H. P. Grice: Conversational Implicata and Conversation As Rational Co-Operation -- A Catalogue Raisonné

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H. P. Grice

St. John's, Oxford

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H. P. Grice, M. A. Lit. Hum., F. B. A, 
Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, 
St. John's, Oxford.  

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The H. P. Grice Papers
Oxford, etc. 

Part 
of 
The Grice Collection

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Extent: 
The number of containers of The H. P. Grice Papers is 10 cartons Linear feet: 12.5.

Carton 1 -- 31 folders
Carton 2 -- 30 folders
Carton 3 -- 26 folders
Carton 4 -- 30 folders
Carton 5 -- 31 folders
Carton 6 -- 38 folders
Carton 7 -- 32 folders
Carton 8 -- 33 folders
Carton 9 -- 31 folders
Carton 10 -- No folders -- Tapes

The H. P. Grice Papers consist of the publications, unpublications, and correspondence by English philosopher H. P. Grice, during his years at Corpus, Merton, and St. John's, Oxford -- and beyond.

It is part of The H. P. Grice Collection, comprising items not contained in The H. P. Grice Papers. 

H. P. Grice's published oeuvre includes the volumes Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, Mass. and London, Harvard University Press), -- a compilation of many of his essays, grouped around his William James 'Logic and Conversation' lectures, along with second part which he entitled 'Semantics and metaphysics'), The Conception of Value (Clarendon), organised around the Carus lectures, but reprinting his "Method in philosophical psychology' and a discussion on 'Metaphysics, philosophical psychology, and value' he had published elsewhere, and Aspects of Reason (Clarendon), centred around the John Locke lectures, but also reprinting his one of his essays on eudaimonia.

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H. P. Grice published some of his essays in  periodical publications such as: 
* Mind ('Personal Identity')
* The Philosophical Review ('Meaning' and 'Utterer's Meaning and Intentions', 'In defence of a dogma')
* The Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society ('The Causal Theory of Perception')
* The Foundations of Language ('Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning and word-meaning')
* The Proceedings of The British Academy ('Intention and Uncertainty')
* The Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association ('Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre'), and 
* The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly ('Actions and events,' 'Aristotle on the multiplicity of being').

Grice is careful in noting the provenance of his many essays in Studies in the Way of Words.

Besides these periodical publications, some of H. P. Grice's essays appeared as commissioned chapters for volumes, such as 

* Analytic Philosophy, ed. by R. J. Butler, for Blackwell ('Some remarks about the senses') 
* Words and objections: essays in the work of W. V. Quine, ed. by D. Davidson and G. Harman for Reidel, Dordrecht ('Vacuous names')
* Mutual knowledge ('Meaning revisited'),
* Logic and grammar ('Logic and conversation')
* Speech acts ('Logic and conversation')
* Pragmatics ('Further notes on logic and conversation')
* Radical Pragmatics 
('Presupposition and conversational implicature')
* Actions and events: essays on the work of Donald Davidson, ed. by Hintikka and Vermazen ('Davidson on weakness of the will'). 

GRICE'S REPRINTS

Many of Grice's essays are reprinted in compilations, at Oxford and elsewhere, including: 
* Warnock's The Philosophy of Perception ('The Causal Theory of Perception' originally in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society)
Strawson's Philosophical Logic ('Meaning,' originally in The Philosophical Review) 
Perry's Personal Identity ('Personal identity,' repr. from Mind)
Searle's The Philosophy of Language ('Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning,' repr. from The Foundations of Language). 

Grice himself reprinted many of his essays in his Studies in the Way of Words.

A chronological listing is given as Appendix B below.  

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Included in The H. P. Grice Papers are extensive notes and research Grice conducts on theories of semantics, reason, trust, and value. 

H. P. Grice's most popular lectures, including The John Locke Lectures at Oxford on Aspects of reason, The William James Lectures at Harvard on Logic and conversation, The Paul Carus Lectures on The Conception of Value, Urbana lectures, and The Immanuel Kant Lectures at Stanford, are all documented both as drafts and finalised forms of transcripts, and also in audio files within the collection.

H. P. Grice's contributions include The William James Lectures at Harvard on Logic and Conversation, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," in The Foundations of Language, "The Urbana Lectures," "Logic and Conversation" (in Davidson and Harman, Logic and Grammar), The Immanuel Kant Lectures at Stanford on Aspects of Reason, The John Locke Lectures at Oxford, and The Paul Carus Lectures on The Conception of Value. 

H. P. Grice's publications and 'unpublications' are compilations of his extensive research performed mainly in the philosophy of language, but also in metaphysics, Aristotelian philosophy, philosophical psychology, and ethics. 

H. P. Grice is attributed with coining "implicature" to describe a dimension of utterer's meaning, and for defining his own paradox known as "Grice's paradox," introduced in Grice's Studies in the Way of Words, a compilation of his essays.

Included in the H. P. Grice collection is Grice's research on Aristotle's metaphysics with A. D. Code, meta-ethics with J. Baker, metaphysics with P. F. Strawson and G. Myro, intention and philosophical psychology, with D. F. Pears, and the philosophy of perception, with G. J. Warnock and R. O. Warner. 

Also included in The H. P. Grice Papers is, under Series IV, documentation of Grice's involvement with various philosophical associations, such as The Aristotelian Society, The British Academy, and The American Philosophical  Association. 

How the folders unfold into the five series:

SERIES I: Correspondence
Carton 1, folders 1-15
Series I divided into
Series IA: Correspondence with Baker, Bennett, Bealer, Code, Suppes, Warner, and Wyatt
Series IB: Other

SERIES II: 
Essays:

Carton 1: Folders 16-31
Carton 2: 30 folders
Carton 3: 26 folders
Carton 4: 30 folders

SERIES III: 
Doctrines

Carton 5: 31 folders
Carton 6: Folders 1-3

SERIES IV: 
Associations

Carton 6: Folders 4-12
Carton 10: Tapes

SERIES V: 
Topical

Carton 6: Folders 13-38
Carton 7: 32 folders
Carton 8: 33 folders
Carton 9: 31 folders

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Container List

The H. P. Grice Papers
comprise
five series

SERIES I: 
The Correspondence of H. P. Grice
A. Baker, Bennett, Bealer, Code, Suppes, Warner, Wyatt
B. General

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SERIES II: Essays

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SERIES III: Doctrines


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SERIES IV: Associations

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SERIES V: Topical

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Series I 

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The Correspondence 
of 
H. P. Grice

Physical Description: 

THE CORRESPONDENCE OF H. P. GRICE
comprises just one Carton 1
Folders 1-15.
(There are further folders in Carton 1 which pertain to Series II). 

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The correspondence of H. P. Grice is arranged alphabetically according to surname of correspondent, followed by correspondence of a more general, sometimes administrative, kind. 

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Scope and Content 

Note

"Series I: The Correspondence of H. P. Grice" includes correspondence with philosophers such as J. Baker, G. P. Bealer, R. O. Warner, and R. Wyatt, addressing various forms of his research on philosophy.

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Carton 1
Folder 1

Correspondenc with J. F. Bennett, of Oxford.

Bennett quotes Grice in his "Linguistic Behaviour."
Grice quotes Bennett in the "Foreword" to Studies in the Way of Words. 
Bennett has an earlier work on Rationality, which evidenced that the topic was key in Grice's Oxford. 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1988). 
Correspondence with J. F. Bennett
The Grice Papers, Series I (Correspondence -- A), Carton 1, Folder 1. 

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Carton 1
Folder 2

Correspondence with J. Baker

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1982). 
Correspondence with J. Baker
The Grice Papers, Series I (Correspondence),
Carton 1, Folder 2. 

Grice and Baker collaborated mainly on work on ethics seen as an offspring, alla Kant, of philosophical psychology. Baker contributes to P. G. R. I. C. E., a festschrift for Grice ("Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends") with an essay on the purity, and alleged lack thereof of, of morally evaluable motives ("Do one's motives have to be pure?"). Baker also contributed to a volume on Grice's honour published by Palgrave, Meaning and analysis: essays on H. P. Grice. 




Baker is the organiser of a symposium on the thought of H. P. Grice for the American Philosophical Association. Proceedings in The Journal of Philosophy -- The chair is J. F. Bennett, with contributions by Baker, R. Grandy, and comments by R. Stalnaker and R. Warner. 

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Correspondence with G. P. Bealer

Carton 1
Folder 4

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1986). 
Correspondence with G. P. Bealer, 
The Grice Papers, Series I (Correspondence)
Carton 1, Folder 4. 




Bealer refers to Grice in his influential Clarendon essay on content. Bealer is concerned with how 'pragmatic inference' may intrude in the ascription of a psychological state, attitude, or stance. 

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Correspondence with A. D. Code

Carton 1
Folders 5-6

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). 
Correspondence with A. D. Code
The Grice Papers
Series I (Correspondence)
Carton 1, Folders 5 and 6. 

Grice saw in Code an excellent Aristotelian. They collaborated on an exploration of Aristotle's underlying logic of essential and non-essential predication, for which they would freely use such verbal forms as 'izzing' and 'hazzing.'

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Correspondence with P. Suppes

Carton 1
Folders 7-8

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1985). 
Correspondence with P. Suppes
The Grice Papers
Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice -- Sub-Series A), Carton 1, Folders 7 and 8. 

Suppes was involved in the P. G. R. I. C. E., and contributed an excellent "The Primacy of Utterer's Meaning," where he addresses what he rightly sees as unfair characterisations of Grice as a behaviourist by three philosophers: Yu, Biro, and Chomsky. (Biro was able to reply to Suppes's commentary on Grice as proposing a reductive but not reductionist analysis of meaning). 

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Correspondence with R. O. Warner.

Carton 1
Folder 9

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). 
Correspondence with R. O. Warner
The Grice Papers
Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice), Carton 1, Folder 9. 



Warner was especially helpful with Grice's third difficult Carus lecture, a metaphysical defence of absolute value. 

Warner also connected with Grice in such topics as the philosophy of perception (seen in an evolutionary light) and the Kantotelian idea of happiness.

In response to Warner's overview of Grice's oeuvre for the festschrift (that Warner co-authored with Grandy), Grice refers to the editors by the collective name of "Richards."


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Correspondence with R. Wyatt

Carton 1
Folders 10-12

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). 
Correspondence with R. Wyatt. 
The Grice Papers
Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice), Carton 1, Folders 10, 11, and 12. 


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Correspondence: Other. 

Carton 1
Folders 13-14

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Correspondence: Other. 

Carton 1, Folder 15

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1988). Various correspondence, 
The Grice Papers
Series I (Correspondence)
Carton 1, Folders 13, 14, and 15. 

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Various published essays on Grice.

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Series II:

H. P. Grice,
Philosophical Essays

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Some Selected Publications 

Physical Description: 

Carton 1 (folders 16-31)
Cartons 2-4. 

These essays by H. P. Grice are arranged chronologically. 

However, for those "n. d." publications, the order is alphabetical by keyword and/or title.

Scope and Content 
Note

Series II, "Grice's Selected Publications" includes H. P. Grice's published essays.

Series II also contains H. P. Grice's drafts and notes that accompany the publication of the essays, some unpublished essays, along with their drafts and/or notes, and published transcripts of his various lectures (William James, Urbana, Carus, John Locke). 

Also included in Series II is Grice's volume for Harvard University Press, Studies in the Way of Words, a compilation of his most influential essays, including, "Meaning" (The Philosophical Review) "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions" (The Philosophical Review) and "Logic and Conversation" (in Davidson's and Harman's Logic and Grammar).

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Carton 1
Folder 16

"Meaning"
The Oxford Philosophical Society.
Published in "The Philosophical Review."

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1948). 
Meaning. 
The Grice Papers
Series II (Essays),
Carton 1, Folder 16. 

AUTHORS CITED:

STEVENSON, C. L. 

For Stevenson, smoke 'means' fire.

"Meaning" develops out of an interest by H. P. Grice on the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. In his essays on Peirce, Grice quotes from many other authors, including, besides C. S. Peirce, C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, and A. C. Ewing. 

For Stevenson, smoke 'means' fire.

Grice had no intention to submit "Meaning" to publication. Bennett guessed that Grice had decided to publish it in 1957, just a year after his "Defence of a dogma." However, the story is other. It was Strawson who submits the essay by Grice to "The Philosophical Review."

P. F. Strawson had attended Grice's talk on Meaning for The Oxford Philosophical Society.

An interesting fact, that confused a few, is that H. L. A. Hart quotes from Grice's "Meaning."

In his critical review of Holloway for The Philosophical Quarterly, Hart quotes Grice pre-dating the publication of "Meaning" in "The Philosophical Review."

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Carton 1
Folders 17-18

"Meaning Revisited" 

Preferred citation

Grice, H. P. (1976). 
'Meaning Revisited'
The Grice Papers
Series II (Essays)
Carton 1, Folders 17 and 18. 

This is the title H. P. Grice chose for a contribution to a symposium at Brighton organised by N. V. Smith. 

It comprises three sections. 

Grice is concerned with the application of his "M. O. R.," or "Modified Occam's Razor" to the lexeme, "mean."

The also explores an 'evolutionary' model of creature construction reaching a stage of non-iconic representation.

Finally, Grice attempts to construct 'meaning' as a 'value-paradeigmatic' notion.

A version was published in the proceedings of the Brighton symposium, by Croom Helm, London. 

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Carton 1, Folder 19

Oxford Philosophy 
Linguistic Botanising 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1970). 
"Oxford Philosophy and Linguistic Botanising."
The Grice Papers
Series II (Essays) Carton 1, Folder 19. 

H. P. Grice, St. John's, Oxford 

By "Oxford Philosophy," H. P. Grice notably refers to J. L. Austin's Play Group, of which he was a member. 

This, to some, infamous, playgroup, met on Saturday mornings at different venues at Oxford, including Grice's own St. John's -- apparently, Austin's favourite venue.

Austin regarded himself and his 'kindergarten' as 'linguistic' or 'language' *botanists*.

The idea was to list various 'ordinary' uses of this or that 'philosophical notion."

Austin: "They say philosophy is about language; well, then, let's botanise!"

Grice's involvement with "Oxford philosophy" of course predated his associations with Austin's play group. He always said he was fortunate of having been a tutee to Hardie at Corpus.

H. P. Grice,

Corpus, Oxford

He would occasionally refer to the emblematic pelican, so prominently displayed at Corpus.

Grice had an interim association with the venue one associates most directly with philosophy, Merton --:

H. P. Grice, 

Merton, Oxford

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Carton 1
Folder 20

"Descartes on 'Clear and Distinct Perception'"

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1966)
"Descartes on clear and distinct perception" The Grice Papers
Series II (Essays)
Carton 1, Folder 20. 
Repr. in Part II (Semantics and Metaphysics) to Studies in the Way of Words. 

Keyword: Descartes, clear and distinct perception, certainty

Grice found Descartes very funny -- in a French way!

H. P. Grice is interested in contesting A. J. Ayer and other Oxford philosophers, on the topic of a criterion for 'certainty.'

In so doing, Grice choses Descartes's time-honoured criterion of 'clarity' and 'distinction,' as applied to perception. 

Grice does NOT quote Descartes in French!

In the proceedings, Grice distinguishes between two 'kinds' of certainty apparently ignored by Descartes:

(a) OBJECTIVE CERTAINTY:
Ordinary-language variant:

"It is certain that p."
-- whatever "it" refers to.

(b) SUBJECTIVE CERTAINTY:
Ordinary-language variant:

"I am certain that p."
-- "I" being, of course, Grice, "in my bestest days, of course!"

There are further items on Descartes in the Grice Collection, notably in the last series, of topics arranged alphabetically.

Grice never cared to publish his views on Descartes until he found an opportunity to do so when compiling his Studies in the Way of Words. 

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Carton 1
Folders 21-23

"Logic and Conversation" 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1964). 
'Logic and conversation'
The Grice Papers
Series II (Essays) 
Carton 1, Folders 21, 22, and 23. 
Repr. as Part I of Studies in the Way of Words.

Keywords: logic, conversation, implicature, principle of conversational helpfulness.

Variations on a theme by Grice:

"Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged."

Variations on a theme by Grice.

"I wish to represent a certain subclass of no11conventional implicaturcs, which I shall call CONVERSATIONAL implicaturcs, as being essentially connected with certain general features of discourse; so my next step is to try to say what these features are."

"The following may provide a first approximation to a general principle. Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the participants (as in a casual conversation). But at each stage, SOME possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE." 

"We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely:  "Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged." One might label this the Cooperative Principle."

Make your move such as is required by the accepted goal of the conversation in which you are engaged.

"One might label such a principle, 




"Logica" had been part of the 'trivium' for ages -- "Although they called it 'dialectica,' then."

Grice on the seven liberal arts

Moved by P. F. Strawson's treatment of the 'formal' devices in "Introduction to Logical Theory," Grice targets these, in their 'ordinary-discourse' counterparts.

Grice attempts to reconcile Strawson's observations with the idea that the 'formal' devices reproduce some sort of 'explicatum,' or 'explicitum,' as identified by Whitehead and Russell in "Principia Mathematica."

In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general features of discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation.

The alleged divergence between the 'ordinary-language' operators and their 'formal' counterparts is explained in terms of the CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATA, then. I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has to ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal device and its alleged 'ordinary-language' counterpart, while still assuming that U is engaged in a co-operative transaction.

Utterer and addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation -- the exchange of information and the institution of decisions -- and judging that conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and rational) if conducted under some form of principle of 'conversational helpfulness.' 

"The observation of a principle of  conversational helpfulness is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: anyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participating in a conversation that will be profitable ONLY on the assumption that it is conducted in general accordance with a principle of conversational helpfulness."

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Carton 1
Folders 24-26

The William James Memorial Lectures on Logic and Conversation, Harvard. 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1967). 
The William James  lectures on logic and conversation
The Grice Papers
Series II (Essays) 
Carton 1, Folders 24, 25, and 26. 

Keywords: logic, conversation, implicature.

CONTENTS: 

Lecture 1 -- 'Prolegomena'
Lecture 2 -- 'Logic and Conversation'
Lecture 3 -- 'Further notes on logic and conversation'
Lecture 4 -- 'Indicative conditionals'
Lecture 5 -- 'Utterer's meaning and intentions'
Lecture 6 -- 'Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning'
Lecture 7 -- 'A model for implicature'

"I hope they don't expect me to lecture on James!"

                              
• 
  

Grice admired James, but not vice versa.

Grice entitled the set as being "Logic and Conversation." That is the title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing that it was way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the second lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and Harman, "Logic and Grammar."

The content of each lecture is indicated below.

In the first, Grice manages to quote from Witters.

In the last, he didn't!

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Carton 1
Folder 27

"Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning" 
The Foundations of Language


Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1967). 'Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning,' the sixth William James lecture, The Foundations of Language.  The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 1, Folder 27. 


The phrase 'utterer' is meant to provoke. Grice thinks that 'speaker' is too narrow. "Surely you can mean by just UTTERING stuff!"

This is the sixth William James lecture, as published in "The Foundations of Language."

As it happens, it became a popular lecture, seeing that J. R. Searle selected this from the whole set for his Oxford reading in philosophy, "The philosophy of language."

It is also the essay cited by Chomsky in his influential John Locke lectures.

