H. P. Grice
St. John's, Oxford
***
The H. P. Grice Papers
The H. P. Grice Papers consist of the publications, unpublications, correspondence by English philosopher H. P. Grice, during his years at Corpus Christi, Merton and St. John's, Oxford, and beyond.
Also included are extensive notes and research Grice conducts on theories of semantics and theories of reason, trust, and value.
Grice's most popular lectures, including The John Locke Lectures at Oxford, The William James Lectures at Harvrd, The Paul Carus Lectures, Urbana lectures, and The Immanuel Kant Lectures at Stanford are all documented as drafts and finalised forms of transcripts, and audio files within the collection.
H. P. Grice's list of contributions during his philosophical career include The William James Lectures at Harvard, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," The Urbana Lectures," "Logic and Conversation," The Immanuel Kant Lectures at Stanford, The John Locke Lectures at Oxfford, and The Carus Lectures.
Grice's publications and unpublications are compilations of his extensive research performed in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, Aristotelian philosophy, philosophical psychology, and ethics.
Grice is also attributed with coining the word "implicature" to describe a dimension of utterer's meaning, and for defining his own paradox known as "Grice's paradox," introduced in Grice's "Studies in the Way of Words," a compilation of his essays.
Included in the H. P. Grice collection is Grice's research on Aristotelian philosophy with J. Baker and metaphysics with G. Myro, his other research focusing on philosopical psychology, with such subjects as perception and intention.
Also included is documentation of Grice's involvement with The Aristotelian Socieety, The British Academy, and The American Philosophical Association.
Container List
Series I
The Correspondence of H. P. Grice
Physical Description:
Carton 1 (folders 1-15)
Carton 1 (folders 1-15)
The correspondence of H. P. Grice is arranged alphabetically according to surname, followed by correspondence of a more general kind.
Scope and Content
Note
Note
Series I, The Correspondence of H. P. Grice includes correspondence with philosophers such as J. Baker, G. P. Bealer, R. O. Warner, and R. Wyatt, addressing various forms of his research on philosophy.
Carton 1, Folder 1
Correspondenc with J. F. Bennett, of Oxford.
Carton 1, Folder 2
Correspondence with J. Baker
Carton 1, Folder 3
Correspondence with G. P. Bealer
Carton 1, Folder 4
Correspondence with A. D. Code
Carton 1, Folders 5-6
Correspondence with P. Suppes
Carton 1, Folders 7-8
Correspondence with R. O. Warner,
Carton 1, Folder 9
Correspondence with R. Wyatt
Carton 1, Folders 10-12
Correspondence: Other.
Carton 1, Folders 13-14
Correspondence: Other.
Carton 1, Folder 15
Various published papers on Grice 1968
***
Series II
Selected publications
Physical Description: Carton 1 (folders 16-31), Cartons 2-4
The essays are arranged chronologically.
However, for those "n. d." publications, the order is alphabetical by keyword and/or title.
However, for those "n. d." publications, the order is alphabetical by keyword and/or title.
Scope and Content Note
Series II includes published papers, but also drafts and notes that accompany their publication of the essays, unpublished essays, along with their drafts and/or notes, and published transcripts of his various lectures (William James, Urbana, Carus, John Locke).
Also included is Grice's volume "Studies in the Way of Words" which is compilation of essays, including, "Meaning," "Utterer's Meaning," and "Logic and Conversation."
Also included is Grice's volume "Studies in the Way of Words" which is compilation of essays, including, "Meaning," "Utterer's Meaning," and "Logic and Conversation."
Carton 1, Folder 16
"Meaning"
The Oxford Philosophical Society.
AUTHORS CITED:
STEVENSON, C. L.
"Meaning" developed out of an interest by H. P. Grice on the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. In his essays on Peirce, Grice quotes from many other authors, including, besides Peirce, Ogden and Richards, and Ewing.
***
The Oxford Philosophical Society.
AUTHORS CITED:
STEVENSON, C. L.
"Meaning" developed out of an interest by H. P. Grice on the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. In his essays on Peirce, Grice quotes from many other authors, including, besides Peirce, Ogden and Richards, and Ewing.
***
Carton 1, Folders 17-18
"Meaning Revisited"
This is the title H. P. Grice chose for a contribution to a symposium at Brighton organised by N. V. Smith.
It comprises three sections.
Grice is concerned with the application of his "M. O. R.," or "Modified Occam's Razor" to the lexeme, "mean."
The also explores an 'evolutionary' model of creature construction reaching a stage of non-iconic representation.
Finally, Grice attempts to construct 'meaning' as a 'value-paradeigmatic' notion.
This is the title H. P. Grice chose for a contribution to a symposium at Brighton organised by N. V. Smith.
It comprises three sections.
Grice is concerned with the application of his "M. O. R.," or "Modified Occam's Razor" to the lexeme, "mean."
The also explores an 'evolutionary' model of creature construction reaching a stage of non-iconic representation.
Finally, Grice attempts to construct 'meaning' as a 'value-paradeigmatic' notion.
Carton 1, Folder 19
Oxford Philosophy - Linguistic Botanising
By "Oxford Philosophy," H. P. Grice notably refers to J. L. Austin's Play Group, of which he was a member.
This, to some, infamous, playgroup, met on Saturday mornings at different venues at Oxford, including Grice's own St. John's -- apparently, Austin's favourite venue.
Austin regarded himself and his 'kindergarten' as 'linguistic' or 'language' *botanists*.
The idea was to list various 'ordinary' uses of this or that 'philosophical notion."
Austin: "They say philosophy is about language; well, then, let's botanise!"
By "Oxford Philosophy," H. P. Grice notably refers to J. L. Austin's Play Group, of which he was a member.
This, to some, infamous, playgroup, met on Saturday mornings at different venues at Oxford, including Grice's own St. John's -- apparently, Austin's favourite venue.
Austin regarded himself and his 'kindergarten' as 'linguistic' or 'language' *botanists*.
The idea was to list various 'ordinary' uses of this or that 'philosophical notion."
Austin: "They say philosophy is about language; well, then, let's botanise!"
Carton 1, Folder 20
"Descartes on 'Clear and Distinct Perception'"
H. P. Grice is interested in contesting A. J. Ayer and other Oxford philosophers on the topic of a criterion for 'certainty,' and choses Descartes's time-honoured criterion of 'clarity' and 'distinction,' as applied to perception. In the proceedings, Grice distinguishes between two 'kinds' of certainty apparently ignored by Descartes:
OBJECTIVE CERTAINTY:
It is certain that p.
SUBJECTIVE CERTAINTY:
I am certain that p.
