H. P. Grice
St. John's, Oxford
H. P. Grice, M. A. Lit. Hum., FBA, Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, St. John's, Oxford.
***
The H. P. Grice Papers
Oxford, etc.
Oxford, etc.
The number of containers is 10 cartons Linear feet: 12.5.
The H. P. Grice Papers consist of the publications, unpublications, and correspondence by English philosopher H. P. Grice, during his years at Corpus Christi, Merton, and St. John's, Oxford -- and beyond.
H. P. Grice's published oeuvre includes the volumes Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, Mass. and London, Harvard University Press), The Conception of Value (Clarendon) and Aspects of Reason (Clarendon).
H. P. Grice published some of his essays in periodical publications such as, Mind ('Personal Identity'), The Philosophical Review ('Meaning' and 'Utterer's Meaning and Intentions', 'In defence of a dogma'), The Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society ('The Causal Theory of Perception'), The Foundations of Language ('Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning and word-meaning'), The Proceedings of The British Academy ('Intention and Uncertainty'), The Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association ('Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre'), and The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly ('Actions and events,' 'Aristotle on the multiplicity of being').
Some of H. P. Grice's essays appeared as commissioned chapters for volumes, such as Analytic Philosophy, ed. by R. J. Butler, for Blackwell ('Some remarks about the senses') Words and objections: essays in the work of W. V. Quine, ed. by D. Davidson and G. Harman for Reidel, Dordrecht ('Vacuous names'), Mutual knowledge ('Meaning revisited'), Logic and grammar ('Logic and conversation'), Speech acts ('Logic and conversation'), Pragmatics ('Further notes on logic and conversation'), Radical Pragmatics ('Presupposition and conversational implicature'), Actions and events, ed. by Hintikka and Vermazen ('Davidson on weakness of the will').
Many of Grice's essays are reprinted in compilations, including Warnock's The Philosophy of Perception ('The Causal Theory of Perception'), Perry's Personal Identity ('Personal identity,' repr. from Mind), Searle's The philosophy of language ('Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning,' repr. from The Foundations of Language).
A chronological listing is listed under 'References' below.
H. P. Grice's published oeuvre includes the volumes Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, Mass. and London, Harvard University Press), The Conception of Value (Clarendon) and Aspects of Reason (Clarendon).
H. P. Grice published some of his essays in periodical publications such as, Mind ('Personal Identity'), The Philosophical Review ('Meaning' and 'Utterer's Meaning and Intentions', 'In defence of a dogma'), The Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society ('The Causal Theory of Perception'), The Foundations of Language ('Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning and word-meaning'), The Proceedings of The British Academy ('Intention and Uncertainty'), The Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association ('Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre'), and The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly ('Actions and events,' 'Aristotle on the multiplicity of being').
Some of H. P. Grice's essays appeared as commissioned chapters for volumes, such as Analytic Philosophy, ed. by R. J. Butler, for Blackwell ('Some remarks about the senses') Words and objections: essays in the work of W. V. Quine, ed. by D. Davidson and G. Harman for Reidel, Dordrecht ('Vacuous names'), Mutual knowledge ('Meaning revisited'), Logic and grammar ('Logic and conversation'), Speech acts ('Logic and conversation'), Pragmatics ('Further notes on logic and conversation'), Radical Pragmatics ('Presupposition and conversational implicature'), Actions and events, ed. by Hintikka and Vermazen ('Davidson on weakness of the will').
Many of Grice's essays are reprinted in compilations, including Warnock's The Philosophy of Perception ('The Causal Theory of Perception'), Perry's Personal Identity ('Personal identity,' repr. from Mind), Searle's The philosophy of language ('Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning,' repr. from The Foundations of Language).
A chronological listing is listed under 'References' below.
***
Included in the Grice Papers are extensive notes and research Grice conducts on theories of semantics, reason, trust, and value.
Grice's most popular lectures, including The John Locke Lectures at Oxford on Aspects of reason, The William James Lectures at Harvard on Logic and conversation, The Paul Carus Lectures on The Conception of Value, Urbana lectures, and The Immanuel Kant Lectures at Stanford, are all documented both as drafts and finalised forms of transcripts, and also in audio files within the collection.
H. P. Grice's contributions include The William James Lectures at Harvard on Logic and Conversation, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," in The Foundations of Language, "The Urbana Lectures," "Logic and Conversation" (in Davidson and Harman, Logic and Grammar), The Immanuel Kant Lectures at Stanford on Aspects of Rason, The John Locke Lectures at Oxfford, and The Paul Carus Lectures on The Conception of Value.
H. P. Grice's publications and unpublications are compilations of his extensive research performed mainly in the philosophy of language, but also in metaphysics, Aristotelian philosophy, philosophical psychology, and ethics.
H. P. Grice is attributed with coining "implicature" to describe a dimension of utterer's meaning, and for defining his own paradox known as "Grice's paradox," introduced in Grice's Studies in the Way of Words, a compilation of his essays.
Included in the H. P. Grice collection is Grice's research on Aristotelian philosophy with A. D. Code, meta-ethics with J. Baker, metaphysics with P. F. Strawson and G. Myro, intention and philosophical psychology, with D. F. Pears, and the philosophy of perception, with G. J. Warnock and R. O. Warner.
Also included in The H. P. Grice Papers is documentation of Grice's involvement with various philosophical associations, such as The Aristotelian Society, The British Academy, and The American Philosophical Association.
Container List
***
Series I
***
***
The Correspondence
of
H. P. Grice
of
H. P. Grice
Physical Description:
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF H. P. GRICE
Carton 1
Folders 1-15.
***
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF H. P. GRICE
Carton 1
Folders 1-15.
***
The correspondence of H. P. Grice is arranged alphabetically according to surname of correspondent, followed by correspondence of a more general, sometimes administrative, kind.
***
***
Scope and Content
Note
Note
"Series I: The Correspondence of H. P. Grice" includes correspondence with philosophers such as J. Baker, G. P. Bealer, R. O. Warner, and R. Wyatt, addressing various forms of his research on philosophy.
Carton 1
Folder 1
Folder 1
Correspondenc with J. F. Bennett, of Oxford.
Bennett quotes Grice in his "Linguistic Behaviour."
Grice quotes Bennett in the "Foreword" to Studies in the Way of Words.
Bennett has an earlier work on Rationality, which evidenced that the topic was key in Grice's Oxford.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1988). Correspondence with J. F. Bennett, The Grice Papers.
***
Carton 1
Folder 2
Correspondence with J. Baker
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1982). Correspondence with J. Baker, The Grice Papers.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1982). Correspondence with J. Baker, The Grice Papers.
Grice and Baker collaborated mainly on work on ethics seen as an offspring, alla Kant, of philosophical psychology. Baker contributes to P. G. R. I. C. E., a festschrift for Grice ("Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends") with an essay on the purity, and alleged lack thereof of, of morally evaluable motives ("Do one's motives have to be pure?"). Baker also contributed to a volume on Grice's honour published by Palgrave, Meaning and analysis: essays on H. P. Grice.
Baker is the organiser of a symposium on the thought of H. P. Grice for the American Philosophical Association. Proceedings in The Journal of Philosophy -- The chair is J. F. Bennett, with contributions by Baker, R. Grandy, and comments by R. Stalnaker and R. Warner.
***
Correspondence with G. P. Bealer
Carton 1
Folder 4
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1986). Correspondence with G. P. Bealer, The Grice Papers, Series I, Cartdon 1, Folder 4.
Bealer refers to Grice in his influential Clarendon essay on content. Bealer is concerned with how 'pragmatic inference' may intrude in the ascription of a psychological state, attitude, or stance.
***
Folder 4
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1986). Correspondence with G. P. Bealer, The Grice Papers, Series I, Cartdon 1, Folder 4.
Bealer refers to Grice in his influential Clarendon essay on content. Bealer is concerned with how 'pragmatic inference' may intrude in the ascription of a psychological state, attitude, or stance.
***
Correspondence with A. D. Code
Carton 1
Folders 5-6
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Correspondence with A. D. Code, The Grice Papers, Series I, Carton 1, Folders 5 and 6.
Grice saw in Code an excellent Aristotelian. They collaborated on an exploration of Aristotle's underlying logic of essential and non-essential predication, for which they would freely use such verbal forms as 'izzing' and 'hazzing.'
***
Folders 5-6
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Correspondence with A. D. Code, The Grice Papers, Series I, Carton 1, Folders 5 and 6.
Grice saw in Code an excellent Aristotelian. They collaborated on an exploration of Aristotle's underlying logic of essential and non-essential predication, for which they would freely use such verbal forms as 'izzing' and 'hazzing.'
***
Correspondence with P. Suppes
Carton 1
Folders 7-8
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1985). Correspondence with P. Suppes, The Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice), Carton 1, Folders 7 and 8.
Suppes was involved in the P. G. R. I. C. E., and contributed an excellent "The Primacy of Utterer's Meaning," where he addresses what he rightly sees as unfair characterisations of Grice as a behaviourist by three philosophers: Yu, Biro, and Chomsky. (Biro was able to reply to Suppes's commentary on Grice as proposing a reductive but not reductionist analysis of meaning).
Folders 7-8
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1985). Correspondence with P. Suppes, The Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice), Carton 1, Folders 7 and 8.
Suppes was involved in the P. G. R. I. C. E., and contributed an excellent "The Primacy of Utterer's Meaning," where he addresses what he rightly sees as unfair characterisations of Grice as a behaviourist by three philosophers: Yu, Biro, and Chomsky. (Biro was able to reply to Suppes's commentary on Grice as proposing a reductive but not reductionist analysis of meaning).
***
Correspondence with R. O. Warner.
Correspondence with R. O. Warner.
Carton 1
Folder 9
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Correspondence with R. O. Warner, The Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice), Carton 1, Folder 9.
Warner was especially helpful with Grice's third difficult Carus lecture, a metaphysical defence of absolute value.
Warner also connected with Grice in such topics as the philosophy of perception (seen in an evolutionary light) and the Kantotelian idea of happiness.
In response to Warner's overview of Grice's oeuvre for the festschrift (that Warner co-authored with Grandy), Grice refers to the editors by the collective name of "Richards."
***
Folder 9
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Correspondence with R. O. Warner, The Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice), Carton 1, Folder 9.
Warner was especially helpful with Grice's third difficult Carus lecture, a metaphysical defence of absolute value.
Warner also connected with Grice in such topics as the philosophy of perception (seen in an evolutionary light) and the Kantotelian idea of happiness.
In response to Warner's overview of Grice's oeuvre for the festschrift (that Warner co-authored with Grandy), Grice refers to the editors by the collective name of "Richards."
***
Correspondence with R. Wyatt
Carton 1
Folders 10-12
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Correspondence with R. Wyatt. The Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice), Carton 1, Folders 10, 11, and 12.
***
Folders 10-12
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Correspondence with R. Wyatt. The Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice), Carton 1, Folders 10, 11, and 12.
***
Correspondence: Other.
Carton 1
Folders 13-14
***
Folders 13-14
***
Correspondence: Other.
Carton 1, Folder 15
Various published essays on Grice.
***
Series II
Some Selected Publications
Physical Description:
Carton 1 (folders 16-31)
Cartons 2-4.
Carton 1 (folders 16-31)
Cartons 2-4.
These essays by H. P. Grice are arranged chronologically.
However, for those "n. d." publications, the order is alphabetical by keyword and/or title.
Scope and Content
Note
Note
Series II, "Grice's Selected Publications" includes H. P. Grice's published essays.
The Series also contains H. P. Grice's drafts and notes that accompany the publication of the essays, some unpublished essays, along with their drafts and/or notes, and published transcripts of his various lectures (William James, Urbana, Carus, John Locke).
Also included in Series II is Grice's volume for Harvard University Press, Studies in the Way of Words, a compilation of his most influential essays, including, "Meaning" (The Philosophical Review) "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions" (The Philosophical Review) and "Logic and Conversation" (in Davidson's and Harman's Logic and Grammar)
The Series also contains H. P. Grice's drafts and notes that accompany the publication of the essays, some unpublished essays, along with their drafts and/or notes, and published transcripts of his various lectures (William James, Urbana, Carus, John Locke).
Also included in Series II is Grice's volume for Harvard University Press, Studies in the Way of Words, a compilation of his most influential essays, including, "Meaning" (The Philosophical Review) "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions" (The Philosophical Review) and "Logic and Conversation" (in Davidson's and Harman's Logic and Grammar)
Carton 1
Folder 16
Folder 16
"Meaning"
The Oxford Philosophical Society.
Published in "The Philosophical Review."
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1948). Meaning. The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folder 16.
AUTHORS CITED:
STEVENSON, C. L.
"Meaning" develops out of an interest by H. P. Grice on the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. In his essays on Peirce, Grice quotes from many other authors, including, besides C. S. Peirce, C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, and A. C. Ewing.
***
The Oxford Philosophical Society.
Published in "The Philosophical Review."
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1948). Meaning. The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folder 16.
AUTHORS CITED:
STEVENSON, C. L.
"Meaning" develops out of an interest by H. P. Grice on the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. In his essays on Peirce, Grice quotes from many other authors, including, besides C. S. Peirce, C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, and A. C. Ewing.
***
Carton 1
Folders 17-18
Folders 17-18
"Meaning Revisited"
Citation
Grice, H. P. (1976). 'Meaning Revisited,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folders 17 and 18.
This is the title H. P. Grice chose for a contribution to a symposium at Brighton organised by N. V. Smith.
It comprises three sections.
Grice is concerned with the application of his "M. O. R.," or "Modified Occam's Razor" to the lexeme, "mean."
The also explores an 'evolutionary' model of creature construction reaching a stage of non-iconic representation.
Finally, Grice attempts to construct 'meaning' as a 'value-paradeigmatic' notion.
A version was published in the proceedings of the Brighton symposium, by Croom Helm, London.
***
Citation
Grice, H. P. (1976). 'Meaning Revisited,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folders 17 and 18.
This is the title H. P. Grice chose for a contribution to a symposium at Brighton organised by N. V. Smith.
It comprises three sections.
Grice is concerned with the application of his "M. O. R.," or "Modified Occam's Razor" to the lexeme, "mean."
The also explores an 'evolutionary' model of creature construction reaching a stage of non-iconic representation.
Finally, Grice attempts to construct 'meaning' as a 'value-paradeigmatic' notion.
A version was published in the proceedings of the Brighton symposium, by Croom Helm, London.
***
Carton 1, Folder 19
Oxford Philosophy
Linguistic Botanising
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1970). Oxford Philosophy and Linguistic Botanising. The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folder 19.
By "Oxford Philosophy," H. P. Grice notably refers to J. L. Austin's Play Group, of which he was a member.
This, to some, infamous, playgroup, met on Saturday mornings at different venues at Oxford, including Grice's own St. John's -- apparently, Austin's favourite venue.
Austin regarded himself and his 'kindergarten' as 'linguistic' or 'language' *botanists*.
The idea was to list various 'ordinary' uses of this or that 'philosophical notion."
Austin: "They say philosophy is about language; well, then, let's botanise!"
***
Linguistic Botanising
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1970). Oxford Philosophy and Linguistic Botanising. The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folder 19.
H. P. Grice, St. John's, Oxford
By "Oxford Philosophy," H. P. Grice notably refers to J. L. Austin's Play Group, of which he was a member.
This, to some, infamous, playgroup, met on Saturday mornings at different venues at Oxford, including Grice's own St. John's -- apparently, Austin's favourite venue.
Austin regarded himself and his 'kindergarten' as 'linguistic' or 'language' *botanists*.
The idea was to list various 'ordinary' uses of this or that 'philosophical notion."
Austin: "They say philosophy is about language; well, then, let's botanise!"
***
Carton 1
Folder 20
Folder 20
"Descartes on 'Clear and Distinct Perception'"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1966). "Descartes on clear and distinct perception," The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folder 20. Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
H. P. Grice is interested in contesting A. J. Ayer and other Oxford philosophers, on the topic of a criterion for 'certainty.'
In so doing, Grice choses Descartes's time-honoured criterion of 'clarity' and 'distinction,' as applied to perception.
In the proceedings, Grice distinguishes between two 'kinds' of certainty apparently ignored by Descartes:
(a) OBJECTIVE CERTAINTY:
Ordinary-language variant:
"It is certain that p."
-- whatever "it" refers to.
(b) SUBJECTIVE CERTAINTY:
Ordinary-language variant:
"I am certain that p."
-- "I" being, of course, Grice, "in my bestest days, of course!"
There are further items on Descartes in the Grice Collection, notably in the last series, of topics arranged alphabetically.
Grice never cared to publish his views on Descartes until he found an opportunity to do so when compiling his Studies in the Way of Words.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1966). "Descartes on clear and distinct perception," The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folder 20. Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
Grice found Descartes very funny -- in a French way!
H. P. Grice is interested in contesting A. J. Ayer and other Oxford philosophers, on the topic of a criterion for 'certainty.'
In so doing, Grice choses Descartes's time-honoured criterion of 'clarity' and 'distinction,' as applied to perception.
In the proceedings, Grice distinguishes between two 'kinds' of certainty apparently ignored by Descartes:
(a) OBJECTIVE CERTAINTY:
Ordinary-language variant:
"It is certain that p."
-- whatever "it" refers to.
(b) SUBJECTIVE CERTAINTY:
Ordinary-language variant:
"I am certain that p."
-- "I" being, of course, Grice, "in my bestest days, of course!"
There are further items on Descartes in the Grice Collection, notably in the last series, of topics arranged alphabetically.
Grice never cared to publish his views on Descartes until he found an opportunity to do so when compiling his Studies in the Way of Words.
***
Carton 1
Folders 21-23
Folders 21-23
"Logic and Conversation"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1964). 'Logic and conversation,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folders 21, 22, and 23.
"Logica" had been part of the 'trivium' for ages -- "Although they called it 'dialectica,' then."
Moved by P. F. Strawson's treatment of the 'formal' devices in "Introduction to Logical Theory," Grice targets these, in their 'ordinary-discourse' counterparts.
Grice attempts to reconcile Strawson's observations with the idea that the 'formal' devices reproduce some sort of 'explicatum,' or 'explicitum,' as identified by Whitehead and Russell in "Principia Mathematica."
In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general features of discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation.
The alleged divergence between the 'ordinary-language' operators and their 'formal' counterparts is explained in terms of the CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATA, then. I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has to ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal device and its alleged 'ordinary-language' counterpart, while still assuming that U is engaged in a co-operative transaction.
Utterer and addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation -- the exchange of information and the institution of decisions -- and judging that conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and rational) if conducted under some form of principle of 'conversational helpfulness.'
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1964). 'Logic and conversation,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folders 21, 22, and 23.
"Logica" had been part of the 'trivium' for ages -- "Although they called it 'dialectica,' then."
Grice attempts to reconcile Strawson's observations with the idea that the 'formal' devices reproduce some sort of 'explicatum,' or 'explicitum,' as identified by Whitehead and Russell in "Principia Mathematica."
In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general features of discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation.
The alleged divergence between the 'ordinary-language' operators and their 'formal' counterparts is explained in terms of the CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATA, then. I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has to ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal device and its alleged 'ordinary-language' counterpart, while still assuming that U is engaged in a co-operative transaction.
Utterer and addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation -- the exchange of information and the institution of decisions -- and judging that conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and rational) if conducted under some form of principle of 'conversational helpfulness.'
"The observation of a principle of conversational helpfulness is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: anyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participating in a conversation that will be profitable ONLY on the assumption that it is conducted in general accordance with a principle of conversational helpfulness."
Carton 1
Folders 24-26
Folders 24-26
The William James Memorial Lectures on Logic and Conversation, Harvard.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1967). The William James lectures on logic and conversation, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folders 24, 25, and 26.
"I hope they don't expect me to lecture on James!"
Grice admired James, but not vice versa.
Grice entitled the set as being "Logic and Conversation." That is the title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing that it was way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the second lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and Harman, "Logic and Grammar."
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1967). The William James lectures on logic and conversation, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folders 24, 25, and 26.
"I hope they don't expect me to lecture on James!"
Grice admired James, but not vice versa.
Grice entitled the set as being "Logic and Conversation." That is the title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing that it was way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the second lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and Harman, "Logic and Grammar."
***
Carton 1
Folder 27
Folder 27
"Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning"
The Foundations of Language
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1967). 'Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folder 27.
The phrase 'utterer' is meant to provoke. Grice thinks that 'speaker' is too narrow. "Surely you can mean by just UTTERING stuff!"
This is the sixth William James lecture, as published in "The Foundations of Language."
As it happens, it became a popular lecture, seeing that J. R. Searle selected this from the whole set for his Oxford reading in philosophy, "The philosophy of language."
It is also the essay cited by Chomsky in his influential John Locke lectures.
Chomsky takes Grice to be a 'behaviourist,' even along Skinner's lines, which provoked a reply by Suppes, later reprinted in P. G. R. I. C. E., or Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends.
(In The New World, the "H. P." was often given in a more "simplified" form.)
***
The Foundations of Language
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1967). 'Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folder 27.
The phrase 'utterer' is meant to provoke. Grice thinks that 'speaker' is too narrow. "Surely you can mean by just UTTERING stuff!"
This is the sixth William James lecture, as published in "The Foundations of Language."
As it happens, it became a popular lecture, seeing that J. R. Searle selected this from the whole set for his Oxford reading in philosophy, "The philosophy of language."
It is also the essay cited by Chomsky in his influential John Locke lectures.
Chomsky takes Grice to be a 'behaviourist,' even along Skinner's lines, which provoked a reply by Suppes, later reprinted in P. G. R. I. C. E., or Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends.
(In The New World, the "H. P." was often given in a more "simplified" form.)
***
Carton 1
Folders 28-30
Folders 28-30
"Utterer's Meaning and Intentions"
The Philosophical Review
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1967). 'Utterer's meaning and intentions,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folders 28, 29, and 30.
Grice is not an animist. While he allows for natural phenomena to mean ("smoke means fire"), 'meaning' is best ascribed to some utterer, where this 'meaning' is nothing but the intentions behind his utterance.
This is the fifth William James lecture. Grice was careful enough to submit it to "The Philosophical Review," since it is a strictly philosophical development of the views expressed in "Meaning" which Strawson had submitted on Grice's behalf to the same "Review" and which had had a series of responses by various philosophers
Among these philosophers is Strawson himself in "Intention and convention in the the theory of speech acts," also in "The Philosophical Review."
Grice quotes from very many other philosophers in this essay, including:
J. O. Urmson
D. W. Stampe
P. F. Strawson
S. R. Schiffer
J. R. Searle
P. F. Strawson is especially relevant since he started a series of alleged counter-examples with his infamous example of the 'rat-infested house.'
Anita Avramides wrote her Oxon D.Phil on that, under Strawson!
***
The Philosophical Review
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1967). 'Utterer's meaning and intentions,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folders 28, 29, and 30.
Grice is not an animist. While he allows for natural phenomena to mean ("smoke means fire"), 'meaning' is best ascribed to some utterer, where this 'meaning' is nothing but the intentions behind his utterance.
This is the fifth William James lecture. Grice was careful enough to submit it to "The Philosophical Review," since it is a strictly philosophical development of the views expressed in "Meaning" which Strawson had submitted on Grice's behalf to the same "Review" and which had had a series of responses by various philosophers
Among these philosophers is Strawson himself in "Intention and convention in the the theory of speech acts," also in "The Philosophical Review."
Grice quotes from very many other philosophers in this essay, including:
J. O. Urmson
D. W. Stampe
P. F. Strawson
S. R. Schiffer
J. R. Searle
P. F. Strawson is especially relevant since he started a series of alleged counter-examples with his infamous example of the 'rat-infested house.'
Anita Avramides wrote her Oxon D.Phil on that, under Strawson!
***
"Vacuous Names"
For Davidson/Hintikka, Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1969). 'Vacuous names,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folders 31, and Carton 2, Folders 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Grice's favourite vacuous name is Bellerophon.
This is an essay commissioned by Donald Davison and Jaako Hintikka for "Words and objects: essays in the work of W. V. Quine" for Reidel.
"Words and objects" had appeared (without Grice's contribution) as a special issue of "Synthese." Grice's contribution, along with Quine's "Reply to H. P. Grice," appeared only in the reprint of that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht.
Grice cites from various philosophers (and logicians -- this was the time when logic was starting to be taught OUTSIDE philosophy departments, or 'sub-faculties'), such as
G. Myro
B. Mates
K. S. Donnellan
P. F. Strawson
Carton 2
Folders 1-4
For Davidson/Hintikka, Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1969). 'Vacuous names,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 1, Folders 31, and Carton 2, Folders 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Grice's favourite vacuous name is Bellerophon.
This is an essay commissioned by Donald Davison and Jaako Hintikka for "Words and objects: essays in the work of W. V. Quine" for Reidel.
"Words and objects" had appeared (without Grice's contribution) as a special issue of "Synthese." Grice's contribution, along with Quine's "Reply to H. P. Grice," appeared only in the reprint of that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht.