Chomsky takes Grice to be a 'behaviourist,' even along Skinner's lines, which provoked a reply by Suppes, later reprinted in P. G. R. I. C. E., or Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends.

(In The New World, the "H. P." was often given in a more "simplified" form.)

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Carton 1
Folders 28-30

"Utterer's Meaning and Intentions" 
The Philosophical Review

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1967). 'Utterer's meaning and intentions,' the fifth William James lecture, The Philosophical Review. 
The Grice Papers
Series II (Essays) Carton 1, Folders 28, 29, and 30. 

Grice is not an animist. While he allows for natural phenomena to mean ("smoke means fire"), 'meaning' is best ascribed to some utterer, where this 'meaning' is nothing but the intentions behind his utterance. 

This is the fifth William James lecture. Grice was careful enough to submit it to "The Philosophical Review," since it is a strictly philosophical development of the views expressed in "Meaning" which Strawson had submitted on Grice's behalf to the same "Review" and which had had a series of responses by various philosophers 

Among these philosophers is Strawson himself in "Intention and convention in the the theory of speech acts," also in "The Philosophical Review."

Grice quotes from very many other philosophers in this essay, including:

J. O. Urmson
D. W. Stampe
P. F. Strawson
S. R. Schiffer
J. R. Searle

P. F. Strawson is especially relevant since he started a series of alleged counter-examples with his infamous example of the 'rat-infested house.'

Grice particularly treasured Stampe's alleged counter-example involving his beloved bridge!

Anita Avramides wrote her Oxon D.Phil on that, under Strawson!

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Carton 1
Folder 31

"Vacuous Names" 
For Davidson/Hintikka, Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine. 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1969). 'Vacuous names,' in Davidson and Hintikka, Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine, Dordrecht: Reidel. The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 1, Folders 31, and Carton 2, Folders 1, 2, 3, and 4. 



Grice's favourite vacuous name is Bellerophon.

This is an essay commissioned by Donald Davison and Jaako Hintikka for "Words and objects: essays in the work of W. V. Quine" for Reidel.

"Words and objects" had appeared (without Grice's contribution) as a special issue of "Synthese." Grice's contribution, along with Quine's "Reply to H. P. Grice," appeared only in the reprint of that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht. 

Grice cites from various philosophers (and logicians -- this was the time when logic was starting to be taught OUTSIDE philosophy departments, or 'sub-faculties'), such as

G. Myro
B. Mates
K. S. Donnellan
P. F. Strawson

Grice was particularly proud to be able to quote Mates "by mouth or book."

Carton 2
Folders 1-4

"Vacuous Names" (continued). 

Citation: Same as item above. Completed.

Grice takes the opportunity, in his tribute to Quine, to introduce one of two of his syntactical devices to allow for conversational implicata to be given maximal scope.

The device in "Vacuous Names" is a subscription device to indicate the ordering of introduction of this or that operation.

Grice wants to give room for utterances of a special 'existential' kind be deemed rational/reasonable, provided the principle of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the addressee to be followed by the utterer.

"Someone isn't attending the party organised by the Merseyside Geographical Society."

"That is Marmaduke Bloggs, who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees."



"But who, as it happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at the Merseyside Newsletter."

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Carton 2
Folders 5-7

The Urbana Lectures 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1970). The Urbana Lectures, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 5, 6, 7, and 8.

The Grice Collection also contains a folder for "Odd ends: Urbana and non-Urbana."

Grice continues with the elaboration of a formal calculus. He originally baptised it "System Q" in honour of Quine. 

At a later stage, Myro will re-name it "System G," in a special version, "System GHP," a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of System G," "in gratitude to Grice."

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Carton 2
Folder 8

Urbana Lectures (continued).

Citation: Same as above (completed). 

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Carton 2, Folders 9-10

"Intention and Uncertainty" 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1971). 'Intention and uncertainty,' Proceedings of the British Academy. The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 2, Folders 9 and 10. 





This is the Henriette Herz British Academy lecture, and as such published in The Proceedings of the British Academy.

Grice calls himself a neo-Prichardian (after the Oxford philosopher) and cares to quote from a few other philosophers -- some of whom he was not necessarily associated with: such as Kenny and Anscombe, and some of whom he was, notably D. F. Pears.

Grice quotes Pears as a philosopher he found especially congenial to explore areas in what both called 'philosophical psychology,' notably the tricky use of 'intending' as made by a few philosophers even in their own circle (such as Hampshire and Hart in "Intention, decision, and certainty."

The title of Grice's lecture is meant to provoke those philosophers who were too ready to bring in 'certainty' in an area that requires deep philosophical exploration. 

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Carton 2
Folder 11
"Probability, Desirability, and Mode Operators" 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1973). 'Probability, desirability, and mode operators,' Conference on Implicature, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folder 11. 

Grice had been freely using the very English 'mood' until J. M. E Moravsik, of all people, corrected him:

"What you mean ain't a 'mood.'"

"I shall call it 'mode' just to please you, J. M. E."

A version of this essay was presented in a conference whose proceedings were published, except for Grice's essay, due to 'technical complications,' viz. his idiosyncratic use of idiosyncratic symbology!

By 'mode' Grice means indicative or imperative. Following Davidson, Grice attaches probability to the indicative, via the doxastic, and desirability to the indicative, via the boulomaic. 

He also allows for mixed utterances. Probability is qualified with a suboperator indicating a degree d; ditto for desirability, degree d'.

***

Carton 2
Folders 12-13.

The Paul Carus Lectures on the conception of value.

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1983). The Conception of Value, 
Clarendon. The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16. 

"I CARUS" 

***

Carton 2
Folders 14-16

The Paul Carus Lectures on the conception of value (continued). 

Citation: Same as above, completed. 

Grice was undecided as to what his Paul Carus lectures were be on.

He had explored 'meaning' under its 'value' "optimality" guise in "Meaning revisited."

Grice thought that introducing 'value-paradeigmatic' notions would allow him to respond in a more apt way to what some critics were raising as a possible 'vicious circle' in his approach to 'semantic' and 'psychological' notions.

The Carus lectures are then dedicated to the 'construction,' alla Hume, of 'value-paradeigmatic' notions, and value itself.

Grice starts by quoting Austin and J. L. Mackie, of Oxford. 



The lectures are intended to a general audience, provided it is a *philosophical* general audience!

Most of the second lecture is Grice's subtle exploration of Kant's categorical imperative, with which he had struggled in the last John Locke lecture on aspects of reasoning -- notably the 'reduction' of the categorical imperative to this or that 'counsel of prudence' with an implicated protasis to the effect that the agent is aiming at 'eudaimonia.'

***

Carton 2
Folders 17-18

"Reply to Davidson on 'Intending'"

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1973). 'Reply to Davidson on 'Intending,' The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 17 and 18. 

Keywords: intending, implicature, disimplicature

• 

Grice and Davidson were members of "The Grice and Davidson Mutual Admiration Society."

Davidson, not being Oxonian, was perhaps not acquainted with Grice's polemics at Oxford with Hart and Hampshire (where Grice sided with Pears, rather).

Grice and Pears hold a 'minimalist' approach to 'intending.'

On the other hand, Davidson makes what Grice sees as 'the same mistake' again of BUILDING 'certainty' into the concept.

Grice finds that to apply the idea of a conversational IMPLICATUM at this point is 'too social to be true.'

Rather, Grice prefers to coin the conversational DISIMPLICATUM:

Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees.

The utterance above, if merely reporting what Bloggs thinks, may involve a 'loose' use of "intends."

The certainty on the agent's part on the success of his enterprise is thus cast with doubt.

Davidson was claiming that the agent's belief in the probability of the object of the agent's intention was a mere conversational IMPLICATUM on the utterer's part.

Grice responds that the ascription of such a belief is an ENTAILMENT of a strict use of 'intend,' even if, in cases where the utterer aims at a conversational DISIMPLICATUM, it can be 'dropped.' 

The addressee will still regard the utterer as abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness.





D. F. Pears was especially interested in the Davidson-Grice polemic on intending.

Keywords: INTENDING, BELIEVING. 

***

Carton 2
Folders 19-21

"Method in Philosophical Psychology: from the banal to the bizarre"
Presidential address to the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division. 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1975). Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre, in The Conception of Value. The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 2, Folders 19, 20, and 21. 

Keywords: philosophical psychology, pirotology, immanuel.

Grice's "Method" is reprinted in The Conception of Value. 

Grice was forever grateful to Carnap for having coined 'pirot.' 

"Or having thought to have coined. Apparently, someone had used the expression before him to mean some sort of exotic fish."

Grice wasn't sure what his presidential address to the American Philosophical Association will be about.

He chose "the banal" (i.e. the 'ordinary-language' counterpart of something like a 'need' we ascribe to a squirrel to gobble nuts) and the 'bizarre': the philosopher's construction of 'need' and other 'psychological,' now theoretical terms.

In the proceedings, Grice creates the discipline of 'pirotology.'

He cares to mention very many philosophers: Aristotle, D. K. Lewis, G. Myro, L. Witters, F. R. Ramsey, G. Ryle, and a few others!

The essay became popular when, of all people, Ned Block, cited it as a programme in 'functionalism,' which it is!

***

Carton 2
Folders 22-23

"Incontinence" 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1982). Davidson on weakness of the will, in Hintikka and Vermazen, Actions and Events, Clarendon. Akrasia, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 22 and 23. 

Keywords: akrasia, philosophical psychology, rationality

"We shouldn't be saying this, but we are saying it!"

Grice prefers 'akrasia,' but he is happy to use Cicero's translation of this. 



For Grice, 'akrasia' has to be accounted for by a theory of rationality from the start.

Grice is interested in both the common-or-garden 'boulomaic' version of akrasia, involving the volitive 'soul,' and 'alethic' or doxastic 'akrasia,' involing the judicative soul proper.

***

Carton 2
Folder 24

"Further Notes on Logic and Conversation" 
Published in Peter Cole, "Pragmatics," for Academic Press, London. 

Preferred citation: 

Grice, H. P. (1967). Further notes on logic and conversation, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part I (Logic and Conversation, Essay 3). The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folder 24. 

Keywords: Modified Occam's razor, implicature. 

The essay had circulated since the Harvard days, and it was also reprinted by Peter Cole in his Pragmatics for Academic Press. 

"Personally, I prefer 'dialectica.'" -- Grice. 

This is the third William James lecture at Harvard. 

It is particularly useful for Grice's introduction of his 'razor,' "M. O. R.," or "Modified Occam's Razor," jocularly expressed by Grice as:

"Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity."

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An Englishing of the Ockham's Latinate:

"Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem."

***

Carton 2
Folder 25

"Presupposition and Conversational Implicature" 
Repr. in P. Cole, Radical pragmatics, for Academic Press, London. 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1970). Presupposition and conversational implicature, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and metaphysics, Essay, The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 2, Folder 25. 

Keywords: presupposition, conversational implicature. 

Grice much preferred Collingwood's to Strawson's presuppositions! 

Grice thought, and rightly, too, that if his notion of the conversational implicatum was to gain Oxonian currency, it should supersede Strawson's idea of the 'prae-suppositum.'

Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with Quine's idea of a 'truth-value gap.'

Grice shows that neither the metaphysical concoction of a truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the 'prae-suppositum' is needed:

"The king of France is bald"

ENTAILS 'There is a king of France."

"The king of France ain't bald."

on the other hand, merely IMPLICATES it, as a perfectly adequate cancellation, abiding with the principle of conversational helpfulness" is in the offing:

"The king of France ain't bald. What made you think he is? For starters, he ain't real!"

Grice credits Hans Sluga for having pointed out to him the way to deal with "the" formally. 

Grice opts for the Whiteheadian-Russellian standard rendition, in terms of the iota operator. 

***

Carton 2
Folders 26-28

"Freedom and Morality in Kant's Foundations"

Citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Freedom and Morality in Kant's Grundlegung, The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 2, Folders 26, 27, and 28. 

Keywords: Grundlegung, freedom, autonomy.

Grice would refer to this, as Kantians do, as the Grundlegung.

Grice was never happy with 'eleutheria,' qua Greek philosophical notion. "To literal to be true?"

By "Foundations," Grice obviously means Kant's essay.

Grice preferred to quote Kant in English. The reason being that Grice was practising "ordinary-language" philosophy; and you cannot expect much 'linguistic botany' in a language other than your own!

Kant was not too 'ordinary' in his use of German, either!

The English translations that Grice used captured, in a way, all that Grice thought was worth capturing in Kant's philosophy. 

Kant was not your 'standard' philosopher in the programme Grice was familiar with: Lit. Hum. Oxon.

However, Kant was popular in The New World, where Grice lectured profusely. 



***

Carton 2
Folders 29-30

John Locke Lectures "Aspects of Reason" 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1977). Aspects of reason, The Kant Lectures, Stanford, Clarendon. The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 2, Folders 29 and 30.

Keywords: reason, happiness.  

While Locke hardly mentions 'reason,' his friend Burthogge does, and profusely!

It was slightly ironic that Grice had delivered these lectures as the Rationalist Kant lectures at Stanford.

He was honoured to be invited to Oxford. Officially, to be a John Locke lecture you have to be *visiting* Oxford.

While Grice was a fellow of St. John's, he was still most welcome to give his set of lectures on reasoning at the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy.

He quotes very many authors, including Locke! In his "proemium," Grice notes that while he was rejected the Locke scholarship back in the day, he was extremely happy to be under Locke's aegis now!

***

Carton 3
Folders 1-5

"Actions and Events"
Published in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1986). Actions and events, The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 3, Folders 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. 

Keywords: action, event

Davidson had published some stuff on 'actions' and 'events,' or 'events and actions,' actually. Davidson's point was that 

p.q

It is raining, and it is pouring.

denotes EVENTS. But "Smith went fishing" denotes an 'action,' which is a kind of 'event.'

However, Davidson is fighting against your intuition, if you are a follower of Whitehead and Russell, to symbolise the "Smith" sentence as:

Fs

where 's' stands for Smith and F for 'fishing.'

The logical form of 'event' reports and 'action' reports seems to be slightly more complicated. Davidson's point especially involved 'adverbs':

The horse runs fast
----
Therefore, the horse runs

Grice explores all these topics and submits the thing to "The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly."

He quotes vary many philosophers, not just Davidson, including: Reichenbach, Robinson, and Kant. 

***

Carton 3
Folder 6

"Post-war Oxford Philosophy"

Preferred citation:
Grice, H. P. (1958). Postwar Oxford philosophy, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and Metaphysics, Essay. The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 3, Folder 6. 

Repr. in Grice, Studies in the Way of Words. 

Grice found it important to reprint this since he had updated thoughts on the matter, which he displays in his "Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy."

The topic represents one of the strands he identifies behind the unity of his philosophy.

By "post-war Oxford philosophy," Grice meant the period he was interested in.

While he had been at Corpus, Merton, and St. John's in the pre-war days, for some reason, he felt that he had made history in the post-war period.

The historical reason Grice gives is understandable enough.

In the pre-war days, Grice was the good student and the new fellow of St. John's -- the other one was Mabbott.

But he had not been able to engage in philosophical discussion much, other than with other tutees of Hardie.

AFTER the war, Grice joins Austin's "Saturday mornings."

Indeed, for Grice, 'post-war' means "all philosophy after the war," since he never abandoned the methods he developed under Austin, which were pretty congenial to the ones he had himself displayed in the pre-war days, in essays like "Negation" and "Personal Identity."

Grice was an EXPERT on Oxonian philosophy.

He saw himself as a member of the school of analytic philosophy, rather than the abused term 'ordinary-language' philosophy.

This is evident by the fact that he contributed to such polemic -- but typically Oxonian -- volumes such as Butler, Analytic Philosophy, published by Blackwell (of all publishers).

Grice led a very social life at Oxford, and held frequent philosophical discussions with philosophers such as

Austin, J. L.
Pears, D. F. 
Strawson, P. F.
Thomson, J. F. 
Urmson, J. O. 
Warnock, G. J. 

and many others. 

***

Carton 3
Folders 7-21
Studies in the Way of Words

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1988). Studies in the Way of Words, London: Harvard University Press. The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 3, Folders 7 to 21. 

Keywords: implicature, rationality. 

This is the title Grice eventually chooses for his compilation of essays. It is a tribute to Locke.

The 'studies' are organised in two Parts. Part I is "Logic and Conversation" and Part II in "Semantics and Metaphysics."

***

Carton 3
Folders 22-25

"Retrospective Foreword" 

Citation:

Grice, H. P. (1987). Retrospective epilogue, in Studies in the Way of Words, London, Harvard University Press. The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 3, Folders 22-26, and Carton 4, Folder 1 and 2.

Grice drops a few words as a 'foreword,' explaining the ordering of essays. He mentions that he hesitated to follow Bennett's suggestion to order the essays chronologically.

Rather, he chose to just publish the whole set of seven William James lectures as Part I.

Part II is organised more or less thematically, though. 

***

Carton 3
Folder 26

"Retrospective Epilogue" 

Citation: Same as above.


This is a long exploration by Grice on the many 'strands' he identifies in his own philosophy.

'Strand' should not mislead us.

For Grice, philosophy, like virtue, is entire.

All the strands therefore show some 'latitudinal,' and we hope, 'longitudinal' unity.

By these two types of 'unity,' Grice means the obvious idea that all sub-disciplines of philosophy (philosophy of language, philosophy of perception, philosophical psychology, etc.) interact, and that a historical regard for one's predecessors is a must.

***

Carton 4
Folder 1

"Retrospective Epilogue" (continued)

Citation: same as above. 

***

Carton 4
Folder 2

"Retrospective Epilogue" and "Foreword"

Citation: same as above.  

***

Carton 4
Folders 3-4

"Metaphysics, Philosophical Eschatology, and Plato's Republic" 

Preferred citation:
Grice, H. P. (1988). Metaphysics, philosophical eschatology, and Plato's Republic, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and metaphysics, Essay. The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 4, Folders 3 and 4. 

  

Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words. Grice had a specific reason to reprint this. More than an exegesis on Plato, it is Grice's take on the fact that metaphysics needs to be subdivided into ontology proper and what he calls 'philosophical eschatology,' for the study of things like his 'category shift,' etc.

The use of Plato is merely an application of his philosophically eschatological approach to the item 'just,' as used by Socrates ('morally just') and Thrasymachus ('legally just'). 

Grice has one specific essay on Aristotle (published in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly). So he thought Plato merited his own essay, too.

Grice is concerned with a neo-Socratic (versus neo-Thrasymachean) account of 'moral' justice as conceptually prior to 'legal' justice.

In the proceeding, he creates 'philosophical eschatology' as the OTHER branch to metaphysics (along with ontology). 

To say that 'just' crosses a categorial barrier (from the moral to the legal) is to utter a metaphysical, strictly eschatological, pronouncement. 

***

Carton 4
Folder 5

H. P. Grice's Reprints 

***

Carton 4
Folder 6

"Aristotle on Being and Good"

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1970). Aristotle on being and good, The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 4, Folder 6. 

Keywords: Aristotle, being, good.

As from this folder, the essays are ordered alphabetically, starting with "Aristotle."

Grice will explore Aristotle on 'being' in explorations with A. D. Code. 

Grice comes up with 'izzing' and 'hazzing' as the two counterparts to Aristotle's views on, respectively, essential and non-essential predication.