H. P. Grice is interested in contesting A. J. Ayer and other Oxford philosophers on the topic of a criterion for 'certainty,' and choses Descartes's time-honoured criterion of 'clarity' and 'distinction,' as applied to perception. In the proceedings, Grice distinguishes between two 'kinds' of certainty apparently ignored by Descartes:
OBJECTIVE CERTAINTY:
It is certain that p.
SUBJECTIVE CERTAINTY:
I am certain that p.
Carton 1, Folders 21-23
"Logic and Conversation"
Moved by P. F. Strawson's treatment of the 'formal' devices in "Introduction to Logical Theory," Grice targets these, in their 'ordinary-discourse' counterparts.
Grice attempts to reconcile Strawson's observations with the idea that the 'formal' devices reproduce some sort of 'explicatum,' or 'explicitum,' as identified by Whitehead and Russell in "Principia Mathematica."
In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general features of discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation.
The alleged divergence between the 'ordinary-language' operators and their 'formal' counterparts is explained in terms of the CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATA, then. I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has to ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal device and its alleged 'ordinary-language' counterpart, while still assuming that U is engaged in a co-operative transaction.
Utterer and addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation -- the exchange of information and the institution of decisions -- and judging that conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and rational) if conducted under some form of principle of 'conversational helpfulness.'
Moved by P. F. Strawson's treatment of the 'formal' devices in "Introduction to Logical Theory," Grice targets these, in their 'ordinary-discourse' counterparts.
Grice attempts to reconcile Strawson's observations with the idea that the 'formal' devices reproduce some sort of 'explicatum,' or 'explicitum,' as identified by Whitehead and Russell in "Principia Mathematica."
In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general features of discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation.
The alleged divergence between the 'ordinary-language' operators and their 'formal' counterparts is explained in terms of the CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATA, then. I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has to ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal device and its alleged 'ordinary-language' counterpart, while still assuming that U is engaged in a co-operative transaction.
Utterer and addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation -- the exchange of information and the institution of decisions -- and judging that conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and rational) if conducted under some form of principle of 'conversational helpfulness.'
"The observation of a principle of conversational helpfulness is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: anyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participating in a conversation that will be profitable ONLY on the assumption that it is conducted in general accordance with a principle of conversational helpfulness."
Carton 1, Folders 24-26
The William James Lectures
Grice entitled the set as being "Logic and Conversation." That is the title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing that it was way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the second lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and Harman, "Logic and Grammar."
***
Grice entitled the set as being "Logic and Conversation." That is the title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing that it was way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the second lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and Harman, "Logic and Grammar."
***
Carton 1, Folder 27
"Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning"
This is the sixth William James lecture, as published in "The Foundations of Language."
As it happens, it became a popular lecture, seeing that J. R. Searle selected this from the whole set for his Oxford reading in philosophy, "The philosophy of language."
It is also the essay cited by Chomsky in his influential John Locke lectures.
Chomsky takes Grice to be a 'behaviourist,' even along Skinner's lines, which provoked a reply by Suppes, later reprinted in P. G. R. I. C. E., or Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends.
(In The New World, the "H. P." was often given in a more "simplified" form.)
This is the sixth William James lecture, as published in "The Foundations of Language."
As it happens, it became a popular lecture, seeing that J. R. Searle selected this from the whole set for his Oxford reading in philosophy, "The philosophy of language."
It is also the essay cited by Chomsky in his influential John Locke lectures.
Chomsky takes Grice to be a 'behaviourist,' even along Skinner's lines, which provoked a reply by Suppes, later reprinted in P. G. R. I. C. E., or Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends.
(In The New World, the "H. P." was often given in a more "simplified" form.)
Carton 1, Folders 28-30
"Utterer's Meaning and Intentions"
This is the fifth William James lecture. Grice was careful enough to submit it to "The Philosophical Review," since it is a strictly philosophical development of the views expressed in "Meaning" which Strawson had submitted on Grice's behalf to the same "Review" and which had had a series of responses by various philosophers
Among these philosophers is Strawson himself in "Intention and convention in the the theory of speech acts," also in "The Philosophical Review."
Grice quotes from very many other philosophers in this essay, including:
J. O. Urmson
D. W. Stampe
S. R. Schiffer
J. R. Searle
***
This is the fifth William James lecture. Grice was careful enough to submit it to "The Philosophical Review," since it is a strictly philosophical development of the views expressed in "Meaning" which Strawson had submitted on Grice's behalf to the same "Review" and which had had a series of responses by various philosophers
Among these philosophers is Strawson himself in "Intention and convention in the the theory of speech acts," also in "The Philosophical Review."
Grice quotes from very many other philosophers in this essay, including:
J. O. Urmson
D. W. Stampe
S. R. Schiffer
J. R. Searle
***
Carton 1, Folder 31
"Vacuous Names"
This is an essay commissioned by Donald Davison and Jaako Hintikka for "Words and objects: essays in the work of W. V. Quine" for Reidel.
"Words and objects" had appeared (without Grice's contribution) as a special issue of "Synthese." Grice's contribution, along with Quine's "Reply to H. P. Grice," appeared only in the reprint of that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht.
Grice cites from various philosophers (and logicians -- this was the time when logic was starting to be taught OUTSIDE philosophy departments, or 'sub-faculties'), such as
G. Myro
B. Mates
K. S. Donnellan
P. F. Strawson
This is an essay commissioned by Donald Davison and Jaako Hintikka for "Words and objects: essays in the work of W. V. Quine" for Reidel.
"Words and objects" had appeared (without Grice's contribution) as a special issue of "Synthese." Grice's contribution, along with Quine's "Reply to H. P. Grice," appeared only in the reprint of that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht.
Grice cites from various philosophers (and logicians -- this was the time when logic was starting to be taught OUTSIDE philosophy departments, or 'sub-faculties'), such as
G. Myro
B. Mates
K. S. Donnellan
P. F. Strawson
Carton 2, Folders 1-4
"Vacuous Names"
Grice takes the opportunity, in his tribute to Quine, to introduce one of two of his syntactical devices to allow for conversational implicata to be given maximal scope.
The device in "Vacuous Names" is a subscription device to indicate the ordering of introduction of this or that operation.
Grice wants to give room for utterances of a special 'existential' kind be deemed rational/reasonable, provided the principle of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the addressee to be followed by the utterer.
"Someone isn't attending the party organised by the Merseyside Geographical Society."
"That is Marmaduke Bloggs, who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees."
"But who, as it happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at The Merseyside Newsletter."