Grice cites from various philosophers (and logicians -- this was the time when logic was starting to be taught OUTSIDE philosophy departments, or 'sub-faculties'), such as
G. Myro
B. Mates
K. S. Donnellan
P. F. Strawson
Carton 2
Folders 1-4
"Vacuous Names" (continued).
Citation: Same as item above. Completed.
Grice takes the opportunity, in his tribute to Quine, to introduce one of two of his syntactical devices to allow for conversational implicata to be given maximal scope.
The device in "Vacuous Names" is a subscription device to indicate the ordering of introduction of this or that operation.
Grice wants to give room for utterances of a special 'existential' kind be deemed rational/reasonable, provided the principle of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the addressee to be followed by the utterer.
"Someone isn't attending the party organised by the Merseyside Geographical Society."
"That is Marmaduke Bloggs, who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees."
"But who, as it happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at The Merseyside Newsletter."
***
Citation: Same as item above. Completed.
Grice takes the opportunity, in his tribute to Quine, to introduce one of two of his syntactical devices to allow for conversational implicata to be given maximal scope.
The device in "Vacuous Names" is a subscription device to indicate the ordering of introduction of this or that operation.
Grice wants to give room for utterances of a special 'existential' kind be deemed rational/reasonable, provided the principle of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the addressee to be followed by the utterer.
"Someone isn't attending the party organised by the Merseyside Geographical Society."
"That is Marmaduke Bloggs, who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees."
"But who, as it happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at The Merseyside Newsletter."
***
Carton 2
Folders 5-7
Folders 5-7
Urbana Lectures
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1970). The Urbana Lectures, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 5, 6, 7, and 8.
Grice continues with the elaboration of a formal calculus. He originally baptised it "System Q" in honour of Quine.
At a later stage, Myro will re-name it "System G," in a special version, "System GHP," a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of System G," "in gratitude to Grice."
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1970). The Urbana Lectures, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 5, 6, 7, and 8.
Grice continues with the elaboration of a formal calculus. He originally baptised it "System Q" in honour of Quine.
At a later stage, Myro will re-name it "System G," in a special version, "System GHP," a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of System G," "in gratitude to Grice."
***
Carton 2
Folder 8
Folder 8
Urbana Lectures (continued).
Citation: Same as above (completed).
***
Citation: Same as above (completed).
***
Carton 2, Folders 9-10
"Intention and Uncertainty"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1971). 'Intention and uncertainty,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 9 and 10.
This is the Henriette Herz British Academy lecture, and as such published in The Proceedings of the British Academy.
Grice calls himself a neo-Prichardian (after the Oxford philosopher) and cares to quote from a few other philosophers -- some of whom he was not necessarily associated with: such as Kenny and Anscombe, and some of whom he was, notably D. F. Pears.
Grice quotes Pears as a philosopher he found especially congenial to explore areas in what both called 'philosophical psychology,' notably the tricky use of 'intending' as made by a few philosophers even in their own circle (such as Hampshire and Hart in "Intention, decision, and certainty."
The title of Grice's lecture is meant to provoke those philosophers who were too ready to bring in 'certainty' in an area that requires deep philosophical exploration.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1971). 'Intention and uncertainty,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 9 and 10.
This is the Henriette Herz British Academy lecture, and as such published in The Proceedings of the British Academy.
Grice calls himself a neo-Prichardian (after the Oxford philosopher) and cares to quote from a few other philosophers -- some of whom he was not necessarily associated with: such as Kenny and Anscombe, and some of whom he was, notably D. F. Pears.
Grice quotes Pears as a philosopher he found especially congenial to explore areas in what both called 'philosophical psychology,' notably the tricky use of 'intending' as made by a few philosophers even in their own circle (such as Hampshire and Hart in "Intention, decision, and certainty."
The title of Grice's lecture is meant to provoke those philosophers who were too ready to bring in 'certainty' in an area that requires deep philosophical exploration.
***
Carton 2
Folder 11
"Probability, Desirability, and Mode Operators"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1973). 'Probability, desirability, and mode operators,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folder 11.
Folder 11
"Probability, Desirability, and Mode Operators"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1973). 'Probability, desirability, and mode operators,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folder 11.
Grice had been freely using the very English 'mood' until J. M. E Moravsik, of all people, corrected him:
"What you mean ain't a 'mood.'"
"I shall call it 'mode' just to please you, J. M. E."
A version of this essay was presented in a conference whose proceedings were published, except for Grice's essay, due to 'technical complications,' viz. his idiosyncratic use of idiosyncratic symbology!
***
Carton 2
Folders 12-13.
Folders 12-13.
The Paul Carus Lectures on the conception of value.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1983). The Conception of Value, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.
"I
CARUS"
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1983). The Conception of Value, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.
"I
CARUS" ***
Carton 2
Folders 14-16
Folders 14-16
The Paul Carus Lectures on the conception of value (continued).
Citation: Same as above, completed.
Grice was undecided as to what his Paul Carus lectures were be on.
He had explored 'meaning' under its 'value' "optimality" guise in "Meaning revisited."
Grice thought that introducing 'value-paradeigmatic' notions would allow him to respond in a more apt way to what some critics were raising as a possible 'vicious circle' in his approach to 'semantic' and 'psychological' notions.
The Carus lectures are then dedicated to the 'construction,' alla Hume, of 'value-paradeigmatic' notions, and value itself.
Grice starts by quoting Austin and J. L. Mackie, of Oxford.
The lectures are intended to a general audience, provided it is a *philosophical* general audience!
Most of the second lecture is Grice's subtle exploration of Kant's categorical imperative, with which he had struggled in the last John Locke lecture on aspects of reasoning -- notably the 'reduction' of the categorical imperative to this or that 'counsel of prudence' with an implicated protasis to the effect that the agent is aiming at 'eudaimonia.'
***
Citation: Same as above, completed.
Grice was undecided as to what his Paul Carus lectures were be on.
He had explored 'meaning' under its 'value' "optimality" guise in "Meaning revisited."
Grice thought that introducing 'value-paradeigmatic' notions would allow him to respond in a more apt way to what some critics were raising as a possible 'vicious circle' in his approach to 'semantic' and 'psychological' notions.
The Carus lectures are then dedicated to the 'construction,' alla Hume, of 'value-paradeigmatic' notions, and value itself.
Grice starts by quoting Austin and J. L. Mackie, of Oxford.
The lectures are intended to a general audience, provided it is a *philosophical* general audience!
Most of the second lecture is Grice's subtle exploration of Kant's categorical imperative, with which he had struggled in the last John Locke lecture on aspects of reasoning -- notably the 'reduction' of the categorical imperative to this or that 'counsel of prudence' with an implicated protasis to the effect that the agent is aiming at 'eudaimonia.'
***
Carton 2
Folders 17-18
Folders 17-18
"Reply to Davidson on 'Intending'"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1973). 'Reply to Davidson on 'Intending,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 17 and 18.
Grice and Davidson were members of "The Grice and Davidson Mutual Admiration Society."
Davidson, not being Oxonian, was perhaps not acquainted with Grice's polemics at Oxford with Hart and Hampshire (where Grice sided with Pears, rather).
Grice and Pears hold a 'minimalist' approach to 'intending.'
On the other hand, Davidson makes what Grice sees as 'the same mistake' again of BUILDING 'certainty' into the concept.
Grice finds that to apply the idea of a conversational IMPLICATUM at this point is 'too social to be true.'
Rather, Grice prefers to coin the conversational DISIMPLICATUM:
Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees.
The utterance above, if merely reporting what Bloggs thinks, may involve a 'loose' use of "intends."
The certainty on the agent's part on the success of his enterprise is thus cast with doubt.
Davidson was claiming that the agent's belief in the probability of the object of the agent's intention was a mere conversational IMPLICATUM on the utterer's part.
Grice responds that the ascription of such a belief is an ENTAILMENT of a strict use of 'intend,' even if, in cases where the utterer aims at a conversational DISIMPLICATUM, it can be 'dropped.'
The addressee will still regard the utterer as abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness.
D. F. Pears was especially interested in the Davidson-Grice polemic on intending.
Keywords: INTENDING, BELIEVING.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1973). 'Reply to Davidson on 'Intending,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 17 and 18.
Grice and Davidson were members of "The Grice and Davidson Mutual Admiration Society."
Davidson, not being Oxonian, was perhaps not acquainted with Grice's polemics at Oxford with Hart and Hampshire (where Grice sided with Pears, rather).
Grice and Pears hold a 'minimalist' approach to 'intending.'
On the other hand, Davidson makes what Grice sees as 'the same mistake' again of BUILDING 'certainty' into the concept.
Grice finds that to apply the idea of a conversational IMPLICATUM at this point is 'too social to be true.'
Rather, Grice prefers to coin the conversational DISIMPLICATUM:
Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees.
The utterance above, if merely reporting what Bloggs thinks, may involve a 'loose' use of "intends."
The certainty on the agent's part on the success of his enterprise is thus cast with doubt.
Davidson was claiming that the agent's belief in the probability of the object of the agent's intention was a mere conversational IMPLICATUM on the utterer's part.
Grice responds that the ascription of such a belief is an ENTAILMENT of a strict use of 'intend,' even if, in cases where the utterer aims at a conversational DISIMPLICATUM, it can be 'dropped.'
The addressee will still regard the utterer as abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness.
D. F. Pears was especially interested in the Davidson-Grice polemic on intending.
Keywords: INTENDING, BELIEVING.
***
Carton 2
Folders 19-21
Folders 19-21
"Method in Philosophical Psychology: from the banal to the bizarre"
Presidential address to the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1975). Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 19, 20, and 21.
Grice was forever grateful to Carnap for having coined 'pirot.' ("Or having thought to have coined. Apparently, someone had used the expression before him to mean some sort of exotic fish.")
Grice wasn't sure what his presidential address to the American Philosophical Association will be about.
He chose "the banal" (i.e. the 'ordinary-language' counterpart of something like a 'need' we ascribe to a squirrel to gobble nuts) and the 'bizarre': the philosopher's construction of 'need' and other 'psychological,' now theoretical terms.
In the proceedings, Grice creates the discipline of 'pirotology.'
He cares to mention very many philosophers: Aristotle, D. K. Lewis, G. Myro, L. Witters, F. R. Ramsey, G. Ryle, and a few others!
The essay became popular when, of all people, Ned Block, cited it as a programme in 'functionalism,' which it is!
***
Presidential address to the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1975). Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 19, 20, and 21.
Grice was forever grateful to Carnap for having coined 'pirot.' ("Or having thought to have coined. Apparently, someone had used the expression before him to mean some sort of exotic fish.")
Grice wasn't sure what his presidential address to the American Philosophical Association will be about.
He chose "the banal" (i.e. the 'ordinary-language' counterpart of something like a 'need' we ascribe to a squirrel to gobble nuts) and the 'bizarre': the philosopher's construction of 'need' and other 'psychological,' now theoretical terms.
In the proceedings, Grice creates the discipline of 'pirotology.'
He cares to mention very many philosophers: Aristotle, D. K. Lewis, G. Myro, L. Witters, F. R. Ramsey, G. Ryle, and a few others!
The essay became popular when, of all people, Ned Block, cited it as a programme in 'functionalism,' which it is!
***
Carton 2
Folders 22-23
Folders 22-23
"Incontinence"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1982). Akrasia, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 22 and 23.
"We shouldn't be saying this, but we are saying it!"
Grice prefers 'akrasia,' but he is happy to use Cicero's translation of this.
For Grice, 'akrasia' has to be accounted for by a theory of rationality from the start.
Grice is interested in both the common-or-garden 'boulomaic' version of akrasia, involving the volitive 'soul,' and 'alethic' or doxastic 'akrasia,' involing the judicative soul proper.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1982). Akrasia, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 22 and 23.
"We shouldn't be saying this, but we are saying it!"
Grice prefers 'akrasia,' but he is happy to use Cicero's translation of this.
For Grice, 'akrasia' has to be accounted for by a theory of rationality from the start.
Grice is interested in both the common-or-garden 'boulomaic' version of akrasia, involving the volitive 'soul,' and 'alethic' or doxastic 'akrasia,' involing the judicative soul proper.
***
Carton 2
Folder 24
Folder 24
"Further Notes on Logic and Conversation"
Published in Peter Cole, "Pragmatics," for Academic Press, London.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1967). Further notes on logic and conversation, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folder 24.
"Personally, I prefer 'dialectica.'" -- Grice.
Published in Peter Cole, "Pragmatics," for Academic Press, London.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1967). Further notes on logic and conversation, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folder 24.
"Personally, I prefer 'dialectica.'" -- Grice.
This is the third William James lecture at Harvard.
It is particularly useful for Grice's introduction of his 'razor,' "M. O. R.," or "Modified Occam's Razor," jocularly expressed by Grice as:
"Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity."
An Englishing of the Ockham's Latinate:
"Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem."
***
Carton 2
Folder 25
It is particularly useful for Grice's introduction of his 'razor,' "M. O. R.," or "Modified Occam's Razor," jocularly expressed by Grice as:
"Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity."
An Englishing of the Ockham's Latinate:
"Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem."
***
Carton 2
Folder 25
"Presupposition and Conversational Implicature"
Repr. in P. Cole, Radical pragmatics, for Academic Press, London.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1970). Presupposition and conversational implicature, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folder 25.
Grice much preferred Collingwood's to Strawson's presuppositions!
Grice thought, and rightly, too, that if his notion of the conversational implicatum was to gain Oxonian currency, it should supersede Strawson's idea of the 'prae-suppositum.'
Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with Quine's idea of a 'truth-value gap.'
Grice shows that neither the metaphysical concoction of a truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the 'prae-suppositum' is needed:
"The king of France is bald"
ENTAILS 'There is a king of France."
"The king of France ain't bald."
on the other hand, merely IMPLICATES it, as a perfectly adequate cancellation, abiding with the principle of conversational helpfulness" is in the offing:
"The king of France ain't bald. What made you think he is? For starters, he ain't real!"
***
Repr. in P. Cole, Radical pragmatics, for Academic Press, London.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1970). Presupposition and conversational implicature, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folder 25.
Grice much preferred Collingwood's to Strawson's presuppositions!
Grice thought, and rightly, too, that if his notion of the conversational implicatum was to gain Oxonian currency, it should supersede Strawson's idea of the 'prae-suppositum.'
Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with Quine's idea of a 'truth-value gap.'
Grice shows that neither the metaphysical concoction of a truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the 'prae-suppositum' is needed:
"The king of France is bald"
ENTAILS 'There is a king of France."
"The king of France ain't bald."
on the other hand, merely IMPLICATES it, as a perfectly adequate cancellation, abiding with the principle of conversational helpfulness" is in the offing:
"The king of France ain't bald. What made you think he is? For starters, he ain't real!"
***
Carton 2
Folders 26-28
Folders 26-28
"Freedom and Morality in Kant's Foundations"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Freedom and Morality in Kant's Grunlegung, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 26, 27, and 28.
Grice would refer to this, as Kantians do, as the Grundlegung.
Grice was never happy with 'eleutheria,' qua Greek philosophical notion. "To literal to be true?"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Freedom and Morality in Kant's Grunlegung, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 26, 27, and 28.
Grice would refer to this, as Kantians do, as the Grundlegung.
Grice was never happy with 'eleutheria,' qua Greek philosophical notion. "To literal to be true?"
By "Foundations," Grice obviously means Kant's essay.
Grice preferred to quote Kant in English. The reason being that Grice was practising "ordinary-language" philosophy; and you cannot expect much 'linguistic botany' in a language other than your own!
Kant was not too 'ordinary' in his use of German, either!
The English translations that Grice used captured, in a way, all that Grice thought was worth capturing in Kant's philosophy.
Kant was not your 'standard' philosopher in the programme Grice was familiar with: Lit. Hum. Oxon.
However, Kant was popular in The New World, where Grice lectured profusely.
***
Carton 2
Folders 29-30
Grice preferred to quote Kant in English. The reason being that Grice was practising "ordinary-language" philosophy; and you cannot expect much 'linguistic botany' in a language other than your own!
Kant was not too 'ordinary' in his use of German, either!
The English translations that Grice used captured, in a way, all that Grice thought was worth capturing in Kant's philosophy.
Kant was not your 'standard' philosopher in the programme Grice was familiar with: Lit. Hum. Oxon.
However, Kant was popular in The New World, where Grice lectured profusely.
***
Carton 2
Folders 29-30
John Locke Lectures "Aspects of Reason"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). Aspects of reason, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 29 and 30.
While Locke hardly mentions 'reason,' his friend Burthogge does, and profusely!
It was slightly ironic that Grice had delivered these lectures as the Rationalist Kant lectures at Stanford.
He was honoured to be invited to Oxford. Officially, to be a John Locke lecture you have to be *visiting* Oxford.
While Grice was a fellow of St. John's, he was still most welcome to give his set of lectures on reasoning at the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy.
He quotes very many authors, including Locke! In his "proemium," Grice notes that while he was rejected the Locke scholarship back in the day, he was extremely happy to be under Locke's aegis now!
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). Aspects of reason, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 29 and 30.
While Locke hardly mentions 'reason,' his friend Burthogge does, and profusely!
It was slightly ironic that Grice had delivered these lectures as the Rationalist Kant lectures at Stanford.
He was honoured to be invited to Oxford. Officially, to be a John Locke lecture you have to be *visiting* Oxford.
While Grice was a fellow of St. John's, he was still most welcome to give his set of lectures on reasoning at the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy.
He quotes very many authors, including Locke! In his "proemium," Grice notes that while he was rejected the Locke scholarship back in the day, he was extremely happy to be under Locke's aegis now!
***
Carton 3
Folders 1-5
Folders 1-5
"Actions and Events"
Published in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1986). Actions and events, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 3, Folders 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Published in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1986). Actions and events, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 3, Folders 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Davidson had published some stuff on 'actions' and 'events,' or 'events and actions,' actually. Davidson's point was that
p.q
It is raining, and it is pouring.
denotes EVENTS. But "Smith went fishing" denotes an 'action,' which is a kind of 'event.'
However, Davidson is fighting against your intuition, if you are a follower of Whitehead and Russell, to symbolise the "Smith" sentence as:
Fs
where 's' stands for Smith and F for 'fishing.'
The logical form of 'event' reports and 'action' reports seems to be slightly more complicated. Davidson's point especially involved 'adverbs':
The horse runs fast
----
Therefore, the horse runs
Grice explores all these topics and submits the thing to "The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly."
He quotes vary many philosophers, not just Davidson, including: Reichenbach, Robinson, and Kant.
***
Carton 3
Folder 6
"Post-war Oxford Philosophy"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1958). Postwar Oxford philosophy, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 3, Folder 6.
Repr. in Grice, Studies in the Way of Words.
By "post-war Oxford philosophy," Grice meant the period he was interested in.
While he had been at Corpus, Merton, and St. John's in the pre-war days, for some reason, he felt that he had made history in the post-war period.
The historical reason Grice gives is understandable enough.
In the pre-war days, Grice was the good student and the new fellow of St. John's -- the other one was Mabbott.
But he had not been able to engage in philosophical discussion much, other than with other tutees of Hardie.
AFTER the war, Grice joins Austin's "Saturday mornings."
Indeed, for Grice, 'post-war' means "all philosophy after the war," since he never abandoned the methods he developed under Austin, which were pretty congenial to the ones he had himself displayed in the pre-war days, in essays like "Negation" and "Personal Identity."
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1958). Postwar Oxford philosophy, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 3, Folder 6.
Repr. in Grice, Studies in the Way of Words.
By "post-war Oxford philosophy," Grice meant the period he was interested in.
While he had been at Corpus, Merton, and St. John's in the pre-war days, for some reason, he felt that he had made history in the post-war period.
The historical reason Grice gives is understandable enough.
In the pre-war days, Grice was the good student and the new fellow of St. John's -- the other one was Mabbott.
But he had not been able to engage in philosophical discussion much, other than with other tutees of Hardie.
AFTER the war, Grice joins Austin's "Saturday mornings."
Indeed, for Grice, 'post-war' means "all philosophy after the war," since he never abandoned the methods he developed under Austin, which were pretty congenial to the ones he had himself displayed in the pre-war days, in essays like "Negation" and "Personal Identity."
***
Carton 3
Folders 7-21
Studies in the Way of Words
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1988). Studies in the Way of Words, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 3, Folders 7 to 21.
Folders 7-21
Studies in the Way of Words
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1988). Studies in the Way of Words, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 3, Folders 7 to 21.
This is the title Grice eventually chooses for his compilation of essays. It is a tribute to Locke.
The 'studies' are organised in two Parts. Part I is "Logic and Conversation" and Part II in "Semantics and Metaphysics."
***
Carton 3
Folders 22-25
"Retrospective Foreword"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1987). Retrospective epilogue, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 3, Folders 22-2
6, and Carton 4, Folder 1 and 2.
Grice drops a few words as a 'foreword,' explaining the ordering of essays. He mentions that he hesitated to follow Bennett's suggestion to order the essays chronologically.
Rather, he chose to just publish the whole set of seven William James lectures as Part I.
Part II is organised more or less thematically, though.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1987). Retrospective epilogue, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 3, Folders 22-2
6, and Carton 4, Folder 1 and 2.
Grice drops a few words as a 'foreword,' explaining the ordering of essays. He mentions that he hesitated to follow Bennett's suggestion to order the essays chronologically.
Rather, he chose to just publish the whole set of seven William James lectures as Part I.
Part II is organised more or less thematically, though.
***
Carton 3
Folder 26
Folder 26
"Retrospective Epilogue"
Citation: Same as above.
This is a long exploration by Grice on the many 'strands' he identifies in his own philosophy.
'Strand' should not mislead us.
For Grice, philosophy, like virtue, is entire.
All the strands therefore show some 'latitudinal,' and we hope, 'longitudinal' unity.
By these two types of 'unity,' Grice means the obvious idea that all sub-disciplines of philosophy (philosophy of language, philosophy of perception, philosophical psychology, etc.) interact, and that a historical regard for one's predecessors is a must.
***
Citation: Same as above.
This is a long exploration by Grice on the many 'strands' he identifies in his own philosophy.
'Strand' should not mislead us.
For Grice, philosophy, like virtue, is entire.
All the strands therefore show some 'latitudinal,' and we hope, 'longitudinal' unity.
By these two types of 'unity,' Grice means the obvious idea that all sub-disciplines of philosophy (philosophy of language, philosophy of perception, philosophical psychology, etc.) interact, and that a historical regard for one's predecessors is a must.
***
Carton 4
Folder 1
Folder 1
"Retrospective Epilogue" (continued)
Citation: same as above.
***
Citation: same as above.
***
Carton 4
Folder 2
Folder 2
"Retrospective Epilogue" and "Foreword"
Citation: same as above.
***
Citation: same as above.
***
Carton 4
Folders 3-4
Folders 3-4
"Metaphysics, Philosophical Eschatology, and Plato's Republic"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1988). Metaphysics, philosophical eschatology, and Plato's Republic, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folders 3 and 4.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
Grice has one specific essay on Aristotle (published in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly). So he thought Plato merited his own essay, too.
Grice is concerned with a neo-Socratic (versus neo-Thrasymachean) account of 'moral' justice as conceptually prior to 'legal' justice.
In the proceeding, he creates 'philosophical eschatology' as the OTHER branch to metaphysics (along with ontology).
To say that 'just' crosses a categorial barrier (from the moral to the legal) is to utter a metaphysical, strictly eschatological, pronouncement.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1988). Metaphysics, philosophical eschatology, and Plato's Republic, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folders 3 and 4.
Grice has one specific essay on Aristotle (published in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly). So he thought Plato merited his own essay, too.
Grice is concerned with a neo-Socratic (versus neo-Thrasymachean) account of 'moral' justice as conceptually prior to 'legal' justice.
In the proceeding, he creates 'philosophical eschatology' as the OTHER branch to metaphysics (along with ontology).
To say that 'just' crosses a categorial barrier (from the moral to the legal) is to utter a metaphysical, strictly eschatological, pronouncement.
***
Carton 4
Folder 5
Folder 5
H. P. Grice's Reprints
***
***
Carton 4
Folder 6
Folder 6
"Aristotle on Being and Good"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1970). Aristotle on being and good, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 6.
As from this folder, the essays are ordered alphabetically, starting with "Aristotle."
Grice will explore Aristotle on 'being' in explorations with A. D. Code.
Grice comes up with 'izzing' and 'hazzing' as the two counterparts to Aristotle's views on, respectively, essential and non-essential predication.
Grice's views on Aristotle on 'the good' connect with Grice's Aristotelian idea of 'eudaimonia,' that he explores elsewhere.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1970). Aristotle on being and good, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 6.
As from this folder, the essays are ordered alphabetically, starting with "Aristotle."
Grice will explore Aristotle on 'being' in explorations with A. D. Code.
Grice comes up with 'izzing' and 'hazzing' as the two counterparts to Aristotle's views on, respectively, essential and non-essential predication.
Grice's views on Aristotle on 'the good' connect with Grice's Aristotelian idea of 'eudaimonia,' that he explores elsewhere.
***
Carton 4
Folder 7
Folder 7
"Aristotle on the Multiplicity of Being"
Repr. in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
(edited by B. F. Loar).