Grice's views on Aristotle on 'the good' connect with Grice's Aristotelian idea of 'eudaimonia,' that he explores elsewhere. 

***

Carton 4
Folder 7

"Aristotle on the Multiplicity of Being" 
Repr. in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
(edited by B. F. Loar). 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1988). Aristotle on the multiplicity of being, The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 4, Folder 7. 

A thorough discussion of Owens's treatment of Aristotle as leading us to the 'snares' of ontology.

Grice distinguishes between 'izzing' and 'hazzing,' which he thinks help in clarifying, 'more axiomatico,' what Aristotle is getting at with his remarks on 'essential' versus 'non-essential' predication.

Surely, for Grice, being should not be multiplied beyond necessity (but izzing and hazzing ARE already multiplied). 

***

Carton 4
Folder 8

"Aristotle: Pleasure" 

Preferred citation:
Grice, H. P. (1970). 'Aristotle on pleasure,' The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 4, Folder 8. 

Keywords: hedonism, pleasure, Aristotle

As a Lit. Hum. Oxon., and especially as a tutee of Hardie at Corpus, Grice was well aware of the centrality of 'hedone' in Aristotle's system.

"Pleasure" is rendered "placitum" (as in "ad placitum") in scholastic philosophy.

But Grice prefers 'agreeable.'

One of Grice's requisites for an ascription of 'eudaimonia,' precisely require that the system of ends an agent chooses to realise be an 'agreeable' one. 

***

Carton 4
Folder 9

"Conversational Implicature" 

Grice's main invention, one which trades on the distinction between what an utterer IMPLIES and what his expression does. 

"A distinction apparently denied by Witters, and all too frequently ignored by, of all people, Austin."

Grice is implicating that Austin's sympathies were for the 'subjectification' of "Linguistic Nature."

Grice remains an obdurate individualist, and never loses sight of the distinction that gives rise to the conversational implicatum, which can very well be hyper-contextualised, idiosyncratic, and perfectly particularised!

His Oxonian example:

"I can very well mean that my tutee is to bring me a philosophical essay next week by uttering "It is raining.""

***

Carton 4
Folder 10

"Negation and privation" 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1938). Negation and privation, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 10. 

Keyword: negation, privation, verificationism, introspection, sense data. 

Grice's reflection, in a verificationist vein, of two types of utterance:

"I don't hear a noise."
"That is not red."

The actual ordering should be the reverse:

"That is not red."
"I don't hear a noise."
Or
"I am not hearing a noise."

Surely, each is co-related to their affirmative counterparts:

"That is red."
"I hear a noise."
Or 
"I am hearing a noise."

But when it comes to the psychological state, attitude, or stance, it is easier to co-relate "That is not red" with, say, "That is green."

"That is green."

does NOT feature "not," and it is alleged by Grice to be the source or reason for Utterer U to utter "That is red."

In the case of "I don't hear a noise," the source or reason is the absence, 'verified' by introspetion, of a psychological state, attitude or stance, co-related to the affirmative counterpart, 

"I hear a noise."
Or
"I am hearing a noise."

which again, does NOT include the "not" operator. 

The first utterance is thus explained in terms of mere sense data; the second, with the aid of introspection ultimately related to sense data ('noise'). 

Grice could have used,
"I don't see it as red."
Or
"I am not seeing the pillar box as blue."

and unify his account. The important distinction is that "That is not red." does not mention the first-person. 

Thus, "I don't hear a noise" seems like an apt utterance to receive an introspective analysis.

In relying on introspection, Grice is being very pre-war Oxonian, at that!

***

Carton 4
Folder 11

"Negation"

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1961). Negation, The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 4, Folder 11. 

Keyword: negation, logical form

Strawson had included a section on 'not' in his "Introduction to Logical Theory."

Grice addresses that point.

Unlike "and," "or," and "if," "not" is a truth-functor (or satisfactory-value-functor) of the unary type.

Grice is interested in applying Cook Wilson's "Statement and inference" to explore what the role of 'not' might be. 

And he succeds in finding one. It is explained in terms of the conversational implicatum:

"That's not red."

now IMPLICATES that some utterer has, somewhere, sometime, expressed the contrary opinion. 

***

Carton 4
Folder 12

"Personal Identity" 
Published in Mind. 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1941). Personal identity, in J. R. Perry, Personal identity, Berkeley, University of California Press, reprinted from Mind. The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 4, Folder 12. 

Keyword: "I," personal identity, Locke


(The folder includes some notes on David Hume) 


Grice was concerned with issues involved the use of the first person singular ("I will be fighting soon") since his pre-war days at Oxford.

The topic had a special Oxonian pedigree that Grice had occasion to study and explore for his M. A. Lit. Hum.

Locke had famously defended a memory-based account of "I" that had received some alleged counter-example by some Scots philosophers, notably Reid.

In his approach to "I," Grice updates the analysis. 

It's now a 'logical construction' of "I" utterances, and relying on Gallie.

Grice uses Broad's taxonomy of "I" utterances, too.

He deals with the Reid-type counterexample, and comes up with a rather elaborate 'analysans' for a simple "I" statement:

"I am hearing a noise."

***

Carton 4
Folder 13

"G. E. Moore and Philosopher's Paradoxes" 
Published in Studies in the Way of Words. 

Preferreed citation:

Grice, H. P. (1956). G. E. Moore and philosopher's paradoxes, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and Metaphysics, Essay, The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 4, Folder 13. 

Keywords: G. E. Moore, paradox, ordinary language, Norman Malcolm.

While an Oxonian thoroughbred, Grice was a bit like Austin,

"Some like Witters, but Moore's my man."

Grice spends some time exploring what Malcolm has to say about Moore in connection with that particularly "Oxonian" turn of phrase, "ordinary language."

For Moore, a 'paradox' by a 'philosopher' arises when 'Philosopher' fails to abide by the dictates of Ordinary Language.

Grice is totally against this view as TOO BROAD to even claim to be true!

***

Carton 4
Folder 14

"A Philosopher's Prospectus" 

***

Carton 4
Folder 15

"Philosophy and 'Ordinary Language'" 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1960). "Philosophy and 'Ordinary Language,'" The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 4, Folder 15. 

At the time of writing, "'ordinary-language' philosophy" had become, "even within Oxford," a bit of a term of abuse. 

Grice tries to defend Austin's approach to it, while suggesting ideas that Austin somewhat ignored, like what an utterer implies by the use of an 'ordinary-language' expression, rather than what the expression itself does. 

Grice is concerned, contra Austin, in explanation (or 'explanatory adequacy'), not taxonomy (or 'descriptive adequacy'). 

Grice disregards Austin's piecemeal approach to 'ordinary language,' as Grice searches for 'the big picture of it all.'
Grice never used 'ordinary language' seriously.

The phrase was used, as he explains, by those who HATED 'ordinary-language' philosophy.

There's no such thing as 'ordinary language.'

Surely you cannot fairly describe the idiosyncratic linguistic habits of an Old Cliftonian as even 'remotely' 'ordinary.'

"Extra-ordinary" more likely!

As far as the 'philosophy' bit goes, this is what Bergmann jocularly described as the 'linguistic turn.'

But as Grice notes, the linguistic turn involves both the 'ideal language' and the 'ordinary language.'

Grice defends Austin's choice of the 'ordinary' seeing that 'it was what he had to hand!'

***

Carton 4
Folder 16

"Some Reflections about Ends and Happiness"
Repr. in Aspects of Reason, Clarendon. 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1977). Some reflections on ends and happiness, in Aspects of reason, Clarendon, The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 4, Folder 16. 

Keywords: eudaimonia, telos. 

For Grice, as for Aristotle, and indeed Kant (Kantotle, in short), a 'telos' and 'eudaimonia' are related in subtle ways.

For 'eudaimonia' we cannot deal with just ONE end, but a system of ends. 

(Although such a system may be a singleton).

Grice specifies a subtle way of characterising 'end' so that a particular ascription of an 'end' may ENTAIL an ascription of 'eudaimonia.'

Grice follows the textual criticism of his former tutee, J. L. Ackrill, in connection with the Socratic point that 'eudaimonia' IS literally related to the 'eudaimon.'

***

Carton 4
Folders 17-25

"Reflections on Morals"

Citation:

Grice, H. P. (1982). Reflections on morals, The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Folders 17-25.

Grice's explorations on morals are language based. With a substantial knowledge of the classical languages ("that are so good at verb systems like the optative, that English lacks"), Grice explores modals like

"should"
"ought," and
"must"

He is well aware of R. M. Hare's reflections on the 'neustic' qualifications of the 'phrastic.'

• "Imperatives" have usually been one source for the philosopher's concern with the language of morals.

"Imperatives" have usually been one source for the philosopher's concern with the language of morals.

Grice attempts to balance this with a similar exploration on 'good,' now regarded as the 'value-paradeigmatic' notion par excellence.

We cannot understand, to echo Strawson, 'the concept of a person' unless we understand the concept of a GOOD person, i.e. the philosopher's conceptION of a good person. 

***

Carton 4
Folder 26

"Reply to G. E. M. Anscombe" 

Citation:

Grice, H. P. (1972). Reply to G. E. M. Anscombe, The Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 26. 




Anscombe's views were often discussed by Oxonian philosophers. She had brought Witters to the "Dreaming Spires," as it were.

Grice was especially connected with Anscombe's reflections on 'intention.'

While Grice favoured an approach such as Hampshire, in "Thought and Action," he borrows a few points from Anscombe, notably that of 'direction of fit' (originally Austin's).

Grice explicitly refers to Anscombe in "Intention and uncertainty," and in his reminiscences he hastens to add that Anscombe would never attend any of Austin's Saturday mornings -- as neither would Dummett.

***

Carton 4
Folders 27-30

"Reply to Richards" 

Citation:

Grice, H. P. (1985). Reply to Richards, repr. in part in The Conception of Value, The Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 4, Folders 27-30.

Originally entitled, "Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of H. P. Grice."

Grice is playing with the first name of both Warner and Grandy, or Grandy and Warner.

Grice is especially concerned with what 'Richards' see as a commitment on Grice's part to the abstract entity of a 'proposition.'

Grice also deals with the alleged insufficiency in his conceptual analysis of 'reasoning.'

He brings for good measure a point about a potential 'regressus ad infinitum' in his account of a chain of intentions involved in meaning and communicating in general.

***

Series III

***

The Doctrines

Physical Description: 
Carton 5
Carton 6 (folders 1-3)

The items are arranged chronologically. Again, for those "n.d." items,  the order is alphabetical.

Scope and Content Note

Series III includes seminars and lectures given during Grice's years at both Oxford and Berkeley, and elsewhere (e.g. Cornell).

***

Carton 5
Folder 1
Grice's Seminar at Cornell. 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1966). The Cornell Seminar, The Grice Papers, Series III (Doctrines), Carton 5, Folder 1. 

Historically important in that they predate his Harvard William James lectures which made of him a household name in New-World philosophy.

***

Carton 5
Folder 2

Grice Seminar 

***

Carton 5
Folder 3

Philosophy
With J. Baker 

***

Carton 5
Folder 4

Philosophy 

***

Carton 5
Folders 5-6

Kant's Ethical Theory 

An exploration of the categorial imperative and its reduction to the hypothetical one. 

***

Carton 5
Folder 7

"Aristotle's Ethics" 

Notably the Nichomachean Ethics. 

***

Carton 5
Folder 8

Philosophy
Kant 
With J. Baker. 

Notably the categorical imperative.

***

Carton 5
Folder 9

"Kant's Ethics"

***

Carton 5
Folders 10-13

Kant Lectures 

***

Carton 5
Folders 14-15

Philosophy 

***

Carton 5
Folders 16-17

"Kant's Ethics"

***

Carton 5
Folder 18

"Knowledge and belief"

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1966). Knowledge and belief, The Grice Papers, Series III (Doctrines), Carton 5, Folder 18. 

Two basic psychological states, attitudes, or stances. Grice is concerned with Gettier-type cases, and also the 'factivity' of 'know' versus the non-factivity of 'believe.'

Grice followed Hintikka's lexicological innovations: the logic of belief is 'doxastic;' the logic of knowledge is 'epistemic.'

***

Carton 5
Folders 19-21

Kant's Ethics

***

Carton 5
Folder 22

Philosophy 
With G. Myro 

Grice and Myro developed a Geach-type of 'qualified identity.'

The formal aspects were developed by Myro.

Grice discussed Wiggins's "Sameness and substance," rather than Geach. 

***

Carton 5
Folder 23

Kant 

***

Carton 5
Folder 24

"Metaphysics and the Language of Philosophy" 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Metaphysics and the language of philosophy, The Grice Papers, Series III (Doctrines), Carton 5, Folder 24. 

Grice had been interested in the methodology of 'metaphysics' from the Oxford days.

He counted as one memorable experience in the area his participation in two episodes for BBC Third Programme on "The nature of metaphysics" with the organiser, D. F. Pears, and his former tutee, P. F. Strawson.

Grice was particularly keen on Collingwood's views on metaphysical presuppositions. 

***

Carton 5
Folder 25

"Freedom"

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Freedom, The Grice Papers, Series III (Doctrines), Carton 5, Folder 25. 

The topic of 'freedom' Grice saw as crucial in his elucidation of a rational being. "Conditions of freedom" are necessary for the very idea, as Kant was well aware. 

Grice would engage in a bit of language botany, when exploring the ways the adjective 'free' is used, 'freely,' in 'ordinary language': 'free fall,' 'alcohol-free,' 'sugar-free.'

His more systematic reflections deal with 'pirotology, or 'creature construction'. Vegetables, for example are less free than animals. And Humans are more free than non-human.

Grice wants to deal with some of the paradoxes identified by Kant about freedom, and he succeeds in solving some of them.

***

Carton 5
Folder 26

Lectures 

***

Carton 5
Folders 27-28

Kant's Ethics 

***

Carton 5
Folder 29

"The Criteria of Intelligence" 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1975). The criteria of intelligence, The Grice Papers, Series III (Doctrines), Carton 5, Folder 29. 

In "Aspects of reason," he mentions 'flat' rationality, and certain other 'talents' that are more difficult for the philosopher to conceptualise, such as 'nose' (i.e. intuitiveness), acumen, tenacity, and such.

Grice's approach is 'pirotological.' If Locke had used 'intelligent' to refer to Prince Maurice's parrot, Grice wants to find criteria for 'intelligent' as applied to his favourite type of 'pirot,' rather ("intelligent, indeed rational.")

***

Carton 5

Folder 30

"Modest Mentalism"

Preferred citation: 

Grice, H. P. (1980). Modest mentalism, The Grice Papers, Series III (Doctrines), Carton 5, Folder 30. 

Grice would seldom use 'mind' or 'mental.' His sympathies went for more Grecian terms like 'soul,' i.e. the psyche and the psychological.

***

Carton 5
Folder 31

Topics for Pursuit, Zeno, Socrates 

Grice's review of the history of philosophy 

***

Carton 6
Folders 1-2

Phonetics, Syntax, and Semantics
With J. F. Staal. 

Staal was particularly good at this type of 'formalistic' philosophy, which was still adequate to reflect the subtleties of 'ordinary language.'

***

Carton 6
Folder 3

The "That"-Clause 
With J. F. Staal

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1970). The 'that'-clause, The Grice Papers, Series III (Doctrines), Carton 6, Folder 3. 


The 'that'-clause was brought to the fore by Davidson, who, consulting the Oxford English Dictionary, reminds philosophers that the English 'that' is VERY cognate with the German idiom.

More specifically, 'that' is a DEMONSTRATIVE, even if the syntax, in English, hides this fact in ways which German syntax doesn't.

Grice NEEDS to rely on 'that'-clauses for his analysis of 'mean,' 'intend,' and notably 'will.'

He finds that Prichard's genial discovery was the license to use 'willing' as pre-facing a 'that'-clause. 

This allows Grice to deals with 'willing' as applied to a third person ("I will that he'll win the chess match.")

Philosophers who disregard this 'third-person' use may indulge in introspection and subjectivism when they shouldn't!

***

Series IV 

***
H. P. Grice's
Contributions
to

Philosophical 
Associations 

Physical Description: 
Carton 6 (folders 4-12), Carton 10

The items are arranged chronologically.

Scope and Content Note

The Series IV includes Kant's Stanford Lectures, various notes and audio tapes of Beanfest, Grice's group research on universalia, and conferences and discussions concerning the American Philosophical Association.

Also includes a carton of cassettes, magnetic recorder tapes, and cassette sets of four on professional talks with George Myro on identities (unqualified and relative), metaphysics, and relatives and Grice's various seminars on his philosophical theories given at different institutions such as Stanford, Berkeley, and Seattle.

***

Carton 6
Folder 4

"Entailment" 
Symposium for the American Philosophical Association. 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1971). Entailment, The American Philosophical Association, The Grice Papers, Series IV (Associations), Carton 6, Folder 4. 

Keyword: entailment

The notion had been introduced in the philosophical literature by G. E. Moore.

Grice is especially interested in the "ENTAILMENT + IMPLICATUM" pair.

A philosophical expression may be said to be co-related to an ENTAILMENT (which is rendered in terms of a reductive analysis). 

However, the use of the expression may co-relate to this or that IMPLICATUM which is rendered 'reasonable' in the light of the addressee's assumption that the utterer is ultimately abiding by a principle of conversational helfpulness.

Grice thinks many philosophers take an IMPLICATUM as an ENTAILMENT when they surely shouldn't!

***

Carton 6
Folders 5-6

Stanford - "Some Aspects of Reason"
The Immanuel Kant Memorial Lectures.

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1977). Aspects of reason, Clarendon, The Grice Papers, Series IV (Associations), Carton 6, Folders 5 and 6. 

Keywords: reason. 

The lectures were also delivered as the John Locke lectures.

Grice is concerned with the reduction of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical imperative.

His main thesis he calls the "AEQUI-vocality" thesis:

"must" has only ONE sense, that crossed the 'boulomaic/doxastic' divide.

***

Carton 6
Folder 7
"Causality"

Conference 
Colloquium at Stanford 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Causality, Stanford Colloquium, The Grice Papers, Series IV (Associations), Carton 6, Folder 7. 

Keyword: cause

Grice's exploration on 'cause' are very rich.

He is concerned with some misuse of 'cause' in ordinary language.

If as Hume suggests, to cause is to will, one would say that "The decapitation of Charles I willed his death," which sounds harsh.

Grice later relates 'cause' to the Greek 'aitia,' as he should. He notes collocations like 'rebel without a cause.'

For the Greeks, and the Griceians, it's a CAUSE TO which one should be involved in elucidating. 

A "cause to..." connects with the idea of 'freedom.'

eauchamp"A cause 

Grice was constantly aware of the threat of MECHANISM, and his idea was to provide philosophical room for the idea of 'finality,' which is NOT 'mechanistically derivable.'

This leads him to discussion of overlap and priority of, say, a physical-cum-physiological versus a psychological theory explaining this or that piece of rational behaviour.

He can be Wittgensteinian when citing Anscombe's translation: No psychological concept without the behaviour the concept is brought to explain.

***

Carton 6
Folder 8

Conferences 
Discussion at the American Philosophical Association. 
Randall Parker's Transcription of Tapes 

***

Carton 6
Folder 9

Unity of Science and Teleology 
"Hands Across the Bay," and Beanfest.