Grice takes the opportunity, in his tribute to Quine, to introduce one of two of his syntactical devices to allow for conversational implicata to be given maximal scope.
The device in "Vacuous Names" is a subscription device to indicate the ordering of introduction of this or that operation.
Grice wants to give room for utterances of a special 'existential' kind be deemed rational/reasonable, provided the principle of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the addressee to be followed by the utterer.
"Someone isn't attending the party organised by the Merseyside Geographical Society."
"That is Marmaduke Bloggs, who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees."
"But who, as it happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at The Merseyside Newsletter."
Carton 2, Folders 5-7
Urbana Lectures
Grice continues with the elaboration of a formal calculus. He originally baptised it "System Q" in honour of Quine.
At a later stage, Myro will re-name it "System G," in a special version, "System GHP," a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of System G," "in gratitude to Grice."
Grice continues with the elaboration of a formal calculus. He originally baptised it "System Q" in honour of Quine.
At a later stage, Myro will re-name it "System G," in a special version, "System GHP," a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of System G," "in gratitude to Grice."
Carton 2, Folder 8
Urbana Lectures (continued).
Carton 2, Folders 9-10
"Intention and Uncertainty"
This is the Henriette Herz British Academy lecture, and as such published in The Proceedings of the British Academy.
Grice calls himself a neo-Prichardian (after the Oxford philosopher) and cares to quote from a few other philosophers -- some of whom he was not necessarily associated with: such as Kenny and Anscombe, and some of whom he was, notably D. F. Pears.
Grice quotes Pears as a philosopher he found especially congenial to explore areas in what both called 'philosophical psychology,' notably the tricky use of 'intending' as made by a few philosophers even in their own circle (such as Hampshire and Hart in "Intention, decision, and certainty."
The title of Grice's lecture is meant to provoke those philosophers who were too ready to bring in 'certainty' in an area that requires deep philosophical exploration.
This is the Henriette Herz British Academy lecture, and as such published in The Proceedings of the British Academy.
Grice calls himself a neo-Prichardian (after the Oxford philosopher) and cares to quote from a few other philosophers -- some of whom he was not necessarily associated with: such as Kenny and Anscombe, and some of whom he was, notably D. F. Pears.
Grice quotes Pears as a philosopher he found especially congenial to explore areas in what both called 'philosophical psychology,' notably the tricky use of 'intending' as made by a few philosophers even in their own circle (such as Hampshire and Hart in "Intention, decision, and certainty."
The title of Grice's lecture is meant to provoke those philosophers who were too ready to bring in 'certainty' in an area that requires deep philosophical exploration.
Carton 2, Folder 11
"Probability, Desirability, and Mode Operators"
Grice had been freely using the very English 'mood' until J. M. E Moravsik, of all people, corrected him:
"What you mean ain't a 'mood.'"
"I shall call it 'mode' just to please you, J. M. E."
Grice had been freely using the very English 'mood' until J. M. E Moravsik, of all people, corrected him:
"What you mean ain't a 'mood.'"
"I shall call it 'mode' just to please you, J. M. E."
Carton 2, Folders 12-13
The Paul Carus Lectures on the conception of value.
Carton 2, Folders 14-16
The Paul Carus Lectures on the conception of value.
Grice was undecided as to what his Paul Carus lectures were be on.
He had explored 'meaning' under its 'value' "optimality" guise in "Meaning revisited."
Grice thought that introducing 'value-paradeigmatic' notions would allow him to respond in a more apt way to what some critics were raising as a possible 'vicious circle' in his approach to 'semantic' and 'psychological' notions.
The Carus lectures are then dedicated to the 'construction,' alla Hume, of 'value-paradeigmatic' notions, and value itself.
Grice starts by quoting Austin and J. L. Mackie, of Oxford.
The lectures are intended to a general audience, provided it is a *philosophical* general audience!
Most of the second lecture is Grice's subtle exploration of Kant's categorical imperative, with which he had struggled in the last John Locke lecture on aspects of reasoning -- notably the 'reduction' of the categorical imperative to this or that 'counsel of prudence' with an implicated protasis to the effect that the agent is aiming at 'eudaimonia.'
Grice was undecided as to what his Paul Carus lectures were be on.
He had explored 'meaning' under its 'value' "optimality" guise in "Meaning revisited."
Grice thought that introducing 'value-paradeigmatic' notions would allow him to respond in a more apt way to what some critics were raising as a possible 'vicious circle' in his approach to 'semantic' and 'psychological' notions.
The Carus lectures are then dedicated to the 'construction,' alla Hume, of 'value-paradeigmatic' notions, and value itself.
Grice starts by quoting Austin and J. L. Mackie, of Oxford.
The lectures are intended to a general audience, provided it is a *philosophical* general audience!
Most of the second lecture is Grice's subtle exploration of Kant's categorical imperative, with which he had struggled in the last John Locke lecture on aspects of reasoning -- notably the 'reduction' of the categorical imperative to this or that 'counsel of prudence' with an implicated protasis to the effect that the agent is aiming at 'eudaimonia.'
Carton 2, Folders 17-18
"Reply to Davidson on 'Intending'"
Davidson, not being Oxonian, was perhaps not acquainted with Grice's polemics at Oxford with Hart and Hampshire (where Grice sided with Pears, rather).
Grice and Pears hold a 'minimalist' approach to 'intending.'
On the other hand, Davidson makes what Grice sees as 'the same mistake' again of BUILDING 'certainty' into the concept.
Grice finds that to apply the idea of a conversational IMPLICATUM at this point is 'too social to be true.'
Rather, Grice prefers to coin the conversational DISIMPLICATUM:
Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees.
The utterance above, if merely reporting what Bloggs thinks, may involve a 'loose' use of "intends."
The certainty on the agent's part on the success of his enterprise is thus cast with doubt.
Davidson was claiming that the agent's belief in the probability of the object of the agent's intention was a mere conversational IMPLICATUM on the utterer's part.
Grice responds that the ascription of such a belief is an ENTAILMENT of a strict use of 'intend,' even if, in cases where the utterer aims at a conversational DISIMPLICATUM, it can be 'dropped.'
The addressee will still regard the utterer as abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness.
Keywords: INTENDING, BELIEVING.
Davidson, not being Oxonian, was perhaps not acquainted with Grice's polemics at Oxford with Hart and Hampshire (where Grice sided with Pears, rather).
Grice and Pears hold a 'minimalist' approach to 'intending.'
On the other hand, Davidson makes what Grice sees as 'the same mistake' again of BUILDING 'certainty' into the concept.