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1988). Aristotle on the multiplicity of being, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 7.
A thorough discussion of Owens's treatment of Aristotle as leading us to the 'snares' of ontology.
Grice distinguishes between 'izzing' and 'hazzing,' which he thinks help in clarifying, 'more axiomatico,' what Aristotle is getting at with his remarks on 'essential' versus 'non-essential' predication.
Surely, for Grice, being should not be multiplied beyond necessity (but izzing and hazzing ARE already multiplied).
***
Repr. in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
(edited by B. F. Loar).
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1988). Aristotle on the multiplicity of being, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 7.
A thorough discussion of Owens's treatment of Aristotle as leading us to the 'snares' of ontology.
Grice distinguishes between 'izzing' and 'hazzing,' which he thinks help in clarifying, 'more axiomatico,' what Aristotle is getting at with his remarks on 'essential' versus 'non-essential' predication.
Surely, for Grice, being should not be multiplied beyond necessity (but izzing and hazzing ARE already multiplied).
***
Carton 4
Folder 8
Folder 8
"Aristotle: Pleasure"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1970). 'Aristotle on pleasure,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 8.
Keywords: hedonism, pleasure, Aristotle
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1970). 'Aristotle on pleasure,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 8.
Keywords: hedonism, pleasure, Aristotle
As a Lit. Hum. Oxon., and especially as a tutee of Hardie at Corpus, Grice was well aware of the centrality of 'hedone' in Aristotle's system.
"Pleasure" is rendered "placitum" (as in "ad placitum") in scholastic philosophy.
But Grice prefers 'agreeable.'
One of Grice's requisites for an ascription of 'eudaimonia,' precisely require that the system of ends an agent chooses to realise be an 'agreeable' one.
***
Carton 4
Folder 9
"Pleasure" is rendered "placitum" (as in "ad placitum") in scholastic philosophy.
But Grice prefers 'agreeable.'
One of Grice's requisites for an ascription of 'eudaimonia,' precisely require that the system of ends an agent chooses to realise be an 'agreeable' one.
***
Carton 4
Folder 9
"Conversational Implicature"
Grice's main invention, one which trades on the distinction between what an utterer IMPLIES and what his expression does.
"A distinction apparently denied by Witters, and all too frequently ignored by, of all people, Austin."
Grice is implicating that Austin's sympathies were for the 'subjectification' of "Linguistic Nature."
Grice remains an obdurate individualist, and never loses sight of the distinction that gives rise to the conversational implicatum, which can very well be hyper-contextualised, idiosyncratic, and perfectly particularised!
His Oxonian example:
"I can very well mean that my tutee is to bring me a philosophical essay next week by uttering "It is raining.""
***
Grice's main invention, one which trades on the distinction between what an utterer IMPLIES and what his expression does.
"A distinction apparently denied by Witters, and all too frequently ignored by, of all people, Austin."
Grice is implicating that Austin's sympathies were for the 'subjectification' of "Linguistic Nature."
Grice remains an obdurate individualist, and never loses sight of the distinction that gives rise to the conversational implicatum, which can very well be hyper-contextualised, idiosyncratic, and perfectly particularised!
His Oxonian example:
"I can very well mean that my tutee is to bring me a philosophical essay next week by uttering "It is raining.""
***
Carton 4
Folder 10
Folder 10
"Negation and privation"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1938). Negation and privation, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 10.
Grice's reflection, in a verificationist vein, of two types of utterance:
"I don't hear a noise."
"That is not red."
The actual ordering should be the reverse:
"That is not red."
"I don't hear a noise."
Or
"I am not hearing a noise."
Surely, each is co-related to their affirmative counterparts:
"That is red."
"I hear a noise."
Or
"I am hearing a noise."
But when it comes to the psychological state, attitude, or stance, it is easier to co-relate "That is not red" with, say, "That is green."
"That is green."
does NOT feature "not," and it is alleged by Grice to be the source or reason for Utterer U to utter "That is red."
In the case of "I don't hear a noise," the source or reason is the absence, 'verified' by introspetion, of a psychological state, attitude or stance, co-related to the affirmative counterpart,
"I hear a noise."
Or
"I am hearing a noise."
which again, does NOT include the "not" operator.
The first utterance is thus explained in terms of mere sense data; the second, with the aid of introspection ultimately related to sense data ('noise').
Grice could have used,
"I don't see it as red."
Or
"I am not seeing the pillar box as blue."
and unify his account. The important distinction is that "That is not red." does not mention the first-person.
Thus, "I don't hear a noise" seems like an apt utterance to receive an introspective analysis.
In relying on introspection, Grice is being very pre-war Oxonian, at that!
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1938). Negation and privation, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 10.
Grice's reflection, in a verificationist vein, of two types of utterance:
"I don't hear a noise."
"That is not red."
The actual ordering should be the reverse:
"That is not red."
"I don't hear a noise."
Or
"I am not hearing a noise."
Surely, each is co-related to their affirmative counterparts:
"That is red."
"I hear a noise."
Or
"I am hearing a noise."
But when it comes to the psychological state, attitude, or stance, it is easier to co-relate "That is not red" with, say, "That is green."
"That is green."
does NOT feature "not," and it is alleged by Grice to be the source or reason for Utterer U to utter "That is red."
In the case of "I don't hear a noise," the source or reason is the absence, 'verified' by introspetion, of a psychological state, attitude or stance, co-related to the affirmative counterpart,
"I hear a noise."
Or
"I am hearing a noise."
which again, does NOT include the "not" operator.
The first utterance is thus explained in terms of mere sense data; the second, with the aid of introspection ultimately related to sense data ('noise').
Grice could have used,
"I don't see it as red."
Or
"I am not seeing the pillar box as blue."
and unify his account. The important distinction is that "That is not red." does not mention the first-person.
Thus, "I don't hear a noise" seems like an apt utterance to receive an introspective analysis.
In relying on introspection, Grice is being very pre-war Oxonian, at that!
***
Carton 4
Folder 11
Folder 11
"Negation"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1961). Negation, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 11.
Strawson had included a section on 'not' in his "Introduction to Logical Theory."
Grice addresses that point.
Unlike "and," "or," and "if," "not" is a truth-functor (or satisfactory-value-functor) of the unary type.
Grice is interested in applying Cook Wilson's "Statement and inference" to explore what the role of 'not' might be.
And he succeds in finding one. It is explained in terms of the conversational implicatum:
"That's not red."
now IMPLICATES that some utterer has, somewhere, sometime, expressed the contrary opinion.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1961). Negation, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 11.
Strawson had included a section on 'not' in his "Introduction to Logical Theory."
Grice addresses that point.
Unlike "and," "or," and "if," "not" is a truth-functor (or satisfactory-value-functor) of the unary type.
Grice is interested in applying Cook Wilson's "Statement and inference" to explore what the role of 'not' might be.
And he succeds in finding one. It is explained in terms of the conversational implicatum:
"That's not red."
now IMPLICATES that some utterer has, somewhere, sometime, expressed the contrary opinion.
***
Carton 4
Folder 12
Folder 12
"Personal Identity"
Published in Mind.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1941). Personal identity, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 12.
(The folder includes some notes on David Hume)
Grice was concerned with issues involved the use of the first person singular ("I will be fighting soon") since his pre-war days at Oxford.
The topic had a special Oxonian pedigree that Grice had occasion to study and explore for his M. A. Lit. Hum.
Locke had famously defended a memory-based account of "I" that had received some alleged counter-example by some Scots philosophers, notably Reid.
In his approach to "I," Grice updates the analysis.
It's now a 'logical construction' of "I" utterances, and relying on Gallie.
Grice uses Broad's taxonomy of "I" utterances, too.
He deals with the Reid-type counterexample, and comes up with a rather elaborate 'analysans' for a simple "I" statement:
"I am hearing a noise."
***
Published in Mind.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1941). Personal identity, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 12.
(The folder includes some notes on David Hume)
Grice was concerned with issues involved the use of the first person singular ("I will be fighting soon") since his pre-war days at Oxford.
The topic had a special Oxonian pedigree that Grice had occasion to study and explore for his M. A. Lit. Hum.
Locke had famously defended a memory-based account of "I" that had received some alleged counter-example by some Scots philosophers, notably Reid.
In his approach to "I," Grice updates the analysis.
It's now a 'logical construction' of "I" utterances, and relying on Gallie.
Grice uses Broad's taxonomy of "I" utterances, too.
He deals with the Reid-type counterexample, and comes up with a rather elaborate 'analysans' for a simple "I" statement:
"I am hearing a noise."
***
Carton 4
Folder 13
Folder 13
"Philosopher's Paradoxes"
Published in Studies in the Way of Words.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1956). G. E. Moore and philosopher's paradoxes, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 13.
While an Oxonian thoroughbred, Grice was a bit like Austin,
"Some like Witters, but Moore's my man."
Grice spends some time exploring what Malcolm has to say about Moore in connection with that particularly "Oxonian" turn of phrase, "ordinary language."
For Moore, a 'paradox' by a 'philosopher' arises when 'Philosopher' fails to abide by the dictates of Ordinary Language.
Grice is totally against this view as TOO BROAD to even claim to be true!
***
Published in Studies in the Way of Words.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1956). G. E. Moore and philosopher's paradoxes, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 13.
While an Oxonian thoroughbred, Grice was a bit like Austin,
"Some like Witters, but Moore's my man."
Grice spends some time exploring what Malcolm has to say about Moore in connection with that particularly "Oxonian" turn of phrase, "ordinary language."
For Moore, a 'paradox' by a 'philosopher' arises when 'Philosopher' fails to abide by the dictates of Ordinary Language.
Grice is totally against this view as TOO BROAD to even claim to be true!
***
Carton 4
Folder 14
Folder 14
"A Philosopher's Prospectus"
***
Carton 4
Folder 15
***
Carton 4
Folder 15
"Philosophy and Ordinary Language"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1960). "Philosophy and 'Ordinary Language,'" The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 15.
Grice never used 'ordinary language' seriously.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1960). "Philosophy and 'Ordinary Language,'" The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 15.
Grice never used 'ordinary language' seriously.
The phrase was used, as he explains, by those who HATED 'ordinary-language' philosophy.
There's no such thing as 'ordinary language.'
Surely you cannot fairly describe the idiosyncratic linguistic habits of an Old Cliftonian as even 'remotely' 'ordinary.'
"Extra-ordinary" more likely!
As far as the 'philosophy' bit goes, this is what Bergmann jocularly described as the 'linguistic turn.'
But as Grice notes, the linguistic turn involves both the 'ideal language' and the 'ordinary language.'
Grice defends Austin's choice of the 'ordinary' seeing that 'it was what he had to hand!'
***
Carton 4
Folder 16
There's no such thing as 'ordinary language.'
Surely you cannot fairly describe the idiosyncratic linguistic habits of an Old Cliftonian as even 'remotely' 'ordinary.'
"Extra-ordinary" more likely!
As far as the 'philosophy' bit goes, this is what Bergmann jocularly described as the 'linguistic turn.'
But as Grice notes, the linguistic turn involves both the 'ideal language' and the 'ordinary language.'
Grice defends Austin's choice of the 'ordinary' seeing that 'it was what he had to hand!'
***
Carton 4
Folder 16
"Some Reflections about Ends and Happiness"
Repr. in Aspects of Reason, Clarendon.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). Some reflections on ends and happiness, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 16.
For Grice, as for Aristotle, and indeed Kant (Kantotle, in short), a 'telos' and 'eudaimonia' are related in subtle ways.
For 'eudaimonia' we cannot deal with just ONE end, but a system of ends.
(Although such a system may be a singleton).
Grice specifies a subtle way of characterising 'end' so that a particular ascription of an 'end' may ENTAIL an ascription of 'eudaimonia.'
Grice follows the textual criticism of his former tutee, J. L. Ackrill, in connection with the Socratic point that 'eudaimonia' IS literally related to the 'eudaimon.'
***
Repr. in Aspects of Reason, Clarendon.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). Some reflections on ends and happiness, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 16.
For Grice, as for Aristotle, and indeed Kant (Kantotle, in short), a 'telos' and 'eudaimonia' are related in subtle ways.
For 'eudaimonia' we cannot deal with just ONE end, but a system of ends.
(Although such a system may be a singleton).
Grice specifies a subtle way of characterising 'end' so that a particular ascription of an 'end' may ENTAIL an ascription of 'eudaimonia.'
Grice follows the textual criticism of his former tutee, J. L. Ackrill, in connection with the Socratic point that 'eudaimonia' IS literally related to the 'eudaimon.'
***
Carton 4
Folders 17-25
Folders 17-25
"Reflections on Morals"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1982). Reflections on morals, The Grice Papers, Series II, Folders 17-25.
Grice's explorations on morals are language based. With a substantial knowledge of the classical languages ("that are so good at verb systems like the optative, that English lacks"), Grice explores modals like
"should"
"ought," and
"must"
He is well aware of R. M. Hare's reflections on the 'neustic' qualifications of the 'phrastic.'
"Imperatives" have usually been one source for the philosopher's concern with the language of morals.
Grice attempts to balance this with a similar exploration on 'good,' now regarded as the 'value-paradeigmatic' notion par excellence.
We cannot understand, to echo Strawson, 'the concept of a person' unless we understand the concept of a GOOD person, i.e. the philosopher's conceptION of a good person.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1982). Reflections on morals, The Grice Papers, Series II, Folders 17-25.
Grice's explorations on morals are language based. With a substantial knowledge of the classical languages ("that are so good at verb systems like the optative, that English lacks"), Grice explores modals like
"should"
"ought," and
"must"
He is well aware of R. M. Hare's reflections on the 'neustic' qualifications of the 'phrastic.'
"Imperatives" have usually been one source for the philosopher's concern with the language of morals.
Grice attempts to balance this with a similar exploration on 'good,' now regarded as the 'value-paradeigmatic' notion par excellence.
We cannot understand, to echo Strawson, 'the concept of a person' unless we understand the concept of a GOOD person, i.e. the philosopher's conceptION of a good person.
***
Carton 4
Folder 26
Folder 26
"Reply to G. E. M. Anscombe"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1972). Reply to G. E. M. Anscombe, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 26.
Anscombe's views were often discussed by Oxonian philosophers. She had brought Witters to the "Dreaming Spires," as it were.
Grice was especially connected with Anscombe's reflections on 'intention.'
While Grice favoured an approach such as Hampshire, in "Thought and Action," he borrows a few points from Anscombe, notably that of 'direction of fit' (originally Austin's).
Grice explicitly refers to Anscombe in "Intention and uncertainty," and in his reminiscences he hastens to add that Anscombe would never attend any of Austin's Saturday mornings -- as neither would Dummett.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1972). Reply to G. E. M. Anscombe, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 26.
Anscombe's views were often discussed by Oxonian philosophers. She had brought Witters to the "Dreaming Spires," as it were.
Grice was especially connected with Anscombe's reflections on 'intention.'
While Grice favoured an approach such as Hampshire, in "Thought and Action," he borrows a few points from Anscombe, notably that of 'direction of fit' (originally Austin's).
Grice explicitly refers to Anscombe in "Intention and uncertainty," and in his reminiscences he hastens to add that Anscombe would never attend any of Austin's Saturday mornings -- as neither would Dummett.
***
Carton 4
Folders 27-30
Folders 27-30
"Reply to Richards"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1985). Reply to Richards, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folders 27-30.
Originally entitled, "Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of H. P. Grice."
Grice is playing with the first name of both Warner and Grandy, or Grandy and Warner.
Grice is especially concerned with what 'Richards' see as a commitment on Grice's part to the abstract entity of a 'proposition.'
Grice also deals with the alleged insufficiency in his conceptual analysis of 'reasoning.'
He brings for good measure a point about a potential 'regressus ad infinitum' in his account of a chain of intentions involved in meaning and communicating in general.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1985). Reply to Richards, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folders 27-30.
Originally entitled, "Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of H. P. Grice."
Grice is playing with the first name of both Warner and Grandy, or Grandy and Warner.
Grice is especially concerned with what 'Richards' see as a commitment on Grice's part to the abstract entity of a 'proposition.'
Grice also deals with the alleged insufficiency in his conceptual analysis of 'reasoning.'
He brings for good measure a point about a potential 'regressus ad infinitum' in his account of a chain of intentions involved in meaning and communicating in general.
***
Series III
***
The Doctrines
Physical Description:
Carton 5
Carton 6 (folders 1-3)
Carton 5
Carton 6 (folders 1-3)
The items are arranged chronologically. Again, for those "n.d." items, the order is alphabetical.
Scope and Content Note
Series III includes seminars and lectures given during Grice's years at both Oxford and Berkeley, and elsewhere (e.g. Cornell).
***
Carton 5
Folder 1
Grice's Seminar at Cornell.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1966). The Cornell Seminar, The Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 1.
Folder 1
Grice's Seminar at Cornell.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1966). The Cornell Seminar, The Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 1.
Historically important in that they predate his Harvard William James lectures which made of him a household name in New-World philosophy.
***
Carton 5
Folder 2
Folder 2
Grice Seminar
***
***
Carton 5
Folder 3
Folder 3
Philosophy
With J. Baker
***
With J. Baker
***
Carton 5
Folder 4
Folder 4
Philosophy
***
***
Carton 5
Folders 5-6
Folders 5-6
Kant's Ethical Theory
An exploration of the categorial imperative and its reduction to the hypothetical one.
***
An exploration of the categorial imperative and its reduction to the hypothetical one.
***
Carton 5
Folder 7
Folder 7
"Aristotle's Ethics"
Notably the Nichomachean Ethics.
***
Notably the Nichomachean Ethics.
***
Carton 5
Folder 8
Folder 8
Philosophy
Kant
With J. Baker.
Notably the categorical imperative.
***
Kant
With J. Baker.
Notably the categorical imperative.
***
Carton 5
Folder 9
Folder 9
"Kant's Ethics"
***
***
Carton 5
Folders 10-13
Folders 10-13
Kant Lectures
***
***
Carton 5
Folders 14-15
Folders 14-15
Philosophy
***
***
Carton 5
Folders 16-17
Folders 16-17
"Kant's Ethics"
***
***
Carton 5
Folder 18
Folder 18
"Knowledge and belief"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1966). Knowledge and belief, The Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 18.
Two basic psychological states, attitudes, or stances. Grice is concerned with Gettier-type cases, and also the 'factivity' of 'know' versus the non-factivity of 'believe.'
Grice followed Hintikka's lexicological innovations: the logic of belief is 'doxastic;' the logic of knowledge is 'epistemic.'
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1966). Knowledge and belief, The Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 18.
Two basic psychological states, attitudes, or stances. Grice is concerned with Gettier-type cases, and also the 'factivity' of 'know' versus the non-factivity of 'believe.'
Grice followed Hintikka's lexicological innovations: the logic of belief is 'doxastic;' the logic of knowledge is 'epistemic.'
***
Carton 5
Folders 19-21
Folders 19-21
Kant's Ethics
***
***
Carton 5
Folder 22
Folder 22
Philosophy
With G. Myro
Grice and Myro developed a Geach-type of 'qualified identity.'
The formal aspects were developed by Myro.
Grice discussed Wiggins's "Sameness and substance," rather than Geach.
***
With G. Myro
Grice and Myro developed a Geach-type of 'qualified identity.'
The formal aspects were developed by Myro.
Grice discussed Wiggins's "Sameness and substance," rather than Geach.
***
Carton 5
Folder 23
Folder 23
Kant
***
***
Carton 5
Folder 24
Folder 24
"Metaphysics and the Language of Philosophy"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Metaphysics and the language of philosophy, The Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 24.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Metaphysics and the language of philosophy, The Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 24.
Grice had been interested in the methodology of 'metaphysics' from the Oxford days.
He counted as one memorable experience in the area his participation in two episodes for BBC Third Programme on "The nature of metaphysics" with the organiser, D. F. Pears, and his former tutee, P. F. Strawson.
Grice was particularly keen on Collingwood's views on metaphysical presuppositions.
***
Carton 5
Folder 25
He counted as one memorable experience in the area his participation in two episodes for BBC Third Programme on "The nature of metaphysics" with the organiser, D. F. Pears, and his former tutee, P. F. Strawson.
Grice was particularly keen on Collingwood's views on metaphysical presuppositions.
***
Carton 5
Folder 25
"Freedom"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Freedom, The Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 25.
The topic of 'freedom' Grice saw as crucial in his elucidation of a rational being. "Conditions of freedom" are necessary for the very idea, as Kant was well aware.
Grice would engage in a bit of language botany, when exploring the ways the adjective 'free' is used, 'freely,' in 'ordinary language': 'free fall,' 'alcohol-free,' 'sugar-free.'
His more systematic reflections deal with 'pirotology, or 'creature construction'. Vegetables, for example are less free than animals. And Humans are more free than non-human.
Grice wants to deal with some of the paradoxes identified by Kant about freedom, and he succeeds in solving some of them.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Freedom, The Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 25.
The topic of 'freedom' Grice saw as crucial in his elucidation of a rational being. "Conditions of freedom" are necessary for the very idea, as Kant was well aware.
Grice would engage in a bit of language botany, when exploring the ways the adjective 'free' is used, 'freely,' in 'ordinary language': 'free fall,' 'alcohol-free,' 'sugar-free.'
His more systematic reflections deal with 'pirotology, or 'creature construction'. Vegetables, for example are less free than animals. And Humans are more free than non-human.
Grice wants to deal with some of the paradoxes identified by Kant about freedom, and he succeeds in solving some of them.
***
Carton 5
Folder 26
Folder 26
Lectures
***
***
Carton 5
Folders 27-28
Folders 27-28
Kant's Ethics
***
***
Carton 5
Folder 29
Folder 29
"The Criteria of Intelligence"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1975). The criteria of intelligence, The Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 29.
In "Aspects of reason," he mentions 'flat' rationality, and certain other 'talents' that are more difficult for the philosopher to conceptualise, such as 'nose' (i.e. intuitiveness), acumen, tenacity, and such.
Grice's approach is 'pirotological.' If Locke had used 'intelligent' to refer to Prince Maurice's parrot, Grice wants to find criteria for 'intelligent' as applied to his favourite type of 'pirot,' rather ("intelligent, indeed rational.")
***
Carton 5
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1975). The criteria of intelligence, The Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 29.
In "Aspects of reason," he mentions 'flat' rationality, and certain other 'talents' that are more difficult for the philosopher to conceptualise, such as 'nose' (i.e. intuitiveness), acumen, tenacity, and such.
Grice's approach is 'pirotological.' If Locke had used 'intelligent' to refer to Prince Maurice's parrot, Grice wants to find criteria for 'intelligent' as applied to his favourite type of 'pirot,' rather ("intelligent, indeed rational.")
***
Carton 5
Folder 30
"Modest Mentalism"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Modest mentalism, The Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 30.
Grice would seldom use 'mind' or 'mental.' His sympathies went for more Grecian terms like 'soul,' i.e. the psyche and the psychological.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Modest mentalism, The Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 30.
Grice would seldom use 'mind' or 'mental.' His sympathies went for more Grecian terms like 'soul,' i.e. the psyche and the psychological.
***
Carton 5
Folder 31
Folder 31
Topics for Pursuit, Zeno, Socrates
Grice's review of the history of philosophy
***
Grice's review of the history of philosophy
***
Carton 6
Folders 1-2
Folders 1-2
Phonetics, Syntax, and Semantics
With J. F. Staal.
Staal was particularly good at this type of 'formalistic' philosophy, which was still adequate to reflect the subtleties of 'ordinary language.'
***
With J. F. Staal.
Staal was particularly good at this type of 'formalistic' philosophy, which was still adequate to reflect the subtleties of 'ordinary language.'
***
Carton 6
Folder 3
Folder 3
The "That"-Clause
With J. F. Staal
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1970). The 'that'-clause, The Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 6, Folder 3.
The 'that'-clause was brought to the fore by Davidson, who, consulting the Oxford English Dictionary, reminds philosophers that the English 'that' is VERY cognate with the German idiom.
More specifically, 'that' is a DEMONSTRATIVE, even if the syntax, in English, hides this fact in ways which German syntax doesn't.
Grice NEEDS to rely on 'that'-clauses for his analysis of 'mean,' 'intend,' and notably 'will.'
He finds that Prichard's genial discovery was the license to use 'willing' as pre-facing a 'that'-clause.
This allows Grice to deals with 'willing' as applied to a third person ("I will that he'll win the chess match.")
Philosophers who disregard this 'third-person' use may indulge in introspection and subjectivism when they shouldn't!
With J. F. Staal
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1970). The 'that'-clause, The Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 6, Folder 3.
The 'that'-clause was brought to the fore by Davidson, who, consulting the Oxford English Dictionary, reminds philosophers that the English 'that' is VERY cognate with the German idiom.
More specifically, 'that' is a DEMONSTRATIVE, even if the syntax, in English, hides this fact in ways which German syntax doesn't.
Grice NEEDS to rely on 'that'-clauses for his analysis of 'mean,' 'intend,' and notably 'will.'
He finds that Prichard's genial discovery was the license to use 'willing' as pre-facing a 'that'-clause.
This allows Grice to deals with 'willing' as applied to a third person ("I will that he'll win the chess match.")
Philosophers who disregard this 'third-person' use may indulge in introspection and subjectivism when they shouldn't!
***
Series IV
***
H. P. Grice's
Contributions
to
H. P. Grice's
Contributions
to
Philosophical
Associations
Associations
Physical Description:
Carton 6 (folders 4-12), Carton 10
Carton 6 (folders 4-12), Carton 10
The items are arranged chronologically.
Scope and Content Note
The Series IV includes Kant's Stanford Lectures, various notes and audio tapes of Beanfest, Grice's group research on universalia, and conferences and discussions concerning the American Philosophical Association.
Also includes a carton of cassettes, magnetic recorder tapes, and cassette sets of four on professional talks with George Myro on identities (unqualified and relative), metaphysics, and relatives and Grice's various seminars on his philosophical theories given at different institutions such as Stanford, Berkeley, and Seattle.
***
Also includes a carton of cassettes, magnetic recorder tapes, and cassette sets of four on professional talks with George Myro on identities (unqualified and relative), metaphysics, and relatives and Grice's various seminars on his philosophical theories given at different institutions such as Stanford, Berkeley, and Seattle.
***
Carton 6
Folder 4
Folder 4
"Entailment"
Symposium for the American Philosophical Association.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1971). Entailment, The American Philosophical Association, The Grice Papers, Series IV, Carton 6, Folder 4.
The notion had been introduced in the philosophical literature by G. E. Moore.
Grice is especially interested in the "ENTAILMENT + IMPLICATUM" pair.
A philosophical expression may be said to be co-related to an ENTAILMENT (which is rendered in terms of a reductive analysis).
However, the use of the expression may co-relate to this or that IMPLICATUM which is rendered 'reasonable' in the light of the addressee's assumption that the utterer is ultimately abiding by a principle of conversational helfpulness.
Grice thinks many philosophers take an IMPLICATUM as an ENTAILMENT when they surely shouldn't!
***
Carton 6
Folders 5-6
Folders 5-6
Stanford - "Some Aspects of Reason"
The Immanuel Kant Memorial Lectures.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). Aspects of reason, The Grice Papers, Series IV, Carton 6, Folders 5 and 6.
The lectures were also delivered as the John Locke lectures.
Grice is concerned with the reduction of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical imperative.
His main thesis he calls the "AEQUI-vocality" thesis:
"must" has only ONE sense, that crossed the 'boulomaic/doxastic' divide.
***
Carton 6
Folder 7
"Causality"
The Immanuel Kant Memorial Lectures.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). Aspects of reason, The Grice Papers, Series IV, Carton 6, Folders 5 and 6.
The lectures were also delivered as the John Locke lectures.
Grice is concerned with the reduction of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical imperative.
His main thesis he calls the "AEQUI-vocality" thesis:
"must" has only ONE sense, that crossed the 'boulomaic/doxastic' divide.
***
Carton 6
Folder 7
"Causality"
Conference
Colloquium at Stanford
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Causality, Stanford Colloquium, The Grice Papers, Series IV, Carton 6, Folder 7.
Grice's exploration on 'cause' are very rich.
He is concerned with some misuse of 'cause' in ordinary language.
If as Hume suggests, to cause is to will, one would say that "The decapitation of Charles I willed his death," which sounds harsh.
Grice later relates 'cause' to the Greek 'aitia,' as he should. He notes collocations like 'rebel without a cause.'
For the Greeks, and the Griceians, it's a CAUSE TO which one should be involved in elucidating.
A "cause to..." connects with the idea of 'freedom.'
Grice was constantly aware of the threat of MECHANISM, and his idea was to provide philosophical room for the idea of 'finality,' which is NOT 'mechanistically derivable.'
This leads him to discussion of overlap and priority of, say, a physical-cum-physiological versus a psychological theory explaining this or that piece of rational behaviour.
He can be Wittgensteinian when citing Anscombe's translation: No psychological concept without the behaviour the concept is brought to explain.
***
Colloquium at Stanford
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Causality, Stanford Colloquium, The Grice Papers, Series IV, Carton 6, Folder 7.
Grice's exploration on 'cause' are very rich.
He is concerned with some misuse of 'cause' in ordinary language.
If as Hume suggests, to cause is to will, one would say that "The decapitation of Charles I willed his death," which sounds harsh.
Grice later relates 'cause' to the Greek 'aitia,' as he should. He notes collocations like 'rebel without a cause.'
For the Greeks, and the Griceians, it's a CAUSE TO which one should be involved in elucidating.
A "cause to..." connects with the idea of 'freedom.'
Grice was constantly aware of the threat of MECHANISM, and his idea was to provide philosophical room for the idea of 'finality,' which is NOT 'mechanistically derivable.'
This leads him to discussion of overlap and priority of, say, a physical-cum-physiological versus a psychological theory explaining this or that piece of rational behaviour.
He can be Wittgensteinian when citing Anscombe's translation: No psychological concept without the behaviour the concept is brought to explain.
***
Carton 6
Folder 8
Folder 8
Conferences
Discussion at the American Philosophical Association.
Randall Parker's Transcription of Tapes
***
Discussion at the American Philosophical Association.
Randall Parker's Transcription of Tapes
***
Carton 6
Folder 9
Folder 9
Unity of Science and Teleology
"Hands Across the Bay," and Beanfest.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Unity of science and teleology, The Grice Papers, Series IV, Carton 6, Folder 9.
As the scholastics used it, 'teleology' was a science, the science of 'telos,' or finality.
The unity of science is threatened by teleology.
Unified science seeks for 'mechanistically derivable' teleology.
But Grice's sympathies lie for 'detached' finality.
***
"Hands Across the Bay," and Beanfest.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Unity of science and teleology, The Grice Papers, Series IV, Carton 6, Folder 9.
As the scholastics used it, 'teleology' was a science, the science of 'telos,' or finality.
The unity of science is threatened by teleology.
Unified science seeks for 'mechanistically derivable' teleology.
But Grice's sympathies lie for 'detached' finality.
***
Carton 6
Folder 10
Folder 10
Beanfest
Transcripts and Audio Cassettes
***
Transcripts and Audio Cassettes
***
Carton 6
Folder 11
Folder 11
Group
"Universals"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Universalia, The Grice Papers, Series IV, Carton 6, Folder 11.
Grice doing history of philosophy. His main concern is with 'universalia' as abstract entities. He proposes an exploration of 'universalia' as a response to Extensionalism, so fashionable, he thinks, in the New World ("The School of Latter-Day Nominalists").
***
"Universals"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Universalia, The Grice Papers, Series IV, Carton 6, Folder 11.
Grice doing history of philosophy. His main concern is with 'universalia' as abstract entities. He proposes an exploration of 'universalia' as a response to Extensionalism, so fashionable, he thinks, in the New World ("The School of Latter-Day Nominalists").
***
Carton 6
Folder 12
Folder 12
Group
"Universals"
Partial Working Copy
***
"Universals"
Partial Working Copy
***
Carton 10
Audio Files of
various lectures and conferences
various lectures and conferences
***
Series V
***
Philosophical Subject
Files
Physical Description:
Carton 6 (folders 13-38), Cartons 7-9
Carton 6 (folders 13-38), Cartons 7-9
Items are arranged aphabetically by philosophical subject.
Scope and Content Note
The "Series V" includes seminar notes at Reed, notes on ancient philosophers such as Aristotle, modern philosophers such as Descartes, and their own philosophical theories, research and accompanying notes on other prominent philosophers such as Kant and Davidson, notes with colleagues J. Baker, A. D. Code, M. Friedman, G. Myro, P. Suppes, R. O. Warner, G. J. Warnock, and P. F. Strawson, on various theories of reason, trust, language semantics, universals, and values.
***
***
Carton 6
Folders 13-14
Folders 13-14
"The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1956). The analytic-synthetic distinction, The Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 6, Folders 13 and 14.
The idea of 'analyticity' was for Grice very important to defend.
Philosophy depends on it!
He knew that to many his claim to fame was his "In defence of a dogma," the dogma of analyticity, no less.
He eventually turns to a 'pragmatist' justification of the distinction.
This pragmatist justification is still in accordance with what he sees as the use of 'analytic' in 'ordinary language'. His infamous examples:
"My neighbour's three-year old understands Russell's Theory of Types."
A: Hard to believe, but I will.
"My neighbour's three-year old is an adult."
Metaphorically? No.
Then I don't understand you, and what you've just said is, in my scheme of things, analytically FALSE.
Grice was also circumstantially concerned with the 'synthetic a priori,' and he would ask his children's playmates:
"Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed!"
The distinction is ultimately Kantian, but it had brought to the fore by the 'linguistic turn,' Oxonian and other!
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1956). The analytic-synthetic distinction, The Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 6, Folders 13 and 14.
The idea of 'analyticity' was for Grice very important to defend.
Philosophy depends on it!
He knew that to many his claim to fame was his "In defence of a dogma," the dogma of analyticity, no less.
He eventually turns to a 'pragmatist' justification of the distinction.
This pragmatist justification is still in accordance with what he sees as the use of 'analytic' in 'ordinary language'. His infamous examples:
"My neighbour's three-year old understands Russell's Theory of Types."
A: Hard to believe, but I will.
"My neighbour's three-year old is an adult."
Metaphorically? No.
Then I don't understand you, and what you've just said is, in my scheme of things, analytically FALSE.
Grice was also circumstantially concerned with the 'synthetic a priori,' and he would ask his children's playmates:
"Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed!"
The distinction is ultimately Kantian, but it had brought to the fore by the 'linguistic turn,' Oxonian and other!
***
Carton 6
Folder 15
Folder 15
Aristotle and "Categories"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1956). Aristotle's Categoriae, The Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 6, Folder 15.
For Aristotle, as Grice and Austin, and Grice and Strawson, were well aware as they educated some of the poor at Oxford ("Only the poor learn at Oxford" -- Arnold), there are ten categories.
Grice doesn't care about the number. But the first are important.
THERE's 'substantia prima,' such as Grice.
And then there's 'substantia secunda,' such as Grice's rationality. The 'essentia.'
Then there are various types of 'attributes.'
But even 'substantia secunda' may be regarded as an 'attribute.'
Grice invents "Category Shift," or subject-ification.
Essence may be introduced as a sub-type of an attribute.
We would have 'substantia prima' AND 'attribute,' which in turn gets divided into 'essential' and 'non-essential.'
While Austin was not so fun to play with, Strawson is.
Banbury is a very altruist person.
Where is his altruism?
Nowhere to be seen.
Yet we may speak of Banbury's altruism.
It's a matter of a 'category shift.'
Grice was slightly disappointed, but he perfectly understood, that Strawson, who had footnoted Grice as 'the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about logic' in "Introduction to Logical Theory," fails to acknowledge that MOST of the research in Strawson's "Individuals: an essay in descriptive (not revisionary) metaphysics" derives from the conclusions reached at his joint philosophical investigations with Grice.
But "the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about metaphysics" sounds clumsier!
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1956). Aristotle's Categoriae, The Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 6, Folder 15.
Grice thought Aristotle was the best!
For Aristotle, as Grice and Austin, and Grice and Strawson, were well aware as they educated some of the poor at Oxford ("Only the poor learn at Oxford" -- Arnold), there are ten categories.
Grice doesn't care about the number. But the first are important.
THERE's 'substantia prima,' such as Grice.
And then there's 'substantia secunda,' such as Grice's rationality. The 'essentia.'
Then there are various types of 'attributes.'
But even 'substantia secunda' may be regarded as an 'attribute.'
Grice invents "Category Shift," or subject-ification.
Essence may be introduced as a sub-type of an attribute.
We would have 'substantia prima' AND 'attribute,' which in turn gets divided into 'essential' and 'non-essential.'
While Austin was not so fun to play with, Strawson is.
Banbury is a very altruist person.
Where is his altruism?
Nowhere to be seen.
Yet we may speak of Banbury's altruism.
It's a matter of a 'category shift.'
Grice was slightly disappointed, but he perfectly understood, that Strawson, who had footnoted Grice as 'the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about logic' in "Introduction to Logical Theory," fails to acknowledge that MOST of the research in Strawson's "Individuals: an essay in descriptive (not revisionary) metaphysics" derives from the conclusions reached at his joint philosophical investigations with Grice.
But "the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about metaphysics" sounds clumsier!
***
Carton 6
Folder 16
Folder 16
Aristotle's Ethics
Grice was 'very fortunate' to have Hardie as his tutor. He overused Hardie's lectures on Aristotle, too, and instilled them on his own tutees!
***
Grice was 'very fortunate' to have Hardie as his tutor. He overused Hardie's lectures on Aristotle, too, and instilled them on his own tutees!
***
Carton 6
Folder 17
Folder 17
Aristotle on Friendship
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Aristotle on friendship, The Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 6, Folder 17.
Grice is concerned with Aristotle's rather cryptic view of the friend (philos, amicus) as the 'alter ego.'
In Grice's cooperative, concerted, view of things, a friend in need is a friend indeed!
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Aristotle on friendship, The Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 6, Folder 17.
Grice is concerned with Aristotle's rather cryptic view of the friend (philos, amicus) as the 'alter ego.'
In Grice's cooperative, concerted, view of things, a friend in need is a friend indeed!
***
Carton 6
Folder 18
Folder 18
Aristotle and Friendship (continued)
Rationality, Trust, and Decency
Grice's idea of 'decency' is connected to his explorations on 'rational' and 'reasonable'. To cheat may be neither unreasonable nor rational.
It's just repulsive!
Indecent, in other words.
In all this, Grice is concerned with 'ordinary language,' and treasures Austin's question to Warnock (when Warnock was looking for a fellowship at Austin's college):
"Warnock: what would you say the difference is between (i) and (ii)?"
i. Smith plays cricket rather properly.
ii. Smith plays cricket rather incorrectly.
"They spent the whole dinner over such subtleties!"
"And Warnock fell in love with Austin."
Grice's explorations on 'trust' are Warnockian in character too. For Warnock, in "Object of morality," trust is key, indeed, the very object of morality.
***
Rationality, Trust, and Decency
Grice's idea of 'decency' is connected to his explorations on 'rational' and 'reasonable'. To cheat may be neither unreasonable nor rational.
It's just repulsive!
Indecent, in other words.
In all this, Grice is concerned with 'ordinary language,' and treasures Austin's question to Warnock (when Warnock was looking for a fellowship at Austin's college):
"Warnock: what would you say the difference is between (i) and (ii)?"
i. Smith plays cricket rather properly.
ii. Smith plays cricket rather incorrectly.
"They spent the whole dinner over such subtleties!"
"And Warnock fell in love with Austin."
Grice's explorations on 'trust' are Warnockian in character too. For Warnock, in "Object of morality," trust is key, indeed, the very object of morality.
***
Carton 6
Folder 19
Folder 19
Aristotle and Multiplicity.
Published as "Aristotle on the multiplicity of being" in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1988). Aristotle on the multiplicity of being, The Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 6, Folder 19.
For Grice there is 'multiplicity' in both 'being' and 'good' -- both accountable in terms of implicata.
Grice is yielding his razor.
"Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity."
But then Aristotle is talking about the 'multiplicity' of '... is' and '... is good.'
Surely, there are ways to turn Aristotle into the monoguist he has to be!
***
Published as "Aristotle on the multiplicity of being" in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1988). Aristotle on the multiplicity of being, The Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 6, Folder 19.
For Grice there is 'multiplicity' in both 'being' and 'good' -- both accountable in terms of implicata.
Grice is yielding his razor.
"Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity."
But then Aristotle is talking about the 'multiplicity' of '... is' and '... is good.'
Surely, there are ways to turn Aristotle into the monoguist he has to be!
***
Carton 6
Folder 20
Folder 20
Bealer
G. P. Bealer is one of Grice's most brilliant tutees!
***
G. P. Bealer is one of Grice's most brilliant tutees!
***
Carton 6
Folder 21
Folder 21
Berkeley Group
Team Notes
***
Team Notes
***
Carton 6
Folder 22
Folder 22
"The Casual Theory Perception"
Published in The Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society. Symposium with A. R. White. Chair: R. Braithwaite, Cambridge.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1961). The causal theory of perception, The Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 6, Folder 22.
Warnock had attended Austin's "Sense and Sensibilia" (not to be confused with Austen's Sense and Sensibility).
But Warnock preferred philosophical investigations with Grice.
Warnock: "Grice once told me, not on a Saturday morning, either, 'How clever language is'"
For they had found that 'ordinary language' does NOT need the concept of a visum.
Grice and Warnock spent lovely occasions exploring what Oxford has as "the philosophy of perception."
While Grice later came to see it as a bit or an offshoot of 'philosophical psychology,' 'the philosophy of perception' is concerned with that treasured bit of the Oxonian philosopher's lexicon, the sense-datum, always in the singular!
The 'cause' involved is crucial. If a material thing causes the sense-datum of a nut, that's because the squarrel (or squirrel) won't be nourished by the sense datum of a nut, but by a nut, only.
***
Published in The Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society. Symposium with A. R. White. Chair: R. Braithwaite, Cambridge.
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1961). The causal theory of perception, The Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 6, Folder 22.
Warnock had attended Austin's "Sense and Sensibilia" (not to be confused with Austen's Sense and Sensibility).
But Warnock preferred philosophical investigations with Grice.
Warnock: "Grice once told me, not on a Saturday morning, either, 'How clever language is'"
For they had found that 'ordinary language' does NOT need the concept of a visum.
Grice and Warnock spent lovely occasions exploring what Oxford has as "the philosophy of perception."
While Grice later came to see it as a bit or an offshoot of 'philosophical psychology,' 'the philosophy of perception' is concerned with that treasured bit of the Oxonian philosopher's lexicon, the sense-datum, always in the singular!
The 'cause' involved is crucial. If a material thing causes the sense-datum of a nut, that's because the squarrel (or squirrel) won't be nourished by the sense datum of a nut, but by a nut, only.
***
Carton 6
Folder 23
Folder 23
Categories
With P. F. Strawson
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1956). Categories, The Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 6, Folder 23.
Grice kept his explorations on categories under two very separate categories: his explorations with J. L. Austin (very serious), and his explorations with P. F. Strawson (more congenial).
Where is Smith's altruism?
Nowhere to be seen.
Should we say it's idle (otiose) to speak of altruism?
No, it's just an ATTRIBUTE, which, via category shift, can be made the subject of your sentence, Strawson.
It's not spatio-temporal, though, right?
Not really.
I don't particularly like your 'trouser words,' Grice.
***
With P. F. Strawson
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1956). Categories, The Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 6, Folder 23.
Grice kept his explorations on categories under two very separate categories: his explorations with J. L. Austin (very serious), and his explorations with P. F. Strawson (more congenial).
Where is Smith's altruism?
Nowhere to be seen.
Should we say it's idle (otiose) to speak of altruism?
No, it's just an ATTRIBUTE, which, via category shift, can be made the subject of your sentence, Strawson.
It's not spatio-temporal, though, right?
Not really.
I don't particularly like your 'trouser words,' Grice.
***
Carton 6
Folder 24
Folder 24
The categorical imperative
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1976). The categorical imperative, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 24.
An exploration of the logical form of Kant's concoction.
Grice is interested in its conceptual connection with the 'hypothetical' imperative, in terms of the type of connection between the protasis and the apodosis.
Grice spends the full second Paul Carus lecture on the conception of value on this.
Grice is aware that the topic is central for Oxonian philosophers such as R. M. Hare (a member of Austin's Play Group, too), who will regard the UNIVERSABILITY of an imperative as a mark of its categorial, indeed, moral status.
He would refer to conversational maxims as contributing to a CONVERSATIONAL IMMANUEL, if it can be shown that, qua items under an overarching principle of conversational helpfulness, each displays qualities associated with conceptual, formal, and applicational generality.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1976). The categorical imperative, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 24.
An exploration of the logical form of Kant's concoction.
Grice is interested in its conceptual connection with the 'hypothetical' imperative, in terms of the type of connection between the protasis and the apodosis.
Grice spends the full second Paul Carus lecture on the conception of value on this.
Grice is aware that the topic is central for Oxonian philosophers such as R. M. Hare (a member of Austin's Play Group, too), who will regard the UNIVERSABILITY of an imperative as a mark of its categorial, indeed, moral status.
He would refer to conversational maxims as contributing to a CONVERSATIONAL IMMANUEL, if it can be shown that, qua items under an overarching principle of conversational helpfulness, each displays qualities associated with conceptual, formal, and applicational generality.
***
Carton 6
Folder 25
Folder 25
"The Logical Construction Theory of Personal Identity"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). The logical construction theory of personal identity, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 25.
The term is Broad's -- but Grice loved it. Rational reconstruction is not too dissimilar. But Grice prefers Broad's more conservative label.
Ultimately, it means that we can provide an analysandum for an "I" utterance WITHOUT using "I," but only 'mnemonic concepts, which belong in a theory of philosophical psychology.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). The logical construction theory of personal identity, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 25.
The term is Broad's -- but Grice loved it. Rational reconstruction is not too dissimilar. But Grice prefers Broad's more conservative label.
Ultimately, it means that we can provide an analysandum for an "I" utterance WITHOUT using "I," but only 'mnemonic concepts, which belong in a theory of philosophical psychology.
***
Carton 6
Folder 26
Folder 26
Davidson's "On Saying That"
Grice had explored 'that'-clauses with Staal. He was concerned about the viability of Davidson's initially appealing etymological approach to the 'that'-clause in terms of 'demonstration.'
Grice had presupposed the logic of 'that'-clauses from a much earlier stage ("Those spots mean that he has measles.")
***
Grice had explored 'that'-clauses with Staal. He was concerned about the viability of Davidson's initially appealing etymological approach to the 'that'-clause in terms of 'demonstration.'
Grice had presupposed the logic of 'that'-clauses from a much earlier stage ("Those spots mean that he has measles.")
***
Carton 6
Folders 27-28
Folders 27-28
"Descartes on clear and distinct percpetion."
Grice's interest in Descartes connects with Descartes's search for a criterion of 'certainty' in terms of 'clarity' and 'distinction' of this or that perception.
Having explored the philosophy of perception with Warnock, it's only natural he wanted to give Descartes's rambles a second and third look!
***
Having explored the philosophy of perception with Warnock, it's only natural he wanted to give Descartes's rambles a second and third look!
***
Carton 6
Folder 29
Folder 29
Michael Sinton on "Grice on Denials of Indicative Conditionals"
Strawson had elaborated on what he felt was a divergence between Whitehead's and Russell's 'horseshoe,' and 'if.'
Grice thought Strawson's observations could be understood in terms of ENTAILMENT + IMPLICATUM ("Robbing Peter to Pay Paul").
But problems, as first noted to Grice, by L. J. Cohen, of Oxford, remain, when it comes to the scope of the implicatum within the operation of, say, 'negation.'
Analogous problems arise with implicata for the other earlier dyadic functors, "and" and "or," and Grice looks for a single explanation of the phenomenon.
The qualification 'indicative' is modal. "Ordinary language" allows for 'if' utterances to be in modes other than the imperative. "Counter-factual," if you need to be philosophical krypto-technical, 'subjective' is you are more of a classicist!
***
Strawson had elaborated on what he felt was a divergence between Whitehead's and Russell's 'horseshoe,' and 'if.'
Grice thought Strawson's observations could be understood in terms of ENTAILMENT + IMPLICATUM ("Robbing Peter to Pay Paul").
But problems, as first noted to Grice, by L. J. Cohen, of Oxford, remain, when it comes to the scope of the implicatum within the operation of, say, 'negation.'
Analogous problems arise with implicata for the other earlier dyadic functors, "and" and "or," and Grice looks for a single explanation of the phenomenon.
The qualification 'indicative' is modal. "Ordinary language" allows for 'if' utterances to be in modes other than the imperative. "Counter-factual," if you need to be philosophical krypto-technical, 'subjective' is you are more of a classicist!
***
Carton 6
Folder 30
Folder 30
"Dispositions and Intentions"
Grice, H. P. (1948). Dispositions and intentions, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 30.
Grice is especially concerned with a 'dispositional' analysis to 'intending.'
He will later reject it in "Intention and uncertainty."
Grice is especially interested in distinguishing his views from RYLE's dispositional account of intentions, which Grice sees as 'reductionist,' and indeed 'eliminationist.'
The logic of 'dispositions' is tricky, as Grice will later explore in connection with 'rationality' (rational propension or propensity) and metaphysics (the 'as if' operator).
***
Grice, H. P. (1948). Dispositions and intentions, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 30.
Grice is especially concerned with a 'dispositional' analysis to 'intending.'
He will later reject it in "Intention and uncertainty."
Grice is especially interested in distinguishing his views from RYLE's dispositional account of intentions, which Grice sees as 'reductionist,' and indeed 'eliminationist.'
The logic of 'dispositions' is tricky, as Grice will later explore in connection with 'rationality' (rational propension or propensity) and metaphysics (the 'as if' operator).
***
Carton 6
Folder 31
Folder 31
"Two Dogmas of Empiricism"
For Quine, there are two. Grice is mainly interested in the first one: that there is a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.
Grice considers Empiricism as a monster on his way to the Rationalist City of Eternal Truth.
***
For Quine, there are two. Grice is mainly interested in the first one: that there is a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.
Grice considers Empiricism as a monster on his way to the Rationalist City of Eternal Truth.
***
Carton 6
Folder 32
Folder 32
"Emotions and Incontinence"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Emotion and akrasia, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 32.
The concept of 'emotion' needs a philosophical elucidation.
Akrasia for Grice covers both boulomaic and doxastic versions.
The boulomaic version may be closer to the concept of an emotion.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Emotion and akrasia, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 32.
The concept of 'emotion' needs a philosophical elucidation.
Akrasia for Grice covers both boulomaic and doxastic versions.
The boulomaic version may be closer to the concept of an emotion.
***
Carton 6
Folder 33
Folder 33
"Entailment and Paradoxes"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1970). Entailment and paradoxes, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 33.
While 'entailment,' as introduced in the philosophical literature by Moore, is hardly seen in terms of the paradoxes, 'if' is. Grice connects the two.
The relation of 'consequence' may be considered a meta-conditional, where paradoxes arise.
His Bootstrap is a principle designed to empoverish the metalanguage so that the philosopher can succeed in the business of pulling himself up by his own!
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1970). Entailment and paradoxes, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 33.
While 'entailment,' as introduced in the philosophical literature by Moore, is hardly seen in terms of the paradoxes, 'if' is. Grice connects the two.
The relation of 'consequence' may be considered a meta-conditional, where paradoxes arise.
His Bootstrap is a principle designed to empoverish the metalanguage so that the philosopher can succeed in the business of pulling himself up by his own!
***
Carton 6
Folders 34-35
Folders 34-35
Ethics
With Judith Baker
***
With Judith Baker
***
Carton 6
Folder 36
Folder 36
Ethics
North Carolina Notes
***
North Carolina Notes
***
Carton 6
Folder 37
Folder 37
Festschrift and Warner Notes
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1985). Prejudices and predilections, which become, the life and opinions of H. P. Grice, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 37.
Strictly, it is not a festschrift in that the name is hidden behind the acronym:
P Paul Philosophical
G Grounds of
R Rationality:
I Intentions
C Categories
E Ends
Notably on the philosophy of perception. Also on the conception of value, especially that tricky third lecture on a metaphysical foundation for objective value.
Grice was supposed to reply to the individual contributors, but does not. However, in his oeuvre we may identify points of contacts between the philosophers who contributed and his own views.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1985). Prejudices and predilections, which become, the life and opinions of H. P. Grice, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 37.
Strictly, it is not a festschrift in that the name is hidden behind the acronym:
P Paul Philosophical
G Grounds of
R Rationality:
I Intentions
C Categories
E Ends
Notably on the philosophy of perception. Also on the conception of value, especially that tricky third lecture on a metaphysical foundation for objective value.
Grice was supposed to reply to the individual contributors, but does not. However, in his oeuvre we may identify points of contacts between the philosophers who contributed and his own views.
***
Carton 6
Folder 38
Folder 38
"Finality"
With A. D Code
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Finality, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 38.
Code was the Aristotelian, and he and Grice are especially concerned in the idea of 'causa finalis.'
For Grice only detached finality can threaten Mechanism, as it should!
***
With A. D Code
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Finality, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 38.
Code was the Aristotelian, and he and Grice are especially concerned in the idea of 'causa finalis.'
For Grice only detached finality can threaten Mechanism, as it should!
***
Carton 7
Folder 1
Folder 1
"Form, Type, and Implication"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). Form, type, and implication, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 1.
Grice was not enamoured with the 'type'/'token' or 'token'/'type' distinction.
His thoughts on 'logical form' were provocative:
"If you can't put it in logical form, it's not worth saying."
Strawson infamously reacted, but with a smile: "Oh, no! If you CAN put it in logical form, it's not worth saying."
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). Form, type, and implication, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 1.
Grice was not enamoured with the 'type'/'token' or 'token'/'type' distinction.
His thoughts on 'logical form' were provocative:
"If you can't put it in logical form, it's not worth saying."
Strawson infamously reacted, but with a smile: "Oh, no! If you CAN put it in logical form, it's not worth saying."
***
Carton 7
Folder 2
Folder 2
Frege, Words and Sentences
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Frege, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 2.
![Gottlob Frege: Leben - Werk - Zeit (German Edition) by [Kreiser, Lothar]](https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/images/I/41ykndEZ%2BVL.jpg)
Frege was one of Grice's obsessions. A Fregeian sense is an explicatum, or implicitum -- a concession to get his principle of conversational helpfulness working in the generation of conversational implicata, that can only mean progress for philosohy!
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Frege, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 2.
Frege was one of Grice's obsessions. A Fregeian sense is an explicatum, or implicitum -- a concession to get his principle of conversational helpfulness working in the generation of conversational implicata, that can only mean progress for philosohy!
***
Carton 7
Folder 3
Folder 3
Kant's "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics"
While Grice can't read Kant in German, he uses the English vernacular.
Note the archaic 'metaphysic' sic in singular.
***
While Grice can't read Kant in German, he uses the English vernacular.
Note the archaic 'metaphysic' sic in singular.
***
Carton 7
Folder 4
Kant's "Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals"
Folder 4
Kant's "Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals"
More Kant.
***
Carton 7
Folder 5
Folder 5
Grammar and Semantics
With R. O. Warner
Truth-conditional semantics and implicata
***
With R. O. Warner
Truth-conditional semantics and implicata
***
Carton 7
Folder 6
Folder 6
"Happiness, Discipline, and Implicatures"
Keyword: Eudaimonia.
The implicata of "Smith is happy" are more complex than Kantotle thought!
***
Keyword: Eudaimonia.
The implicata of "Smith is happy" are more complex than Kantotle thought!
***
Carton 7
Folder 7
Folder 7
"Hume"
Grice called one of his metaphysical construction routines "Humeian projection," since the 'mind,' as it were, 'spreads over' its objects.
Grice was especially concerned with the poverty of Hume's criticism to Locke on personal identity.
***
Grice calls one of his metaphysical construction routines "Humeian Projection."
Grice called one of his metaphysical construction routines "Humeian projection," since the 'mind,' as it were, 'spreads over' its objects.
Grice was especially concerned with the poverty of Hume's criticism to Locke on personal identity.
***
Carton 7
Folders 8-9
David Hume's Account on Personal Identity
Grice opted for a Lockeian memory-based on "I" utterances that Hume rather regarded as 'vague,' and 'confusing.
***
Grice opted for a Lockeian memory-based on "I" utterances that Hume rather regarded as 'vague,' and 'confusing.
***
Carton 7
Folder 10
Folder 10
Identity
Notes
With G. Myro
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Identity, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 10.
The idea that "=" is unqualified needs qualification. Whitehead and Russell ignored this. Grice and Myro didn't!
***
Notes
With G. Myro
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1980). Identity, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 10.
The idea that "=" is unqualified needs qualification. Whitehead and Russell ignored this. Grice and Myro didn't!
***
Carton 7, Folders 11-12
"Ifs and Cans"
Keywords: conditional, power
Two of Grice's favourites. He opposed Strawson's view on 'if.' Grice thought that 'if' was the horseshoe of Whitehead and Russell, provided we add an IMPLICATUM to an ENTAILMENT.
The 'can' is merely dispositional, if not alla Ryle, alla Grice!
***
Keywords: conditional, power
Two of Grice's favourites. He opposed Strawson's view on 'if.' Grice thought that 'if' was the horseshoe of Whitehead and Russell, provided we add an IMPLICATUM to an ENTAILMENT.
The 'can' is merely dispositional, if not alla Ryle, alla Grice!
***
Carton 7
Folder 13
Folder 13
Irony, Stress, and Truth
Part of "Further notes on Logic and Conversation"
Reprinted in Studies in the Way of Words.
Three topics where the IMPLICATUM helps.
"He is a scoundrel" may well be the IMPLICATUM of "He is a fine friend."
But cfr. the pretense theory of irony. Grice, being a classicist, loved the etymological connection.
With Stress, he was concerned with anti-Gettier uses of emphatic 'know': "I KNOW." (Implicatum: I do have conclusive evidence").
"Truth" (or "... is true") sprang from Grice's attention to that infamous Bristol symposium between Austin and Strawson.
Grice wants to defend Austin's correspondence theory against Strawson's 'performative' approach.
If "... is true" IMPLICATES "someone previously affirmed this," that does not mean a 'ditto' IMPLICATUM is part of the ENTAILMENT of an "... is true" utterance.
***
Part of "Further notes on Logic and Conversation"
Reprinted in Studies in the Way of Words.
Three topics where the IMPLICATUM helps.
"He is a scoundrel" may well be the IMPLICATUM of "He is a fine friend."
But cfr. the pretense theory of irony. Grice, being a classicist, loved the etymological connection.
With Stress, he was concerned with anti-Gettier uses of emphatic 'know': "I KNOW." (Implicatum: I do have conclusive evidence").
"Truth" (or "... is true") sprang from Grice's attention to that infamous Bristol symposium between Austin and Strawson.
Grice wants to defend Austin's correspondence theory against Strawson's 'performative' approach.
If "... is true" IMPLICATES "someone previously affirmed this," that does not mean a 'ditto' IMPLICATUM is part of the ENTAILMENT of an "... is true" utterance.
***
Carton 7
Folders 14-16
Folders 14-16
Kant
***
***
Carton 7
Folder 17
Folder 17
Kant's Ethics
***
***
Carton 7
Folder 18
Folder 18
Kant, Mid-sentences, Freedom
Grice was especially concerned with Kant's having brought back the old Greek idea of 'eleutheria' for philosophical discussion.
***
Grice was especially concerned with Kant's having brought back the old Greek idea of 'eleutheria' for philosophical discussion.
***
Carton 7
Folder 19
Folder 19
Language and Reference
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). Language and Reference, The Irvine lectures, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 19.
Grice favours a transcendental approach to communication.
Our beliefs worth communicating have to be true.
Our orders worth communicating have to refer to our willings.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). Language and Reference, The Irvine lectures, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 19.
Grice favours a transcendental approach to communication.
Our beliefs worth communicating have to be true.
Our orders worth communicating have to refer to our willings.
***
Carton 7
Folder 20
Folder 20
Language Semantics
alla Tarski.
***
alla Tarski.
***
Carton 7
Folders 21-22
Folders 21-22
John Locke Lecture Notes
On aspects of reason. Including extensive language botany on 'rational', 'reasonable,' and indeed 'reason' (justificatory, explanatory, and mixed).
At this point, Grice notes that linguistic botany is INDISPENSABLE towards the construction of a more systematic explanatory theory.
It is an exploration of a range of uses of 'reason' that leads him to his "Aequi-vocality" thesis that 'must' has only one sense!
***
On aspects of reason. Including extensive language botany on 'rational', 'reasonable,' and indeed 'reason' (justificatory, explanatory, and mixed).
At this point, Grice notes that linguistic botany is INDISPENSABLE towards the construction of a more systematic explanatory theory.
It is an exploration of a range of uses of 'reason' that leads him to his "Aequi-vocality" thesis that 'must' has only one sense!
***
Carton 7
Folder 23
Folder 23
Davidson's "The Logical Form of Action Sentences"
A Davidsonian problem. Category shift invites us to see Smith's fishing as the subject of an 'action sentence.'
Cf. The horse runs fast.
---
Therefore, the horse runs.
***
A Davidsonian problem. Category shift invites us to see Smith's fishing as the subject of an 'action sentence.'
Cf. The horse runs fast.
---
Therefore, the horse runs.
***
Carton 7
Folders 24-25
Folders 24-25
Meaning and Philosophical Psychology
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1976). Meaning and philosophical psychology, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folders 24 and 25.
Meaning is perhaps the psychological state, attitude, or stance, per excellence.
Grice coins "M-intention" for the bunch of intentions a rational 'meaner' must mean before he even EXPLICATES something!
While not explicitly, Grice wants to supersede Peirce's merely taxonomic approaches to the thing, more in the vein of Ogden and Richards.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1976). Meaning and philosophical psychology, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folders 24 and 25.
Meaning is perhaps the psychological state, attitude, or stance, per excellence.
Grice coins "M-intention" for the bunch of intentions a rational 'meaner' must mean before he even EXPLICATES something!
While not explicitly, Grice wants to supersede Peirce's merely taxonomic approaches to the thing, more in the vein of Ogden and Richards.
***
Carton 7
Folders 26-27
Folders 26-27
Metaphysics
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1957). Metaphysics, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folders 26 and 27.
Cfr. Grice/Strawson/Pears, "Metaphysics," in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, The BBC Third Programme.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1957). Metaphysics, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folders 26 and 27.
Cfr. Grice/Strawson/Pears, "Metaphysics," in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, The BBC Third Programme.
***
Carton 7
Folder 28
Folder 28
Metaphysics and Ill-Will
Keyword: Ill-will
A conceptual elucidation.
***
Keyword: Ill-will
A conceptual elucidation.
***
Carton 7
Folder 29
Folder 29
Metaphysics and Theorizing
Grice called himself 'folksy': his theories, even if subject to various types of Ramseyfication, are 'popular' in kind!
And ceteris paribus!
Metaphysical construction is disciplined and the best theorising the philosopher can hope for!
***
Grice called himself 'folksy': his theories, even if subject to various types of Ramseyfication, are 'popular' in kind!
And ceteris paribus!
Metaphysical construction is disciplined and the best theorising the philosopher can hope for!
***
Carton 7
Folder 30
Folder 30
Method and Myth
A philosopher should be, as Plato was, to use a myth, if he thinks his tutee will thank him for that!
***
A philosopher should be, as Plato was, to use a myth, if he thinks his tutee will thank him for that!
***
Carton 7
Folder 31
Folder 31
Mill's Induction
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). Mill's Induction, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 31.
More Grice to the Mill.
Grice loved Hardie's playing with Mill's Method of Difference with an Oxford copper.
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). Mill's Induction, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 31.
More Grice to the Mill.
Grice loved Hardie's playing with Mill's Method of Difference with an Oxford copper.
***
Carton 7
Folder 32
Miscellaneous
Actions and Events
"Actions and events" is Davidsonian in motivation, but Kantian in method!
***
Actions and Events
"Actions and events" is Davidsonian in motivation, but Kantian in method!
***
Carton 8
Folder 1
Folder 1
Miscellaneous
With J. Baker
***
With J. Baker
***
Carton 8
Folder 2
Folder 2
Miscellaneous
Metaphysics Notes
***
Metaphysics Notes
***
Carton 8
Folder 3
Folder 3
Miscellaneous
Oxford Philosophy
By Oxford philosophy, Grice meant his own!
***
Oxford Philosophy
By Oxford philosophy, Grice meant his own!
***
Carton 8
Folders 4-8
Folders 4-8
Miscellaneous Philosophy
***
***
Carton 8
Folders 9-13
Folders 9-13
Miscellaneous
Philosophy Topics
***
Philosophy Topics
***
Carton 8
Folders 14-15
"Modality, Desirability, and Probability"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). Modality, desirability, and probability, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folders 14 and 15.
Folders 14-15
"Modality, Desirability, and Probability"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1977). Modality, desirability, and probability, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folders 14 and 15.
He would use 'mode operator.'
Modality is the more correct term, for things like 'should,' 'ought,' and 'must,' in that order. One sense.
The doxastic modals are correlated to probability. The boulomaic modals are correlated to desirability.
There is probability to a degree d.
But there is also desirability to a degree d.
They both combine in Grice's attempt to show how Kant's categorical imperative reduces to the hypothetical.
***
Carton 8
Folders 16-17
Folders 16-17
"Nicomachean Ethics"
"Aristotle's Ethics"
From Hardie.
***
"Aristotle's Ethics"
From Hardie.
***
Carton 8
Folder 18
Folder 18
Objectivity and Value
His third Carus lecture. He tries to find out what J. L. Mackie means when he says that a value is ultimately 'subjective'. What about intersubjective, and constructively 'objective'?
***
His third Carus lecture. He tries to find out what J. L. Mackie means when he says that a value is ultimately 'subjective'. What about intersubjective, and constructively 'objective'?
***
Carton 8
Folder 19
Folder 19
Objective Value, Rational Motivation
The rational motivation for objective value.
Many notions are value-paradeigmatic.
The most important of all philosophical notions, that of 'rationality,' presupposes objective value as one of its motivations.
For Grice, 'ratio' can be understood 'cognoscendi' but also 'essendi.' "Rational motivation" involves both types of 'ratio.'
***
The rational motivation for objective value.
Many notions are value-paradeigmatic.
The most important of all philosophical notions, that of 'rationality,' presupposes objective value as one of its motivations.
For Grice, 'ratio' can be understood 'cognoscendi' but also 'essendi.' "Rational motivation" involves both types of 'ratio.'
***
Carton 8
Folder 20
Folder 20
Oddents (or Odd Ends)
Urbane and Not Urbane
***
Urbane and Not Urbane
***
Carton 8
Folders 21-22
Folders 21-22
Vision, Taste, and
The philosophy of perception
Mainly with Warnock.
Keyword: Taste.
Warnock reprinted Grice's "Causal Theory of Perception" in his influential Reading in Philosophy, "The philosophy of perception."
***
The philosophy of perception
Mainly with Warnock.
Keyword: Taste.
Warnock reprinted Grice's "Causal Theory of Perception" in his influential Reading in Philosophy, "The philosophy of perception."
***
Carton 8
Folder 23
Folder 23
Perception
With G. J. Warnock.
***
With G. J. Warnock.
***
Carton 8
Folder 24
Folder 24
Perception
With Warnock. Warnock learned about perception much more from Grice than from Austin!
***
With Warnock. Warnock learned about perception much more from Grice than from Austin!
***
Carton 8
Folder 25
Folder 25
Perception
With R. O. Warner
An evolutionary justification of 'material' thing as the denotatum of a perceptual judgement.
***
With R. O. Warner
An evolutionary justification of 'material' thing as the denotatum of a perceptual judgement.
***
Carton 8
Folder 26
Folder 26
"Descartes on Clear and Distinct Perception"
"Malcolm on Dreaming"
Descartes meets Malcolm, and vice versa.
***
"Malcolm on Dreaming"
Descartes meets Malcolm, and vice versa.
***
Carton 8, Folder 27
"A Pint of Philosophy" by Alfred Brook Gordon, includes notes by Grice
Figurative!
***
Figurative!
***
Carton 8
Folder 28
Folder 28
"A Philosophy of Life"
Happiness Notes
Keywords: Kantotle, eudaimonia.
***
Happiness Notes
Keywords: Kantotle, eudaimonia.
***
Carton 8, Folder 29
"Pierce's Theory of Signs"
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1947). Peirce's theory of signs, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folder 29.
Keyword: meaning. He cites Ewing, Ogden and Richards, and many others. "Those spots mean measles."
Grice finds Peirce 'krypto-technical' and proposes to "English" him into an 'ordinary-language' philosopher.
He does not altogether fail!
***
Citation:
Grice, H. P. (1947). Peirce's theory of signs, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folder 29.
Keyword: meaning. He cites Ewing, Ogden and Richards, and many others. "Those spots mean measles."
Grice finds Peirce 'krypto-technical' and proposes to "English" him into an 'ordinary-language' philosopher.
He does not altogether fail!
***
Carton 8
Folder 30
Folder 30
"Basic Pirotese, Sentence Semantics and Syntax"
KEYWORDS: pirot, pirotese, semantics, syntax
Pirotese is the philosopher's engaging in pirotology.
"Pirots karulise elatically."
But not all of them.
Grice finds that the pirotological talk allows to start from zero.
He is constructing a language -- "Pirotese" -- and the world that language is supposed to represent or denote.
***
KEYWORDS: pirot, pirotese, semantics, syntax
Pirotese is the philosopher's engaging in pirotology.
"Pirots karulise elatically."
But not all of them.
Grice finds that the pirotological talk allows to start from zero.
He is constructing a language -- "Pirotese" -- and the world that language is supposed to represent or denote.
***
Carton 8
Folder 31
Folder 31
"Pirots and Obbles"
KEYWORDS: pirot, obble, creature construction.
An obble is a pirot's object.
Grice introduces potching and cotching. To potch is what a pirot does with an obble: he perceives it. To cotch is what a pirot can further do with an obble: know or cognise it.
Cotching, unlike potching, is factive.
***
KEYWORDS: pirot, obble, creature construction.
An obble is a pirot's object.
Grice introduces potching and cotching. To potch is what a pirot does with an obble: he perceives it. To cotch is what a pirot can further do with an obble: know or cognise it.
Cotching, unlike potching, is factive.
***
Carton 8
Folders 32-33
Folders 32-33
"Methodology - Pirots"
KEYWORDS: "pirot"
Pirotology. Creature-construction. The genitorial programme.
Grice as engineer.
***
KEYWORDS: "pirot"
Pirotology. Creature-construction. The genitorial programme.
Grice as engineer.
***
Carton 9
Folder 1
Folder 1
"Practical Reason"
KEYWORD: reason, practical reason.
Grice prefers the idiom of 'soul.' There's the ratiocinative soul. Within the ratiocinative, there's the executive soul and the merely administrative soul.
Cicero had to translate Aristotle into 'prudentia,' every time Aristotle talked of 'phronesis.'
Grice was aware that Kant's terminology can be confusing. Kant had used "pure" reason for reason in the doxastic realm.
Kant's critique of practical reason is HARDLY symmetrical to his critique of 'doxastic' reason.
Grice, with his 'aequi-vocality' thesis of 'must' ("must" crosses the doxastic-boulomaic divide), Grice is being more of a symmetricalist.
***
KEYWORD: reason, practical reason.
Grice prefers the idiom of 'soul.' There's the ratiocinative soul. Within the ratiocinative, there's the executive soul and the merely administrative soul.
Cicero had to translate Aristotle into 'prudentia,' every time Aristotle talked of 'phronesis.'
Grice was aware that Kant's terminology can be confusing. Kant had used "pure" reason for reason in the doxastic realm.
Kant's critique of practical reason is HARDLY symmetrical to his critique of 'doxastic' reason.
Grice, with his 'aequi-vocality' thesis of 'must' ("must" crosses the doxastic-boulomaic divide), Grice is being more of a symmetricalist.
***
Carton 9
Folder 2
Folder 2
"Preliminary Valediction"
For the Studies in the Way of Words.
***
For the Studies in the Way of Words.
***
Carton 9
Folder 3
Folder 3
"Presupposition and implicature"
KEYWORDS: implicature, presupposition.
His take on Strawson.
"The king of France is bald" entails there is a king of France.
"The king of France ain't bald" does not; only implicate it.
Grice knew he was robbing Peter to pay Paul.
***
KEYWORDS: implicature, presupposition.
His take on Strawson.
"The king of France is bald" entails there is a king of France.
"The king of France ain't bald" does not; only implicate it.
Grice knew he was robbing Peter to pay Paul.
***
Carton 9
Folder 4
Folder 4
"Probability and life"
KEYWORDS: life, probability.
Evolutionary account of the pirot's adaptability to its changeable environs.
Grice borrows the notion of probability from Davidson, whose early claim to fame was to provide the logic of the notion.
Grice abbreviates probability by "Pr." and compares it to a boulomaic operator, "De." for desirability.
A rational agent must calculate both the probability and the desirability of his action.
For both probability and desirability, the degree is crucial. Grice symbolises this by 'd': probability in degree d; probability in degree d'.
The topic of life Grice relates to that of adaptation and surival, and connects with his genitorial programme of creature construction ("pirotology."): life as continued operancy.
***
KEYWORDS: life, probability.
Evolutionary account of the pirot's adaptability to its changeable environs.
Grice borrows the notion of probability from Davidson, whose early claim to fame was to provide the logic of the notion.
Grice abbreviates probability by "Pr." and compares it to a boulomaic operator, "De." for desirability.
A rational agent must calculate both the probability and the desirability of his action.
For both probability and desirability, the degree is crucial. Grice symbolises this by 'd': probability in degree d; probability in degree d'.
The topic of life Grice relates to that of adaptation and surival, and connects with his genitorial programme of creature construction ("pirotology."): life as continued operancy.
***
Carton 9
Folder 5
Folder 5
"Rationality and trust"
KEYWORDS: trust, rationality.
Trust and rationality are pre-requisites of conversation.
Cf. his desideratum of conversational candour, subsumed under the over-arching principle of conversational helpfulness (formerly 'conversational benevolence-cum-self-interest')
Grice thought that the principle of conversational benevolence has to be weighed against the principle of conversational self-interest.
The result is the overarching principle of conversational helpfulness.
Clarity gets in the picture. The desideratum of conversational clarity is a reasonable requirement for conversants to abide by.
Grice follows some of Warnock's observations.
The logical grammar of 'trust' is subtle, especially when we are considering the two sub-goals of conversation:
-- giving and receiving information
-- influencing and being influenced by others
In both sub-goals, trust is paramount.
The explorations of trust had become an Oxonian hobby, with authors not such like Warnock, but B. A. O. Williams, and others.
***
KEYWORDS: trust, rationality.
Trust and rationality are pre-requisites of conversation.
Cf. his desideratum of conversational candour, subsumed under the over-arching principle of conversational helpfulness (formerly 'conversational benevolence-cum-self-interest')
Grice thought that the principle of conversational benevolence has to be weighed against the principle of conversational self-interest.
The result is the overarching principle of conversational helpfulness.
Clarity gets in the picture. The desideratum of conversational clarity is a reasonable requirement for conversants to abide by.
Grice follows some of Warnock's observations.
The logical grammar of 'trust' is subtle, especially when we are considering the two sub-goals of conversation:
-- giving and receiving information
-- influencing and being influenced by others
In both sub-goals, trust is paramount.
The explorations of trust had become an Oxonian hobby, with authors not such like Warnock, but B. A. O. Williams, and others.
***
Carton 9
Folder 6
"Reasons"
Linguistic analysis on 'justificatory,' 'explanatory' and 'mixed' uses of 'reason.'
While Grice knows that the basic use of 'reason' is qua verb (reasoner reasons from premise P to conclusion C), he spends some time in exploring 'reason' as noun.
Grice found it a bit of a roundabout way to approach rationality.
However, his distinction between 'justificatory' and 'explanatory' 'reason' is built upon his linguistic botany on the use of 'reason' qua noun.
Explanatory reason seems more basic for Grice than 'justificatory' reason.
Explanatory reason EXPLAINS the rational agent's behaviour.
Grice is aware of Freud and his 'rationalizations.'
An agent may invoke some 'reason' for his acting which is not 'legitimate.'
An agent may convince himself that he wants to move to Bournemouth because of the weather; when in fact, his reason to move to Bournemouth is to be closer to Cowes and join the yacht club there.
***
Linguistic analysis on 'justificatory,' 'explanatory' and 'mixed' uses of 'reason.'
While Grice knows that the basic use of 'reason' is qua verb (reasoner reasons from premise P to conclusion C), he spends some time in exploring 'reason' as noun.
Grice found it a bit of a roundabout way to approach rationality.
However, his distinction between 'justificatory' and 'explanatory' 'reason' is built upon his linguistic botany on the use of 'reason' qua noun.
Explanatory reason seems more basic for Grice than 'justificatory' reason.
Explanatory reason EXPLAINS the rational agent's behaviour.
Grice is aware of Freud and his 'rationalizations.'
An agent may invoke some 'reason' for his acting which is not 'legitimate.'
An agent may convince himself that he wants to move to Bournemouth because of the weather; when in fact, his reason to move to Bournemouth is to be closer to Cowes and join the yacht club there.
***
Carton 9
Folder 7
Folder 7
"Reflections on morals"
KEYWORDS: meta-ethics
Meta-ethics.
Morals is very Oxonian. There were in Grice's time only THREE chairs of philosophy at Oxford: the three W:
The Waynflete chair of metaphysical philosophy.
The Wykeham chair of logic (not philosophy, really)
The White chair of moral philosophy.
Later, the Wilde chair of philosophical psychology was created.
Grice was familiar with Austin's cavalier attitude to morals as White's professor of moral philosophy, succeeding Kneale.
When R. M. Hare succeeds Austin, Grice knew that it was time to play with implicata!
Grice's approach to morals is very 'meta-ethical' and starts with a fastidious exploration of 'modes' related to phrases involving 'should,' 'ought,' and 'must.'
For Hampshire, 'should' is the moral word par excellence.
For Hare, it is 'ought.'
For Grice, it is "MUST."
However, Grice also wants to say that whatever he'll say about the 'moral' MUST must apply to the 'doxastic' "must," as in "What goes up must come down."
***
KEYWORDS: meta-ethics
Meta-ethics.
Morals is very Oxonian. There were in Grice's time only THREE chairs of philosophy at Oxford: the three W:
The Waynflete chair of metaphysical philosophy.
The Wykeham chair of logic (not philosophy, really)
The White chair of moral philosophy.
Later, the Wilde chair of philosophical psychology was created.
Grice was familiar with Austin's cavalier attitude to morals as White's professor of moral philosophy, succeeding Kneale.
When R. M. Hare succeeds Austin, Grice knew that it was time to play with implicata!
Grice's approach to morals is very 'meta-ethical' and starts with a fastidious exploration of 'modes' related to phrases involving 'should,' 'ought,' and 'must.'
For Hampshire, 'should' is the moral word par excellence.
For Hare, it is 'ought.'
For Grice, it is "MUST."
However, Grice also wants to say that whatever he'll say about the 'moral' MUST must apply to the 'doxastic' "must," as in "What goes up must come down."
***
Carton 9
Folder 8
Folder 8
"Russell and Heterologicality"
KEYWORDS: Russell, heterological
Grice was fascinated by Baron Russell's remarks on 'heterological.'
And its implicata.
***
KEYWORDS: Russell, heterological
Grice was fascinated by Baron Russell's remarks on 'heterological.'
And its implicata.
***
Carton 9
Folder 9
Folder 9
Schiffer
On Remnants on meaning.
S. R. Schiffer had been Strawson's tutee at Oxford as a Rhode Scholar in the completion of his D. Phil. on 'Meaning' (later published by Clarendon).
Eventually, Schiffer grew sceptic, and let Grice know about it!
Grice did not find Schiffer's arguments totally destructive, but saw the positive side to them: they should remind any philosopher that the issues he is dealing are profound and bound to involve much elucidation before they are solved.
***
On Remnants on meaning.
S. R. Schiffer had been Strawson's tutee at Oxford as a Rhode Scholar in the completion of his D. Phil. on 'Meaning' (later published by Clarendon).
Eventually, Schiffer grew sceptic, and let Grice know about it!
Grice did not find Schiffer's arguments totally destructive, but saw the positive side to them: they should remind any philosopher that the issues he is dealing are profound and bound to involve much elucidation before they are solved.
***
Carton 9
Folder 10
Folder 10
"Semantics of Children's Language"
KEYWORDS: semantics, children's language, ontology, phylogeny, developmental pragmatics, learning, acquisition.
Interesting in that he was always enquiring his children's playmates: "Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed!"
***
KEYWORDS: semantics, children's language, ontology, phylogeny, developmental pragmatics, learning, acquisition.
Interesting in that he was always enquiring his children's playmates: "Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed!"
***
Carton 9
Folder 11
Folder 11
"Sentence Semantics"
Truth-conditional, constructivist.
While Grice is NOT concerned about the 'semantics' of utterer's meaning, he is about the semantics of SENTECE meaning.
Grice's second stage of his programme about meaning begins with specifications of 'means' as applied to 'x'.
He is having Tarski's and Davidson's elaborations of schemas like
"p" means that p.
"Snow is white" means that snow is white.
***
Truth-conditional, constructivist.
While Grice is NOT concerned about the 'semantics' of utterer's meaning, he is about the semantics of SENTECE meaning.
Grice's second stage of his programme about meaning begins with specifications of 'means' as applied to 'x'.
He is having Tarski's and Davidson's elaborations of schemas like
"p" means that p.
"Snow is white" means that snow is white.
***
Carton 9
Folder 12
Folder 12
"Sentence Semantics and Propositional Complexes"
KEYWORDS: propositional complex.
Grice was keen on the concept of a 'propositional complex,' which allowed him NOT to commit to the abstract entity of a 'proposition,' if the latter is regarded as an extensional family of 'propositional complexes' (Paul saw Peter; Peter was seen by Paul).
The topic of a propositional complex was one that Grice regarded as Oxonian in nature.
C. A. B. Peacocke had struggled with the same type of problems, in his various essays on the theory of content.
Only a perception-based account of content in terms of 'qualia' gets the philosopher out of the vicious circle of introducing linguistic entities to clarify psychological entities and vice versa.
***
KEYWORDS: propositional complex.
Grice was keen on the concept of a 'propositional complex,' which allowed him NOT to commit to the abstract entity of a 'proposition,' if the latter is regarded as an extensional family of 'propositional complexes' (Paul saw Peter; Peter was seen by Paul).
The topic of a propositional complex was one that Grice regarded as Oxonian in nature.
C. A. B. Peacocke had struggled with the same type of problems, in his various essays on the theory of content.
Only a perception-based account of content in terms of 'qualia' gets the philosopher out of the vicious circle of introducing linguistic entities to clarify psychological entities and vice versa.
***
Carton 9
Folder 13
"Significance of the Middle Book's Aristotle's Metaphysics" by A. D. Code
KEYWORDS: Aristotle, metaphysics, the middle book.
Very middle. Grice never knew what was middle for Aristotle, but admired Code too much to air this!
The organisation of Aristotle's metaphysics was a topic of much concern for Grice.
With Code, Grice coined 'izzing' and 'hazzing' to refer to essential and non-essential attribution.
***
KEYWORDS: Aristotle, metaphysics, the middle book.
Very middle. Grice never knew what was middle for Aristotle, but admired Code too much to air this!
The organisation of Aristotle's metaphysics was a topic of much concern for Grice.
With Code, Grice coined 'izzing' and 'hazzing' to refer to essential and non-essential attribution.
***
Carton 9
Folder 14
"Social justice"
On Socrates and Thrasymachus.
Grice was well aware that Rawls have made use of Grice's ideas on 'personal identity.' The philosophical elucidation of 'fairness' is of great concern for Grice. He had been in touch with the explorations by Nozick and Nagel along anti-Rawlsian lines.
Grice's ideas on rationality guide his exploration of 'social justice.'
***
On Socrates and Thrasymachus.
Grice was well aware that Rawls have made use of Grice's ideas on 'personal identity.' The philosophical elucidation of 'fairness' is of great concern for Grice. He had been in touch with the explorations by Nozick and Nagel along anti-Rawlsian lines.
Grice's ideas on rationality guide his exploration of 'social justice.'
***
Carton 9
Folder 15
Folder 15
""Subjective" conditions and intentions"
KEYWORDS: intention, subjective condition.
Cf. his dispositional account to 'intending.'
A subjective condition takes into account the intender's, rather than the ascriber's, point of view:
Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees.
***
KEYWORDS: intention, subjective condition.
Cf. his dispositional account to 'intending.'
A subjective condition takes into account the intender's, rather than the ascriber's, point of view:
Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees.
***
Carton 9
Folder 16
Folder 16
"Super-relatives"
Very Super.
***
Very Super.
***
Carton 9
Folders 17-18
Folders 17-18
"Syntax and semantics"
KEYWORDS: syntax, semantics.
Especially the former. Grice loved two devices of the syntactic kind: subscripts and square brackets (for the assignment of 'common-ground status').
Grice was a conservative when it comes to syntax and semantics. He would hardly use 'pragmatics,' but was aware of Morris's triangle.
Syntax is presented along the lines of Gentzen -- a system of 'natural deduction' in terms of inference rules of introduction and elimination for each formal device.
Semantics pertains rather to Witters's truth-values: the assignment of a satisfactory-valuation: the true and the good.
***
KEYWORDS: syntax, semantics.
Especially the former. Grice loved two devices of the syntactic kind: subscripts and square brackets (for the assignment of 'common-ground status').
Grice was a conservative when it comes to syntax and semantics. He would hardly use 'pragmatics,' but was aware of Morris's triangle.
Syntax is presented along the lines of Gentzen -- a system of 'natural deduction' in terms of inference rules of introduction and elimination for each formal device.
Semantics pertains rather to Witters's truth-values: the assignment of a satisfactory-valuation: the true and the good.
***
Carton 9
Folder 19
Folder 19
"The "that" and the "why"
Metaphysics
KEYWORDS: explanation, description, 'why,' 'what'.
Taxonomy, worse than Explanation, always.
Grice is exploring the 'taxonomy-description' vs. explanation dichotomy.
He would often criticise Austin for spending too much valuable time on linguistic botany, 'without an aim in his head.'
Instead, other philosophers look for the 'big picture of it all,' and disregard piecemeal analyses.
Conversation is a good example. While Austin would subjectify 'Language' (Linguistic Nature), Grice rather places rationality squarely on the behaviour displayed by utterers as they make conversational moves that their addressees will judge as 'rational' along specific lines.
Observation of the principle of conversational helpfulness is RATIONAL (reasonable) along the following lines:
Anyone who cares about the two goals which are central to conversation:
-- giving and receiving information
-- influencing and being influenced by others
is expected to have an interest in taking part in a conversation which will only be profitable under the assumption that it is conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational helpfulness.
***
Metaphysics
KEYWORDS: explanation, description, 'why,' 'what'.
Taxonomy, worse than Explanation, always.
Grice is exploring the 'taxonomy-description' vs. explanation dichotomy.
He would often criticise Austin for spending too much valuable time on linguistic botany, 'without an aim in his head.'
Instead, other philosophers look for the 'big picture of it all,' and disregard piecemeal analyses.
Conversation is a good example. While Austin would subjectify 'Language' (Linguistic Nature), Grice rather places rationality squarely on the behaviour displayed by utterers as they make conversational moves that their addressees will judge as 'rational' along specific lines.
Observation of the principle of conversational helpfulness is RATIONAL (reasonable) along the following lines:
Anyone who cares about the two goals which are central to conversation:
-- giving and receiving information
-- influencing and being influenced by others
is expected to have an interest in taking part in a conversation which will only be profitable under the assumption that it is conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational helpfulness.
***
Carton 9
Folder 20
Folder 20
Trust, Metaphysics, and Value.
With J. Baker.
KEYWORDS: trust, metaphysics, value.
Trust a corollary of the principle of conversational helpfulness.
The logical grammar of 'trust' is an interesting one. Grice used to speak of 'candour.'
In a given conversational setting, assuming the principle of conversational helpfulness is operating, the utterer U is assumed by the addressee A to be 'trustworthy.'
There are two dimensions for trust, which relate to the TWO goals which Grice assumes the principle of conversational helpfulness captures:
-- giving and receiving information
-- influencing and being influenced by others
In both sub-goals, trust is key.
In the doxastic realm, trust has to do, not so much with 'truth' (with which the expression is cognate) but 'evidence.'
In the boulomaic realm, 'evidence' becomes less crucial. Grice mentions attitudes of the boulomaic type that are not usually judged in terms of evidential support.
However, in the 'boulomaic' realm, utterer will be assumed as 'trustworthy' if the conative attitudes he displays are 'sincere.'
***
With J. Baker.
KEYWORDS: trust, metaphysics, value.
Trust a corollary of the principle of conversational helpfulness.
The logical grammar of 'trust' is an interesting one. Grice used to speak of 'candour.'
In a given conversational setting, assuming the principle of conversational helpfulness is operating, the utterer U is assumed by the addressee A to be 'trustworthy.'
There are two dimensions for trust, which relate to the TWO goals which Grice assumes the principle of conversational helpfulness captures:
-- giving and receiving information
-- influencing and being influenced by others
In both sub-goals, trust is key.
In the doxastic realm, trust has to do, not so much with 'truth' (with which the expression is cognate) but 'evidence.'
In the boulomaic realm, 'evidence' becomes less crucial. Grice mentions attitudes of the boulomaic type that are not usually judged in terms of evidential support.
However, in the 'boulomaic' realm, utterer will be assumed as 'trustworthy' if the conative attitudes he displays are 'sincere.'
***
Carton 9
Folder 21
Folder 21
"Universals"
KEYWORDS: universalia.
Universalia as abstrata.
Grice's concern with 'universalia' can be traced back to his reading of Aristotle's "Categoriae."
Other than the 'substantia prima,' it may be said that anything else -- attribute, etc. -- belongs in the realm of 'universalia.'
As such, univeralia are not spatio-temporal continuants.
However, his category shift allows Grice to have this 'universalia' as subjects of discourse.
The topic is approached formally by means of the notion of 'order': 'first-order predicate calculus' ranges over individuals, in Strawson's use of the term.
Higher-order predicate calculus ranges over 'predicates' and beyond -- as such, 'universalia' can only be formalised in higher-order calculi.
***
KEYWORDS: universalia.
Universalia as abstrata.
Grice's concern with 'universalia' can be traced back to his reading of Aristotle's "Categoriae."
Other than the 'substantia prima,' it may be said that anything else -- attribute, etc. -- belongs in the realm of 'universalia.'
As such, univeralia are not spatio-temporal continuants.
However, his category shift allows Grice to have this 'universalia' as subjects of discourse.
The topic is approached formally by means of the notion of 'order': 'first-order predicate calculus' ranges over individuals, in Strawson's use of the term.
Higher-order predicate calculus ranges over 'predicates' and beyond -- as such, 'universalia' can only be formalised in higher-order calculi.
***
Carton 9
Folder 22
Folder 22
"Universals"
With M. Friedman
KEYWORDS: universalia.
***
With M. Friedman
KEYWORDS: universalia.
***
Carton 9
Folder 23
Folder 23
"Value, Metaphysics, and Teleology"
KEYWORDS: value, metaphysics, teleology, telos, finality, mechanism.
Grice was obsessed with the Greek idea of a 'telos,' as overused by Aristotle. He thought teleology is a key philosophical way to contest Mechanism, so popular in The New World.
Strictly, and Grice knew this, 'teleology' is constituted as a 'discipline.'
For the philosopher, 'teleology' is that part of philosophy that studies the realm of the 'telos.'
Informally, 'teleological' is opposed to 'mechanistic'.
Grice is interested in the mechanism/teleology debate.
He found New-World philosophers too mechanistic-oriented, in contrast with the more 'two-culture' atmosphere he was familiar with at Oxford!
***
KEYWORDS: value, metaphysics, teleology, telos, finality, mechanism.
Grice was obsessed with the Greek idea of a 'telos,' as overused by Aristotle. He thought teleology is a key philosophical way to contest Mechanism, so popular in The New World.
Strictly, and Grice knew this, 'teleology' is constituted as a 'discipline.'
For the philosopher, 'teleology' is that part of philosophy that studies the realm of the 'telos.'
Informally, 'teleological' is opposed to 'mechanistic'.
Grice is interested in the mechanism/teleology debate.
He found New-World philosophers too mechanistic-oriented, in contrast with the more 'two-culture' atmosphere he was familiar with at Oxford!
***
Carton 9
Folder 24
Folder 24
"Values, Morals, Absolutes, and the Metaphysical"
The absolute versus the relative, is constructed OUT of the relative, thought. There is hardly a realm of UNconstructed reality.
Grice is especially concerned with J. L. Mackie's rather cavalier attitude towards the relative and the absolute.
Surely the 'absolute' IS a construction out of the 'relative.'
Grice takes a Kantotelian attitude. We designate a proper judge, the ratiocinative part of the soul of a personal being. Whatever is 'relative' to this particular creature attains, ipso facto, 'absolute value.'
Grice proposes a reduction of 'what is valuable-ABSOLUTE' to 'what is valuable-RELATIVE,' and succeeds!
***
The absolute versus the relative, is constructed OUT of the relative, thought. There is hardly a realm of UNconstructed reality.
Grice is especially concerned with J. L. Mackie's rather cavalier attitude towards the relative and the absolute.
Surely the 'absolute' IS a construction out of the 'relative.'
Grice takes a Kantotelian attitude. We designate a proper judge, the ratiocinative part of the soul of a personal being. Whatever is 'relative' to this particular creature attains, ipso facto, 'absolute value.'
Grice proposes a reduction of 'what is valuable-ABSOLUTE' to 'what is valuable-RELATIVE,' and succeeds!
***
Carton 9
Folders 25-27
Folders 25-27
Miscellaneous
"Value sub-systems"
"The Kantian Problem"
Values coordinate in systems. One such is 'eudaimonia.'
Kant's problem is the reduction of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical imperative.
For Kant, values tend towards the subjective. Grice, rather, wants to offer a 'metaphysical' defence of 'objective' value.
***
"Value sub-systems"
"The Kantian Problem"
Values coordinate in systems. One such is 'eudaimonia.'
Kant's problem is the reduction of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical imperative.
For Kant, values tend towards the subjective. Grice, rather, wants to offer a 'metaphysical' defence of 'objective' value.
***
Grice called the manual of conversational maxims the Conversational Immanuel.
***
***
Carton 9
Folder 28
Folder 28
"Values and rationalism"
KEYWORDS: value, rationalism, axiology
As opposed to 'relativism,' which denies the rational basis to attitude ascriptions.
Grice is concerned with the absence of a thorough discussion of 'value' by English philosophers.
Continental philosophers, by comparison, have a special discipline, 'axiology,' for it!
Similarly, a continental-oriented tradition Grice finds in The New World in philosophers of a pragmatist bent, such as Carus.
Grice wants to say that 'rationality' is a value, because it is a faculty that a creature (human) displays to adapt and survive to his changing environments.
***
KEYWORDS: value, rationalism, axiology
As opposed to 'relativism,' which denies the rational basis to attitude ascriptions.
Grice is concerned with the absence of a thorough discussion of 'value' by English philosophers.
Continental philosophers, by comparison, have a special discipline, 'axiology,' for it!
Similarly, a continental-oriented tradition Grice finds in The New World in philosophers of a pragmatist bent, such as Carus.
Grice wants to say that 'rationality' is a value, because it is a faculty that a creature (human) displays to adapt and survive to his changing environments.
***
Carton 9
Folder 29
Folder 29
Philippa Foot's "Virtues and Vices"
KEYWORDS: Philippa Foot, virtue, vice, virtue ethics, flourishing
He admired Foot's ability to make the right conceptual distinction.
Foot is following a very Oxonian tradition best represented by the work of G. J. Warnock.
Of course, Grice was over-familiar with the 'virtue' vs. 'vice' distinction, since Hardie had instilled it on him at Corpus!
For Grice, 'virtue' and 'vice' display an interesting 'logical' grammar, though.
He would say that 'rationality' is a virtue; fallacious reasoning is a vice.
Some things he took more of a moral standpoint about. To cheat is neither irrational nor unreasonble: just plain 'repulsive.'
As such, it would be a 'vice.'
Grice is concerned with 'vice' in his account of 'akrasia.'
If agent A KNOWS that doing x is 'virtuous,' yet decides to do ~x, which is 'vicious,' A is being 'akratic.'
For Grice, akratic behaviour applies both in the doxastic and the boulomaic realm.
And it is part of the philosopher's job to elucidate the conceptual intricacies attached to it.
***
KEYWORDS: Philippa Foot, virtue, vice, virtue ethics, flourishing
He admired Foot's ability to make the right conceptual distinction.
Foot is following a very Oxonian tradition best represented by the work of G. J. Warnock.
Of course, Grice was over-familiar with the 'virtue' vs. 'vice' distinction, since Hardie had instilled it on him at Corpus!
For Grice, 'virtue' and 'vice' display an interesting 'logical' grammar, though.
He would say that 'rationality' is a virtue; fallacious reasoning is a vice.
Some things he took more of a moral standpoint about. To cheat is neither irrational nor unreasonble: just plain 'repulsive.'
As such, it would be a 'vice.'
Grice is concerned with 'vice' in his account of 'akrasia.'
If agent A KNOWS that doing x is 'virtuous,' yet decides to do ~x, which is 'vicious,' A is being 'akratic.'
For Grice, akratic behaviour applies both in the doxastic and the boulomaic realm.
And it is part of the philosopher's job to elucidate the conceptual intricacies attached to it.
***
Carton 9
Folders 30-31
"Wants and Needs"
KEYWORDS: want, need, wanting, needing, philosophical psychology, soul
Folders 30-31
"Wants and Needs"
KEYWORDS: want, need, wanting, needing, philosophical psychology, soul
"Want" etymologically means "absence;" "need" should be preferred. The squarrel (squirrel) Toby NEEDS intake of nuts, and you'll soon see gobbling them! There is not much philosophical bibliography on these two 'psychological states' Grice is analysing. Their logic is interesting:
(i) Smith wants to play cricket.
(ii) Smith NEEDS to play cricket.
Grice is concerned with the propositional content attached to the 'want' and 'need' predicate.
"Wants that" sounds harsh; so does "need that."
Still, there are propositional attached to (i) and (ii): "Smith plays cricket."
Grice took a very cavalier attitude to what linguists spend their lives analysing.
He thought it was surely NOT the job of the philosopher, especially from a prestigious university such as Oxford, to deal with the arbitrariness of grammatical knots attached to this or that English verb. He rarely used "English," but stuck with 'ordinary language.'
Surely, he saw himself in the tradition of Kantotle, and so, aiming at grand philosophical truths: not conventions of usage, even his own!
***
APPENDIX A
H. P. Grice: Catalogue Raisonée
Grice, H.P. (1938). ‘Negation and privation’ The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1941). ‘Personal identity,’ in Mind, repr. in J. Perry, Personal Identity, Berkeley, University of California Press.
--- (1946). Seminar on Peirce's theory of signs, The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1948). Intentions and dispositions.' On Ryle and Hampshire.
--- (1948). Intentions and dispositions.' On Ryle and Hampshire.
--- (1956). In defence of a dogma, with P. F. Strawson, The Philosophical Review, repr. in Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1989.
--- (1957). 'Meaning,' The Philosophical Review.
--- (1957). 'Metaphysics,' with P. F. Strawson and D. F. Pears, in D. F. Pears, The nature of metaphysics. London: Macmillan.
--- (1957). 'Meaning,' The Philosophical Review.
--- (1957). 'Metaphysics,' with P. F. Strawson and D. F. Pears, in D. F. Pears, The nature of metaphysics. London: Macmillan.
--- (1959). ‘Vision,’ with G. J. Warnock, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 8, Folder 21, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1960). ‘The philosophy of perception,’ notes with G. J. Warnock on visum. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/138c.
--- (1961). ‘The causal theory of perception,’ symposium with A.R. White, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume, 35, no. 1:121-153, repr. in Warnock (1968) and, without the excursus on implication, in Grice (1989).
--- (1962). ‘Some remarks about the senses,’ in R. J. Butler, Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, repr. in Grice 1989.
--- (1964). ‘Logic and conversation,’ an Oxford seminar, in The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1967). The William James Memorial Lectures, in The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley, repr. in a revised form as Part I of Grice (1989).
--- (1968). 'Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning,' The Foundations of Language, repr. in J. R. Searle, The Philosophy of Language, Oxford.
--- (1969). 'Vacuous names,' in D. Davidson and J. Hintikka, Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel.
--- (1968). 'Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning,' The Foundations of Language, repr. in J. R. Searle, The Philosophy of Language, Oxford.
--- (1969). 'Vacuous names,' in D. Davidson and J. Hintikka, Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel.
--- (1969). ‘Utterer’s meaning and intentions,’ The Philosophical Review, 72(2): 147-177, repr. in Grice (1989).
--- (1970). The philosophy of perception: a retrospective, with G. J. Warnock, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1970). ‘Philosophy and ordinary language,' The H.P. Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 15, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1971). ‘Intention and uncertainty,’ Proceedings of the British Academy, 57:263-269.
--- (1971). 'Entailment,' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series IV, Carton 6, Folder 4, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1971). 'Ifs and cans,' The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1972.) Potching and cotching obbles. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1973). 'Identity,' with G. Myro, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1973). ‘Davidson on intending,’ The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 92/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California at Berkeley.
--- (1974). ‘Disimplicature,’ The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1974) ‘Frege: words, and sentences,’ The H. P. Grice Papers.
--- (1975). 'Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre,' Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, repr. in The Conception of Value.
--- (1974) ‘Frege: words, and sentences,’ The H. P. Grice Papers.
--- (1975). 'Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre,' Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, repr. in The Conception of Value.
--- (1975). ‘Logic and conversation,’ in Davidson and Harman (1975), also in Cole and Morgan (1975), repr. in a revised form in Grice (1989).
--- (1976). ‘Russell and heterologicality,’ The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1977). ‘Mill's induction,’ The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 7, Folder 31, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1977). ‘The Kant Lectures,’ Stanford. Redelivered as The John Locke lectures, repr. in Aspects of Reason. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
--- (1978). ‘Further notes on logic and conversation,’ in Cole (1978), repr. in a revised form in Grice (1989).
--- (1979). ‘Knowledge and belief,’ The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 18, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1980). 'Socrates,' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 31, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1981). ‘Presupposition and conversational implicature,’ in Cole (1981), repr. in a revised form in Grice (1989).
--- (1982). 'Meaning revisited,' in N. V. Smith, Mutual knowledge. Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
--- (1982). 'Meaning revisited,' in N. V. Smith, Mutual knowledge. Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
--- (1983). ‘The Paul Carus lectures,’ repr. as The Conception of Value. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
--- (1984). ‘Prejudices and predilections, which become, the life and opinions of Paul Grice,’ The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 91/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1985). 'The unity of science and teleology,' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series IV, Carton 6, Folder 9, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1986). ‘Reply to Richards,’ in Grandy/Warner, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends. pp. 45-108.
--- (1987). ‘Retrospective epilogue,’ repr. in Grice (1989), Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
--- (1988). ‘Metaphysics and theorizing,’ The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1988). ‘Aristotle on the multiplicity of being,’ posthumously edited by B. F. Loar. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
***
APPENDIX B
1941
'Personal Identity'
In Mind, repr. in J. Perry, Personal Identity, Berkeley, University of California Press.
Grice's attempt to reduce "I" statements ("I am hearing a noise") in terms of a chain of mnemonic
states. While quoting from recent philosophers such as Gallie and Broad, he has an occasion to go
back to Locke and contest the infamous counterexample presented by Reid. Grice concludes with a
methodological note: the intricacy of one's analysis should not be a minus, but a plus.
1946
Common sense and scepticism.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1946
Seminar on Peirce's Theory of Signs.
The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California,
Berkeley.
Important as a source for Grice's attempt to 'English' Peirce. Peirce ultra-Latinate and Greek
taxonomies have Grice nervous. He proposes to reduce all of Peirceian divisions to 'mean.' In the
proceedings, he quote from Ogden, Richards, Ewing. It is from Peirce that Grice explores examples
such as those spots 'meaning' measles.
1948
Meaning.
Paper to the Oxford Philosophical Society.
1953.
G. E. Moore and Philosopher's Paradoxes.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1956
'In defence of a dogma'
With P. F. Strawson, The Philosophical Review, repr. in Grice, Studies in the Way of Words,
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1989.
The locus classicus for the 'ordinary-language' philosophical response to Quine in "Two dogmas of
empiricism." Grice and Strawson claim that '... is analytic" does have an ordinary use, as attached two
a type of behavioural conversational response. To an analytically false move (such as "My
neighbour's three-year-old son is an adult") the addressee is bound to utter, "I don't understand you!
You are not being figurative, are you?." To a synthetically false move, on the other hand (such as "My
neighbour's three-year-old understands Russell's Theory of Types"), the addressee will jump with,
"Can't believe it!"
1957
'Meaning'
Published in The Philosophical Review.
1957
'Metaphysics'
With P. F. Strawson and D. F. Pears, in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, proceedings of the BBC Third programe lectures.
Grice participated in two of them. He discusses Collingwood on presupposition.
1958
Post-war Oxford philosophy
repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1959
‘Vision'
With G. J. Warnock, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 8, Folder 21, BANC MSS 90/135c, The
Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Of the five senses, Grice and Warnock are particularly interested in 'seeing.' As Grice will put it later,
'see' is a factive. It presupposes the existence of the event reported after the 'that'-clause. A 'visum,'
however, as an intermediary between the material thing and the perceiver does not seem necessary in
'ordinary' discourse.
1960
'The philosophy of perception'
Notes with G. J. Warnock on visum.
The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/138c.
Keywords: visum, Warnock, Grice, the philosophy of perception. Grice kept the lecture notes to a
view of publishing a retrospective. Warnock recalled Grice saying, "How clever language is!"
1962
'Some remarks about the senses'
In R. J. Butler, Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, repr. in Grice 1989.
An interesting piece in that it was commissioned by Butler, who knew Grice from his Oxford days.
Grice cites O. P. Wood and R. Albritton. Grice is concerned with a special topic in the philosophy of
perception, notably the identification of the traditional 'five' senses: vision, audition, taste, smell, and
tact. He introduces what is regarded in the philosophical literature as the first 'thought-experiment,' in
terms of the senses that Martians may have. They have two pairs of eyes: are we going to allow that
they 'see' with both pairs? Grice introduces a sub-division of seeing: a Martian x-s an object with his
upper pair of eyes, but he y-s an object with the lower pair of eyes. In his exploration, he takes a
'realist' stance, which respects the 'ordinary' discursive ways to approach issues of perception.
1964
'Logic and conversation'
an Oxford seminar, in The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Keyword: implicatum, principle of conversational helpfulness.
Important in that it is Grice's occasion to introduce the principle of conversational helpfulness as
generating implicata under the assumption of rationality. The lecture makes it obvious that Grice's
interest is methodological, and not 'philological.' He is not interest in conversation per se, but only as
the source for his principle of conversational helpfulness and the notion of the conversational
implicatum, which springs from the distinction between what an utterer implies and what his
expression does, a distinction 'apparently denied by Witters and all too frequently ignored by Austin.'
1966.
Descartes on clear and distinct perception.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1967
The William James Memorial Lectures on Logic and Conversation
In The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley, repr. in a revised form as Part I of Grice (1989). The original set consisted of seven
lectures. To wit: Prolegomena, Logic and conversation, Further notes on logic and conversation,
Indicative Conditionals, Utterer's meaning and intentions, Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and
word meaning, and Some models for implicature. They were pretty successful at Oxford. While the
notion of an 'implicatum' had been introduced by Grice at Oxford, even in connection with a principle
of conversational helpfulness, he takes the occasion now to explore the type of rationality involved.
Observation of the principle of conversational helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along the following
lines: anyone who cares about the two central goals to conversation (give/receive information,
influence/be influened) is expected to have an interest in participating in a conversation that is only
going to be profitable given that it is conducted along the lines set by the principle of conversational
helpfulness. In "Prolegomena" he lists Austin, Strawson, Hare, Hart, and himself, as victims of a
disregard for the implicatum. In the third lecture he introduces his razor, "Senses are not to be
muliplied beyond necessity." In "Indicative conditionals" he tackles Strawson on 'if' as not
representing the horse-shoe of Whitehead and Russell. The next two lectures, "Utterer's meaning and
intentions" and "Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning" refine his earlier, more
austere, account of this particularly Peirceian phenomenon. He concludes the lectures with an
exploration on the relevance of the implicatum to philosophical psychology.
1968
Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning.
Published in The Foundations of Language, ed. by J. F. Staal.
1969
'Utterer’s meaning and intentions'
The Philosophical Review, 72(2): 147-177, repr. in Grice (1989).
This is officially the fifth William James lecture. Grice takes up the analysis of 'meaning' he had
presented back in 1948 at the Oxford Philosophical Society. Motivated mainly by Strawson's attack in
"Intention and convention in speech acts," that offered an alleged counter-example to the sufficiency
of Grice's analysis, Grice ends up introducing so many intention that he almost trembled. He ends up
seeing 'meaning' as a 'value-paradeigmatic' concept, perhaps never realisable in a sublunary way. But
it is the analysis in this particular essay where he is at his formal best. He distinguishes between
protreptic and exhibitive utterances, and also modes of correlation (iconic, conventional). He
symbolises the utterer and the addressee, and generalises over the type of psychological state,
attitude, or stance, "meaning" seems to range (notably indicative vs. imperative). He formalises the
'reflexive' intention, and more importantly, the 'overtness' of communication in terms of a self
referential recursive intention that disallows any 'sneaky' intention to be brought into the picture of
meaning-constitutive intentions.
1969
Vacuous names
Commissioned by Donald Davidson and J. Hintikka for Words and objections: essays on the work of
W. V. Quine. Grice introduces a subscript device to account for 'implicata' of utterances like
"Marmaduke Bloggs won't be attending the party; he was invented by the journalists." In the later
section, he explores identificatory and non-identificatory uses of 'the' without involving himself in the
problems Donnellan did!
1970.
Presupposition and conversational implicature.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1971
'Entailment,' The H. P. Grice Papers
Series IV, Carton 6, Folder 4, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley
Grice was interested in G. E. Moore's coinage of 'entailment' for logical consequence. As an analyst,
Grice knew that a true conceptual analysis needs to be reductive (if not reductionist). The prongs the
analyst lists are thus 'entailments' of the concept in question. Philosophers, however, may misidentify
what is an entailment for an implicature, or vice versa. Initially, Grice was interested in the second
family of cases. With his coinage of 'disimplicature,' he expanded his interest to cover the first family
of cases, too. Grice remained a philosophical methodologist: he is not so much concerned with any
area or discipline or philosophical concept per se (unless it's rationality), but with the misuses of
some tools in the philosophy of language as committed by some of his colleagues at Oxford.
1971
'Ifs and cans'
The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Keyword: Austin.
Austin had brought the topic to the fore as an exploration of free will. D. F. Pears had noted that
'conversational' implicature may account for the conditional perfection ('if' yields 'iff'). Cfr. M. R.
Ayers on Austin on 'if' and 'can.'
1972
'Potching and cotching obbles'
The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley
Keyword: Pirotese.
Grice was fascinated by Carnap's "pirots" which karulise elatically. Grice adds 'potching' for
something like 'perceiving' and 'cotching' for something like 'cognising.'
1974
'Disimplicature'
The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Keyword: disimplicature.
If Grice's claim to fame is 'implicature,' he finds 'disimplicature' an intriguing notion to capture those
occasions when an utterer means LESS than he says. His examples include: a loose use of 'intending'
(without the entailment of the doxastic condition), the uses of 'see' in Shakespeareian contexts
("Macbeth saw Banquo," "Hamlet saw his father on the ramparts of Elsinore") and the use of "is" to
mean "seems" ("That tie is blue under this light, but green otherwise," when both conversants know
that a change of colour is out of the question. He plays with "You're the cream in my coffee" being an
utterance where the disimplicature (i.e. entailment dropping) is total. "Disimplicature" does not
appeal to a new principle of conversational rationality. It is perfectly accountable by the principle of
conversational helpfulness, in particular, the desideratum of conversational candour.
1974
'Frege: words, and sentences'
The H. P. Grice Papers.
Keywords: Frege
Frege was the topic of Dummett's explorations. A student of Grice's at Berkeley brought Dummett's "Frege" and told Grice that he intended to explore this. "Have you read it?" "No I haven't. And I hope I won't" was Grice's reply. Some authors have noted some similarities between Grice's notion of a 'conventional' implicature and Frege's rambles on 'colouring. Grice was more interested in the idea of a "Fregeian" sense. One of his metaphysical construction-routines (Humeian projection) is aimed at the generation of concepts, in most cases the 'rational reconstruction' of an intuitive concept displayed in 'ordinary discourse.'
1975
'Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre'
In Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association.
Grice's method in functionalist philosophical psychology. Introduces pirotology as a creature-construction discipline.
Repr. in The Conception of Value.
1975
'Logic and conversation'
In Davidson and Harman (1975), also in Cole and Morgan (1975), repr. in a revised form in Grice
(1989).
Most people without a philosophical background first encounter Grice through this essay.
Philosophers usually get first acquainted with his "In defence of a dogma," or "Meaning." In "Logic
and Conversation," Grice re-utilises the notion of an implicatum and the principle of conversational
helpfulness that he had introduced at Oxford to a more select audience. Grice's idea is that the
observation of the principle of conversational helfpulness is rational (reasonable) along the following
lines: anyone who is concerned with the two goals which are central to conversation (to give/receive
information, to influence/be influenced) should be interested in participating in a conversation that is
only going to be profitable on the assumption that it is conducted along the lines of the principle of
conversational helfpulness. Grice's point is methodological. He is not at all interested in
conversational exchanges as such. Unfortunately, the essay starts "in media res," and skips Grice's
careful list of Oxonian examples of 'disregard' for the key idea of what a conversant IMPLICATES by
the conversational move he makes. His concession is that there is an EXPLICATUM or
EXPLICITUM (roughly, the logical form) which is beyond pragmatic constraints. This concession is
easily explained in terms of his overarching irreverent, conservative, dissenting rationalism.
1976.
Meaning revisited.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1977
'Mill's induction'
The H. P. Grice Papers
Series V, Carton 7, Folder 31, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Keywords: Mill, induction.
Grice loved to reminisce an anecdote concerning his tutor Hardie at Corpus when Hardie invoked
Mill's principles to prove that Hardie was not responsible for a traffic jam. In drafts on word play,
Grice would speak of not bringing "more Grice to your Mill." Mill's System of Logic was part of the
reading material for his degree in Lit. Hum. at Oxford, so he was very familiar with it. Mill represents
the best of the English empiricist tradition. Grice kept an interest on inductive methodology. In his
"Life and opinions" he mentions some obscure essays by Kneale and Keynes on the topic. Grice was
interested in Kneale's 'secondary induction,' since Grice saw this as an application of a construction
routine. He was also interested in Keynes's notion of a 'generator property,' which he found
metaphysically intriguing.
1977
'The Immanuel Kant Memorial Lectures'
Stanford.
Redelivered as The John Locke lectures
Repr. in Aspects of Reason. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
The Grice Collection contains previous drafts of this.
Keyword: reasoning
Grice structures the lectures in the form of a philosophical dialogue with his audience. The first
lecture is intended to provide a bit of 'linguistic botanising' for 'reasonable,' and 'rational.' In later
lectures, Grice tackles 'reason' qua noun. The remaining lectures are meant to explore what he calls
the "Aequi-vocality" thesis: "must" has only ONE SENSE that crosses what he calls the 'doxastic'
'boulomaic' divide. He is especially concerned -- this being the Kant lectures -- with Kant's attempt to
reduce the categorical imperative to a 'counsel of prudence.' Kant re-introduces the Aristotelian idea
of 'eudaimonia.' While a further lecture on 'happiness' as the pursuit of a system of ends is NOT
strictly part of the either the Kant or the Locke lectures, it relates, since eudaimonia may be regarded
as the goal involved in the relevant imperative.
1978
'Further notes on logic and conversation'
In Cole (1978), repr. in a revised form in Grice (1989).
This is originally the third William James lecture, in a revised form. In that lecture, Grice introduced
the "M. O. R.," or Modified Occam's Razor: "Senses are not be multiplied beyond necessity." The
point is that "ENTAILMENT-CUM-IMPLICATUM" does the job that MULTIPLIED SENSES
should not do!
1979
'Knowledge and belief'
The H. P. Grice Papers
Series III, Carton 5, Folder 18
BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Keywords: knowledge, belief.
The topic had attracted the attention of some Oxonian philosophers such as J. O. Urmson in
"Parenthetical verbs." Urmson speaks of a 'scale': "I know" can be used parenthetically, as "I believe"
can. For Grice, to utter "I believe" is obviously to make a weaker conversational move. The addressee
is thus allowed to infer that the utterer is not in a position to make the stronger claim. The mechanism
is explained via his principle of conversational helpfulness.
1980.
Meaning revisited.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1980
'Socrates'
The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III
Carton 5, Folder 31
BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Keyword: Socrates.
Grice's most extensive published account of Socrates is in his commentary on Plato's Republic: a
'eschatological' comment, as he puts it. He has Socrates -- and the neo-Socrates -- exploring the logic
and grammar of 'just' against the attack by Thrasymachus -- and the neo-Thrasymachus. Grice's point
is that while the legal 'just' may be conceptually PRIOR to the moral 'just,' the moral 'just' is
evaluationally prior.
1981
'Presupposition and conversational implicature'
In Cole (1981), repr. in a revised form in Grice (1989).
The original source of this exploration was a seminar in 1970. Grice is interested in re
conceptualising Strawson's manoeuvre regarding 'presupposition' as involving what Grice disregards
as a metaphysical concoction: the truth-value gap. In Grice's view, based on a principle of
conversational 'tailoring' that falls under his principle of conversational helpfulness -- indeed under
the desideratum of conversational clarity ("be perspicuous [sic]") -- 'The king of France is bald'
ENTAILS there is a king of France; while 'The king of France ain't bald' merely IMPLICATES it.
1982
Meaning revisited.
In N. V. Smith, Mutual knowledge, Croom Helm, London.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
An axiological approach to meaning.
1983
'The Paul Carus lectures'
Repr. as The Conception of Value. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
There were three Paul Carus lectures. The first is a review of J. L. Mackie's Inventing right and
wrong; the second is an exploration on the categorical imperative, and its connection with a prior
hypothetical imperative; the third is a metaphysical defence of absolute value.
1984
'Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of H. P. Grice
The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 91/135c
The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Most of this material was included as the second part of his "Reply to Richards." The life and
opinions are distinctly separated. Under 'Life,' Grice convers his initial conservative, irreverent
rationalism under his non-conformist father, his tutorials with Hardie at Corpus, and his associations
with J. L. Austin's Play Group. Under 'Opinions,' he mainly expands on 'ordinary-language'
philosophy and his way to the City of Eternal Truth.
1985
'The unity of science and teleology'
The H. P. Grice Papers
Series IV, Carton 6, Folder 9, BANC MSS 90/135c
The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Keywords: unity of science, teleology.
"Unity of science" was a very "New-World" expression that Grice did not quite buy it. He was
brought up in a world of 'two cultures.' Peter Winch and other philosophers were contesting the idea
that science is unitary, when it comes to the explanation of rational behaviour. Since a philosophical
approach to the explanation of rational behaviour, including conversational behaviour (to account for
the conversational implicata) is Grice's priority, he needs to distinguish himself from those who
propose a 'unified' science, which Grice regards as eliminationist and reductionist.
1986
'Reply to Richards'
In Grandy/Warner, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends
pp. 45-108.
The 'Reply' is divided in sections. After a preamble displaying his gratitude for the volume in his
honour, he turns to his 'prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of H. P.
Grice. The third section is a reply to the editors's overview of his work. The reply itself is subdivided
into questions of meaning and rationality, and questions of metaphysics and value.
1986
'Actions and events'
The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
An examination of Davidson, followed by a Kantian approach to freedom and causation.
1987
Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1988
'Metaphysics, Philosophical eschatology, and Plato's Republic'
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1988
'Metaphysics and theorizing'
The H. P. Grice Papers
Series V, BANC MSS 90/135c
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Keywords: metaphysics, theorising
APPENDIX B
H. P. Grice: Catalogue Raisonée --
With keywords.
Grice, H. P.
1938
'Negation'
The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California,
Berkeley.
Grice's attempt to 'eliminate' "not" along verificationist lines. "That is not red" is based on "That is
green." "I am not hearing a noise" is based on the absence of an introspection to the effect that the
utterer is hearing a noise. Grice was involved in serious philosophical studies before the Second
World War under the tutelage of Hardie at Corpus. While his socialising was limited ("having been
born on the wrong side of the tracks"), he was unable to attend Austin's seminal Thursday evening
play group meetings with the seven: Hampshire, Hart, MacDermott, MacNabb, Woozley, and Berlin.
But he learned all about the methodology when he returned to Oxford after the war.
1938
'Negation'
The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California,
Berkeley.
Grice's attempt to 'eliminate' "not" along verificationist lines. "That is not red" is based on "That is
green." "I am not hearing a noise" is based on the absence of an introspection to the effect that the
utterer is hearing a noise. Grice was involved in serious philosophical studies before the Second
World War under the tutelage of Hardie at Corpus. While his socialising was limited ("having been
born on the wrong side of the tracks"), he was unable to attend Austin's seminal Thursday evening
play group meetings with the seven: Hampshire, Hart, MacDermott, MacNabb, Woozley, and Berlin.
But he learned all about the methodology when he returned to Oxford after the war.
1941
'Personal Identity'
In Mind, repr. in J. Perry, Personal Identity, Berkeley, University of California Press.
Grice's attempt to reduce "I" statements ("I am hearing a noise") in terms of a chain of mnemonic
states. While quoting from recent philosophers such as Gallie and Broad, he has an occasion to go
back to Locke and contest the infamous counterexample presented by Reid. Grice concludes with a
methodological note: the intricacy of one's analysis should not be a minus, but a plus.
1946
Common sense and scepticism.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1946
Seminar on Peirce's Theory of Signs.
The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California,
Berkeley.
Important as a source for Grice's attempt to 'English' Peirce. Peirce ultra-Latinate and Greek
taxonomies have Grice nervous. He proposes to reduce all of Peirceian divisions to 'mean.' In the
proceedings, he quote from Ogden, Richards, Ewing. It is from Peirce that Grice explores examples
such as those spots 'meaning' measles.
1948
Meaning.
Paper to the Oxford Philosophical Society.
1953.
G. E. Moore and Philosopher's Paradoxes.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1956
'In defence of a dogma'
With P. F. Strawson, The Philosophical Review, repr. in Grice, Studies in the Way of Words,
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1989.
The locus classicus for the 'ordinary-language' philosophical response to Quine in "Two dogmas of
empiricism." Grice and Strawson claim that '... is analytic" does have an ordinary use, as attached two
a type of behavioural conversational response. To an analytically false move (such as "My
neighbour's three-year-old son is an adult") the addressee is bound to utter, "I don't understand you!
You are not being figurative, are you?." To a synthetically false move, on the other hand (such as "My
neighbour's three-year-old understands Russell's Theory of Types"), the addressee will jump with,
"Can't believe it!"
1957
'Meaning'
Published in The Philosophical Review.
1957
'Metaphysics'
With P. F. Strawson and D. F. Pears, in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, proceedings of the BBC Third programe lectures.
Grice participated in two of them. He discusses Collingwood on presupposition.
1958
Post-war Oxford philosophy
repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1959
‘Vision'
With G. J. Warnock, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 8, Folder 21, BANC MSS 90/135c, The
Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Of the five senses, Grice and Warnock are particularly interested in 'seeing.' As Grice will put it later,
'see' is a factive. It presupposes the existence of the event reported after the 'that'-clause. A 'visum,'
however, as an intermediary between the material thing and the perceiver does not seem necessary in
'ordinary' discourse.
1960
'The philosophy of perception'
Notes with G. J. Warnock on visum.
The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/138c.
Keywords: visum, Warnock, Grice, the philosophy of perception. Grice kept the lecture notes to a
view of publishing a retrospective. Warnock recalled Grice saying, "How clever language is!"
1961
'The causal theory of perception'
Symposium with A.R. White, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume, 35, no.
1:121-153, repr. in Warnock (1968) and, without the excursus on implication, in Grice (1989).
The locus classicus in the philosophical literature for Grice's implicatum. He introduces a 'dout-or
denial' condition for an utterance of a 'phenomenalist' report ("That pillar-box seems red to me." He
attacks neo-Wittgensteinian approaches that regard the report as _false_. In a long excursus on
'implication,' he compares the phenomenalist report with utterances like "He has beautiful
handwriting" (He is hopeless at philosophy), a particularised conversational implicatum; "My
wife is in the kitchen or the garden" (I have non-truth-functional grounds to utter this), a
generalised conversational implicatum, "She was poor but she was honest" (a Great-War witty
(her poverty and her honesty contrast), a 'conventional' implicatum; and "Have you stopped beating
your wife?" -- an old Oxonian conundrum -- (You have been beating your wife), a presupposition.
More importantly, he considers different tests for each. Those for the conversational implicatum will
become crucial: cancellability, calculability, non-detachability, and indeterminacy. Back to the issue
of perception, he holds a conservative view as presented by Price at Oxford.
'The causal theory of perception'
Symposium with A.R. White, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume, 35, no.
1:121-153, repr. in Warnock (1968) and, without the excursus on implication, in Grice (1989).
The locus classicus in the philosophical literature for Grice's implicatum. He introduces a 'dout-or
denial' condition for an utterance of a 'phenomenalist' report ("That pillar-box seems red to me." He
attacks neo-Wittgensteinian approaches that regard the report as _false_. In a long excursus on
'implication,' he compares the phenomenalist report with utterances like "He has beautiful
handwriting" (He is hopeless at philosophy), a particularised conversational implicatum; "My
wife is in the kitchen or the garden" (I have non-truth-functional grounds to utter this), a
generalised conversational implicatum, "She was poor but she was honest" (a Great-War witty
(her poverty and her honesty contrast), a 'conventional' implicatum; and "Have you stopped beating
your wife?" -- an old Oxonian conundrum -- (You have been beating your wife), a presupposition.
More importantly, he considers different tests for each. Those for the conversational implicatum will
become crucial: cancellability, calculability, non-detachability, and indeterminacy. Back to the issue
of perception, he holds a conservative view as presented by Price at Oxford.
1962
'Some remarks about the senses'
In R. J. Butler, Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, repr. in Grice 1989.
An interesting piece in that it was commissioned by Butler, who knew Grice from his Oxford days.
Grice cites O. P. Wood and R. Albritton. Grice is concerned with a special topic in the philosophy of
perception, notably the identification of the traditional 'five' senses: vision, audition, taste, smell, and
tact. He introduces what is regarded in the philosophical literature as the first 'thought-experiment,' in
terms of the senses that Martians may have. They have two pairs of eyes: are we going to allow that
they 'see' with both pairs? Grice introduces a sub-division of seeing: a Martian x-s an object with his
upper pair of eyes, but he y-s an object with the lower pair of eyes. In his exploration, he takes a
'realist' stance, which respects the 'ordinary' discursive ways to approach issues of perception.
1964
'Logic and conversation'
an Oxford seminar, in The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Keyword: implicatum, principle of conversational helpfulness.
Important in that it is Grice's occasion to introduce the principle of conversational helpfulness as
generating implicata under the assumption of rationality. The lecture makes it obvious that Grice's
interest is methodological, and not 'philological.' He is not interest in conversation per se, but only as
the source for his principle of conversational helpfulness and the notion of the conversational
implicatum, which springs from the distinction between what an utterer implies and what his
expression does, a distinction 'apparently denied by Witters and all too frequently ignored by Austin.'
1966.
Descartes on clear and distinct perception.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1967
The William James Memorial Lectures on Logic and Conversation
In The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,
Berkeley, repr. in a revised form as Part I of Grice (1989). The original set consisted of seven
lectures. To wit: Prolegomena, Logic and conversation, Further notes on logic and conversation,
Indicative Conditionals, Utterer's meaning and intentions, Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and
word meaning, and Some models for implicature. They were pretty successful at Oxford. While the
notion of an 'implicatum' had been introduced by Grice at Oxford, even in connection with a principle
of conversational helpfulness, he takes the occasion now to explore the type of rationality involved.
Observation of the principle of conversational helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along the following
lines: anyone who cares about the two central goals to conversation (give/receive information,
influence/be influened) is expected to have an interest in participating in a conversation that is only
going to be profitable given that it is conducted along the lines set by the principle of conversational
helpfulness. In "Prolegomena" he lists Austin, Strawson, Hare, Hart, and himself, as victims of a
disregard for the implicatum. In the third lecture he introduces his razor, "Senses are not to be
muliplied beyond necessity." In "Indicative conditionals" he tackles Strawson on 'if' as not
representing the horse-shoe of Whitehead and Russell. The next two lectures, "Utterer's meaning and
intentions" and "Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning" refine his earlier, more
austere, account of this particularly Peirceian phenomenon. He concludes the lectures with an
exploration on the relevance of the implicatum to philosophical psychology.
1968
Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning.
Published in The Foundations of Language, ed. by J. F. Staal.
1969
'Utterer’s meaning and intentions'
The Philosophical Review, 72(2): 147-177, repr. in Grice (1989).
This is officially the fifth William James lecture. Grice takes up the analysis of 'meaning' he had
presented back in 1948 at the Oxford Philosophical Society. Motivated mainly by Strawson's attack in
"Intention and convention in speech acts," that offered an alleged counter-example to the sufficiency
of Grice's analysis, Grice ends up introducing so many intention that he almost trembled. He ends up
seeing 'meaning' as a 'value-paradeigmatic' concept, perhaps never realisable in a sublunary way. But
it is the analysis in this particular essay where he is at his formal best. He distinguishes between
protreptic and exhibitive utterances, and also modes of correlation (iconic, conventional). He
symbolises the utterer and the addressee, and generalises over the type of psychological state,
attitude, or stance, "meaning" seems to range (notably indicative vs. imperative). He formalises the
'reflexive' intention, and more importantly, the 'overtness' of communication in terms of a self
referential recursive intention that disallows any 'sneaky' intention to be brought into the picture of
meaning-constitutive intentions.
1969
Vacuous names
Commissioned by Donald Davidson and J. Hintikka for Words and objections: essays on the work of
W. V. Quine. Grice introduces a subscript device to account for 'implicata' of utterances like
"Marmaduke Bloggs won't be attending the party; he was invented by the journalists." In the later
section, he explores identificatory and non-identificatory uses of 'the' without involving himself in the
problems Donnellan did!
1970.
Presupposition and conversational implicature.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1970
'The philosophy of perception: a retrospective, with G. J. Warnock'
The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Warnock was possibly the only philosopher at Oxford Grice felt congenial enough to engage in
different explorations in the so-called 'philosophy of perception.' Their joint adventures involved the
disimplicature of a 'visum.' Grice later approached sense data in more 'evolutionary' terms: a material
thing is to be vindicated transcendentally, in the sense that it is a material thing (and not a sense
datum or collection thereof) that nourishes a creature like a human. Grice was particularly grateful to
Warnock. By reprinting the full symposium on "The Causal Theory of Perception" in his influential
series of Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Warnock had spread Grice's lore of implicature all over!
'The philosophy of perception: a retrospective, with G. J. Warnock'
The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Warnock was possibly the only philosopher at Oxford Grice felt congenial enough to engage in
different explorations in the so-called 'philosophy of perception.' Their joint adventures involved the
disimplicature of a 'visum.' Grice later approached sense data in more 'evolutionary' terms: a material
thing is to be vindicated transcendentally, in the sense that it is a material thing (and not a sense
datum or collection thereof) that nourishes a creature like a human. Grice was particularly grateful to
Warnock. By reprinting the full symposium on "The Causal Theory of Perception" in his influential
series of Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Warnock had spread Grice's lore of implicature all over!
1970
'Philosophy and 'ordinary' language'
The H.P. Grice Papers
Series II, Carton 4, Folder 15
BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
The University of California, Berkeley.
Grice is not really interested in 'ordinary' language as a philologist might. He SPOKE 'ordinary'
language, he thought. The point had been brought to the fore by Austin. "If they think philosophy is a
play on words, well then, let's play the game." Grice's interest is methodological. Malcolm had been
claiming that 'ordinary language' is incorrigible. While Grice agreed that 'language can be clever,' he
knew that Aristotle was possibly right when he explored 'ta legomena' in terms of the 'many' and the
selected 'wise.'
'Philosophy and 'ordinary' language'
The H.P. Grice Papers
Series II, Carton 4, Folder 15
BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
The University of California, Berkeley.
Grice is not really interested in 'ordinary' language as a philologist might. He SPOKE 'ordinary'
language, he thought. The point had been brought to the fore by Austin. "If they think philosophy is a
play on words, well then, let's play the game." Grice's interest is methodological. Malcolm had been
claiming that 'ordinary language' is incorrigible. While Grice agreed that 'language can be clever,' he
knew that Aristotle was possibly right when he explored 'ta legomena' in terms of the 'many' and the
selected 'wise.'
1971
'Intention and uncertainty'
Proceedings of the British Academy, 57:263-269.
This is the Henriette Herz Trust annual lecture. Grice had been appointed a FBA in 1966, but he took
his time to deliver his lecture. He was motivated by Hampshire's and Hart's essay on intention and
certainty in "Mind." Grice manages to quote from Prichard (he calls himself a neo-Prichardian),
Anscombe (whom he otherwise would not count, although they shared a discussion table at the
American Philosophical Association), Kenny, and Pears. His most congenial approach was Pears's.
'Intention and uncertainty'
Proceedings of the British Academy, 57:263-269.
This is the Henriette Herz Trust annual lecture. Grice had been appointed a FBA in 1966, but he took
his time to deliver his lecture. He was motivated by Hampshire's and Hart's essay on intention and
certainty in "Mind." Grice manages to quote from Prichard (he calls himself a neo-Prichardian),
Anscombe (whom he otherwise would not count, although they shared a discussion table at the
American Philosophical Association), Kenny, and Pears. His most congenial approach was Pears's.
1971
'Entailment,' The H. P. Grice Papers
Series IV, Carton 6, Folder 4, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley
Grice was interested in G. E. Moore's coinage of 'entailment' for logical consequence. As an analyst,
Grice knew that a true conceptual analysis needs to be reductive (if not reductionist). The prongs the
analyst lists are thus 'entailments' of the concept in question. Philosophers, however, may misidentify
what is an entailment for an implicature, or vice versa. Initially, Grice was interested in the second
family of cases. With his coinage of 'disimplicature,' he expanded his interest to cover the first family
of cases, too. Grice remained a philosophical methodologist: he is not so much concerned with any
area or discipline or philosophical concept per se (unless it's rationality), but with the misuses of
some tools in the philosophy of language as committed by some of his colleagues at Oxford.
1971
'Ifs and cans'
The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Keyword: Austin.
Austin had brought the topic to the fore as an exploration of free will. D. F. Pears had noted that
'conversational' implicature may account for the conditional perfection ('if' yields 'iff'). Cfr. M. R.
Ayers on Austin on 'if' and 'can.'
1972
'Potching and cotching obbles'
The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley
Keyword: Pirotese.
Grice was fascinated by Carnap's "pirots" which karulise elatically. Grice adds 'potching' for
something like 'perceiving' and 'cotching' for something like 'cognising.'
1973
'Identity'
With G. Myro
The H. P. Grice Papers
BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
'Identity'
With G. Myro
The H. P. Grice Papers
BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Keywords: identity, relative identity, the Grice-Myro theory of identity.
While Grice presupposes the use of "=" in his treatment of 'the' king of France, he also explores a
relativisation of "=." His motivation was an essay by Wiggins, almost Aristotelian in spirit, against
Strawson's criterion of space-time continuancy for the identification of the 'substantia prima.' Grice
wants to apply '=' to cases were the time continuancy is made explicit. This yields that "a = b" in
scenario S, but that it may not be the case that "a = b" in a second scenario S'.
1973
'Davidson on intending'
The H.P. Grice Papers
BANC MSS 92/135c, The Bancroft Library
The University of California at Berkeley.
Grice's response to Davidson's pretty unfair use of Grice's notion of conversational implicature in
Davidson's analysis of intention caught a lot of interest. D. F. Pears loved Grice's reply. Implicatum
here is out of the question -- disimplicatum may not. Grice just saw that his theory of conversation is
TOO SOCIAL to be true when applied to 'intending.' The doxastic condition is one of the
ENTAILMENTS in an ascription of an intending. It cannot be cancelled as an implicatum can. If it
CAN be cancelled, it is best seen as a DISIMPLICATUM, or a loose use by an utterer meaning less
than what he says or explicitly conveys to more careful conversants.
While Grice presupposes the use of "=" in his treatment of 'the' king of France, he also explores a
relativisation of "=." His motivation was an essay by Wiggins, almost Aristotelian in spirit, against
Strawson's criterion of space-time continuancy for the identification of the 'substantia prima.' Grice
wants to apply '=' to cases were the time continuancy is made explicit. This yields that "a = b" in
scenario S, but that it may not be the case that "a = b" in a second scenario S'.
1973
'Davidson on intending'
The H.P. Grice Papers
BANC MSS 92/135c, The Bancroft Library
The University of California at Berkeley.
Grice's response to Davidson's pretty unfair use of Grice's notion of conversational implicature in
Davidson's analysis of intention caught a lot of interest. D. F. Pears loved Grice's reply. Implicatum
here is out of the question -- disimplicatum may not. Grice just saw that his theory of conversation is
TOO SOCIAL to be true when applied to 'intending.' The doxastic condition is one of the
ENTAILMENTS in an ascription of an intending. It cannot be cancelled as an implicatum can. If it
CAN be cancelled, it is best seen as a DISIMPLICATUM, or a loose use by an utterer meaning less
than what he says or explicitly conveys to more careful conversants.
1974
'Disimplicature'
The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Keyword: disimplicature.
If Grice's claim to fame is 'implicature,' he finds 'disimplicature' an intriguing notion to capture those
occasions when an utterer means LESS than he says. His examples include: a loose use of 'intending'
(without the entailment of the doxastic condition), the uses of 'see' in Shakespeareian contexts
("Macbeth saw Banquo," "Hamlet saw his father on the ramparts of Elsinore") and the use of "is" to
mean "seems" ("That tie is blue under this light, but green otherwise," when both conversants know
that a change of colour is out of the question. He plays with "You're the cream in my coffee" being an
utterance where the disimplicature (i.e. entailment dropping) is total. "Disimplicature" does not
appeal to a new principle of conversational rationality. It is perfectly accountable by the principle of
conversational helpfulness, in particular, the desideratum of conversational candour.
1974
'Frege: words, and sentences'
The H. P. Grice Papers.
Keywords: Frege
Frege was the topic of Dummett's explorations. A student of Grice's at Berkeley brought Dummett's "Frege" and told Grice that he intended to explore this. "Have you read it?" "No I haven't. And I hope I won't" was Grice's reply. Some authors have noted some similarities between Grice's notion of a 'conventional' implicature and Frege's rambles on 'colouring. Grice was more interested in the idea of a "Fregeian" sense. One of his metaphysical construction-routines (Humeian projection) is aimed at the generation of concepts, in most cases the 'rational reconstruction' of an intuitive concept displayed in 'ordinary discourse.'
1975
'Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre'
In Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association.
Grice's method in functionalist philosophical psychology. Introduces pirotology as a creature-construction discipline.
Repr. in The Conception of Value.
1975
'Logic and conversation'
In Davidson and Harman (1975), also in Cole and Morgan (1975), repr. in a revised form in Grice
(1989).
Most people without a philosophical background first encounter Grice through this essay.
Philosophers usually get first acquainted with his "In defence of a dogma," or "Meaning." In "Logic
and Conversation," Grice re-utilises the notion of an implicatum and the principle of conversational
helpfulness that he had introduced at Oxford to a more select audience. Grice's idea is that the
observation of the principle of conversational helfpulness is rational (reasonable) along the following
lines: anyone who is concerned with the two goals which are central to conversation (to give/receive
information, to influence/be influenced) should be interested in participating in a conversation that is
only going to be profitable on the assumption that it is conducted along the lines of the principle of
conversational helfpulness. Grice's point is methodological. He is not at all interested in
conversational exchanges as such. Unfortunately, the essay starts "in media res," and skips Grice's
careful list of Oxonian examples of 'disregard' for the key idea of what a conversant IMPLICATES by
the conversational move he makes. His concession is that there is an EXPLICATUM or
EXPLICITUM (roughly, the logical form) which is beyond pragmatic constraints. This concession is
easily explained in terms of his overarching irreverent, conservative, dissenting rationalism.
1976.
Meaning revisited.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1976
'Russell and heterologicality'
The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Keywords: Russell, heterological.
Grice was particularly interested in Russell's philosophy because of the usual Oxonian antipathy
towards his type of philosophising. Being an irreverent conservative rationalist, Grice found in
Russell a good point for dissent!
'Russell and heterologicality'
The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Keywords: Russell, heterological.
Grice was particularly interested in Russell's philosophy because of the usual Oxonian antipathy
towards his type of philosophising. Being an irreverent conservative rationalist, Grice found in
Russell a good point for dissent!
1977
'Mill's induction'
The H. P. Grice Papers
Series V, Carton 7, Folder 31, BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Keywords: Mill, induction.
Grice loved to reminisce an anecdote concerning his tutor Hardie at Corpus when Hardie invoked
Mill's principles to prove that Hardie was not responsible for a traffic jam. In drafts on word play,
Grice would speak of not bringing "more Grice to your Mill." Mill's System of Logic was part of the
reading material for his degree in Lit. Hum. at Oxford, so he was very familiar with it. Mill represents
the best of the English empiricist tradition. Grice kept an interest on inductive methodology. In his
"Life and opinions" he mentions some obscure essays by Kneale and Keynes on the topic. Grice was
interested in Kneale's 'secondary induction,' since Grice saw this as an application of a construction
routine. He was also interested in Keynes's notion of a 'generator property,' which he found
metaphysically intriguing.
1977
'The Immanuel Kant Memorial Lectures'
Stanford.
Redelivered as The John Locke lectures
Repr. in Aspects of Reason. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
The Grice Collection contains previous drafts of this.
Keyword: reasoning
Grice structures the lectures in the form of a philosophical dialogue with his audience. The first
lecture is intended to provide a bit of 'linguistic botanising' for 'reasonable,' and 'rational.' In later
lectures, Grice tackles 'reason' qua noun. The remaining lectures are meant to explore what he calls
the "Aequi-vocality" thesis: "must" has only ONE SENSE that crosses what he calls the 'doxastic'
'boulomaic' divide. He is especially concerned -- this being the Kant lectures -- with Kant's attempt to
reduce the categorical imperative to a 'counsel of prudence.' Kant re-introduces the Aristotelian idea
of 'eudaimonia.' While a further lecture on 'happiness' as the pursuit of a system of ends is NOT
strictly part of the either the Kant or the Locke lectures, it relates, since eudaimonia may be regarded
as the goal involved in the relevant imperative.
1978
'Further notes on logic and conversation'
In Cole (1978), repr. in a revised form in Grice (1989).
This is originally the third William James lecture, in a revised form. In that lecture, Grice introduced
the "M. O. R.," or Modified Occam's Razor: "Senses are not be multiplied beyond necessity." The
point is that "ENTAILMENT-CUM-IMPLICATUM" does the job that MULTIPLIED SENSES
should not do!
1979
'Knowledge and belief'
The H. P. Grice Papers
Series III, Carton 5, Folder 18
BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Keywords: knowledge, belief.
The topic had attracted the attention of some Oxonian philosophers such as J. O. Urmson in
"Parenthetical verbs." Urmson speaks of a 'scale': "I know" can be used parenthetically, as "I believe"
can. For Grice, to utter "I believe" is obviously to make a weaker conversational move. The addressee
is thus allowed to infer that the utterer is not in a position to make the stronger claim. The mechanism
is explained via his principle of conversational helpfulness.
1980.
Meaning revisited.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1980
'Socrates'
The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III
Carton 5, Folder 31
BANC MSS 90/135c,
The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Keyword: Socrates.
Grice's most extensive published account of Socrates is in his commentary on Plato's Republic: a
'eschatological' comment, as he puts it. He has Socrates -- and the neo-Socrates -- exploring the logic
and grammar of 'just' against the attack by Thrasymachus -- and the neo-Thrasymachus. Grice's point
is that while the legal 'just' may be conceptually PRIOR to the moral 'just,' the moral 'just' is
evaluationally prior.
1981
'Presupposition and conversational implicature'
In Cole (1981), repr. in a revised form in Grice (1989).
The original source of this exploration was a seminar in 1970. Grice is interested in re
conceptualising Strawson's manoeuvre regarding 'presupposition' as involving what Grice disregards
as a metaphysical concoction: the truth-value gap. In Grice's view, based on a principle of
conversational 'tailoring' that falls under his principle of conversational helpfulness -- indeed under
the desideratum of conversational clarity ("be perspicuous [sic]") -- 'The king of France is bald'
ENTAILS there is a king of France; while 'The king of France ain't bald' merely IMPLICATES it.
1982
Meaning revisited.
In N. V. Smith, Mutual knowledge, Croom Helm, London.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
An axiological approach to meaning.
1983
'The Paul Carus lectures'
Repr. as The Conception of Value. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.
There were three Paul Carus lectures. The first is a review of J. L. Mackie's Inventing right and
wrong; the second is an exploration on the categorical imperative, and its connection with a prior
hypothetical imperative; the third is a metaphysical defence of absolute value.
1984
'Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of H. P. Grice
The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 91/135c
The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Most of this material was included as the second part of his "Reply to Richards." The life and
opinions are distinctly separated. Under 'Life,' Grice convers his initial conservative, irreverent
rationalism under his non-conformist father, his tutorials with Hardie at Corpus, and his associations
with J. L. Austin's Play Group. Under 'Opinions,' he mainly expands on 'ordinary-language'
philosophy and his way to the City of Eternal Truth.
1985
'The unity of science and teleology'
The H. P. Grice Papers
Series IV, Carton 6, Folder 9, BANC MSS 90/135c
The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
Keywords: unity of science, teleology.
"Unity of science" was a very "New-World" expression that Grice did not quite buy it. He was
brought up in a world of 'two cultures.' Peter Winch and other philosophers were contesting the idea
that science is unitary, when it comes to the explanation of rational behaviour. Since a philosophical
approach to the explanation of rational behaviour, including conversational behaviour (to account for
the conversational implicata) is Grice's priority, he needs to distinguish himself from those who
propose a 'unified' science, which Grice regards as eliminationist and reductionist.
1986
'Reply to Richards'
In Grandy/Warner, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends
pp. 45-108.
The 'Reply' is divided in sections. After a preamble displaying his gratitude for the volume in his
honour, he turns to his 'prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of H. P.
Grice. The third section is a reply to the editors's overview of his work. The reply itself is subdivided
into questions of meaning and rationality, and questions of metaphysics and value.
1986
'Actions and events'
The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
An examination of Davidson, followed by a Kantian approach to freedom and causation.
1987
Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy.
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1987
'Retrospective epilogue'
Repr. in Grice (1989), Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Grice took the occasion of the compilation of his Studies in the Way of Words by Harvard to review
philosophical progress in terms of various 'strands' which however display a consistent unity.
1987
'Foreword' to Studies in the Way of Words.
'Retrospective epilogue'
Repr. in Grice (1989), Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Grice took the occasion of the compilation of his Studies in the Way of Words by Harvard to review
philosophical progress in terms of various 'strands' which however display a consistent unity.
1987
'Foreword' to Studies in the Way of Words.
1988
'Metaphysics, Philosophical eschatology, and Plato's Republic'
Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words.
1988
'Metaphysics and theorizing'
The H. P. Grice Papers
Series V, BANC MSS 90/135c
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
Keywords: metaphysics, theorising
1988
'Aristotle on the multiplicity of being'
Posthumously edited by B. F. Loar.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
The Grice Papers contains drafts of the essay eventually submitted for publication.
Keywords: Aristotle, multiplicity, being, izzing, hazzing.
'Aristotle on the multiplicity of being'
Posthumously edited by B. F. Loar.
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
The Grice Papers contains drafts of the essay eventually submitted for publication.
Keywords: Aristotle, multiplicity, being, izzing, hazzing.
REFERENCES
Join The Grice Club!
Austin, J. L. How to do things with words.
Grice, H. P. Studies in the way of words.
Grice, H. P. The conception of value.
Grice, H. P. Aspects of reason.
Hampshire, S. N. Thought and action.
Hare, R. M. The language of morals. Clarendon.
Pears, D. F. Questions in philosophical psychology. London: Duckworth.
Ryle, G. The concept of mind. Hutchinson's University Library.
Strawson, P. F. Introduction to logical theory.
Strawson, P. F. Individuals: an essay in descriptive metaphysics.
Urmson, J. O. Philosophical analysis
Warnock, G. J. English Philosophy, Clarendon.
Warnock, G. J. The philosophy of perception, Oxford.
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment