is understandable enough.
In the pre-war days, Grice was the good student and the new fellow of St. John's -- the other one was Mabbott.
But he had not been able to engage in philosophical discussion much, other than with other tutees of Hardie.
AFTER the war, Grice joins Austin's "Saturday mornings."
Indeed, for Grice, 'post-war' means "all philosophy after the war," since he never abandoned the methods he developed under Austin, which were pretty congenial to the ones he had himself displayed in the pre-war days, in essays like "Negation" and "Personal Identity."
Carton 3, Folders 7-21
"Studies in the Way of Words"
This is the title Grice eventually chooses for his compilation of essays. It is a tribute to Locke.
The 'studies' are organised in two Parts. Part I is "Logic and Conversation" and Part II in "Semantics and Metaphysics."
This is the title Grice eventually chooses for his compilation of essays. It is a tribute to Locke.
The 'studies' are organised in two Parts. Part I is "Logic and Conversation" and Part II in "Semantics and Metaphysics."
Carton 3, Folders 22-25
"Retrospective Foreword"
Grice drops a few words as a 'foreword,' explaining the ordering of essays. He mentions that he hesitated to follow Bennett's suggestion to order the essays chronologically.
Rather, he chose to just publish the whole set of seven William James lectures as Part I.
Part II is organised more or less thematically, though.
Grice drops a few words as a 'foreword,' explaining the ordering of essays. He mentions that he hesitated to follow Bennett's suggestion to order the essays chronologically.
Rather, he chose to just publish the whole set of seven William James lectures as Part I.
Part II is organised more or less thematically, though.
Carton 3, Folder 26
"Retrospective Epilogue"
This is a long exploration by Grice on the many 'strands' he identifies in his own philosophy.
'Strand' should not mislead us.
For Grice, philosophy, like virtue, is entire.
All the strands therefore show some 'latitudinal,' and we hope, 'longitudinal' unity.
By these two types of 'unity,' Grice means the obvious idea that all sub-disciplines of philosophy (philosophy of language, philosophy of perception, philosophical psychology, etc.) interact, and that a historical regard for one's predecessors is a must.
This is a long exploration by Grice on the many 'strands' he identifies in his own philosophy.
'Strand' should not mislead us.
For Grice, philosophy, like virtue, is entire.
All the strands therefore show some 'latitudinal,' and we hope, 'longitudinal' unity.
By these two types of 'unity,' Grice means the obvious idea that all sub-disciplines of philosophy (philosophy of language, philosophy of perception, philosophical psychology, etc.) interact, and that a historical regard for one's predecessors is a must.
Carton 4, Folder 1
"Retrospective Epilogue"
Carton 4, Folder 2
"Retrospective Epilogue and Foreword"
Carton 4, Folders 3-4
"Metaphysics, Philosophical Eschatology, and Plato's Republic"
Grice has one specific essay on Aristotle (published in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly). So he thought Plato merited his own essay, too.
Grice is concerned with a neo-Socratic (versus neo-Thrasymachean) account of 'moral' justice as conceptually prior to 'legal' justice.
In the proceeding, he creates 'philosophical eschatology' as the OTHER branch to metaphysics (along with ontology).
To say that 'just' crosses a categorial barrier (from the moral to the legal) is to utter a metaphysical, strictly eschatological, pronouncement.
Grice has one specific essay on Aristotle (published in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly). So he thought Plato merited his own essay, too.
Grice is concerned with a neo-Socratic (versus neo-Thrasymachean) account of 'moral' justice as conceptually prior to 'legal' justice.
In the proceeding, he creates 'philosophical eschatology' as the OTHER branch to metaphysics (along with ontology).
To say that 'just' crosses a categorial barrier (from the moral to the legal) is to utter a metaphysical, strictly eschatological, pronouncement.
Carton 4, Folder 5
Grice Reprints
Carton 4, Folder 6
"Aristotle on Being and Good"
Grice will explore Aristotle on 'being' in explorations with A. D. Code.
Grice comes up with 'izzing' and 'hazzing' as the two counterparts to Aristotle's views on, respectively, essential and non-essential predication.
Grice's views on Aristotle on 'the good' connect with Grice's Aristotelian idea of 'eudaimonia,' that he explores elsewhere.
Grice will explore Aristotle on 'being' in explorations with A. D. Code.
Grice comes up with 'izzing' and 'hazzing' as the two counterparts to Aristotle's views on, respectively, essential and non-essential predication.
Grice's views on Aristotle on 'the good' connect with Grice's Aristotelian idea of 'eudaimonia,' that he explores elsewhere.
Carton 4, Folder 7
"Aristotle on the Multiplicity of Being"
A thorough discussion of Owens's treatment of Aristotle as leading us to the 'snares' of ontology.
Grice distinguishes between 'izzing' and 'hazzing,' which he thinks help in clarifying, 'more axiomatico,' what Aristotle is getting at with his remarks on 'essential' versus 'non-essential' predication.
Surely, for Grice, being should not be multiplied beyond necessity (but izzing and hazzing ARE already multiplied).
A thorough discussion of Owens's treatment of Aristotle as leading us to the 'snares' of ontology.
Grice distinguishes between 'izzing' and 'hazzing,' which he thinks help in clarifying, 'more axiomatico,' what Aristotle is getting at with his remarks on 'essential' versus 'non-essential' predication.
Surely, for Grice, being should not be multiplied beyond necessity (but izzing and hazzing ARE already multiplied).
Carton 4, Folder 8
"Aristotle: Pleasure"
As a Lit. Hum. Oxon., and especially as a tutee of Hardie at Corpus, Grice was well aware of the centrality of 'hedone' in Aristotle's system.
"Pleasure" is rendered "placitum" (as in "ad placitum") in scholastic philosophy.
But Grice prefers 'agreeable.'
One of Grice's requisites for an ascription of 'eudaimonia,' precisely require that the system of ends an agent chooses to realise be an 'agreeable' one.
Carton 4, Folder 9
"Pleasure" is rendered "placitum" (as in "ad placitum") in scholastic philosophy.
But Grice prefers 'agreeable.'
One of Grice's requisites for an ascription of 'eudaimonia,' precisely require that the system of ends an agent chooses to realise be an 'agreeable' one.
Carton 4, Folder 9
"Conversational Implicature"
Grice's main invention, one which trades on the distinction between what an utterer IMPLIES and what his expression does.
"A distinction apparently denied by Witters, and all too frequently ignored by, of all people, Austin."
Grice is implicating that Austin's sympathies were for the 'subjectification' of "Linguistic Nature."
Grice remains an obdurate individualist, and never loses sight of the distinction that gives rise to the conversational implicatum, which can very well be hyper-contextualised, idiosyncratic, and perfectly particularised!
His Oxonian example:
"I can very well mean that my tutee is to bring me a philosophical essay next week by uttering "It is raining.""
Grice's main invention, one which trades on the distinction between what an utterer IMPLIES and what his expression does.
"A distinction apparently denied by Witters, and all too frequently ignored by, of all people, Austin."
Grice is implicating that Austin's sympathies were for the 'subjectification' of "Linguistic Nature."
Grice remains an obdurate individualist, and never loses sight of the distinction that gives rise to the conversational implicatum, which can very well be hyper-contextualised, idiosyncratic, and perfectly particularised!
His Oxonian example:
"I can very well mean that my tutee is to bring me a philosophical essay next week by uttering "It is raining.""
Carton 4, Folder 10
"Negation"
Grice's reflection, in a verificationist vein, of two types of utterance:
"I don't hear a noise."
"That is not red."
The actual ordering should be the reverse:
"That is not red."
"I don't hear a noise."
Or
"I am not hearing a noise."
Surely, each is co-related to their affirmative counterparts:
"That is red."
"I hear a noise."
Or
"I am hearing a noise."
But when it comes to the psychological state, attitude, or stance, it is easier to co-relate "That is not red" with, say, "That is green."
"That is green."
does NOT feature "not," and it is alleged by Grice to be the source or reason for Utterer U to utter "That is red."
In the case of "I don't hear a noise," the source or reason is the absence, 'verified' by introspetion, of a psychological state, attitude or stance, co-related to the affirmative counterpart,
"I hear a noise."
Or
"I am hearing a noise."
which again, does NOT include the "not" operator.
The first utterance is thus explained in terms of mere sense data; the second, with the aid of introspection ultimately related to sense data ('noise').
Grice could have used,
"I don't see it as red."
Or
"I am not seeing the pillar box as blue."
and unify his account. The important distinction is that "That is not red." does not mention the first-person.
Thus, "I don't hear a noise" seems like an apt utterance to receive an introspective analysis.
In relying on introspection, Grice is being very pre-war Oxonian, at that!
Grice's reflection, in a verificationist vein, of two types of utterance:
"I don't hear a noise."
"That is not red."
The actual ordering should be the reverse:
"That is not red."
"I don't hear a noise."
Or
"I am not hearing a noise."
Surely, each is co-related to their affirmative counterparts:
"That is red."
"I hear a noise."
Or
"I am hearing a noise."
But when it comes to the psychological state, attitude, or stance, it is easier to co-relate "That is not red" with, say, "That is green."