Grice finds that to apply the idea of a conversational IMPLICATUM at this point is 'too social to be true.'
Rather, Grice prefers to coin the conversational DISIMPLICATUM:
Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees.
The utterance above, if merely reporting what Bloggs thinks, may involve a 'loose' use of "intends."
The certainty on the agent's part on the success of his enterprise is thus cast with doubt.
Davidson was claiming that the agent's belief in the probability of the object of the agent's intention was a mere conversational IMPLICATUM on the utterer's part.
Grice responds that the ascription of such a belief is an ENTAILMENT of a strict use of 'intend,' even if, in cases where the utterer aims at a conversational DISIMPLICATUM, it can be 'dropped.'
The addressee will still regard the utterer as abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness.
Keywords: INTENDING, BELIEVING.
Carton 2, Folders 19-21
"Method in Philosophical Psychology: from the banal to the bizarre"
Grice wasn't sure what his presidential address to the American Philosophical Association will be about.
He chose "the banal" (i.e. the 'ordinary-language' counterpart of something like a 'need' we ascribe to a squirrel to gobble nuts) and the 'bizarre': the philosopher's construction of 'need' and other 'psychological,' now theoretical terms.
In the proceedings, Grice creates the discipline of 'pirotology.'
He cares to mention very many philosophers: Aristotle, D. K. Lewis, G. Myro, L. Witters, F. R. Ramsey, G. Ryle, and a few others!
The essay became popular when, of all people, Ned Block, cited it as a programme in 'functionalism,' which it is!
Grice wasn't sure what his presidential address to the American Philosophical Association will be about.
He chose "the banal" (i.e. the 'ordinary-language' counterpart of something like a 'need' we ascribe to a squirrel to gobble nuts) and the 'bizarre': the philosopher's construction of 'need' and other 'psychological,' now theoretical terms.
In the proceedings, Grice creates the discipline of 'pirotology.'
He cares to mention very many philosophers: Aristotle, D. K. Lewis, G. Myro, L. Witters, F. R. Ramsey, G. Ryle, and a few others!
The essay became popular when, of all people, Ned Block, cited it as a programme in 'functionalism,' which it is!
Carton 2, Folders 22-23
"Two Chapters on Incontinence"
Grice prefers 'akrasia,' but he is happy to use Cicero's translation of this.
For Grice, 'akrasia' has to be accounted for by a theory of rationality from the start.
Grice is interested in both the common-or-garden 'boulomaic' version of akrasia, involving the volitive 'soul,' and 'alethic' or doxastic 'akrasia,' involing the judicative soul proper.
Grice prefers 'akrasia,' but he is happy to use Cicero's translation of this.
For Grice, 'akrasia' has to be accounted for by a theory of rationality from the start.
Grice is interested in both the common-or-garden 'boulomaic' version of akrasia, involving the volitive 'soul,' and 'alethic' or doxastic 'akrasia,' involing the judicative soul proper.
Carton 2, Folder 24
"Further Notes on Logic and Conversation"
This is the third William James lecture at Harvard.
It is particularly useful for Grice's introduction of his 'razor,' "M. O. R.," or "Modified Occam's Razor," jocularly expressed by Grice as:
"Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity."
An Englishing of the Ockham's Latinate:
"Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem."
Carton 2, Folder 25
It is particularly useful for Grice's introduction of his 'razor,' "M. O. R.," or "Modified Occam's Razor," jocularly expressed by Grice as:
"Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity."
An Englishing of the Ockham's Latinate:
"Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem."
Carton 2, Folder 25
"Presupposition and Conversational Implicature"
Grice thought, and rightly, too, that if his notion of the conversational implicatum was to gain Oxonian currency, it should supersede Strawson's idea of the 'prae-suppositum.'
Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with Quine's idea of a 'truth-value gap.'
Grice shows that neither the metaphysical concoction of a truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the 'prae-suppositum' is needed:
"The king of France is bald"
ENTAILS 'There is a king of France."
"The king of France ain't bald."
on the other hand, merely IMPLICATES it, as a perfectly adequate cancellation, abiding with the principle of conversational helpfulness" is in the offing:
"The king of France ain't bald. What made you think he is? For starters, he ain't real!"
Grice thought, and rightly, too, that if his notion of the conversational implicatum was to gain Oxonian currency, it should supersede Strawson's idea of the 'prae-suppositum.'
Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with Quine's idea of a 'truth-value gap.'
Grice shows that neither the metaphysical concoction of a truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the 'prae-suppositum' is needed:
"The king of France is bald"
ENTAILS 'There is a king of France."
"The king of France ain't bald."
on the other hand, merely IMPLICATES it, as a perfectly adequate cancellation, abiding with the principle of conversational helpfulness" is in the offing:
"The king of France ain't bald. What made you think he is? For starters, he ain't real!"
Carton 2, Folders 26-28
"Freedom and Morality in Kant's Foundations"
By "Foundations," Grice obviously means Kant's essay.
Grice preferred to quote Kant in English. The reason being that Grice was practising "ordinary-language" philosophy; and you cannot expect much 'linguistic botany' in a language other than your own!
Kant was not too 'ordinary' in his use of German, either!
The English translations that Grice used captured, in a way, all that Grice thought was worth capturing in Kant's philosophy.
Kant was not your 'standard' philosopher in the programme Grice was familiar with: Lit. Hum. Oxon.
However, Kant was popular in The New World, where Grice lectured profusely.
Carton 2, Folders 29-30
Grice preferred to quote Kant in English. The reason being that Grice was practising "ordinary-language" philosophy; and you cannot expect much 'linguistic botany' in a language other than your own!
Kant was not too 'ordinary' in his use of German, either!
The English translations that Grice used captured, in a way, all that Grice thought was worth capturing in Kant's philosophy.
Kant was not your 'standard' philosopher in the programme Grice was familiar with: Lit. Hum. Oxon.
However, Kant was popular in The New World, where Grice lectured profusely.
Carton 2, Folders 29-30
John Locke Lectures "Aspects of Reason"
It was slightly ironic that Grice had delivered these lectures as the Rationalist Kant lectures at Stanford.
He was honoured to be invited to Oxford. Officially, to be a John Locke lecture you have to be *visiting* Oxford.
While Grice was a fellow of St. John's, he was still most welcome to give his set of lectures on reasoning at the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy.
He quotes very many authors, including Locke! In his "proemium," Grice notes that while he was rejected the Locke scholarship back in the day, he was extremely happy to be under Locke's aegis now!
It was slightly ironic that Grice had delivered these lectures as the Rationalist Kant lectures at Stanford.
He was honoured to be invited to Oxford. Officially, to be a John Locke lecture you have to be *visiting* Oxford.
While Grice was a fellow of St. John's, he was still most welcome to give his set of lectures on reasoning at the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy.
He quotes very many authors, including Locke! In his "proemium," Grice notes that while he was rejected the Locke scholarship back in the day, he was extremely happy to be under Locke's aegis now!
Carton 3, Folders 1-5
Actions and Events
Davidson had published some stuff on 'actions' and 'events,' or 'events and actions,' actually. Davidson's point was that
p.q
It is raining, and it is pouring.
denotes EVENTS. But "Smith went fishing" denotes an 'action,' which is a kind of 'event.'
However, Davidson is fighting against your intuition, if you are a follower of Whitehead and Russell, to symbolise the "Smith" sentence as:
Fs
where 's' stands for Smith and F for 'fishing.'
The logical form of 'event' reports and 'action' reports seems to be slightly more complicated. Davidson's point especially involved 'adverbs':
The horse runs fast
----
Therefore, the horse runs
Grice explores all these topics and submits the thing to "The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly."
He quotes vary many philosophers, not just Davidson, including: Reichenbach, Robinson, and Kant.
Carton 3, Folder 6
Postwar Oxford Philosophy
By "post-war Oxford philosophy," Grice meant the period he was interested in.
While he had been at Corpus, Merton, and St. John's in the pre-war days, for some reason, he felt that he had made history in the post-war period.
The historical reason Grice gives is understandable enough.
In the pre-war days, Grice was the good student and the new fellow of St. John's -- the other one was Mabbott.
But he had not been able to engage in philosophical discussion much, other than with other tutees of Hardie.
AFTER the war, Grice joins Austin's "Saturday mornings."
Indeed, for Grice, 'post-war' means "all philosophy after the war," since he never abandoned the methods he developed under Austin, which were pretty congenial to the ones he had himself displayed in the pre-war days, in essays like "Negation" and "Personal Identity."
By "post-war Oxford philosophy," Grice meant the period he was interested in.
While he had been at Corpus, Merton, and St. John's in the pre-war days, for some reason, he felt that he had made history in the post-war period.
The historical reason Grice gives is understandable enough.
In the pre-war days, Grice was the good student and the new fellow of St. John's -- the other one was Mabbott.
But he had not been able to engage in philosophical discussion much, other than with other tutees of Hardie.
AFTER the war, Grice joins Austin's "Saturday mornings."
Indeed, for Grice, 'post-war' means "all philosophy after the war," since he never abandoned the methods he developed under Austin, which were pretty congenial to the ones he had himself displayed in the pre-war days, in essays like "Negation" and "Personal Identity."
Carton 3, Folders 7-21
"Studies in the Way of Words"
This is the title Grice eventually chooses for his compilation of essays. It is a tribute to Locke.
The 'studies' are organised in two Parts. Part I is "Logic and Conversation" and Part II in "Semantics and Metaphysics."
This is the title Grice eventually chooses for his compilation of essays. It is a tribute to Locke.
The 'studies' are organised in two Parts. Part I is "Logic and Conversation" and Part II in "Semantics and Metaphysics."
Carton 3, Folders 22-25
"Retrospective Foreword"
Grice drops a few words as a 'foreword,' explaining the ordering of essays. He mentions that he hesitated to follow Bennett's suggestion to order the essays chronologically.
Rather, he chose to just publish the whole set of seven William James lectures as Part I.
Part II is organised more or less thematically, though.
Grice drops a few words as a 'foreword,' explaining the ordering of essays. He mentions that he hesitated to follow Bennett's suggestion to order the essays chronologically.
Rather, he chose to just publish the whole set of seven William James lectures as Part I.
Part II is organised more or less thematically, though.
Carton 3, Folder 26
"Retrospective Epilogue"
This is a long exploration by Grice on the many 'strands' he identifies in his own philosophy.
'Strand' should not mislead us.
For Grice, philosophy, like virtue, is entire.
All the strands therefore show some 'latitudinal,' and we hope, 'longitudinal' unity.
By these two types of 'unity,' Grice means the obvious idea that all sub-disciplines of philosophy (philosophy of language, philosophy of perception, philosophical psychology, etc.) interact, and that a historical regard for one's predecessors is a must.
This is a long exploration by Grice on the many 'strands' he identifies in his own philosophy.
'Strand' should not mislead us.
For Grice, philosophy, like virtue, is entire.
All the strands therefore show some 'latitudinal,' and we hope, 'longitudinal' unity.
By these two types of 'unity,' Grice means the obvious idea that all sub-disciplines of philosophy (philosophy of language, philosophy of perception, philosophical psychology, etc.) interact, and that a historical regard for one's predecessors is a must.
Carton 4, Folder 1
"Retrospective Epilogue"
Carton 4, Folder 2
"Retrospective Epilogue and Foreword"
Carton 4, Folders 3-4
"Metaphysics, Philosophical Eschatology, and Plato's Republic"
Grice has one specific essay on Aristotle (published in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly). So he thought Plato merited his own essay, too.
Grice is concerned with a neo-Socratic (versus neo-Thrasymachean) account of 'moral' justice as conceptually prior to 'legal' justice.
In the proceeding, he creates 'philosophical eschatology' as the OTHER branch to metaphysics (along with ontology).
To say that 'just' crosses a categorial barrier (from the moral to the legal) is to utter a metaphysical, strictly eschatological, pronouncement.
Grice has one specific essay on Aristotle (published in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly). So he thought Plato merited his own essay, too.
Grice is concerned with a neo-Socratic (versus neo-Thrasymachean) account of 'moral' justice as conceptually prior to 'legal' justice.
In the proceeding, he creates 'philosophical eschatology' as the OTHER branch to metaphysics (along with ontology).
To say that 'just' crosses a categorial barrier (from the moral to the legal) is to utter a metaphysical, strictly eschatological, pronouncement.
Carton 4, Folder 5
Grice Reprints
Carton 4, Folder 6
"Aristotle on Being and Good"
Grice will explore Aristotle on 'being' in explorations with A. D. Code.
Grice comes up with 'izzing' and 'hazzing' as the two counterparts to Aristotle's views on, respectively, essential and non-essential predication.
Grice's views on Aristotle on 'the good' connect with Grice's Aristotelian idea of 'eudaimonia,' that he explores elsewhere.
Grice will explore Aristotle on 'being' in explorations with A. D. Code.
Grice comes up with 'izzing' and 'hazzing' as the two counterparts to Aristotle's views on, respectively, essential and non-essential predication.
Grice's views on Aristotle on 'the good' connect with Grice's Aristotelian idea of 'eudaimonia,' that he explores elsewhere.
Carton 4, Folder 7
"Aristotle on the Multiplicity of Being"
A thorough discussion of Owens's treatment of Aristotle as leading us to the 'snares' of ontology.
Grice distinguishes between 'izzing' and 'hazzing,' which he thinks help in clarifying, 'more axiomatico,' what Aristotle is getting at with his remarks on 'essential' versus 'non-essential' predication.
Surely, for Grice, being should not be multiplied beyond necessity (but izzing and hazzing ARE already multiplied).
A thorough discussion of Owens's treatment of Aristotle as leading us to the 'snares' of ontology.
Grice distinguishes between 'izzing' and 'hazzing,' which he thinks help in clarifying, 'more axiomatico,' what Aristotle is getting at with his remarks on 'essential' versus 'non-essential' predication.
Surely, for Grice, being should not be multiplied beyond necessity (but izzing and hazzing ARE already multiplied).
Carton 4, Folder 8
"Aristotle: Pleasure"
As a Lit. Hum. Oxon., and especially as a tutee of Hardie at Corpus, Grice was well aware of the centrality of 'hedone' in Aristotle's system.
"Pleasure" is rendered "placitum" (as in "ad placitum") in scholastic philosophy.
But Grice prefers 'agreeable.'
One of Grice's requisites for an ascription of 'eudaimonia,' precisely require that the system of ends an agent chooses to realise be an 'agreeable' one.
Carton 4, Folder 9
"Pleasure" is rendered "placitum" (as in "ad placitum") in scholastic philosophy.
But Grice prefers 'agreeable.'
One of Grice's requisites for an ascription of 'eudaimonia,' precisely require that the system of ends an agent chooses to realise be an 'agreeable' one.
Carton 4, Folder 9
"Conversational Implicature"
Grice's main invention, one which trades on the distinction between what an utterer IMPLIES and what his expression does.
"A distinction apparently denied by Witters, and all too frequently ignored by, of all people, Austin."
Grice is implicating that Austin's sympathies were for the 'subjectification' of "Linguistic Nature."
Grice remains an obdurate individualist, and never loses sight of the distinction that gives rise to the conversational implicatum, which can very well be hyper-contextualised, idiosyncratic, and perfectly particularised!
His Oxonian example:
"I can very well mean that my tutee is to bring me a philosophical essay next week by uttering "It is raining.""
Grice's main invention, one which trades on the distinction between what an utterer IMPLIES and what his expression does.
"A distinction apparently denied by Witters, and all too frequently ignored by, of all people, Austin."
Grice is implicating that Austin's sympathies were for the 'subjectification' of "Linguistic Nature."
Grice remains an obdurate individualist, and never loses sight of the distinction that gives rise to the conversational implicatum, which can very well be hyper-contextualised, idiosyncratic, and perfectly particularised!
His Oxonian example:
"I can very well mean that my tutee is to bring me a philosophical essay next week by uttering "It is raining.""
Carton 4, Folder 10
"Negation"
Grice's reflection, in a verificationist vein, of two types of utterance:
"I don't hear a noise."
"That is not red."
The actual ordering should be the reverse:
"That is not red."
"I don't hear a noise."
Or
"I am not hearing a noise."
Surely, each is co-related to their affirmative counterparts:
"That is red."
"I hear a noise."
Or
"I am hearing a noise."
But when it comes to the psychological state, attitude, or stance, it is easier to co-relate "That is not red" with, say, "That is green."
"That is green."
does NOT feature "not," and it is alleged by Grice to be the source or reason for Utterer U to utter "That is red."
In the case of "I don't hear a noise," the source or reason is the absence, 'verified' by introspetion, of a psychological state, attitude or stance, co-related to the affirmative counterpart,
"I hear a noise."
Or
"I am hearing a noise."
which again, does NOT include the "not" operator.
The first utterance is thus explained in terms of mere sense data; the second, with the aid of introspection ultimately related to sense data ('noise').
Grice could have used,
"I don't see it as red."
Or
"I am not seeing the pillar box as blue."
and unify his account. The important distinction is that "That is not red." does not mention the first-person.
Thus, "I don't hear a noise" seems like an apt utterance to receive an introspective analysis.
In relying on introspection, Grice is being very pre-war Oxonian, at that!
Grice's reflection, in a verificationist vein, of two types of utterance:
"I don't hear a noise."
"That is not red."
The actual ordering should be the reverse:
"That is not red."
"I don't hear a noise."
Or
"I am not hearing a noise."
Surely, each is co-related to their affirmative counterparts:
"That is red."
"I hear a noise."
Or
"I am hearing a noise."
But when it comes to the psychological state, attitude, or stance, it is easier to co-relate "That is not red" with, say, "That is green."
"That is green."
does NOT feature "not," and it is alleged by Grice to be the source or reason for Utterer U to utter "That is red."
In the case of "I don't hear a noise," the source or reason is the absence, 'verified' by introspetion, of a psychological state, attitude or stance, co-related to the affirmative counterpart,
"I hear a noise."
Or
"I am hearing a noise."
which again, does NOT include the "not" operator.
The first utterance is thus explained in terms of mere sense data; the second, with the aid of introspection ultimately related to sense data ('noise').
Grice could have used,
"I don't see it as red."
Or
"I am not seeing the pillar box as blue."
and unify his account. The important distinction is that "That is not red." does not mention the first-person.
Thus, "I don't hear a noise" seems like an apt utterance to receive an introspective analysis.
In relying on introspection, Grice is being very pre-war Oxonian, at that!
Carton 4, Folder 11
"Negation"
Strawson had included a section on 'not' in his "Introduction to Logical Theory."
Grice addresses that point.
Unlike "and," "or," and "if," "not" is a truth-functor (or satisfactory-value-functor) of the unary type.
Grice is interested in applying Cook Wilson's "Statement and inference" to explore what the role of 'not' might be.
And he succeds in finding one. It is explained in terms of the conversational implicatum:
"That's not red."
now IMPLICATES that some utterer has, somewhere, sometime, expressed the contrary opinion.
Strawson had included a section on 'not' in his "Introduction to Logical Theory."
Grice addresses that point.
Unlike "and," "or," and "if," "not" is a truth-functor (or satisfactory-value-functor) of the unary type.
Grice is interested in applying Cook Wilson's "Statement and inference" to explore what the role of 'not' might be.
And he succeds in finding one. It is explained in terms of the conversational implicatum:
"That's not red."
now IMPLICATES that some utterer has, somewhere, sometime, expressed the contrary opinion.
