H. P. Grice: A conceptual analysis of "By uttering x (and thereby explicitly conveying that p), utterer U conversationally implies that q."

The implicatum

It is high time to show the connection between the principle of conversational helpfulness, on the one hand, and this or that particularised conversational implicatum on the other. 

A participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfill the principle of conversational helpfulness in various ways, which include the following: · 

He may quietly and unostentatiously violate it (just be conversational unhelpful, for this or that reason, as when a philosopher says he is proud of rendering what is clear obscure).

If so, in some cases he will be liable to mislead, if not amuse. 

Or he may explicitly and with a caveat opt out from the operation of the principle of conversational helpfulness.

He may say, indicate, or allow it to become plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the principle of conversational helpfulness requires, as in war.

In such a case, a principle of conversational conflict is in operation. 

He may say, for example, 

"I cannot say more; my lips are sealed."

Or he may want to turn aggressive, as in war, in which case he will be unreasonable and irrational. Cf. Kant on 'ill-will.' 




He may be faced by a clash: 

He may be unable, for example, to fulfill a maxim such as Be as informative as is required, without violating a different conversational maxim, such as Have adequate evidence for what you say

Or he may be unable to fulfill the principle of conversational benevolence without violating the principle of conversational self-interest.

Or he may be unable to fulfill the desideratum of conversational candour wihtout violating or infringing the desideratum of conversational clarity.

(Cf. "Causal Theory of Perception," for rules of strength, and Strawson's treatment of 'pragmatic rule' in "Introduction to Logical Theory." -- for further clashes)

Now, he may also 'flout' this or that conversational maxim, i.e. he may blatantly fail to fulfill it. 

This is typical of philosophers, whom Malcom detested:

"That pillar box seems red to me."

"These are my hands; I know it."

On the assumption that the utterer is able to fulfill the conversational maxim, principle, desideratum, norm, requirement, or rule, and to do so without violating another maxim, principle, desideratum, norm, requirement, or rule (because of a clash), and that he is not opting out, and that he is not, in view of the intentional blatancy of his performance (intended to be recognised as such) trying to mislead, the addressee is faced with a minor practical problem: 

How can the philosopher (for it's usually a philosopher) explicitly conveying what he did explicitly convey be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing the overall principle of conversational helpfulness? 

This situation is one that characteristically gives rise to a conversational implicatum, i.e. to the assumption that the utterer conversationally implpies that q.

And when a conversational implicatum is generated in this way, I shall say that this or that maxim, if not the overall principle of conversational helpfulness, is being 'exploited.'

At some level, the principle of conversational helpfulness IS being 'exploited,' in a jocular way, since the utterer surely intends his addressee to SEE THROUGH.

We are now in a position to characterize the notion of conversational implicatum, or, the analysandum:

"By uttering p (thereby explicitly conveying that p), the utterer U conversationally implies that q."

iff 

so-and-so


An utterer who, by (in, when) explicitly conveying (or making as if to implicitly convey) that p has implicated or conversationally implied that q, may be said to have conversationally implicated or implied that q, provided that 

(l) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the principle of conversational helpfulness 

(2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, "q" is the content of his psychological state, stance or attitude, required in order to make his explicitly conveying or making as if to explicitly convey that p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this presumption; and 

(3) the utterer thinks (and would expect his addressee to think that the utterer thinks) that it is within the competence of his addressee (say, perhaps not an infant) to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required. 

Apply this to our initial example, to B's remark that C has not yet been to prison, or already twice, as the case might be.

In a suitable setting A might reason, abductively, or conclude, as follows: 

"(1) B has apparently violated the maxim conjoining topical appositeness, and so he may also be regarded as having flouted one of the maxims conjoining perspicuity, our desideratum of conversational clarity, if not the sub-principle of conversational benevolence.

Yet I have no reason to suppose that the utterer is opting out from the operation of the principle of conversational helpfulness; 

(2) given the circumstances, I can regard his irrelevance or blatant unappositeness as only apparent or jocular or amusing or philosophical or rhetorical if and only if, I suppose him to think that Smith is potentially dishonest, or too dishonest (he's been to prison twice already)

(3) B knows that I am capable of working out step (2). 

Therefore: thee utterer U conversationally implies that Smith is potentially dishonest, or too dishonest, as the case might be.

The presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out.

For even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by a bit of a philosophical argument, the implicatum (if present at all) will not count as a reasonable, indeed, rational conversational implicatum, nor will the utterer count as reasonable (cf. Humpty Dumpty, "There's glory for you"); it will at most count, perhaps, as a conventional implicatum if anything. 

To work out that a particular conversational implicatu is present, the addressee will rely on the following data: 

(I) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved; 

The carpenter = St. Joseph, Mary's husband.
the vyse = his piece of machinery


(2) the principle of conversational helpfulness and its maxims; 

(3) the context, linguistic or other, of the utterance; 

(4) other items of background knowledge; and 

(5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case. 

A general pattern for the working out of a conversational implicature might be given as follows: 

1. By uttering x, the utterer U explicitly conveys that p.

2. There is no reason to suppose that U is not observing the maxims, or at least the principle of conversational helpfulness.

3. U could not be doing this unless he thinks that q (that Smith is potentially dishonest)

 4. U knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q IS required.

5. e has done nothing (such as cancelling, explitictly or otherwise) to stop me thinking that q (even though surely he is in a logical position to do so), since q is, bydefinition, or analysis, or caveat, or fiat, not part of what he explicitly conveys, p, by uttering his utterance.

6. He intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q.

7. Therefore, Q. E. D., the utterer U conversationally implies that q.

Neat, right?