"That is green."
does NOT feature "not," and it is alleged by Grice to be the source or reason for Utterer U to utter "That is red."
In the case of "I don't hear a noise," the source or reason is the absence, 'verified' by introspetion, of a psychological state, attitude or stance, co-related to the affirmative counterpart,
"I hear a noise."
Or
"I am hearing a noise."
which again, does NOT include the "not" operator.
The first utterance is thus explained in terms of mere sense data; the second, with the aid of introspection ultimately related to sense data ('noise').
Grice could have used,
"I don't see it as red."
Or
"I am not seeing the pillar box as blue."
and unify his account. The important distinction is that "That is not red." does not mention the first-person.
Thus, "I don't hear a noise" seems like an apt utterance to receive an introspective analysis.
In relying on introspection, Grice is being very pre-war Oxonian, at that!
Carton 4, Folder 11
"Negation"
Strawson had included a section on 'not' in his "Introduction to Logical Theory."
Grice addresses that point.
Unlike "and," "or," and "if," "not" is a truth-functor (or satisfactory-value-functor) of the unary type.
Grice is interested in applying Cook Wilson's "Statement and inference" to explore what the role of 'not' might be.
And he succeds in finding one. It is explained in terms of the conversational implicatum:
"That's not red."
now IMPLICATES that some utterer has, somewhere, sometime, expressed the contrary opinion.
Strawson had included a section on 'not' in his "Introduction to Logical Theory."
Grice addresses that point.
Unlike "and," "or," and "if," "not" is a truth-functor (or satisfactory-value-functor) of the unary type.
Grice is interested in applying Cook Wilson's "Statement and inference" to explore what the role of 'not' might be.
And he succeds in finding one. It is explained in terms of the conversational implicatum:
"That's not red."
now IMPLICATES that some utterer has, somewhere, sometime, expressed the contrary opinion.
Carton 4, Folder 12
"Personal Identity" (including notes on Hume)
Grice was concerned with issues involved the use of the first person singular ("I will be fighting soon") since his pre-war days at Oxford.
The topic had a special Oxonian pedigree that Grice had occasion to study and explore for his M. A. Lit. Hum.
Locke had famously defended a memory-based account of "I" that had received some alleged counter-example by some Scots philosophers, notably Reid.
In his approach to "I," Grice updates the analysis.
It's now a 'logical construction' of "I" utterances, and relying on Gallie.
Grice uses Broad's taxonomy of "I" utterances, too.
He deals with the Reid-type counterexample, and comes up with a rather elaborate 'analysans' for a simple "I" statement:
"I am hearing a noise."
Grice was concerned with issues involved the use of the first person singular ("I will be fighting soon") since his pre-war days at Oxford.
The topic had a special Oxonian pedigree that Grice had occasion to study and explore for his M. A. Lit. Hum.
Locke had famously defended a memory-based account of "I" that had received some alleged counter-example by some Scots philosophers, notably Reid.
In his approach to "I," Grice updates the analysis.
It's now a 'logical construction' of "I" utterances, and relying on Gallie.
Grice uses Broad's taxonomy of "I" utterances, too.
He deals with the Reid-type counterexample, and comes up with a rather elaborate 'analysans' for a simple "I" statement:
"I am hearing a noise."
Carton 4, Folder 13
"Philosopher's Paradoxes"
While an Oxonian thoroughbred, Grice was a bit like Austin,
"Some like Witters, but Moore's my man."
Grice spends some time exploring what Malcolm has to say about Moore in connection with that particularly "Oxonian" turn of phrase, "ordinary language."
For Moore, a 'paradox' by a 'philosopher' arises when 'Philosopher' fails to abide by the dictates of Ordinary Language.
Grice is totally against this view as TOO BROAD to even claim to be true!
While an Oxonian thoroughbred, Grice was a bit like Austin,
"Some like Witters, but Moore's my man."
Grice spends some time exploring what Malcolm has to say about Moore in connection with that particularly "Oxonian" turn of phrase, "ordinary language."
For Moore, a 'paradox' by a 'philosopher' arises when 'Philosopher' fails to abide by the dictates of Ordinary Language.
Grice is totally against this view as TOO BROAD to even claim to be true!
Carton 4, Folder 14
"A Philosopher's Prospectus"
Carton 4, Folder 15
"Philosophy and Ordinary Language"
Grice never used 'ordinary language' seriously.
Grice never used 'ordinary language' seriously.
The phrase was used, as he explains, by those who HATED 'ordinary-language' philosophy.
There's no such thing as 'ordinary language.'
Surely you cannot fairly describe the idiosyncratic linguistic habits of an Old Cliftonian as even 'remotely' 'ordinary.'
"Extra-ordinary" more likely!
As far as the 'philosophy' bit goes, this is what Bergmann jocularly described as the 'linguistic turn.'
But as Grice notes, the linguistic turn involves both the 'ideal language' and the 'ordinary language.'
Grice defends Austin's choice of the 'ordinary' seeing that 'it was what he had to hand!'
Carton 4, Folder 16
There's no such thing as 'ordinary language.'
Surely you cannot fairly describe the idiosyncratic linguistic habits of an Old Cliftonian as even 'remotely' 'ordinary.'
"Extra-ordinary" more likely!
As far as the 'philosophy' bit goes, this is what Bergmann jocularly described as the 'linguistic turn.'
But as Grice notes, the linguistic turn involves both the 'ideal language' and the 'ordinary language.'
Grice defends Austin's choice of the 'ordinary' seeing that 'it was what he had to hand!'
Carton 4, Folder 16
Some Reflections about Ends and Happiness
For Grice, as for Aristotle, and indeed Kant (Kantotle, in short), a 'telos' and 'eudaimonia' are related in subtle ways.
For 'eudaimonia' we cannot deal with just ONE end, but a system of ends.
(Although such a system may be a singleton).
Grice specifies a subtle way of characterising 'end' so that a particular ascription of an 'end' may ENTAIL an ascription of 'eudaimonia.'
Grice follows the textual criticism of his former tutee, J. L. Ackrill, in connection with the Socratic point that 'eudaimonia' IS literally related to the 'eudaimon.'
For Grice, as for Aristotle, and indeed Kant (Kantotle, in short), a 'telos' and 'eudaimonia' are related in subtle ways.
For 'eudaimonia' we cannot deal with just ONE end, but a system of ends.
(Although such a system may be a singleton).
Grice specifies a subtle way of characterising 'end' so that a particular ascription of an 'end' may ENTAIL an ascription of 'eudaimonia.'
Grice follows the textual criticism of his former tutee, J. L. Ackrill, in connection with the Socratic point that 'eudaimonia' IS literally related to the 'eudaimon.'
Carton 4, Folders 17-25
Reflections on Morals
Grice's explorations on morals are language based. With a substantial knowledge of the classical languages ("that are so good at verb systems like the optative, that English lacks"), Grice explores modals like
"should"
"ought," and
"must"
He is well aware of R. M. Hare's reflections on the 'neustic' qualifications of the 'phrastic.'
"Imperatives" have usually been one source for the philosopher's concern with the language of morals.
Grice attempts to balance this with a similar exploration on 'good,' now regarded as the 'value-paradeigmatic' notion par excellence.
We cannot understand, to echo Strawson, 'the concept of a person' unless we understand the concept of a GOOD person, i.e. the philosopher's conceptION of a good person.
Grice's explorations on morals are language based. With a substantial knowledge of the classical languages ("that are so good at verb systems like the optative, that English lacks"), Grice explores modals like
"should"
"ought," and
"must"
He is well aware of R. M. Hare's reflections on the 'neustic' qualifications of the 'phrastic.'
"Imperatives" have usually been one source for the philosopher's concern with the language of morals.
Grice attempts to balance this with a similar exploration on 'good,' now regarded as the 'value-paradeigmatic' notion par excellence.
We cannot understand, to echo Strawson, 'the concept of a person' unless we understand the concept of a GOOD person, i.e. the philosopher's conceptION of a good person.
Carton 4, Folder 26
"Reply to G. E. M. Anscombe"
Anscombe's views were often discussed by Oxonian philosophers. She had brought Witters to the "Dreaming Spires," as it were.
Grice was especially connected with Anscombe's reflections on 'intention.'
While Grice favoured an approach such as Hampshire, in "Thought and Action," he borrows a few points from Anscombe, notably that of 'direction of fit' (originally Austin's).
Grice explicitly refers to Anscombe in "Intention and uncertainty," and in his reminiscences he hastens to add that Anscombe would never attend any of Austin's Saturday mornings -- as neither would Dummett.
Anscombe's views were often discussed by Oxonian philosophers. She had brought Witters to the "Dreaming Spires," as it were.
Grice was especially connected with Anscombe's reflections on 'intention.'
While Grice favoured an approach such as Hampshire, in "Thought and Action," he borrows a few points from Anscombe, notably that of 'direction of fit' (originally Austin's).
Grice explicitly refers to Anscombe in "Intention and uncertainty," and in his reminiscences he hastens to add that Anscombe would never attend any of Austin's Saturday mornings -- as neither would Dummett.
Carton 4, Folders 27-30
"Reply to Richards"
Grice is playing with the first name of both Warner and Grandy, or Grandy and Warner.
Grice is especially concerned with what 'Richards' see as a commitment on Grice's part to the abstract entity of a 'proposition.'
Grice also deals with the alleged insufficiency in his conceptual analysis of 'reasoning.'
He brings for good measure a point about a potential 'regressus ad infinitum' in his account of a chain of intentions involved in meaning and communicating in general.
Grice is playing with the first name of both Warner and Grandy, or Grandy and Warner.
Grice is especially concerned with what 'Richards' see as a commitment on Grice's part to the abstract entity of a 'proposition.'
Grice also deals with the alleged insufficiency in his conceptual analysis of 'reasoning.'
He brings for good measure a point about a potential 'regressus ad infinitum' in his account of a chain of intentions involved in meaning and communicating in general.
***
Series III
***
Teaching Materials
Physical Description: Carton 5, Carton 6 (folders 1-3)
The items are arranged chronologically. Again, for those "n.d." items, the order is alphabetical.
Scope and Content Note
Series III includes seminars and lectures given during Grice's years at both Oxford and Berkeley, and elsewhere (e.g. Cornell).
Carton 5, Folder 1
Student Notes on Grice's Seminar at Cornell
Historically important in that they predate his Harvard William James lectures which made of him a household name in New-World philosophy.
Historically important in that they predate his Harvard William James lectures which made of him a household name in New-World philosophy.
Carton 5, Folder 2
Grice Seminar
Carton 5, Folder 3
Philosophy with J. Baker
Carton 5, Folder 4
Philosophy
Carton 5, Folders 5-6
Seminar on Kant's Ethical Theory
An exploration of the categorial imperative and its reduction to the hypothetical one.
An exploration of the categorial imperative and its reduction to the hypothetical one.
Carton 5, Folder 7
Seminar on "Aristotle Ethics"
Notably the Nichomachean Ethics.
Notably the Nichomachean Ethics.
Carton 5, Folder 8
Philosophy: Kant Seminar with J. Baker
Notably the categorical imperative.
Notably the categorical imperative.
Carton 5, Folder 9
"Kant's Ethics"
Carton 5, Folders 10-13
Kant Lectures
Carton 5, Folders 14-15
Philosophy
Carton 5, Folders 16-17
"Kant's Ethics"
Carton 5, Folder 18
"Knowledge and Belief"
Two basic psychological states, attitudes, or stances. Grice is concerned with Gettier-type cases, and also the 'factivity' of 'know' versus the non-factivity of 'believe.'
Two basic psychological states, attitudes, or stances. Grice is concerned with Gettier-type cases, and also the 'factivity' of 'know' versus the non-factivity of 'believe.'
Carton 5, Folders 19-21
Kant's Ethics
Carton 5, Folder 22
Philosophy
Grice and Myro
Grice and Myro developed a Geach-type of 'qualified identity.'
The formal aspects were developed by Myro.
Grice discussed Wiggins's "Sameness and substance," rather than Geach.
Grice and Myro
Grice and Myro developed a Geach-type of 'qualified identity.'
The formal aspects were developed by Myro.
Grice discussed Wiggins's "Sameness and substance," rather than Geach.
Carton 5, Folder 23
Notes on Kant
Carton 5, Folder 24
Metaphysics and the Language of Philosophy
Grice had been interested in the methodology of 'metaphysics' from the Oxford days.
He counted as one memorable experience in the area his participation in two episodes for BBC Third Programme on "The nature of metaphysics" with the organiser, D. F. Pears, and his former tutee, P. F. Strawson.
Grice was particularly keen on Collingwood's views on metaphysical presuppositions.
Carton 5, Folder 25
He counted as one memorable experience in the area his participation in two episodes for BBC Third Programme on "The nature of metaphysics" with the organiser, D. F. Pears, and his former tutee, P. F. Strawson.
Grice was particularly keen on Collingwood's views on metaphysical presuppositions.
Carton 5, Folder 25
Seminar on Freedom
The topic of 'freedom' Grice saw as crucial in his elucidation of a rational being. "Conditions of freedom" are necessary for the very idea, as Kant was well aware.
Grice would engage in a bit of language botany, when exploring the ways the adjective 'free' is used, 'freely,' in 'ordinary language': 'free fall,' 'alcohol-free,' 'sugar-free.'
His more systematic reflections deal with 'pirotology, or 'creature construction'. Vegetables, for example are less free than animals. And Humans are more free than non-human.
Grice wants to deal with some of the paradoxes identified by Kant about freedom, and he succeeds in solving some of them.
The topic of 'freedom' Grice saw as crucial in his elucidation of a rational being. "Conditions of freedom" are necessary for the very idea, as Kant was well aware.
Grice would engage in a bit of language botany, when exploring the ways the adjective 'free' is used, 'freely,' in 'ordinary language': 'free fall,' 'alcohol-free,' 'sugar-free.'
His more systematic reflections deal with 'pirotology, or 'creature construction'. Vegetables, for example are less free than animals. And Humans are more free than non-human.
Grice wants to deal with some of the paradoxes identified by Kant about freedom, and he succeeds in solving some of them.
Carton 5, Folder 26
Grice Lectures
Carton 5, Folders 27-28
Seminar on Kant's Ethics
Carton 5, Folder 29
"The Criteria of Intelligence"
In "Aspects of reason," he mentions 'flat' rationality, and certain other 'talents' that are more difficult for the philosopher to conceptualise, such as 'nose' (i.e. intuitiveness), acumen, tenacity, and such.
Grice's approach is 'pirotological.' If Locke had used 'intelligent' to refer to Prince Maurice's parrot, Grice wants to find criteria for 'intelligent' as applied to his favourite type of 'pirot,' rather ("intelligent, indeed rational.")
In "Aspects of reason," he mentions 'flat' rationality, and certain other 'talents' that are more difficult for the philosopher to conceptualise, such as 'nose' (i.e. intuitiveness), acumen, tenacity, and such.
Grice's approach is 'pirotological.' If Locke had used 'intelligent' to refer to Prince Maurice's parrot, Grice wants to find criteria for 'intelligent' as applied to his favourite type of 'pirot,' rather ("intelligent, indeed rational.")
Carton 5, Folder 30
Modest Mentalism
Grice would seldom use 'mind' or 'mental.' His sympathies went for more Grecian terms like 'soul,' i.e. the psyche and the psychological.
Grice would seldom use 'mind' or 'mental.' His sympathies went for more Grecian terms like 'soul,' i.e. the psyche and the psychological.
Carton 5, Folder 31
Topics for Pursuit, Zeno, Socrates
Grice's review of the history of philosophy
Grice's review of the history of philosophy
Carton 6, Folders 1-2
Grice/Staal Seminar, Syntax, Semantics, and Phonetics
Staal was particularly good at this type of 'formalistic' philosophy, which was still adequate to reflect the subtleties of 'ordinary language.'
Staal was particularly good at this type of 'formalistic' philosophy, which was still adequate to reflect the subtleties of 'ordinary language.'
Carton 6, Folder 3
Grice/Staal, "That" Clause
The 'that'-clause was brought to the fore by Davidson, who, consulting the Oxford English Dictionary, reminds philosophers that the English 'that' is VERY cognate with the German idiom.
More specifically, 'that' is a DEMONSTRATIVE, even if the syntax, in English, hides this fact in ways which German syntax doesn't.
Grice NEEDS to rely on 'that'-clauses for his analysis of 'mean,' 'intend,' and notably 'will.'
He finds that Prichard's genial discovery was the license to use 'willing' as pre-facing a 'that'-clause.
This allows Grice to deals with 'willing' as applied to a third person ("I will that he'll win the chess match.")
Philosophers who disregard this 'third-person' use may indulge in introspection and subjectivism when they shouldn't!
The 'that'-clause was brought to the fore by Davidson, who, consulting the Oxford English Dictionary, reminds philosophers that the English 'that' is VERY cognate with the German idiom.
More specifically, 'that' is a DEMONSTRATIVE, even if the syntax, in English, hides this fact in ways which German syntax doesn't.
Grice NEEDS to rely on 'that'-clauses for his analysis of 'mean,' 'intend,' and notably 'will.'
He finds that Prichard's genial discovery was the license to use 'willing' as pre-facing a 'that'-clause.
This allows Grice to deals with 'willing' as applied to a third person ("I will that he'll win the chess match.")
Philosophers who disregard this 'third-person' use may indulge in introspection and subjectivism when they shouldn't!
***
Series IV
***
Professional Associations
Physical Description: Carton 6 (folders 4-12), Carton 10
The items are arranged chronologically.
Scope and Content Note
Series IV includes Kant's Stanford Lectures, various notes and audio tapes of Beanfest, Grice's group research on universalia, and conferences and discussions concerning the American Philosophical Association.
Also includes a carton of cassettes, magnetic recorder tapes, and cassette sets of four on professional talks with George Myro on identities (unqualified and relative), metaphysics, and relatives and Grice's various seminars on his philosophical theories given at different institutions such as Stanford, Berkeley, and Seattle
Also includes a carton of cassettes, magnetic recorder tapes, and cassette sets of four on professional talks with George Myro on identities (unqualified and relative), metaphysics, and relatives and Grice's various seminars on his philosophical theories given at different institutions such as Stanford, Berkeley, and Seattle
Carton 6, Folder 4
APA Symposium -
"Entailment"
The notion had been introduced in the philosophical literature by G. E. Moore.
Grice is especially interested in the "ENTAILMENT + IMPLICATUM" pair.
A philosophical expression may be said to be co-related to an ENTAILMENT (which is rendered in terms of a reductive analysis).
However, the use of the expression may co-relate to this or that IMPLICATUM which is rendered 'reasonable' in the light of the addressee's assumption that the utterer is ultimately abiding by a principle of conversational helfpulness.
Grice thinks many philosophers take an IMPLICATUM as an ENTAILMENT when they surely shouldn't!
"Entailment"
The notion had been introduced in the philosophical literature by G. E. Moore.
Grice is especially interested in the "ENTAILMENT + IMPLICATUM" pair.
A philosophical expression may be said to be co-related to an ENTAILMENT (which is rendered in terms of a reductive analysis).
However, the use of the expression may co-relate to this or that IMPLICATUM which is rendered 'reasonable' in the light of the addressee's assumption that the utterer is ultimately abiding by a principle of conversational helfpulness.
Grice thinks many philosophers take an IMPLICATUM as an ENTAILMENT when they surely shouldn't!
Carton 6, Folders 5-6
Stanford - "Some Aspects of Reason," Kant 1977
The lectures were also delivered as the John Locke lectures.
Grice is concerned with the reduction of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical imperative.
His main thesis he calls the "AEQUI-vocality" thesis:
"must" has only ONE sense, that crossed the 'boulomaic/doxastic' divide.
The lectures were also delivered as the John Locke lectures.
Grice is concerned with the reduction of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical imperative.
His main thesis he calls the "AEQUI-vocality" thesis:
"must" has only ONE sense, that crossed the 'boulomaic/doxastic' divide.
Carton 6, Folder 7
Conferences - Causality Colloquium At Stanford
Grice's exploration on 'cause' are very rich.
He is concerned with some misuse of 'cause' in ordinary language.
If as Hume suggests, to cause is to will, one would say that "The decapitation of Charles I willed his death," which sounds harsh.
Grice later relates 'cause' to the Greek 'aitia,' as he should. He notes collocations like 'rebel without a cause.'
For the Greeks, and the Griceians, it's a CAUSE TO which one should be involved in elucidating.
"A cause to..." connects with the idea of 'freedom.'
Grice was constantly aware of the threat of MECHANISM, and his idea was to provide philosophical room for the idea of 'finality,' which is NOT 'mechanistically derivable.'
This leads him to discussion of overlap and priority of, say, a physical-cum-physiological versus a psychological theory explaining this or that piece of rational behaviour.
He can be Wittgensteinian when citing Anscombe's translation: No psychological concept without the behaviour the concept is brought to explain.
Grice's exploration on 'cause' are very rich.
He is concerned with some misuse of 'cause' in ordinary language.
If as Hume suggests, to cause is to will, one would say that "The decapitation of Charles I willed his death," which sounds harsh.
Grice later relates 'cause' to the Greek 'aitia,' as he should. He notes collocations like 'rebel without a cause.'
For the Greeks, and the Griceians, it's a CAUSE TO which one should be involved in elucidating.
"A cause to..." connects with the idea of 'freedom.'
Grice was constantly aware of the threat of MECHANISM, and his idea was to provide philosophical room for the idea of 'finality,' which is NOT 'mechanistically derivable.'
This leads him to discussion of overlap and priority of, say, a physical-cum-physiological versus a psychological theory explaining this or that piece of rational behaviour.
He can be Wittgensteinian when citing Anscombe's translation: No psychological concept without the behaviour the concept is brought to explain.
Carton 6, Folder 8
Conferences - APA Discussion - Randall Parker's Transcription of Tapes
Carton 6, Folder 9
Unity of Science and Teleology "Hands Across the Bay," and Beanfest
The unity of science is threatened by teleology.
Unified science seeks for 'mechanistically derivable' teleology.
But Grice's sympathies lie for 'detached' finality.
The unity of science is threatened by teleology.
Unified science seeks for 'mechanistically derivable' teleology.
But Grice's sympathies lie for 'detached' finality.
Carton 6, Folder 10
Beanfest - Transcripts and Audio Cassettes
Carton 6, Folder 11
Group Universals
Grice doing history of philosophy. His main concern is with 'universalia' as abstract entities. He proposes an exploration of 'universalia' as a response to Extensionalism, so fashionable, he thinks, in the New World ("The School of Latter-Day Nominalists").
Grice doing history of philosophy. His main concern is with 'universalia' as abstract entities. He proposes an exploration of 'universalia' as a response to Extensionalism, so fashionable, he thinks, in the New World ("The School of Latter-Day Nominalists").
Carton 6, Folder 12
Group Universals - Partial Working Copy
Carton 10
Audio Files of various lectures and conferences
**
Series V
**
Philosophical Subject
Files
Physical Description: Carton 6 (folders 13-38), Cartons 7-9
Items are arranged aphabetically.
Scope and Content Note
Series V includes Reed Seminar notes, notes on ancient philosophers such as Aristotle, modern philosophers such as Descartes, and their own philosophical theories, research and accompanying notes on other prominent philosophers such as Kant and Davidson, notes with colleagues J. Baker, A. D. Code, M. Friedman, G. Myro, P. Suppes, R. O. Warner, G. J. Warnock, and P. F. Strawson, on various theories of reason, trust, language semantics, universals, and values.
Carton 6, Folders 13-14
"The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction"
The idea of 'analyticity' was for Grice very important to defend.
Philosophy depends on it!
He knew that to many his claim to fame was his "In defence of a dogma," the dogma of analyticity, no less.
He eventually turns to a 'pragmatist' justification of the distinction.
This pragmatist justification is still in accordance with what he sees as the use of 'analytic' in 'ordinary language'. His infamous examples:
"My neighbour's three-year old understands Russell's Theory of Types."
A: Hard to believe, but I will.
"My neighbour's three-year old is an adult."
Metaphorically? No.
Then I don't understand you, and what you've just said is, in my scheme of things, analytically FALSE.
Grice was also circumstantially concerned with the 'synthetic a priori,' and he would ask his children's playmates:
"Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed!"
The distinction is ultimately Kantian, but it had brought to the fore by the 'linguistic turn,' Oxonian and other!
The idea of 'analyticity' was for Grice very important to defend.
Philosophy depends on it!
He knew that to many his claim to fame was his "In defence of a dogma," the dogma of analyticity, no less.
He eventually turns to a 'pragmatist' justification of the distinction.
This pragmatist justification is still in accordance with what he sees as the use of 'analytic' in 'ordinary language'. His infamous examples:
"My neighbour's three-year old understands Russell's Theory of Types."
A: Hard to believe, but I will.
"My neighbour's three-year old is an adult."
Metaphorically? No.
Then I don't understand you, and what you've just said is, in my scheme of things, analytically FALSE.
Grice was also circumstantially concerned with the 'synthetic a priori,' and he would ask his children's playmates:
"Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed!"
The distinction is ultimately Kantian, but it had brought to the fore by the 'linguistic turn,' Oxonian and other!
Carton 6, Folder 15
Aristotle and "Categories"
For Aristotle, as Grice and Austin, and Grice and Strawson, were well aware as they educated some of the poor at Oxford ("Only the poor learn at Oxford" -- Arnold), there are ten categories.
Grice doesn't care about the number. But the first are important.
THERE's 'substantia prima,' such as Grice.
And then there's 'substantia secunda,' such as Grice's rationality. The 'essentia.'
Then there are various types of 'attributes.'
But even 'substantia secunda' may be regarded as an 'attribute.'
Grice invents "Category Shift," or subject-ification.
Essence may be introduced as a sub-type of an attribute.
We would have 'substantia prima' AND 'attribute,' which in turn gets divided into 'essential' and 'non-essential.'
While Austin was not so fun to play with, Strawson is.
Banbury is a very altruist person.
Where is his altruism?
Nowhere to be seen.
Yet we may speak of Banbury's altruism.
It's a matter of a 'category shift.'
Grice was slightly disappointed, but he perfectly understood, that Strawson, who had footnoted Grice as 'the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about logic' in "Introduction to Logical Theory," fails to acknowledge that MOST of the research in Strawson's "Individuals: an essay in descriptive (not revisionary) metaphysics" derives from the conclusions reached at his joint philosophical investigations with Grice.
But "the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about metaphysics" sounds clumsier!
Grice thought Aristotle was the best!
For Aristotle, as Grice and Austin, and Grice and Strawson, were well aware as they educated some of the poor at Oxford ("Only the poor learn at Oxford" -- Arnold), there are ten categories.
Grice doesn't care about the number. But the first are important.
THERE's 'substantia prima,' such as Grice.
And then there's 'substantia secunda,' such as Grice's rationality. The 'essentia.'
Then there are various types of 'attributes.'
But even 'substantia secunda' may be regarded as an 'attribute.'
Grice invents "Category Shift," or subject-ification.
Essence may be introduced as a sub-type of an attribute.
We would have 'substantia prima' AND 'attribute,' which in turn gets divided into 'essential' and 'non-essential.'
While Austin was not so fun to play with, Strawson is.
Banbury is a very altruist person.
Where is his altruism?
Nowhere to be seen.
Yet we may speak of Banbury's altruism.
It's a matter of a 'category shift.'
Grice was slightly disappointed, but he perfectly understood, that Strawson, who had footnoted Grice as 'the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about logic' in "Introduction to Logical Theory," fails to acknowledge that MOST of the research in Strawson's "Individuals: an essay in descriptive (not revisionary) metaphysics" derives from the conclusions reached at his joint philosophical investigations with Grice.
But "the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about metaphysics" sounds clumsier!
Carton 6, Folder 16
Aristotle's Ethics
Grice was 'very fortunate' to have Hardie as his tutor. He overused Hardie's lectures on Aristotle, too, and instilled them on his own tutees!
Grice was 'very fortunate' to have Hardie as his tutor. He overused Hardie's lectures on Aristotle, too, and instilled them on his own tutees!
Carton 6, Folder 17
Aristotle and Friendship
Grice is concerned with Aristotle's rather cryptic view of the friend (philos, amicus) as the 'alter ego.'
In Grice's cooperative, concerted, view of things, a friend in need is a friend indeed!
Grice is concerned with Aristotle's rather cryptic view of the friend (philos, amicus) as the 'alter ego.'
In Grice's cooperative, concerted, view of things, a friend in need is a friend indeed!
Carton 6, Folder 18
Aristotle and Friendship, Rationality, Trust, and Decency
Grice's idea of 'decency' is connected to his explorations on 'rational' and 'reasonable'. To cheat may be neither unreasonable nor rational.
It's just repulsive!
Indecent, in other words.
In all this, Grice is concerned with 'ordinary language,' and treasures Austin's question to Warnock (when Warnock was looking for a fellowship at Austin's college):
"Warnock: what would you say the difference is between (i) and (ii)?"
i. Smith plays cricket rather properly.
ii. Smith plays cricket rather incorrectly.
"They spent the whole dinner over such subtleties!"
"And Warnock fell in love with Austin."
Grice's explorations on 'trust' are Warnockian in character too. For Warnock, in "Object of morality," trust is key, indeed, the very object of morality.
Grice's idea of 'decency' is connected to his explorations on 'rational' and 'reasonable'. To cheat may be neither unreasonable nor rational.
It's just repulsive!
Indecent, in other words.
In all this, Grice is concerned with 'ordinary language,' and treasures Austin's question to Warnock (when Warnock was looking for a fellowship at Austin's college):
"Warnock: what would you say the difference is between (i) and (ii)?"
i. Smith plays cricket rather properly.
ii. Smith plays cricket rather incorrectly.
"They spent the whole dinner over such subtleties!"
"And Warnock fell in love with Austin."
Grice's explorations on 'trust' are Warnockian in character too. For Warnock, in "Object of morality," trust is key, indeed, the very object of morality.
Carton 6, Folder 19
Aristotle and Multiplicity
Grice is yielding his razor.
"Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity."
But then Aristotle is talking about the 'multiplicity' of '... is' and '... is good.'
Surely, there are ways to turn Aristotle into the monoguist he has to be!
Grice is yielding his razor.
"Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity."
But then Aristotle is talking about the 'multiplicity' of '... is' and '... is good.'
Surely, there are ways to turn Aristotle into the monoguist he has to be!
Carton 6, Folder 20
Bealer
G. P. Bealer is one of Grice's most brilliant tutees!
G. P. Bealer is one of Grice's most brilliant tutees!
Carton 6, Folder 21
Berkeley Group Team Notes
Carton 6, Folder 22
Casual Theory Perception
Warnock had attended Austin's "Sense and Sensibilia" (not to be confused with Austen's Sense and Sensibility).
But Warnock preferred philosophical investigations with Grice.
Warnock: "Grice once told me, not on a Saturday morning, either, 'How clever language is'"
For they had found that 'ordinary language' does NOT need the concept of a visum.
Grice and Warnock spent lovely occasions exploring what Oxford has as "the philosophy of perception."
While Grice later came to see it as a bit or an offshoot of 'philosophical psychology,' 'the philosophy of perception' is concerned with that treasured bit of the Oxonian philosopher's lexicon, the sense-datum, always in the singular!
The 'cause' involved is crucial. If a material thing causes the sense-datum of a nut, that's because the squarrel (or squirrel) won't be nourished by the sense datum of a nut, but by a nut, only.
Warnock had attended Austin's "Sense and Sensibilia" (not to be confused with Austen's Sense and Sensibility).
But Warnock preferred philosophical investigations with Grice.
Warnock: "Grice once told me, not on a Saturday morning, either, 'How clever language is'"
For they had found that 'ordinary language' does NOT need the concept of a visum.
Grice and Warnock spent lovely occasions exploring what Oxford has as "the philosophy of perception."
While Grice later came to see it as a bit or an offshoot of 'philosophical psychology,' 'the philosophy of perception' is concerned with that treasured bit of the Oxonian philosopher's lexicon, the sense-datum, always in the singular!
The 'cause' involved is crucial. If a material thing causes the sense-datum of a nut, that's because the squarrel (or squirrel) won't be nourished by the sense datum of a nut, but by a nut, only.
Carton 6, Folder 23
Categories with Strawson
Grice kept his explorations on categories under two very separate categories: his explorations with J. L. Austin (very serious), and his explorations with P. F. Strawson (more congenial).
Where is Smith's altruism?
Nowhere to be seen.
Should we say it's idle (otiose) to speak of altruism?
No, it's just an ATTRIBUTE, which, via category shift, can be made the subject of your sentence, Strawson.
It's not spatio-temporal, though, right?
Not really.
I don't particularly like your 'trouser words,' Grice.
Grice kept his explorations on categories under two very separate categories: his explorations with J. L. Austin (very serious), and his explorations with P. F. Strawson (more congenial).
Where is Smith's altruism?
Nowhere to be seen.
Should we say it's idle (otiose) to speak of altruism?
No, it's just an ATTRIBUTE, which, via category shift, can be made the subject of your sentence, Strawson.
It's not spatio-temporal, though, right?
Not really.
I don't particularly like your 'trouser words,' Grice.
Carton 6, Folder 24
Categorical Imperatives
An exploration of the logical form of Kant's concoction.
Grice is interested in its conceptual connection with the 'hypothetical' imperative, in terms of the type of connection between the protasis and the apodosis.
Grice spends the full second Paul Carus lecture on the conception of value on this.
Grice is aware that the topic is central for Oxonian philosophers such as R. M. Hare (a member of Austin's Play Group, too), who will regard the UNIVERSABILITY of an imperative as a mark of its categorial, indeed, moral status.
He would refer to conversational maxims as contributing to a CONVERSATIONAL IMMANUEL, if it can be shown that, qua items under an overarching principle of conversational helpfulness, each displays qualities associated with conceptual, formal, and applicational generality.
An exploration of the logical form of Kant's concoction.
Grice is interested in its conceptual connection with the 'hypothetical' imperative, in terms of the type of connection between the protasis and the apodosis.
Grice spends the full second Paul Carus lecture on the conception of value on this.
Grice is aware that the topic is central for Oxonian philosophers such as R. M. Hare (a member of Austin's Play Group, too), who will regard the UNIVERSABILITY of an imperative as a mark of its categorial, indeed, moral status.
He would refer to conversational maxims as contributing to a CONVERSATIONAL IMMANUEL, if it can be shown that, qua items under an overarching principle of conversational helpfulness, each displays qualities associated with conceptual, formal, and applicational generality.
Carton 6, Folder 25
"The Logical Construction Theory of Personal Identity"
The term is Broad's -- but Grice loved it. Rational reconstruction is not too dissimilar. But Grice prefers Broad's more conservative label.
Ultimately, it means that we can provide an analysandum for an "I" utterance WITHOUT using "I," but only 'mnemonic concepts, which belong in a theory of philosophical psychology.
The term is Broad's -- but Grice loved it. Rational reconstruction is not too dissimilar. But Grice prefers Broad's more conservative label.
Ultimately, it means that we can provide an analysandum for an "I" utterance WITHOUT using "I," but only 'mnemonic concepts, which belong in a theory of philosophical psychology.
Carton 6, Folder 26
Davidson's "On Saying That"
Grice had explored 'that'-clauses with Staal. He was concerned about the viability of Davidson's initially appealing etymological approach to the 'that'-clause in terms of 'demonstration.'
Grice had presupposed the logic of 'that'-clauses from a much earlier stage ("Those spots mean that he has measles.")
Grice had explored 'that'-clauses with Staal. He was concerned about the viability of Davidson's initially appealing etymological approach to the 'that'-clause in terms of 'demonstration.'
Grice had presupposed the logic of 'that'-clauses from a much earlier stage ("Those spots mean that he has measles.")
Carton 6, Folders 27-28
Descartes Notes
Grice's interest in Descartes connects with Descartes's search for a criterion of 'certainty' in terms of 'clarity' and 'distinction' of this or that perception.
Having explored the philosophy of perception with Warnock, it's only natural he wanted to give Descartes's rambles a second and third look!
Grice's interest in Descartes connects with Descartes's search for a criterion of 'certainty' in terms of 'clarity' and 'distinction' of this or that perception.
Having explored the philosophy of perception with Warnock, it's only natural he wanted to give Descartes's rambles a second and third look!
Carton 6, Folder 29
"Grice on Denials of Indicative Conditionals" by Michael Sinton
Strawson had elaborated on what he felt was a divergence between Whitehead's and Russell's 'horseshoe,' and 'if.'
Grice thought Strawson's observations could be understood in terms of ENTAILMENT + IMPLICATUM ("Robbing Peter to Pay Paul").
But problems, as first noted to Grice, by L. J. Cohen, of Oxford, remain, when it comes to the scope of the implicatum within the operation of, say, 'negation.'
Analogous problems arise with implicata for the other earlier dyadic functors, "and" and "or," and Grice looks for a single explanation of the phenomenon.
The qualification 'indicative' is modal. "Ordinary language" allows for 'if' utterances to be in modes other than the imperative. "Counter-factual," if you need to be philosophical krypto-technical, 'subjective' is you are more of a classicist!
Strawson had elaborated on what he felt was a divergence between Whitehead's and Russell's 'horseshoe,' and 'if.'
Grice thought Strawson's observations could be understood in terms of ENTAILMENT + IMPLICATUM ("Robbing Peter to Pay Paul").
But problems, as first noted to Grice, by L. J. Cohen, of Oxford, remain, when it comes to the scope of the implicatum within the operation of, say, 'negation.'
Analogous problems arise with implicata for the other earlier dyadic functors, "and" and "or," and Grice looks for a single explanation of the phenomenon.
The qualification 'indicative' is modal. "Ordinary language" allows for 'if' utterances to be in modes other than the imperative. "Counter-factual," if you need to be philosophical krypto-technical, 'subjective' is you are more of a classicist!
Carton 6, Folder 30
Dispositions and Intentions
Grice is especially concerned with a 'dispositional' analysis to 'intending.'
He will later reject it in "Intention and uncertainty."
Grice is especially interested in distinguishing his views from RYLE's dispositional account of intentions, which Grice sees as 'reductionist,' and indeed 'eliminationist.'
The logic of 'dispositions' is tricky, as Grice will later explore in connection with 'rationality' (rational propension or propensity) and metaphysics (the 'as if' operator).
Grice is especially concerned with a 'dispositional' analysis to 'intending.'
He will later reject it in "Intention and uncertainty."
Grice is especially interested in distinguishing his views from RYLE's dispositional account of intentions, which Grice sees as 'reductionist,' and indeed 'eliminationist.'
The logic of 'dispositions' is tricky, as Grice will later explore in connection with 'rationality' (rational propension or propensity) and metaphysics (the 'as if' operator).
Carton 6, Folder 31
Dogmas of Empiricism
For Quine, there are two. Grice is mainly interested in the first one: that there is a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.
Grice considers Empiricism as a monster on his way to the Rationalist City of Eternal Truth.
For Quine, there are two. Grice is mainly interested in the first one: that there is a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.
Grice considers Empiricism as a monster on his way to the Rationalist City of Eternal Truth.
Carton 6, Folder 32
Emotions and Incontinence
The concept of 'emotion' needs a philosophical elucidation.
Akrasia for Grice covers both boulomaic and doxastic versions.
The boulomaic version may be closer to the concept of an emotion.
The concept of 'emotion' needs a philosophical elucidation.
Akrasia for Grice covers both boulomaic and doxastic versions.
The boulomaic version may be closer to the concept of an emotion.
Carton 6, Folder 33
Entailment and Paradoxes
While 'entailment,' as introduced in the philosophical literature by Moore, is hardly seen in terms of the paradoxes, 'if' is. Grice connects the two.
The relation of 'consequence' may be considered a meta-conditional, where paradoxes arise.
His Bootstrap is a principle designed to empoverish the metalanguage so that the philosopher can succeed in the business of pulling himself up by his own!
While 'entailment,' as introduced in the philosophical literature by Moore, is hardly seen in terms of the paradoxes, 'if' is. Grice connects the two.
The relation of 'consequence' may be considered a meta-conditional, where paradoxes arise.
His Bootstrap is a principle designed to empoverish the metalanguage so that the philosopher can succeed in the business of pulling himself up by his own!
Carton 6, Folders 34-35
Notes on Ethics with Judith Baker
Carton 6, Folder 36
North Carolina Ethics Notes
Carton 6, Folder 37
Festschrift and Warner Notes
Notably on the philosophy of perception. Also on the conception of value, especially that tricky third lecture on a metaphysical foundation for objective value.
Notably on the philosophy of perception. Also on the conception of value, especially that tricky third lecture on a metaphysical foundation for objective value.
Carton 6, Folder 38
"Finality" Notes with Alan Code
Code was the Aristotelian, and he and Grice are especially concerned in the idea of 'causa finalis.'
For Grice only detached finality can threaten Mechanism, as it should!
Code was the Aristotelian, and he and Grice are especially concerned in the idea of 'causa finalis.'
For Grice only detached finality can threaten Mechanism, as it should!
Carton 7, Folder 1
"Form, Type, and Implication" by Grice
Grice was not enamoured with the 'type'/'token' or 'token'/'type' distinction.
His thoughts on 'logical form' were provocative:
"If you can't put it in logical form, it's not worth saying."
Strawson infamously reacted, but with a smile: "Oh, no! If you CAN put it in logical form, it's not worth saying."
Grice was not enamoured with the 'type'/'token' or 'token'/'type' distinction.
His thoughts on 'logical form' were provocative:
"If you can't put it in logical form, it's not worth saying."
Strawson infamously reacted, but with a smile: "Oh, no! If you CAN put it in logical form, it's not worth saying."
Carton 7, Folder 2
Frege, Words and Sentences Notes
Frege was one of Grice's obsessions. A Fregeian sense is an explicatum, or implicitum -- a concession to get his principle of conversational helpfulness working in the generation of conversational implicata, that can only mean progress for philosohy!
Frege was one of Grice's obsessions. A Fregeian sense is an explicatum, or implicitum -- a concession to get his principle of conversational helpfulness working in the generation of conversational implicata, that can only mean progress for philosohy!
Carton 7, Folder 3
"Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics" by Kant
While Grice can't read Kant in German, he uses the English vernacular.
Note the archaic 'metaphysic' sic in singular.
While Grice can't read Kant in German, he uses the English vernacular.
Note the archaic 'metaphysic' sic in singular.
Carton 7, Folder 4
"Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals"
More Kant.
More Kant.
Carton 7, Folder 5
Grammar and Semantics with R. O. Warner
Truth-conditional semantics and implicata.
Truth-conditional semantics and implicata.
Carton 7, Folder 6
Happiness, Discipline, and Implicatives
Keyword: Eudaimonia.
The implicata of "Smith is happy" are more complex than Kantotle thought!
Keyword: Eudaimonia.
The implicata of "Smith is happy" are more complex than Kantotle thought!
Carton 7, Folder 7
Notes on Hume
Grice calls one of his metaphysical construction routines "Humeian Projection."
Grice called one of his metaphysical construction routines "Humeian projection," since the 'mind,' as it were, 'spreads over' its objects.
Grice was especially concerned with the poverty of Hume's criticism to Locke on personal identity.
Carton 7, Folders 8-9
Hume's Account on Personal Identity Notes
Grice opted for a Lockeian memory-based on "I" utterances that Hume rather regarded as 'vague,' and 'confusing.
Grice opted for a Lockeian memory-based on "I" utterances that Hume rather regarded as 'vague,' and 'confusing.
Carton 7, Folder 10
Identity Notes with G. Myro
The idea that "=" is unqualified needs qualification. Whitehead and Russell ignored this. Grice and Myro didn't!
The idea that "=" is unqualified needs qualification. Whitehead and Russell ignored this. Grice and Myro didn't!
Carton 7, Folders 11-12
"Ifs and Cans"
Two of Grice's favourites. He opposed Strawson's view on 'if.' Grice thought that 'if' was the horseshoe of Whitehead and Russell, provided we add an IMPLICATUM to an ENTAILMENT.
The 'can' is merely dispositional, if not alla Ryle, alla Grice!
Two of Grice's favourites. He opposed Strawson's view on 'if.' Grice thought that 'if' was the horseshoe of Whitehead and Russell, provided we add an IMPLICATUM to an ENTAILMENT.
The 'can' is merely dispositional, if not alla Ryle, alla Grice!
Carton 7, Folder 13
Irony, Stress, and Truth
Three topics where the IMPLICATUM helps.
"He is a scoundrel" may well be the IMPLICATUM of "He is a fine friend."
But cfr. the pretense theory of irony. Grice, being a classicist, loved the etymological connection.
With Stress, he was concerned with anti-Gettier uses of emphatic 'know': "I KNOW." (Implicatum: I do have conclusive evidence").
"Truth" (or "... is true") sprang from Grice's attention to that infamous Bristol symposium between Austin and Strawson.
Grice wants to defend Austin's correspondence theory against Strawson's 'performative' approach.
If "... is true" IMPLICATES "someone previously affirmed this," that does not mean a 'ditto' IMPLICATUM is part of the ENTAILMENT of an "... is true" utterance.
Three topics where the IMPLICATUM helps.
"He is a scoundrel" may well be the IMPLICATUM of "He is a fine friend."
But cfr. the pretense theory of irony. Grice, being a classicist, loved the etymological connection.
With Stress, he was concerned with anti-Gettier uses of emphatic 'know': "I KNOW." (Implicatum: I do have conclusive evidence").
"Truth" (or "... is true") sprang from Grice's attention to that infamous Bristol symposium between Austin and Strawson.
Grice wants to defend Austin's correspondence theory against Strawson's 'performative' approach.
If "... is true" IMPLICATES "someone previously affirmed this," that does not mean a 'ditto' IMPLICATUM is part of the ENTAILMENT of an "... is true" utterance.
Carton 7, Folders 14-16
Notes on Kant
Carton 7, Folder 17
Kant's Ethics
Carton 7, Folder 18
Kant, Mid-sentences, Freedom
Grice was especially concerned with Kant's having brought back the old Greek idea of 'eleutheria' for philosophical discussion.
Grice was especially concerned with Kant's having brought back the old Greek idea of 'eleutheria' for philosophical discussion.
Carton 7, Folder 19
Language and Reference
Grice favours a transcendental approach to communication.
Our beliefs worth communicating have to be true.
Our orders worth communicating have to refer to our willings.
Grice favours a transcendental approach to communication.
Our beliefs worth communicating have to be true.
Our orders worth communicating have to refer to our willings.
Carton 7, Folder 20
Language Semantics
alla Tarski.
alla Tarski.
Carton 7, Folders 21-22
John Locke Lecture Notes
On aspects of reason. Including extensive language botany on 'rational', 'reasonable,' and indeed 'reason' (justificatory, explanatory, and mixed).
At this point, Grice notes that linguistic botany is INDISPENSABLE towards the construction of a more systematic explanatory theory.
It is an exploration of a range of uses of 'reason' that leads him to his "Aequi-vocality" thesis that 'must' has only one sense!
On aspects of reason. Including extensive language botany on 'rational', 'reasonable,' and indeed 'reason' (justificatory, explanatory, and mixed).
At this point, Grice notes that linguistic botany is INDISPENSABLE towards the construction of a more systematic explanatory theory.
It is an exploration of a range of uses of 'reason' that leads him to his "Aequi-vocality" thesis that 'must' has only one sense!
Carton 7, Folder 23
Logical Form and Action Sentences
A Davidsonian problem. Category shift invites us to see Smith's fishing as the subject of an 'action sentence.'
Cf. The horse runs fast.
---
Therefore, the horse runs.
A Davidsonian problem. Category shift invites us to see Smith's fishing as the subject of an 'action sentence.'
Cf. The horse runs fast.
---
Therefore, the horse runs.
Carton 7, Folders 24-25
Meaning and Psychology
Meaning is perhaps the psychological state, attitude, or stance, per excellence.
Grice coins "M-intention" for the bunch of intentions a rational 'meaner' must mean before he even EXPLICATES something!
While not explicitly, Grice wants to supersede Peirce's merely taxonomic approaches to the thing, more in the vein of Ogden and Richards.
Meaning is perhaps the psychological state, attitude, or stance, per excellence.
Grice coins "M-intention" for the bunch of intentions a rational 'meaner' must mean before he even EXPLICATES something!
While not explicitly, Grice wants to supersede Peirce's merely taxonomic approaches to the thing, more in the vein of Ogden and Richards.
Carton 7, Folders 26-27
Notes on Metaphysics
Cfr. Grice/Strawson/Pears, "Metaphysics," in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, The BBC Third Programme.
Cfr. Grice/Strawson/Pears, "Metaphysics," in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, The BBC Third Programme.
Carton 7, Folder 28
Metaphysics and Ill-Will
Keyword: Ill-will
A conceptual elucidation.
Keyword: Ill-will
A conceptual elucidation.
Carton 7, Folder 29
Metaphysics and Theorizing
Grice called himself 'folksy': his theories, even if subject to various types of Ramseyfication, are 'popular' in kind!
And ceteris paribus!
Metaphysical construction is disciplined and the best theorising the philosopher can hope for!
Grice called himself 'folksy': his theories, even if subject to various types of Ramseyfication, are 'popular' in kind!
And ceteris paribus!
Metaphysical construction is disciplined and the best theorising the philosopher can hope for!
Carton 7, Folder 30
Method and Myth Notes
A philosopher should be, as Plato was, to use a myth, if he thinks his tutee will thank him for that!
A philosopher should be, as Plato was, to use a myth, if he thinks his tutee will thank him for that!
Carton 7, Folder 31
Mills Induction
More Grice to the Mill.
Grice loved Hardie's playing with Mill's Method of Difference with an Oxford copper.
More Grice to the Mill.
Grice loved Hardie's playing with Mill's Method of Difference with an Oxford copper.
Carton 7, Folder 32
Miscellaneous on Actions and Events
"Actions and events" is Davidsonian in motivation, but Kantian in method!
"Actions and events" is Davidsonian in motivation, but Kantian in method!
Carton 8, Folder 1
Miscellaneous - J. Baker
Carton 8, Folder 2
Miscellaneous - Metaphysics Notes
Carton 8, Folder 3
Miscellaneous - Oxford Philosophy
By Oxford philosophy, Grice meant his own!
By Oxford philosophy, Grice meant his own!
Carton 8, Folders 4-8
Miscellaneous Philosophy Notes
Carton 8, Folders 9-13
Miscellaneous Philosophy Topics
Carton 8, Folders 14-15
Modality, Desirability, and Probability
He would use 'mode operator.'
Modality is the more correct term, for things like 'should,' 'ought,' and 'must,' in that order. One sense.
The doxastic modals are correlated to probability. The boulomaic modals are correlated to desirability.
There is probability to a degree d.
But there is also desirability to a degree d.
They both combine in Grice's attempt to show how Kant's categorical imperative reduces to the hypothetical.
He would use 'mode operator.'
Modality is the more correct term, for things like 'should,' 'ought,' and 'must,' in that order. One sense.
The doxastic modals are correlated to probability. The boulomaic modals are correlated to desirability.
There is probability to a degree d.
But there is also desirability to a degree d.
They both combine in Grice's attempt to show how Kant's categorical imperative reduces to the hypothetical.
Carton 8, Folders 16-17
Nicomachean Ethics and Aristotle Ethics
From Hardie.
From Hardie.
Carton 8, Folder 18
Objectivity and Value
His third Carus lecture. He tries to find out what J. L. Mackie means when he says that a value is ultimately 'subjective'. What about intersubjective, and constructively 'objective'?
His third Carus lecture. He tries to find out what J. L. Mackie means when he says that a value is ultimately 'subjective'. What about intersubjective, and constructively 'objective'?
Carton 8, Folder 19
Objective Value, Rational Motivation
The rational motivation for objective value.
Many notions are value-paradeigmatic.
The most important of all philosophical notions, that of 'rationality,' presupposes objective value as one of its motivations.
For Grice, 'ratio' can be understood 'cognoscendi' but also 'essendi.' "Rational motivation" involves both types of 'ratio.'
The rational motivation for objective value.
Many notions are value-paradeigmatic.
The most important of all philosophical notions, that of 'rationality,' presupposes objective value as one of its motivations.
For Grice, 'ratio' can be understood 'cognoscendi' but also 'essendi.' "Rational motivation" involves both types of 'ratio.'
Carton 8, Folder 20
Oddents - Urbane and Not Urbane
Carton 8, Folders 21-22
Vision, Taste, and other Perception Papers
Mainly with Warnock.
Keyword: Taste.
Warnock reprinted Grice's "Causal Theory of Perception" in his influential Reading in Philosophy, "The philosophy of perception."
Mainly with Warnock.
Keyword: Taste.
Warnock reprinted Grice's "Causal Theory of Perception" in his influential Reading in Philosophy, "The philosophy of perception."
Carton 8, Folder 23
Papers on Perception
With G. J. Warnock.
With G. J. Warnock.
Carton 8, Folder 24
Perception Notes
With Warnock. Warnock learned about perception much more from Grice than from Austin!
With Warnock. Warnock learned about perception much more from Grice than from Austin!
Carton 8, Folder 25
Notes on Perception with R. O. Warner
An evolutionary justification of 'material' thing as the denotatum of a perceptual judgement.
An evolutionary justification of 'material' thing as the denotatum of a perceptual judgement.
Carton 8, Folder 26
"Clear and Distinct Perception and Dreaming"
Descartes meets Malcolm, and vice versa.
Descartes meets Malcolm, and vice versa.
Carton 8, Folder 27
"A Pint of Philosophy" by Alfred Brook Gordon, includes notes by Grice
Figurative!
Figurative!
Carton 8, Folder 28
"A Philosophy of Life" Notes, Happiness Notes
Keywords: Kantotle, eudaimonia.
Keywords: Kantotle, eudaimonia.
Carton 8, Folder 29
"Lectures on Pierce"
Keyword: meaning. He cites Ewing, Ogden and Richards, and many others. "Those spots mean measles."
Grice finds Peirce 'krypto-technical' and proposes to "English" him into an 'ordinary-language' philosopher.
He does not altogether fail!
Keyword: meaning. He cites Ewing, Ogden and Richards, and many others. "Those spots mean measles."
Grice finds Peirce 'krypto-technical' and proposes to "English" him into an 'ordinary-language' philosopher.
He does not altogether fail!
Carton 8, Folder 30
Basic Pirotese, Sentence Semantics and Syntax
Pirotese is the philosopher's engaging in pirotology.
"Pirots karulise elatically."
But not all of them.
Pirotese is the philosopher's engaging in pirotology.
"Pirots karulise elatically."
But not all of them.
Carton 8, Folder 31
Pirots and Obbles
An obble is a pirot's object.
An obble is a pirot's object.
Carton 8, Folders 32-33
Methodology - Pirots Notes
Pirotology. Creature-construction. The genitorial programme.
Grice as engineer.
Pirotology. Creature-construction. The genitorial programme.
Grice as engineer.
Carton 9, Folder 1
Practical Reason
Grice prefers the idiom of 'soul.' There's the ratiocinative soul. Within the ratiocinative, there's the executive soul and the merely administrative soul.
Cicero had to translate Aristotle into 'prudentia,' every time Aristotle talked of 'phronesis.'
Grice prefers the idiom of 'soul.' There's the ratiocinative soul. Within the ratiocinative, there's the executive soul and the merely administrative soul.
Cicero had to translate Aristotle into 'prudentia,' every time Aristotle talked of 'phronesis.'
Carton 9, Folder 2
"Preliminary Valediction"
For the Studies in the Way of Words.
For the Studies in the Way of Words.
Carton 9, Folder 3
Presupposition and Implicature.
His take on Strawson.
His take on Strawson.
Carton 9, Folder 4
Probability and Life
Evolutionary account of the pirot's adaptability to its changeable environs.
Evolutionary account of the pirot's adaptability to its changeable environs.
Carton 9, Folder 5
Rationality and Trust notes
Trust and rationality are pre-requisites of conversation.
Cf. his desideratum of conversational candour, subsumed under the over-arching principle of conversational helpfulness (formerly 'conversational benevolence-cum-self-interest')
Grice thought that the principle of conversational benevolence has to be weighed against the principle of conversational self-interest.
The result is the overarching principle of conversational helpfulness.
Clarity gets in the picture. The desideratum of conversational clarity is a reasonable requirement for conversants to abide by.
Trust and rationality are pre-requisites of conversation.
Cf. his desideratum of conversational candour, subsumed under the over-arching principle of conversational helpfulness (formerly 'conversational benevolence-cum-self-interest')
Grice thought that the principle of conversational benevolence has to be weighed against the principle of conversational self-interest.
The result is the overarching principle of conversational helpfulness.
Clarity gets in the picture. The desideratum of conversational clarity is a reasonable requirement for conversants to abide by.
Carton 9, Folder 6
Reasons
Linguistic analysis on 'justificatory,' 'explanatory' and 'mixed' uses of 'reason.'
Linguistic analysis on 'justificatory,' 'explanatory' and 'mixed' uses of 'reason.'
Carton 9, Folder 7
Reflections on Morals
Meta-ethics.
Meta-ethics.
Carton 9, Folder 8
Russell and Heterologicality
Grice was fascinated by Baron Russell's remarks on 'heterological.'
And its implicata.
Grice was fascinated by Baron Russell's remarks on 'heterological.'
And its implicata.
Carton 9, Folder 9
Schiffer
On Remnants on meaning.
On Remnants on meaning.
Carton 9, Folder 10
Semantics of Children's Language
Interesting in that he was always enquiring his children's playmates: "Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed!"
Interesting in that he was always enquiring his children's playmates: "Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed!"
Carton 9, Folder 11
Sentence Semantics
Truth-conditional, constructivist.
Truth-conditional, constructivist.
Carton 9, Folder 12
Sentence Semantics - Prepositional Complexes
Grice was keen on the concept of a 'propositional complex,' which allowed him NOT to commit to the abstract entity of a 'proposition,' if the latter is regarded as an extensional family of 'propositional complexes' (Paul saw Peter; Peter was seen by Paul)
Grice was keen on the concept of a 'propositional complex,' which allowed him NOT to commit to the abstract entity of a 'proposition,' if the latter is regarded as an extensional family of 'propositional complexes' (Paul saw Peter; Peter was seen by Paul)
Carton 9, Folder 13
"Significance of the Middle Book's Aristotle's Metaphysics" by Alan Code
Very middle. Grice never knew what was middle for Aristotle, but admired Code too much to air this!
Very middle. Grice never knew what was middle for Aristotle, but admired Code too much to air this!
Carton 9, Folder 14
Social Justice
On Socrates and Thrasymachus.
On Socrates and Thrasymachus.
Carton 9, Folder 15
"Subjective" Conditions and Intentions
Cf. his dispositional account to 'intending.'
A subjective condition takes into account the intender's, rather than the ascriber's, point of view:
Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees.
Cf. his dispositional account to 'intending.'
A subjective condition takes into account the intender's, rather than the ascriber's, point of view:
Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees.
Carton 9, Folder 16
Super-Relatives
Very Super.
Very Super.
Carton 9, Folders 17-18
Syntax and Semantics
Especially the former. Grice loved two devices of the syntactic kind: subscripts and square brackets (for the assignment of 'common-ground status').
Especially the former. Grice loved two devices of the syntactic kind: subscripts and square brackets (for the assignment of 'common-ground status').
Carton 9, Folder 19
The 'That" and "Why" - Metaphysics Notes
Taxonomy, worse than Explanation, always.
Taxonomy, worse than Explanation, always.
Carton 9, Folder 20
Various work on Trust, Metaphysics, Value, etc/ with J. Baker
Trust a corollary of the principle of conversational helpfulness.
Trust a corollary of the principle of conversational helpfulness.
Carton 9, Folder 21
Universals
Universalia as abstrata.
Universalia as abstrata.
Carton 9, Folder 22
Universals with Michael Friedman
Carton 9, Folder 23
Value, Metaphysics, and Teleology
Grice was obsessed with the Greek idea of a 'telos,' as overused by Aristotle. He thought teleology is a key philosophical way to contest Mechanism, so popular in The New World.
Grice was obsessed with the Greek idea of a 'telos,' as overused by Aristotle. He thought teleology is a key philosophical way to contest Mechanism, so popular in The New World.
Carton 9, Folder 24
Values, Morals, Absolutes, and the Metaphysical
The absolute versus the relative, is constructed OUT of the relative, thought. There is hardly a realm of UNconstructed reality.
The absolute versus the relative, is constructed OUT of the relative, thought. There is hardly a realm of UNconstructed reality.
Carton 9, Folders 25-27
Miscellaneous - Value Sub-systems, the "Kantian Problem"
Values coordinate in systems. One such is 'eudaimonia.'
Values coordinate in systems. One such is 'eudaimonia.'
Grice called the manual of conversational maxims the Conversational Immanuel.
Carton 9, Folder 28
Values and Rationalism
As opposed to 'relativism,' which denies the rational basis to attitude ascriptions.
As opposed to 'relativism,' which denies the rational basis to attitude ascriptions.
Carton 9, Folder 29
"Virtues and Vices" by Philippa Foot
He admired Foot's ability to make the right conceptual distinction.
He admired Foot's ability to make the right conceptual distinction.
Carton 9, Folders 30-31
Wants and Needs
"Want" etymologically means "absence;" "need" should be preferred. The squarrel (squirrel) Toby NEEDS intake of nuts, and you'll soon see gobbling them!
Join The Grice Club!
Austin, J. L. How to do things with words.
Grice, H. P. Studies in the way of words.
Grice, H. P. The conception of value.
Grice, H. P. Aspects of reason.
Hampshire, S. N. Thought and action.
Hare, R. M. The language of morals. Clarendon.
Pears, D. F. Problems in philosophical psychology. London: Duckworth.
Ryle, G. The concept of mind. Hutchinson's University Library.
Strawson, P. F. Introduction to logical theory.
Strawson, P. F. Individuals: an essay in descriptive metaphysics.
Urmson, J. O. Philosophical analysis
Warnock, G. J. English Philosophy
Warnock, G. J. The philosophy of perception.
"Want" etymologically means "absence;" "need" should be preferred. The squarrel (squirrel) Toby NEEDS intake of nuts, and you'll soon see gobbling them!
REFERENCES
Join The Grice Club!
Austin, J. L. How to do things with words.
Grice, H. P. Studies in the way of words.
Grice, H. P. The conception of value.
Grice, H. P. Aspects of reason.
Hampshire, S. N. Thought and action.
Hare, R. M. The language of morals. Clarendon.
Pears, D. F. Problems in philosophical psychology. London: Duckworth.
Ryle, G. The concept of mind. Hutchinson's University Library.
Strawson, P. F. Introduction to logical theory.
Strawson, P. F. Individuals: an essay in descriptive metaphysics.
Urmson, J. O. Philosophical analysis
Warnock, G. J. English Philosophy
Warnock, G. J. The philosophy of perception.
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