Carton 4, Folder 12
"Personal Identity" (including notes on Hume)
Grice was concerned with issues involved the use of the first person singular ("I will be fighting soon") since his pre-war days at Oxford.
The topic had a special Oxonian pedigree that Grice had occasion to study and explore for his M. A. Lit. Hum.
Locke had famously defended a memory-based account of "I" that had received some alleged counter-example by some Scots philosophers, notably Reid.
In his approach to "I," Grice updates the analysis.
It's now a 'logical construction' of "I" utterances, and relying on Gallie.
Grice uses Broad's taxonomy of "I" utterances, too.
He deals with the Reid-type counterexample, and comes up with a rather elaborate 'analysans' for a simple "I" statement:
"I am hearing a noise."
Grice was concerned with issues involved the use of the first person singular ("I will be fighting soon") since his pre-war days at Oxford.
The topic had a special Oxonian pedigree that Grice had occasion to study and explore for his M. A. Lit. Hum.
Locke had famously defended a memory-based account of "I" that had received some alleged counter-example by some Scots philosophers, notably Reid.
In his approach to "I," Grice updates the analysis.
It's now a 'logical construction' of "I" utterances, and relying on Gallie.
Grice uses Broad's taxonomy of "I" utterances, too.
He deals with the Reid-type counterexample, and comes up with a rather elaborate 'analysans' for a simple "I" statement:
"I am hearing a noise."
Carton 4, Folder 13
"Philosopher's Paradoxes" Undated
Carton 4, Folder 14
"A Philosopher's Prospectus" Undated
Carton 4, Folder 15
"Philosophy and Ordinary Language" Undated
Carton 4, Folder 16
Some Reflections about Ends and Happiness Undated
Carton 4, Folders 17-25
Reflections on Morals with Judith Baker Undated
Carton 4, Folder 26
"Reply to Anscombe" Undated
Carton 4, Folders 27-30
"Reply to Richards" Undated
Series 3 Teaching Materials 1964-1983
Physical Description: Carton 5, Carton 6 (folders 1-3)
Arrangement
Arranged chronologically; alphabetical for those teaching materials without dates.
Scope and Content Note
Includes seminars and lectures given during Grice's years as a Professor Emeritus at UC Berkeley.
Carton 5, Folder 1
Student Notes on Grice's Seminar at Cornell 1964
Carton 5, Folder 2
Grice Seminar 1969
Carton 5, Folder 3
Philosophy 290-2 with Judith Baker 1992
Carton 5, Folder 4
Philosophy 290-2 1993
Carton 5, Folders 5-6
Seminar on Kant's Ethical Theory 1974-1977
Carton 5, Folder 7
Seminar on "Aristotle Ethics" 1975-1996
Carton 5, Folder 8
Philosophy 290, Kant Seminar with Judith Baker 1976-1977
Carton 5, Folder 9
"Kant's Ethics," Volume II 1977
Carton 5, Folders 10-13
Kant Lectures 1977
Carton 5, Folders 14-15
Philosophy 290 1977-1978
Carton 5, Folders 16-17
"Kant's Ethics," Volume III 1978
Carton 5, Folder 18
Knowledge and Belief Seminar 1979-1980
Carton 5, Folders 19-21
Seminar on Kant's Ethics, Volume V 1980-1982
Carton 5, Folder 22
Philosophy 200. Grice and Myro 1982
Carton 5, Folder 23
Notes on Kant 1982
Carton 5, Folder 24
Metaphysics and the Language of Philosophy 1983
Carton 5, Folder 25
Seminar on Freedom Undated
Carton 5, Folder 26
Grice Lectures Undated
Carton 5, Folders 27-28
Seminar on Kant's Ethics Undated
Carton 5, Folder 29
"The Criteria of Intelligence" Lectures II-IV Undated
Carton 5, Folder 30
UC Berkeley, Modest Mentalism Undated
Carton 5, Folder 31
Topics for Pursuit, Zeno, Socrates Notes Undated
Carton 6, Folders 1-2
Grice/Staal Seminar, Syntax, Semantics, and Phonetics Undated
Carton 6, Folder 3
Grice/Staal, "That" Clause Undated
Series 4 Professional Associations 1971-1987
Physical Description: Carton 6 (folders 4-12), Carton 10
Arrangement
Arranged chronologically.
Scope and Content Note
Includes Kant's Stanford Lectures, various notes and audio tapes of Beanfest, Grice's fall 1987 group research on universals, and conferences and discussions concerning the American Psychological Association (APA). Also includes a carton of cassettes, magnetic recorder tapes, and cassette sets of four on professional talks with colleague George Myro on identities, metaphysics, and relatives and Grice's various seminars given at different institutions such as Stanford, University of California, Berkeley, and Seattle on his philosophical theories.
Carton 6, Folder 4
APA Symposium - "Entailment" 1971
Carton 6, Folders 5-6
Stanford - "Some Aspects of Reason," Kant 1977
Carton 6, Folder 7
Conferences - Causality Colloquium At Stanford University Circa 1978
Carton 6, Folder 8
Conferences - APA Discussion - Randall Parker's Transcription of Tapes 1983-1989
Carton 6, Folder 9
Unity of Science and Teleology "Hands Across the Bay," and Beanfest 1985
Carton 6, Folder 10
Beanfest - Transcripts and Audio Cassettes 1985
Carton 6, Folder 11
Group Universals 1987
Carton 6, Folder 12
Group Universals - Partial Working Copy 1987
Carton 10
Audio Files of various lectures and conferences 1970-1986
Series 5 Subject Files 1951-1988
Physical Description: Carton 6 (folders 13-38), Cartons 7-9
Arrangement
Alphabetically
Scope and Content Note
Includes Reed Seminar notes, notes on ancient philosophers such as Aristotle, Descartes and their own philosophical theories, research and accompanying notes on other prominent philosophers such as Kant and Davidson, notes with colleagues Judith Baker, Alan Code, Michael Friedman, George Myro, Patrick Suppes, and Richard Warner, on various theories of reason, trust, language semantics, universals, and values.