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Unity of science and teleology, The Grice Papers, Series IV (Associations), Carton 6, Folder 9. 

As the scholastics used it, 'teleology' was a science, the science of 'telos,' or finality. 

The unity of science is threatened by teleology.

Unified science seeks for 'mechanistically derivable' teleology.

But Grice's sympathies lie for 'detached' finality.

***

Carton 6
Folder 10

Beanfest
Transcripts and Audio Cassettes 

***

Carton 6
Folder 11

Group 
"Universals"

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Universalia, The Grice Papers, Series IV (Assocations), Carton 6, Folder 11. 




Grice doing history of philosophy. His main concern is with 'universalia' as abstract entities. He proposes an exploration of 'universalia' as a response to Extensionalism, so fashionable, he thinks, in the New World ("The School of Latter-Day Nominalists").

***

Carton 6
Folder 12

Group 
"Universals"
Partial Working Copy 

***

Carton 10

Audio Files of 
various lectures and conferences 

***

Series V

***

Philosophical Subject 

Files 

Physical Description: 
Carton 6 (folders 13-38), Cartons 7-9

Items are arranged aphabetically by philosophical subject. 

Scope and Content Note

The "Series V" includes seminar notes at Reed, notes on ancient philosophers such as Aristotle, modern philosophers such as Descartes, and their own philosophical theories, research and accompanying notes on other prominent philosophers such as Kant and Davidson, notes with colleagues J. Baker, A. D. Code, M. Friedman, G. Myro, P. Suppes, R. O. Warner, G. J. Warnock, and P. F. Strawson, on various theories of reason, trust, language semantics, universals, and values.

***

Carton 6
Folders 13-14

"The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction"

Citation:

Grice, H. P. (1956). The analytic-synthetic distinction, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folders 13 and 14. 

The idea of 'analyticity' was for Grice very important to defend.

Philosophy depends on it!

He knew that to many his claim to fame was his "In defence of a dogma," the dogma of analyticity, no less.

He eventually turns to a 'pragmatist' justification of the distinction.

This pragmatist justification is still in accordance with what he sees as the use of 'analytic' in 'ordinary language'. His infamous examples:

"My neighbour's three-year old understands Russell's Theory of Types."

A: Hard to believe, but I will.

"My neighbour's three-year old is an adult."

Metaphorically? No.

Then I don't understand you, and what you've just said is, in my scheme of things, analytically FALSE.

Grice was also circumstantially concerned with the 'synthetic a priori,' and he would ask his children's playmates:

"Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed!"

The distinction is ultimately Kantian, but it had brought to the fore by the 'linguistic turn,' Oxonian and other!

***

Carton 6
Folder 15

Aristotle and "Categories" 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1956). Aristotle's Categoriae, The Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 6, Folder 15. 

Keywords: Aristotle, Categoriae

Grice thought Aristotle was the best!

Aristotle saw 'Categoriae,' along with 'De Interpretatione' as part of  his 'Organon.' However, philosophers of language tend to explore these topics without a consideration of the later parts of the Organon dealing with the syllogism, the tropes, and the topics. 

The reason Grice is attracted to the Aristotelian category (as Austin and Strawson equally were) is that 'category' allows for a 'linguistic turn' reading.

While meant by Aristotle in a primarily ontological way, Oxonian philosophers hasten to add that a 'category of expression,' as Grice puts it, is just as valid a topic for philosophical exploration.

Grice will later add an intermediary category, which is the subject of his philosophical psychology. As such, a category can be construed ontologically, or representationally: the latter involving philosophical psychological concepts, and expressions themselves.


For Aristotle, as Grice and Austin, and Grice and Strawson, were well aware as they educated some of the poor at Oxford ("Only the poor learn at Oxford" -- Arnold), there are ten categories.

Grice doesn't care about the number. But the first are important.

THERE's 'substantia prima,' such as Grice.

And then there's 'substantia secunda,' such as Grice's rationality. The 'essentia.'

Then there are various types of 'attributes.'

But even 'substantia secunda' may be regarded as an 'attribute.'

Grice invents "Category Shift," or subject-ification.

Essence may be introduced as a sub-type of an attribute.

We would have 'substantia prima' AND 'attribute,' which in turn gets divided into 'essential' and 'non-essential.'

While Austin was not so fun to play with, Strawson is.

Banbury is a very altruist person.

Where is his altruism?

Nowhere to be seen.

Yet we may speak of Banbury's altruism.

It's a matter of a 'category shift.'

Grice was slightly disappointed, but he perfectly understood, that Strawson, who had footnoted Grice as 'the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about logic' in "Introduction to Logical Theory," fails to acknowledge that MOST of the research in Strawson's "Individuals: an essay in descriptive (not revisionary) metaphysics" derives from the conclusions reached at his joint philosophical investigations with Grice.

But "the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about metaphysics" sounds clumsier!

***

Carton 6
Folder 16

Aristotle's Ethics 

Grice was 'very fortunate' to have Hardie as his tutor. He overused Hardie's lectures on Aristotle, too, and instilled them on his own tutees!

***

Carton 6
Folder 17

Aristotle on Friendship

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Aristotle on friendship, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 17. 

Grice is concerned with Aristotle's rather cryptic view of the friend (philos, amicus) as the 'alter ego.'

In Grice's cooperative, concerted, view of things, a friend in need is a friend indeed!

***

Carton 6
Folder 18

Aristotle and Friendship (continued)
Rationality, Trust, and Decency 

Preferred ciation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Rationality, trust, and decency, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 18

Keywords: rationality, trust, decency

Grice's idea of 'decency' is connected to his explorations on 'rational' and 'reasonable'. To cheat may be neither unreasonable nor rational.

It's just repulsive!

Indecent, in other words.

In all this, Grice is concerned with 'ordinary language,' and treasures Austin's question to Warnock (when Warnock was looking for a fellowship at Austin's college):

"Warnock: what would you say the difference is between (i) and (ii)?"

i. Smith plays cricket rather properly.
ii. Smith plays cricket rather incorrectly.

"They spent the whole dinner over such subtleties!"

"And Warnock fell in love with Austin."

Grice's explorations on 'trust' are Warnockian in character too. For Warnock, in "Object of morality," trust is key, indeed, the very object of morality.

***

Carton 6
Folder 19

Aristotle and Multiplicity.
Published as "Aristotle on the multiplicity of being" in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1988). Aristotle on the multiplicity of being, The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 19. 

For Grice there is 'multiplicity' in both 'being' and 'good' -- both accountable in terms of implicata. 

Grice is yielding his razor.

"Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity."

But then Aristotle is talking about the 'multiplicity' of '... is' and '... is good.'

Surely, there are ways to turn Aristotle into the monoguist he has to be!

***

Carton 6
Folder 20

Bealer 

G. P. Bealer is one of Grice's most brilliant tutees!

The Grice collection contains a full folder of correspondence with Bealer (Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice)). 

***

Carton 6
Folder 21

Berkeley Group 
Team Notes 

***

Carton 6
Folder 22

"The Casual Theory Perception"
Published in The Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society. Symposium with A. R. White. Chair: R. Braithwaite, Cambridge.

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1961). The causal theory of perception, in Studies in the Way of Words, repr. from Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 22. 

Grice found that a full reprint from the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in a compilation also containing the William James Harvard would be too repetitive. Therefore, he omits the 'excursus' on 'implication.' However, the way he re-formulates, in 1988, what that 'excursus' covers is very interesting: there's conversational implicata, particularised ("Smith has beautiful handwriting") and generalised ("My wife is in the kitchen or in the garden"), there's presupposition (You haven't stopped beating your wife"), and there's CONVENTIONAL implicata ("She was poor, but she was honest")

Warnock had attended Austin's "Sense and Sensibilia" (not to be confused with Austen's Sense and Sensibility).

But Warnock preferred philosophical investigations with Grice.

Warnock: "Grice once told me, not on a Saturday morning, either, 'How clever language is'"

For they had found that 'ordinary language' does NOT need the concept of a visum.

Grice and Warnock spent lovely occasions exploring what Oxford has as "the philosophy of perception."

While Grice later came to see it as a bit or an offshoot of 'philosophical psychology,' 'the philosophy of perception' is concerned with that treasured bit of the Oxonian philosopher's lexicon, the sense-datum, always in the singular!

The 'cause' involved is crucial. If a material thing causes the sense-datum of a nut, that's because the squarrel (or squirrel) won't be nourished by the sense datum of a nut, but by a nut, only. 

***

Carton 6
Folder 23

Categories 
With P. F. Strawson 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1956). Categories, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 23. 

Grice found Aristotle's coinage of a 'category' a bit of a geniality.

As a representative of the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy, Grice was attracted to the idea that a category can be understood variously, as applying to the realm of reality (ontology), but also to the philosophy of language (category of expression) and to philosophical psychology (category of representation). 

Grice kept his explorations on categories under two very separate categories: his explorations with J. L. Austin (very serious), and his explorations with P. F. Strawson (more congenial).

Where is Smith's altruism?
Nowhere to be seen.
Should we say it's idle (otiose) to speak of altruism?
No, it's just an ATTRIBUTE, which, via category shift, can be made the subject of your sentence, Strawson.
It's not spatio-temporal, though, right?
Not really.
I don't particularly like your 'trouser words,' Grice. 

***

Carton 6
Folder 24

The categorical imperative

Citation:

Grice, H. P. (1976). The categorical imperative, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 24. 

Keyword: categorical imperative. 

An exploration of the logical form of Kant's concoction.

Grice is interested in its conceptual connection with the 'hypothetical' imperative, in terms of the type of connection between the protasis and the apodosis.

Grice spends the full second Paul Carus lecture on the conception of value on this.

Grice is aware that the topic is central for Oxonian philosophers such as R. M. Hare (a member of Austin's Play Group, too), who will regard the UNIVERSABILITY of an imperative as a mark of its categorial, indeed, moral status.

He would refer to conversational maxims as contributing to a CONVERSATIONAL IMMANUEL, if it can be shown that, qua items under an overarching principle of conversational helpfulness, each displays qualities associated with conceptual, formal, and applicational generality.

***

Carton 6
Folder 25

"The Logical-Construction Theory of Personal Identity" 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1977). The logical-construction theory of personal identity, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 25. 

The term is Broad's -- but Grice loved it. Rational reconstruction is not too dissimilar. But Grice prefers Broad's more conservative label.

Ultimately, it means that we can provide an analysandum for an "I" utterance WITHOUT using "I," but only 'mnemonic concepts, which belong in a theory of philosophical psychology. 

***

Carton 6
Folder 26

Davidson's "On Saying That" 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1970). Davidson on saying that, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 26. 

Grice had explored 'that'-clauses with Staal. He was concerned about the viability of Davidson's initially appealing etymological approach to the 'that'-clause in terms of 'demonstration.'

Grice had presupposed the logic of 'that'-clauses from a much earlier stage ("Those spots mean that he has measles.")

***

Carton 6
Folders 27-28

"Descartes on clear and distinct percpetion."

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1966). Descartes on clear and distinct perception, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and Metaphysics, Essay, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folders 27 and 28. 

Grice's interest in Descartes connects with Descartes's search for a criterion of 'certainty' in terms of 'clarity' and 'distinction' of this or that perception. 

Having explored the philosophy of perception with Warnock, it's only natural he wanted to give Descartes's rambles a second and third look!

***

Carton 6
Folder 29

Michael Sinton on "Grice on Denials of Indicative Conditionals"  

Strawson had elaborated on what he felt was a divergence between Whitehead's and Russell's 'horseshoe,' and 'if.'

Grice thought Strawson's observations could be understood in terms of ENTAILMENT + IMPLICATUM ("Robbing Peter to Pay Paul").

But problems, as first noted to Grice, by L. J. Cohen, of Oxford, remain, when it comes to the scope of the implicatum within the operation of, say, 'negation.'

Analogous problems arise with implicata for the other earlier dyadic functors, "and" and "or," and Grice looks for a single explanation of the phenomenon. 

The qualification 'indicative' is modal. "Ordinary language" allows for 'if' utterances to be in modes other than the imperative. "Counter-factual," if you need to be philosophical krypto-technical, 'subjective' is you are more of a classicist!

***

Carton 6
Folder 30

"Dispositions and Intentions"

Grice, H. P. (1948). Dispositions and intentions, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 30. 



Grice is especially concerned with a 'dispositional' analysis to 'intending.'

He will later reject it in "Intention and uncertainty."

Grice is especially interested in distinguishing his views from RYLE's dispositional account of intentions, which Grice sees as 'reductionist,' and indeed 'eliminationist.'

The logic of 'dispositions' is tricky, as Grice will later explore in connection with 'rationality' (rational propension or propensity) and metaphysics (the 'as if' operator). 

***

Carton 6
Folder 31

"Two Dogmas of Empiricism" 



For Quine, there are two. Grice is mainly interested in the first one: that there is a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.

Grice considers Empiricism as a monster on his way to the Rationalist City of Eternal Truth. 

***

Carton 6
Folder 32

"Emotions and Incontinence"

Citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Emotion and akrasia, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 32. 





The concept of 'emotion' needs a philosophical elucidation.

Akrasia for Grice covers both boulomaic and doxastic versions.

The boulomaic version may be closer to the concept of an emotion.

***

Carton 6
Folder 33

"Entailment and Paradoxes"

Citation:

Grice, H. P. (1970). Entailment and paradoxes, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 33. 

Keyword: entailment, paradox.

Series IV (Associations) contains a folder on 'Entailment,' as a draft of his contribution to a colloquium organised by The American Philosophical Association. 

While 'entailment,' as introduced in the philosophical literature by Moore, is hardly seen in terms of the paradoxes, 'if' is. Grice connects the two.

The relation of 'consequence' may be considered a meta-conditional, where paradoxes arise. 

His Bootstrap is a principle designed to empoverish the metalanguage so that the philosopher can succeed in the business of pulling himself up by his own!

***

Carton 6
Folders 34-35

Ethics
With Judith Baker 

***

Carton 6
Folder 36

Ethics 
North Carolina Notes 

***

Carton 6
Folder 37

Festschrift and Warner Notes 

Citation:

Grice, H. P. (1985). Prejudices and predilections, which become, the life and opinions of H. P. Grice, repr. in part in The Conception of Value, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 37. 

Strictly, it is not a festschrift in that the name is hidden behind the acronym:

P Paul      Philosophical
G              Grounds of
R              Rationality:
I               Intentions
C              Categories
E               Ends
Notably on the philosophy of perception. Also on the conception of value, especially that tricky third lecture on a metaphysical foundation for objective value. 

Grice was supposed to reply to the individual contributors, but does not. However, in his oeuvre we may identify points of contacts between the philosophers who contributed and his own views. 

***

Carton 6
Folder 38

"Finality"
With A. D Code 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Finality, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 6, Folder 38. 

Keyword: final cause, finality, telos, teleology

Code was the Aristotelian, and he and Grice are especially concerned in the idea of 'causa finalis.'

For Grice only detached finality can threaten Mechanism, as it should!

***

Carton 7
Folder 1

"Form, Type, and Implication" 


Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1977). Form, type, and implication, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 1. 

Grice was not enamoured with the 'type'/'token' or 'token'/'type' distinction.

His thoughts on 'logical form' were provocative:

"If you can't put it in logical form, it's not worth saying."

Strawson infamously reacted, but with a smile: "Oh, no! If you CAN put it in logical form, it's not worth saying."

***

Carton 7
Folder 2

Frege, Words and Sentences 


Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Frege, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 2. 

Frege was one of Grice's obsessions. A Fregeian sense is an explicatum, or implicitum -- a concession to get his principle of conversational helpfulness working in the generation of conversational implicata, that can only mean progress for philosophy!

There is an affinity between Frege's treatment of 'colouring' (the German particle "aber") and Grice's idea of a convetional implicatum ("She was poor, but she was honest")

Grice does not seem interested in providing a philosophical exploration of conventional implicata, and there is a reason for this.

Conventional implicata are NOT essentially connected, as conversational implicata are, with RATIONALITY. Conventional implicata CANNOT be 'calculable.'

They have less of a philosophical interest, too, in that they are NOT cancellable. Grice sees cancellability as a way to prove some philosophers who analyse an expression in terms of 'sense' and 'entailment,' where a cancellable conversational implicatum is all there is (to it). 

Grice gives only another example of a conventional implicatum: 'therefore,' as in Jill's utterance:

"Jack is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave."

This is interesting because "therefore" compares to "so" which P. F. Strawson, in P. G. R. I. C. E., claims is the ASSERTED counterpart to "if."

But Strawson was never associated with the type of linguistic botany that Grice was. 

***

Carton 7
Folder 3

Kant's "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics" 

Keyword: Grunlegung. 

While Grice can't read Kant in German, he uses the English vernacular.

Note the archaic 'metaphysic' sic in singular.

***

Carton 7
Folder 4
Kant's "Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals" 

Keyword: Grundlegung.

More Kant.

***

Carton 7
Folder 5

Grammar and Semantics 
With R. O. Warner 

Truth-conditional semantics and implicata

***

Carton 7
Folder 6

"Happiness, Discipline, and Implicatures" 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Happiness, discipline, and implicature, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 6. 

Keyword: eudaimonia.

While Grice felt he had to use 'happiness,' he is always having Aristotle's 'eudaimonia' in mind!

Keyword: Eudaimonia.

The implicata of "Smith is happy" are more complex than Kantotle thought!

***

Carton 7
Folder 7

"David Hume"

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). David Hume, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 7. 

Grice calls one of his metaphysical construction routines "Humeian Projection."

Grice called one of his metaphysical construction routines "Humeian projection," since the 'mind,' as it were, 'spreads over' its objects.

Grice was especially concerned with the poverty of Hume's criticism to Locke on personal identity.

***

Carton 7
Folders 8-9

David Hume's Account on Personal Identity  

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). David Hume's account of personal identity, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folders 8 and 9. 

Keywords: Hume, personal identity.


Grice opted for a Lockeian memory-based on "I" utterances that Hume rather regarded as 'vague,' and 'confusing.

Locke's approach to identity is NOT eliminationist as Hume's is.

Grice explored these issues with J. C. Haugeland. 

***

Carton 7
Folder 10

Identity 
Notes
With G. Myro 

Citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Identity, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 10. 

Keyword: relative identity.

The idea that "=" is unqualified needs qualification. Whitehead and Russell ignored this. Grice and Myro didn't!

Grice wants to allow for

It is the case that a = b /t1

It is not the case that a = b /t2

The idea is intuitive, but philosophers of a Leibnizian bent are too accustomed to deal with "=" as an absolute. 

Grice applies this to 'human' vs. 'person.' A human may be identical to a person, but cease to be so. 


***

Carton 7, Folders 11-12

"Ifs and Cans" 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1970). Ifs and cans, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folders 11 and 12. 

Keywords: conditional, power

Two of Grice's favourites. He opposed Strawson's view on 'if.' Grice thought that 'if' was the horseshoe of Whitehead and Russell, provided we add an IMPLICATUM to an ENTAILMENT.

The 'can' is merely dispositional, if not alla Ryle, alla Grice!

***

Carton 7
Folder 13

Irony, Stress, and Truth
Part of "Further notes on Logic and Conversation"
Reprinted in Studies in the Way of Words. 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1967). Further notes on logic and conversation, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 13. 

Three topics where the IMPLICATUM helps.

"He is a scoundrel" may well be the IMPLICATUM of "He is a fine friend."

But cfr. the pretense theory of irony. Grice, being a classicist, loved the etymological connection.

With Stress, he was concerned with anti-Gettier uses of emphatic 'know': "I KNOW." (Implicatum: I do have conclusive evidence").

"Truth" (or "... is true") sprang from Grice's attention to that infamous Bristol symposium between Austin and Strawson.

Grice wants to defend Austin's correspondence theory against Strawson's 'performative' approach.

If "... is true" IMPLICATES "someone previously affirmed this," that does not mean a 'ditto' IMPLICATUM is part of the ENTAILMENT of an "... is true" utterance.

***

Carton 7
Folders 14-16

Immanuel Kant 

***

Carton 7
Folder 17

Kant's Ethics 

***

Carton 7
Folder 18

Kant, Mid-sentences, Freedom 

Grice was especially concerned with Kant's having brought back the old Greek idea of 'eleutheria' for philosophical discussion.

***

Carton 7
Folder 19

Language and Reference 
Language and Reality




Citation:

Grice, H. P. (1977). Language and Reference, The Irvine lectures, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 19. 




Grice favours a transcendental approach to communication.

Our beliefs worth communicating have to be true.

Our orders worth communicating have to refer to our willings. 

***

Carton 7
Folder 20

Language Semantics 

alla Tarski.

***

Carton 7
Folders 21-22

John Locke Lecture Notes 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1977). Aspects of reason, Clarendon, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folders 21 and 22. 

On aspects of reason. Including extensive language botany on 'rational', 'reasonable,' and indeed 'reason' (justificatory, explanatory, and mixed). 

At this point, Grice notes that linguistic botany is INDISPENSABLE towards the construction of a more systematic explanatory theory.

It is an exploration of a range of uses of 'reason' that leads him to his "Aequi-vocality" thesis that 'must' has only one sense!

***

Carton 7
Folder 23

Davidson's "The Logical Form of Action Sentences"

A Davidsonian problem. Category shift invites us to see Smith's fishing as the subject of an 'action sentence.'

Cf. The horse runs fast.
---
Therefore, the horse runs. 

***

Carton 7
Folders 24-25

Meaning and Philosophical Psychology 

Citation:

Grice, H. P. (1976). Meaning and philosophical psychology, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folders 24 and 25. 

Meaning is perhaps the psychological state, attitude, or stance, per excellence.

Grice coins "M-intention" for the bunch of intentions a rational 'meaner' must mean before he even EXPLICATES something!

While not explicitly, Grice wants to supersede Peirce's merely taxonomic approaches to the thing, more in the vein of Ogden and Richards.

***

Carton 7
Folders 26-27

Metaphysics 

Citation:

Grice, H. P. (1957). Metaphysics, in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, London, Macmillan, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folders 26 and 27. 

Cfr. Grice/Strawson/Pears, "Metaphysics," in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, The BBC Third Programme.

***

Carton 7
Folder 28

Metaphysics and Ill-Will 

Keyword: Ill-will

A conceptual elucidation.


***

Carton 7
Folder 29

Metaphysics and Theorizing 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Metaphysics and theorising, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 29. 

Grice called himself 'folksy': his theories, even if subject to various types of Ramseyfication, are 'popular' in kind!

And ceteris paribus!

Metaphysical construction is disciplined and the best theorising the philosopher can hope for!

***

Carton 7
Folder 30

Method and Myth 

A philosopher should be, as Plato was, to use a myth, if he thinks his tutee will thank him for that!

*** 

Carton 7
Folder 31

Mill's Induction 

Citation:

Grice, H. P. (1977). Mill's Induction, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 31. 



More Grice to the Mill.
Grice loved Hardie's playing with Mill's Method of Difference with an Oxford copper.

***

Carton 7
Folder 32

Miscellaneous 
Actions and Events 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1986). Actions and events, The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 7, Folder 32. 

"Actions and events" is Davidsonian in motivation, but Kantian in method!

***

Carton 8
Folder 1

Miscellaneous 
With J. Baker 

*** 

Carton 8
Folder 2

Miscellaneous
Metaphysics Notes 

***

Carton 8
Folder 3

Miscellaneous 
Oxford Philosophy 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1958). Postwar Oxford philosophy, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and Metaphysics, Essay, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folder 3.

By Oxford philosophy, Grice meant his own!

*** 

Carton 8
Folders 4-8

Miscellaneous 
Philosophy 

***

Carton 8
Folders 9-13

Miscellaneous 
Philosophy 
Topics 

***

Carton 8
Folders 14-15
"Modality, Desirability, and Probability"

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1977). Modality, desirability, and probability, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folders 14 and 15. 

He would use 'mode operator.'

Modality is the more correct term, for things like 'should,' 'ought,' and 'must,' in that order. One sense.

The doxastic modals are correlated to probability. The boulomaic modals are correlated to desirability.

There is probability to a degree d.

But there is also desirability to a degree d. 

They both combine in Grice's attempt to show how Kant's categorical imperative reduces to the hypothetical. 

Kant uses 'modality' in a way that Grice disfavours, preferring 'modus.'

Grice is aware that Kant's use of 'modality' is qua category (Kant's reduction to four of Aristotle's original ten categories). 

***

Carton 8
Folders 16-17

"Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics"
"Aristotle's Ethics" 

From Hardie.

***

Carton 8
Folder 18

Objectivity and Value 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1983). The conception of value, Clarendon, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folder 18. 

His third Carus lecture. He tries to find out what J. L. Mackie means when he says that a value is ultimately 'subjective'. What about intersubjective, and constructively 'objective'?

***

Carton 8
Folder 19

Objective Value, Rational Motivation 

The rational motivation for objective value. 

Many notions are value-paradeigmatic. 

The most important of all philosophical notions, that of 'rationality,' presupposes objective value as one of its motivations.

For Grice, 'ratio' can be understood 'cognoscendi' but also 'essendi.' "Rational motivation" involves both types of 'ratio.'

*** 

Carton 8
Folder 20

Oddents (or Odd Ends)
Urbane and Not Urbane 
Or Urbana and Not-Urbana

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1977). Odds and ends: Urbana and non Urbana, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folder 20. 

***

Carton 8
Folders 21-22

Vision, Taste, and 
The philosophy of perception 

Preferred citations:

Grice, H. P. (1959). Vision, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folders 21 and 22.

Keyword: vision, seeing

Grice, H. P. (1959). Taste, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folders 21 and 22.

Keyword: taste, the objects of the five senses

Grice, H. P. (1959). Perception, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folders 21 and 22. 

Keyword: philosophy of perception.

Mainly with Warnock.

Keywords: Vision, Taste, Perception. 

Warnock reprinted Grice's "Causal Theory of Perception" in his influential Reading in Philosophy, "The philosophy of perception."

***

Carton 8
Folder 23

Perception 

With G. J. Warnock.

***

Carton 8
Folder 24

Perception 

With Warnock. Warnock learned about perception much more from Grice than from Austin!

***

Carton 8
Folder 25

Perception 
With R. O. Warner 

An evolutionary justification of 'material' thing as the denotatum of a perceptual judgement. 

***

Carton 8
Folder 26

"Descartes on Clear and Distinct Perception"
"Malcolm on Dreaming" 

Descartes meets Malcolm, and vice versa.

Preferred citations:

Grice, H. P. (1966). Descartes on clear and distinct perception, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and Metaphysics, Essay, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folder 26

Keyword: perception.

Grice, H. P. (1966). Dreaming, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folder 26.

Keywords: Malcolm, dreaming. 

***

Carton 8, Folder 27

"A Pint of Philosophy" by Alfred Brook Gordon, includes notes by Grice 

Figurative!

***

Carton 8
Folder 28

"A Philosophy of Life" 
Happiness 
Notes 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Eudaimonia, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folder 28. 

Keywords: Kantotle, eudaimonia.


***

Carton 8, Folder 29

"C. S. Pierce's Theory of Signs"

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1947). C. S. Peirce's theory of signs, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folder 29. 

Keyword: meaning. He cites Ewing, Ogden and Richards, and many others. "Those spots mean measles."

Grice finds Peirce 'krypto-technical' and proposes to "English" him into an 'ordinary-language' philosopher.

He does not altogether fail!

***

Carton 8
Folder 30

"Basic Pirotese, Sentence Semantics and Syntax"

KEYWORDS: pirot, pirotese, semantics, syntax

Pirotese is the philosopher's engaging in pirotology.

"Pirots karulise elatically."

But not all of them.

Grice finds that the pirotological talk allows to start from zero. 

He is constructing a language -- "Pirotese" -- and the world that language is supposed to represent or denote. 

*** 

Carton 8
Folder 31

"Pirots and Obbles"

KEYWORDS: pirot, obble, creature construction.

An obble is a pirot's object.

Grice introduces potching and cotching. To potch is what a pirot does with an obble: he perceives it. To cotch is what a pirot can further do with an obble: know or cognise it.

Cotching, unlike potching, is factive. 

***

Carton 8
Folders 32-33

"Methodology - Pirots"

KEYWORDS: "pirot"

Pirotology. Creature-construction. The genitorial programme.

Grice as engineer.

***

Carton 9
Folder 1

"Practical Reason"



KEYWORD: reason, practical reason. 



Grice prefers the idiom of 'soul.' There's the ratiocinative soul. Within the ratiocinative, there's the executive soul and the merely administrative soul.

Cicero had to translate Aristotle into 'prudentia,' every time Aristotle talked of 'phronesis.'

Grice was aware that Kant's terminology can be confusing. Kant had used "pure" reason for reason in the doxastic realm.

Kant's critique of practical reason is HARDLY symmetrical to his critique of 'doxastic' reason.

Grice, with his 'aequi-vocality' thesis of 'must' ("must" crosses the doxastic-boulomaic divide), Grice is being more of a symmetricalist.

***

Carton 9
Folder 2

"Preliminary Valediction" 

For the Studies in the Way of Words.

***

Carton 9
Folder 3

"Presupposition and implicature"

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1970). Presupposition and conversational implicature, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II: Semantics and metaphysics, Essay, repr. from Cole, Radical Pragmatics, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9, Folder 3.

KEYWORDS: implicature, presupposition. 

His take on Strawson.

"The king of France is bald" entails there is a king of France.

"The king of France ain't bald" does not; only implicate it.

Grice knew he was robbing Peter to pay Paul. 

***

Carton 9
Folder 4

"Probability and life"

KEYWORDS: life, probability.

Evolutionary account of the pirot's adaptability to its changeable environs.

Grice borrows the notion of probability from Davidson, whose early claim to fame was to provide the logic of the notion.

Grice abbreviates probability by "Pr." and compares it to a boulomaic operator, "De." for desirability.

A rational agent must calculate both the probability and the desirability of his action.

For both probability and desirability, the degree is crucial. Grice symbolises this by 'd': probability in degree d; probability in degree d'.

The topic of life Grice relates to that of adaptation and surival, and connects with his genitorial programme of creature construction ("pirotology."): life as continued operancy. 

***

Carton 9
Folder 5

"Rationality and trust" 

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1967). Rationality and trust, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9, Folder 5. 

KEYWORDS: trust, rationality.

Trust and rationality are pre-requisites of conversation. 

Cf. his desideratum of conversational candour, subsumed under the over-arching principle of conversational helpfulness (formerly 'conversational benevolence-cum-self-interest')

Grice thought that the principle of conversational benevolence has to be weighed against the principle of conversational self-interest.

The result is the overarching principle of conversational helpfulness.

Clarity gets in the picture. The desideratum of conversational clarity is a reasonable requirement for conversants to abide by. 

Grice follows some of Warnock's observations.

The logical grammar of 'trust' is subtle, especially when we are considering the two sub-goals of conversation:

-- giving and receiving information
-- influencing and being influenced by others

In both sub-goals, trust is paramount.

The explorations of trust had become an Oxonian hobby, with authors not such like Warnock, but B. A. O. Williams, and others. 

***

Carton 9
Folder 6

"Reasons"


Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1966). Aspects of reason, Clarendon, Reasons, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9, Folder 6. Linguistic analysis on 'justificatory,' 'explanatory' and 'mixed' uses of 'reason.'

While Grice knows that the basic use of 'reason' is qua verb (reasoner reasons from premise P to conclusion C), he spends some time in exploring 'reason' as noun.

Grice found it a bit of a roundabout way to approach rationality.

However, his distinction between 'justificatory' and 'explanatory' 'reason' is built upon his linguistic botany on the use of 'reason' qua noun.

Explanatory reason seems more basic for Grice than 'justificatory' reason.

Explanatory reason EXPLAINS the rational agent's behaviour.

Grice is aware of Freud and his 'rationalizations.'

An agent may invoke some 'reason' for his acting which is not 'legitimate.'

An agent may convince himself that he wants to move to Bournemouth because of the weather; when in fact, his reason to move to Bournemouth is to be closer to Cowes and join the yacht club there.

***

Carton 9
Folder 7

"Reflections on morals"

KEYWORDS: meta-ethics

Meta-ethics. 
Morals is very Oxonian. There were in Grice's time only THREE chairs of philosophy at Oxford: the three W:

The Waynflete chair of metaphysical philosophy.
The Wykeham chair of logic (not philosophy, really)
The White chair of moral philosophy.

Later, the Wilde chair of philosophical psychology was created.

Grice was familiar with Austin's cavalier attitude to morals as White's professor of moral philosophy, succeeding Kneale.

When R. M. Hare succeeds Austin, Grice knew that it was time to play with implicata!

Grice's approach to morals is very 'meta-ethical' and starts with a fastidious exploration of 'modes' related to phrases involving 'should,' 'ought,' and 'must.'

For Hampshire, 'should' is the moral word par excellence.

For Hare, it is 'ought.'

For Grice, it is "MUST."

However, Grice also wants to say that whatever he'll say about the 'moral' MUST must apply to the 'doxastic' "must," as in "What goes up must come down."

***

Carton 9
Folder 8

"Russell and Heterologicality"

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1970). Russell and heterologicality, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9, Folder 8. 

KEYWORDS: Russell, heterological

Grice was fascinated by Baron Russell's remarks on 'heterological.'

And its implicata. 

***

Carton 9
Folder 9

Notes on Schiffer 

On Remnants on meaning.

S. R. Schiffer had been Strawson's tutee at Oxford as a Rhode Scholar in the completion  of his D. Phil. on 'Meaning' (later published by Clarendon).

Eventually, Schiffer grew sceptic, and let Grice know about it!

Grice did not find Schiffer's arguments totally destructive, but saw the positive side to them: they should remind any philosopher that the issues he is dealing are profound and bound to involve much elucidation before they are solved. 

***

Carton 9
Folder 10

"Semantics of Children's Language"

KEYWORDS: semantics, children's language, ontology, phylogeny, developmental pragmatics, learning, acquisition.  

Interesting in that he was always enquiring his children's playmates: "Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed!"

***

Carton 9
Folder 11

"Sentence Semantics"

Truth-conditional, constructivist.  
While Grice is NOT concerned about the 'semantics' of utterer's meaning, he is about the semantics of SENTECE meaning.

Grice's second stage of his programme about meaning begins with specifications of 'means' as applied to 'x'.

He is having Tarski's and Davidson's elaborations of schemas like

"p" means that p.

"Snow is white" means that snow is white. 

***

Carton 9
Folder 12

"Sentence Semantics and Propositional Complexes"

KEYWORDS: propositional complex. 

Grice was keen on the concept of a 'propositional complex,' which allowed him NOT to commit to the abstract entity of a 'proposition,' if the latter is regarded as an extensional family of 'propositional complexes' (Paul saw Peter; Peter was seen by Paul).

The topic of a propositional complex was one that Grice regarded as Oxonian in nature.

C. A. B. Peacocke had struggled with the same type of problems, in his various essays on the theory of content.

Only a perception-based account of content in terms of 'qualia' gets the philosopher out of the vicious circle of introducing linguistic entities to clarify psychological entities and vice versa. 

***

Carton 9
Folder 13

A. D. Code's "Significance of the Middle Book's Aristotle's Metaphysics"

KEYWORDS: Aristotle, metaphysics, the middle book.


Very middle. Grice never knew what was middle for Aristotle, but admired Code too much to air this!

The organisation of Aristotle's metaphysics was a topic of much concern for Grice.

With Code, Grice coined 'izzing' and 'hazzing' to refer to essential and non-essential attribution.

***

Carton 9
Folder 14

"Social justice"

On Socrates and Thrasymachus. 

Grice was well aware that Rawls have made use of Grice's ideas on 'personal identity.' The philosophical elucidation of 'fairness' is of great concern for Grice. He had been in touch with the explorations by Nozick and Nagel along anti-Rawlsian lines. 

Grice's ideas on rationality guide his exploration of 'social justice.'

***

Carton 9
Folder 15

""Subjective" conditions and intentions"

KEYWORDS: intention, subjective condition. 

Cf. his dispositional account to 'intending.'

A subjective condition takes into account the intender's, rather than the ascriber's, point of view:

Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees.

***

Carton 9
Folder 16

"Super-relatives"

Very Super.

***

Carton 9
Folders 17-18

"Syntax and semantics"

KEYWORDS: syntax, semantics.

Especially the former. Grice loved two devices of the syntactic kind: subscripts and square brackets (for the assignment of 'common-ground status'). 

Grice was a conservative when it comes to syntax and semantics. He would hardly use 'pragmatics,' but was aware of Morris's triangle.

Syntax is presented along the lines of Gentzen -- a system of 'natural deduction' in terms of inference rules of introduction and elimination for each formal device.

Semantics pertains rather to Witters's truth-values: the assignment of a satisfactory-valuation: the true and the good.

***

Carton 9
Folder 19

"The "that" and the "why" 
Metaphysics 

KEYWORDS: explanation, description, 'why,' 'what'. 

Taxonomy, worse than Explanation, always.

Grice is exploring the 'taxonomy-description' vs. explanation dichotomy.

He would often criticise Austin for spending too much valuable time on linguistic botany, 'without an aim in his head.'

Instead, other philosophers look for the 'big picture of it all,' and disregard piecemeal analyses.

Conversation is a good example. While Austin would subjectify 'Language' (Linguistic Nature), Grice rather places rationality squarely on the behaviour displayed by utterers as they make conversational moves that their addressees will judge as 'rational' along specific lines. 

Observation of the principle of conversational helpfulness is RATIONAL (reasonable) along the following lines:

Anyone who cares about the two goals which are central to conversation: 

-- giving and receiving information
-- influencing and being influenced by others

is expected to have an interest in taking part in a conversation which will only be profitable under the assumption that it is conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational helpfulness.

***

Carton 9
Folder 20

Trust, Metaphysics, and Value.
With J. Baker.

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Trust, metaphysics, and value, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9, Folder 20. 

KEYWORDS: trust, metaphysics, value. 

Trust a corollary of the principle of conversational helpfulness.

The logical grammar of 'trust' is an interesting one. Grice used to speak of 'candour.' 

In a given conversational setting, assuming the principle of conversational helpfulness is operating, the utterer U is assumed by the addressee A to be 'trustworthy.'

There are two dimensions for trust, which relate to the TWO goals which Grice assumes the principle of conversational helpfulness captures: 

-- giving and receiving information
-- influencing and being influenced by others

In both sub-goals, trust is key.

In the doxastic realm, trust has to do, not so much with 'truth' (with which the expression is cognate) but 'evidence.'

In the boulomaic realm, 'evidence' becomes less crucial. Grice mentions attitudes of the boulomaic type that are not usually judged in terms of evidential support.

However, in the 'boulomaic' realm, utterer will be assumed as 'trustworthy' if the conative attitudes he displays are 'sincere.'

***

Carton 9
Folder 21

"Universals" 

KEYWORDS: universalia. 

The Grice Papers contains folders on universalia in Series IV (Associations), too. 

Universalia as abstrata.

Grice's concern with 'universalia' can be traced back to his reading of Aristotle's "Categoriae."

Other than the 'substantia prima,' it may be said that anything else -- attribute, etc. -- belongs in the realm of 'universalia.'

As such, univeralia are not spatio-temporal continuants.

However, his category shift allows Grice to have this 'universalia' as subjects of discourse.

The topic is approached formally by means of the notion of 'order': 'first-order predicate calculus' ranges over individuals, in Strawson's use of the term.

Higher-order predicate calculus ranges over 'predicates' and beyond -- as such, 'universalia' can only be formalised in higher-order calculi. 


***

Carton 9
Folder 22

"Universals"
With M. Friedman 

KEYWORDS: universalia. 

***

Carton 9
Folder 23

"Value, Metaphysics, and Teleology"

KEYWORDS: value, metaphysics, teleology, telos, finality, mechanism.

Grice was obsessed with the Greek idea of a 'telos,' as overused by Aristotle. He thought teleology is a key philosophical way to contest Mechanism, so popular in The New World. 

Strictly, and Grice knew this, 'teleology' is constituted as a 'discipline.' 

For the philosopher, 'teleology' is that part of philosophy that studies the realm of the 'telos.'

Informally, 'teleological' is opposed to 'mechanistic'.

Grice is interested in the mechanism/teleology debate.

He found New-World philosophers too mechanistic-oriented, in contrast with the more 'two-culture' atmosphere he was familiar with at Oxford!



***

Carton 9
Folder 24

"Values, Morals, Absolutes, and the Metaphysical"

The absolute versus the relative, is constructed OUT of the relative, thought. There is hardly a realm of UNconstructed reality.

Grice is especially concerned with J. L. Mackie's rather cavalier attitude towards the relative and the absolute.

Surely the 'absolute' IS a construction out of the 'relative.'

Grice takes a Kantotelian attitude. We designate a proper judge, the ratiocinative part of the soul of a personal being. Whatever is 'relative' to this particular creature attains, ipso facto, 'absolute value.'

Grice proposes a reduction of 'what is valuable-ABSOLUTE' to 'what is valuable-RELATIVE,' and succeeds!

***

Carton 9
Folders 25-27

Miscellaneous 
"Value sub-systems"
"The Kantian Problem" 

Values coordinate in systems. One such is 'eudaimonia.'

Kant's problem is the reduction of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical imperative. 

For Kant, values tend towards the subjective. Grice, rather, wants to offer a 'metaphysical' defence of 'objective' value.

***

Grice called the manual of conversational maxims the Conversational Immanuel.

***

Carton 9
Folder 28

"Values and rationalism"

KEYWORDS: value, rationalism, axiology

As opposed to 'relativism,' which denies the rational basis to attitude ascriptions.

Grice is concerned with the absence of a thorough discussion of 'value' by English philosophers. 

Continental philosophers, by comparison, have a special discipline, 'axiology,' for it!

Similarly, a continental-oriented tradition Grice finds in The New World in philosophers of a pragmatist bent, such as Carus.

Grice wants to say that 'rationality' is a value, because it is a faculty that a creature (human) displays to adapt and survive to his changing environments. 

***

Carton 9
Folder 29

Philippa Foot's "Virtues and Vices" 

KEYWORDS: Philippa Foot, virtue, vice, virtue ethics, flourishing

He admired Foot's ability to make the right conceptual distinction. 

Foot is following a very Oxonian tradition best represented by the work of G. J. Warnock.

Of course, Grice was over-familiar with the 'virtue' vs. 'vice' distinction, since Hardie had instilled it on him at Corpus!

For Grice, 'virtue' and 'vice' display an interesting 'logical' grammar, though.

He would say that 'rationality' is a virtue; fallacious reasoning is a vice.

Some things he took more of a moral standpoint about. To cheat is neither irrational nor unreasonble: just plain 'repulsive.' 

As such, it would be a 'vice.'

Grice is concerned with 'vice' in his account of 'akrasia.'

If agent A KNOWS that doing x is 'virtuous,' yet decides to do ~x, which is 'vicious,' A is being 'akratic.' 

For Grice, akratic behaviour applies both in the doxastic and the boulomaic realm.

And it is part of the philosopher's job to elucidate the conceptual intricacies attached to it. 

***

Carton 9
Folders 30-31

"Wants and Needs"

Preferred citation:

Grice, H. P. (1980). Wants and needs, The Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 9, Folders 30 and 31. 

KEYWORDS: want, need, wanting, needing, philosophical  psychology, soul

"Want" etymologically means "absence;" "need" should be preferred. The squarrel (squirrel) Toby NEEDS intake of nuts, and you'll soon see gobbling them! There is not much philosophical bibliography on these two 'psychological states' Grice is analysing. Their logic is interesting:

(i) Smith wants to play cricket.
(ii) Smith NEEDS to play cricket. 

Grice is concerned with the propositional content attached to the 'want' and 'need' predicate. 

"Wants that" sounds harsh; so does "need that."

Still, there are propositional attached to (i) and (ii): "Smith plays cricket."

Grice took a very cavalier attitude to what linguists spend their lives analysing.

He thought it was surely NOT the job of the philosopher, especially from a prestigious university such as Oxford, to deal with the arbitrariness of grammatical knots attached to this or that English verb. He rarely used "English," but stuck with 'ordinary language.'

Surely, he saw himself in the tradition of Kantotle, and so, aiming at grand philosophical truths: not conventions of usage, even his own!

***

APPENDIX A 

H. P. Grice: Catalogue Raisonée

Grice, H.P. (1938). ‘Negation and privation’ The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

--- (1941). ‘Personal identity,’ in Mind, repr. in J. Perry, Personal Identity, Berkeley, University of California Press.

--- (1946). Seminar on Peirce's theory of signs, The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
--- (1948). Intentions and dispositions.' On Ryle and Hampshire. 

--- (1956). In defence of a dogma, with P. F. Strawson, The Philosophical Review, repr. in Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1989.
--- (1957). 'Meaning,' The Philosophical Review.
--- (1957). 'Metaphysics,' with P. F. Strawson and D. F. Pears, in D. F. Pears, The nature of metaphysics. London: Macmillan. 

--- (1959). ‘Vision,’ with G. J. Warnock, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 8, Folder 21, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

--- (1960). ‘The philosophy of perception,’ notes with G. J. Warnock on visum. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/138c.

--- (1961). ‘The causal theory of perception,’ symposium with A.R. White, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume, 35, no. 1:121-153, repr. in Warnock (1968) and, without the excursus on implication, in Grice (1989).

--- (1962). ‘Some remarks about the senses,’ in R. J. Butler, Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, repr. in Grice 1989.

--- (1964). ‘Logic and conversation,’ an Oxford seminar, in The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

--- (1967). The William James Memorial Lectures, in The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley, repr. in a revised form as Part I of Grice (1989).
--- (1968). 'Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning,' The Foundations of Language, repr. in J. R. Searle, The Philosophy of Language, Oxford. 
--- (1969). 'Vacuous names,' in D. Davidson and J. Hintikka, Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel. 

--- (1969). ‘Utterer’s meaning and intentions,’ The Philosophical Review, 72(2): 147-177, repr. in Grice (1989).

--- (1970). The philosophy of perception: a retrospective, with G. J. Warnock, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

--- (1970). ‘Philosophy and ordinary language,' The H.P. Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 15, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

--- (1971). ‘Intention and uncertainty,’ Proceedings of the British Academy, 57:263-269.

--- (1971). 'Entailment,' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series IV, Carton 6, Folder 4, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. 

--- (1971). 'Ifs and cans,' The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. 

--- (1972.) Potching and cotching obbles. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. 

--- (1973). 'Identity,' with G. Myro, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. 

--- (1973). ‘Davidson on intending,’ The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 92/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California at Berkeley.

 --- (1974). ‘Disimplicature,’ The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. 
--- (1974) ‘Frege: words, and sentences,’ The H. P. Grice Papers. 
--- (1975). 'Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre,' Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, repr. in The Conception of Value. 

--- (1975). ‘Logic and conversation,’ in Davidson and Harman (1975), also in Cole and Morgan (1975), repr. in a revised form in Grice (1989).

--- (1976). ‘Russell and heterologicality,’ The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. 

--- (1977). ‘Mill's induction,’ The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 7, Folder 31, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. 

--- (1977). ‘The Kant Lectures,’ Stanford. Redelivered as The John Locke lectures, repr. in Aspects of Reason. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

--- (1978). ‘Further notes on logic and conversation,’ in Cole (1978), repr. in a revised form in Grice (1989).

--- (1979). ‘Knowledge and belief,’ The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 18, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

--- (1980). 'Socrates,' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III, Carton 5, Folder 31, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

--- (1981). ‘Presupposition and conversational implicature,’ in Cole (1981), repr. in a revised form in Grice (1989).
--- (1982). 'Meaning revisited,' in N. V. Smith, Mutual knowledge. Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words. 

--- (1983). ‘The Paul Carus lectures,’ repr. as The Conception of Value. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991.

--- (1984). ‘Prejudices and predilections, which become, the life and opinions of Paul Grice,’ The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 91/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

--- (1985). 'The unity of science and teleology,' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series IV, Carton 6, Folder 9, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

--- (1986). ‘Reply to Richards,’ in Grandy/Warner, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends. pp. 45-108.

--- (1987). ‘Retrospective epilogue,’ repr. in Grice (1989), Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

--- (1988). ‘Metaphysics and theorizing,’ The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

--- (1988). ‘Aristotle on the multiplicity of being,’ posthumously edited by B. F. Loar. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

***

APPENDIX B
***

H. P. Grice: Catalogue Raisonée -- 

With keywords.

Grice, H. P. 

1938

'Negation and Privation'

The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), Carton 4, Folder 10, BANC MSS 90/135c
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Keywords: negation, privation, verificationism

Grice's attempt to 'eliminate' "not" along verificationist lines. "That is not red" is based on "That is

green." "I am not hearing a noise" is based on the absence of an introspection to the effect that the
utterer is hearing a noise. Grice was involved in serious philosophical studies before the Second
World War under the tutelage of Hardie at Corpus. While his socialising was limited ("having been
born on the wrong side of the tracks"), he was unable to attend Austin's seminal Thursday evening
play group meetings with the seven: Hampshire, Hart, MacDermott, MacNabb, Woozley, and Berlin.
But he learned all about the methodology when he returned to Oxford after the war. He will turn back
to the topic of negation later at Oxford (vide Grice 1961). He will later consider negation within the
list of formal devices along with their vernacular counterparts. In the fourth William James lecture he
considers a role for negation along the lines of Cook Wilson in Statement and Inference. His 'Vacuous
Names' contains introduction and elimination for negation. In his commentary in P. G. R. I. C. E. he
illustrates the Humeian projection (metaphysical construction routine) with the pre-intuitive concept
of negation, specifying the various stages the intuitive concept undergoes until it becomes fully
rationally recostructed. 

1941

'Personal Identity'

In Mind, repr. in J. Perry, Personal Identity, Berkeley, University of California Press, The H. P. Grice
Papers, Series II (Essays) and Series V (Topical) BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
University of California, Berkeley. 

Keywords: first personal pronoun, "I", personal identity, Hume, Locke

Grice's attempt to reduce "I" statements ("I am hearing a noise") in terms of a chain of mnemonic

states. While quoting from recent philosophers such as Gallie and Broad, he has an occasion to go

back to Locke and contest the infamous counterexample presented by Reid. Grice concludes with a

methodological note: the intricacy of one's analysis should not be a minus, but a plus. He will later
reconsider Broad's observation and re-titles it "the logical-construction theory of personal identity." It
was Haugeland who had Grice re-consider Hume's vagaries with personal identity. Unlike the more
conservative Locke (that Grice favours), eliminationist Hume sees "I" as a conceptual chimaera. 

1946

'Common sense and scepticism,' Repr. in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and
Metaphysics, Essay.

While it is strictly slightly odd to quote this as "(1946)" just because, by a stroke of the pen, Grice

writes that date in the Harvard volume, we will follow the practice. Grice always took the sceptic's

challenge, and in his later reflections, as an affront to our idea of rationality. Hume's sceptical attack

is partial, and targeted towards practical rationality, though. Grice is here concerned with a

Cantabrigian topic popularised by G. E. Moore. As Grice recollects, "Some like Witters, but Moore's

my man." Unlike the Cambridge analysts such as Moore, Grice saw himself as a 'linguistic turn'

Oxonian analyst, so it's only natural he connects scepticism and common sense with 'ordinary

language', the elephant in Grice's room.

1946

Seminar on C. S. Peirce's Theory of Signs, The H.P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8,
Folder 29, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Keywords: sign, Peirce

Important as a source for Grice's attempt to 'English' Peirce. Peirce ultra-Latinate and Greek

taxonomies have Grice nervous. He proposes to reduce all of Peirceian divisions to 'mean.' In the

proceedings, he quote from Ogden, Richards, Ewing. It is from Peirce that Grice explores examples

such as those spots 'meaning' measles. Grice's use of Peirce is illustrative, thus, of the Oxonian
linguistic turn focused on 'ordinary language.' In finding Peirce krypo-technical, Grice is ensuing that
his tutees, and indeed any Oxonian philosophy student (Grice was university lecturer) be aware that
'to mean' should be more of a priority than this or that jargon by this or that (New World?)
philosopher!

1948

'Meaning.' The Oxford Philosophical Society, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and

Metaphysics, Essay, repr. from The Philosophical Review, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays),
BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. 

Grice may be seen as a practitioner of 'ordinary-language' philosophy (his explorations of the

factivity or lack thereof of various uses of "to mean." The second part of the essay, for which he

became philosophically very popular, takes up an intention-based approach to semantic notions. The

only authority Grice cites, in a typical Oxonian fashion, is C. L. Stevenson, who, from The New

World, had been defending an emotivist theory of ethics, and making a few remarks on how "to

mean" is used, with scare quotes, in something like a 'causal' account ("Smoke 'means' fire."). After

its publication in The Philosophical Review, Grice's account received "almost as many alleged

counterexamples as rule-utilitarianism" (B. J. Harrison), but mostly outside Oxford, and in The New

World. New-World philosophers saw Grice's attempt as reductionist and as oversimplifying Quine's

troubles with empiricism. "Meaning" was reprinted in various collections, notably in P. F. Strawson's

Philosophical Logic (and it should be remembered that it was Strawson who had the thing typed and

submitted to The Philosophical Review!)

1953

'G. E. Moore and Philosopher's Paradoxes,' repr. in Studies in the Way of Words, in Part II, Semantics
and Metaphysics, Essays, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
University of California, Berkeley. 

Keywords: G. E. Moore, paradox.

As with his earlier 'Common sense and scepticism,' Grice tackles Moore's and Malcolm's claim that
'ordinary language,' so-called, solves a few of "Philosopher"'s paradoxes. "Philosopher" is Moore's
attempt at humour to symbolise "any" philosopher. Grice finds problems in this, as over-simplifying a
pretty convoluted terrain. 

1956

'In defence of a dogma'

With P. F. Strawson, The Philosophical Review, repr. in Grice, Studies in the Way of Words,

Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1989, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c. 

Keywords: analytic-synthetic distinction

The locus classicus for the 'ordinary-language' philosophical response to Quine in "Two dogmas of

empiricism." Grice and Strawson claim that '... is analytic" does have an ordinary use, as attached two

a type of behavioural conversational response. To an analytically false move (such as "My

neighbour's three-year-old son is an adult") the addressee is bound to utter, "I don't understand you!

You are not being figurative, are you?." To a synthetically false move, on the other hand (such as "My

neighbour's three-year-old understands Russell's Theory of Types"), the addressee will jump with,

"Can't believe it!"

1957

'Meaning'

Published in The Philosophical Review. 

The preferred quotation is of course Grice, H. P. (1948), seeing that Grice recalled the exact year

when he gave the talk for the Philosophical Society at Oxford. It was however, the publication in The

Philosophical Review that occasioned a tirade of alleged counter-examples by New-World

philosophers, and at least one or two Oxonians: Urmson and Strawson. Urmson criticised the

NECESSITY of Grice's account, by introducing an alleged counter-example involving bribery. Grice

will consider a way out of Urmson's alleged counter-example in his fifth Wiliam James Lecture.

Strawson's alleged counter-example was perhaps slightly more serious, if regressive. His "rat-infested

house" alleged counter-example started a chain which required Grice to avoid, ultimately, any

'sneaky' intention by way of a recursive clause to the effect that, for utterer U to have MEANT that p,

all meaning-constitutive intentions should be 'above board.'

1957

'Metaphysics,' With P. F. Strawson and D. F. Pears, in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics,
proceedings of the BBC Third programe lectures, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), BANC
MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. 

Keywords: metaphysics, presupposition, Aristotle, Kant, Hume, Collingwood.

Grice participated in two of them. He discusses Collingwood on presupposition. Metaphysics
remained a favourite topic for Grice's philosophical explorations, as it is evident from his 1988 essay
on "Metaphysics, Philosophical Eschatology, and Plato's Republic," reprinted in his Studies in the
Way of Words. The BBC lecture is typically dated in tone. It was the days when philosophers thought
they could educate the non-elite by dropping names like Collingwood. The Third Programme was
extremely popular, especially in London, as it was a way for Londoners to get to know "what is going
on" down at Oxford -- the only place an educated Londoner at the time was interested in displaying
some interest about!

1958

'Post-war Oxford philosophy,' repr. in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and
Metaphysics, Essay, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft
Library, The University of California, Berkeley. 

While Grice loved to drop Oxonian names -- notably his 'rivals,' such as Dummett or Anscombe, he

knew when not to. His "Post-war Oxford philosophy," as opposed to more specific items in The Grice

Collection, remains 'general' in tone, and intended as a defense of the 'ordinary-language' approach to

philosophy. Surprisingly, or perhaps not (for those who knew Grice), he takes a pretty idiosyncratic

characterisation of conceptual analysis. Grice's philosophical problems emerge with Grice's

idiosyncratic use of this or that expression. Conceptual analysis is meant to solve HIS problems, not

others'! 

1959

‘Vision,' With G. J. Warnock, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Carton 8, Folder 21, BANC
MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. 

Of the five senses, Grice and Warnock are particularly interested in 'seeing.' As Grice will put it later,

'see' is a factive. It presupposes the existence of the event reported after the 'that'-clause. A 'visum,'

however, as an intermediary between the material thing and the perceiver does not seem necessary in

'ordinary' discourse. Warnock will reconsider Grice's views too ("On what is seen," in Sibley). While
Grice uses 'vision,' he knows he is interested in Philosopher's paradox concerning 'seeing,' notably
Witters on 'seeing as.'

1960

'The philosophy of perception,' Notes with G. J. Warnock on visum, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC
MSS 90/138c.

Keywords: visum, Warnock, Grice, the philosophy of perception. 

Grice kept the lecture notes to a view of publishing a retrospective. Warnock recalled Grice

saying, "How clever language is!"

1961

'The causal theory of perception' in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and Metaphysics,
Essay, Symposium with A. R. White, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume,
35, no. 1:121-153 Repr. in Warnock (1968) and, without the excursus on implication, in Grice (1989),
The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The
University of California, Berkeley. 

Keyword: causal theory of perception, implicature.

The locus classicus in the philosophical literature for Grice's implicatum. He introduces a 'dout-or 

denial' condition for an utterance of a 'phenomenalist' report ("That pillar-box seems red to me." He

attacks neo-Wittgensteinian approaches that regard the report as _false_. In a long excursus on

'implication,' he compares the phenomenalist report with utterances like "He has beautiful

handwriting" (He is hopeless at philosophy), a particularised conversational implicatum; "My

wife is in the kitchen or the garden" (I have non-truth-functional grounds to utter this), a

generalised conversational implicatum, "She was poor but she was honest" (a Great-War witty

(her poverty and her honesty contrast), a 'conventional' implicatum; and "Have you stopped beating

your wife?" -- an old Oxonian conundrum -- (You have been beating your wife), a presupposition.

More importantly, he considers different tests for each. Those for the conversational implicatum will

become crucial: cancellability, calculability, non-detachability, and indeterminacy. Back to the issue

of perception, he holds a conservative view as presented by Price at Oxford. One interesting reprint is
in "Causal Theories." White's response is usually ignored, but shouldn't. White is an Australian
philosopher at Oxford who is usually regarded as a practitioner of 'ordinary-language' philosophy.
However, in his response, White hardly touches the issue of the 'implicature' with which Grice is
primarily concerned. 

1962

'Some remarks about the senses,' in Studies in the Way of Words, in Part II, Semantics and
Metaphysics, Essay, 1989. R. J. Butler, Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell

An interesting piece in that it was commissioned by Butler, who knew Grice from his Oxford days.

Grice cites O. P. Wood and R. Albritton. Grice is concerned with a special topic in the philosophy of

perception, notably the identification of the traditional 'five' senses: vision,  audition, taste, smell, and

tact. He introduces what is regarded in the philosophical literature as the first 'thought-experiment,' in

terms of the senses that Martians may have. They have two pairs of eyes: are we going to allow that

they 'see' with both pairs? Grice introduces a sub-division of seeing: a Martian x-s an object with his

upper pair of eyes, but he y-s an object with the lower pair of eyes. In his exploration, he takes a

'realist' stance, which respects the 'ordinary' discursive ways to approach issues of perception. A
second interesting point is that in allowing this to be reprinted in Butler's "Analytic philosophy,"
Grice is demonstrating that 'analytic philosophers' should NOT be obsessed with 'ordinary language.'
Butler's compilation, a rather dry one, is meant as a response to the more linguistic oriented ones by
A. G. N. Flew (Grice's first tutee at St. John's, as it happens), also published by Blackwell, and
containing pieces by Austin, and company. One philosopher who took Grice very seriously on this
was Coady, in his "The senses of the Martians."

1964

'Logic and conversation,' an Oxford seminar, in The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, 

The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

Keyword: implicatum, principle of conversational helpfulness.

In titling his seminar "Logic and Conversation," Grice is thinking Strawson. After all, in the seminal
"Introduction to Logical Theory," that every Oxonian student was reading, Strawson had the cheek to
admit that he never ceased to learn logic from his tutor, Grice. Yet he elaborates a totally anti
Griceian view of things. To be fair to Strawson, the only segment where he acknwoledges Grice's
difference of opinion is a brief footnote, concerning the 'strength' or lack thereof, of this or that
quantified utterance. Strawson uses an adjective that Grice will seldom do, 'pragmatic'. On top,
Strawson attributes the adjective to 'rule.' For Grice, in Strawson's wording, there is this or that
'pragmatic rule' to the effect that one should make a stronger rather than a weaker converational
move. Strawson's Introduction was published BEFORE Grice aired his views for the Aristotelian
Society. In this seminar then Grice takes the opportunity to correct a few misunderstandings.  
Important in that it is Grice's occasion to introduce the principle of conversational helpfulness as

generating implicata under the assumption of rationality. The lecture makes it obvious that Grice's

interest is methodological, and not 'philological.' He is not interest in conversation per se, but only as

the source for his principle of conversational helpfulness and the notion of the conversational

implicatum, which springs from the distinction between what an utterer implies and what his

expression does, a distinction 'apparently denied by Witters and all too frequently ignored by Austin.'

1966

'Descartes on clear and distinct perception,' Repr. in Part II (Semantics and Metaphysics) to Studies in
the Way of Words, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays) and Series V (Topical), BANC MSS
90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. 

Grice is NOT interested in an exegesis of Descartes's thought. He doesn't care to give a reference to

any edition of Descartes's oeuvre. But he plays with 'certain'. "It is certain that p" is objective

certainty, apparently. "I am certain that p" is subjective certainty, rather. Oddly, Grice will turn to

UNcertainty as it connects with intention in his British Academy lecture. 

1967

The William James Memorial Lectures on Logic and Conversation, in Studies in the Way of Words,
as Part I, "Logic and Conversation," The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft
Library, The University of California, Berkeley. 

In The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California,

Berkeley, repr. in a revised form as Part I of Grice (1989). The original set consisted of seven

lectures. To wit: Prolegomena, Logic and conversation, Further notes on logic and conversation,

Indicative Conditionals, Utterer's meaning and intentions, Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and

word meaning, and Some models for implicature. They were pretty successful at Oxford. While the

notion of an 'implicatum' had been introduced by Grice at Oxford, even in connection with a principle

of conversational helpfulness, he takes the occasion now to explore the type of rationality involved.

Observation of the principle of conversational helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along the following

lines: anyone who cares about the two central goals to conversation (give/receive information,

influence/be influened) is expected to have an interest in participating in a conversation that is only

going to be profitable given that it is conducted along the lines set by the principle of conversational

helpfulness. In "Prolegomena" he lists Austin, Strawson, Hare, Hart, and himself, as victims of a

disregard for the implicatum. In the third lecture he introduces his razor, "Senses are not to be

muliplied beyond necessity." In "Indicative conditionals" he tackles Strawson on 'if' as not

representing the horse-shoe of Whitehead and Russell. The next two lectures, "Utterer's meaning and

intentions" and "Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning" refine his earlier, more

austere, account of this particularly Peirceian phenomenon. He concludes the lectures with an

exploration on the relevance of the implicatum to philosophical psychology. 

1967

Prolegomena, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part I ("Logic and Conversation"), Essay 1, The H. P.

Grice Papers. 

A discussion of Oxonian philosophers of Grice's play group, notably J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, H.

L. A. Hart, and R. M. Hare. He adds himself for good measure ("A causal theory of perception").

Philosophers, even at Oxford, have to be careful with the attention that is due to 'general principles of

discourse.' Grice quotes philosophers of an earlier generation, such as Ryle, and some interpreters or

practictioners of Oxonian analysis, such as Benjamin and Searle. He even manages to quote from

Witters's "Philosophical investigations," on seeing a banana as a banana. 

1967

Logic and Conversation, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part I ("Logic and Conversation"), Essay 2,

The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC. 

An elaboration of his Oxonian seminar on "Logic and conversation." There's a principle of

conversational helpfulness, which includes a desideratum of conversational candour and a

desideratum of conversational clarity, and the sub-principle of conversational self-interest clashing

with the sub-principle of conversational benevolence. The whole point of the manoeuvre is to provide

a rational basis for a conversational 'implicatum,' as his term of art goes. Observation of the principle

of conversational helpfulness is rational/reasonable along the following lines: anyone who is

interested in the two goals conversation is supposed to serve -- give/receive information, influence/be

influenced -- should only care to enter a conversation that will be only profitable under the

assumption that it is conducted in accordance with the principle of conversational helfpulness, and

attending desiderata and sub-principles. Grice takes special care in listing tests for the proof that an

implicatum is 'conversational' in this rather technical usage: a conversational implicatum is

RATIONALLY calculable (it is the content of a psychological state, attitude or stance that the

addressee assigns to the utterer on condition that he is being helpful), non-detachable, indeterminate,

and VERY cancellable, thus never part of the 'sense' and never an 'entailment' of this or that piece of

philosophical vocabulary. 

1967

Further notes on logic and conversation, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part I ("Logic and

Conversation"), Essay III, The H. P. Grice Papers. 

But what do we mean 'sense'. Surely Occam was right with his Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter

necessitatem. We need to translate that alla 'linguistic turn.' Grice jokes: "Senses are not be multiplied

beyond necessity." He also considers irony, stress, and truth, which the Grice Papers have under a

special folder in the Series V (Topical). 

1967

Indicative conditionals, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part I ("Logic and Conversation"), Essay IV,

The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC. 

In "Prolegomena," Grice had quoted verbatim from Strawson's infamous idea that there is a SENSE

of inferrability with 'if.' While the lecture covers much more than 'if' ("He only said 'if';" "Oh, no, he

said a great deal more than that!," the title was never meant to be original. Grice in fact provides a

rational justification for the three connectives ("and," "or," and "if") and before that, the unary functor

"not."

1967

Utterer's meaning and intentions, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part I ("Logic and Conversation"),

Essay V, repr. from The Philosophical Review, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC. 

This is Grice's occasion to address some of the criticisms -- in the form of alleged counter-examples,

typically, as his later reflections on epagoge versus diagoge note -- by J. O. Urmson, P. F. Strawson,

and other philosophers associated with Oxford, such as J. R. Searle, D. W. Stampe, and S. R. Schiffer.

The final 'analysandum' is pretty complex (of the type that he did find his analysis of "I am hearing a

sound" complex in "Personal identity" -- "hardly an obstacle for adopting it!" --), it became yet

another target of attack by especially New-World philosophers in the pages of Mind, Nous, and other

journals. 

1967

Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word meaning, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part I

("Logic and Conversation"), Essay VI, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC. 

Grice wants to keep on playing. In "Meaning," he had said "x means that p" is surely reducible to

utterer U means that p. In this lecture, he lectures us as to how to proceed. In so doing he invents this

or that procedure: some basic, some resultant. When Chomsky reads the reprint in Searle's

Philosophy of Language, he cries: "Behaviourist! Skinnerian!" It was Suppes who comes to Grice's

defence. "Surely the way Grice uses expressions like 'resultant' procedure are never meant in the strict

'behaviourist' way." Suppes concludes that it is much fairer to characterise Grice as an 'intentionalist.'

1967

Some models for implicature, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part I ("Logic and Conversation"),

Essay VI, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC. 

A rather obscure exploration on the connection of semiotics and philosophical psychology. Grice is

aware that there is an allegation in the air about a possible 'vicious' circle in trying to define 'category

of expression' in terms of a 'category of representation.' He does not provide a solution to the problem

which he'll take up in his "Method in philosophical psychology," in his role of President of the

American Philosophical Association. 

1968

'Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning' Published in The Foundations of

Language, ed. by J. F. Staal.  The H. P. Grice Papers, Repr. in J. R. Searle, The Philosophy of

Language, Oxford, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

Staal asked Grice to publish the sixth William James lecture for a newish periodical publication of

whose editorial board he was a member. The fun thing is Grice complied!

1969

'Utterer’s meaning and intentions' The Philosophical Review, 72(2): 147-177, Repr. in Grice (1989),
The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC, Berkeley.

This is officially the fifth William James lecture. Grice takes up the analysis of 'meaning' he had

presented back in 1948 at the Oxford Philosophical Society. Motivated mainly by Strawson's attack in

"Intention and convention in speech acts," that offered an alleged counter-example to the sufficiency

of Grice's analysis, Grice ends up introducing so many intention that he almost trembled. He ends up

seeing 'meaning' as a 'value-paradeigmatic' concept, perhaps never realisable in a sublunary way. But

it is the analysis in this particular essay where he is at his formal best. He distinguishes between

protreptic and exhibitive utterances, and also modes of correlation (iconic, conventional). He

symbolises the utterer and the addressee, and generalises over the type of psychological state,

attitude, or stance, "meaning" seems to range (notably indicative vs. imperative). He formalises the

'reflexive' intention, and more importantly, the 'overtness' of communication in terms of a self

referential recursive intention that disallows any 'sneaky' intention to be brought into the picture of

meaning-constitutive intentions. 

1969

'Vacuous names,' in Donald Davidson and Jaako Hintikka, Words and objections: essays on the work
of W. V. Quine, Dordrecht, Reidel, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), BANC MSS 90/135c,
Berkeley. 

Keywords: identificatory use, non-identificatory use, subscript device. 

Davidson and Hintikka were well aware of the 'New-World' impact of the 'Old-World' ideas

displayed by Grice and Strawson in their attack to Quine. Quine had indeed addressed Grice's and

Strawson's 'sophisticated' version of the paradigm-case argument in "Word and Object." 

Davidson and Hintikka arranged to publish a special issue for a periodical publication, to which P. F.

Strawson had already contributed. It was only natural, when Davidson and Hintikka were informed

by Reidel of their interest in turning the special issue into a separate volume, that they would

approach the other infamous member of the dynamic duo! Commissioned by Donald Davidson and J.

Hintikka for Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine. Grice introduces a subscript
device to account for 'implicata' of utterances like "Marmaduke Bloggs won't be attending the party;
he was invented by the journalists." In the later section, he explores identificatory and non
identificatory uses of 'the' without involving himself in the problems Donnellan did! Some
philosophers, notably Ostertag, have found the latter section the most intriguing bit, and thus Ostertag
cared to reprint the section on Descriptions for his edited MIT volume on the topic. 

1970

'Presupposition and conversational implicature, 'Repr. in a revised form in Part II (Semantics and

metaphysics) to Studies in the Way of Words, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), BANC

MSS 90/135c, Berkeley. 

Soon after delivering in the New World his exploration on the implicatum, Grice has no better idea

than to promote Strawson's philosophy in the New World. Strawson will later reflect on the colder

shores of the Old World, so we know what Grice had in mind! Strawson's main claim to fame in the

New World (and at least Oxford in the Old World) was his "On referring," where he had had the

cheek to say that by uttering, "The king of France is not bald," the utterer IMPLIES that there is a

king of France. He later changed that to "the utterer PRESUPPOSES." So Grice knew what he was

dealing with. Grice and Strawson had entertained Quine at Oxford, and Strawson was particularly

keen on that turn of phrase he learned from Quine, 'the truth-value gap.' Grice, rather, found it pretty

repulsive: "Tertium exclusum!" So, Grice goes on to argue that by uttering 'The king of France is

bald,' one of the ENTAILMENTS of the proposition explicitly conveyed is indeed 'There is a king of

France.' However, in its negative co-relate, things change. By uttering 'The king of France ain't bald,'

the utterer merely IMPLICATES (in a pretty cancellable format) that he believes there is a king of

France. ("The king of France ain't bald: there's no king of France!"). 

1970

'The philosophy of perception: a retrospective, with G. J. Warnock,' The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC

MSS 90/135c,  The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Keywords: perception, the philosophy of perception, visum

Warnock was possibly the only philosopher at Oxford Grice felt congenial enough to engage in

different explorations in the so-called 'philosophy of perception.' Their joint adventures involved the

disimplicature of a 'visum.' Grice later approached sense data in more 'evolutionary' terms: a material

thing is to be vindicated transcendentally, in the sense that it is a material thing (and not a sense

datum or collection thereof) that nourishes a creature like a human. Grice was particularly grateful to

Warnock. By reprinting the full symposium on "The Causal Theory of Perception" in his influential

series of Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Warnock had spread Grice's lore of implicature all over!

1970

'Philosophy and 'ordinary' language,' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II, Carton 4, Folder 15 BANC

MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

Keywords: 'ordinary-language' philosophy

Grice is not really interested in 'ordinary' language as a philologist might. He SPOKE
'ordinary' language, he thought. The point had been brought to the fore by Austin. "If they think
philosophy is a play on words, well then, let's play the game." Grice's interest is methodological.
Malcolm had been claiming that 'ordinary language' is incorrigible. While Grice agreed that 'language
can be clever,' he knew that Aristotle was possibly right when he explored 'ta legomena' in terms of
the 'many' and the selected 'wise.'

1971

'Intention and uncertainty,' Proceedings of the British Academy, 57:263-269, The H. P. Grice Papers,

Series II (Essays), BANC MSS 90/135c, Berkeley. 

This is the Henriette Herz Trust annual lecture. Grice had been appointed a FBA in 1966, but he took

his time to deliver his lecture. He was motivated by Hampshire's and Hart's essay on intention and

certainty in "Mind." Grice manages to quote from Prichard (he calls himself a neo-Prichardian),

Anscombe (whom he otherwise would not count, although they shared a discussion table at the

American Philosophical Association), Kenny, and Pears. His most congenial approach was Pears's. 

1971

'Entailment,' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series IV (Associations) Carton 6, Folder 4, and Series V

(Topical), BANC MSS 90/135c,  The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley

Grice was interested in G. E. Moore's coinage of 'entailment' for logical consequence. As an analyst,

Grice knew that a true conceptual analysis needs to be reductive (if not reductionist). The prongs the

analyst lists are thus 'entailments' of the concept in question. Philosophers, however, may misidentify

what is an entailment for an implicature, or vice versa. Initially, Grice was interested in the second

family of cases. With his coinage of 'disimplicature,' he expanded his interest to cover the first family

of cases, too. Grice remained a philosophical methodologist: he is not so much concerned with any

area or discipline or philosophical concept per se (unless it's rationality), but with the misuses of

some tools in the philosophy of language as committed by some of his colleagues at Oxford. 

1971

'Ifs and cans,' The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of

California, Berkeley. 

Keyword: Austin.

Austin had brought the topic to the fore as an exploration of free will. D. F. Pears had noted that

'conversational' implicature may account for the conditional perfection ('if' yields 'iff'). Cfr. M. R.

Ayers on Austin on 'if' and 'can.'

1972

'Potching and cotching obbles,' The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,

University of California, Berkeley

Keyword: Pirotese.

Grice was fascinated by Carnap's "pirots" which karulise elatically. Grice adds 'potching' for

something like 'perceiving' and 'cotching' for something like 'cognising.' 

1973

'Identity' -- With G. Myro, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,

University of California, Berkeley. 

Keywords: identity, relative identity, the Grice-Myro theory of identity.

While Grice presupposes the use of "=" in his treatment of 'the' king of France, he also explores a

relativisation of "=." His motivation was an essay by Wiggins, almost Aristotelian in spirit, against

Strawson's criterion of space-time continuancy for the identification of the 'substantia prima.' Grice

wants to apply '=' to cases were the time continuancy is made explicit. This yields that "a = b" in

scenario S, but that it may not be the case that "a = b" in a second scenario S'. Myro had an occasion

to expand on Grice's views in his contribution on the topic for Philosophical Grounds of Rationality:

Intentions, Categories, Ends, or P. G. R. I. C. E. for short. Myro mentions his System Ghp, a highly

powerful/hopefully plausible version of Grice's System Q, "in gratitude to H. P. Grice."

1973

'Davidson on intending,' The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 92/135c, The Bancroft Library, The

University of California at Berkeley.

Grice's response to Davidson's pretty unfair use of Grice's notion of conversational implicature in

Davidson's analysis of intention caught a lot of interest. D. F. Pears loved Grice's reply. Implicatum

here is out of the question -- disimplicatum may not. Grice just saw that his theory of conversation is

TOO SOCIAL to be true when applied to 'intending.' The doxastic condition is one of the

ENTAILMENTS in an ascription of an intending. It cannot be cancelled as an implicatum can. If it

CAN be cancelled, it is best seen as a DISIMPLICATUM, or a loose use by an utterer meaning less

than what he says or explicitly conveys to more careful conversants. 

1974

'Disimplicature,' The H.P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University

of California, Berkeley.

Keyword: disimplicature.

If Grice's claim to fame is 'implicature,' he finds 'disimplicature' an intriguing notion to capture those

occasions when an utterer means LESS than he says. His examples include: a loose use of 'intending'

(without the entailment of the doxastic condition), the uses of 'see' in Shakespeareian contexts

("Macbeth saw Banquo," "Hamlet saw his father on the ramparts of Elsinore") and the use of "is" to

mean "seems" ("That tie is blue under this light, but green otherwise," when both conversants know

that a change of colour is out of the question. He plays with "You're the cream in my coffee" being an

utterance where the disimplicature (i.e. entailment dropping) is total. "Disimplicature" does not

appeal to a new principle of conversational rationality. It is perfectly accountable by the principle of

conversational helpfulness, in particular, the desideratum of conversational candour. 

1974

'Frege: words, and sentences,' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), BANC MSS 90/135c, Berkeley. 

Keywords: Frege

Frege was the topic of Dummett's explorations. A student of Grice's at Berkeley brought Dummett's "Frege" and told Grice that he intended to explore this. "Have you read it?" "No I haven't. And I hope I won't" was Grice's reply. Some authors have noted some similarities between Grice's notion of a 'conventional' implicature and Frege's rambles on 'colouring. Grice was more interested in the idea of a "Fregeian" sense. One of his metaphysical construction-routines (Humeian projection) is aimed at the generation of concepts, in most cases the 'rational reconstruction' of an intuitive concept displayed in 'ordinary discourse.'

1975

'Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre,' in The Conception of Value, Clarendon, repr. from The Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association.

Grice's method in functionalist philosophical psychology. Introduces pirotology as a creature-construction discipline. Repr. in The Conception of Value, it reached a wider audience. The essay is highly subdivided, and covers a lot of ground. Grice starts by noting that, contra Ryle, he wants to see psychological predicates as theoretical concepts. The kind of theory he is having in mind is 'folksy.' The first creature he introduces to apply his method is Toby, a squarrel, that is a reconstructed squirrel. Grice gives some principles of pirotology. Maxims of rational behaviour compound to form what he calls an immanuel, of which The Conversational Immanuel is a part. Grice concludes with a warning against the Devil of Scientism, but acknowledges perhaps he was giving much too credit to Myro's influence on this!

1975

'Logic and conversation,' n Davidson and Harman (1975), also in Cole and Morgan (1975), repr. in a
revised form in Grice (1989).

While the essay was also reprinted by Cole and Morgan, Grice always cited it from the Davidson's

and Harman's two-column reprint. Most people without a philosophical background first encounter

Grice through this essay.  Philosophers usually get first acquainted with his "In defence of a dogma,"

or "Meaning." In "Logic and Conversation," Grice re-utilises the notion of an implicatum and the

principle of conversational helpfulness that he had introduced at Oxford to a more select audience.

Grice's idea is that the observation of the principle of conversational helfpulness is rational

(reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who is concerned with the two goals which are central

to conversation (to give/receive information, to influence/be influenced) should be interested in

participating in a conversation that is only going to be profitable on the assumption that it is

conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational helfpulness. Grice's point is

methodological. He is not at all interested in conversational exchanges as such. Unfortunately, the

essay starts "in media res," and skips Grice's careful list of Oxonian examples of 'disregard' for the

key idea of what a conversant IMPLICATES by the conversational move he makes. His concession is

that there is an EXPLICATUM or EXPLICITUM (roughly, the logical form) which is beyond

pragmatic constraints. This concession is easily explained in terms of his overarching irreverent,

conservative, dissenting rationalism. 

1976

'Meaning revisited,' Repr. in Part II (Semantics and Metaphysics) to Studies in the Way of Words.

A fascinating exploration in three parts. In the first, he applies his modified occam's razor to "mean":

"Smoke means rain" and "I mean love," don't need different 'senses' of 'mean.' He was aware that that

was exactly the terminology he had adopted in both "Meaning" and the relevant William James

lectures (V and VI) at Harvard. In the second part he applies pirotology. We have a pirot feeling pain,

simulating it, and finally uttering, "I am in pain." In the concluding section, he sees 'meaning' as an

'optimum,' i.e. a value-paradeigmatic notion introducing 'value' in its guise of 'optimality.'

1976

'Russell and heterologicality,' The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,

University of California, Berkeley. 

Keywords: Russell, heterological.

Grice was particularly interested in Russell's philosophy because of the usual Oxonian antipathy

towards his type of philosophising. Being an irreverent conservative rationalist, Grice found in

Russell a good point for dissent!

1977

'Mill's induction,' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V, Carton 7, Folder 31, BANC MSS 90/135c,  The

Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. 

Keywords: Mill, induction.

Grice loved to reminisce an anecdote concerning his tutor Hardie at Corpus when Hardie invoked

Mill's principles to prove that Hardie was not responsible for a traffic jam. In drafts on word play,

Grice would speak of not bringing "more Grice to your Mill." Mill's System of Logic was part of the

reading material for his degree in Lit. Hum. at Oxford, so he was very familiar with it. Mill represents

the best of the English empiricist tradition. Grice kept an interest on inductive methodology. In his

"Life and opinions" he mentions some obscure essays by Kneale and Keynes on the topic. Grice was

interested in Kneale's 'secondary induction,' since Grice saw this as an application of a construction

routine. He was also interested in Keynes's  notion of a 'generator property,' which he found

metaphysically intriguing. 

1977

'The Immanuel Kant Memorial Lectures', Aspects of reason, Clarendon, Stanford, Redelivered as The

John Locke lectures, Repr. in Aspects of Reason. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, The Grice Collection

contains previous drafts of this. The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), Bancroft. 

Keyword: reasoning

Grice structures the lectures in the form of a philosophical dialogue with his audience. The first

lecture is intended to provide a bit of 'linguistic botanising' for 'reasonable,' and 'rational.' In later

lectures, Grice tackles 'reason' qua noun. The remaining lectures are meant to explore what he calls

the "Aequi-vocality" thesis: "must" has only ONE SENSE that crosses what he calls the 'doxastic'

'boulomaic' divide. He is especially concerned -- this being the Kant lectures -- with Kant's attempt to

reduce the categorical imperative to a 'counsel of prudence.' Kant re-introduces the Aristotelian idea

of 'eudaimonia.' While a further lecture on 'happiness' as the pursuit of a system of ends is NOT

strictly part of the either the Kant or the Locke lectures, it relates, since eudaimonia may be regarded

as the goal involved in the relevant imperative. 

1977

Reason and reasoning

As the title implies, Grice takes the verb, "to reason," as conceptually prior. A reasoner reasons,

briefly, from a premise to a conclusion. There are types of reason: flat reason and gradual reason. He

famously reports Shropshire, another tutee with Hardie, and his proof on the immortality of the

human soul. He makes some remarks on 'akrasia' as key, too. 

1977

Reason and reasons

If the first lecture was dedicated to an elucidation (and indeed attempt at a 'conceptual' analysis in

terms of intentions and doxastic conditions -- reasoner R intends that premise P yields conclusion C

and believes his intention will cause his entertaining of the conclusion from his entertaining the

premise), the second lecture, which takes up some earlier notes on linguistic botanising -- now in The

Grice Papers -- focuses on 'reason' qua noun. This leads to a THEORY of reasons as justificatory,

explanatory, and mixed. He makes use of the protreptic/exhibitive distinction, as he approaches an

allege divide between the boulomaic and the doxastic. 

1977

Practical and alethic reasons 

The boulomaic (or volitive) is a part of the soul; so is the doxatic (or judicative). Grice plays with

correlative operators: desirability versus probability. He invokes the 'exhibitive'/'protreptic' distinction

he had introduced in the fifth William James lecture, now applied to psychological attitudes

themselves.

1977

Further remarks on practical and alethic reasons

Grice's attempt is to tackle the Kantian problem in the Grundlegung: how to derive the categorical

imperative from a counsel of prudence. Under the assumption that the protasis is "Let the agent be

happy," Grice does not find it obtuse at all to construct a universalisable imperative out of a mere

'motive'-based counsel of prudence. 

1978

'Further notes on logic and conversation,' n Peter Cole (1978), repr. in a revised form in Grice (1989),

The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), BANC MSS 90/135c, Bancroft. 

Keywords: Modified Occam's Razor

The preferred citation should be Grice 1967:III.  This is originally the third William James lecture, in
a revised form. In that lecture, Grice introduced the "M. O. R.," or Modified Occam's Razor: "Senses
are not be multiplied beyond necessity." The point is that "ENTAILMENT-CUM-IMPLICATUM"
does the job that MULTIPLIED SENSES should not do!

1979

Proem, Aspects of reason, Clarendon, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC, Berkeley.

A special note on occasion of delivering his lectures on 'Aspects of reason and reasoning' at Oxford

as the John Locke Memorial Lectures at Merton. Particularly apt in mentioning his failing to obtain

the John Locke lectureship (Strawson did!), but feeling safe under Locke's aegis now

1979 

'Knowledge and belief,' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (Doctrines), Carton 5, Folder 18, BANC

MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Keywords: knowledge, belief.

The topic had attracted the attention of some Oxonian philosophers such as J. O. Urmson in

"Parenthetical verbs." Urmson speaks of a 'scale': "I know" can be used parenthetically, as "I believe"

can. For Grice, to utter "I believe" is obviously to make a weaker conversational move. The addressee

is thus allowed to infer that the utterer is not in a position to make the stronger claim. The mechanism

is explained via his principle of conversational helpfulness. 

1980

'Meaning revisited', Repr. in Part II (Semantics and metaphysics) to Studies in the Way of Words. 

A revision of Grice 1976, which should be the preferred citation. 

1980

'Socrates,' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (The Doctrines), Carton 5, Folder 31, BANC MSS

90/135c,  The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

Keyword: Socrates. 

Grice's most extensive published account of Socrates is in his commentary on Plato's Republic: a

'eschatological' comment, as he puts it. He has Socrates -- and the neo-Socrates -- exploring the logic

and grammar of 'just' against the attack by Thrasymachus -- and the neo-Thrasymachus. Grice's point

is that while the legal 'just' may be conceptually PRIOR to the moral 'just,' the moral 'just' is

evaluationally prior. 

1980

Some reflections about ends and happiness, in Aspects of Reason, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC
MSS 90/135c, Bancroft.

Grice is concerned with the specific system of ends that 'eudaimonia' consists for for both Kant and
Aristotle (or Kantotle for short). Grice borrows, but never returns, some reflections by his fomer
tuttee at St. John's, J. L. Ackrill. Ackrill's point is about the etymological basis for 'eudaimonia,' from
'eudaimon.' Grice thinks the metaphor should be disimplicated, and taken quite 'literally.' Grice
concludes with a set of ends that justify our ascription of 'eudaimonia' to the agent.

1981

'Presupposition and conversational implicature,' in Peter Cole (1981), repr. in a revised form in Grice
(1989).

Keywords: presupposition, conversational implicature

A reprint of Grice (1970), which should be the preferred citation. There are divergences in this draft,
though. The original source of this exploration was a seminar in 1970. Grice is interested in re

conceptualising Strawson's manoeuvre regarding 'presupposition' as involving what Grice disregards

as a metaphysical concoction: the truth-value gap. In Grice's view, based on a principle of

conversational 'tailoring' that falls under his principle of conversational helpfulness -- indeed under

the desideratum of conversational clarity ("be perspicuous [sic]") -- 'The king of France is bald'

ENTAILS there is a king of France; while 'The king of France ain't bald' merely IMPLICATES it. 

1982

'Meaning revisited,' In N. V. Smith, Mutual knowledge, Croom Helm, London. Repr. in Part II

(Semantics and Metaphysics) to Studies in the Way of Words.

An axiological approach to meaning. Strictly a reprint of Grice (1976), which should be the preferred

citation. 

1983

'The Paul Carus lectures,' repr. as The Conception of Value. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, The H. P.
Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), BANC MSS 90/135c, Bancroft. 

There were three Paul Carus lectures. The first is a review of J. L. Mackie's Inventing right and 
wrong; the second is an exploration on the categorical imperative, and its connection with a prior

hypothetical imperative; the third is a metaphysical defence of absolute value. 

1983

Value and objectivity, The Conception of Value, Clarendon, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS
90/135c, Bancroft. 

A discussion of J. L. Mackie's Inventing right and wrong. In the proceedings, Grice quotes the 'artless
sexism' of J. L. Austin in talking about the 'trouser words' in Sense and Sensibilia. Grice tackles all
the distinctions Mackie had played with: objective/subjective, absolute/relative,
categorical/hypothetical.

1983

Relative and absolute value, The Conception of value, Clarendon, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC
MSS 90/135c, Bancroft. 

An exploration on Paton on the categorical imperative. Grice had previously explored the logical
form of hypothetical imperatives in the Kant (and later Locke) lectures (notably Lecture IV, "Further
remarks on practical and alethic reasons"). Here he considers topics related to Hare's tropic-clistic
neustic-phrastic quartet. What does it mean that a command is conditional? The two successors of
Grice's post as Tutorial Fellow at St. John's, Baker and Hacker, will tackle the same issue with
humour, in "Sense and nonsense," published by Blackwell (too irreverent to be published by the
Clarendon). 

1983

Metaphysics and value, The Conception of Value, Clarendon, The H. P. Grice Papers, Bancroft. 

A metaphysical defence of absolute value. The topic fascinated Grice, and he invented a few routines
to cope with it. Humeian projection rationally reconstructs the intuitive concept 'being of value.'
Category shift allows to put a value such as Banbury's disinterestedness in subject form. But the most
important routine is that of Trans-Substantion, or Metousiosis. A human reconstructs as a rational
personal being, and alla Kantotle, whatever he judges is therefore 'of absolute value.' The issue
involves for Grice the introduction of a final cause: 'the final cause of a tiger is to tigerise,' the final
cause of a reasoner is to reason! And this entails absolute value, now metaphysically defended. 

1984

'Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of H. P. Grice, The H.P. Grice

Papers, BANC MSS 91/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

Most of this material was included as the second part of his "Reply to Richards." The life and

opinions are distinctly separated. Under 'Life,' Grice convers his initial conservative, irreverent

rationalism under his non-conformist father, his tutorials with Hardie at Corpus, and his associations

with J. L. Austin's Play Group. Under 'Opinions,' he mainly expands on 'ordinary-language'

philosophy and his way to the City of Eternal Truth. 

1984

Metaphysics, Philosophical Psychology, and Value,  in The Conception of Value, The H. P. Grice
Papers, BANC, Bancroft.

Part of his "Prejudices and predilections."

1985

'The unity of science and teleology,' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series IV (Associations), Carton 6,

Folder 9, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.

Keywords: unity of science, teleology.

"Unity of science" was a very "New-World" expression that Grice did not quite buy it. He was 

brought up in a world of 'two cultures.' Peter Winch and other philosophers were contesting the idea

that science is unitary, when it comes to the explanation of rational behaviour. Since a philosophical

approach to the explanation of rational behaviour, including conversational behaviour (to account for

the conversational implicata) is Grice's priority, he needs to distinguish himself from those who

propose a 'unified' science, which Grice regards as eliminationist and reductionist. 

1986

'Reply to Richards'

In Grandy/Warner, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends

pp. 45-108.

The 'Reply' is divided in sections. After a preamble displaying his gratitude for the volume in his 

honour, he turns to his 'prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of H. P.

Grice. The third section is a reply to the editors's overview of his work. The reply itself is subdivided

into questions of meaning and rationality, and questions of metaphysics and value. 

1986

'Actions and events'

The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

An examination of Davidson, followed by a Kantian approach to freedom and causation. 

1987

'Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy', repr. in Part II (Semantics and Metaphysics) to

Studies in the Way of Words.

An update to his "Post-war Oxford Philosophy." More generally concerned with the province of
philosophy in general and conceptual analysis beyond 'ordinary language.'

1987

'Retrospective Epilogue,' Repr. in Grice (1989), Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press.

Grice took the occasion of the compilation of his Studies in the Way of Words by Harvard to review
philosophical progress in terms of various 'strands' which however display a consistent unity. 

1987

'Foreword' to Studies in the Way of Words. 

Grice quotes from J. F. Bennett. 

1988

'Metaphysics, Philosophical eschatology, and Plato's Republic,' Repr. in Part II ("Semantics and 

Metaphysics") to Studies in the Way of Words. 

Eschatology is a sub-discipline of metaphysics concerned with what Grice calls a 'category shift.'

Grice, exploring an application of such a technique to Aristotle on 'friend,' applies it now to Socrates's

view, against Thrasymachus, that 'right' applies primarily to 'morality,' and secondarily to 'legality.'

1988

'Metaphysics and theorizing,' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft

Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Keywords: metaphysics, theorising

1988

'Aristotle on the multiplicity of being,' Posthumously edited by B. F. Loar.  Pacific Philosophical

Quarterly, The H. P. Grice Papers, Bancroft. 

The Grice Papers contains drafts of the essay eventually submitted for publication. 

Keywords: Aristotle, multiplicity, being, izzing, hazzing.  

***

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***

REFERENCES

Austin, J. L. How to do things with words.
Austin, J. L. Sense and sensibilia, ed. by G. J. Warnock.
Austin, J. L. Philosophical Papers, ed. by G. J. Warnock and J. O. Urmson
Bostock, D. On Grice. 
Grice, H. P. Studies in the way of words.
Grice, H. P. The conception of value. Clarendon.
Grice, H. P. Aspects of reason. Clarendon. 
Hampshire, S. N. Thought and action. 
Hampshire, S. N. On Grice
Hare, R. M. The language of morals. Clarendon. 
Hare, R. M. On Grice. Mind. 
Nowell-Smith, P. H. Ethics.
Nowell-Smith, P. H. Contextual Implication
Nowell-Smith, P. F. On Grice. 
Over, D. E. On Grice.
Peacocke, C. A. B. On Grice
Pears, D. F. Ifs and cans. 
Pears, D. F.  Questions in philosophical psychology. London: Duckworth.
Richardson, G. Grice. 
Ryle, G. The concept of mind. Hutchinson's University Library. 
Strawson, P. F. Introduction to logical theory.
Strawson, P. F. Individuals: an essay in descriptive metaphysics. 
Strawson, P. F. Review of Grice, Studies in the Way of Words. 
Strawson, P. F. Grice. Proceedings of the British Academy.
Thomson, J. F. Conditionals. The Journal of Philosophy
Urmson, J. O. Philosophical analysis
Urmson, J. O. H. P. Grice, The Independent. 
Urmson, J. O. On Grice.
Warnock, G. J. English Philosophy, Clarendon. 
Warnock, G. J. The philosophy of perception, Oxford. 
Woozley, A. D. On Grice.