Carton 6, Folders 13-14
"The Analytic/Synthetic Division" 1983
Carton 6, Folder 15
Aristotle and "Categories" Undated
Carton 6, Folder 16
Aristotle's Ethics Undated
Carton 6, Folder 17
Aristotle and Friendship Undated
Carton 6, Folder 18
Aristotle and Friendship, Rationality, Trust, and Decency Undated
Carton 6, Folder 19
Aristotle and Multiplicity Undated
Carton 6, Folder 20
Bealer Notes Undated
Carton 6, Folder 21
Berkeley Group Team Notes 1983
Carton 6, Folder 22
Casual Theory Perception Undated
Carton 6, Folder 23
Categories with Strawson Undated
Carton 6, Folder 24
Categorical Imperatives 1981
Carton 6, Folder 25
"The Logical Construction Theory of Personal Identity" Undated
Carton 6, Folder 26
Davidson's "On Saying That" Undated
Carton 6, Folders 27-28
Descartes Notes Undated
Carton 6, Folder 29
"Grice on Denials of Indicative Conditionals" by Michael Sinton Circa 1971
Carton 6, Folder 30
Dispositions and Intentions Notes Undated
Carton 6, Folder 31
Dogmas of Empiricism Undated
Carton 6, Folder 32
Emotions and Incontinence Undated
Carton 6, Folder 33
Entailment and Paradoxes Undated
Carton 6, Folders 34-35
Notes on Ethics with Judith Baker Undated
Carton 6, Folder 36
North Carolina Ethics Notes Undated
Carton 6, Folder 37
Festschrift and Warner Notes Circa 1981-1982
Carton 6, Folder 38
"Finality" Notes with Alan Code Undated
Carton 7, Folder 1
"Form, Type, and Implication" by Grice Undated
Carton 7, Folder 2
Frege, Words and Sentences Notes Undated
Carton 7, Folder 3
"Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics" by Kant Undated
Carton 7, Folder 4
"Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals" Undated
Carton 7, Folder 5
Grammar and Semantics with Richard Warner Undated
Carton 7, Folder 6
Happiness, Discipline, and Implicatives Undated
Carton 7, Folder 7
Notes on Hume 1975
Carton 7, Folders 8-9
Hume's Account on Personal Identity Notes Undated
Carton 7, Folder 10
Identity Notes with George Myro 1973
Carton 7, Folders 11-12
"Ifs and Cans" Undated
Carton 7, Folder 13
Irony, Stress, and Truth Undated
Carton 7, Folders 14-16
Notes on Kant 1981-1982
Carton 7, Folder 17
Kant's Ethics 1982
Carton 7, Folder 18
Kant, Midsentences, Freedom Undated
Carton 7, Folder 19
Language and Reference Circa 1966
Carton 7, Folder 20
Language Semantics Undated
Carton 7, Folders 21-22
John Locke Lecture Notes 1979
Carton 7, Folder 23
Logical Form and Action Sentences Undated
Carton 7, Folders 24-25
Meaning and Psychology Undated
Carton 7, Folders 26-27
Notes on Metaphysics 1988
Carton 7, Folder 28
Metaphysics and Ill-Will Undated
Carton 7, Folder 29
Metaphysics and Theorizing Undated
Carton 7, Folder 30
Method and Myth Notes Undated
Carton 7, Folder 31
Mills Induction Undated
Carton 7, Folder 32
Miscellaneous on Actions and Events Undated
Carton 8, Folder 1
Miscellaneous - Judith Baker Undated
Carton 8, Folder 2
Miscellaneous - Metaph Notes 1987-1988
Carton 8, Folder 3
Miscellaneous - Oxford Philosophy Undated
Carton 8, Folders 4-8
Miscellaneous Philosophy Notes 1981-1985
Carton 8, Folders 9-13
Miscellaneous Philosophy Topics Undated
Carton 8, Folders 14-15
Modality, Desirability, and Probability Undated
Carton 8, Folders 16-17
Nicomachean Ethics and Aristotle Ethics 1975-1976
Carton 8, Folder 18
Objectivity and Value Undated
Carton 8, Folder 19
Objective Value, Rational Motivation Circa 1978
Carton 8, Folder 20
Oddents - Urbane and Not Urbane Undated
Carton 8, Folders 21-22
Vision, Taste, and other Perception Papers Undated
Carton 8, Folder 23
Papers on Perception Undated
Carton 8, Folder 24
Perception Notes Undated
Carton 8, Folder 25
Notes on Perception with Richard Warner 1988
Carton 8, Folder 26
"Clear and Distinct Perception and Dreaming" Undated
Carton 8, Folder 27
"A Pint of Philosophy" by Alfred Brook Gordon, includes notes by Grice Circa 1951
Carton 8, Folder 28
"A Philosophy of Life" Notes, Happiness Notes Undated
Carton 8, Folder 29
"Lectures on Pierce" Undated
Carton 8, Folder 30
Basic Pirotese, Sentence Semantics and Syntax Circa 1970
Carton 8, Folder 31
Pirots and Obbles Undated
Carton 8, Folders 32-33
Methodology - Pirots Notes Undated
Carton 9, Folder 1
Practical Reason Undated
Carton 9, Folder 2
"Preliminary Valediction" 1985
Carton 9, Folder 3
Presupposition and Implicative Circa 1979
Carton 9, Folder 4
Probability and Life Undated
Carton 9, Folder 5
Rationality and Trust notes Undated
Carton 9, Folder 6
Reasons 1966
Carton 9, Folder 7
Reflections on Morals Circa 1980
Carton 9, Folder 8
Russell and Heterologicality Undated
Carton 9, Folder 9
Schiffer Undated
Carton 9, Folder 10
Semantics of Children's Language Undated
Carton 9, Folder 11
Sentence Semantics Undated
Carton 9, Folder 12
Sentence Semantics - Prepositional Complexes Undated
Carton 9, Folder 13
"Significance of the Middle Book's Aristotle's Metaphysics" by Alan Code Undated
Carton 9, Folder 14
Social Justice Undated
Carton 9, Folder 15
"Subjective" Conditions and Intentions Undated
Carton 9, Folder 16
Super-Relatives Undated
Carton 9, Folders 17-18
Syntax and Semantics Undated
Carton 9, Folder 19
The 'That" and "Why" - Metaphysics Notes 1986-1987
Carton 9, Folder 20
Various work on Trust, Metaphysics, Value, etc/ with Judith Baker Undated
Carton 9, Folder 21
Universals 1987
Carton 9, Folder 22
Universals with Michael Friedman 1987
Carton 9, Folder 23
Value, Metaphysics, and Teleology Undated
Carton 9, Folder 24
Values, Morals, Absolutes, and the Metaphysical Undated
Carton 9, Folders 25-27
Miscellaneous - Value Sub-systems, the "Kantian Problem" Undated
Carton 9, Folder 28
Values and Rationalism Undated
Carton 9, Folder 29
"Virtues and Vices" by Philippa Foot Undated
Carton 9, Folders 30-31
Wants and Needs 1974-1975
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment