Ligatum, lex, -- the natural/non-natural
distinction -- natural law, also called law of nature, in moral and political
philosophy, an objective norm or set of objective norms governing human
behavior, similar to the positive laws of a human ruler, but binding on all
people alike and usually understood as involving a superhuman legislator.
Ancient Grecian and Roman thought, particularly Stoicism, introduced ideas of
eternal laws directing the actions of all rational beings and built into the
very structure of the universe. Roman lawyers developed a doctrine of a law
that all civilized peoples would recognize, and made some effort to explain it
in terms of a natural law common to animals and humans. The most influential
forms of natural law theory, however, arose from later efforts to use Stoic and
legal language to work out a Christian theory of morality and politics. The aim
was to show that the principles of morals could be known by reason alone,
without revelation, so that the whole human race could know how to live properly.
The law of nature applies, on this understanding, only to rational beings, who
can obey or disobey it deliberately and freely. It is thus different in kind
from the laws God laid down for the inanimate and irrational parts of creation.
Natural law theorists often saw continuities and analogies between natural laws
for humans and those for the rest of creation but did not confuse them. The
most enduringly influential natural law writer was Aquinas. On his view God’s
eternal reason ordains laws directing all things to act for the good of the
community of the universe, the declaration of His own glory. Human reason can
participate sufficiently in God’s eternal reason to show us the good of the
human community. The natural law is thus our sharing in the eternal law in a
way appropriate to our human nature. God lays down certain other laws through
revelation; these divine laws point us toward our eternal goal. The natural law
concerns our earthly good, and needs to be supplemented by human laws. Such
laws can vary from community to community, but to be binding they must always
stay within the limits of the law of nature. God engraved the most basic
principles of the natural law in the minds of all people alike, but their
detailed application takes reasoning powers that not everyone may have.
Opponents of Aquinas called
voluntarists argued that God’s will, not
his intellect, is the source of law, and that God could have laid down different
natural laws for us. Hugo Grotius rejected their position, but unlike Aquinas
he conceived of natural law as meant not to direct us to bring about some
definite common good but to set the limits on the ways in which each of us
could properly pursue our own personal aims. This Grotian outlook was developed
by Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Locke along voluntarist lines. Thomistic views
continued to be expounded by Protestant as well as Roman Catholic writers until
the end of the seventeenth century. Thereafter, while natural law theory
remained central to Catholic teaching, it ceased to attract major new
non-Catholic proponents. Natural law doctrine in both Thomistic and Grotian
versions treats morality as basically a matter of compliance with law.
Obligation and duty, obedience and disobedience, merit and guilt, reward and
punishment, are central notions. Virtues are simply habits of following laws.
Though the law is suited to our distinctive human nature and can be discovered
by the proper use of reason, it is not a self-imposed law. In following it we
are obeying God. Since the early eighteenth century, philosophical discussions
of whether or not there is an objective morality have largely ceased to center
on natural law. The idea remains alive, however, in jurisprudence. Natural law
theories are opposed to legal positivism, the view that the only binding laws
are those imposed by human sovereigns, who cannot be subject to higher legal
constraints. Legal theorists arguing that there are rational objective limits
to the legislative power of rulers often think of these limits in terms of natural
law, even when their theories do not invoke or imply any of the religious
aspects of earlier natural law positions. Refs.: N. Cartwright-Hampshire, “How
the laws of phyiscs lie,” in P. G. R. I. C. E., without a response by H. P.
Grice. (“That will not be feasible.”)
natura – the natural/transnatural
distinction -- natural philosophy – Grice: “It’s funny: there are only three or
four chairs of philosophy at Oxford and one had to be on ‘the trans-natural’
philosophy! Back in the day, I might just as well have to have attended the
‘natural’ philosophy lectures!” -- the
study of nature or of the spatiotemporal world. This was regarded as a task for
philosophy before the emergence of modern science, especially physics and
astronomy, and the term is now only used with reference to premodern times.
Philosophical questions about nature still remain, e.g., whether materialism is
true, but they would usually be placed in metaphysics or in a branch of it that
may be called philosophy of nature. Natural philosophy is not to be confused
with metaphysical naturalism, which is the metaphysical view no part of science
itself that all that there is is the spatiotemporal world and that the only way
to study it is that of the empirical sciences. It is also not to be confused
with natural theology, which also may be considered part of metaphysics. The Sedleian Professor of Natural Philosophy is the name of
a chair at the Mathematical Institute of the University of Oxford. The
Sedleian Chair was founded by Sir William Sedley who, by his will dated 20
October 1618, left the sum of £2,000 to the University of Oxford for purchase
of lands for its endowment. Sedley's bequest took effect in 1621 with the
purchase of an estate at Waddesdon in Buckinghamshire to produce the necessary
income. It is regarded as the oldest of Oxford's scientific chairs.
Holders of the Sedleian Professorship have, since the mid 19th Century, worked
in a range of areas of Applied Mathematics and Mathematical Physics. They are
simultaneously elected to fellowships at Queen's College, Oxford. The
Sedleian Professors in the past century have been Augustus Love (1899-1940),
who was distinguished for his work in the mathematical theory of elasticity,
Sydney Chapman (1946-1953), who is renowned for his contributions to the
kinetic theory of gases and solar-terrestrial physics, George Temple
(1953-1968), who made significant contributions to mathematical physics and the
theory of generalized functions, Brooke Benjamin (1979-1995), who did highly
influential work in the areas of mathematical analysis and fluid mechanics, and
Sir John Ball (1996-2019), who is distinguished for his work in the
mathematical theory of elasticity, materials science, the calculus of
variations, and infinite-dimensional dynamical systems. Refs.: H. P.
Grice: “Oxford and the four Ws: Waynflete, White, Wykeham, and Wilde.”
Natura – nautralism -- natural religion, a
term first occurring in the second half of the seventeenth century, used in
three related senses, the most common being 1 a body of truths about God and
our duty that can be discovered by natural reason. These truths are sufficient
for salvation or according to some orthodox Christians would have been
sufficient if Adam had not sinned. Natural religion in this sense should be distinguished
from natural theology, which does not imply this. A natural religion may also
be 2 one that has a human, as distinct from a divine, origin. It may also be 3
a religion of human nature as such, as distinguished from religious beliefs and
practices that have been determined by local circumstances. Natural religion in
the third sense is identified with humanity’s original religion. In all three
senses, natural religion includes a belief in God’s existence, justice,
benevolence, and providential government; in immortality; and in the dictates
of common morality. While the concept is associated with deism, it is also
sympathetically treated by Christian writers like Clarke, who argues that
revealed religion simply restores natural religion to its original purity and adds
inducements to compliance. The Faculty of Medicine appoints an elector for
the professorship of Human Anatomy and for the professorship of Pathology. The
Board of Natural Science appoints one elector for the professorship of Pathology
and two for the Lee's Readerships. The Board of Modern History appoints two
electors for the Beit professorship and lectureship, and three for the Ford
lectureship. The Board of Theology appoints three of the seven electors for the
Speaker's lectureship in Biblical Studies. Three different Boards of Faculty
appoint electors for the Wilde lectureship in Natural Religion. Refs.:
H. P. Grice, “Natural religion at Oxford – the Wilde and the Wilde.”
Modus – necessitas -- Necessitarianism:
“An ugly word once used by Strawson in a tutorial!” – Grice. -- the doctrine
that necessity is an objective feature of the world. Natural language permits
speakers to express modalities: a state of affairs can be actual Paris’s being
in France, merely possible chlorophyll’s making things blue, or necessary 2 ! 2
% 4. Anti-necessitarians believe that these distinctions are not grounded in
the nature of the world. Some of them claim that the distinctions are merely
verbal. Others, e.g., Hume, believed that psychological facts, like our
expectations of future events, explain the idea of necessity. Yet others
contend that the modalities reflect epistemic considerations; necessity
reflects the highest level of an inquirer’s commitment. Some necessitarians
believe there are different modes of metaphysical necessity, e.g., causal and
logical necessity. Certain proponents of idealism believe that each fact is
necessarily connected with every other fact so that the ultimate goal of
scientific inquiry is the discovery of a completely rigorous mathematical
system of the world.
modus -- necessitas – necessarium -- necessity,
a modal property attributable to a whole proposition dictum just when it is not
possible that the proposition be false the proposition being de dicto
necessary. Narrowly construed, a proposition P is logically necessary provided
P satisfies certain syntactic conditions, namely, that P’s denial is formally
self-contradictory. More broadly, P is logically necessary just when P
satisfies certain semantic conditions, namely, that P’s denial is false, and P
true, in all possible worlds. These semantic conditions were first suggested by
Leibniz, refined by Vitters and Carnap, and fully developed as the possible
worlds semantics of Kripke, Hintikka, et al., in the 0s. Previously,
philosophers had to rely largely on intuition to determine the acceptability or
otherwise of formulas involving the necessity operator, A, and were at a loss
as to which of various axiomatic systems for modal logic, as developed in the
0s by C. I. Lewis, best captured the notion of logical necessity. There was
much debate, for instance, over the characteristic NN thesis of Lewis’s system
S4, namely, AP / A AP if P is necessary then it is necessarily necessary. But
given a Leibnizian account of the truth conditions for a statement of the form
Aa namely R1 that Aa is true provided a is true in all possible worlds, and R2
that Aa is false provided there is at least one possible world in which a is
false, a proof can be constructed by reductio ad absurdum. For suppose that AP
/ AAP is false in some arbitrarily chosen world W. Then its antecedent will be
true in W, and hence by R1 it follows a that P will be true in all possible
worlds. But equally its consequent will be false in W, and hence by R2 AP will
be false in at least one possible world, from which again by R2 it follows b
that P will be false in at least one possible world, thus contradicting a. A
similar proof can be constructed for the characteristic thesis of S5, namely,
-A-P / A-A-P if P is possibly true then it is necessarily possible. Necessity
is also attributable to a property F of an object O provided it is not possible
that there is no possible world in which O exists and lacks F F being de re necessary, internal or
essential to O. For instance, the non-repeatable haecceitist property of being
identical to O is de re necessary essential to O, and arguably the repeatable
property of being extended is de re necessary to all colored objects. nĕcesse
(arch. nĕcessum , I.v. infra: NECESVS, S. C. de Bacch. l. 4: necessus , Ter.
Heaut. 2, 3, 119 Wagn. ad loc.; id. Eun. 5, 5, 28; Gell. 16, 8, 1; v. Lachm. ad
Lucr. 6, 815), neutr. adj. (gen. necessis, Lucr. 6, 815 ex conj. Lachm.; cf.
Munro ad loc.; elsewhere only nom. and acc. sing., and with esse or habere)
[perh. Sanscr. naç, obtain; Gr. root ἐνεκ-; cf. ἀνάγκη; v. Georg Curtius Gr.
Etym. 424]. I. Form necesse. A. Unavoidable, inevitable, indispensable,
necessary (class.; cf.: opus, usus est) 1. With esse. a. With subject.-clause:
“edocet quanto detrimento...necesse sit constare victoriam,” Caes. B. G. 7, 19:
“necesse est eam, quae ... timere permultos,” Auct. Her. 4, 16, 23: emas, non
quod opus est, sed quod necesse est, Cato ap. Sen. Ep. 94, 28: “nihil fit, quod
necesse non fuerit,” Cic. Fat. 9, 17: “necesse est igitur legem haberi in rebus
optimis,” id. Leg. 2, 5, 12; id. Verr 2, 3, 29, § 70. — b. With dat. (of the
person, emphatic): nihil necesse est mihi de me ipso dicere, Cic. Sen. 9, 30:
“de homine enim dicitur, cui necesse est mori,” id. Fat. 9, 17.— c. With ut and
subj.: “eos necesse est ut petat,” Auct. Her. 4, 16, 23: “sed ita necesse
fuisse, cum Demosthenes dicturus esset, ut concursus ex totā Graeciā fierent,”
Cic. Brut. 84, 289; Sen. Ep. 78, 15: “hoc necesse est, ut, etc.,” Cic. de Or. 2,
29, 129; Sen. Q. N. 2, 14, 2: “neque necesse est, uti vos auferam,” Gell. 2,
29, 9: “necesse est semper, ut id ... per se significet,” Quint. 8, 6, 43.— d.
With subj. alone: “haec autem oratio ... aut nulla sit necesse est, aut omnium
irrisione ludatur,” Cic. de Or. 1, 12, 50: “istum condemnetis necesse est,”
Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 18, § 45: “vel concidat omne caelum necesse est,” id. Tusc. 1,
23, 54: “si necesse est aliquid ex se magni boni pariat,” Lact. 3, 12, 7.— 2.
With habere (class. only with inf.): “non habebimus necesse semper concludere,”
Cic. Part. Or. 13, 47: “eo minus habeo necesse scribere,” id. Att. 10, 1, 4:
“Oppio scripsi ne necesse habueris reddere,” id. ib. 16, 2, 5: “non verbum pro
verbo necesse habui reddere,” id. Opt. Gen. Or. 5, 14: “non necesse habeo omnia
pro meo jure agere,” Ter. Ad. 1, 1, 26; Quint. 11, 1, 74; Vulg. Matt. 14, 16:
necesse habere with abl. (= egere; “late Lat.): non necesse habent sani
medico,” Vulg. Marc. 2, 17.—In agreement with object of habere: “non habet rex
sponsalia necesse,” Vulg. 1 Reg. 18, 25.— B. Needful, requisite, indispensable,
necessary: “id quod tibi necesse minime fuit, facetus esse voluisti,” Cic.
Sull. 7, 22.— II. Form necessum (mostly ante-class.). A. With subject.-clause:
“foras necessum est, quicquid habeo, vendere,” Plaut. Stich. 1, 3, 66: quod sit
necessum scire, Afran. ap. Charis. p. 186 P.: “nec tamen haec retineri hamata
necessumst,” Lucr. 2, 468: “externa corpus de parte necessumst tundier,” id. 4,
933: “necessum est vorsis gladiis depugnarier,” Plaut. Cas. 2, 5, 36: “necessum
est paucis respondere,” Liv. 34, 5: “num omne id aurum in ludos consumi
necessum esset?” id. 39, 5: “tonsorem capiti non est adhibere necessum,” Mart.
6, 57, 3.— B. With dat.: “dicas uxorem tibi necessum esse ducere,” Plaut. Mil.
4, 3, 25.— C. With subj.: “unde anima, atque animi constet natura necessum
est,” Lucr. 4, 120: “quare etiam nativa necessum est confiteare Haec eadem,”
id. 5, 377. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The may and the must,” “Ichthyological
necessity.”
need – H. P. Grice, “Need,” cf. D. Wiggins, “Need.” “What Toby
needs” Grice was also interested in the modal use of ‘need’. “You need to do
it.” “ ‘Need,’ like ‘ought’ takes ‘to.’” “It’s very Anglo-Saxon.” “Or, rather
non-Indo-European substratum!” As it is attested only in Germanic,
Celtic, and Balto-Slavic, it might be non-PIE, from a regional substrate
language.
negri: a crucial Italian
philosopher. Antonio Negri From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to
navigationJump to search This article is about the scholar. For the poet, see
Antonio Negri (poet). Antonio Negri AntonioNegri
SeminarioInternacionalMundo.jpg Born 1
August 1933 (age 87) Padua, Kingdom of Italy Alma mater University of Padua Istituto italiano per gli
studi storici [it][1] Era Contemporary
philosophy Region Western
philosophy School Continental
philosophy Autonomist Marxism Neo-Spinozism[2][3][4][5][6] Institutions University of Padua[7] Paris VIII
(Vincennes) Paris VII (Jussieu)[7] École Normale Supérieure[7] Collège
international de philosophie Main interests Political
philosophy · Class conflict · Globalization · Commons · Biopolitics Notable
ideas Philosophy of
globalization · multitude · theory of Empire · Constituent power · Immaterial
labour[8] · Post-fordism · Altermodernity · Refusal of work Influences[show]
Influenced[show] Antonio "Toni" Negri (born 1 August 1933) is an
Italian Spinozistic-Marxist[9] sociologist and political philosopher, best
known for his co-authorship of Empire and secondarily for his work on
Spinoza.[10][11][12][13] Born in Padua, he became a political philosophy
professor in his hometown university. Negri founded the Potere Operaio (Worker
Power) group in 1969 and was a leading member of Autonomia Operaia. As one of
the most popular theorists of Autonomism, he has published hugely influential
books urging "revolutionary consciousness." He was accused in
the late 1970s of various charges including being the mastermind of the
left-wing terrorist organization[14] Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse or BR), involved
in the May 1978 kidnapping of Aldo Moro, two-time Prime Minister of Italy, and
leader of the Christian-Democrat Party, among others. He was wrongly suspected
to have made a threatening phone call on behalf of the BR,[15][16] but the
court was unable to conclusively prove his ties.[14] The question of Negri's
complicity with left-wing extremism is a controversial subject.[17] He was
indicted on a number of charges, including "association and insurrection
against the state" (a charge which was later dropped), and sentenced for
involvement in two murders. Negri fled to France where, protected by the
Mitterrand doctrine, he taught at the Paris VIII (Vincennes) and the Collège
international de philosophie, along with Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and
Gilles Deleuze. In 1997, after a plea-bargain that reduced his prison time from
30 to 13 years,[18] he returned to Italy to serve the end of his sentence. Many
of his most influential books were published while he was behind bars. He now
lives in Venice and Paris with his partner, the French philosopher Judith
Revel. Like Deleuze, Negri's preoccupation with Spinoza is well known in
contemporary philosophy.[19][20] Along with Althusser and Deleuze, he has been
one of the central figures of a French-inspired Neo-Spinozism in continental
philosophy of the late 20th and early 21st centuries,[21][6][22][23][24] that
was the second remarkable Spinoza revival in history, after a well-known
rediscovery of Spinoza by German thinkers (especially the German Romantics and
Idealists) in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. He is the father of
film director Anna Negri. Contents 1 Early years 2 Arrest
and flight 3 Political
thought and writing 3.1 Labor
of Dionysus: A Critique of the State-Form (1994) 3.2 Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern
State (1999) 3.3 Empire
(2000) 3.4 Multitude:
War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (2004) 3.5 Commonwealth (2009) 3.6 Occupy movements of 2011–2012 and
Declaration 4 Quotes
5 Selected
works (English) 5.1 Online
articles 6 Films
7 See
also 8 References
9 Further
reading 10 External
links Early years This section of a biography of a living person does not
include any references or sources. Please help by adding reliable sources.
Contentious material about living people that is unsourced or poorly sourced
must be removed immediately. Find sources: "Antonio Negri" – news ·
newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (January 2011) (Learn how and when to
remove this template message) Antonio Negri was born in Padua, in the
Northeastern Italian region of Veneto, in 1933. His father was an active
communist militant from the city of Bologna (in the Northeastern Italian region
of Emilia-Romagna), and although he died when Negri was two years old, his
political engagement made Negri familiar with Marxism from an early age, while
his mother was a teacher from the town of Poggio Rusco (in province of Mantua,
Lombardy).[25] He began his career as a militant in the 1950s with the activist
Roman Catholic youth organization Gioventú Italiana di Azione Cattolica (GIAC).
Negri became a communist in 1953–54 when he worked at a kibbutz in Israel for a
year. The kibbutz was organised according to ideas of Zionist socialism and all
the members were Jewish communists.[26] He joined the Italian Socialist Party
in 1956 and remained a member until 1963, while at the same time becoming more
and more engaged throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s in Marxist
movements. He had a quick academic career at the University of Padua and
was promoted to full professor at a young age in the field of "dottrina
dello Stato" (State theory), a peculiarly Italian field that deals with
juridical and constitutional theory. This might have been facilitated by his
connections to influential politicians such as Raniero Panzieri and philosopher
Norberto Bobbio, strongly engaged with the Socialist Party. In the early
1960s, Negri joined the editorial group of Quaderni Rossi, a journal that
represented the intellectual rebirth of Marxism in Italy outside the realm of
the communist party. In 1969, together with Oreste Scalzone and Franco
Piperno, Negri was one of the founders of the group Potere Operaio (Workers'
Power) and the Operaismo (workerist) Communist movement. Potere Operaio
disbanded in 1973 and gave rise to the Autonomia Operaia Organizzata (Organised
Workers' Autonomy) movement. Arrest and flight On 16 March 1978, Aldo
Moro, former Italian prime minister and Christian Democrat party leader,
was kidnapped in Rome by the Red Brigades, his five-man bodyguard murdered on
the spot of the kidnapping in Rome's Via Fani. While they were holding him,
forty-five days after the kidnapping,[18] the Red Brigades called his family on
the phone, informing Moro's wife of her husband's impending death.[18] Nine
days later his body, shot in the head, was found dumped in a city lane.[18] The
conversation was recorded, and later broadcast and televised. A number of
people who knew Negri and remembered his voice identified him as the probable
author of the call, but the claim has been since dismissed: the author of the
call was, in fact, Valerio Morucci.[27][28] On 7 April 1979, at the age
of forty-six, Antonio Negri was arrested for his part in the Autonomy Movement,
along with others (Emilio Vesce, Luciano Ferrari Bravo, Mario Dalmaviva, Lauso
Zagato, Oreste Scalzone, Pino Nicotri, Alisa del Re, Carmela di Rocco, Massimo
Tramonte, Sandro Serafini, Guido Bianchini, and others). Padova's Public
Prosecutor Pietro Calogero accused them of being involved in the political wing
of the Red Brigades, and thus behind left-wing terrorism in Italy. Negri was
charged with a number of offences, including leadership of the Red Brigades,
masterminding the 1978 kidnapping and murder of the President of the Christian
Democratic Party Aldo Moro, and plotting to overthrow the government.[29] At
the time, Negri was a political science professor at the University of Padua
and visiting lecturer at Paris' École Normale Supérieure. The Italian public
was shocked that an academic could be involved in such events.[18] A year
later, Negri was exonerated from Aldo Moro's kidnapping after a leader of the
BR, having decided to cooperate with the prosecution, testified that Negri
"had nothing to do with the Red Brigades."[14] The charge of 'armed
insurrection against the State' against Negri was dropped at the last moment,
and because of this he did not receive the 30-year plus life sentence requested
by the prosecutor, but only 30 years for being the instigator of political
activist Carlo Saronio's murder and having 'morally concurred' with the murder
of Andrea Lombardini, a carabiniere, during a failed bank robbery.[14]
Part of a series on Libertarian socialism Anarchist flag.svg Political
concepts[show] Economics[show] People[show] Philosophies and tendencies[show]
Significant events[show] Related topics[show] BlackFlagSymbol.svg Anarchism
portal Red flag II.svg Socialism portal A coloured voting box.svg Politics
portal vte His philosopher peers saw little fault with Negri's activities.
Michel Foucault commented, "Isn't he in jail simply for being an
intellectual?"[30] French philosophers Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze
also signed in November 1977 L'Appel des intellectuels français contre la
répression en Italie (The Call of French Intellectuals Against Repression in
Italy) in protest against Negri's imprisonment and Italian anti-terrorism
legislation.[31][32] In 1983, four years after his arrest and while he
was still in prison awaiting trial, Negri was elected to the Italian
legislature as a member for the Radical Party.[33] Claiming parliamentary
immunity, he was temporarily released and used his freedom to escape to France.
There he remained for 14 years, writing and teaching, protected from
extradition in virtue of the "Mitterrand doctrine". His refusal to
stand trial in Italy was widely criticized by Italian media and by the Italian
Radical Party, who had supported his candidacy to Parliament.[33][failed
verification] In France, Negri began teaching at the Paris VIII
(Vincennes) and the Collège international de philosophie, founded by Jacques
Derrida. Although the conditions of his residence in France prevented him from
engaging in political activities, he wrote prolifically and was active in a
broad coalition of left-wing intellectuals. In 1990 Negri with Jean-Marie
Vincent and Denis Berger founded the journal Futur Antérieur. (The journal
ceased publication in 1998 but was reborn as Multitudes in 2000, with Negri as
a member of the international editorial board.) In 1997, after a
plea-bargain that reduced his prison time from 30 to 13 years,[18] Negri
returned to Italy to serve the end of his sentence. He was released from prison
in the spring of 2003, having written some of his most influential works while
behind bars. In the late 1980s the Italian President Francesco Cossiga described
Antonio Negri as "a psychopath" who "poisoned the minds of an
entire generation of Italy's youth."[34] Political thought and
writing Part of a series on Left communism ICC Logo.svg Concepts[show]
Movements[show] People[show] Organizations[show] Related topics[show]
Symbol-hammer-and-sickle.svg Communism portal Red flag II.svg Socialism portal
A coloured voting box.svg Politics portal vte Unlike other forms of Marxism,
autonomist Marxism emphasises the ability of the working class to force changes
to the organization of the capitalist system independent of the state, trade
unions or political parties. Autonomists are less concerned with party
political organization than are other Marxists, focusing instead on
self-organized action outside of traditional organizational structures.
Autonomist Marxism is thus a "bottom-up" theory: it draws attention
to activities that autonomists see as everyday working-class resistance to
capitalism, for example absenteeism, slow working, and socialization in the
workplace. The journal Quaderni Rossi ("Red Notebooks"), produced
between 1961 and 1965, and its successor Classe Operaia ("Working
Class"), produced between 1963 and 1966, were also influential in the
development of early autonomism. Both were founded by Antonio Negri and Mario
Tronti. Today, Antonio Negri is best known as the co-author, with Michael
Hardt, of the controversial Marxist-inspired treatise Empire (2000).[29]
In 2009 Negri completed the book Commonwealth, the final in a trilogy that
began in 2000 with Empire and continued with Multitude in 2004, co-authored
with Michael Hardt.[35] Since Commonwealth, he has written multiple
notable articles on the Arab Spring and Occupy movements along with other
social issues.[36][37] Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the State-Form
(1994) In this book, the authors ask themselves "How is it, then, that
labour, with all its life-affirming potential, has become the means of
capitalist discipline, exploitation, and domination in modern society?"
The authors expose and pursue this paradox through a systematic analysis of the
role of labour in the processes of capitalist production and in the
establishment of capitalist legal and social institutions. Critiquing liberal
and socialist notions of labor and institutional reform from a radical
democratic perspective, Hardt and Negri challenge the state-form
itself.[38] Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State (1999)
This book, written solely by Negri, "explores the drama of modern
revolutions-from Machiavelli’s Florence and Harrington’s England to the
American, French, and Russian revolutions-and puts forward a new notion of how
power and action must be understood if we are to achieve a radically democratic
future."[39] Empire (2000) Main article: Empire (Negri and Hardt
book) In general, the book theorizes an ongoing transition from a
"modern" phenomenon of imperialism, centered around individual
nation-states, to an emergent postmodern construct created among ruling powers
which the authors call "Empire", with different forms of
warfare: ...according to Hardt and Negri's Empire, the rise of Empire is
the end of national conflict, the "enemy" now, whoever he is, can no
longer be ideological or national. The enemy now must be understood as a kind
of criminal, as someone who represents a threat not to a political system or a
nation but to the law. This is the enemy as a terrorist... In the "new
order that envelops the entire space of... civilization", where conflict
between nations has been made irrelevant, the "enemy" is
simultaneously "banalized" (reduced to an object of routine police
repression) and absolutized (like the Enemy, an absolute threat to the ethical
order"[40]).[41] Empire elaborates a variety of ideas surrounding
constitutions, global war, and class. Hence, the Empire is constituted by a
monarchy (the United States and the G8, and international organizations such as
NATO, the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization), an
oligarchy (the multinational corporations and other nation-states) and a
democracy (the various non-government organizations and the United Nations).
Part of the book's analysis deals with "imagin[ing] resistance", but
"the point of Empire is that it, too, is "total" and that
resistance to it can only take the form of negation - "the will to be
against".[42] The Empire is total, but economic inequality persists, and
as all identities are wiped out and replaced with a universal one, the identity
of the poor persists.[43] Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of
Empire (2004) Main article: Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire
Multitude addresses these issues and picks up the thread where Empire has left
off. In order to do so, Hardt and Negri argue, one must first analyze the
present configuration of war and its contradictions. This analysis is performed
in the first chapter, after which chapters two and three focus on multitude and
democracy, respectively. Multitude is not so much a sequel as it is a
reiteration from a new point of view in a new, relatively accessible style that
is distinct from the predominantly academic prose style of Empire. Multitude
remains, the authors insist, despite its ubiquitous subject matter and its
almost casual tone, a book of philosophy which aims to shape a conceptual
ground for a political process of democratization rather than present an answer
to the question 'what to do?’ or offer a programme for concrete
action.[44] Commonwealth (2009) Main article: Commonwealth (book)
Antonio Negri holding a copy of Commonwealth, with co-author Michael Hardt In
this book, the authors introduce the concept of "the republic of
property": "What is central for our purposes here is that the concept
of property and the defence of property remain the foundation of every modern political
constitution. This is the sense in which the republic, from the great bourgeois
revolutions to today, is a republic of property".[45] Part 2 of the book
deals with the relationship between modernity and anti-modernity and proposes
"altermodernity". Altermodernity "involves not only insertion in
the long history of antimodern struggles but also rupture with any fixed
dialectic between modern sovereignty and antimodern resistance. In the passage
from antimodernity to altermodernity, just as tradition and identity are
transformed, so too resistance takes on a new meaning, dedicated now to the
constitution of alternatives. The freedom that forms the base of resistance, as
we explained earlier, comes to the fore and constitutes an event to announce a
new political project."[46] For Alex Callinicos in a review
"What is newest in Commonwealth is its take on the fashionable idea of the
common. Hardt and Negri mean by this not merely the natural resources that
capital seeks to appropriate, but also "the languages we create, the
social practices we establish, the modes of sociality that define our
relationships", which are both the means and the result of biopolitical
production. Communism, they argue, is defined by the common, just as capitalism
is by the private and socialism (which they identify in effect with statism)
with the public."[47] For David Harvey Negri and Hardt "in the search
of an altermodernity – something that is outside the dialectical opposition
between modernity and anti-modernity – they need a means of escape. The choice
between capitalism and socialism, they suggest, is all wrong. We need to
identify something entirely different, communism – working within a different
set of dimensions."[48] Harvey also notes that "Revolutionary
thought, Hardt and Negri argue, must find a way to contest capitalism and 'the
republic of property.' It 'should not shun identity politics but instead must
work through it and learn from it,’ because it is the 'primary vehicle for
struggle within and against the republic of property since identity itself is
based on property and sovereignty.'”[48] In the same exchange in Artforum
between Harvey and Micheal Hardt and Antonio Negri, Hardt and Negri attempt to
correct Harvey in a concept that is important within the argument of Commonwealth.
As such, they state that "We instead define the concept of singularity,
contrasting it to the figure of the individual on the one hand and forms of
identity on the other, by focusing on three aspects of its relationship to
multiplicity: Singularity refers externally to a multiplicity of others; is
internally divided or multiple; and constitutes a multiplicity over time - that
is, a process of becoming."[48] Occupy movements of 2011–2012 and
Declaration In May 2012 Negri self-published (with Michael Hardt) an electronic
pamphlet on the occupy and encampment movements of 2011–2012 called Declaration
that argues the movement explores new forms of democracy. The introduction was
published at Jacobin under the title "Take Up the Baton". He also
published an article with Hardt in Foreign Affairs in October 2011 stating
"The Encampment in Lower Manhattan Speaks to a Failure of
Representation."[37] Quotes "Prison, with its daily rhythm,
with the transfer and the defense, does not leave any time; prison dissolves
time: This is the principal form of punishment in a capitalist
society."[49] "Nothing in my books has any direct organizational
relationship. My responsibility is totally as an intellectual who writes and
sells books!"[50] "...it is indeed necessary to recognize as a fact
the emergence of the B.R. [Red Brigades] and NAP [Armed Proletariat Nuclei] as
the tip of the iceberg of the Movement. This does not require one in any way to
transform the recognition into a defense, and this does not in any way deny the
grave mistake of the B.R. line. At one point I defined the B.R. as a variable
of the movement gone crazy... I state again that terrorism can only be fought
through an authentic mass political struggle and inside the revolutionary
movement."[50] In Empire the expansion of capitalism is supposed to be
'internal' rather than 'external,' in that it "subsumes not the
non-capitalist environment but its own capitalist terrain—that is, that the
subsumption is no longer formal but real."[51] Selected works (English)
See also: Category:Books by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt Negri, Antonio.
Pipeline: Letters from Prison, translated by Ed Emery. Cambridge, Polity, 2015
Negri, Antonio. Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State,
translated by Maurizia Boscagli. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1999. Reprint by University of Minnesota Press, 2009. Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri, Commonwealth, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009. ISBN
978-0-674-03511-9 The Cell (DVD of 3 interviews on captivity with Negri) Angela
Melitopoulos, Actar, 2008. Antonio Negri, The Porcelain Workshop: For a New
Grammar of Politics Translated by Noura Wedell. California: Semiotext(e) 2008.
Antonio Negri, Political Descartes: Reason, Ideology and the Bourgeois Project.
Translated by Matteo Mandarini and Alberto Toscano. New York: Verso, 2007.
Antonio Negri, Negri on Negri: In Conversation with Anne Dufourmentelle.
London: Routledge, 2004. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and
Democracy in the Age of Empire, New York: Penguin Press, 2004. Antonio Negri,
Subversive Spinoza: (Un)Contemporary Variations, edited by Timothy S. Murphy,
translated by Timothy S. Murphy, Michael Hardt, Ted Stolze, and Charles T.
Wolfe, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004. Antonio Negri, Time for
Revolution. Translated by Matteo Mandarini. New York: Continuum, 2003. Antonio
Negri, The Labor of Job: The Biblical Text as a Parable of Human Labor,
(Forward: Michael Hardt; Translator: Matteo Mandarini), Duke University Press,
(begun 1983) 2009. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, Harvard University
Press, 2000. Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio. Labor of Dionysus: A Critique
of the State-Form. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. Negri,
Antonio.The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics,
translated by Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.
Antonio Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse, New York:
Autonomedia, 1991. Antonio Negri, Revolution Retrieved: Selected Writings on
Marx, Keynes, Capitalist Crisis and New Social Subjects, 1967–83,[52] trans. Ed
Emery and John Merrington, London: Red Notes, 1988. ISBN 0-906305-09-8 Antonio
Negri, The Politics of Subversion: A Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century,
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989. Félix Guattari and Antonio Negri, Communists
like us, 1985. Goodbye Mr. Socialism Antonio Negri in conversation with Raf
Valvola Scelsi, Seven Stories Press, 2008. Casarino, Cesare and Negri, Antonio.
In Praise of the Common. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009.
Declaration, with Michael Hardt, 2012. Online articles Multitudes quarterly
journal (in French) Archives of the journal Futur Antérieur (in French) English
translations of recent articles by Antonio Negri from Generation Online Hardt
& Negri (2002), "Marx's Mole is Dead" in Eurozine Between
"Historic Compromise" and Terrorism: Reviewing the experience of
Italy in the 1970s Le Monde Diplomatique, August–September 1998 "Towards
an Ontological Definition of Multitude" Article published in the French
journal Multitudes. Extract from Negri and Hardt's Empire at Marxists.org
"Take Up the Baton." Films Marx Reloaded, Arte, April 2011. Antonio
Negri: A Revolt that Never Ends, ZDF/Arte, 52 min., 2004. [1] See also Paolo
Virno Libertarian marxism References Elsa Romeo, La Scuola di Croce:
testimonianze sull'Istituto italiano per gli studi storici, Il Mulino, 1992, p.
309. Negri, Antonio: The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's
Metaphysics and Politics. Translated from the Italian by Michael Hardt.
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). Originally published as
L'anomalia selvaggia: Saggio su potere e potenza in Baruch Spinoza (Milano:
Feltrinelli, 1981). Antonio Negri (1981): "This work [The Savage Anomaly]
was written in prison. And it was also conceived, for the most part, in prison.
Certainly, I have always known Spinoza well. Since I was in school, I have
loved the Ethics (and here I would like to fondly remember my teacher of those
years). I continued to work on it, never losing touch, but a full study
required too much time. [...] Spinoza is the clear and luminous side of Modern
philosophy. [...] With Spinoza, philosophy succeeds for the first time in
negating itself as a science of mediation. In Spinoza there is the sense of a
great anticipation of the future centuries; there is the intuition of such a
radical truth of future philosophy that it not only keeps him from being
flattened onto seventeenth-century thought but also, it often seems, denies any
confrontation, any comparison. Really, none of his contemporaries understands
him or refutes him. [...] Spinoza's materialist metaphysics is the potent
anomaly of the century: not a vanquished or marginal anomaly but, rather, an
anomaly of victorious materialism, of the ontology of a being that always moves
forward and that by constituting itself poses the ideal possibility for
revolutionizing the world." Toscano, Alberto (January 2005).
"The Politics of Spinozism: Composition and Communication (Paper presented
at the Cultural Research Bureau of Iran, Tehran, January 4, 2005)" (PDF).
Retrieved 20 June 2019. Ruddick, Susan (2010), 'The Politics of Affect:
Spinoza in the Work of Negri and Deleuze,'. Theory, Culture & Society 27(4):
21–45 Grattan, Sean (2011), 'The Indignant Multitude: Spinozist Marxism
after Empire,'. Mediations 25(2): 7–8 Duffy, Simon B. (2014), 'French and
Italian Spinozism,'. In: Rosi Braidotti (ed.), After Poststructuralism:
Transitions and Transformations. (London: Routledge, 2014), p. 148–168
Maggiori Robert, "Toni Negri, le retour du «diable» Archived 5 January
2016 at the Wayback Machine", Libération.fr, 3 July 1997. Antonio
Negri and Michael Hardt, Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England:
Harvard University Press, 2000), § 3.4. Goddard, Michael (2011), 'From
the Multitudo to the Multitude: The Place of Spinoza in the Political
Philosophy of Toni Negri,'. In: Pierre Lamarche, David Sherman, and Max
Rosenkrantz (eds.), Reading Negri: Marxism in the Age of Empire (Chicago: Open
Court, 2011), pp. 171–192 Negri, Antonio: L'anomalia selvaggia. Saggio su
potere e potenza in Baruch Spinoza. (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1981) Negri,
Antonio: Spinoza sovversivo. Variazioni (in)attuali. (Roma: Antonio Pellicani
Editore, 1992) Negri, Antonio: Spinoza et nous [La philosophie en effet].
(Paris: Éditions Galilée, 2010) Negri, Antonio: Spinoza e noi. (Milano:
Mimesis, 2012) Portelli, Alessandro (1985). "Oral Testimony, the Law
and the Making of History: the 'April 7' Murder Trial". History Workshop
Journal. Oxford University Press. 20 (1): 5–35. doi:10.1093/hwj/20.1.5.
"L' ULTIMA PAROLA SUL CASO '7 APRILE' LA CASSAZIONE CONFERMA LE CONDANN -
la Repubblica.it". Archivio - la Repubblica.it. Retrieved 3 January
2017. Portelli, Alessandro (30 March 2010). Death of Luigi Trastulli and
Other Stories, The: Form and Meaning in Oral History. SUNY Press. ISBN
9781438416335. Drake, Richard. "The Red and the Black: Terrorism in
Contemporary Italy", International Political Science Review / Revue
internationale de science politique, Vol. 5, No. 3, Political Crises (1984),
pp. 279–298. Quote: "The debate over Toni Negri's complicity in left-wing
extremism has already resulted in the publication of several thick polemical
volumes, as well as a huge number of op-ed pieces." Windschuttle,
Keith. "Tutorials in Terrorism", The Australian, 16 March 2005.[dead
link] Negri, Antonio: Subversive Spinoza: (Un)Contemporary Variations.
Translated from the Italian by Timothy S. Murphy et al. (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2004). Originally published as Spinoza sovversivo: Variazioni
(in)attuali (Roma: Antonio Pellicani Editore, 1992). Antonio Negri (1992):
"Twenty-some years ago, when at the age of forty I returned to the study
of the Ethics, which had been 'my book' during adolescence, the theoretical
climate in which I found myself immersed had changed to such an extent that it
was difficult to tell if the Spinoza standing before me then was the same one
who had accompanied me in my earliest studies." Žižek, Slavoj: The
Parallax View. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006) Several notable figures
of French (and Italian)-inspired post-structuralist Neo-Spinozism including
Ferdinand Alquié, Louis Althusser, Étienne Balibar, Alain Billecoq, Francesco
Cerrato, Paolo Cristofolini, Gilles Deleuze, Martial Gueroult, Chantal Jaquet,
Frédéric Lordon, Pierre Macherey, Frédéric Manzini, Alexandre Matheron, Filippo
Mignini, Pierre-François Moreau, Vittorio Morfino, Antonio Negri, Charles
Ramond, Bernard Rousset, Pascal Sévérac, André Tosel, Lorenzo Vinciguerra, and
Sylvain Zac. Vinciguerra, Lorenzo (2009), 'Spinoza in French Philosophy
Today,'. Philosophy Today 53(4): 422–437. doi:10.5840/philtoday200953410
Peden, Knox: Reason without Limits: Spinozism as Anti-Phenomenology in
Twentieth-Century French Thought. (PhD thesis, University of California,
Berkeley, 2009) Peden, Knox: Spinoza Contra Phenomenology: French
Rationalism from Cavaillès to Deleuze. (Stanford University Press, 2014) ISBN
9780804791342 Autistici/Inventati (ed.). "Intervista a Romano
Alquati". pp. 5, 13, 15, 17–18. Retrieved 2 December 2018. Ganahl,
Rainer. "Marx is still Marx: Antonio Negri". Semiotext(e). Archived
from the original on 30 October 2013. Retrieved 28 October 2013.
"Tecniche d'indagine. Quando il telefono è un bluff". Panorama (in
Italian). 29 September 2011. Archived from the original on 29 September 2013.
Retrieved 30 October 2012. Lucio Di Marzo (10 December 2011). "Dopo
il caso Battisti, ora Toni Negri spiega la filosofia ai francesi". Il
Giornale (in Italian). Archived from the original on 3 September 2012.
Retrieved 30 October 2012. Malcolm Bull (4 October 2001). "You can't
build a new society with a Stanley knife". London Review of Books.
Archived from the original on 13 January 2011. Retrieved 12 December
2010. Michel Foucault, "Le philosophe masqué" (in Dits et
écrits, volume 4, Paris, Gallimard, 1994, p. 105) "Revised
bibliography of Deleuze" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 30
October 2008. Retrieved 30 August 2016. Gilles Deleuze, Lettre ouverte
aux juges de Negri, text n°20 in Deux régimes de fous, Mille et une nuits, 2003
(transl. of Lettera aperta ai giudici di Negri published in La Repubblica on 10
May 1979); Ce livre est littéralement une preuve d'innocence, text n°21
(op.cit.), originally published in Le Matin de Paris on 13 December 1979
"Pannella: e' chiaro che mira all' amnistia". Corriere della Sera. 22
June 1997. Archived from the original on 4 September 2011. Retrieved 5 January
2011. The Independent, "Antonio Negri: The nostalgic revolutionary
Archived 28 October 2011 at the Wayback Machine", 17 August 2004. Accessed
7/04/10 Gray, John (20 November 2009). "Commonwealth, By Michael
Hardt & Antonio Negri / First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, By Slavoj
Zizek". The Independent. Archived from the original on 14 November 2014.
Retrieved 12 December 2010. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Arabs are
democracy's new pioneers Archived 12 March 2017 at the Wayback Machine, The
Guardian, 24 February 2011. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, The Fight
for 'Real Democracy' at the Heart of Occupy Wall Street Archived 11 August 2014
at the Wayback Machine, Foreign Affairs, 11 October 2011. Introductory
page on the book by University of Minnesota press Introduction to the
book by University of Minnesota Press Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt,
Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: Harvard University
Press, 2000), pg 6. Walter Benn Michaels, The Shape of the Signifier:
1967 to the end of history (Princeton University Press, 2004), pp.
171–172. Walter Benn Michaels, The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the
end of history (Princeton University Press, 2004), pg 173. "The
problem, as they see it, is that "postmodernist authors" have
neglected the one identity that should matter most to those on the left, the
one we have always with us: "The only non-localizable 'common name' of
pure difference in all eras is that of the poor" (156)...only the
poor, Hardt and Negri say, "live radically the actual and present
being" (157)." Walter Benn Michaels, The Shape of the Signifier: 1967
to the end of history (Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 179–180.
Laurie, Timothy; Stark, Hannah (2017), "Love's Lessons: Intimacy, Pedagogy
and Political Community", Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities,
22 (4): 69–79 Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt. Commonwealth. Harvard
University Press. 2009. Pg.15 Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt.
Commonwealth. Harvard University Press. 2009. Pg.107 "Commonwealth.
Book Review by Alex Callinicos, March 2010". Archived from the original on
3 July 2013. Retrieved 21 May 2013. "David Harvey, Antonio Negri and
Michael Hardt. An exchange on Commonwealth". Artforum. Archived from the
original on 22 September 2013. Retrieved 21 May 2013. Preface to his The
Savage Anomaly. The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics. [A study
"drafted by the light of midnight oil in prison" (ibid.), from April
1979 to April 1980]. Minneapolis/Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1981,
p. xxiii Autonomia: Post-Political Politics, ed. Sylvere Lotringer &
Christian Marazzi. New York: Semiotext(e), 1980, 2007. Hardt and Negri
2000, p. 272. "Revolution Retrieved". Archived from the
original on 9 August 2009. Further reading The Cell (DVD of 3 interviews on
captivity with Negri) Angela Melitopoulos, Actar, 2008. Empire and Imperialism:
A Critical Reading of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Atilio Borón, London:
Zed Books, 2005. (Publisher's announcement) Reading Capital Politically, Harry
Cleaver. 1979, second ed. 2000. The Philosophy of Antonio Negri, vol. 1:
Resistance in Practice, ed. Timothy S. Murphy and Abdul-Karim Mustapha. London:
Pluto Press, 2005. The Philosophy of Antonio Negri, vol. 2: Revolution in
Theory, ed. Timothy S. Murphy and Abdul-Karim Mustapha. London: Pluto Press,
2007. Dossier on Empire: a special issue of Rethinking Marxism, ed. Abdul-karim
Mustapha. London: T&F/Routledge, 2002. Autonomia: Post-Political Politics,
ed. Sylvere Lotringer & Christian Marazzi. New York: Semiotext(e), 1980,
2007. (Includes transcripts of Negri's exchanges with his accusers during his
trial.) ISBN 1-58435-053-9, ISBN 978-1-58435-053-8. Available online at
Semiotext(e) Antonio Negri Illustrated: Interview in Venice, Claudio Calia, Red
Quill Books, 2011. ISBN 978-1-926958-13-2 (Publisher's announcement) External
links Media related to Toni Negri at Wikimedia Commons Quotations
related to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri at Wikiquote vte Continental
philosophy vte Social and political philosophy Authority control Edit this at
Wikidata BIBSYS:
90123636BNE: XX1153666BNF: cb119175124 (data)CANTIC: a10401854CiNii:
DA00365531GND: 119063492ICCU: IT\ICCU\CFIV\006163ISNI: 0000 0001 2146 876XLCCN:
n79100667LNB: 000042126NDL: 00451083NKC: xx0083451NLA: 35683277NLG: 193716NLI:
000098735NLK: KAC199619981NLP: A19518080NSK: 000180690NTA: 069416044SELIBR:
79575SNAC: w6036bqpSUDOC: 027045897Trove: 1040891VIAF: 108238827WorldCat
Identities: lccn-n79100667 Categories: 1933 birthsLiving peoplePeople from
PaduaAutonomismUniversity of Padua alumni20th-century Italian
philosophers21st-century Italian philosophersAnti-globalization
writersContinental philosophersDuke University facultyCritics of work and the
work ethicScholars of MarxismIndustrial Workers of the WorldMarxist theoristsPolitical
philosophersRevolution theoristsItalian communistsItalian socialistsItalian
political philosophersItalian MarxistsLibertarian socialistsPotere
OperaioSpinoza scholarsSpinozist philosophersItalian magazine editorsItalian
book publishers (people)Italian magazine foundersItalian publishers
(people)Neo-SpinozismDescartes scholarsItalian exiles
Refs.: Luigi Speranza,
"Grice e Negri," per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool
Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
abdicatum: negation: H. P. Grice,
“Negation.” the logical operation on propositions that is indicated, e.g., by
the prefatory clause ‘It is not the case that . . .’. Negation is standardly
distinguished sharply from the operation on predicates that is called
complementation and that is indicated by the prefix ‘non-’. Because negation
can also be indicated by the adverb ‘not’, a distinction is often drawn between
external negation, which is indicated by attaching the prefatory ‘It is not the
case that . . .’ to an assertion, and internal negation, which is indicated by
inserting the adverb ‘not’ along with, perhaps, nature, right of negation
601 601 grammatically necessary words
like ‘do’ or ‘does’ into the assertion in such a way as to indicate that the
adverb ‘not’ modifies the verb. In a number of cases, the question arises as to
whether external and internal negation yield logically equivalent results. For
example, ‘It is not the case that Santa Claus exists’ would seem obviously to
be true, whereas ‘Santa Claus does not exist’ seems to some philosophers to
presuppose what it denies, on the ground that nothing could be truly asserted
of Santa Claus unless he existed. Refs.:
H. P. Grice, “Negation and privation;” H. P. Grice, “Lectures on negation.”
Nemesius: Grecian philosopher. His
treatise on the soul, On the Nature of Man, tr. from Grecian into Latin by
Alphanus of Salerno and Burgundio of Pisa was attributed to Gregory of Nyssa, and
enjoyed some authority. The treatise rejects Plato for underplaying the unity
of soul and body, and Aristotle for making the soul essentially corporeal. The
soul is self-subsistent, incorporeal, and by nature immortal, but naturally
suited for union with the body. Nemesius draws on Ammonius Saccas and Porphyry to
explain the incorruptible soul’s perfect union with the corruptible body. His
review of the powers of the soul (“what I will call ‘the power structure of the
soul,’” – Grice). draws especially on Galen on the brain. His view that
rational creatures possess free will in virtue of their rationality influenced
Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus.
Neri -- Guido Davide Neri Da
Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Guido Davide
Neri (Milano, 26 novembre 1935 – 29 marzo 2001) è stato un filosofo e
accademico italiano, docente di filosofia teoretica presso l'Università
degli Studi di Verona dal 1968 fino alla sua scomparsa. Allievo di Antonio
Banfi e di Enzo Paci, Neri rappresenta una delle ultime sintesi della Scuola di
Milano, di cui riprende alcuni dei temi portanti: ricerca fenomenologica,
analisi storico-politica, studi estetici.[1][2] Rispetto ai suoi maestri,
del cui pensiero è stato uno dei maggiori interpreti, Neri sviluppa un percorso
di ricerca originale, caratterizzato da una critica delle ideologie del
Novecento e dei loro fallimenti, e da una lettura non dogmatica della storia
contemporanea, volta a metterne in luce discontinuità e aporie. Forte di
un'indole scettica e fedele al principio dell'epoché fenomenologica, Neri ha
ripercorso le vicende della dialettica marxista, focalizzando in particolare la
sua attenzione sull'Europa centro-orientale, e sulle varie forme di
controcondotta e dissenso che, a partire dagli anni sessanta, sono andati
germinando in quel contesto storico. I suoi autori di riferimento – Husserl e
Merleau-Ponty, Bloch e Lukács, Kosík e Kołakowski – rivelano la tensione
intellettuale tra ricerca teoretica e storica che ha caratterizzato il lavoro
di Neri, dalle principali monografie, ai saggi su aut aut e Il filo rosso, fino
al materiale inedito conservato presso l'Archivio Neri, da pochi anni istituito
presso l'Università degli Studi di Milano.[1] Indice 1 Biografia 2 Pensiero
3 L'Archivio
Guido Davide Neri 4 Opere
5 Note
6 Bibliografia
7 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Durante gli anni universitari, trascorsi tra Pavia e Milano,
Neri ha l'occasione di frequentare gli ultimi corsi di Antonio Banfi, ormai
lontano dalla fenomenologia e intento a perfezionare (e radicalizzare) il suo
umanesimo di stampo marxista, e dell'ancor giovane Enzo Paci che, in quegli
stessi anni di dopoguerra, intraprende un confronto innovativo con gli esiti
della ricerca husserliana, e in particolare con i contenuti della Crisi delle
scienze europee, oggetto di numerosi corsi. Proprio questo "apprendistato
fenomenologico", secondo l'espressione di Luciano Fausti, ha consentito a
Neri di acquisire un metodo di ricerca che lo ha accompagnato, non solo nei
suoi studi delle opere di Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Patočka (dei quali traduce e
cura varie pubblicazioni), ma, più in generale, nell'analisi del pensiero storico
e politico novecentesco. A questi interessi va ad aggiungersi quello per l'arte
e l'estetica, decisivo in questi primi anni, e dovuto in particolare agli
insegnamenti di Dino Formaggio, con cui Neri si laureò nel 1957. Neri
continuerà a interessarsi a questi temi anche negli anni successivi, dedicando
diversi scritti a Panofsky (della cui Prospettiva come forma simbolica cura nel
1962 l'edizione) e a Caravaggio, e interrogandosi sul rapporto tra
fenomenologia ed estetica.[1] Agli anni di studio, segue una fase di
ricerca che lo porterà nei primi anni sessanta a Praga, ospite dell'Accademia
delle Scienze della Cecoslovacchia e, in seguito, negli Stati Uniti d'America,
dove nel 1968 è visiting scholar presso la Pennsylvania State University. A
Praga, Neri entra in contatto con la giovane generazione di intellettuali cechi
che, in questi anni cruciali, portano avanti l'idea di riformare il socialismo
dal suo interno, a partire da una profonda reinterpretazione del materialismo e
della prassi marxiana. È grazie a Neri che in Italia si diffondono le opere di
Karel Kosík e di Jan Patočka che, pur così profondamente diversi, condividono
con Neri l'interesse per la fenomenologia e la politica. Durante la sua
esperienza americana, Neri dedica a Marx una serie di lezioni e conferenze, i
cui testi inediti, facenti parte del Fondo Neri, sono conservati presso la
Biblioteca di Filosofia dell'Università degli Studi di Milano. Analizzando il
pensiero di Marx, Neri si rifà in particolar modo, oltre che all'insegnamento
di Kosík, agli scritti di Gajo Petrović e alla scuola jugoslava legata alla
rivista Praxis. Tornato in Italia, inizia un lungo periodo di insegnamento a
Verona, durante il quale incentra i suoi corsi sulla fenomenologia
post-husserliana, su Bloch, sull'idea filosofica di Europa e la sua eredità, a
seguito del fallimento dei principali progetti politici novecenteschi. Escono
in questi anni le sue opere più note: Aporie della realizzazione (1980), sulla
filosofia e l'ideologia dei paesi del socialismo realizzato, e Crisi e
costruzione della storia (1984), dedicato, ancora una volta, al maestro
Banfi.[1] Pensiero In più occasioni, Neri ha manifestato il suo debito
nei confronti dei suoi maestri milanesi, per averlo iniziato allo studio della
fenomenologia. In tal senso, il passaggio dall'insegnamento di Banfi a quello
di Paci è decisivo. «Al centro non era più – scrive Neri poco prima di morire,
ricordando quegli anni – il "disperato razionalismo" del fondatore
della fenomenologia: il fuoco della rilettura era diventato il "mondo
della vita" e la critica dell'obbiettivismo moderno».[1] Un pensiero che
ben si presta a una generazione di giovani studiosi che, durante gli anni
sessanta, si raccolgono intorno a Paci, desiderosi di affinare un pensiero che
consenta di riguadagnare un sguardo disincantato, ma non indifferente, sulla
realtà sociale e culturale circostante, contro «l'asfissiante razionalismo» di
Banfi e, più in generale, contro l'impronta culturale del PCI.[1] Neri
rientra in questa nuova leva di studiosi e in questi termini si possono
interpretare anche i suoi studi fenomenologici. «Con il tema del mondo della
vita – ribadisce Neri, in un altro tra i suoi scritti più tardi – la
fenomenologia mostrava di saper affrontare i problemi posti dalle scienze storiche
e sociali, dall'antropologia culturale e infine anche dal pensiero
marxista».[1] L'esempio di Paci, tuttavia, che cercò a tutti gli effetti di
coniugare metodo fenomenologico e dialettica marxista, è seguito dall'allievo
solo parzialmente, lasciando la sua impronta più visibile nel volume del 1966,
Prassi e conoscenza, una cui parte è dedicata ai critici marxisti della
fenomenologia. Col passare del tempo, tuttavia, Neri adotta una posizione di
sempre più evidente rottura, prediligendo a qualsiasi tentativo conciliatorio
una critica fenomenologica del socialismo realizzato e delle sue distorsioni. A
tal proposito, il confronto con Kosík e il dissenso, all'interno del socialismo
reale, giocano un ruolo di primo piano.[1] Come si evince dalla sua opera
del 1980, Aporie della realizzazione, Neri distingue due fasi e due generazioni
di filosofi, all'interno della complessa crisi del socialismo in costruzione.
Da una parte, la prima generazione è rappresentata da György Lukács e da Ernst
Bloch. Proprio al pensiero di quest'ultimo, alle sue concezioni di storia e di
utopia e ai suoi numerosi ripensamenti, Neri dedica una lunga analisi, che
tornerà periodicamente anche negli anni successivi, come testimoniano i
programmi dei suoi corsi universitari. A Bloch è ispirato, d'altronde, il
titolo del libro, che Neri ricava da una pagina di Principio speranza. È
all'interno della dialettica tra realtà e realizzazione, tra condizione
presente e speranza futura, che Neri individua l'andatura del socialismo reale,
della sua filosofia e della sua ideologia. Solo con la seconda generazione di
filosofi, tuttavia, le aporie della realizzazione socialista vengono veramente
al pettine; la malinconia di Bloch cede infatti il passo allo sguardo scettico
di Kołakowski e al tentativo di Kosík di rileggere la dialettica marxista in
termini concreti, al di là di ogni deriva ideologica. Dello stesso tenore è
anche il libro su Banfi, Crisi e costruzione della storia, di pochi anni
successivo, in cui Neri si confronta con lo stesso tema della realizzazione,
inteso stavolta nei termini del tentativo banfiano di costruire un percorso
storico su basi razionali, oltre la crisi della civiltà moderna, verso una
nuova prospettiva umanistica. Alla luce del ritratto offertoci da Neri, che si
concentra in particolare sugli anni trenta, intesi come momento cruciale per lo
sviluppo della teoria banfiana, emerge un'immagine di Banfi particolarmente
complessa, nella quale la svolta ideologica e l'adesione al comunismo non
offuscano il perdurare di uno spirito critico e di una prospettiva europea, che
si sviluppa al di là dei particolarismi delle filosofie nazionali.[1]
L'Archivio Guido Davide Neri Nel 2009 è stato creato presso la Biblioteca di
Filosofia dell'Università degli Studi di Milano l'Archivio Guido Davide
Neri.[1][3] In tale archivio è raccolta un'imponente quantità di materiali
inediti, che comprendono riflessioni, appunti per corsi e seminari, annotazioni
di viaggio, corrispondenze. Sono considerati di particolare rilievo, in vista
di futuri studi sul pensiero filosofico di Neri, i 149 quaderni, contenenti le
riflessioni del filosofo, dalla metà degli anni cinquanta, fino alla sua morte.
Attraverso la lettura di questi scritti, ora completamente consultabili e in
corso di digitalizzazione, è possibile chiarire il rapporto e gli scambi di
Neri con altri rappresentanti della filosofia milanese: da Banfi a Paci, da Dal
Pra a Preti. Grande importanza rivestono anche i commenti in presa diretta su
alcuni tra i più rilevanti avvenimenti storici del Novecento: dall'invasione
sovietica dell'Ungheria del 1956, alla Primavera di Praga, fino al crollo del
socialismo reale. A ciò si aggiungono le riflessioni sul ruolo della filosofia
nella società, sul modo e l'opportunità di insegnarla, e sulla sua tenuta, di fronte
alle scosse della storia.[1] Opere Prassi e conoscenza: Con una sezione
dedicata ai critici marxisti della fenomenologia, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1966.
Aporie della realizzazione: Filosofia e ideologia nel socialismo reale, Milano,
Feltrinelli, 1980. Crisi e costruzione della storia: Sviluppi del pensiero di
Antonio Banfi, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1988. Il sensibile, la storia, l'arte:
Scritti 1957-2001, Verona, Ombre Corte, 2003. Note Francesco Tava, Guido
Davide Neri (1935-2001), su Open Commons of Phenomenology. URL consultato il 15
settembre 2016. ^ Gabriele Scaramuzza, Presentazione, in Per Guido Davide Neri.
Atti della Giornata di Studio e di Testimonianze svoltasi presso la Fondazione
Corrente, Milano, l’11 ottobre 2011, Materiali di Estetica, n. 3.1, 2016, pp.
1-2. ^ Archivio Guido Davide Neri, su sba.unimi.it. URL consultato il 16
settembre 2016. Bibliografia Bibliografia degli scritti di Neri, in aut aut, n.
304, luglio-agosto 2001, pp. 161-164. Per Guido Davide Neri. Atti della
Giornata di Studio e di Testimonianze svoltasi presso la Fondazione Corrente,
Milano, l’11 ottobre 2011, in Materiali di Estetica, n. 3.1, 2016. Quando tra
noi muore un filosofo. Ricordo di Guido D. Neri, a cura di amici, colleghi e
studenti, Pizzighettone, Viciguerra, 2002. Luciano Fausti, Guido Davide Neri
tra scepsi e storia. Un percorso filosofico, Milano, UNICOPLI, 2010. Laura
Frigerio e Elena Mazzolani, Il Fondo Guido Davide Neri, in Sistema Università,
vol. 10, n. 39/40, 2012, pp. 6-8. Amedeo Vigorelli, Fenomenologia e storia. A
partire da Patocka: itinerario filosofico di Guido Davide Neri, in Leussein,
vol. 4, n. 1, 2012, pp. 141-163. Collegamenti esterni Francesco Tava, Guido
Davide Neri (1935-2001), su Open Commons of Phenomenology. URL consultato il 15
settembre 2016. Archivio Guido Davide Neri, su sba.unimi.it. URL consultato il
16 settembre 2016. Fondo librario Guido Davide Neri, su sba.unimi.it. URL
consultato il 16 settembre 2016. Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 235392839 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 1569
6416 · LCCN (EN) n80164719 · GND (DE) 12717186X · BNF (FR) cb12139619g (data) ·
BNE (ES) XX1056623 (data) · BAV (EN) 495/166569 · WorldCat Identities (EN)
lccn-n80164719 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia
Università Portale Università Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX
secoloAccademici italiani del XX secoloNati nel 1935Morti nel 2001Nati il 26
novembreMorti il 29 marzoNati a MilanoStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di
PaviaStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di Milano[altre]
Nesi -- Giovanni Nesi Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Nota disambigua.svg
Disambiguazione – Se stai cercando il pianista italiano, vedi Giovanni Nesi
(pianista). Abbozzo Questa voce sull'argomento filosofi italiani è solo un
abbozzo. Contribuisci a migliorarla secondo le convenzioni di Wikipedia.
Giovanni Nesi (Firenze, 14 gennaio 1456 – Firenze, 1506) è stato un filosofo
italiano. Figlio di Francesco di
Giovanni e di Nera di Giovanni Spinelli, si dedicò interamente agli studi
letterari. Strinse stretti rapporti con i principali umanisti fiorentini
dell'epoca, tra cui Donato Acciaiuoli e Marsilio Ficino. Influenzato
dall'operato di Girolamo Savonarola, ricoprì anche diverse cariche
politiche. Opere Ioannis Nesii
adulescentuli oratiuncula (1472) Orazione del Corpo di Cristo (1474) Orazione
de Eucharestia (1475) Orazione sull'umiltà (1476) Sulla carità (1478) De
moribus (1484) De charitate (1486) Oraculum de novo saeculo (1497) Canzoniere
(1497-1498) Poema (1499-incompiuta) Collegamenti esterni Giovanni Nesi, in
Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Elisabetta Tortelli, Giovanni Nesi, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani,
vol. 78, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2013. Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 34638068 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0000 8113 8044 · LCCN (EN) n78090588 · BNF (FR)
cb137510691 (data) · BAV (EN) 495/336981 · CERL cnp01372438 · WorldCat
Identities (EN) lccn-n78090588 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale
Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XV secoloNati nel 1456Morti nel
1506Nati il 14 gennaioNati a FirenzeMorti a Firenze[altre]
Ariskant – Kantianism, palaeo-Kantianism,
neo-Kantianism, Ariskantianism! -- neo-Kantianism – as opposed to
‘palaeo-Kantianism’ -- the diverse Kantian movement that emerged within G.
philosophy in the 1860s, gained a strong academic foothold in the 1870s,
reached its height during the three decades prior to World War I, and
disappeared with the rise of Nazism. The movement was initially focused on renewed
study and elaboration of Kant’s epistemology in response to the growing
epistemic authority of the natural sciences and as an alternative to both
Hegelian and speculative idealism and the emerging materialism of, among
others, Ludwig Büchner 182499. Later neo-Kantianism explored Kant’s whole
philosophy, applied his critical method to disciplines other than the natural
sciences, and developed its own philosophical systems. Some originators and/or
early contributors were Kuno Fischer 18247, Hermann von Helmholtz 182,
Friedrich Albert Lange 182875, Eduard Zeller 18148, and Otto Liebmann 18402,
whose Kant und die Epigonen 1865 repeatedly stated what became a neoKantian
motto, “Back to Kant!” Several forms of neo-Kantianism are to be distinguished.
T. K. Oesterreich 09, in Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der
Philosophie “F.U.’s Compendium of the History of Philosophy,” 3, developed the
standard, somewhat chronological, classification: 1 The physiological
neo-Kantianism of Helmholtz and Lange, who claimed that physiology is
“developed or corrected Kantianism.” 2 The metaphysical neo-Kantianism of the
later Liebmann, who argued for a Kantian “critical metaphysics” beyond
epistemology in the form of “hypotheses” about the essence of things. 3 The realist
neo-Kantianism of Alois Riehl 18444, who emphasized the real existence of
Kant’s thing-in-itself. 4 The logistic-methodological neo-Kantianism of the
Marburg School of Hermann Cohen 18428 and Paul Natorp 18544. 5 The axiological
neo-Kantianism of the Baden or Southwest G. School of Windelband 18485 and
Heinrich Rickert 18636. 6 The relativistic neo-Kantianism of Georg Simmel
18588, who argued for Kantian categories relative to individuals and cultures.
7 The psychological neo-Kantianism of Leonard Nelson 27, originator of the
Göttingen School; also known as the neo-Friesian School, after Jakob Friedrich
Fries 17731843, Nelson’s self-proclaimed precursor. Like Fries, Nelson held
that Kantian a priori principles cannot be transcendentally justified, but can
be discovered only through introspection. Oesterreich’s classification has been
narrowed or modified, partly because of conflicting views on how distinctly
“Kantian” a philosopher must have been to be called “neo-Kantian.” The very
term ‘neo-Kantianism’ has even been called into question, as suggesting real
intellectual commonality where little or none is to be found. There is,
however, growing consensus that Marneo-Euclidean geometry neo-Kantianism
603 603 burg and Baden neo-Kantianism
were the most important and influential. Marburg School. Its founder, Cohen,
developed its characteristic Kantian idealism of the natural sciences by
arguing that physical objects are truly known only through the laws of these
sciences and that these laws presuppose the application of Kantian a priori
principles and concepts. Cohen elaborated this idealism by eliminating Kant’s
dualism of sensibility and understanding, claiming that space and time are
construction methods of “pure thought” rather than a priori forms of perception
and that the notion of any “given” perceptual data prior to the “activity” of
“pure thought” is meaningless. Accordingly, Cohen reformulated Kant’s
thing-in-itself as the regulative idea that the mathematical description of the
world can always be improved. Cohen also emphasized that “pure thought” refers
not to individual consciousess on his
account Kant had not yet sufficiently left behind a “subjectobject”
epistemology but rather to the content
of his own system of a priori principles, which he saw as subject to change
with the progress of science. Just as Cohen held that epistemology must be
based on the “fact of science,” he argued, in a decisive step beyond Kant, that
ethics must transcendentally deduce both the moral law and the ideal moral
subject from a humanistic science more
specifically, from jurisprudence’s notion of the legal person. This analysis
led to the view that the moral law demands that all institutions, including
economic enterprises, become democratic
so that they display unified wills and intentions as transcendental
conditions of the legal person and that
all individuals become colegislators. Thus Cohen arrived at his frequently
cited claim that Kant “is the true and real originator of G. socialism.” Other
important Marburg Kantians were Cohen’s colleague Natorp, best known for his
studies on Plato and philosophy of education, and their students Karl Vorländer
18608, who focused on Kantian socialist ethics as a corrective of orthodox
Marxism, and Ernst Cassirer 18745. Baden School. The basic task of philosophy
and its transcendental method is seen as identifying universal values that make
possible culture in its varied expressions. This focus is evident in
Windelband’s influential insight that the natural sciences seek to formulate
general laws nomothetic knowledge while the historical sciences seek to
describe unique events idiographic
knowledge. This distinction is based on the values interests of mastery of
nature and understanding and reliving the unique past in order to affirm our
individuality. Windelband’s view of the historical sciences as idiographic
raised the problem of selection central to his successor Rickert’s writings:
How can historians objectively determine which individual events are
historically significant? Rickert argued that this selection must be based on
the values that are generally recognized within the cultures under
investigation, not on the values of historians themselves. Rickert also
developed the transcendental argument that the objectivity of the historical
sciences necessitates the assumption that the generally recognized values of
different cultures approximate in various degrees universally valid values.
This argument was rejected by Weber, whose methodological work was greatly indebted
to Rickert. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Kantianism: old and new.”
Platone – Platonism – Walter Pater -- Neo-platonism
– as opposed to ‘palaeo-Platonism’ -- that period of Platonism following on the
new impetus provided by the philosophical speculations of Plotinus A.D. 20469.
It extends, as a minimum, to the closing of the Platonic School in Athens by
Justinian in 529, but maximally through Byzantium, with such figures as Michael
Psellus 101878 and Pletho c.13601452, the Renaissance Ficino, Pico, and the Florentine
Academy, and the early modern period the Cambridge Platonists, Thomas Taylor,
to the advent of the “scientific” study of the works of Plato with
Schleiermacher 17681834 at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The term
was formerly also used to characterize the whole period from the Old Academy of
Plato’s immediate successors, Speusippus and Xenocrates, through what is now
termed Middle Platonism c.80 B.C.A.D. 220, down to Plotinus. This account
confines itself to the “minimum” interpretation. Neoplatonism proper may be
divided into three main periods: that of Plotinus and his immediate followers
third century; the “Syrian” School of Iamblichus and his followers fourth
century; and the “Athenian” School begun by Plutarch of Athens, and including Syrianus,
Proclus, and their successors, down to Damascius fifthsixth centuries. Plotinus
and his school. Plotinus’s innovations in Platonism developed in his essays,
the Enneads, collected and edited by his pupil Porphyry after his death, are
mainly two: a above the traditional supreme principle of earlier Platonism and
Aristotelianism, a self-thinking intellect, which was also regarded as true
being, he postulated a principle superior to intellect and being, totally
unitary and simple “the One”; b he saw reality as a series of levels One,
Intelligence, Soul, each higher one outflowing or radiating into the next
lower, while still remaining unaffected in itself, and the lower ones fixing
themselves in being by somehow “reflecting back” upon their priors. This eternal
process gives the universe its existence and character. Intelligence operates
in a state of non-temporal simultaneity, holding within itself the “forms” of
all things. Soul, in turn, generates time, and receives the forms into itself
as “reason principles” logoi. Our physical three-dimensional world is the
result of the lower aspect of Soul nature projecting itself upon a kind of
negative field of force, which Plotinus calls “matter.” Matter has no positive
existence, but is simply the receptacle for the unfolding of Soul in its lowest
aspect, which projects the forms in three-dimensional space. Plotinus often
speaks of matter as “evil” e.g. Enneads II.8, and of the Soul as suffering a
“fall” e.g. Enneads V.1, 1, but in fact he sees the whole cosmic process as an
inevitable result of the superabundant productivity of the One, and thus “the
best of all possible worlds.” Plotinus was himself a mystic, but he arrived at
his philosophical conclusions by perfectly logical means, and he had not much
use for either traditional religion or any of the more recent superstitions.
His immediate pupils, Amelius c.22590 and Porphyry 234c.305, while somewhat
more hospitable to these, remained largely true to his philosophy though
Amelius had a weakness for triadic elaborations in metaphysics. Porphyry was to
have wide influence, both in the Latin West through such men as Marius
Victorinus, Augustine, and Boethius, and in the Grecian East and even, through
translations, on medieval Islam, as the founder of the Neoplatonic tradition of
commentary on both Plato and Aristotle, but it is mainly as an expounder of
Plotinus’s philosophy that he is known. He added little that is distinctive,
though that little is currently becoming better appreciated. Iamblichus and the
Syrian School. Iamblichus c.245325, descendant of an old Syrian noble family,
was a pupil of Porphyry’s, but dissented from him on various important issues.
He set up his own school in Apamea in Syria, and attracted many pupils. One
chief point of dissent was the role of theurgy really just magic, with
philosophical underpinnings, but not unlike Christian sacramental theology.
Iamblichus claimed, as against Porphyry, that philosophical reasoning alone
could not attain the highest degree of enlightenment, without the aid of
theurgic rites, and his view on this was followed by all later Platonists. He
also produced a metaphysical scheme far more elaborate than Plotinus’s, by a
Scholastic filling in, normally with systems of triads, of gaps in the “chain
of being” left by Plotinus’s more fluid and dynamic approach to philosophy. For
instance, he postulated two Ones, one completely transcendent, the other the
source of all creation, thus “resolving” a tension in Plotinus’s metaphysics.
Iamblichus was also concerned to fit as many of the traditional gods as
possible into his system, which later attracted the attention of the Emperor
Julian, who based himself on Iamblichus when attempting to set up a Hellenic
religion to rival Christianity, a project which, however, died with him in 363.
The Athenian School. The precise links between the pupils of Iamblichus and
Plutarch d.432, founder of the Athenian School, remain obscure, but the
Athenians always retained a great respect for the Syrian. Plutarch himself is a
dim figure, but Syrianus c.370437, though little of his writings survives, can
be seen from constant references to him by his pupil Proclus 412 85 to be a
major figure, and the source of most of Proclus’s metaphysical elaborations.
The Athenians essentially developed and systematized further the doctrines of
Iamblichus, creating new levels of divinity e.g. intelligibleintellectual gods,
and “henads” in the realm of the One
though they rejected the two Ones, this process reaching its culmination
in the thought of the last head of the Athenian Academy, Damascius c.456540.
The drive to systematize reality and to objectivize concepts, exhibited most
dramatically in Proclus’s Elements of Theology, is a lasting legacy of the
later Neoplatonists, and had a significant influence on the thought, among
others, of Hegel. Grice: “The implicaturum of ‘everything old is new again’ is
that everything new is old again.” “It’s the older generation,
knock-knock-knocking at the door!” -- Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Everything old is
new again – and vice versa.”
Otiumm -- Schole –scholasticism -- neo-scholasticism:
as opposed to palaeo-scholasticism – Grice: “The original name of Oxford was
‘studium generale’! The mascot was the ox!” --. the movement given impetus
Neoplatonism, Islamic neo-Scholasticism 605
605 by Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris 1879, which, while
stressing Aquinas, was a general recommendation of the study of medieval
Scholasticism as a source for the solution of vexing modern problems. Leo
assumed that there was a doctrine common to Aquinas, Bonaventure, Albertus
Magnus, and Duns Scotus, and that Aquinas was a preeminent spokesman of the
common view. Maurice De Wulf employed the phrase ‘perennial philosophy’ to
designate this common medieval core as well as what of Scholasticism is
relevant to later times. Historians like Mandonnet, Grabmann, and Gilson soon
contested the idea that there was a single medieval doctrine and drew attention
to the profound differences between the great medieval masters. The discussion of
Christian philosophy precipitated by Brehier in 1 generated a variety of
suggestions as to what medieval thinkers and later Christian philosophers have
in common, but this was quite different from the assumption of Aeterni Patris.
The pedagogical directives of this and later encyclicals brought about a
revival of Thomism rather than of Scholasticism, generally in seminaries,
ecclesiastical s, and Catholic universities. Louvain’s Higher Institute of
Philosophy under the direction of Cardinal Mercier and its Revue de Philosophie
Néoscolastique were among the first fruits of the Thomistic revival. The studia
generalia of the Dominican order continued at a new pace, the Saulchoir
publishing the Revue thomiste. In graduate centers in Milan, Madrid, Latin
America, Paris, and Rome, men were trained for the task of teaching in s and
seminaries, and scholarly research began to flourish as well. The Leonine
edition of the writings of Aquinas was soon joined by new critical editions of
Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, and Ockham, as well as Albertus Magnus. Medieval
studies in the broader sense gained from the quest for manuscripts and the
growth of paleography and codicology. Besides the historians mentioned above,
Jacques Maritain 23, a layman and convert to Catholicism, did much both in his
native France and in the United States to promote the study of Aquinas. The
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies at Toronto, with Gilson regularly and
Maritain frequently in residence, became a source of and
teachers in Canada and the United States, as Louvain and, in Rome, the
Jesuit Gregorianum and the Dominican Angelicum already were. In the 0s s took
doctorates in theology and philosophy at Laval in Quebec and soon the influence
of Charles De Koninck was felt. Jesuits at St. Louis began to publish The Modern Schoolman,
Dominicans in Washington The Thomist, and the
Catholic Philosophical Association The New Scholasticism. The School of
Philosophy at Catholic , long the primary domestic source of professors and
scholars, was complemented by graduate programs at St. Louis, Georgetown, Notre
Dame, Fordham, and Marquette. In the golden period of the Thomistic revival in
the United States, from the 0s until the end of the Vatican Council II in 5,
there were varieties of Thomism based on the variety of views on the relation
between philosophy and science. By the 0s Thomistic philosophy was a prominent
part of the curriculum of all Catholic s and universities. By 0, it had all but
disappeared under the mistaken notion that this was the intent of Vatican II.
This had the effect of releasing Aquinas into the wider philosophical
world.
Aquino -- Aquinismo – “If followers of
William are called Occamists, followers of a Saint should surely call
themselves “Aquinistae”! -- neo-Thomism – as opposed to palaeo-Thomism --, a
philosophical-theological movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
manifesting a revival of interest in Aquinas. It was stimulated by Pope Leo
XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris 1879 calling for a renewed emphasis on the
teaching of Thomistic principles to meet the intellectual and social challenges
of modernity. The movement reached its peak in the 0s, though its influence
continues to be seen in organizations such as the Catholic Philosophical Association. Among its
major figures are Joseph Kleutgen, Désiré Mercier, Joseph Maréchal, Pierre
Rousselot, Réginald Garrigou-LaGrange, Martin Grabmann, M.-D. Chenu, Jacques
Maritain, Étienne Gilson, Yves R. Simon, Josef Pieper, Karl Rahner, Cornelio
Fabro, Emerich Coreth, Bernard Lonergan, and W. Norris Clarke. Few, if any, of
these figures have described themselves as NeoThomists; some explicitly
rejected the designation. Neo-Thomists have little in common except their
commitment to Aquinas and his relevance to the contemporary world. Their
interest produced a more historically accurate understanding of Aquinas and his
contribution to medieval thought Grabmann, Gilson, Chenu, including a
previously ignored use of the Platonic metaphysics of participation Fabro. This
richer understanding of Aquinas, as forging a creative synthesis in the midst
of competing traditions, has made arguing for his relevance easier. Those
Neo-Thomists who were suspicious of modernity produced fresh readings of
Aquinas’s texts applied to contemporary problems Pieper, Gilson. Their
influence can be seen in the revival of virtue theory and the work of Alasdair
MacIntyre. Others sought to develop Aquinas’s thought with the aid of later
Thomists Maritain, Simon and incorporated the interpretations of Counter-Reformation
Thomists, such as Cajetan and Jean Poinsot, to produce more sophisticated, and
controversial, accounts of the intelligence, intentionality, semiotics, and
practical knowledge. Those Neo-Thomists willing to engage modern thought on its
own terms interpreted modern philosophy sympathetically using the principles of
Aquinas Maréchal, Lonergan, Clarke, seeking dialogue rather than confrontation.
However, some readings of Aquinas are so thoroughly integrated into modern
philosophy that they can seem assimilated Rahner, Coreth; their highly
individualized metaphysics inspired as much by other philosophical influences,
especially Heidegger, as Aquinas. Some of the labels currently used among
Neo-Thomists suggest a division in the movement over critical, postKantian
methodology. ‘Existential Thomism’ is used for those who emphasize both the
real distinction between essence and existence and the role of the sensible in
the mind’s first grasp of being. ‘Transcendental Thomism’ applies to figures
like Maréchal, Rousselot, Rahner, and Coreth who rely upon the inherent
dynamism of the mind toward the real, rooted in Aquinas’s theory of the active
intellect, from which to deduce their metaphysics of being. Refs.: Luigi
Speranza, “Grice e Aquino: grammatici speculative, per il Club Anglo-Italiano,
The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
Grecian: Grice: “Much as in London The
Royal Opera only staged operas in Italian, and call itself, The Italian Royal
Opera, at Rome, they only philosophised in Grecian! That is the elite’s way to
separate from the riff raff.” – Grice. Grice: “Similarly, at Oxford, I came
with a knowledge of Grecian and Roman far superior than English – and we always
looked down on those who came down to Oxford just to do what we insultingly
called “Eng. Lit.”!” --.
Academia:
academia vecchia/academia nuova -- accademia nuova – v. Grice,
“Carneades at Rome, and the beginning of Western philosophy.” New Academy, the
name given the Academy, the school founded by Plato in the Athenian suburs, during
the time it was controlled by Academic Skeptics. Its principal leaders in this
period were Arcesilaus and Carneades; our most accessible source for the New
Academy is Cicero’s “Academica.” A master of logical techniques such as sorites
which he learned from Diodorus, Arcesilaus attempted to revive the dialectic of
Plato, using it to achieve the suspension of belief he learned to value from
Pyrrho. Later, and especially under the leadership of Carneades, the New
Academy developed a special relationship with Stoicism: as the Stoics found new
ways to defend their doctrine of the criterion, Carneades found new ways to
refute it in the Stoics’ own terms. Carneades’ visit to Rome in 155 B.C. with a
Stoic and a Peripatetic marks the beginning of Rome’s interest, especially with
the elite, just to be different and to speak in a tongue that the vulgus would
not understand, in what the Romans called “philosophia hellenistica” – Cicero,
“Since I cannot think of a vernacular Roman term for ‘philosophia.’” An
Englishman had the same problem with logic, which he rendered as ‘witcraft.’ –
and ‘witlove.’ His anti-Stoic arguments were recorded by his successor
Clitomachus d. c.110 B.C., whose work is known to us through summaries in
Cicero. Clitomachus was succeeded by Philo of Larisa c.16079 B.C., who was the
teacher of Antiochus of Ascalon c.130c.67 B.C.. Philo later attempted to
reconcile the Old and the New Academy by softening the Skepticism of the New
and by fostering a Skeptical reading of Plato. Angered by this, Antiochus broke
away in about 87 B.C. to found what he called the Old Academy, which is now
considered to be the beginning of Middle Platonism. Probably about the same
time, Aenesidemus dates unknown revived the strict Skepticism of Pyrrho and founded
the school that is known to us through the work of Sextus Empiricus. Academic
Skepticism differed from Pyrrhonism in its sharp focus on Stoic positions, and
possibly in allowing for a weak assent as opposed to belief, which they
suspended in what is probable; and Pyrrhonians accused Academic Skeptics of
being dogmatic in their rejection of the possibility of knowledge. The New
Academy had a major influence on the development of modern philosophy, most
conspicuously through Hume, who considered that his brand of mitigated skepticism
belonged to this school. Grice: “Western philosophy begins with Carneades
lecturing the rough Romans some philosophy; because Greece is EAST!” – Refs.:
H. P. Grice, “The longitudinal history of philosophy from Carneades’s sojourn
at Rome to my British Academy lecture at London.”
Newcomb’s paradox: a conflict, which Grice
finds fascinating, between two widely accepted principles of rational decision,
arising in the following decision problem, known as Newcomb’s problem. Two
boxes are before you. The first contains either $1,000,000 or nothing. The
second contains $1,000. You may take the first box alone or both boxes. Someone
with uncanny foresight has predicted your choice and fixed the content of the
first box according to his prediction. If he has predicted that you will take
only the first box, he has put $1,000,000 in that box; and if he has predicted
that you will take both boxes, he has left the first box empty. The expected
utility of an option is commonly obtained by multiplying the utility of its
possible outcomes by their probabilities given the option, and then adding the
products. Because the predictor is reliable, the probability that you receive
$1,000,000 given that you take only the first box is high, whereas the
probability that you receive $1,001,000 given that you take both boxes is low.
Accordingly, the expected utility of taking only the first box is greater than
the expected utility of taking both boxes. Therefore the principle of
maximizing expected utility says to take only the first box. However, the
principle of dominance says that if the states determining the outcomes of
options are causally independent of the options, and there is one option that
is better than the others in each state, then you should adopt it. Since your
choice does not causally influence the contents of the first box, and since
choosing both boxes yields $1,000 in addition to the contents of the first box
whatever they are, the principle says to take both boxes. Newcomb’s paradox is
named after its formulator, William Newcomb. Nozick publicized it in “Newcomb’s
Problem and Two Principles of Choice” 9. Many theorists have responded to the
paradox by changing the definition of the expected utility of an option so that
it is sensitive to the causal influence of the option on the states that
determine its outcome, but is insensitive to the evidential bearing of the
option on those states. Refs: H. P. Grice, “Why I love Newcomb.”
Grice, “Oxford’s kindly light” -- Newman
(“Lead Kindly light”) -- English prelate and philosopher of religion. As fellow
at Oriel , Oxford, he was a prominent member of the Anglican Oxford Movement.
He became a Roman Catholic in 1845, took holy orders in 1847, and was made a
cardinal in 1879. His most important philosophical work is the Grammar of
Assent 1870. Here Newman explored the difference between formal reasoning and
the informal or natural movement of the mind in discerning the truth about the
concrete and historical. Concrete reasoning in the mode of natural inference is
implicit and unreflective; it deals not with general principles as such but
with their employment in particular circumstances. Thus a scientist must judge
whether the phenomenon he confronts is a novel significant datum, a
coincidence, or merely an insignificant variation in the data. The acquired
capacity to make judgments of this sort Newman called the illative sense, an
intellectual skill shaped by experience and personal insight and generally
limited for individuals to particular fields of endeavor. The illative sense
makes possible a judgment of certitude about the matter considered, even though
the formal argument that partially outlines the process possesses only
objective probability for the novice. Hence probability is not necessarily
opposed to certitude. In becoming aware of its tacit dimension, Newman spoke of
recognizing a mode of informal inference. He distinguished such reasoning,
which, by virtue of the illative sense, culminates in a judgment of certitude
about the way things are real assent, from formal reasoning conditioned by the
certainty or probability of the premises, which assents to the conclusion thus
conditioned notional assent. In real assent, the proposition functions to
“image” the reality, to make its reality present. In the Development of
Christian Doctrine 1845, Newman analyzed the ways in which some ideas unfold
themselves only through historical development, within a tradition of inquiry.
He sought to delineate the common pattern of such development in politics,
science, philosophy, and religion. Although his focal interest was in how
religious doctrines develop, he emphasizes the general character of such a
pattern of progressive articulation. H. P. Grice, “Oxford’s kindly light.”
Res – realism – neo-relaism, New Realism –
or neo-realism – as opposed to “palaeo-realism” -- an early twentieth-century
revival in England of various forms of realism in reaction to the dominant
idealisms inherited from the nineteenth century. In America this revival took a
cooperative form when six philosophers Ralph Barton Perry, Edwin Holt, William
Pepperell Montague, Walter Pitkin, Edward Spaulding, and Walter Marvin
published “A Program and First Platform of Six Realists” 0, followed two years
later by the cooperative volume The New Realism, in which each authored an
essay. This volume gave rise to the designation ‘New Realists’ for these six
philosophers. Although they clearly disagreed on many particulars, they
concurred on several matters of philosophical style and epistemological
substance. Procedurally they endorsed a cooperative and piecemeal approach to
philosophical problems, and they were constitutionally inclined to a closeness
of analysis that would prepare the way for later philosophical tendencies.
Substantively they agreed on several epistemological stances central to the
refutation of idealism. Among the doctrines in the New Realist platform were
the rejection of the fundamental character of epistemology; the view that the
entities investigated in logic, mathematics, and science are not “mental” in
any ordinary sense; the view that the things known are not the products of the
knowing relation nor in any fundamental sense conditioned by their being known;
and the view that the objects known are immediately and directly present to
consciousness while being independent of that relation. New Realism was a
version of direct realism, which viewed the notions of mediation and
representation in knowledge as opening gambits on the slippery slope to
idealism. Their refutation of idealism focused on pointing out the fallacy of
moving from the truism that every object of knowledge is known to the claim
that its being consists in its being known. That we are obviously at the center
of what we know entails nothing about the nature of what we know. Perry dubbed
this fact “the egocentric predicament,” and supplemented this observation with
arguments to the effect that the objects of knowledge are in fact independent
of the knowing relation. New Realism as a version of direct realism had as its
primary conceptual obstacle “the facts of relativity,” i.e., error, illusion,
perceptual variation, and valuation. Dealing with these phenomena without
invoking “mental intermediaries” proved to be the stumbling block, and New
Realism soon gave way to a second cooperative venture by another group of philosophers that came to be known as
Critical Realism. The term ‘new realism’ is also occasionally used with regard
to those British philosophers principal among them Moore and Russell similarly
involved in refuting idealism. Although individually more significant than
the group, theirs was not a cooperative
effort, so the group term came to have primarily an referent.
newton, -- “Hypotheses non fingo.” Grice:
“His surname is a toponymic: it literally means ‘new-town,’ but it implicates,
“FROM new-town.” – “We never knew what ‘old’ town Sir Isaac is implicating,
possibly Oldton, in Cumbria.” -- English physicist and mathematician, one of
the greatest scientists of all time. Born in Woolsthorpe, Lincolnshire, he
attended Cambridge , receiving the B.A. in 1665; he became a fellow of Trinity
in New Realism Newton, Sir Isaac 610
610 1667 and Lucasian Professor of Mathematics in 1669. He was elected
fellow of the Royal Society in 1671 and served as its president from 1703 until
his death. In 1696 he was appointed warden of the mint. In his later years he
was involved in political and governmental affairs rather than in active
scientific work. A sensitive, secretive person, he was prone to irascibility most notably in a dispute with Leibniz over
priority of invention of the calculus. His unparalleled scientific
accomplishments overshadow a deep and sustained interest in ancient chronology,
biblical study, theology, and alchemy. In his early twenties Newton’s genius
asserted itself in an astonishing period of mathematical and experimental
creativity. In the years 1664 67, he discovered the binomial theorem; the
“method of fluxions” calculus; the principle of the composition of light; and
fundamentals of his theory of universal gravitation. Newton’s masterpiece,
Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica “The Mathematical Principles of
Natural Philosophy”, appeared in 1687. This work sets forth the mathematical
laws of physics and “the system of the world.” Its exposition is modeled on
Euclidean geometry: propositions are demonstrated mathematically from
definitions and mathematical axioms. The world system consists of material
bodies masses composed of hard particles at rest or in motion and interacting according
to three axioms or laws of motion: 1 Every body continues in its state of rest
or of uniform motion in a straight line unless it is compelled to change that
state by forces impressed upon it. 2 The change of motion is proportional to
the motive force impressed and is made in the direction of the straight line in
which that force is impressed. [Here, the impressed force equals mass times the
rate of change of velocity, i.e., acceleration. Hence the familiar formula, F %
ma.] 3 To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction; or, the
mutual action of two bodies upon each other is always equal and directed to
contrary parts. Newton’s general law of gravitation in modern restatement is:
Every particle of matter attracts every other particle with a force varying
directly as the product of their masses and inversely as the square of the
distance between them. The statement of the laws of motion is preceded by an
equally famous scholium in which Newton enunciates the ultimate conditions of
his universal system: absolute time, space, place, and motion. He speaks of
these as independently existing “quantities” according to which true
measurements of bodies and motions can be made as distinct from relative
“sensible measures” and apparent observations. Newton seems to have thought
that his system of mathematical principles presupposed and is validated by the
absolute framework. The scholium has been the subject of much critical
discussion. The main problem concerns the justification of the absolute framework.
Newton commends adherence to experimental observation and induction for
advancing scientific knowledge, and he rejects speculative hypotheses. But
absolute time and space are not observable. In the scholium Newton did offer a
renowned experiment using a rotating pail of water as evidence for
distinguishing true and apparent motions and proof of absolute motion. It has
been remarked that conflicting strains of a rationalism anticipating Kant and
empiricism anticipating Hume are present in Newton’s conception of science.
Some of these issues are also evident in Newton’s Optics 1704, especially the
fourth edition, 1730, which includes a series of suggestive “Queries” on the
nature of light, gravity, matter, scientific method, and God. The triumphant reception
given to Newton’s Principia in England and on the Continent led to idealization
of the man and his work. Thus Alexander Pope’s famous epitaph: Nature and
Nature’s laws lay hid in night; God said, “Let Newton be!” and all was light.
The term ‘Newtonian’, then, denoted the view of nature as a universal system of
mathematical reason and order divinely created and administered. The metaphor
of a “universal machine” was frequently applied. The view is central in the
eighteenth-century Enlightenment, inspiring a religion of reason and the
scientific study of society and the human mind. More narrowly, ‘Newtonian’
suggests a reduction of any subject matter to an ontology of individual
particles and the laws and basic terms of mechanics: mass, length, and time.
Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Hypotheses non fingo: Newton e la sua mela,” Luigi
Speranza, per il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice,
Liguria, Italia.
Autrecourt, philosopher, unimaginatively born
in Autrecourt, he was educated at Paris (“but I kept Autrecourt as my surname,
Paris being so common” – “Letter to Matthew Parris” --) and earned bachelor’s
degrees in theology and law and a master’s degree in arts. After a list of
propositions from his writings was condemned in 1346, he was sentenced to burn
his works publicly and recant, which he did in Paris the following year. He was
appointed dean of Metz cathedral in 1350. Nicholas’s ecclesiastical troubles
arose partly from nine letters two of which survive which reduce to absurdity
the view that appearances provide a sufficient basis for certain and evident
knowledge. On the contrary, except for “certitude of the faith,” we can be
certain only of what is equivalent or reducible to the principle of
noncontradiction. He accepts as a consequence of this that we can never validly
infer the existence of one distinct thing from another, including the existence
of substances from qualities, or causes from effects. Indeed, he finds that “in
the whole of his natural philosophy and metaphysics, Aristotle had such
[evident] certainty of scarcely two conclusions, and perhaps not even of one.”
Nicholas devotes another work, the Exigit ordo executionis also known as The
Universal Treatise, to an extended critique of Aristotelianism. It attacks what
seemed to him the blind adherence given by his contemporaries to Aristotle and
Averroes, showing that the opposite of many conclusions alleged to have been
demonstrated by the Philosopher e.g., on
the divisibility of continua, the reality of motion, and the truth of
appearances are just as evident or
apparent as those conclusions themselves. Because so few of his writings are
extant, however, it is difficult to ascertain just what Nicholas’s own views
were. Likewise, the reasons for his condemnation are not well understood,
although recent studies have suggested that his troubles might have been due to
a reaction to certain ideas that he appropriated from English theologians, such
as Adam de Wodeham. Nicholas’s views elicited comment not only from church authorities,
but also from other philosophers, including Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen,
Albert of Saxony, and Nicholas of Oresme. Despite a few surface similarities,
however, there is no evidence that his teachings on certainty or causality had
any influence on modern philosophers, such as Descartes or Hume.
Intellectus:
The sensus-intellectus distinction, the: Grice: “Occam’s adage presupposes a
bi-partite philosophical psychology for the credibility realm: the ‘sensus,’ or
perceptual level, and the ‘intellectus,’ or the realm of intellect. nihil est
in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu: a principal tenet of empiricism.
A weak interpretation of the principle maintains that all concepts are acquired
from sensory experience; no concepts are innate or a priori. A stronger
interpretation adds that all propositional knowledge is derived from sense
experience. The weak interpretation was held by Aquinas and Locke, who thought
nevertheless that we can know some propositions to be true in virtue of the
relations between the concepts involved. The stronger interpretation was
endorsed by J. S. Mill, who argued that even the truths of mathematics are inductively
based on experience, as Grice tutored R. Wollheim for his PPE at Oxford: “How
did you find that out?” “Multiplication.” “That proves Mill wrong.”
Activum/passivum distinction: used by
Grice, ‘nous poietikos’ ‘nous – intellectus activus, intellectus passivus --.
Grice thought ‘active’ was misused there, “unless there is a hint that Aquinas
means that the self-conscious soul is the site of personal identity, which
‘does’ things.” --.
Nifo -- Agostino Nifo Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Philosophus Augustinus Niphus Suessanus
Agostino Nifo (Sessa Aurunca, 1469 o 1470 – Sessa Aurunca, 18 gennaio
1538[1][2][3]) è stato un filosofo italiano.
Indice 1 Biografia
2 Le
opere 3 Genealogia
4 Note
5 Bibliografia
5.1 Edizioni
e traduzioni 5.2 Studi
6 Voci
correlate 7 Altri
progetti 8 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Agostino Nifo alla
corte di Carlo V (Luigi Toro, 1876, Municipio di Sessa Aurunca) Durante i
propri studi, Nifo frequentò l'Università di Padova, dove studiò filosofia e
divenne allievo di Nicoletto Vernia.[1]
Fu professore di filosofia all'Università di Padova e in seguito insegnò
anche a Napoli, Roma e Pisa [1], guadagnando una fama tale da essere incaricato
da papa Leone X di difendere la dottrina cattolica sull'immortalità contro gli
attacchi di Pietro Pomponazzi e degli alessandristi. Fu ricompensato con la
nomina a conte palatino con il diritto di assumere il cognome del Papa,
Medici.[1] Busto di Agostino Nifo,
esposto nel Liceo classico "Agostino Nifo" di Sessa Aurunca La sua
prima filosofia si ispirava ad Averroè, modificò poi la propria visione
giungendo a posizioni più vicine all'ortodossia cattolica. Nel 1495 pubblicò
un'edizione delle opere di Averroè corredate di un commento compatibile con la
sua nuova posizione.[1] Nella grande
controversia con gli alessandristi si oppose alla tesi del Pomponazzi per il
quale l'anima razionale è inseparabile dal corpo materiale e, dunque, la morte
di questo porta con sé anche la scomparsa dell'anima. Nifo sostenne, invece,
che l'anima individuale, quale parte dell'intelletto assoluto, è
indistruttibile e alla morte del corpo si fonde in un'unità eterna. Tra i suoi allievi, presso l'università di
Salerno, tra gli altri, ricordiamo, Tiberio Rosselli, filosofo calabrese autore
di un testo molto controverso, Apologeticus adversos cucullatos (1520, Parma),
in cui cerca di affermare le sue dottrine che tendono a discostarsi da quello
del suo maestro. Lo si ritiene
protagonista di un curioso episodio: nel 1523, infatti, pubblicò il trattato in
latino De regnandi peritia, che alcuni ritengono essere un plagio del più noto
Il Principe di Machiavelli[1] (scritto nel 1513 ma pubblicato postumo solo nel
1531) del cui manoscritto il Nifo sarebbe venuto in possesso. Gli fu conferita nel 1528 la cittadinanza
onoraria della città di Napoli ed il 20 settembre 1531 essa fu estesa ai figli
ed agli eredi in perpetuo. A lui è dedicato il Convitto Nazionale di Sessa
Aurunca, sua città natale, della quale fu anche sindaco tra il 1535 ed il
1536.[4] Le opere Le sue opere
principali sono: Liber de intellectu
(1503) De immortalitate animi (1518) De infinitate primi motoris quaestio
Opuscula moralia et politica Dialectica ludicra (1521) De regnandi peritia
(1523) Furono poi più volte ripubblicati, in quanto ampiamente diffusi, i suoi
numerosi commentari su Aristotele, di cui i più importanti sono: Aristotelis de generatione & corruptione
liber Augustino Nipho philosopho Suessano interprete & expositore, (1506)
Expositiones in libros de sophisticos elenchis Aristotelis, (1540) Expositiones
in omnes libros de Historia animalim, de partibus animalium et earum causis ac
de Generatione animalium (1546) (LA) In libris Aristotelis meteorologicis
commentaria, Venetiis, Ottaviano Scoto, 1547. URL consultato il 30 giugno 2015.
Physicorum auscultationum Aristotelis libri octo, (1549) Super Libros Priorum
Aristotelis, (1554) Commentarium in tres libros Aristotelis De anima, (1559)
Dilucidarium metaphysicarum disputationum in Aristotelis Deum et quatuor libros
metaphysicarum, (1559) L'edizione più nota fu quella stampata a Parigi nel
1645[1] in quattordici volumi (compresi gli Opuscula). Dialectica ludicra (1521), frontespizio;
conservato nella biblioteca del Convitto Agostino Nifo di Sessa Aurunca Dialectica ludicra (1521), disegno
interno Dialectica ludicra (1521),
colophon In libris Aristotelis meteorologicis
commentaria (1547) In libros
Aristotelis De generatione & corruptione interpretationes & commentaria
(1557), frontespizio; conservato anch'esso nella biblioteca del Convitto Nifo
di Sessa Aurunca In libros
Aristotelis De generatione & corruptione interpretationes & commentaria
(1557), colophon Genealogia Una sua
breve genealogia è questa[1][2][3]: 1.
... Nifo 1.1. Domizio Nifo (Barone di Joppolo, cavaliere) @(Sessa Aurunca) ...
1.1.1. Jacopo/Giacomo Nifo (*Tropea +Sessa Aurunca >1469 - giureconsulto,
ciambellano, commerciante di tessuti) @(Sessa Aurunca) Francesca Galeoni
1.1.1.1. Agostino Nifo (*Sessa Aurunca 1469/1472 +Sessa Aurunca 18 gennaio 1538
- filosofo) @(Sessa Aurunca 1496) Angela Landi (nobile) 1.1.1.1.1. Domizio Nifo
(+Sessa Aurunca) 1.1.1.1.2. Livia Nifo @1 Filippo Toraldo, @2 Col'Antonio di
Transo 1.1.1.1.3. Giacomo Nifo @ Isabella Vaccaro 1.1.1.1.3.1. Paolo Nifo @
Livia Transo 1.1.1.1.3.1.1. Agostino juniore Nifo @ Diana di Paulo
1.1.1.1.3.1.1.1. Paolo Nifo 1.1.1.1.3.1.1.2. Giacomo Nifo 1.1.1.1.3.1.1.X.
altri 1.1.1.1.3.1.2. maschio Nifo 1.1.1.1.3.1.3. maschio Nifo 1.1.1.1.3.1.4.
Isabella Nifo @ Marc'Antonio Giove della Vega 1.1.1.1.3.1.5. Girolama Nifo @
Scipione Cirasolo 1.1.1.1.3.2. Domizio Nifo 1.1.1.1.3.3. Clarice Nifo
1.1.1.1.3.4. Diana Nifo @ Cesare Conso 1.1.1.1.3.5. Quintia Nifo @ Vincenzo
Gattola 1.1.1.1.3.X. altri 1.1.1.2. Vincenzo Nifo 1.2. Giovanni Nifo (*Tropea
+Roma - cavaliere, Vicario e Agente Generale del Duca di Sessa) Note NIFO, Agostino, in Dizionario biografico
degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Giuseppe Gabrieli, "Sessa Aurunca e
Agostino Nifo", in "Raccolta Storica dei Comuni", nn° 16-17-18,
Anno IX, Istituto di Studi Atellani, Sant'Arpino (CE), luglio-dicembre 1983,
pagg. 38-39 Carlo De Lellis, Discorsi
delle Famiglie Nobili del Regno di Napoli, Volume 2, Napoli, Giovanni Francesco
Paci, 1663, pp. 321–336. ^ Giampiero Di Marco, I sindaci della città di Sessa,
Sessa Aurunca, Zano Editore, 2013, p. 38. Bibliografia Edizioni e traduzioni
Agostino Nifo, La filosofia nella corte. Monografia introduttiva, testo latino
a fronte, traduzione, note e apparati di E. De Bellis. Collana “Il pensiero
occidentale”, Milano, Bompiani, 2010. Studi AA. VV., «Nifo, Agostino», in
Dizionario di filosofia, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2009.
Giampiero Di Marco, Giuseppe Parolino, Incunaboli e cinquecentine nelle
biblioteche di Sessa, Minturno, Caramanica Editore, 1997. Margherita Palumbo,
«NIFO, Agostino», in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Volume 78, Roma,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2013. Ennio De Bellis, Il pensiero logico
di Agostino Nifo, Galatina, Congedo, 1997. Ennio De Bellis, Nicoletto Vernia e
Agostino Nifo. Aspetti storiografici e metodologici, Galatina, Congedo, 2003.
Ennio De Bellis, Bibliografia di Agostino Nifo, Collana Quaderni di
“Rinascimento”. Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento, Firenze, Olschki,
2005. Angelico Poppi, Introduzione all'aristotelismo padovano, Antenore, Padova
1970. Voci correlate Anima Averroè Immortalità Pietro Pomponazzi Altri progetti
Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Agostino Nifo
Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Agostino Nifo
Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini o altri file
su Agostino Nifo Collegamenti esterni (EN) Agostino Nifo, su Enciclopedia
Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata Agostino Nifo,
in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Modifica su Wikidata Agostino Nifo, su BeWeb, Conferenza Episcopale Italiana.
Modifica su Wikidata (DE) Agostino Nifo, su ALCUIN, Università di Ratisbona.
Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Agostino Nifo, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited
srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Agostino Nifo, su Open Library,
Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Hugh Chisholm (a cura di), Nifo,
Agostino, in Enciclopedia Britannica, XI, Cambridge University Press, 1911.
Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 73879631 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 2096 4120 · SBN IT\ICCU\BVEV\002923 · LCCN
(EN) n88038671 · GND (DE) 104123397 · BNF (FR) cb120880888 (data) · BNE (ES)
XX1724912 (data) · ULAN (EN) 500323241 · NLA (EN) 61543547 · BAV (EN) 495/8427
· CERL cnp00352049 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n88038671 Biografie Portale
Biografie Cattolicesimo Portale Cattolicesimo Filosofia Portale Filosofia
Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XVI secoloMorti nel 1538Morti il 18
gennaioNati a Sessa AuruncaMorti a Sessa AuruncaPersonalità del cattolicesimoPersone
legate all'Università degli Studi di PadovaProfessori dell'Università di
Pisa[altre]
Nihil ex nihilo fit – Grice: “an intuitive
metaphysical principle first enunciated by Parmenides, often held equivalent to
the proposition that nothing arises without a cause. Creation ex nihilo is
God’s production of the world without any natural or material cause, but
involves a supernatural cause, and so it would not violate the principle.
Nizolio Mario Nizolio Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Mario Nizolio Mario Nizolio o Nizzoli
(Brescello, 5 marzo 1488 – Sabbioneta, 5 giugno 1567[1]) è stato un umanista e
filosofo italiano. Indice 1 Biografia 2 La dottrina 3 Opere
4 Note
5 Bibliografia
6 Voci
correlate 7 Altri
progetti 8 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Marius Nizolius
(1498—1576) - Ciceronem observationes
lapide sulla parete del municipio di Brescello Nel 1522 insegnò lingue
classiche a Brescia e pubblicò il lessico latino Observationes in M. Tullium
Ciceronem (o Thesaurus Ciceronianus). Ebbe una lunga polemica con Marco Antonio
Maioragio per una critica portata da quest'ultimo a Cicerone che, iniziata con
la Epistola ad M. A. Majoragium, proseguì con l'Antapologia e si concluse con i
De veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi contra pseudophilosophos
libri IV, pubblicati nel 1553 a Parma, dove insegnava dal 1547, che
interessarono Leibniz al punto che questi li fece ristampare nel 1670
premettendogli il titolo Antibarbarus Philosophicus, sive Philosophia
Scholasticorum impugnata libris IV. Nel
1562 fu chiamato da Vespasiano Gonzaga a Sabbioneta. La dottrina Contemporaneamente alle critiche
del Ramo alla logica aristotelica, anche per Nizolio occorre sostituire
all'astrattezza di quella logica un pensiero che sia concretamente legato alla
realtà e a questo scopo la strada maestra sta nel ritrovare i processi del
pensiero direttamente nella struttura grammaticale della lingua. Egli individua cinque principi per fare della
buona filosofia: «Il primo principio generale della verità e della buona
filosofia consiste nella conoscenza delle lingue greca e latina» in cui sono
espressi quei testi filosofici; il secondo principio è la «conoscenza di quei
precetti e documenti che si trovano nella grammatica e nella retorica», sostituendo
la grammatica e la retorica alla metafisica, dal momento che i metafisici si
sono preoccupati solo di ricercare la verità, senza occuparsi della utilità,
necessità e pertinenza delle cose trattate.
Il terzo principio consiste nel leggere i classici e nello sforzarsi di
comprendere il modo con il quale il popolo si esprime, essendoci verità in
quella schiettezza di linguaggio. «Il quarto principio generale della verità è
la libertà e la vera licenza delle opinioni e del giudizio su qualunque argomento,
come richiede la verità e la natura». Non devono essere dunque Platone o
Aristotele i nostri maestri, ma «i cinque sensi, l'intelligenza, il pensiero,
la memoria, l'uso e l'esperienza delle cose».
Il quinto principio afferma che, oltre a esporre ogni tesi con la
chiarezza del linguaggio comune senza introdurre nel discorso oscurità o
sottigliezze, occorre non trattare problemi che non hanno realtà. Esempi di
invenzioni umane prive di oggettività sono le idee platoniche e la tesi della
realtà degli universali. Secondo Nizolio, infatti, la realtà è costituita
soltanto da oggetti singoli e individuali e questi devono essere indagati «non
attraverso la loro natura propria e privata, ma attraverso la loro comune e
continua successione». Si fa filosofia e scienza non astraendo, ossia togliendo
da una singola realtà quel quid che viene poi analizzato come se esso fosse
reale, ma comprendendo, ossia considerando insieme le singole realtà:
l'universale aristotelico è «una vana e finta astrazione» mentre l'universale
del Nizolio «deriva invece dalla comprensione di tutti i singolari di ogni
genere, accolti insieme con un atto solo, senza astrazioni intellettive, ma con
il solo ausilio di un'intelligenza che comprende i singolari». In sostanza, secondo il Nizolio, noi non
possiamo realmente distaccare, con un'operazione dell'intelletto, un universale
da ogni singola cosa, ma semmai passare dall'individuale al collettivo. L'operazione del Nizolio consiste nel
sostituire alla dialettica la retorica e alla logica la grammatica ma, pur
mettendo in rilievo i difetti della logica aristotelica, egli non riesce a
fondare una nuova logica realmente efficace e persuasiva. Opere Observationes in M. Tullium Ciceronem,
Brixiae (Brescia) 1535, in-folio, opera ripubblicata con aggiunte a Venezia nel
1570 col titolo Thesaurus ciceronianus, e nel 1734 col titolo Lexicon
ciceronianum, (con aggiunte di Jacopo Facciolati). De veris principiis et vera
ratione philosophandi contra pseudo-philosophos, scritto contro gli scolatici,
Parma, 1553; Leibniz ne ha curato una nuova edizione con una prefazione ed una
lettera a Jakob Thomasius sulla dottrina di Aristotele, Francofurti, 1670
(Roma, Bocca, 1956). Garin, Eugenio, Rossi, Paolo, Vasoli, Cesare (a cura di),
Testi umanistici su la retorica. Testi editi e inediti su retorica e dialettica
di Mario Nizolio, Francesco Patrizi e Pietro Ramo, Milano, Bocca, 1953. “Marii
Nizolii Brixellensis in M.T. Ciceronem observationes Caelii Secundi Curionis
labore & industria secundò atque iterum locupletatae, perpolitae, &
restitutae. Ejusdem M. Nizolii libellus, in quo vulgaria quaedam verba, &
parum Latina, ad purissimam Ciceronis consuetudinem emendantur, ab eodem
Caelio, s.c. limatus & auctus” (BU Clermont Auvergne) Note ^ Margherita
Palumbo nel Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani volume 78 del 2013 (vedi
Collegamenti esterni), scrive:«È quindi probabile che Nizzoli abbia preferito
fare ritorno volontariamente a Brescello, dove la morte lo colse nel 1566.»
Bibliografia Ballestri, Massimiliano. Mario Nizolio 1488-1566, Milano, Cosmo
editore, 1985. Battistella, Ruggero. Mario Nizolio, umanista e filosofo
(1488-1566), Treviso, L. Zoppelli, 1904. Nizzoli, Alberto. Mario Nizolio e il
rinnovamento scientifico moderno, Como, Meroni, 1970. Rossi, Paolo. La celebrazione
della rettorica e la polemica antimetafisica del "De Principiis" del
Nizolio, in La crisi dell'uso dogmatico della ragione, a cura di Antonio Banfi,
Milano, Bocca, 1951, pp. 99-221. Thieme, Klaus (ed.). Marius Nizolius aus
Bersello: Vier Bücher über die wahren Prinzipien und die wahre philosophische
Methode. Gegen die Pseudophilosophen [monografia sui "principi" con
traduzione in tedesco], Monaco, Wilhelm Fink, 1980. Voci correlate Logica
aristotelica Universale Idea Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource
contiene una pagina dedicata a Mario Nizolio Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote
contiene citazioni di o su Mario Nizolio Collegamenti esterni Mario Nizolio, su
Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica
su Wikidata Guido Calogero, Mario Nizolio, in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Mario Nizolio, su
Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata
Margherita Palumbo, Mario Nizolio, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Mario
Nizolio, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere
di Mario Nizolio, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata Mario
Nizzoli, in Dizionario di filosofia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2009.
Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 10640980 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 0869 7517 · LCCN (EN) n80138037 · GND (DE)
118735578 · BNF (FR) cb123721783 (data) · BNE (ES) XX1049048 (data) · BAV (EN)
495/106985 · CERL cnp01879629 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n80138037
Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Categorie: Umanisti
italianiFilosofi italiani del XVI secoloNati nel 1488Morti nel 1567Nati il 5 marzoMorti
il 5 giugnoNati a BrescelloMorti a Sabbioneta[altre]
Noce: essential Italian
philosopher. Augusto Del Noce Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to
navigationJump to search Niente fonti! Questa voce o sezione sull'argomento
filosofi non cita le fonti necessarie o quelle presenti sono insufficienti.
Commento: Solo 5 note, di cui 2 esplicative e non richiamanti fonti Puoi
migliorare questa voce aggiungendo citazioni da fonti attendibili secondo le
linee guida sull'uso delle fonti. Segui i suggerimenti del progetto di
riferimento. Augusto Del Noce Augusto Del Noce.jpg Senatore della Repubblica
Italiana Legislature IX (dal 15 febbraio
1984) Gruppo parlamentare Democratico
Cristiano Coalizione Pentapartito
Circoscrizione Lazio
Collegio Roma
VI Incarichi parlamentari Membro della VII Commissione permanente (Istruzione
pubblica) Sito istituzionale Dati generali Partito politico Democrazia Cristiana Titolo di studio laurea in
lettere e filosofia Professione Professore
di filosofia «Certo i cattolici hanno un vizio maledetto: pensare alla forza
della modernità e ignorare come questa modernità, nei limiti in cui pensa di
voler negare la trascendenza religiosa, attraversi oggi la sua massima crisi,
riconosciuta anche da certi scrittori laici.» (Risposte alla
scristianità, da Il Sabato, 7 giugno 1985) Augusto Del Noce (Pistoia, 11 agosto
1910 – Roma, 30 dicembre 1989) è stato un politologo, filosofo e politico
italiano. È stato titolare della cattedra di "Storia delle dottrine
politiche" all'Università La Sapienza di Roma. Studioso del
razionalismo cartesiano e del pensiero moderno (Hegel, Marx), analizzò le
radici filosofiche e teologiche della crisi della modernità, ricostruendo con
cura le contraddizioni interne dell'immanentismo. Argomentò l'incompatibilità
tra marxismo, umanesimo, ed altri sistemi di pensiero che propugnavano la
liberazione secolare dell'uomo e la dottrina cristiana (affermò: "solo il
Redentore può emancipare"). Sostenne tenacemente, per tali motivi,
l'impossibilità del dialogo tra cattolici e comunisti e previde il
"suicidio della rivoluzione" (1978). Studioso del fascismo, sostenne
che tale ideologia fosse peraltro in continuità con il comunismo e fosse
anch'esso un momento della secolarizzazione della modernità. Sostenne, inoltre,
l'esistenza di molti punti di contatto tra il fascismo e il pensiero dei
sessantottini. Filosofo della politica, preconizzò la crisi del
socialismo reale, mentre esso viveva la sua massima espansione a livello
mondiale. Argomentò che tale sistema, da una parte applicava coerentemente la
filosofia di Marx, ma dall'altra negava le premesse del marxismo: ciò in quanto
- mostrava Del Noce - lo stesso sistema di Marx si basava sulla contraddizione
tra dialettica e materialismo storico. Ribadiva infine la necessità dei valori
di verità e di moralità. Indice 1 Biografia
2 Il
pensiero 2.1 Il
problema dell'ateismo 2.2 Compimento
e dissoluzione del marxismo 2.3 L'interpretazione
del fascismo 3 Opere
4 Note
5 Bibliografia
6 Altri
progetti 7 Collegamenti
esterni 7.1 Articoli
di Del Noce Biografia Figlio di un ufficiale dell'esercito e di Rosalia Pratis,
savonese discendente di una famiglia nobile savoiarda, Augusto Del Noce nasce a
Pistoia nel 1910. L'anno dopo la madre si trasferisce con il figlio a Savona e,
allo scoppio della guerra mondiale, a Torino, presso una zia materna. A Torino,
Augusto svolge tutta la sua carriera di studi: dapprima al noto liceo
D'Azeglio, frequentato da alcuni dei futuri protagonisti della vita politica e
culturale della città e della nazione (Norberto Bobbio, Massimo Mila, Gian
Carlo Pajetta, Cesare Pavese, Felice Balbo e altri), poi all'Università degli
Studi di Torino, Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, allievo di Adolfo Faggi,
Erminio Juvalta e Carlo Mazzantini con il quale si laurea nel 1932 con una tesi
su Malebranche. Inizia quindi a insegnare presso istituti superiori (Novi
Ligure, Assisi, Mondovì), mentre sviluppa la sua attività di studio anche con
soggiorni all'estero. Nel 1936 legge con entusiasmo Umanesimo integrale
di Jacques Maritain, che rafforza in lui, tra l'altro, una sempre più convinta
opposizione al fascismo. Cerca invano di farsi trasferire a Torino e di
accedere qui alla carriera universitaria. Nel 1941 si trasferisce a Roma per un
distacco propostogli dall'amico Enrico Castelli. A Roma frequenta Franco Rodano
che, con Felice Balbo e altri, anima l'esperienza di «Sinistra Cristiana», un
tentativo di conciliazione di comunismo e Cristianesimo da quale Del Noce resta
per breve tempo affascinato. Nel 1944 viene accolta la sua richiesta di
trasferimento presso un istituto superiore di Torino, dove torna a risiedere.
Accompagna all'insegnamento[1] un'intensa attività di studio e di
collaborazione a diversi periodici, tra cui Cronache Sociali che gli dà
occasione di incontrare Giuseppe Dossetti. Nel 1946 scrive e pubblica il
saggio La non filosofia di Marx, che ripubblicherà vent'anni dopo nella sua
opera maggiore (Il problema dell'ateismo) e nel quale fissa i termini
complessivi della sua interpretazione del marxismo. Nello stesso anno cura
l'edizione italiana di Concupiscentia irresistibilis di Lev Isaakovič Šestov.
Nel 1948, nasce suo figlio Fabrizio Del Noce. Nel 1954 inizia la
collaborazione alla Enciclopedia filosofica del Centro Studi Filosofici
Cristiani di Gallarate, diretta da Luigi Pareyson. Dal 1957 al 1961 è distaccato
a Bologna presso il centro di documentazione diretto da Giuseppe Dossetti. Nel
capoluogo emiliano frequenta Nicola Matteucci e collabora stabilmente al
neonato periodico «Il Mulino». Scrive su Ordine Civile, rivista animata da
Gianni Baget Bozzo, e altri[2] alcuni saggi, uno dei quali, «Idee per
l'interpretazione del fascismo»[3], sarà all'origine delle future revisioni
storiografiche di De Felice e Nolte. Nel 1959 partecipa al convegno organizzato
dalla Democrazia Cristiana a Santa Margherita Ligure con una relazione
intitolata L'incidenza della cultura sulla politica nella presente situazione
italiana: sugli stessi temi Del Noce intratterrà per anni un rapporto difficile
con il partito cattolico (altri interventi nei convegni di San Pellegrino del
1963 e di Lucca nel 1967). Nel 1963 partecipa a un concorso a cattedra a
Trieste, ma non ottiene il posto; nel 1964 pubblica Il problema dell'ateismo e
l'anno successivo Riforma cattolica e filosofia moderna, Volume I, Cartesio. Il
30 aprile del 1966 partecipa alla «Giornata rensiana» con una relazione
intitolata Giuseppe Rensi fra Leopardi e Pascal. Ovvero l'autocritica
dell'ateismo negativo in Giuseppe Rensi, nella quale espone la sua fondamentale
fenomenologia del pessimismo come pensiero religioso. Nello stesso anno vince
il concorso per una cattedra di Storia della filosofia moderna e contemporanea
all'Università degli Studi di Trieste, dove diventerà professore ordinario e
rimarrà a insegnare fino al 1970. In quell'anno esce L'epoca della secolarizzazione,
che raccoglie molti dei saggi e degli interventi degli anni sessanta. Sempre
nel 1970 si realizza il tanto atteso trasferimento a Roma, dove, all'Università
"La Sapienza", insegna prima Storia delle dottrine politiche e poi -
dal 1974 - Filosofia della politica. Si infittisce la sua collaborazione
a riviste e periodici, sui quali interviene anche riguardo all'attualità
politica e culturale. Diresse la collana «Documenti di cultura moderna»,
dell'editore torinese Borla (poi passata alla Rusconi) proponendo al pubblico
italiano autori come Marcel de Corte, Titus Burkhardt, Manuel García Pelayo,
Hans Sedlmayr ed Eric Voegelin. Partecipa vivacemente al dibattito sul
divorzio[4]. Dopo la metà degli anni settanta inizia il rapporto con gli
universitari di Comunione e Liberazione partecipando a convegni e incontri
promossi dal Movimento Popolare. Nel 1978 pubblica il saggio Il suicidio della
rivoluzione, dedicato al compimento e alla dissoluzione del marxismo. Nel 1981
con Il cattolico comunista chiude i conti con l'esperienza di Rodano (che nel
frattempo ha lasciato la DC per il PCI) e dei teorici della conciliazione tra
Cattolicesimo e marxismo. Dal 1978 inizia anche la collaborazione continuativa
con il settimanale «Il Sabato» e nel 1983 contribuisce alla creazione della
rivista «30 giorni», di cui rimarrà stabile collaboratore. Nello stesso anno
viene candidato come indipendente nelle liste della Democrazia Cristiana per il
Senato: primo dei non eletti, entrerà in Senato l'anno successivo (1984) a
seguito della morte di un collega. Nel 1986 viene insignito del
«Premio Internazionale Medaglia d'Oro al merito della Cultura Cattolica». Nel
1989 riceve il «Premio Nazionale di Cultura nel Giornalismo: la penna d'oro»;
nell'agosto dello stesso anno viene premiato dal Meeting di Rimini. Muore nella
notte tra il 29 e il 30 dicembre a Roma. È tumulato nel Famedio del cimitero di
Savigliano. Nel 1990 esce Giovanni Gentile, volume che raccoglie diversi saggi
sul padre dell'attualismo, sul fascismo e sul suo significato nella storia
contemporanea, frutto di decenni di studi e rielaborazioni di Del Noce.
L'archivio del filosofo e la sua biblioteca sono custoditi a Savigliano dalla
«Fondazione Centro Studi Augusto Del Noce», sorta nei primi anni novanta,
diretta prima da Guido Ramacciotti, poi da Francesco Mercadante, da Giuseppe
Riconda, e attualmente da Enzo Randone. Il pensiero Il problema
dell'ateismo Nella sua più celebre opera Il problema dell'ateismo (del 1964)
Del Noce inizia l'analisi della storia della filosofia moderna invertendo il
paradigma storicistico e positivistico che nel progressismo aveva la sua cifra
comune. Il filosofo afferma infatti che tale paradigma di illuministica origine
ha come prima condizione d'esistenza la postulazione dell'ateismo come necessità
del progredire dei sistemi filosofici e delle scienze a prescindere dalla
teologia cristiana, cioè a prescindere dalla Scolastica, anzi in più o meno
esplicita opposizione alla Scolastica. La tesi che Del Noce intende
dimostrare in questa sua opera è -come evidenzia appunto il titolo- la
considerazione dell'ateismo non più come «necessità» bensì come «problema»
della modernità, il cui ultimo, coerente e necessario sbocco è appunto il
nichilismo post-nietzscheano distaccato ormai da qualsiasi riflessione
filosofica e sfociato in una pura forma di vita, in puro way of life di
distruzione e auto-distruzione dell'uomo. Del Noce pone quindi innanzitutto una
distinzione fra tre diverse forme di ateismo, ovvero fra l'ateismo positivo o
politico («diurno»), i cui esempi perfetti sono stati l'illuminismo di un
Diderot o l'umanesimo di un Feuerbach, l'ateismo negativo o nichilistico
(«notturno»), esemplificato invece dalla filosofia di Schopenhauer, e infine
l'ateismo tragico, detto anche «follia filosofica», cioè la forma più rara e
particolare di ateismo che Del Noce trova solo in due casi in tutta la storia
della filosofia, ovvero in Nietzsche e in Jules Lequier. Posta
questa propedeutica distinzione, Del Noce inizia l'anamnesi del pensiero filosofico
moderno per rintracciare la genesi di ogni forma di ateismo, impossibile da
pensarsi per la filosofia antica come dimostra il fatto che anche la filosofia
epicurea -considerata comunemente come ateistica- ammetteva in realtà
l'esistenza degli dèi. Per Del Noce appare evidente che la crisi della
Scolastica medievale non ha costituito un processo necessario per il semplice
fatto che proprio colui che aveva intenzione di riformarla -cioè Cartesio- fu
invece colui che in realtà la tradì e se ne allontanò: è nelle celeberrime
Meditazioni metafisiche che il filosofo francese -allievo dei Gesuiti- tentò di
riproporre una nuova prova dell'esistenza di Dio da opporre al naturalismo
libertinista del Seicento, che predicava relativismo etico e che sostituiva il
Dio-Logos con la Natura impersonale e senza ordine. In realtà però
Cartesio, nel suo sforzo apologetico, compì il definitivo tradimento della
filosofia cristiana riattingendo ad un agostinismo privato di platonismo e
considerando così le idee dei semplici «contenuti della mente». In altre parole
se l'idea di Dio, quantunque logicamente necessaria, non è il riflesso
intellettivo di una realtà ontologica esterna al soggetto ma è una semplice
struttura logica, allora vale realmente la critica kantiana della prova ontologica
di Sant'Anselmo secondo la quale non è lecito aggiungere il predicato
dell'esistenza alla perfezione dell'idea se non per un paralogismo. Del
Noce in sintesi ha mostrato come il tradimento e la perdita della Scolastica,
attuata innanzitutto da Cartesio, ha come punto centrale l'idea di Idea, che è
passata ad essere da struttura del reale a struttura del razionale, passando
quindi dal dominio dell'ontologia a quello della psicologia. Per questo non vi
è alcuna spiegazione se non il rifiuto pregiudiziale di riconoscere uno statuto
ontologico all'idea, cosicché non vi sarebbe appunto alcuna necessità di
trapasso della Scolastica né tantomeno alcuna necessità di genesi del
razionalismo; in tal senso la famosa critica di Kant varrebbe quindi solo contro
Cartesio e non contro Sant'Anselmo, il cui platonismo gli permetteva ancora di
inferire necessariamente la «perfezione» dell'esistenza dall'idea dell'Essere
con ogni perfezione, cioè dall'idea di Dio. Del Noce prosegue la sua
analisi mostrando quindi come in Cartesio, che pur nelle sue intenzioni voleva
essere un defensor Fidei, già sussisteva in nuce ogni forma di illuminismo che
avrebbe poi dominato nel Settecento, per questo egli parla di un
pre-illuminismo cartesiano e aggiunge inoltre che proprio Cartesio, fiero
avversario del libertinismo dilagante nel suo tempo, fu colui che tradusse
l'ateismo libertinistico e irrazionalistico nella sua forma razionalizzata,
cioè nell'illuminismo, che sarebbe stato appunto un libertinismo
razionalistico. Si noti che Del Noce non pone giudizi sulla persona di Renato
Cartesio, e anzi sottolinea come al suo tempo egli si poteva davvero credere il
grande condottiero vincitore della battaglia culturale del Cristianesimo contro
il libertinismo, ma ciò perché non era riuscito a prevedere una forma di
ateismo non-irrazionalistico e non-relativistico quale fu appunto l'illuminismo
settecentesco, che non si limitò più ad opporsi alla Scolastica ma che formò
una propria dogmatica visione della storia in cui il Cristianesimo, rappresentato
dalle leggende nere del Medioevo, era stato solo un ostacolo per lo «sviluppo»
e l'«emancipazione» dell'umanità (si tenga presenta la definizione kantiana di
«illuminismo»). Da Cartesio in poi -secondo Del Noce- sono comunque due i
percorsi filosofici che partono e che sviluppano i due aspetti compresenti in
Cartesio, ovvero l'illuminismo e lo spiritualismo: da una parte infatti
Condillac, Kant, Condorcet, fino a Hegel e Marx riceveranno il lascito
propriamente razionalistico e sensu lato materialistico di Cartesio, dall'altra
invece Pascal, Malebranche, Vico e infine Rosmini saranno gli eredi del suo
patrimonio spiritualistico, inteso questo come filosofia di accordo fra ragione
naturale e fede cristiana, posta la distanza epistemologica dalla Scolastica;
famosa ed illuminante è a questo proposito la teoria della «visione in Dio» di
Malebranche, nonché la distinzione pascaliana fra «Dio dei filosofi» e «Dio di
Gesù Cristo». Andando comunque alla radice del problema del tradimento della
metafisica cristiana (Tomismo) da parte di Cartesio e del conseguente
illuminismo, Del Noce individua come unica possibile condizione per tale
tradimento il rifiuto del peccato originale come male metafisico e quindi il
rifiuto dello «status naturae lapsae» di cui proprio il Cristo sarebbe il
redentore: senza alcuna natura umana da redimere, cioè senzanecessità di alcun
redentore, il razionalismo ha sostituito il peccato con l'ignoranza e Dio con
la ragion critica, rifacendosi così ad un pelagianesimo laicizzato che da solo
rende possibile una qualsiasi forma di ateismo. Egli nota, infine, che avendo
rifiutato la radice metafisica del male se ne è dovuta cercare quella fisica o
psicofisica, secondo gli schemi ideologici che nel Novecento avrebbero reso la
psicanalisi e la psicologia gli elementi complementari allo scientismo per una
completa e non riduttiva visione del mondo senza Dio, e per una definitiva
«ateologizzazione» della ragione. Compimento e dissoluzione del marxismo
Riguardo al marxismo e alla sua interpretazione Del Noce scrisse due opere,
ovvero Il cattolico comunista e Il suicidio della rivoluzione, che
costituiscono la continuazione de Il problema dell'ateismo in quanto in esse il
filosofo analizza più dettagliatamente solo una delle linee filosofiche originate
da Cartesio, quella razionalistica, cioè quella che nella storia moderna fu
vincente nella sua estensione politica, nel tentativo di trovare e di
dimostrare la continuità necessaria fra razionalismo, materialismo, marxismo e
infine nichilismo, quest'ultimo inteso come cifra problematica della civiltà
postmoderna. La giustificazione epistemologica di questa analisi è data
dal fatto incontestabile che la storia del Novecento inizia da un fatto
filosofico, ovvero dal passaggio della filosofia marxiana in azione politica,
ovvero dalla coerentizzazione di quella che Del Noce definisce la
«non-filosofia di Marx»: da ciò appare non solo giustificato ma anche
necessario portarsi sul piano storico della filosofia per comprenderne il suo
portato teoretico, e così disinnescarne il suo sostrato ideologico. Del Noce si
affianca a diversi studiosi stranieri, quali ad esempio Voegelin, per
rintracciare l'inizio della cosiddetta secolarizzazione, il cui compimento
sarebbe stato appunto il marxismo e poi il nichilismo, nel sequestro della
nozione di «progresso» da parte di filosofie laiche dalla teologia di
Gioacchino da Fiore, o meglio dall'interpretazione di tale teologia: ben nota è
infatti la distinzione gioachimita nelle tre età della storia, l'Età di
Dio-Padre (Ebraismo), l'Età di Dio-Figlio (Cristianesimo) e infine l'Età di
Dio-Spirito che avrebbe dovuto superare i «limiti» del Cristianesimo ed
estendere l'elezione e la salvezza in modo universale. Di tale teologia
mistica e profetica si appropriò lo gnosticismo sviluppatosi in seno al
Cristianesimo stesso ed estesosi pian piano oltre i confini delle filosofie
razionalistiche del Settecento e soprattutto dell'Ottocento. Del Noce nota
infatti una sorta di dialettica nata all'interno dell'illuminismo settecentesco
non tanto fra atei e deisti bensì fra rivoluzionari e conservatori, ovvero
fra il puro giacobinismo ghigliottinatore dell'«ancien Régime» e il
progressismo che caratterizzò invece la fase dell'illuminismo dopo la
degenerazione della rivoluzione francese in Terrore, ovvero la fase dei
cosiddetti ideologues, fra i quali Cabanis e Condorcet. Il punto attorno a cui
si sviluppava tale dialettica fu appunto la differente filosofia della storia
che aveva caratterizzato l'illuminismo pre-rivoluzionario e l'illuminismo post-rivoluzionario,
in quanto il primo aveva escluso una qualsiasi evoluzione storica e necessaria
dell'umanità e aveva anzi condannato il Medioevo con la storiografia della
leggenda nera, mentre il secondo aveva invece rivalutato l'intera storia pre-illuministica
(sia pagana che cristiana) considerandola come momento dialettico necessario
pur se negativo della storia universale. In questo senso Del Noce ha
potuto mettere in parallelo l'opposizione fra illuminismo giacobino e
spiritualismo in Francia e quella fra kantismo e hegelismo in Germania, ove
spiritualismo e hegelismo sono state filosofie vincenti in quanto hanno
assorbito in sé il momento rivoluzionario e negativo dell'illuminismo per poi
superarlo nella formazione di quella filosofia della storia che ebbe certo in
Hegel il suo culmine. Riguardo al binomio illuminismo-spiritualismo la critica
vincente del secondo sul primo è stata quella di un estremo e insostenibile
riduzionismo rappresentato dal sensismo di Condillac, in altre parole è stata
la critica di ridurre la comprensione del mondo al pari di ciò che lo stesso
illuminismo aveva accusato la religione di aver fatto. In questo contesto è la
nascita della visione sociologica del mondo a rappresentare il tentativo di
superare questa aporia illuministica senza tuttavia dover ritornare alla
metafisica tradizionale: Del Noce insomma sostiene il trapasso dell'illuminismo
in socialismo, non a caso nato in Francia, intesa questa come dottrina che
dell'illuminismo mantiene il carattere utopistico (socialismo utopistico) e
quindi anti-tradizionalistico, ma ne sconfessa invece il deprecabile
riduzionismo che ancora non permetteva un'adeguata analisi della società ai
fini della rivoluzione politica. In Germania invece la dialettica fra
kantismo e hegelismo, con netta vittoria dell'hegelismo, ha come punto di
svolta la riconsiderazione hegeliana della storia come storia dell'Assoluto
(«storia di Dio»), secondo il ben noto schema gioachimita che vedeva in
ogni momento storico un grado dimanifestazione dell'Assoluto, e quindi
«necessario» pur nella sua negatività. In questo senso Hegel è colui che diede
forma alla corrente tradizionalistica dell'illuminismo, ove la tradizione non è
più però - come per Tommaso d'Aquino - l'insieme delle verità eterne e immutabili
che solcano trasversalmente la dimensione temporale mediante il passaggio delle
generazioni, ma è bensì la struttura dialettica eterna che necessita
l'evoluzione delle verità, e quindi la sua temporalizzazione. Per questo
Del Noce afferma che l'idealismo hegeliano ebbe nei confronti del kantismo la
medesima funzione che in Francia ebbe il positivismo comtiano nei confronti del
socialismo utopistico: egli ricorda la critica di Comte nei confronti
dell'illuminismo settecentesco, la sua rivalutazione della tradizione (in senso
dialettico), nonché la celeberrima teoria degli stadi che costituisce - ancora
una volta - una forma secolarizzata della teologia gioachimita. È dopo questa
dettagliata analisi che Del Noce innesta il discorso sul marxismo, il quale appunto
si configurò - per stessa ammissione di Marx - come ripresa critica di Hegel
attraverso la filtrazione di Feuerbach e della sinistra hegeliana (celebri sono
le marxiane Tesi su Feuerbach) e come fusione fra la dialettica hegeliana e la
politica del socialismo utopistico: alla base del cosiddetto socialismo
scientifico rimane ancora il desiderio di palingenesi politica propria di
Saint-Simon o di Fourier, ma onde evitare il risibile utopismo di questi ultimi
ad esso Marx applicò la dialettica hegeliana con cui solamente si sarebbe
potuto analizzare il capitalismo e prevederne così il «necessario»
fallimento. A tal punto però l'analisi marxiana di come potrà nascere la
società comunista introduce l'elemento di distacco non solo dall'idealismo hegeliano
ma anche dalla filosofia stessa, ovvero la necessità di tradurre il pensiero
analitico in azione politica e di affidare alla storia invece che alla ragione
il compito di dimostrare la verità delle tesi marxiane. In questo Del Noce si
riallaccia a una lunga storiografia socialista, uno dei cui esponenti più noti
è per esempio Lukács, che afferma la stretta e necessaria continuità fra
filosofia di Marx e di Engels, politica di Lenin e politica di Stalin, senza
concedere alcuna differenza né alcuna opposizione fra socialismo reale e
socialismo ideale (quasi a guisa di giustificazione storica). Il fattore
fondamentale di continuità fra Marx e Lenin è infatti quella struttura
tipicamente gnostica che equalizza il male all'ignoranza e il bene alla
conoscenza e quindi divide il genere umano fra la massa degli ignoranti e la
ristretta cerchia degli «illuminati», che nella riflessione leniniana erano gli
intellettuali borghesi che per una non spiegata differenza dal resto della
borghesia avrebbero potuto e dovuto guidare la rivoluzione; in questo senso la
politica leniniana, poi proseguita coerentemente nella politica staliniana,
sarebbe stata l'incarnazione perfetta nonché l'unica incarnazione possibile
della filosofia marxiana, e non invece -come è tesi di una certa apologetica
socialista- un tradimento di Marx. Ancora una volta Del Noce si rifà a
una lunga storiografia critica nel considerare il marxismo non come una
filosofia ma come una religione, ma a ciò egli aggiunge la dimostrazione non
del suo carattere di religione civile bensì di religione gnostica: in tal modo
il marxismo leninista sarebbe davvero il compimento del razionalismo ove
quest'ultimo è inteso come gnosticismo laico, religione non di Dio ma
dell'Idea/ideale che non ha bisogno dell'Incarnazione di un Dio-Uomo in quanto
l'uomo stesso avrebbe potuto e dovuto far incarnare tale Idea nel mondo
attraverso la sua azione. Questo è il senso dell'appellativo delnociano di
«non-filosofia» per il marxismo, giacché la contemplazione metafisica in
esso viene interamente assorbita dall'azione politica, in quanto per Marx la
politica è la vera metafisica al pari di come per Nietzsche lo è la
morale. Eppure è proprio questo punto a costituire secondo Del Noce la
contraddizione fondamentale interna al marxismo e quindi la causa prima del suo
fallimento storico: se infatti la «riconciliazione con la realtà» iniziata da
Hegel, proseguita da Feurbach a portata a compimento da Marx deve rivoltare
l'intera comprensione del mondo in trasformazione del mondo, cioè in rivoluzione,
allora in ciò non rimane giustificato il riferimento ideologico all'avvenire
come sede immaginifica della società comunista, ovvero non rimane giustificato
il carattere ancora religioso del marxismo per cui esso ha sostituito il futuro
all'eternità e il lavoro dell'uomo alla Redenzione del Dio-Uomo. Il
fallimento storico del comunismo, quindi, sarebbe stato non solo la
dimostrazione sperimentale della falsità delle teorie marxiane ma anche il
coerente compimento del marxismo come auto-distruggersi nella sua forma di
religione. Con ciò si spiegherebbe per Del Noce l'attivismo comunista dopo il
1945 nonché la graduale decadenza del socialismo nel mondo fino alla sua
profetizzata fine, simboleggiata dalla caduta del Muro di Berlino. È propria di
Del Noce infatti la teoria secondo cui il compimento e la dissoluzione del
marxismo non siano due momenti separati o addirittura opposti, ma siano bensì
il medesimo momento dispiegato coerentemente nel tempo. L'interpretazione
del fascismo Sul fascismo e sulla sua interpretazione in stretta relazione al
marxismo Del Noce ha dedicato gran parte dei suoi studi e delle sue opere,
partendo appunto dalle opinioni comuni e molte volte ideologiche degli storici
nei confronti del fascismo e delineando una struttura paradigmatica tanto
controversa quanto precisa e fondata. È a partire dalla definizione data dallo
storico tedesco Ernst Nolte di ogni movimento fascista come «resistenza contro
la trascendenza», intesa come trascendenza storica e non metafisica, che Del
Noce sottolinea la continuità fra questo serio giudizio e la communis opinio
del fascismo come movimento reazionario, per questo tradizionalista e
nazionalista, e per converso di ogni forma di tradizionalismo e di nazionalismo
come rimando implicito e forse inconscio al fascismo. Di questo Del Noce
fa una critica serrata, facendo notare innanzitutto le origini culturali dei
due fondatori del fascismo, cioè Gentile e Mussolini, come antitetiche rispetto
a ogni forma di politica reazionaria, tradizionalista e nazionalista e come
invece affini rispetto al socialismo, del quale Mussolini in particolare fu un
esponente. Si noti che l'obiettivo che Del Noce intende colpire e abbattere è
quella generale concezione del fascismo come momento singolare e controcorrente
rispetto all'intera storia moderna, dalla rivoluzione francese in poi, mentre
ciò che intende mostrare è la continuità quasi necessaria che è posta fra
l'hegelismo, il marxismo e il fascismo come tre momenti dell'unico processo di
secolarizzazione. Il filosofo inizia quindi dall'analisi della figura storica
di Mussolini e della sua formazione culturale, notando il suo giovanile
anticlericalismo, il suo spontaneo confluire nel socialismo, e il seguente
superamento di quest'ultimo per l'evoluzione fascista del suo pensiero. È in
particolare sul concetto di «rivoluzione» che Del Noce pone l'accento, essendo
questo un concetto base del marxismo che però, attraverso l'incontro
mussoliniano con la tedesca «filosofia dello Spirito» risorgente in Italia,
dovette radicalmente trasformarsi e portarsi dal livello sociale della «classe»
a quello personale del «soggetto». È insomma -per Del Noce- l'incontro
intellettuale di Mussolini con la filosofia di Giovanni Gentile ad aver reso
necessaria la trasformazione della rivoluzione in un senso non più finalistico
o escatologico (come era nel marxismo puro, il cui fine è appunto la società
comunista) ma in un senso propriamente attivistico e lato sensu solipsistico,
in termini gentiliani cioè attualistico. Con ciò Del Noce può connettere la
psicologia di Mussolini con il vero e proprio formalismo pratico del fascismo,
il quale non aveva in realtà alcun contenuto definito, ma proclamava bensì una
forma di azione tanto vaga e generale da poter attrarre a sé ogni sorta di ceto
sociale (anche il proletariato) e di frangia ideologica, in alcuni momenti
persino quella marxistica. Il concetto di «rivoluzione» infatti contiene
in sé già un termine finale ben preciso verso cui lo stato attuale del mondo
andrebbe rivoluzionato, mentre nella politica fascista il termine rivoluzione
deve necessariamente essere sostituito dal termine «riforma» (si pensi appunto
alla riforma Gentile) in senso non più tradizionale, cioè come ri-formare ciò
che è stato de-formato, bensì in senso creazionale, cioè come dare una nuova
forma (indefinita) alle antiche cose, perciò rimane un concetto molto affine a
quello di marxistico di rivoluzione, e permette l'affiancamento ideale
dell'attualismo gentiliano al modernismo teologico fiorente a quel tempo e
condannato come eresia dalla Chiesa cattolica. Opere Senso comune e
teologia della storia nel pensiero di Enrico Castelli, Torino, Edizioni di
filosofia, 1954. La solitudine di Adolfo Faggi, Torino, Edizioni di filosofia,
1954. L'incidenza della cultura sulla politica nella presente situazione
italiana, in Cultura e libertà, Roma, Edizioni 5 lune, 1959. Il problema
dell'ateismo. Il concetto di ateismo e la storia della filosofia come problema,
Bologna, Il Mulino, 1963; 1964.Bologna Riforma cattolica e filosofia moderna,
Bologna, Il Mulino, 1965; Brescia, Morcelliana, 2019. Il problema ideologico
nella politica dei cattolici italiani, Torino, Bottega d'Erasmo, 1964. Il
problema politico dei cattolici, Roma-Milano, UIPC, 1967. Simone Weil,
interprete del mondo di oggi, in L'amore di Dio, Torino, Borla, 1968; 2010.
ISBN 978-88-263-0004-7. L'epoca della secolarizzazione, Milano, Giuffrè, 1970.
L'Eurocomunismo e l'Italia, Roma, Editrice Europea Informazioni, 1976. Il
suicidio della rivoluzione, Milano, Rusconi, 1992 [1978], ISBN 88-18-01384-X.
Premio Nazionale Rhegium Julii per la Saggistica[5] Il cattolico comunista,
Milano, Rusconi, 1981. L'interpretazione transpolitica della storia
contemporanea, Napoli, Guida, 1982. ISBN 88-7042-161-9. Secolarizzazione e
crisi della modernità, Napoli, Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa-Edizioni
scientifiche italiane, 1989. ISBN 88-7104-095-3. Opere postume Giovanni
Gentile. Per una interpretazione filosofica della storia contemporanea,
Bologna, Il Mulino, 1990. ISBN 88-15-02790-4. Da Cartesio a Rosmini. Scritti
vari, anche inediti, di filosofia e storia della filosofia,
Milano, Giuffrè, 1992. ISBN 88-14-02760-9. Filosofi dell'esistenza e della
libertà. Spir, Chestov, Lequier, Renouvier, Benda, Weil, Vidari, Faggi,
Martinetti, Rensi, Juvalta, Mazzantini, Castelli, Capograssi, Milano, Giuffrè,
1992. ISBN 88-14-04045-1. Rivoluzione, Risorgimento, Tradizione. Scritti su
l'Europa (e altri, anche inediti), Milano, Giuffrè, 1993. ISBN 88-14-03666-7. I
cattolici e il progressismo, Milano, Leonardo, 1994. ISBN 88-355-1114-3.
Fascismo e antifascismo. Errori della cultura, Milano, Leonardo, 1995. ISBN
88-04-39419-6. Cristianità e laicità. Scritti su Il sabato (e vari, anche
inediti), Milano, Giuffrè, 1998. ISBN 88-14-05265-4. Pensiero della Chiesa e
filosofia contemporanea. Leone XIII, Paolo VI, Giovanni Paolo II, Roma,
Edizioni Studium, 2005. ISBN 88-382-3981-9. Verità e ragione nella storia.
Antologia di scritti, a cura di Alberto Mina, Milano, Biblioteca Universale
Rizzoli, 2007. ISBN 978-88-17-01505-9. Modernità. Interpretazione transpolitica
della storia contemporanea, Morcelliana, Brescia 2007. Note ^ Del Noce insegnò
nel capoluogo piemontese fino al 1957. ^ Gianni Baget Bozzo. Del Noce, il
filosofo della libertà politica. Copia archiviata, su ideazione.com. URL
consultato il 19 maggio 2009 (archiviato dall'url originale il 2 dicembre
2008). ^ Augusto Del Noce, «Idee per l'interpretazione del fascismo», Ordine
Civile, 15 aprile 1960. ^ Del Noce fu tra i componenti del comitato promotore
del referendum abrogativo antidivorzista del 12 maggio 1974) e più tardi
sull'aborto. ^ premio Rhegium Julii, su circolorhegiumjulii.wordpress.com. URL
consultato il 3 novembre 2018. Bibliografia Paolo Armellini, Razionalità e
storia in Augusto Del Noce, in Il pensiero politico, Roma, Aracne editrice,
2015, ISBN 978-88-7999-250-3. Massimo Borghesi, Augusto Del Noce. La
legittimazione critica del moderno. Marietti 1820, Genova-Milano
2011.[collegamento interrotto] Luca Del Pozzo, Filosofia cristiana e politica
in Augusto Del Noce, Pagine, I libri del Borghese, Roma, 2019, pp. 290. Sergio
Fumagalli, Gnosi moderna e secolarizzazione nell'analisi di Emanuele Samek
Lodovici ed Augusto Del Noce, PUSC, 2005 (scaricabile in PDF dal sito
www.sergiofumagalli.it) Gian Franco Lami, La tradizione in Augusto Del Noce,
Franco Angeli, Milano 2009, Marietti 1820, Genova-Milano 2011. Antonio Rainone,
«DEL NOCE, Augusto» in Enciclopedia Italiana - V Appendice, Roma, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1991. Pietro Ratto, Ipotesi sul fondamento
dell'essenza dissolutiva del marxismo e del fascismo, in Boscoceduo. La
rivoluzione comincia dal principio, Sanremo, EBK Edizioni Leudoteca, 2017, pp.
61-68, ISBN 978-88-907833-7-1. Ambrogio Riili, Augusto Del Noce interprete del
Marxismo. L'ateismo, la gnosi, il "dialogo" con Galvano Della Volpe e
con Lucien Goldmann, in iCentotalleri, Saonara (PD), il prato, 2018, ISBN
978-88-6336-441-5. Francesco Tibursi, Il pensiero di Augusto del Noce come
Teoria sociale, in Andrea Millefiorini (a cura di), Fenomenologia del
disordine. Prospettive sull'irrazionale nella riflessione sociologica italiana,
Societas, Roma, Nuova Cultura, 2015, pp. 165-200, ISBN 978-88-6812-457-1.
Xavier Tilliette, Omaggi. Filosofi italiani del nostro tempo, traduzione di G.
Sansonetti, Brescia, Morcelliana, 1997, p. 92, ISBN 978-88-372-1663-4. Natascia
Villani, Marxismo ateismo secolarizzazione. Dialogo aperto con Augusto del
Noce, in Pensiero giurdico. Saggi, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica, 2003, ISBN
978-88-88321-61-5. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene
citazioni di o su Augusto Del Noce Collegamenti esterni Augusto Del Noce, in
Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Repertori Bibliografici, su centenariodelnoce.it
(archiviato dall'url originale il 29 settembre 2013). La metafisica civile di
Augusto Del Noce: ontologismo e liberalismo dalla rivista telematica di
filosofia Dialeghesthai. Pietro Ratto, Laicità e Democrazia: da Del Noce a
Giotto, su BoscoCeduo, 15 maggio 2007. Democrazia e modernità in Augusto Del
Noce, articolo dal mensile 30Giorni. L'inseparabilità dei Tre. Del Noce e la
modernità, di Andrea Fiamma Centro Culturale Augusto Del Noce,
http://www.centrodelnoce.it. Fondazione Augusto Del Noce, http://www.fondazioneaugustodelnoce.net.
Sito ufficiale del Centenario della nascita del Filosofo Italiano Augusto Del
Noce, su centenariodelnoce.it. URL consultato il 16 maggio 2012 (archiviato
dall'url originale il 4 maggio 2013). Articoli di Del Noce «Il dialogo tra la
Chiesa e la cultura moderna» da Studi Cattolici. «L'errore di Mounier» da Il
Tempo. «Risposte alla scristianità» da Il Sabato. «La sconfitta del modernismo»
da Il Tempo. «La morale comune dell'Ottocento e la morale di oggi», tratto da
Il problema della morale oggi. «Rivoluzione gramsciana», tratto da Il suicidio
della rivoluzione. «Origini dell'indifferenza morale» da Il Tempo. «Le origini
dell'indifferenza religiosa» da Il Tempo. «Religione civile e secolarizzazione»
da Il Tempo. «Un dramma europeo: il dissenso cattolico» da Corriere della Sera.
«Questi poveri cattolici minacciati dal suicidio»[collegamento interrotto] da
Il Sabato «In stato di porno-assedio»[collegamento interrotto] da Il Sabato.
«La più grande vergogna del nostro secolo» da Il Sabato. «Fu vera gloria? La
resistenza 40 anni dopo»[collegamento interrotto], tratto da Litterae
Communionis. «Una colomba, non un santo (caso Bukarin)»[collegamento
interrotto] da Il Sabato. «Intensità d'una gran illusione (Dossetti e
dossettismo)»[collegamento interrotto] da Il Sabato. «L'antifascismo di
comodo»[collegamento interrotto] da Corriere della Sera. «Togliatti? Un
perfetto gramsciano. Polemica su Gramsci»[collegamento interrotto] da Il
Sabato. «Il nazi contagio»[collegamento interrotto] da Il Sabato. «La morale
catto-comunista»[collegamento interrotto] da Il Sabato. «Abbasso Mazzini» da Il
Sabato. «I lumi sull'Italia»[collegamento interrotto] da Il Sabato. «Recensione
del romanzo di Benson "Il Padrone del mondo"»[collegamento interrotto]
dal mensile 30Giorni. «Filo rosso da Mosca a Berlino
(Hitler-Stalin)»[collegamento interrotto] da Il Sabato. «Le connessioni tra
filosofia e politica»[collegamento interrotto] da Il Tempo. «Pci, l'impossibile
conversione»[collegamento interrotto] tratto da Prospettive nel mondo Controllo
di autorità VIAF
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Biografie Cattolicesimo Portale Cattolicesimo Filosofia Portale Filosofia
Politica Portale Politica Categorie: Politologi italianiFilosofi italiani del
XX secoloPolitici italiani del XX secoloNati nel 1910Morti nel 1989Nati l'11
agostoMorti il 30 dicembreNati a PistoiaMorti a RomaFilosofi
cattoliciPersonalità del cattolicesimoStorici del FascismoAnticomunisti
italianiPolitici della Democrazia CristianaSenatori della IX legislatura della
Repubblica ItalianaMilitanti cattolici italianiFilosofi della religione[altre]
Refs.: Luigi Speranza,
"Grice e del Noce," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool
Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
Nola Giovanni Andrea de
Nola Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search
Abbozzo medici italiani Questa voce sugli argomenti filosofi italiani e medici
italiani è solo un abbozzo. Contribuisci a migliorarla secondo le convenzioni
di Wikipedia. Stemma della famiglia Nola Molise Coat of arms of the House of
Nola Molise.jpg Blasonatura Un campo d’argento con una sbarra torchina, dentro
la quale sono tre scudi d’arme di color d’oro. Giovanni Andrea de Nola
(Crotone, XVI secolo – Crotone, XVI secolo) è stato un filosofo e medico
italiano. Indice 1 Biografia
2 Opere
3 Bibliografia
4 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Di origini napoletane e zio dello storico e scrittore
crotonese Giovanni Battista di Nola Molisi, fiorì nel XVI secolo e insegnò per
lungo tempo Medicina all'Università degli Studi "Federico II" di
Napoli. Discepolo di Donato Antonio Altomare, divenne noto per aver scritto e
pubblicato nel 1562 la sua opera più famosa dal titolo Quod sedimentum sanorum,
aegrorumque corporum non sit eiusdem speciei aduersus Ferdinandum Cassanum
& alios contrarium sentientes. Opere
Quod sedimentum sanorum, aegrorumque corporum non sit eiusdem speciei aduersus
Ferdinandum Cassanum & alios contrarium sentientes (1562). Bibliografia
Giustino Marruncelli, Elementi dell'arte di ragionare in medicina, Napoli,
Gabinetto Bibliografico e Tipografico, 1823; Salvatore de Renzi, Storia della
medicina Italiana, Napoli, Tipografia del Filiatre-Sebezio, 1848; National
Library of Medicine, Catalog: volume 5, Washington, Library of Congress, 1950;
Adalberto Pazzini, La Calabria nella storia della medicina, Roma, 1952; Lynn
Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science: The sixteenth century,
Londra, Macmillan, 1958; AA.VV., Lavoro critico, Bari, Dedalo Libri, 1975.
Collegamenti esterni Giovanni Andrea de Nola, Google Books. URL consultato il
19 maggio 2017. La Famiglia dei Nola Molise, Archivio storico di Crotone. URL
consultato il 19 maggio 2017 (archiviato dall'url originale il 29 aprile 2015).
Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 67306238 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0000 6143 8963 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIE\000787 · LCCN
(EN) n90671784 · GND (DE) 120785714 · BAV (EN) 495/229753 · CERL cnp00421640 ·
WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n90671784 Biografie Portale Biografie Due Sicilie
Portale Due Sicilie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Medicina Portale Medicina
Storia di famiglia Portale Storia di famiglia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del
XVI secoloMedici italianiNati nel XVI secoloMorti nel XVI secoloNati a
CrotoneMorti a CrotoneProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico
II[altre]
Nous – Grice’s favourite formation from
nous is ‘noetic’, noetic – the opposite of the favourite Griceian sub-disipline
in philosophy, aesthetics -- from Grecian noetikos, from noetos, ‘perceiving’,
of or relating to apprehension by the intellect. In a strict sense the term
refers to nonsensuous data given to the cognitive faculty, which discloses
their intelligible meaning as distinguished from their sensible apprehension.
We hear a sentence spoken, but it becomes intelligible for us only when the
sounds function as a foundation for noetic apprehension. For Plato, the objects
of such apprehension noetá are the Forms eide with respect to which the
sensible phenomena are only occasions of manifestation: the Forms in themselves
transcend the sensible and have their being in a realm apart. For empiricist
thinkers, e.g., Locke, there is strictly speaking no distinct noetic aspect,
since “ideas” are only faint sense impressions. In a looser sense, however, one
may speak of ideas as independent of reference to particular sense impressions,
i.e. independent of their origin, and then an idea can be taken to signify a
class of objects. Husserl uses the term to describe the intentionality or
dyadic character of consciousness in general, i.e. including both eidetic or
categorial and perceptual knowing. He speaks of the correlation of noesis or
intending and noema or the intended object of awareness. The categorial or
eidetic is the perceptual object as intellectually cognized; it is not a realm
apart, but rather what is disclosed or made present “constituted” Nihil est in
intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu noetic 617 617 when the mode of appearance of the
perceptual object is intended by a categorial noesis.
euclidean/non-euclideeian
distinction, the:
– as applied to geometry. H. P. Grice, “Non-Euclidean implicatura of space” –
“Non-Euclidean geometrical implicatura – None-euclidean geometry refers to any
axiomatized version of geometry in which Euclides’s parallel axiom is rejected,
after so many unsuccessful attempts to prove it. As in so many branches of
mathematics, Gauss had thought out much of the matter first, but he kept most
of his ideas to himself. As a result, credit is given to Bolyai and Lobachevsky.
Instead of assuming that just one line passes through a point in a plane
parallel to a non-coincident co-planar line, Bolyai and Loachevsky offer a
geometry in which a line admits more than one parallel, and the sum of the
“angles” between the “sides” of a “triangle” lies below 180°. Then Riemann
conceived of a geometry in which lines always meet so no parallels, and the sum
of the “angles” exceeds 180°. In this connection Riemann distinguishes between
the unboundedness of space as a property of its extent, and the special case of
the infinite measure over which distance might be taken which is dependent upon
the curvature of that space. Pursuing the published insight of Gauss, that the
curvature of a surface could be defined in terms only of properties dependent
solely on the surface itself and later called “intrinsic”, Riemann also defines
the metric on a surface in a very general and intrinsic way, in terms of the
differential arc length. Thereby he clarified the ideas of “distance” that his
non-Euclidean precursors had introduced drawing on trigonometric and hyperbolic
functions; arc length was now understood geodesically as the shortest
“distance” between two “points” on a surface, and was specified independent of
any assumptions of a geometry within which the surface was embedded. Further
properties, such as that pertaining to the “volume” of a three-“dimensional”
solid, were also studied. The two main types of non-Euclidean geometry, and its
Euclidean parent, may be summarized as follows: Reaction to these geometries
was slow to develop, but their impact gradually emerged. As mathematics, their
legitimacy was doubted; but Beltrami produced a model of a Bolyai-type
two-dimensional space inside a planar circle. The importance of this model was
to show that the consistency of this geometry depended upon that of the
Euclidean version, thereby dispelling the fear that it was an inconsistent
flash of the imagination. During the last thirty years of the nineteenth
century a variety of variant geometries were proposed, and the relationships
between them were studied, together with consequences for projective geometry.
On the empirical side, these geometries, and especially Riemann’s approach,
affected the understanding of the relationship between geometry and space; in
particular, it posed the question whether space is curved or not the later
being the Euclidean answer. The geometries thus played a role in the emergence
and articulation of relativity theory, especially the differential geometry and
tensorial calculus within which its mathematical properties could be expressed.
Philosophically the new geometries stressed the hypothetical nature of
axiomatizing, in contrast to the customary view of mathematical theories as
true in some usually unclear sense. This feature led to the name ‘meta-geometry’
for them. It was intended as an ironical proposal of opponents to be in line
with the hypothetical character of meta-physics (and meta-ethics) in
philosophy. They also helped to encourage conventionalist philosophy of science
with Poincaré, e.g., and put fresh light on the age-old question of the impossibility
of a priori knowledge.
monotonic/non-monotonice
distinction, the: Grice: “It may be argued that we do not need ‘polytonic,’
just a concept that NEGATES monotone – but since at Clifton I learned about
Grecian polytonicity, I like the idea!” -- “On occasion, the semantics of
implicatura is non-monotonic, i. e. a
logic that fails to be monotonic -- i.e., in proof-theoretic terms, fails to
meet the condition that for all statements u1, . . . un, if f,y, if ‘u1, . . .
un Yf’, for any y, ‘u1 , . . . un, y Y f’. Equivalently, let Γ represent a
collection of statements, u1 . . . un, and say that in a monotonic system, such
as system G (after Grice), if ‘Γ Y f’, for any y, ‘Γ, y Y f’ and similarly in
other cases. A non-monotonic system is any system with the following property:
For some Γ, f, and y, ‘ΓNML f’ but ‘Γ, y K!NML f’. This is what Grice calls a
“weak” non-monotonic system G-w-n-m. In contrast, in a “strong” non-monotonic
system – G-s-n-m, we might have, again for some Γ, f, y, where Γ is consistent
and Γ 8 f is consistent: ‘Γ, y YNML > f’. A primary motivation for Grice for
a non-monotonic system or defeasible reasoning, which is so evident in
conversational reasoning, is to produce a representation for default (ceteris
paribus) reasoning or defeasible reasoning. Grice’s interest in defeasible (or
ceteris paribus) reasoning – for conversational implicatura -- readily spreads
to epistemology, logic, and meta-ethics. The exigencies of this or that
practical affair requires leaping to conclusions, going beyond available
evidence, making assumptions. In doing so, Grice often errs and must leap back
from his conclusion, undo his assumption, revise his belief. In Grice’s
standard example, “Tweety is a bird and all birds fly, except penguins and
ostriches. Does Tweety fly?” If pressed, Grice needs to form a belief about
this matter. Upon discovering that Tweety is a penguin, Grice may have to re-tract
his conclusion. Any representation of defeasible (or ceteris paribus) reasoning
must capture the non-monotonicity of this reasoning. A non-monotonic system
G-s-n-m is an attempt to do this by adding this or that rule of inference that
does not preserve monotonicity. Although a practical affair may require Grice
to reason “defeasibly” – an adverb Grice borrowed from Hart -- the best way to
achieve non-monotonicity may not be to add this or that non-monotonic rule of
inference to System G. What one gives up in such system may well not be worth
the cost: loss of the deduction theorem and of a coherent notion of
consistency. Therefore, Grice’s challenge for a non-monotonic system and for defeasible
reasoning, generally is to develop a rigorous way to re-present the structure
of non-monotonic reasoning without losing or abandoning this or that historically
hard-won propertiy of a monotonic system. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, “Monotonicity,
and Polytonicity.” G. P. Baker, “Meaning and defeasibility,” in festschrift for
H. L. A. Hart; R. Hall, “Excluders;” H. P. Grice, “Ceteris paribus and
defeasibility.”
nonviolence: H. P. Grice
joined the Royal Navy in 1941 – and served till 1945, earning the degree of
captain. He was involved in the North-Atlantic theatre and later at the
Admiralty. Non-violence is the renunciation of violence in personal, social, or
international affairs. It often includes a commitment called active nonviolence
or nonviolent direct action actively to oppose violence and usually evil or
injustice as well by nonviolent means. Nonviolence may renounce physical
violence alone or both physical and psychological violence. It may represent a
purely personal commitment or be intended to be normative for others as well.
When unconditional absolute 619 norm normative relativism 620
nonviolence it renounces violence in all
actual and hypothetical circumstances. When conditional conditional nonviolence it concedes the justifiability of violence in
hypothetical circumstances but denies it in practice. Held on moral grounds
principled nonviolence, the commitment belongs to an ethics of conduct or an
ethics of virtue. If the former, it will likely be expressed as a moral rule or
principle e.g., One ought always to act nonviolently to guide action. If the
latter, it will urge cultivating the traits and dispositions of a nonviolent
character which presumably then will be expressed in nonviolent action. As a
principle, nonviolence may be considered either basic or derivative. Either
way, its justification will be either utilitarian or deontological. Held on
non-moral grounds pragmatic nonviolence, nonviolence is a means to specific
social, political, economic, or other ends, themselves held on non-moral
grounds. Its justification lies in its effectiveness for these limited purposes
rather than as a way of life or a guide to conduct in general. An alternative
source of power, it may then be used in the service of evil as well as good.
Nonviolent social action, whether of a principled or pragmatic sort, may
include noncooperation, mass demonstrations, marches, strikes, boycotts, and
civil disobedience techniques explored
extensively in the writings of Gene Sharp. Undertaken in defense of an entire
nation or state, nonviolence provides an alternative to war. It seeks to deny
an invading or occupying force the capacity to attain its objectives by
withholding the cooperation of the populace needed for effective rule and by
nonviolent direct action, including civil disobedience. It may also be used
against oppressive domestic rule or on behalf of social justice. Gandhi’s
campaign against British rule in India, Scandinavian resistance to Nazi
occupation during World War II, and Martin Luther King, Jr.’s actions on behalf
of civil rights in the United States are illustrative. Nonviolence has origins
in Far Eastern thought, particularly Taoism and Jainism. It has strands in the
Jewish Talmud, and many find it implied by the New Testament’s Sermon on the
Mount. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “My Royal Navy days: memoirs of a captain.”
normal/non-normal
distinction, the: Grice:
I shall refer to the ‘normal form’ as a formula equivalent to a given formula, but having special properties. The
main varieties follow. A Conjunctive normal form. If D1 . . . Dn are
disjunctions of sentential variables or their negations, such as p 7 -q 7 r, a
formula F is in what I shall call
“conjunctive normal form” provided F % D1 & D2 & . . & Dn. The
following are in conjunctive normal form: -p 7 q; p 7 q 7 r & -p 7 -q 7 -r
& -q 7 r. Every formula of Grice’s predicate calculus – System G, Gricese
-- has an equivalent “conjunctive normal
form.” This fact can be used to prove the completeness of sentential logic.
Disjunctive normal form. If C1 . . . Cn are conjunctions of sentential
variables or their negations, such as p & -q & -r, a formula F is in what I shall call “disjunctive
normal form” provided F % C1 7 C27 . . Cn. The following are thus in
disjunctive normal form: p & -q 7 -p & q; p & q & -r 7 -p &
-q & -r. Every formula of sentential logic has an equivalent disjunctive
normal form. Prenex normal form. A formula of Grice’s predicate calculus –
system G, Gricese -- is in what Grice calls “prenex normal form” if 1 every
quantifier occurs at the beginning of the formula, 2 the scope of the
quantifiers extends to the end of the formula, and 3 what follows the
quantifiers contains at least one occurrence of every variable that appears in
the set of quantifiers. Thus, DxDyFx / Gy and xDyzFxy 7 Gyz / Dxyz are in what
I shall call “prenex normal form.” The formula may contain free variables;
thus, Dxy Fxyz / Gwyx is also in prenex normal form. The following, however,
are not in prenex normal form: xDy Fx / Gx; xy Fxy / Gxy. Every formula of
Grice’s predicate calculus – System G, Gricese -- has an equivalent formula in
prenex normal form. A formula F in predicate logic is in what Grice, as a
tribute to Skolem, calls the “Skolem normal form” provided 1 F is in prenex
normal form, 2 every existential quantifier precedes any universal quantifier,
3 F contains at least one existential quantifier, and 4 F contains no free
variables. Thus, DxDy zFxy / Gyz and DxDyDzwFxy 7 Fyz 7 Fzw are in Skolem
normal form; however, Dx y Fxyz and x y Fxy 7 Gyx are not. Any formula has an equivalent
Skolem normal form. “This has implications for the lack of completeness of my
predicate calculus – but do I worry?”. Refs.: Grice, “Normal and abnormal
forms: a logical introduction.”
notum: Grice was slightly obsessed with “know,” Latin
‘notum – nosco’ -- nosco , nōvi, nōtum, 3 (old form,
GNOSCO, GNOVI, GNOTVM, acc. to Prisc. p. 569 P.; I.inf. pass. GNOSCIER, S. C.
de Bacch.; cf. GNOTV, cognitu, Paul. ex Fest. p. 96 Müll.: GNOT (contr. for
gnovit) οἶδεν, ἐπιγινώσκει; GNOTV, γνῶσιν, διάγνωσιν, Gloss. Labb.—Contr. forms
in class. Lat. are nosti, noram, norim. nosse; nomus for novimus: nomus ambo
Ulixem, Enn. ap. Diom. p. 382 P., or Trag. v. 199 Vahl.), v. a. for gnosco,
from the root gno; Gr. γιγνώσκω, to begin to know, to get a knowledge of,
become acquainted with, come to know a thing (syn.: scio, calleo). I. Lit. 1.
(α). Tempp. praes.: “cum igitur, nosce te, dicit, hoc dicit, nosce animum
tuum,” Cic. Tusc. 1, 22, 52: Me. Sauream non novi. Li. At nosce sane, Plaut.
As. 2, 4, 58; cf.: Ch. Nosce signum. Ni. Novi, id. Bacch. 4, 6, 19; id. Poen.
4, 2, 71: “(Juppiter) nos per gentes alium alia disparat, Hominum qui facta,
mores, pietatem et fidem noscamus,” id. Rud. prol. 12; id. Stich. 1, 1, 4: “id
esse verum, cuivis facile est noscere,” Ter. Ad. 5, 4, 8: “ut noscere possis
quidque,” Lucr. 1, 190; 2, 832; 3, 124; 418; 588; Cic. Rep. 1, 41, 64: deus
ille, quem mente noscimus, id. N. D. 1, 14, 37.—Pass.: “EAM (tabulam) FIGIER
IOVBEATIS, VBEI FACILVMED GNOSCIER POTISIT, S. C. de Bacch.: forma in tenebris
nosci non quita est, Ter Hec. 4, 1, 57 sq.: omnes philosophiae partes tum
facile noscuntur, cum, etc.,” Cic. N. D. 1, 4, 9: philosophiae praecepta
noscenda, id. Fragm. ap. Lact. 3, 14: “nullique videnda, Voce tamen noscar,”
Ov. M. 14, 153: “nec noscitur ulli,” by any one, id. Tr. 1, 5, 29: “noscere
provinciam, nosci exercitui,” by the army, Tac. Agr. 5.— (β). Temppperf., to
have become acquainted with, to have learned, to know: “si me novisti minus,”
Plaut. Aul. 4, 10, 47: “Cylindrus ego sum, non nosti nomen meum?” id. Men. 2,
2, 20: “novi rem omnem,” Ter. And. 4, 4, 50: “qui non leges, non instituta ...
non jura noritis,” Cic. Pis. 13, 30: “plerique neque in rebus humanis quidquam
bonum norunt, nisi, etc.,” id. Lael. 21, 79: “quam (virtutem) tu ne de facie
quidem nosti,” id. Pis. 32, 81; id. Fin. 2, 22, 71: “si ego hos bene novi,” if
I know them well, id. Rosc. Am. 20 fin.: si Caesarem bene novi, Balb. ap. Cic.
Att. 9, 7, B, 2: “Lepidum pulchre noram,” Cic. Fam. 10, 23, 1: “si tuos digitos
novi,” id. Att. 5, 21, 13: “res gestas de libris novisse,” to have learned from
books, Lact. 5, 19, 15: “nosse Graece, etc. (late Lat. for scire),” Aug. Serm.
45, 5; 167, 40 al.: “ut ibi esses, ubi nec Pelopidarum—nosti cetera,” Cic. Fam.
7, 28, 2; Plin. Ep. 3, 9, 11.— 2. To examine, consider: “ad res suas
noscendas,” Liv. 10, 20: “imaginem,” Plaut. Ps. 4, 2, 29.—So esp., to take
cognizance of as a judge: “quae olim a praetoribus noscebantur,” Tac. A. 12,
60.— II. Transf., in the tempp. praes. A. In gen., to know, recognize (rare;
perh. not in Cic.): hau nosco tuom, I know your (character, etc.), i. e. I know
you no longer, Plaut. Trin. 2, 4, 44: “nosce imaginem,” id. Ps. 4, 2, 29; id.
Bacch. 4, 6, 19: “potesne ex his ut proprium quid noscere?” Hor. S. 2, 7, 89;
Tac. H. 1, 90.— B. In partic., to acknowledge, allow, admit of a reason or an
excuse (in Cic.): “numquam amatoris meretricem oportet causam noscere, Quin,
etc.,” Plaut. Truc. 2, 1, 18: “illam partem excusationis ... nec nosco, nec
probo,” Cic. Fam. 4, 4, 1; cf.: “quod te excusas: ego vero et tuas causas
nosco, et, etc.,” id. Att. 11, 7, 4: “atque vereor, ne istam causam nemo
noscat,” id. Leg. 1, 4, 11.— III. Transf. in tempp. perf. A. To be acquainted
with, i. e. to practise, possess: “alia vitia non nosse,” Sen. Q. N. 4 praef. §
9.— B. In mal. part., to know (in paronomasia), Plaut. Most. 4, 2, 13; id. Pers.
1, 3, 51.— IV. (Eccl. Lat.) Of religious knowledge: “non noverant Dominum,”
Vulg. Judic. 2, 12; ib. 2 Thess. 1, 8: “Jesum novi, Paulum scio,” I
acknowledge, ib. Act. 19, 15.—Hence, nōtus , a, um, P. a., known. A. Lit.:
“nisi rem tam notam esse omnibus et tam manifestam videres,” Cic. Verr. 2, 3,
58, 134: “ejusmodi res ita notas, ita testatas, ita manifestas proferam,” id.
ib. 2, 2, 34, § “85: fingi haec putatis, quae patent, quae nota sunt omnibus,
quae tenentur?” id. Mil. 28, 76: “noti atque insignes latrones,” id. Phil. 11,
5, 10: “habere omnes philosophiae notos et tractatos locos,” id. Or. 33, 118:
“facere aliquid alicui notum,” id. Fam. 5, 12, 7: “tua nobilitas hominibus
litteratis est notior, populo obscurior,” id. Mur. 7, 16: “nullus fuit civis Romanus
paulo notior, quin, etc.,” Caes. B. C. 2, 19: “vita P. Sullae vobis populoque
Romano notissima,” Cic. Sull. 26, 72: “nulli nota domus sua,” Juv. 1, 7.— (β).
With gen. (poet.): “notus in fratres animi paterni,” Hor. C. 2, 2, 6: noti
operum Telchines. Stat. Th. 2, 274: “notusque fugarum, Vertit terga,” Sil. 17,
148.— (γ). With subj.-clause: “notum est, cur, etc.,” Juv. 2, 58.— (δ). With
inf. (poet.): “Delius, Trojanos notus semper minuisse labores,” Sil. 12, 331.—
2. In partic. a. Subst.: nōti , acquaintances, friends: “de dignitate M.
Caelius notis ac majoribus natu ... respondet,” Cic. Cael. 2, 3: “hi suos notos
hospitesque quaerebant,” Caes. B. C. 1, 74, 5; Hor. S. 1, 1, 85; Verg. Cir.
259.— b. In a bad sense, notorious: “notissimi latronum duces,” Cic. Fam. 10,
14, 1: “integrae Temptator Orion Dianae,” Hor. C. 3, 4, 70; Ov. M. 1, 198:
“Clodia, mulier non solum nobilis sed etiam nota,” Cic. Cael. 13, 31; cf. Cic.
Verr. 1, 6, 15: “moechorum notissimus,” Juv. 6, 42.— B. Transf., act., knowing,
that knows: novi, notis praedicas, to those that know, Plaut. Ps. 4, 2, 39.Chisholm:
r. m. influential philosopher whose
publications spanned the field, including ethics and the history of philosophy.
He is mainly known as an epistemologist, metaphysician, and philosopher of
mind. In early opposition to powerful forms of reductionism, such as
phenomenalism, extensionalism, and physicalism, Chisholm developed an original
philosophy of his own. Educated at Brown and Harvard Ph.D., 2, he spent nearly
his entire career at Brown. He is known chiefly for the following
contributions. a Together with his teacher and later his colleague at Brown, C.
J. Ducasse, he developed and long defended an adverbial account of sensory
experience, set against the sense-datum act-object account then dominant. b
Based on deeply probing analysis of the free will problematic, he defended a
libertarian position, again in opposition to the compatibilism long orthodox in
analytic circles. His libertarianism had, moreover, an unusual account of agency,
based on distinguishing transeunt event causation from immanent agent
causation. c In opposition to the celebrated linguistic turn of linguistic
philosophy, he defended the primacy of intentionality, a defense made famous
not only through important papers, but also through his extensive and
eventually published correspondence with Wilfrid Sellars. d Quick to recognize
the importance and distinctiveness of the de se, he welcomed it as a basis for
much de re thought. e His realist ontology is developed through an intentional
concept of “entailment,” used to define key concepts of his system, and to
provide criteria of identity for occupants of fundamental categories. f In
epistemology, he famously defended forms of foundationalism and internalism,
and offered a delicately argued dissolution of the ancient problem of the
criterion. The principles of Chisholm’s epistemology and metaphysics are not
laid down antecedently as hard-and-fast axioms. Lacking any inviolable
antecedent privilege, they must pass muster in the light of their consequences
and by comparison with whatever else we may find plausible. In this regard he
sharply contrasts with such epistemologists as Popper, with the skepticism of
justification attendant on his deductivism, and Quine, whose stranded
naturalism drives so much of his radical epistemology and metaphysics. By
contrast, Chisholm has no antecedently set epistemic or metaphysical
principles. His philosophical views develop rather dialectically, with
sensitivity to whatever considerations, examples, or counterexamples reflection
may reveal as relevant. This makes for a demanding complexity of elaboration,
relieved, however, by a powerful drive for ontological and conceptual
economy. notum per se Latin, ‘known
through itself’, self-evident. This term corresponds roughly to the term
‘analytic’. In Thomistic theology, there are two ways for a thing to be
self-evident, secundum se in itself and quoad nos to us. The proposition that
God exists is self-evident in itself, because God’s existence is identical with
his essence; but it is not self-evident to us humans, because humans are not
directly acquainted with God’s essence.Aquinas’s Summa theologiae I, q.2,a.1,c.
For Grice, by uttering “Smith knows that p,” the emisor explicitly conveys, via
semantic truth-conditional entailment, that (1) p; (2) Smith believes that p;
(3) if (1), (2); and conversationally implicates, in a defeasible pragmatic
way, explainable by his adherence to the principle of conversational
co-operation, that Smith is guaranteeing that p.”Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The
monosemy of ‘know’,” H. P. Grice, “The implicatura of ‘know;’” H. P. Grice, “’I
know’ and ‘I guarantee’;” H. P. Grice, “Austin’s performatory fallacy on ‘know’
and ‘guarantee.’”
conventional/non-conventional distinction, the: “If I were to rename all my taxonomies, I
would say I have always been unconventional, and that it was not convention I’m
interested, but unconventionality --. Grice: “Philosophers and the
unconventional.” “Implicature and the unconventional philosopher.” -- “If I
have to chose, I chose non-conventional, but I don’t have to, so I shall use
‘unconventional.’” -- Unfortunately, Grice never came up with a word or
sobriquet for the non-conventional, and kept using the ‘non-conventional.’
Similarly, he never came up with a positive way to refer to the non-natural,
and non-natural it remained. Luckily, we can take it as a joke. Convention
figures TWICE in Grice’s scheme. For his reductive analysis of communication,
he surely can avoid convention by relying on a self-referring anti-sneaky
clause. But when it comes to the ‘taxonomy’ of the ‘shades’ of implication, he
wants the emissor to implicate that p WITHOUT relying on a convention. If the
emissor RELIES on a convention, there are problems for his analysis. Why?
First, at the explicit level, it can be assumed that conventions will feature
(Smith’s dog is ‘by convention’ called ‘Fido”). At the level of the implied,
there are two ways where convention matters in a wrong way. “My neighbour’s
three-year-old is an adult” FLOUTS a convention – or meaning postulate. And it
corresponds to the entailment. But finally, there is a third realm of the
conventional. For particles like “therefore,” or ‘but.’ “But” Grice does not
care much about, but ‘therefore’ he does. He wants to say that ‘therefore’ is
mainly emphatic.The emissor implies a passage from premise to conclusion. And
that implication relies on a convention YET it is not part of the entailment.
So basically, it is an otiose addition. Why would rational conversationalists
rely on them? The rationale for this is that Grice wants to provide a GENERAL
theory of communication that will defeat Austin’s convention-tied ritualistic
view of language. So Grice needs his crucial philosophical refutations NOT to rely
on convention. What relies on convention cannot be cancellable. What doesn’t
can. I an item relies on convention it has not really redeemed from that part
of the communicative act that can not be explained rationally by argument.
There is no way to calculate a conventional item. It is just a given. And Grice
is interested in providing a rationale. His whole campaign relates to this idea
that Austin has rushed, having detected a nuance in a linguistic phenomenon, to
explain it away, without having explored in detail what kind of nuance it is.
For Grice it is NOT a conventional nuance – it’s a sous-entendu of conversation
(as Mill has it), an unnecessary implication (as Russell has it). Why did Grice
chose ‘convention’? The influence of Lewis seems minor, because he touches on
the topic in “Causal Theory,” before Lewis. The word ‘convention’ does NOT
occur in “Causal Theory,” though. But there are phrasings to that effect. Notably,
let us consider his commentary in the reprint, when he omits the excursus. He
says that he presents FOUR cases: a particularized conversational (‘beautiful
handwriting’), a generalised conversational (“in the kitchen or in the
bedroom”), a ‘conventional implicaturum’ (“She was poor but she was honest”)
and a presupposition (“You have not ceased to eat iron”). So the obvious target
for exploration is the third, where Grice has the rubric ‘convention,’ as per
‘conventional.’ So his expansion on the ‘but’ example (what Frege has as
‘colouring’ of “aber”) is interesting to revise. “plied is that Smith
has been bcating his wifc. (2) " She was poor but she was honcst ",
whele what is implied is (vcry roughly) that there is some contrast between
poverty and honesty, or between her poverty and her honesty. The first cxample
is a stock case of what is sometimes called " prcsupposition " and it
is often held that here 1he truth of what is irnplicd is a necessary condition
of the original statement's beirrg cither true or false. This might be
disputed, but it is at lcast arguable that it is so, and its being arguable
might be enough to distinguish-this type of case from others. I shall however
for convenience assume that the common view mentioned is correct. This
consideration clearly distinguishes (1) from (2); even if the implied
proposition were false, i.e. if there were no reason in the world to contrast
poverty with honesty either in general or in her case, the original statement
could still be false; it would be false if for example she were rich and
dishonest. One might perhaps be less comfortable about assenting to its truth
if the implied contrast did not in fact obtain; but the possibility of falsity
is enough for the immediate purpose. My next experiment on these examples is to
ask what it is in each case which could properly be said to be the vehicle of
implication (to do the implying). There are at least four candidates, not
necessarily mutually exclusive. Supposing someone to have uttered one or other
of my sample sentences, we may ask whether the vehicle of implication would be
(a) what the speaker said (or asserted), or (b) the speaker (" did he
imply that . . . .':) or (c) the words the speaker used, or (d) his saying that
(or again his saying that in that way); or possibly some plurality of these
items. As regards (a) I think (1) and (2) differ; I think it would be correct
to say in the case of (l) that what he speaker said (or asserted) implied that
Smith had been beating this wife, and incorrect to say in the case of (2) that
what te said (or asserted) implied that there was a contrast between e.g.,
honesty and poverty. A test on which I would rely is the following : if
accepting that the implication holds involves one in r27 128 H. P. GRICE
accepting an hypothetical' if p then q ' where 'p ' represents the original
statement and ' q' represents what is implied, then what the speaker said (or
asserted) is a vehicle of implication, otherwise not. To apply this rule to the
given examples, if I accepted the implication alleged to hold in the case of
(1), I should feel compelled to accept the hypothetical " If Smith has
left off beating his wife, then he has been beating her "; whereas if I
accepted the alleged implication in the case of (2), I should not feel
compelled to accept the hypothetical " If she was poor but honest, then
there is some contrast between poverty and honesty, or between her poverty and
her honesty." The other candidates can be dealt with more cursorily; I
should be inclined to say with regard to both (l) and (2) that the speaker
could be said to have implied whatever it is that is irnplied; that in the case
of (2) it seems fairly clear that the speaker's words could be said to imply a
contrast, whereas it is much less clear whether in the case of (1) the
speaker's words could be said to imply that Smith had been beating his wife;
and that in neither case would it be evidently appropriate to speak of his
saying that, or of his saying that in that way, as implying what is implied.
The third idea with which I wish to assail my two examples is really a twin
idea, that of the detachability or cancellability of the implication. (These
terms will be explained.) Consider example (1): one cannot fi.nd a form of
words which could be used to state or assert just what the sentence "
Smith has left off beating his wife " might be used to assert such that
when it is used the implication that Smith has been beating his wife is just
absent. Any way of asserting what is asserted in (1) involves the irnplication
in question. I shall express this fact by saying that in the case of (l) the
implication is not detqchable from what is asserted (or simpliciter, is not
detachable). Furthermore, one cannot take a form of words for which both what
is asserted and what is implied is the same as for (l), and then add a further
clause withholding commitment from what would otherwise be implied, with the
idea of annulling the implication without annulling the assertion. One cannot
intelligibly say " Smith has left off beating his wife but I do not mean
to imply that he has been beating her." I shall express this fact by
saying that in the case of (1) the implication is not cancellable (without THE
CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION r29 cancelling the assertion). If we turn to (2) we
find, I think, that there is quite a strong case for saying that here the implication
ls detachable. Thcrc sccms quitc a good case for maintaining that if, instead
of sayirrg " She is poor but shc is honcst " I were to say " She
is poor and slre is honcst", I would assert just what I would havc
asscrtcct ii I had used thc original senterrce; but there would now be no
irnplication of a contrast between e.g', povery and honesty. But the question
whether, in tl-re case of (2), thc inrplication is cancellable, is slightly
more cornplex. Thcrc is a sonse in which we may say that it is non-cancellable;
if sorncone were to say " She is poor but she is honest, though of course
I do not mean to imply that there is any contrast between poverty and honesty
", this would seem a puzzling and eccentric thing to have said; but though
we should wish to quarrel with the speaker, I do not think we should go so far
as to say that his utterance was unintelligible; we should suppose that he had
adopted a most peculiar way of conveying the the news that she was poor and
honesl. The fourth and last test that I wish to impose on my exarnples is to
ask whether we would be inclined to regard the fact that the appropriate
implication is present as being a matter of the meaning of some particular word
or phrase occurring in the sentences in question. I am aware that this may not
be always a very clear or easy question to answer; nevertheless Iwill risk the
assertion that we would be fairly happy to say that, as regards (2), the
factthat the implication obtains is a matter of the meaning of the word ' but
'; whereas so far as (l) is concerned we should have at least some inclination
to say that the presence of the implication was a matter of the meaning of some
of the words in the sentence, but we should be in some difficulty when it came
to specifying precisely which this word, or words are, of which this is true.”
Since the actual wording ‘convention’ does not occur it may do to revise how he
words ‘convention’ in Essay 2 of WoW. So here is the way he words it in Essay
II.“In some cases the CONVENTIONAL meaning of the WORDS used will DETERMINE
what is impliccated, besides helping to determine what is said.” Where
‘determine’ is the key word. It’s not “REASON,” conversational reason that
determines it. “If I say (smugly), ‘He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave,’
I have certainly COMMITTED myself, by virtue of the meaning of my words, to its
being the case that his being brave is a consequence of (follows from) his
being an Englishman. But, while I have said that [or explicitly conveyed THAT]
he is an Englishman, and [I also have] said that [or explicitly conveyed that]
he is brave, I do not want to say [if I may play with what people
conventionally understand by ‘convention’] that I have said [or explicitly
conveyed] (in the favoured sense) that [or explicitly conveyed that] it follows
from his being an Englishman that he is brave, though I have certainly
INDICATED, and so implicated, that this is so.” The rationale as to why the
label is ‘convention’ comes next. “I do not want to say that my utterance of
this sentence would be, strictly speaking, FALSE should the consequence in
question fail to hold. So some implicaturums are conventional, unlike the one
with which I introduce this discussion of implicaturum.”Grice’s
observation or suggestion then or advise then, in terms of nomenclature. His
utterance WOULD be FALSE if the MEANING of ‘therefore’ were carried as an
ENTAILMENT (rather than emphatic truth-value irrelevant rhetorical emphasis).
He expands on this in The John Lecture, where Jill is challenged. “What do you
mean, “Jack is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave”?” What is being
challenged is the validity of the consequence. ‘Therefore’ is vague enough NOT
to specify what type of consequence is meant. So, should someone challenge the
consequence, Jill would still be regarded by Grice as having uttered a TRUE
utterance. The metabolism here is complex since it involves assignment of
‘meaning’ to this or that expression (in this case ‘therefore’). In Essay VI he
is perhaps more systematic.The wider programme just mentioned arises out of a
distinction which, for purposes which I need not here specify, I wish to make
within the total signification of a remark: a distinction between what the
speaker has said (in a certain favoured, and maybe in some degree artificial,
sense of 'said'), and what he has 'implicated' (e.g. implied, indicated,
suggested, etc.), taking into account the fact that what he has implicated may
be either conventionally implicated (implicated by virtue of the meaning of
some word or phrase which he has used) or non-conventionally implicated (in
which case the specification of the implicaturum falls [TOTALLY] outside [AND
INDEPENDENTLY, i. e. as NOT DETERMINED BY] the specification of the
conventional meaning of the words used [Think ‘beautiful handwriting,’ think
‘In the kitchen or in the bedroom’). He is clearest in Essay 6 – where he adds
‘=p’ in the symbolization.UTTERER'S MEANING, SENTENCE-MEANING, AND
WORD-MEANINGMy present aim is to throw light on the connection between (a) a
notion of ‘meaning’ which I want to regard as basic, viz. that notion which is
involved in saying of someone that ‘by’ (when) doing SUCH-AND-SUCH he means
THAT SO-AND-SO (in what I have called a non-natural use of 'means'), and (b)
the notions of meaning involved in saying First, that a given sentence means
'so-and-so' Second, that a given word or phrase means 'so-and-so'. What I have
to say on these topics should be looked upon as an attempt to provide a sketch
of what might, I hope, prove to be a viable theory, rather than as an attempt
to provide any part of a finally acceptable theory. The account which I shall
otTer of the (for me) basic notion of meaning is one which I shall not seek now to defend.I should like its
approximate correctness to be assumed, so that attention may be focused on its
utility, if correct, in the explication of other and (I hope) derivative
notions of meaning. This enterprise forms part of a wider programme which I
shall in a moment delineate, though its later stages lie beyond the limits which
I have set for this paper. The wider programme just mentioned arises out of a
distinction which, for purposes which I need not here specify, I wish to make
within the total signification of a remark: a distinction between what the
speaker has said (in a certain favoured, and maybe in some degree artificial,
sense of 'said'), and what he has 'implicated' (e.g. implied, indicated,
suggested, etc.), taking into account the fact that what he has implicated may
be either conventionally implicated (implicated by virtue of the meaning of
some word or phrase which he has used) or non-conventionally implicated (in
which case the specification of the implicaturum falls [TOTALLY] outside [AND
INDEPENDENTLY, i. e. as NOT DETERMINED BY] the specification of the conventional
meaning of the words used [Think ‘beautiful handwriting,’ think ‘In the kitchen
or in the bedroom’). The programme is directed towards an explication of the
favoured SENSE of 'say' and a clarification of its relation to the notion of
conventional meaning. The stages of the programme are as folIows: First, To
distinguish between locutions of the form 'U (utterer) meant that .. .'
(locutions which specify what rnight be called 'occasion-meaning') and
locutions of the From Foundalions oJ Language. 4 (1968), pp. 1-18. Reprinted by
permission of the author and the editor of Foundations oJ Language. I I hope
that material in this paper, revised and re·arranged, will form part of a book
to be published by the Harvard University Press. form 'X (utterance-type) means H ••• "'.
In locutions of the first type, meaning is specified without the use of
quotation-marks, whereas in locutions of the second type the meaning of a
sentence, word or phrase is specified with the aid of quotation marks. This
difference is semantically important. Second, To attempt to provide a definiens
for statements of occasion-meaning; more precisely, to provide a definiens for
'By (when) uttering x, U meant that *p'. Some explanatory comments are needed
here. First, I use the term 'utter' (together with 'utterance') in an
artificially wide sense, to cover any case of doing x or producing x by the
performance of which U meant that so-and-so. The performance in question need
not be a linguistic or even a conventionalized performance. A specificatory
replacement of the dummy 'x' will in some cases be a characterization of a
deed, in others a characterization of a product (e.g. asound). (b) '*' is a
dummy mood-indicator, distinct from specific mood-indicators like 'I-'
(indicative or assertive) or '!' (imperative). More precisely, one may think of
the schema 'Jones meant that *p' as yielding a full English sentence after two
transformation al steps: (i) replace '*' by a specific mood-indicator and
replace 'p' by an indicative sentence. One might thus get to 'Jones meant that
I- Smith will go home' or to 'Jones meant that! Smith will go horne'. (ii)
replace the sequence following the word 'that' by an appropriate clause in
indirect speech (in accordance with rules specified in a linguistic theory).
One might thus get to 'Jones meant that Srnith will go horne' 'Jones meant that
Srnith is to go horne'. Third, To attempt to elucidate the notion of the
conventional meaning of an utterance-type; more precisely, to explicate
sentences which make claims of the form 'X (utterance-type) means "*''',
or, in case X is a non-scntcntial utterancctype, claims of the form 'X means H
••• "', where the location is completed by a nonsentential expression.
Again, some explanatory comments are required. First, It will be convenient to
recognize that what I shall call statements of timeless meaning (statements of
the type 'X means " ... "', in which the ~pecification of meaning
involves quotation-marks) may be subdivided into (i) statements of timeless
'idiolect-meaning', e.g. 'For U (in U's idiolect) X means " ... '"
and (ü) statements of timeless 'Ianguage meaning', e.g. 'In L (language) X
means " ... "'. It will be convenient to handle these separately, and
in the order just given. (b) The truth of a statement to the effect that X
means ' .. .' is of course not incompatible with the truth of a further
statement to the effect that X me ans '--", when the two lacunae are quite
differently completed. An utterance-type rriay have more than one conventional
meaning, and any definiens which we offer must allow fOT this fact. 'X means
" ... '" should be understood as 'One of the meanings of X is "
... " '. (IV) In view of the possibility of multiplicity in the timeless
meaning of an utterance-type, we shall need to notice, and to provide an
explication of, what I shall call the applied timeless meaning of an
utterance-type. That is to say, we need a definiens for the schema 'X
(utterance-type) meant here " ... "', a schema the specifications of
which announce the correct reading of X for a given occasion of utterance.
Comments. (a) We must be careful to distinguish the applied timeless meaning of
X (type) with respecf to a particular token x (belonging to X) from the
occasionmeaning of U's utterance of x. The following are not equivalent: (i)
'When U uttered it, the sentence "Palmer gave Nickiaus quite a
beating" meant "Palmer vanquished Nickiaus with some ease"
[rather than, say, "Palmer administered vigorous corporal punishment to
NickIaus."]' (ii) 'When U uttered the sentence "Palmer gave NickIaus
quite a beating" U meant that Palmer vanquished NickIaus with some ease.'
U might have been speaking ironically, in which case he would very likely have
meant that NickIaus vanquished Palmer with some ease. In that case (ii) would
c1early be false; but nevertheless (i) would still have been true. Second,
There is some temptation to take the view that the conjunction of One, 'By
uttering X, U meant that *p' and (Two, 'When uttered by U, X meant
"*p'" provides a definiens for 'In uttering X, U said [OR EXPLICITLY
CONVEYED] that *p'. Indeed, ifwe give consideration only to utterance-types for
which there are available adequate statements of time1ess meaning taking the
exemplary form 'X meant "*p'" (or, in the case of applied time1ess
meaning, the form 'X meant here "*p" '), it may even be possible to
uphold the thesis that such a coincidence of occasion-meaning and applied
time1ess meaning is a necessary and sufficient condition for saying that *p.
But a litde refiection should convince us of the need to recognize the
existence of statements of timeless meaning which instantiate forms other than
the cited exemplary form. There are, I think, at least some sentences whose
‘timeless’ meaning is not adequately specifiable by a statement of the exemplary
form. Consider the sentence 'Bill is a philosopher and he is, therefore, brave'
(S ,). Or Jill: “Jack is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.”It would be
appropriate, I think, to make a partial specification of the timeless meaning
of S, by saying 'Part of one meaning of S, is "Bill is occupationally
engaged in philosophical studies" '. One might, indeed, give a full
specifu::ation of timeless meaning for S, by saying 'One meaning of S, inc1udes
"Bill is occupationally engaged in philosophie al studies" and
"Bill is courageous" and "[The fact] That Bill is courageous
follows from his being occupationally engaged in philosophical studies",
and that is all that is included'. We
might re-express this as 'One meaning of S, comprises "Bill is occupationally
engaged (etc)", "Bill is courageous", and "That Bill is eourageous follows
(ete .)".'] It will be preferable to speeify the timeless meaning of S I
in this way than to do so as folIows: 'One meaning of S I is "Bill is
occupationally engaged (etc.) and Bill is courageous and that Bill is
eourageous follows (ete.)" '; for this latter formulation at least
suggests that SI is synonymous with the conjunctive sentence quoted in the
formulation, whieh does not seem to be the case. Since it is true that another
meaning of SI inc1udes 'Bill is addicted to general reftections about life'
(vice 'Bill is occupationally engaged (etc.)'), one could have occasion to say
(truly), with respect to a given utterance by U of SI' 'The meaning of SI HERE
comprised "Bill is oecupationally engaged (ete.)", "Bill is
eourageous", and "That Bill is courageous follows (ete.)"', or
to say 'The meaning of S I HERE included "That Bill is courageous follows
(etc.)" '. It could also be true that when U uttered SI he meant (part of what
he meant was) that that Bill is eourageous follows (ete.). Now I do not wish to
allow that, in my favoured sense of'say', one who utters SI will have said [OR
EXPLICITLY CONVEYED ] that Bill's being courageous follows from his being a
philosopher, though he may weil have said that Bill is a philosopher and that
Bill is courageous. I would wish to maintain that the SEMANTIC FUNCTION of the
'therefore' is to enable a speaker to indicate, though not to say [or
explicitly convey], that a certain consequenee holds. Mutatis mutandis, I would
adopt the same position with regard to words like 'but' and 'moreover'. In the
case of ‘but’ – contrast.In the case of ‘moreover,’ or ‘furthermore,’ the
speaker is not explicitly conveying that he is adding; he is implicitly
conveying that he is adding, and using the emphatic, colloquial, rhetorical,
device. Much favoured by rhetoricians. To start a sentence with “Furthermore”
is very common. To start a sentence, or subsentence with, “I say that in
addition to the previous, the following also holds, viz.”My primary reason for
opting for this partieular sense of'say' is that I expect it to be of greater
theoretical utility than some OTHER sense of'say' [such as one held, say, by L.
J. Cohen at Oxford] would be. So I shall be committed to the view that applied
timeless meaning and occasion=meaning may coincide, that is to say, it may be
true both First, that when U uttered X the meaning of X inc1uded '*p' and Second, that part of what U meant when he uttered X
was that *p, and yet be false that U has said, among other things, that *p. “I
would like to use the expression 'conventionally meant that' in such a way that
the fulfilment of the two conditions just mentioned, while insufficient for the
truth of 'U said that *p' will be suffieient (and neeessary) for the truth of
'U conventionally meant that *p'.”The above is important because Grice is for
the first time allowing the adverb ‘conventionally’ to apply not as he does in
Essay I to ‘implicate’ but to ‘mean’ in general – which would INCLUDE what is
EXPLICITLY CONVEYED. This will not be as central as he thinks he is here,
because his exploration will be on the handwave which surely cannot be
specified in terms of that the emissor CONVENTIONALLY MEANS.(V) This
distinction between what is said [or explicity conveyed] and what is
conventionally meant [or communicated, or conveyed simpliciter] creates the
task of specifying the conditions in which what U conventionally means by an
utterance is also part of what U said [or explicitly conveyed].I have hopes of
being able to discharge this task by proceeding along the following lines.First,
To specify conditions which will be satisfied only by a limited range of
speech-acts, the members of which will thereby be stamped as specially central
or fundamental. “Adding, contrasting, and reasoning” will not. Second, To
stipulate that in uttering X [utterance type], U will have said [or explicitly
conveyed] that *p, if both First, U has 1stFLOOR-ed that *p, where 1stFloor-ing
is a CENTRAL speech-act [not adding, contrasting, or reasoning], and Second, X
[the utterance type] embodies some CONVENTIONAL device [such as the mode of the
copula] the meaning of which is such that its presence in X [the utterance
type] indicates that its utterer is FIRST-FLOOR -ing that *p. Third, To define,
for each member Y of the range of central speech-aets, 'U has Y -ed that *p' in
terms of occasion-meaning (meaning that ... ) or in terms of some important
elements) involved in the already provided definition of occasion-meaning. (VI)
The fulfilment of the task just outlined will need to be supplemented by an
account of this or that ELEMENT in the CONVENTIONAL MEANING of an utterance
(such as one featuring ‘therefore,’ ‘but,’ or ‘moreover’) which is NOT part of
what has been said [or explicitly conveyed].This account, at least for an
important sub-class of such elements, might take the following shape: First,
this or that problematic element is linked with this or that speech-act which
is exhibited as posterior to, and such that their performance is dependent
upon, some member or disjunction of members of the central, first-floor range;
e. g. the meaning of 'moreover' would be linked with the speech-act of adding,
the performance of which would require the performance of one or other of the
central speech-acts. – [and the meaning of ‘but’ with contrasting, and the
meaning of ‘therefore’ with reasoning, or inferring].Second, If
SECOND-FLOOR-ing is such a non-central speech-act [such as inferring/reasoning,
contrasting, or adding], the dependence of SECOND-FLOOR-ing that *p upon the
performance of some central FIRST-FLOOR speech-act [such as stating or
ordering] would have to be shown to be of a nature which justifies a RELUCTANCE
to treat SECOND-FLOOR-ing (e. g. inferring, contrasting, adding) that *p as a
case not merely of saying that *p, but also of saying that = p, or of saying
that = *p (where' = p', or ' = *p', is a representation of one or more
sentential forms specifically associated with SECOND-FLOOR-ing). Z Third, The
notion of SECOND-FLOOR-ing (inferring, contrasting, adding) that *p (where
Z-ing is non-central) would be explicated in terms of the nation of meaning
that (or in terms of some important elements) in the definition of that
notion). When Grice learned that that
brilliant Harvardite, D. K. Lewis, was writing a dissertation under Quine on
‘convention’ he almost fainted! When he noticed that Lewis was relying rightly
on Schelling and mainly restricting the ‘conventionality’ to the
‘arbitrariness,’ which Grice regarded as synonym with ‘freedom’ (Willkuere,
liber arbitrium), he recovered. For Lewis, a two-off predicament occurs when
you REPEAT. Grice is not interested. When you repeat, you may rely on some
‘arbitrariness.’ This is usually the EMISSOR’s auctoritas. As when Humptyy
Dumpty was brought to Davidson’s attention. “Impenetrability!” “I don’t know
what that means.” “Well put, Alice, if that is your name, as you said it was.
What I mean by ‘impenetrability’ is that we rather change the topic, plus it’s
tea time, and I feel like having some eggs.” Grice refers to this as the
‘idion.’ He reminisces when he was in the bath and designed a full new highway
code (“Nobody has yet used it – but the pleasure was in the semiotic design.”).
A second reminiscence pertains to his writing a full grammar of
“Deutero-Esperanto.” “I loved it – because I had all the power a master needs!
I decide what it’s proper!” In the field of the implicatura, Grice uses
‘convention’ casually, mainly to contrast it with HIS field, the
non-conventional. One should not attach importance to this. On occasion Grice
used Frege’s “Farbung,” just to confuse. The sad story is that Strawson was
never convinced by the non-conventional. Being a conventionalist at heart (vide
his “Intention and convention in speech acts,”) and revering Austin, Strawson
opposes Grice’s idea of the ‘non-conventional.’ Note that in Grice’s general
schema for the communicatum, the ‘conventional’ is just ONE MODE OF CORRELATION
between the signum and the signatum, or the communicatum and the intentum. The
‘conventional’ can be explained, unlike Lewis, in mere terms of the validatum.
Strawson and Wiggins “Cogito; ergo, sum”: What is explicitly conveyed is:
“cogito” and “sum”. The conjunction
“cogito” and “sum” is not made an ‘invalidatum’ if the implicated consequence
relation, emotionally expressed by an ‘alas’-like sort of ejaculation, ‘ergo,’
fails to hold. Strawson and Wiggins give other examples. For some reason, Latin
‘ergo’ becomes the more structured, “therefore,” which is a composite of
‘there’ and ‘fore.’ Then there’s the very Hun, “so,” (as in “so so”). Then
there’s the “Sie schoene aber poor,” discussed by Frege --“but,” – and Strawson
and Wiggins add a few more that had Grice elaborating on first-floor versus second-floor.
Descartes is on the first floor. He states “cogito” and he states “sum.” Then
he goes to the second floor, and the screams, “ergo,” or ‘dunc!’” The examples
Strawson and Wiggins give are: “although” (which looks like a subordinating
dyadic connector but not deemed essential by Gazdar’s 16 ones). Then they give
an expression Grice quite explored, “because,” or “for”as Grice prefers (‘since
it improves on Stevenson), the ejaculation “alas,” and in its ‘misusage,’
“hopefully.” This is an adverbial that Grice loved: “Probably, it will rains,”
“Desirably, there is icecream.” There is a confusing side to this too. “intentions are to
be recognized, in the normal case, by virtue of a knowledge of the conventional
use of the sentence (indeed my account of "non-conventional implicaturum"
depends on this idea).” So here we may disregard the ‘bandaged leg case’ and
the idea that there is implicaturum in art, etc. If we take the sobriquet
‘non-conventional’ seriously, one may be led to suggest that the ‘non-conventional’
DEPENDS on the conventional. One distinctive feature – the fifth – of the
conversational implicaturum is that it is partly generated as partly depending
on the ‘conventional’ “use.” So this is tricky. Grice’s anti-conventionalism --
conventionalism, the philosophical doctrine that logical truth and mathematical
truth are created by our choices, not dictated or imposed on us by the world.
The doctrine is a more specific version of the linguistic theory of logical and
mathematical truth, according to which the statements of logic and mathematics
are true because of the way people use language. Of course, any statement owes
its truth to some extent to facts about linguistic usage. For example, ‘Snow is
white’ is true in English because of the facts that 1 ‘snow’ denotes snow, 2
‘is white’ is true of white things, and 3 snow is white. What the linguistic
theory asserts is that statements of logic and mathematics owe their truth
entirely to the way people use language. Extralinguistic facts such as 3 are
not relevant to the truth of such statements. Which aspects of linguistic usage
produce logical truth and mathematical truth? The conventionalist answer is:
certain linguistic conventions. These conventions are said to include rules of
inference, axioms, and definitions. The idea that geometrical truth is truth we
create by adopting certain conventions received support by the discovery of
non-Euclidean geometries. Prior to this discovery, Euclidean geometry had been
seen as a paradigm of a priori knowledge. The further discovery that these
alternative systems are consistent made Euclidean geometry seem rejectable
without violating rationality. Whether we adopt the Euclidean system or a
non-Euclidean system seems to be a matter of our choice based on such pragmatic
considerations as simplicity and convenience. Moving to number theory,
conventionalism received a prima facie setback by the discovery that arithmetic
is incomplete if consistent. For let S be an undecidable sentence, i.e., a
sentence for which there is neither proof nor disproof. Suppose S is true. In
what conventions does its truth consist? Not axioms, rules of inference, and
definitions. For if its truth consisted in these items it would be provable.
Suppose S is not true. Then its negation must be true. In what conventions does
its truth consist? Again, no answer. It appears that if S is true or its
negation is true and if neither S nor its negation is provable, then not all
arithmetic truth is truth by convention. A response the conventionalist could
give is that neither S nor its negation is true if S is undecidable. That is,
the conventionalist could claim that arithmetic has truth-value gaps. As to
logic, all truths of classical logic are provable and, unlike the case of
number theory and geometry, axioms are dispensable. Rules of inference suffice.
As with geometry, there are alternatives to classical logic. The intuitionist,
e.g., does not accept the rule ‘From not-not-A infer A’. Even detachment ’From A, if A then B, infer B’ is rejected in some multivalued systems of
logic. These facts support the conventionalist doctrine that adopting any set
of rules of inference is a matter of our choice based on pragmatic
considerations. But the anti-conventionalist might respond consider a simple logical
truth such as ‘If Tom is tall, then Tom is tall’. Granted that this is provable
by rules of inference from the empty set of premises, why does it follow that
its truth is not imposed on us by extralinguistic facts about Tom? If Tom is
tall the sentence is true because its consequent is true. If Tom is not tall
the sentence is true because its antecedent is false. In either case the
sentence owes its truth to facts about Tom.
-- convention T, a criterion of material adequacy of proposed truth
definitions discovered, formally articulated, adopted, and so named by Tarski
in connection with his 9 definition of the concept of truth in a formalized
language. Convention T is one of the most important of several independent
proposals Tarski made concerning philosophically sound and logically precise
treatment of the concept of truth. Various of these proposals have been
criticized, but convention T has remained virtually unchallenged and is
regarded almost as an axiom of analytic philosophy. To say that a proposed
definition of an established concept is materially adequate is to say that it
is “neither too broad nor too narrow,” i.e., that the concept it characterizes
is coextensive with the established concept. Since, as Tarski emphasized, for
many formalized languages there are no criteria of truth, it would seem that
there can be no general criterion of material adequacy of truth definitions.
But Tarski brilliantly finessed this obstacle by discovering a specification
that is fulfilled by the established correspondence concept of truth and that
has the further property that any two concepts fulfilling it are necessarily
coextensive. Basically, convention T requires that to be materially adequate a
proposed truth definition must imply all of the infinitely many relevant
Tarskian biconditionals; e.g., the sentence ‘Some perfect number is odd’ is
true if and only if some perfect number is odd. Loosely speaking, a Tarskian
biconditional for English is a sentence obtained from the form ‘The sentence
——— is true if and only if ——’ by filling the right blank with a sentence and
filling the left blank with a name of the sentence. Tarski called these
biconditionals “equivalences of the form T” and referred to the form as a
“scheme.” Later writers also refer to the form as “schema T.”
stuff
and nonsense:
cf. Grice: “P. M. S. Hacker and the nonsense of sense.’ Grice: “One has to be
very careful. For Grice, “You’re the cream in my coffee” involves a category
mistake, it’s nonsense, and neither true nor false. For me, it involves
categorial falsity; therefore, it is analytically false, and therefore,
meaningful, in its poor own ways!” – “”You’re the cream in my coffee” compares
with a not that well known ditty by Freddie Ayer, and the Ambassadors,
“Saturday is in bed – but Garfield isn’t.”” – “ “Saturday is in bed” involves
categorial falsity but surely only Freddie would use it metaphorically – not
all categorial falsities pass the Richards test --. Grice: “ “It is not the
case that you’re the cream in my coffee” is a truism” – But cf. “You haven’t
been cleaning the Aegean stables – because you’ve just said you spent the
summer in Hull, and the stables are in Greece.” Cf. “Grice: “ ‘You’re the cream
in my coffee’ is literally, a piece of nonsense – it involves a categorial
falsity.” “Sentences involving categorial falsity nonsense are the specialty of
Ryle, our current Waynflete!” -- Sense-nonsense -- demarcation, the line
separating empirical science from mathematics and logic, from metaphysics, and
from pseudoscience. Science traditionally was supposed to rely on induction,
the formal disciplines including metaphysics on deduction. In the verifiability
criterion, the logical positivists identified the demarcation of empirical
science from metaphysics with the demarcation of the cognitively meaningful
from the meaningless, classifying metaphysics as gibberish, and logic and
mathematics, more charitably, as without sense. Noting that, because induction
is invalid, the theories of empirical science are unverifiable, Popper proposed
falsifiability as their distinguishing characteristic, and remarked that some
metaphysical doctrines, such as atomism, are obviously meaningful. It is now
recognized that science is suffused with metaphysical ideas, and Popper’s
criterion is therefore perhaps a rather rough criterion of demarcation of the
empirical from the nonempirical rather than of the scientific from the
non-scientific. It repudiates the unnecessary task of demarcating the
cognitively meaningful from the cognitively meaningless. There are cases in which a denial has to be interpreted as the denial of an
implicature. “She is not the cream in my. Grice: "There may be an occasion when the
denial of a metaphor -- any absurd
utterance when taken literally, e. g., 'You're the cream in my coffee' -- may
be interpreted *not* as, strictly, denying that you're *literally* the
cream in my coffee, but, in a jocular, transferred -- and strictly
illogical -- way, as the denying the implicaturum, or metaphorical
interpretant, viz.'It is not the case that that you're the salt in my
stew,". Grice was interested in how ‘absurdum’ became ‘nonsense’ -- absurdum,
adj. ab, mis-, and Sanscr. svan = “sonare;” cf. susurrus, and σῦριγξ, = a pipe;
cf. also absonus.” Lewis and Short render ‘absurdum’’ as ‘out of tune, hence
giving a disagreeable sound, harsh, rough.’ I. Lit.: “vox absona et absurda,”
Cic. de Or. 3, 11, 41; so of the croaking of frogs: absurdoque sono fontes et
stagna cietis, Poët. ap. Cic. Div. 1, 9, 15.— II. Fig., -- Short and Lewis this
‘absurd’ transferred usage: ‘absurd,’ which is not helpful -- “of persons and
things, irrational, incongruous, absurd, silly, senseless, stupid.” They give a
few quotes: “ratio inepta atque absurda,” – The reason is inept and absurd”
Ter. Ad. 3, 3, 22: “hoc pravum, ineptum, absurdum atque alienum a vitā meā
videtur,” id. ib. 5, 8, 21: “carmen cum ceteris rebus absurdum tum vero in
illo,” Cic. Mur. 26: “illud quam incredibile, quam absurdum!” “How incredible!
How absurd!” -- id. Sull. 20: “absurda res est caveri,” id. Balb. 37: bene
dicere haud absurdum est, is not inglorious, per litotem for, is praiseworthy,
glorious, Sall. C. 3 Kritz.—Homo absurdus, a man who is fit or good for
nothing: “sin plane abhorrebit et erit absurdus,” Cic. de Or. 2, 20, 85:
“absurdus ingenio,” Tac. H. 3, 62; cf.: “sermo comis, nec absurdum ingenium,”
id. A. 13, 45.—Comp., Cic. Phil. 8, 41; id. N. D. 1, 16; id. Fin. 2, 13.—Sup.,
Cic. Att. 7, 13.—Adv.: absurdē . 1. Lit., discordantly: “canere,” Cic. Tusc. 2,
4, 12.— 2. Fig., irrationally, absurdly, Plaut. Ep. 3, 1, 6; Cic. Rep. 2, 15;
id. Div. 2, 58, 219 al.—Comp., Cic. Phil. 8, 1, 4.—Sup., Aug. Trin. 4 fin. Cf.
Tertullian, “Credo quia absurdum est.” – an answer to “Quam incredible, quam
absurdum!” -- Refs.:
H. P. Grice, “Ryle and categorial nonsense;” “The absurdity of ‘You’re the
cream in my coffee.’”
Norcia Agostino da Norcia Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Questa voce è orfana
Questa voce sull'argomento religiosi è orfana, ovvero priva di collegamenti in
entrata da altre voci. Inseriscine almeno uno pertinente e non generico e
rimuovi l'avviso. Segui i suggerimenti del progetto di riferimento. Agostino da
Norcia (XIV secolo – XV secolo) è stato un religioso, mistico e filosofo
italiano, originario dell'Umbria. Scrisse, a quanto risulta da fonti indirette,
un libello intitolato De Amore – Fundamenta Mundis ac Ethicae.. Di lui non si sa molto e il poco che si sa è
incerto; della sua esistenza infatti si è appreso attraverso i riferimenti nei
testi di alcuni autori, i più famosi dei quali sono Bruno[1] e Mersenne, che lo
nominano e citano. Alcuni filologi sostengono, peraltro, che il nome “Agostino”
sarebbe in realtà uno pseudonimo, dietro il quale potrebbe nascondersi un
autore, probabilmente ben più famoso e conosciuto, che si servì di tale nome
d'arte per evitare censure e guai con la Chiesa. Secondo alcune ricostruzioni visse in Italia,
prevalentemente fra la Toscana e l'Umbria. Stando a quanto racconta Mersenne in
una lettera al fratello morì nel Lazio.
L'opera Il nucleo centrale del suo pensiero consiste nell'unione
dell'idea di Dio come Amore con uno spunto, totalmente riadattato, di derivazione
neoplatonica, secondo cui la realtà è emanazione, a partire da livelli di
purezza e deità più elevati. Agostino, facendo dell'Amore la caratteristica
principale di Dio, arrivava a dire che la realtà coincide con l'Amore, in forme
più o meno degradate. Da questo concetto fa derivare una forte istanza di
svelamento: nonostante l'apparente neutralità emotiva del reale, il vero
fondamento divino, e quindi dell'universo, è l'amore. La verità si consegue
quindi applicando questo principio all'apparenza fenomenica degli oggetti, in
modo da svelarne il vero essere, cioè il principio di Amore. Il suo passo più
celebre, tuttavia, riguarda l'etimologia della parola “desiderium”, che
Agostino collega all'espressione “de sidera”: come le stelle, infatti, sono
qualcosa che percepiamo con i sensi, ma senza potere esperire direttamente
l'Amore che da loro scaturisce, così il desiderio è in realtà mera apparenza
sotto la quale si cela un bisogno. Il desiderio, questo tendere all'apparenza,
scompare completamente solo una volta compreso fino in fondo il fondamento
dell'essere, nella mystica copulatio raggiungibile attraverso la preghiera e la
meditazione. Il suo pensiero, quindi, sembra unire una forte istanza metafisica
a un'altrettanto forte istanza etica, cercando nella realtà una fondamentale
armonicità di senso che è compito di ogni uomo, scopertala, riprodurre e
preservare. Note ^ De l'infinito,
universo e mondi, Londra 1584 Praxis descensus seu applicatio entis (1591), Marburg
1609 Bibliografia Cantimori,Delio, Prospettive di storia ereticale italiana del
Cinquecento, G. Laterza, 1960. ISBN 8806162950 Bolgiani, Franco, Ortodossia ed
eresia: il problema storiografico nella storia del cristianesimo e la
situazione ortodossia-eresia agli inizi della storia cristiana,CELID, 1987 ISBN
9788876611384 V · D · M Francescanesimo Biografie Portale Biografie
Cattolicesimo Portale Cattolicesimo Categorie: Religiosi italianiMistici
italianiFilosofi italiani del XIV secoloFilosofi italiani del XV secoloNati nel
XIV secoloMorti nel XV secoloFrancescani italiani[altre]
Noto Antonio Di Noto Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Questa voce è orfana
Questa voce sull'argomento filosofi è orfana, ovvero priva di collegamenti in
entrata da altre voci. Inseriscine almeno uno pertinente e non generico e
rimuovi l'avviso. Segui i suggerimenti del progetto di riferimento. Dubbio di
enciclopedicità La rilevanza enciclopedica di questa voce o sezione
sull'argomento filosofia è stata messa in dubbio. Motivo: Non è chiara la
rilevanza enciclopedica del soggetto. L'unica opera pubblicata sembra essere
L’evidenza di Dio nella filosofia del sec.XIII. Fonti assenti Puoi aiutare
aggiungendo informazioni verificabili e non evasive sulla rilevanza, citando
fonti attendibili di terze parti e partecipando alla discussione. Se ritieni la
voce non enciclopedica, puoi proporne la cancellazione. Segui i suggerimenti
del progetto di riferimento. Per interpellare gli autori della voce o il
progetto usa: {{AiutoE|Antonio Di Noto|filosofia}}--~~~~ Antonio Di Noto
(Pollina, 7 aprile 1924 – Figline Valdarno, 12 novembre 1977) è stato un
filosofo italiano. Indice 1 Biografia 1.1 Morte
2 Voci
correlate 3 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Fece gli studi ginnasiali al Convento di Giaccherino
(1936-1939) e al Convento del Bosco ai Frati (1939-1941). Vestì il saio
francescano a Fucecchio il 5 agosto 1941 e professò il 6 agosto 1942. Fece i
tre anni di filosofia (= Liceo classico) (1942-1945) rispettivamente a Lucca,
Bosco ai Frati e al Convento di San Vivaldo; il quadriennio teologico a
Fiesole, Siena e alcuni mesi di teologia pastorale al Convento di Sargiano.
Emise i voti solenni a Fiesole l’8 dicembre 1946 e fu ordinato sacerdote a
Siena il 29 giugno 1949. Il 10 gennaio 1950 andò a Parigi per gli studi
superiori e frequentò l’Istituto Cattolico, la Sorbona e il Collège de France.
Nel Giugno del 1954 conseguì il Dottorato in filosofia e il Diploma di studi
superiori alla Sorbona, insieme al diploma in lingua francese. Essendo andato a
Londra per alcuni mesi ebbe il Diploma di lingua inglese che in seguito
perfezionò tornando ogni anno a Londra nel periodo estivo. Nel 1958 pubblicò la
tesi di laurea “L’evidenza di Dio nella filosofia del sec.XIII" (Ed.
CEDAM, Padova)e nel 1963 "La théologie naturelle de Pierre de Trabibus
O.F.M. Choix de Questions du Ier Livre des Sentences (MS 154 de la Bibliothèque
Communale d'Assise)". Il 17 ottobre 1954 si imbarcò per l’Egitto e si
stabilì al Seminario di Ghiza dove insegnò filosofia, pedagogia e psicologia
pastorale. Lì ricoprì gli incarichi di Guardiano e Maestro dei Chierici. Dopo
aver lavorato con tanta dedizione per la Vicarìa Egiziana nel settembre del
1968 tornò in Italia e fu per un anno Direttore di un grande hotel di
Montecatini Terme. Nel 1969 si trasferì a Figline Valdarno per l’insegnamento
delle lingue moderne nell’Istituto “Marsilio Ficino”. Nel 1970 si iscrisse alla
Università Cattolica dove conseguì il Dottorato in Filosofia valido in Italia.
Aveva iniziato l’insegnamento della lingua inglese alla scuola per infermieri
dell’ospedale di Figline e un corso serale per adulti. Stava creando un
laboratorio linguistico per facilitare e perfezionare l’apprendimento delle
lingue. Morte Deceduto nell’Ospedale di
Figline Valdarno il 12 Novembre 1977 alle ore 02,25 per edema polmonare acuto
da miocardite in diabetico. Affetto da grave forma di diabete, si era sentito
male nella notte dell’11 novembre, ma dopo aver prolungato il riposo mattutino
aveva tenuto lezione fino a mezzogiorno. Prese allora poco cibo e tornò a
riposarsi. Alle 18 andò alla preghiera comune e alle 18.30 tenne il corso di
lingua inglese per adulti. Alle 20 mentre era a tavola fu chiamato il medico
cardiologo che ordinò il ricovero urgente in ospedale. Qui alle 2.25 la sua
vita è stata stroncata da un complesso attacco cardiaco polmonare. Ai funerali, presieduti dal Padre Provinciale
nella Chiesa di San Francesco in Figline erano presenti tanti religiosi e
sacerdoti, i parenti, molte suore oltre che un grande pubblico di studenti e popolo
che riempiva la Chiesa. È stato sepolto nel cimitero di Montemurlo. Voci correlate Convento di Giaccherino
Convento del Bosco ai Frati Convento di San Vivaldo Convento di Sargiano
Montemurlo Collegamenti esterni L'evidenza di Dio nella filosofia del secolo
XIII La théologie naturelle de Pierre de Trabibus O.F.M. Choix de Questions du
Ier Livre des Sentences Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia
Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX secoloNati nel 1924Morti nel 1977Nati il 7
aprileMorti il 12 novembreNati a PollinaMorti a Figline Valdarno[altre]
notum – the ‘gnotus’ -- divided line, one
of three analogies with the sun and cave offered in Plato’s Republic VI, 509d
511e as a partial explanation of the Good. Socrates divides a line into two
unequal segments: the longer represents the intelligible world and the shorter
the sensible world. Then each of the segments is divided in the same
proportion. Socrates associates four mental states with the four resulting
segments beginning with the shortest: eikasia, illusion or the apprehension of
images; pistis, belief in ordinary physical objects; dianoia, the sort of
hypothetical reasondispositional belief divided line 239 239 ing engaged in by mathematicians; and
noesis, rational ascent to the first principle of the Good by means of
dialectic. Grice read Austin’s essay on this with interest. Refs.: J. L.
Austin, “Plato’s Cave,” in Philosophical Papers.
noûs: Grice uses ‘nous’
and ‘noetic’ when he is feeling very Grecian. Grecian term for mind or the
faculty of reason. Noûs is the highest type of thinking, the kind a god would
do. Sometimes called the faculty of intellectual intuition, it is at work when
someone understands definitions, concepts, and anything else that is grasped
all at once. Noûs stands in contrast with another intellectual faculty,
dianoia. When we work through the steps of an argument, we exercise dianoia; to
be certain the conclusion is true without argument to just “see” it, as, perhaps, a god
might is to exercise noûs. Just which
objects could be apprehended by noûs was controversial.
Novaro Mario Novaro Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Mario Novaro Mario Novaro (Diano Marina, 25
settembre 1868 – Ponti di Nava, 9 agosto 1944) è stato un poeta, filosofo e
imprenditore italiano. Indice 1 Biografia 2 Opere
3 Bibliografia
4 Voci
correlate 5 Altri
progetti 6 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Fratello dello scrittore Angiolo Silvio Novaro, nacque da
famiglia economicamente agiata e dopo aver condotto brillantemente gli studi
liceali si iscrisse all'Università di Berlino dove nel 1893 si laureò in
Filosofia ottenendo l'anno seguente la laurea anche all'Università degli Studi
di Torino. Si stabilì a Oneglia dove fu assessore comunale per il neonato
partito socialista. Dopo avere per breve tempo insegnato nel locale liceo, con
i fratelli si occupò dell'industria olearia intestata alla madre Paolina
Sasso. Pur dedito all'attività
imprenditoriale fece parte attiva della vita letteraria dei primo anni del
Novecento e fondò nel 1899 la rivista La Riviera Ligure, da lui diretta fino al
1919, anno della sua cessazione. Ospitò nel suo giornale i poeti e gli
scrittori emergenti della poesia italiana del secolo, come Pascoli,
Roccatagliata, Jahier, Boine e Sbarbaro.
Scrisse in età giovanile alcuni saggi di carattere filosofico e raccolse
tutte le sue poesie, che hanno come tema principale l'aspro paesaggio ligure,
in un volume intitolato Murmuri ed echi che vide le stampe nel 1912. Fu anche
il curatore dell'edizione delle opere di Boine che sentiva affine negli
interessi soprattutto di carattere etico.
Opere Die philosophie des Nicolaus Malebranche, Berlin, Mayer &
Müller, 1893. Il concetto di infinito e il problema cosmologico, Roma, Balbi,
1895. Pensieri metafisici di Malebranche, Lanciano, Carraba, 1911. Murmuri ed
echi, Napoli, Ricciardi, 1912. Ristampato più volte, edizioni recenti: edizione
definitiva a cura di Giuseppe Cassinelli, premessa di Pino Boero e Maria
Novaro, Milano, All'insegna del pesce d'oro, 1994. ISBN 88-444-1267-5. edizione
critica a cura di Veronica Pesce, prefazione di Giorgio Ficara, Genova,
Fondazione Giorgio e Lilli Devoto, 2011. Bibliografia «NOVARO, Mario» in
Enciclopedia Italiana - III Appendice, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 1961. Eleonora Cardinale, «NOVARO, Mario» in Dizionario Biografico
degli Italiani, Volume 78, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2013.
Voci correlate La Riviera Ligure Nicolas Malebranche Altri progetti Collabora a
Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Mario Novaro Collegamenti
esterni Tra Diano Marina e Oneglia: i luoghi dei fratelli Novaro, su
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secoloImprenditori italiani del XX secoloNati nel 1868Morti nel 1944Nati il 25
settembreMorti il 9 agostoNati a Diano MarinaMorti a OrmeaStudenti
dell'Università Humboldt di BerlinoStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di
Torino[altre]
nowell-smithianism. “The Nowell is redundant,” Grice would say. P. H.
Nowell-Smith adopted the “Nowell” after his father’s first name. In “Ethics,”
he elaborates on what he calls ‘contextual implication.’ The essay was widely
read, and has a freshness that other ‘meta-ethicist’ at Oxford seldom display.
His ‘contextual implication’ compares of course to Grice’s ‘conversational implicaturum.’
Indeed, by using ‘conversational implicaturum,’ Grice is following an Oxonian
tradition started with C. K. Grant and his ‘pragmatic implication,’ and P. H.
Nowell-Smith and his ‘contextual implication.’ At Oxford, they were obsessed
with these types of ‘implicatura,’ because it was the type of thing that a less
subtle philosopher would ignore. Grice’s cancellability priority for his type
of implicatura hardly applies to Nowell-Smith. Nowell-Smith never displays the
‘rationalist’ bent that Grice wants to endow to his principle of conversational
co-operation. Nowell-Smith, rather, calls his ‘principles’ “rules of
conversational etiquette.” If you revise the literature, you will see that
things like “avoid ambiguity,” “don’t play unnecessary with words,” are listed
indeed in what is called a ‘conversational manual,’ of ‘conversational
etiquette,’ that is. In his rationalist bent, Grice narrows down the use of
‘conversational’ to apply to ‘conversational maxim,’ which is only a
UNIVERSALISABLE one, towards the overarching goal of rational co-operation. In
this regard, many of the rules of ‘conversational etiquette’ (Grice even
mentions ‘moral rules,’ and a rule like ‘be polite’) to fall outside the
principle of conversational helpfulness, and thus, not exactly generating a
‘conversational implicaturum.’ While Grice gives room to allow such
non-conversational non-conventional implicatura to be ‘calculable,’ that is,
‘rationalizable, by ‘argument,’ he never showed any interest in giving one
example – for the simple reason that none of those ‘maxims’ generated the type
of ‘mistake’ on the part of this or that philosopher, as he was interested in
rectifying. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The life and times of P. H. Nowell-Smith,
which becomes prejudices and predilections,” Luigi Speranza, “Nowell and Smith”
--, BANC MSS 90/135c.
Numenius: Grecian Platonist philosopher of
neoPythagorean tendencies. Very little is known of his life, but his
philosophical importance is considerable. His system of three levels of
spiritual reality a primal god the Good,
the Father, who is almost supra-intellectual; a secondary, creator god the
demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus; and a world soul
largely anticipates that of Plotinus in the next century, though he was
more strongly dualist than Plotinus in his attitude to the physical world and
matter. He was much interested in religion. His most important work, fragments
of which are preserved by Eusebius, is a dialogue On the Good, but he also
wrote a polemic work On the Divergence of the Academics from Plato, which shows
him to be a lively controversialist.
o:
one of the four types of prepositions -- affirmo-nego distinction, the: O:
particularis abdicativa. See Grice, “Circling the Square of Opposition.”
oakeshott, M.: H. P. Grice, “Oakeshott’s
conversational implicaturum,” English philosopher and political theorist
trained at Cambridge and in G.y. He taught first at Cambridge and Oxford; from
1 he was professor of political science at the London School of Economics and
Political Science. His works include Experience and Its Modes 3, Rationalism in
Politics 2, On Human Conduct 5, and On History 3. Oakeshott’s misleading
general reputation, based on Rationalism in Politics, is as a conservative
political thinker. Experience and Its Modes is a systematic work in the
tradition of Hegel. Human experience is exclusively of a world of ideas
intelligible insofar as it is coherent. This world divides into modes
historical, scientific, practical, and poetic experience, each being partly
coherent and categorially distinct from all others. Philosophy is the never
entirely successful attempt to articulate the coherence of the world of ideas
and the place of modally specific experience within that whole. His later works
examine the postulates of historical and practical experience, particularly
those of religion, morality, and politics. All conduct in the practical mode
postulates freedom and is an “exhibition of intelligence” by agents who
appropriate inherited languages and ideas to the generic activity of
self-enactment. Some conduct pursues specific purposes and occurs in
“enterprise associations” identified by goals shared among those who
participate in them. The most estimable forms of conduct, exemplified by
“conversation,” have no such purpose and occur in “civil societies” under the purely
“adverbial” considerations of morality and law. “Rationalists” illicitly use
philosophy to dictate to practical experience and subordinate human conduct to
some master purpose. Oakeshott’s distinctive achievement is to have melded
holistic idealism with a morality and politics radical in their affirmation of
individuality. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The Oxbridge conversation,” H. P. Grice,
“The ancient stone walls of Oxford.”
objectivum
– Grice: “Kant thought he was being witty when he speaks of the Copernican
revolution – While I prefer ‘subjectification’ for what he meant, Strawson
likes ‘category shift.’ At Oxford, we never took good care of Number One!” -- Grice reads Meinong on objectivity and finds
it funny! Meinong distinguishes four classes of objects: ‘Objekt,’ simpliciter,
which can be real (like horses) or ideal (like the concepts of difference,
identity, etc.) and “Objectiv,” e.g. the affirmation of the being (Sein) or
non-being (Nichtsein), of a being-such (Sosein), or a being-with (Mitsein) -
parallel to existential, categorical and hypothetical judgements. An “Objectiv”
is close to what contemporary philosophers call states of affairs (where these
may be actual—may obtain—or not). The third class is the dignitative, e.g. the
true, the good, the beautiful. Finally, there is the desiderative, e.g. duties,
ends, etc. To these four classes of objects correspond four classes of
psychological acts: (re)presentation
(das Vorstellen), for objects thought (das Denken), for the objectives feeling
(das Fühlen), for dignitatives desire (das Begehren), for the desideratives.
Grice starts with subjectivity. Objectivity can be constructed as
non-relativised subjectivity. Grice discusses of Inventing right and wrong
by Mackie. In the proceedings, Grice quotes the artless sexism of Austin
in talking about the trouser words in Sense and Sensibilia. Grice tackles all
the distinctions Mackie had played with: objective/Subjectsive,
absolute/relative, categorical/hypothetical or suppositional. Grice quotes directly
from Hare: Think of one world into whose fabric values are objectively built;
and think of another in which those values have been annihilated. And remember
that in both worlds the people in them go on being concerned about the same
things—there is no difference in the Subjectsive value. Now I ask, what is the
difference between the states of affairs in these two worlds? Can any answer be
given except, none whatever? Grice uses the Latinate objective (from objectum).
Cf. Hare on what he thinks the oxymoronic sub-jective value. Grice considered
more seriously than Barnes did the systematics behind Nicolai Hartmanns
stratification of values. Refs.: the most explicit allusion is a specific essay
on “objectivity” in The H. P. Grice Papers. Most of the topic is covered in “Conception,”
Essay 1. BANC. objectivum. Here the
contrast is what what is subjective, or subjectivum. Notably value. For
Hartmann and Grice, a value is rational, objective and absolute, and
categorical (not relative). objectum.
For Grice the subjectum is prior. While ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ are basic
Aristotelian categories, the idea of the direct object or indirect object seems
to have little philosophical relevance. (but cf. “What is the meaning of ‘of’?
Genitivus subjectivus versus enitivus objectivus. The usage that is more
widespread is a misnomer for ‘thing’. When an empiricist like Grice speaks of
an ‘obble’ or an ‘object,’ he means a thing. That is because, since Hume
there’s no such thing as a ‘subject’ qua self. And if there is no subject,
there is no object. No Copernican revolution for empiricists. the obiectum-quo/obiectum quod distinction: obiectum
quo:
Griceian for “the object by which an object is known.” Grice: “A sort of
meta-object, if you press me.” -- It should be understood in contrast with “obiectum
quod,” -- the object that is known. E. g. when Grice’s son knows WHAT ‘a shaggy
thing’ is, the shaggy thing is the obiectum quod and Grice’s son’s concept of
the shaggy thing is the obiectum quo. The concept (‘shaggy’) is thus instrumental
to knowing a shaggy thing, but the concept ‘shaggy’ is not itself what is
known. A human needs a concept in order to have knowledge, because a human’s
knowledge is receptive, in contrast with God’s which is productive. God creates
what he knows. Human knowledge is mediated; divine knowledge is immediate. J.
C. Wilson famously believed that the distinction between obiectum quod and
obiectum quo exposes the crucial mistake of Bradley’s neo-Hegelian idealism –
“that is destroying the little that’s left of philosophy at Oxford.” According
to an idealist such as Bradley, the object of knowledge, i.e., what Bradley
knows, is an idea. In contrast, the Scholastics maintain that an idealist such
as Bradley conflate the object of knowledge with the *means* (the obiectum quo)
by which human knowledge is made possible. Humans must be connected to the
object of knowledge by something obiectum quo, but what connects them is not
that to which they are connected – “autem natura est terminus ut quo, 3°
Obiectum ut qu9 l esi illud ipsum, ad quod potentia, vel scientia
spectat.Obiectiim ;t quo est propria raiio , propter qnam potentia, vel
scientia circa aliquid versatur. Vel obiectum quod cst illud , quod in scientia
demonstratur.0biectum quo consistit in mediis, quibus probantur conclusiones in
eadem scientia *, 4* l't quod significat subiecium , cui proprie convenit
aliquod attributurn , vel quaedam denominatio: ut quo indicat rationem ,
propter quam subiectum cst, vel denominatur tale ; e. g., hic terminus albus ,
si accipiatur sit quod, significal parietem, vel aliud, quod dicitur album; sin
autem ut quo denotat ipsam albitudinem. Hoc sensu terminus acceptus ut, quod
dicitur etiam usurpari in recto , ut quo, in obliquo *. 5° Denique: Species,
per quam fit cognitio alicuius rei, est obiectum, quo illa cognoscitur; res
antem a specie repraesentata est obiectum quod : « Species visibilis, ait s.
Thomas, non se habet, ut quod videtur, sed ut quo videtur *». Et alibi : «
Species intelligibiles, quibus intellectus possibilis fit in actu, non sunt
obiectum intelleclus, non enim se habent ad intellectum, sicut quod
intelligitur, sed sicut quo intelligit * ». Sane, species non est terminus, in
quem cognitio fertur , sed dumlaxat principium, ex quo facultas cognitrix
determinatur ad I .*, q. n,l;un r m ab ipsa specie repraesentatam, Quarc , etsi
auima cognoseat res pcr species, tamen illas in seipsis cognoscit : «
('ognoscere res per earum similitudines im cognoscente existentes, est
cognoscere eas in seipsis * ». Et B. Albcrtus M. • Sensus [*r hoc, quod species
est sensibilium, sensibilia imin-diato arripit.” Refs.: H. P. Grice: The
obiectum-quo/obiectum quod distinction: and what to do with it. objective
rightness. In meta-ethics, an action is objectively right for a person to
perform on some occasion if the agent’s performing it on that occasion really
is right, whether or not the agent, or anyone else, believes it is. An action
is subjectively right for a person to perform on some occasion if the agent
believes, or perhaps justifiably believes, of that action that it is
objectively right. For example, according to a version of utilitarianism, an
action is objectively right provided the action is optimific in the sense that
the consequences that would result from its per624 O 624 formance are at least as good as those
that would result from any alternative action the agent could instead perform.
Were this theory correct, then an action would be an objectively right action
for an agent to perform on some occasion if and only if that action is in fact
optimific. An action can be both objectively and subjectively right or neither.
But an action can also be subjectively right, but fail to be objectively right,
as where the action fails to be optimific again assuming that a utilitarian
theory is correct, yet the agent believes the action is objectively right. And
an action can be objectively right but not subjectively right, where, despite
the objective rightness of the action, the agent has no beliefs about its
rightness or believes falsely that it is not objectively right. This
distinction is important in our moral assessments of agents and their actions.
In cases where we judge a person’s action to be objectively wrong, we often
mitigate our judgment of the agent when we judge that the action was, for the
agent, subjectively right. This same objectivesubjective distinction applies to
other ethical categories such as wrongness and obligatoriness, and some
philosophers extend it to items other than actions, e.g., emotions.
obligatum – Grice: “This has
a deep connection with the Latin idea of ius, cf. iunctum – and lex from ligare
– “Perhaps Hare prefers ‘ought’ because it eye-rymes with ‘obligation.’” Deontology
-- duty, what a person is obligated or required to do. Duties can be moral,
legal, parental, occupational, etc., depending on their foundations or grounds.
Because a duty can have several different grounds, it can be, say, both moral
and legal, though it need not be of more than one type. Natural duties are
moral duties people have simply in virtue of being persons, i.e., simply in
virtue of their nature. There is a prima facie duty to do something if and only
if there is an appropriate basis for doing that thing. For instance, a prima
facie moral duty will be one for which there is a moral basis, i.e., some moral
grounds. This conDutch book duty 248
248 trasts with an all-things-considered duty, which is a duty one has
if the appropriate grounds that support it outweigh any that count against it.
Negative duties are duties not to do certain things, such as to kill or harm,
while positive duties are duties to act in certain ways, such as to relieve
suffering or bring aid. While the question of precisely how to draw the
distinction between negative and positive duties is disputed, it is generally
thought that the violation of a negative duty involves an agent’s causing some
state of affairs that is the basis of the action’s wrongness e.g., harm, death,
or the breaking of a trust, whereas the violation of a positive duty involves
an agent’s allowing those states of affairs to occur or be brought about.
Imperfect duties are, in Kant’s words, “duties which allow leeway in the
interest of inclination,” i.e., that permit one to choose among several
possible ways of fulfilling them. Perfect duties do not allow that leeway.
Thus, the duty to help those in need is an imperfect duty since it can be
fulfilled by helping the sick, the starving, the oppressed, etc., and if one
chooses to help, say, the sick, one can choose which of the sick to help.
However, the duty to keep one’s promises and the duty not to harm others are
perfect duties since they do not allow one to choose which promises to keep or
which people not to harm. Most positive duties are imperfect; most negative
ones, perfect. obligationes, the study of inferentially inescapable, yet
logically odd arguments, used by late medieval logicians in analyzing
inferential reasoning. In Topics VIII.3 Aristotle describes a respondent’s task
in a philosophical argument as providing answers so that, if they must defend
the impossible, the impossibility lies in the nature of the position, and not
in its logical defense. In Prior Analytics I.13 Aristotle argues that nothing
impossible follows from the possible. Burley, whose logic exemplifies early
fourteenth-century obligationes literature, described the resulting logical
exercise as a contest between interlocutor and respondent. The interlocutor
must force the respondent into maintaining contradictory statements in
defending a position, and the respondent must avoid this while avoiding
maintaining the impossible, which can be either a position logically
incompatible with the position defended or something impossible in itself.
Especially interesting to Scholastic logicians were the paradoxes of
disputation inherent in such disputes. Assuming that a respondent has
successfully defended his position, the interlocutor may be able to propose a
commonplace position that the respondent can neither accept nor reject, given
the truth of the first, successfully defended position. Roger Swineshead
introduced a controversial innovation to obligationes reasoning, later rejected
by Paul of Venice. In the traditional style of obligation, a premise was
relevant to the argument only if it followed from or was inconsistent with
either a the proposition defended or b all the premises consequent to the
former and prior to the premise in question. By admitting any premise that was
either consequent to or inconsistent with the proposition defended alone,
without regard to intermediate premises, Swineshead eliminated concern with the
order of sentences proposed by the interlocutor, making the respondent’s task
harder.
recte-obliquum
distinction, the:
casus obliquum -- oblique context. As explained by Frege in “Über Sinn und
Bedeutung” 2, a linguistic context is oblique ungerade if and only if an
expression e.g., proper name, dependent clause, or sentence in that context
does not express its direct customary sense. For Frege, the sense of an
expression is the mode of presentation of its nominatum, if any. Thus in direct
speech, the direct customary sense of an expression designates its direct
customary nominatum. For example, the context of the proper name ‘Kepler’ in 1
Kepler died in misery. is non-oblique i.e., direct since the proper name
expresses its direct customary sense, say, the sense of ‘the man who discovered
the elliptical planetary orbits’, thereby designating its direct customary
nominatum, Kepler himself. Moreover, the entire sentence expresses its direct
sense, namely, the proposition that Kepler died in misery, thereby designating
its direct nominatum, a truth-value, namely, the true. By contrast, in indirect
speech an expression neither expresses its direct sense nor, therefore,
designates its direct nominatum. One such sort of oblique context is direct
quotation, as in 2 ‘Kepler’ has six letters. The word appearing within the
quotation marks neither expresses its direct customary sense nor, therefore,
designates its direct customary nominatum, Kepler. Rather, it designates a
word, a proper name. Another sort of oblique context is engendered by the verbs
of propositional attitude. Thus, the context of the proper name ‘Kepler’ in 3
Frege believed Kepler died in misery. is oblique, since the proper name expresses
its indirect sense, say, the sense of the words ‘the man widely known as
Kepler’, thereby designating its indirect nominatum, namely, the sense of ‘the
man who discovered the elliptical planetary orbits’. Note that the indirect
nominatum of ‘Kepler’ in 3 is the same as the direct sense of ‘Kepler’ in 1.
Thus, while ‘Kepler’ in 1 designates the man Kepler, ‘Kepler’ in 3 designates
the direct customary sense of the word ‘Kepler’ in 1. Similarly, in 3 the
context of the dependent clause ‘Kepler died in misery’ is oblique since the
dependent clause expresses its indirect sense, namely, the sense of the words
‘the proposition that Kepler died in misery’, thereby designating its indirect
nominatum, namely, the proposition that Kepler died in misery. Note that the
indirect nominatum of ‘Kepler died in misery’ in 3 is the same as the direct
sense of ‘Kepler died in misery’ in 1. Thus, while ‘Kepler died in misery’ in 1
designates a truthvalue, ‘Kepler died in misery’ in 3 designates a proposition,
the direct customary sense of the words ‘Kepler died in misery’ in 1.
obversum: a sort of immediate inference
that allows a transformation of affirmative categorical A-propositions and
I-propositions into the corresponding negative E-propositions and O-propositions,
and of E- and O-propositions into the corresponding A- and I-propositions,
keeping in each case the order of the subject and predicate terms, but changing
the original predicate into its complement, i.e., into a negated term. E. g. ‘Every
man is mortal’ ’No man is non-mortal’;
‘Some students are happy’ ‘Some students
are not non-happy’; ‘No dogs are jealous’
‘All dogs are non-jealous’; and ‘Some bankers are not rich’ ‘Some bankers are not non-rich’. .
occasion:
“I will use ‘occasion,’ occasionally.” The etymology of ‘occasion’ is
fabuluous. It has to do with ‘casus,’ ptosis, fall. Grice struggled with the
lingo and he not necessarily arrived at the right choice. Occasion he uses in
the strange phrase “occasion-meaning” (sic). Surely not ‘occasional meaning.’
What is an occasion? Surely it’s a context. But Grice would rather be seen dead
than using a linguistic turn of phrase like Firth’s context-of-utterance! So
there you have the occasion-meaning. Basically, it’s the PARTICULARISED
implicaturum. On occasion o, E communicates that p. Grice allows that there is
occasion-token and occasion-type. occasionalism: a
theory of causation held by a number of important seventeenth-century Cartesian
philosophers, including Johannes Clauberg, Géraud de Cordemoy, Arnold Geulincx,
Louis de la Forge, and Nicolas Malebranche. In its most extreme version,
occasionalism is the doctrine that all finite created entities are devoid of
causal efficacy, and that God is the only true causal agent. Bodies do not
cause effects in other bodies nor in minds; and minds do not cause effects in
bodies nor even within themselves. God is directly, immediately, and solely
responsible for bringing about all phenomena. When a needle pricks the skin,
the physical event is merely an occasion for God to cause the relevant mental
state pain; a volition in the soul to raise an arm or to think of something is
only an occasion for God to cause the arm to rise or the ideas to be present to
the mind; and the impact of one billiard ball upon another is an occasion for
God to move the second ball. In all three contexts mindbody, bodybody, and mind alone God’s ubiquitous causal activity proceeds in
accordance with certain general laws, and except for miracles he acts only when
the requisite material or psychic conditions obtain. Less thoroughgoing forms
of occasionalism limit divine causation e.g., to mindbody or bodybody alone.
Far from being an ad hoc solution to a Cartesian mindbody problem, as it is
often considered, occasionalism is argued for from general philosophical
considerations regarding the nature of causal relations considerations that
later appear, modified, in Hume, from an analysis of the Cartesian concept of
matoblique intention occasionalism 626
626 ter and of the necessary impotence of finite substance, and, perhaps
most importantly, from theological premises about the essential ontological
relation between an omnipotent God and the created world that he sustains in
existence. Occasionalism can also be regarded as a way of providing a
metaphysical foundation for explanations in mechanistic natural philosophy.
Occasionalists are arguing that motion must ultimately be grounded in something
higher than the passive, inert extension of Cartesian bodies emptied of the
substantial forms of the Scholastics; it needs a causal ground in an active
power. But if a body consists in extension alone, motive force cannot be an
inherent property of bodies. Occasionalists thus identify force with the will
of God. In this way, they are simply drawing out the implications of
Descartes’s own metaphysics of matter and motion. Refs: H. P. Grice, “What’s
the case – and occasionalism.”
modified
occam’s razorr:
cf. Myro’s modified modified Occam razor – implicatura non sunt implicanda
praeter implicatura -- see H. P. Grice, “Modified Occam’s Razor” -- known as
the More than Subtle Doctor, English Scholastic philosopher known equally as
the father of nominalism and for his role in the Franciscan dispute with Pope
John XXII over poverty. Born at Occam in Surrey, he entered the Franciscan
order at an early age and studied at Oxford, attaining the rank of a B. A., i.
e. a “baccalarius formatus.” His brilliant but controversial career is cut
short when Lutterell, chancellor of Oxford, presented the pope with a list of 56
allegedly heretical theses extracted from Occam (Grice: “One was, ‘Senses are
not be multipled beyond necessity.’). The papal commission studies them for two
years and find 51 open to censure – “while five are ‘o-kay.’”-- , but none was
formally condemned. While in Avignon, Occam researches previous papal
concessions to the Franciscans regarding collective poverty, eventually
concluding that John XXII contradicted his predecessors and hence was ‘no
pope,’ or “no true pope.” After committing these charges to writing, Occam
flees with Cesena, then minister general of the order, first to Pisa and
ultimately to Munich, where he composes many treatises about church-state
relations. Although departures from his eminent predecessors have combined with
ecclesiastical difficulties to make Occam unjustly notorious, his thought
remains, by current lights, philosophically conservative – or as he would
expand, “irreverent, dissenting, rationalist conservative.” On most
metaphysical issues, Occam fancies himself the true interpreter of Aristotle.
Rejecting the doctrine that the universalse is a real thing other than a name
(‘flatus vocis’) or a concept as “the worst error of philosophy,” Occam
dismisses not only Platonism, but also “modern realist” doctrines according to
which a nature enjoys a double mode of existence and is universal in the
intellect but numerically multiplied in this or that particulare. Occam argues
that everything real is individual and particular. Universality is a property
pertaining only to the expression, sign, or name and that by virtue of its
signification (semantic) relation. Because Occam understands a ‘primary’ name
to be ‘psychological’, and thus a ‘naturally’ significant concept, his own
theory of the universale is best classified as a form of conceptualism. Occam
rejects atomism, and defends Aristotelian hylomorphism in physics and
metaphysics, complete with its distinction between substantial form and
accidental form. Yet, Occam opposes the reifying tendency of the “moderns”
unnamed contemporary opponents, who posited a distinct kind of ‘res’ for each
of Aristotle’s ten categories. Occam agues that from a purely philosophical
point of view it is indefensible to
posit anything besides this or that particular substance and this or that particular
quality. Occam follows the Franciscan school in recognizing a plurality of
substantial forms in living things in humans, the forms of corporeity, sensory
soul, and intellectual soul. Occam diverges from Duns Scotus in asserting a
real, not a formal, distinction among them. Aristotle had reached behind
regular correlations in nature to posit substance-things and accident-things as
primitive explanatory entities that essentially are or give rise to powers
virtus that produce the regularities. Similarly, Occam distinguishes efficient
causality properly speaking from sine qua non causality, depending on whether
the correlation between A’s and B’s is produced by the power of A or by the
will of another, and explicitly denies the existence of any sine qua non causation
in nature. Further, Ocam insists, in Aristotelian fashion, that created
substance- and accident-natures are essentially the causal powers they are in
and of themselves and hence independently of their relations to anything else;
so that not even God can make heat naturally a coolant. Yet, if God cannot
change, He shares with created things the ability to obstruct such
“Aristotelian” productive powers and prevent their normal operation. Ockham’s
nominalistic conceptualism about universals does not keep him from endorsing
the uniformity of nature principle, because he holds that individual natures
are powers and hence that co-specific things are maximally similar powers.
Likewise, he is conventional in appealing to several other a priori causal
principles: “Everything that is in motion is moved by something,” “Being cannot
come from non-being,” “Whatever is produced by something is really conserved by
something as long as it exists.” Occam even recognizes a kind of necessary
connection between created causes and effects
e.g., while God could act alone to produce any created effect, a
particular created effect could not have had another created cause of the same
species instead. Ockham’s main innovation on the topic of causality is his
attack on Duns Scotus’s distinction between “essential” and “accidental” orders
and contrary contention that every genuine efficient cause is an immediate
cause of its effects. Ockham is an Aristotelian reliabilist in epistemology,
taking for granted as he does that human cognitive faculties the senses and
intellect work always or for the most part. Occam infers that since we have
certain knowledge both of material things and of our own mental acts, there
must be some distinctive species of acts of awareness intuitive cognitions that
are the power to produce such evident judgments. Ockham is matter-of-fact both
about the disruption of human cognitive functions by created obstacles as in
sensory illusion and about divine power to intervene in many ways. Such facts carry
no skeptical consequences for Ockham, because he defines certainty in terms of
freedom from actual doubt and error, not from the logical, metaphysical, or
natural possibility of error. In action theory, Ockham defends the liberty of
indifference or contingency for all rational beings, created or divine. Ockham
shares Duns Scotus’s understanding of the will as a self-determining power for
opposites, but not his distaste for causal models. Thus, Ockham allows that 1
unfree acts of will may be necessitated, either by the agent’s own nature, by
its other acts, or by an external cause; and that 2 the efficient causes of
free acts may include the agent’s intellectual and sensory cognitions as well
as the will itself. While recognizing innate motivational tendencies in the
human agent e.g., the inclination to
seek sensory pleasure and avoid pain, the affectio commodi tendency to seek its
own advantage, and the affectio iustitiae inclination to love things for their
own intrinsic worth he denies that these
limit the will’s scope. Thus, Ockham goes beyond Duns Scotus in assigning the
will the power, with respect to any option, to will for it velle, to will
against it nolle, or not to act at all. In particular, Ockham concludes that
the will can will against nolle the good, whether ignorantly or perversely by hating God or by willing against its own
happiness, the good-in-general, the enjoyment of a clear vision of God, or its
own ultimate end. The will can also will velle evils the opposite of what right reason dictates,
unjust deeds qua unjust, dishonest, and contrary to right reason, and evil
under the aspect of evil. Ockham enforces the traditional division of moral
science into non-positive morality or ethics, which directs acts apart from any
precept of a superior authority and draws its principles from reason and
experience; and positive morality, which deals with laws that oblige us to
pursue or avoid things, not because they are good or evil in themselves, but
because some legitimate superior commands them. The notion that Ockham sponsors
an unmodified divine command theory of ethics rests on conflation and
confusion. Rather, in the area of non-positive morality, Ockham advances what
we might label a “modified right reason theory,” which begins with the Aristotelian
ideal of rational self-government, according to which morally virtuous action
involves the agent’s free coordination of choice with right reason. He then
observes that suitably informed right reason would dictate that God, as the
infinite good, ought to be loved above all and for his own sake, and that such
love ought to be expressed by the effort to please him in every way among other
things, by obeying all his commands. Thus, if right reason is the primary norm
in ethics, divine commands are a secondary, derivative norm. Once again, Ockham
is utterly unconcerned about the logical possibility opened by divine liberty
of indifference, that these twin norms might conflict say, if God commanded us
to act contrary to right reason; for him, their de facto congruence suffices
for the moral life. In the area of soteriological merit and demerit a branch of
positive morality, things are the other way around: divine will is the primary
norm; yet because God includes following the dictates of right reason among the
criteria for divine acceptance thereby giving the moral life eternal
significance, right reason becomes a secondary and derivative norm there.
Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Why I love Occam,” H. P. Grice, “Comments on Occam’s
‘Summa Totius Logicae,’” H. P. Grice, “Occam on ‘significare.’” And then
there’s Occam’s razor. H. P. Grice, “Modified Occam’s Razor.” Also called the
principle of parsimony, a methodological principle commending a bias toward
simplicity in the construction of theories. The parameters whose simplicity is
singled out for attention have varied considerably, from kinds of entities to
the number of presupposed axioms to the nature of the curve drawn between data
points. Found already in Aristotle, the tag “entities should not be multiplied
beyond necessity” became associated with William Ockham although he never
states that version, and even if non-contradiction rather than parsimony is his
favorite weapon in metaphysical disputes, perhaps because it characterized the
spirit of his philosophical conclusions. Opponents, who thought parsimony was
being carried too far, formulated an “anti-razor”: where fewer entities do not
suffice, posit more!
ŒCONOMIA:
Grice: “The end of philosophy at Oxford came with the PPE – I mean, what does a
philosopher to do with the ‘laws’ of the ‘home’?” -- Cf. Grice on the principle
of oeconomia of rational effort. The Greeks used ‘oeconomia’ to mean thrifty.
Cf. effort. There were three branches of philosophia practica: philosophia
moralis, oeconomia and politica. Grice
would often refer to ‘no undue effort,’ ‘no unnecessary trouble,’ to go into
the effort, ‘not worth the energy,’ and so on. These utilitarian criteria
suggest he is more of a futilitarian than the avowed Kantian he says he is.
This Grice also refers to as ‘maximum,’ ‘maximal,’ optimal. It is part of his
principle of economy of rational effort. Grice leaves it open as how to
formulate this. Notably in “Causal,” he allows that ‘The pillar box seems red”
and “The pillar box is red” are difficult to formalise in terms in which we
legitimize the claim or intuition that ‘The pillar box IS red” is ‘stronger’
than ‘The pillar box seems red.’ If this were so, it would provide a rational
justification for going into the effort of uttering something STRONGER (and
thus less economical, and more effortful) under the circumstances. As in “My wife is in the kitchen or in the bedroom, and
the house has only two rooms (and no passages, etc.)” the reason why the
conversational implicaturum is standardly carried is to be found in the
operation of some such general principle as that giving preference to the
making of a STRONGER rather than a weaker statement in the absence of a reason
for not so doing. The implicaturum therefore is not of a part of the meaning of
the expression “seems.” There is however A VERY IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE between
the case of a ‘phenomenalist’ statement (Bar-Hillel it does not count as a
statement) and that of disjunctives, such as “My wife is in the kitchen or ind
the bedroom, and the house has only two rooms (and no passages, etc.).” A
disjunctive is weaker than either of its disjuncts in a straightforward LOGICAL
fashion, viz., a disjunctive is entailed (alla Moore) by, but does not entail,
each of its disjuncts. The statement “The pillar box is red” is NOT STRONGER
than the statement, if a statement it is, “The pillar box seems red,” in this
way. Neither statement entails the other. Grice thinks that he has,
neverthcless a strong inclination to regard the first of these statements as
STRONGER than the second. But Grice leaves it open the ‘determination’ of in
what fashion this might obtain. He suggests that there may be a way to provide
a reductive analysis of ‘strength’ THAT YIELDS that “The pillar box is red” is
a stronger conversational contribution than “The pillar box seems red.”
Recourse to ‘informativeness’ may not do, since Grice is willing to generalise
over the acceptum to cover informative and non-informative cases. While there
is an element of ‘exhibition’ in his account of the communicatum, he might not
be happy with the idea that it is the utterer’s INTENTION to INFORM his
addressee that he, the utterer, INTENDS that his addressee will believe that
he, the utterer, believes that it is raining. “Inform” seems to apply only to
the content of the propositional complexum, and not to the attending ‘animata.’
olivi: philosopher whose
views on the theory and practice of Franciscan poverty led to a long series of
investigations of his orthodoxy. Olivi’s preference for humility, as well as
the suspicion with which he was regarded, prevented his becoming a master of theology
at Paris. He was effectively vindicated and permitted to teach at Florence and
Montpellier. But after his death, probably in part because his remains were
venerated and his views were championed by the Franciscan Spirituals, his
orthodoxy was again examined. The Council of Vienne condemned three unrelated
tenets associated with Olivi. Finally, Pope John XXII condemned a series of
statements based on Olivi’s Apocalypse commentary. Olivi thought of himself
chiefly as a theologian, writing copious biblical commentaries; his philosophy
of history was influenced by Joachim of Fiore. His views on poverty inspired
the leader of the Franciscan Observant reform movement, St. Bernardino of
Siena. Apart from his views on poverty, Olivi is best known for his
philosophical independence from Aristotle, whom he condemned as a materialist.
Contrary to Aristotle’s theory of projectile motion, Olivi advocated a theory
of impetus. He undermined orthodox views on Aristotelian categories. His attack
on the category of relation was thought to have dangerous implications in
Trinitarian theology. Ockham’s theory of quantity is in part a defense of views
presented by Olivi. Olivi was critical of Augustinian as well as Aristotelian
views; he abandoned the theories of seminal reason and divine illumination. He
also argued against positing impressed sensible and intelligible species,
claiming that only the soul, not perceptual objects, played an active role in
perception. Bold as his philosophical views were, he presented them
tentatively. A voluntarist, he emphasized the importance of will. He claimed
that an act of understanding was not possible in the absence of an act of will.
He provided an important experiential argument for the freedom of the will. His
treatises on contracts revealed a sophisticated understanding of economics. His
treatise on evangelical poverty includes the first defense of a theory of papal
infallibility.
omega: the last letter
of the Grecian alphabet w. Following Canto,, it is used in lowercase as a
proper name for the first infinite ordinal number, which is the ordinal of the
natural ordering of the set of finite ordinals. By extension it is also used as
a proper name for the set of finite ordinals itself or even for the set of
natural numbers. Following Gödel 678, it is used as a prefix in names of
various logical properties of sets of sentences, most notably
omega-completeness and omega-consistency. Omega-completeness, in the original
sense due to Tarski, is a syntactical property of sets of sentences in a formal
arithmetic language involving a symbol ‘0’ for the number zero and a symbol ‘s’
for the so-called successor function, resulting in each natural number being
named by an expression, called a numeral, in the following series: ‘0’, ‘s0’,
‘ss0’, and so on. For example, five is denoted by ‘sssss0’. A set of sentences
is said to be omegacomplete if it deductively yields every universal sentence
all of whose singular instances it yields. In this framework, as usual, every
universal sentence, ‘for every n, n has P’ yields each and every one of its
singular instances, ‘0 has P’, ‘s0 has P’, ‘ss0 has P’, etc. However, as had
been known by logicians at least since the Middle Ages, the converse is not
true, i.e., it is not in general the case that a universal sentence is
deducible from the set of its singular instances. Thus one should not expect to
find omega-completeness except in exceptional sets. The set of all true
sentences of arithmetic is such an exceptional set; the reason is the semantic
fact that every universal sentence whether or not in arithmetic is materially
equivalent to the set of all its singular instances. A set of sentences that is
not omega-complete is said to be omega-incomplete. The existence of
omega-incomplete sets of sentences is a phenomenon at the core of the 1 Gödel
incompleteness result, which shows that every “effective” axiom set for
arithmetic is omega-incomplete and thus has as theorems all singular instances
of a universal sentence that is not one of its theorems. Although this is a
remarkable fact, the existence of omega-incomplete sets per se is far from
remarkable, as suggested above. In fact, the empty set and equivalently the set
of all tautologies are omega-incomplete because each yields all singular
instances of the non-tautological formal sentence, here called FS, that
expresses the proposition that every number is either zero or a successor.
Omega-consistency belongs to a set that does not yield the negation of any
universal sentence all of whose singular instances it yields. A set that is not
omega-consistent is said to be omega-inconsistent. Omega-inconsistency of
course implies consistency in the ordinary sense; but it is easy to find
consistent sets that are not omega-consistent, e.g., the set whose only member
is the negation of the formal sentence FS mentioned above. Corresponding to the
syntactical properties just mentioned there are analogous semantic properties
whose definitions are obtained by substituting ‘semantically implies’ for
‘deductively yields’. The Grecian letter omega and its English name have many
other uses in modern logic. Carnap introduced a non-effective, non-logical
rule, called the omega rule, for “inferring” a universal sentence from its
singular instances; adding the omega rule to a standard axiomatization of
arithmetic produces a complete but non-effective axiomatization. An
omega-valued logic is a many-valued logic whose set of truth-values is or is
the same size as the set of natural numbers. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “I know that
there are infinitely many stars.”
one-at-a-time-sailor. Grice’s ‘universale’ – and ‘particulare.’ – the \/x versus
the /\x. For \/x Grice has “one-at-a-time sailor.” For /\x Grice has ‘the
altogether nice girl.” “He is loved by the altogether nice girl. Or grasshopper:
Grice’s one-at-a-time grasshopper. His rational reconstruction of ‘some’ and
‘all.’ “A simple proposal for the treatment of the two quantifiers, rendered
otiosely in English by “all” and “some (at least one),” – “the” is definable in
terms of “all” -- would call for the assignment to a predicate such as that of
‘being a grasshopper,” symbolized by “G,” besides its normal or standard
EXtension, two special things (or ‘object,’ if one must use Quine’s misnomer),
associated with quantifiers, an 'altogether' ‘substitute’, thing or object and
a 'one-at-a-time' non-substitute thing or object.”“To the predicate
'grasshopper' is assigned not only an individual, viz. a grasshopper, but also
what I call ‘The All-Together Grass-Hopper,’
or species-1and ‘The One-At-A-Time Grass-Hopper,’ or species-2. “I now
stipulate that an 'altogether' item satisfies such a predicate as “being a
grasshopper,” or G, just in case every normal or standard item associated with
“the all-to-gether” grasshopper satisfies the predicate in question. Analogously,
a 'one-at-a-time' item satisfies a predicate just in case “SOME (AT LEAST ONE)”
of the associated standard items satisfies that predicate.”“So ‘The
All-To-Gether Grass-Hopper izzes green just in case every individual
grasshopper is green.The one-at-a-time grasshopper izzes green just in case some
(at least one) individual grasshopper izzes green.”“We can take this pair of
statements about these two special grasshoppers as providing us with
representations of (respectively) the statements, ‘Every grass-hopper is
green,’ and ‘Some (at least one) grasshopper is green.’“The apparatus which
Grice sketched is plainly not, as it stands, adequate to provide a comprehensive
treatment of quantification.”“It will not, e. g. cope with well-known problems of
multiple quantification,” as in “Every Al-Together Nice Grass-Hopper Loves A
Sailing Grass-Hopper.”“It will not deliver for us distinct representations of
the two notorious (alleged) readings of ‘Every nice girl loves a sailor,” in
one of which (supposedly) the universal quantifier is dominant with respect to
scope, and in the other of which the existential quantifier is dominant.”The
ambiguity was made ambiguous by Marie Lloyd. For every time she said “a
sailor,” she pointed at herself – thereby disimplicating the default implicaturum
that the universal quantifier be dominant. “To cope with Marie Lloyd’s problem
it might be sufficient to explore, for semantic purposes, the device of
exportation, and to distinguish between, 'There exists a sailor such that every
nice girl loves him', which attributes a certain property to the one-at-a-time
sailor, and (ii) 'Every nice girl is such that she loves some sailor', which
attributes a certain (and different) property to the altogether nice girl.Note
that, as one makes this move, that though exportation, when applied to
statements about individual objects, seems not to affect truth-value, whatever
else may be its semantic function, when it is applied to sentences about
special objects it may, and sometimes will, affect truth-value.”“But however
effective this particular shift may be, it is by no means clear that there are
not further demands to be met which would overtax the strength of the envisaged
apparatus.It is not, for example, clear whether it could be made adequate to
deal with indefinitely long strings of 'mixed' quantifiers.”“The proposal might
also run into objections of a more conceptual character from those who would
regard the special objects which it invokes as metaphysically disreputable –
for where would an ‘altogether sailor” sail?, or an one-at-a-time grasshopper
hop?“Should an alternative proposal be reached or desired, one (or, indeed,
more than one) is available.”“One may be regarded as a replacement for, an
extension of, or a reinterpretation of the scheme just outlined, in accordance
with whatever view is finally taken of the potency and respectability of the ideas
embodied in that scheme.” “This proposal treats a propositional complexum as a
sequence, indeed as ordered pairs containing a subject-item and a
predicate-item.It thus offers a subject-predicate account of quantification (as
opposed to what?, you may wonder). However, it will not allow an individual, i.
e. a sailor, or a nice girl, to appear as COMPONENTS in a propositional
complexum.The sailor and the nice girl will always be reduced, ‘extensionally,’
or ‘extended,’ if you wish, as a set or an attribute.“According to the class-theoretic
version, we associate with the subject-expression of a canonically formulated
sentence a class of (at least) a second order. If the subject expression is a
singular name, like “Grice,” its ontological correlatum will be the singleton
of the singleton of the entity which bears the name Grice, or Pop-Eye.” “The
treatment of a singular terms which are not names – e. g. ‘the sailor’ -- will
be parallel, but is here omitted. It involves the iota operator, about which
Russell would say that Frege knew a iota. If the subject-expression is an
indefinite quantificational phrase, like 'some (at least one) sailor’ ‘or some
(at least one) grasshopper', its ontological correlatum will be the set of all
singletons whose sole member is a member belonging to the extension of the
predicate to which the indefinite modifier “some (at least one)” is attached.So
the ontological correlatum of the phrase ‘some (at least one) sailor’ or 'some (at
least one) grasshopper' will be the class of all singletons whose sole member
is an individuum (sailor, grasshopper). If the subject expression is a universal
quantificational phrase, like ‘every nice girl’ its ontological correlatum will
be the singleton whose sole member is the class which forms the extension of
the predicate to which the universal modifier (‘every’) is attached.Thus, the correlate of the phrase 'every nice girl' will
be the singleton of the class of nice girls.The song was actually NOT written
by a nice girl – but by a bad boy.A predicate of a canonically formulated
sentence is correlated with the classes which form its extension.As for the
predication-relation, i. e., the relation which has to obtain between
subject-element and predicate-element in a propositional complex for that
complex to be factive, a propositional complexum is factive or value-satisfactory
just in case its subject-element contains as a member at least one item which
is a sub-class of the predicate-element.”If the ontological correlatum of 'a
sailor,’ or, again, of 'every nice girl') contains as a member at least one subset
of the ontological correlata of the dyadic predicate ' … loves … ' (viz. the
class of love), the propositional complexum directly associated with the
sentence ‘A sailor loves every nice girl’ is factive, as is its converse“Grice
devotes a good deal of energy to the ‘one-at-a-time-sailor,’ and the
‘altogether nice girl’ and he convinced himself that it offered a powerful
instrument which, with or without adjustment, is capable of handling not only
indefinitely long sequences of ‘mixed’ quantificational phrases, but also some
other less obviously tractable problems, such as the ‘ground’ for this being
so: what it there about a sailor – well, you know what sailors are. When the
man o' war or merchant ship comes sailing into port/The jolly tar with joy,
will sing out, Land Ahoy!/With his pockets full of money and a parrot in a
cage/He smiles at all the pretty girls upon the landing stage/All the nice
girls love a sailor/All the nice girls love a tar/For there's something about a
sailor/(Well you know what sailors are!)/Bright and breezy, free and easy,/He's
the ladies' pride and joy!/He falls in love with Kate and Jane, then he's off
to sea again,/Ship ahoy! Ship ahoy!/He will spend his money freely, and he's
generous to his pals,/While Jack has got a sou, there's half of it for you,/And
it's just the same in love and war, he goes through with a smile,/And you can
trust a sailor, he's a white man (meaning: honest man) all the while!“Before
moving on, however, I might perhaps draw attention to three features of the proposal.”“First,
employing a strategy which might be thought of as Leibnizian, it treats a
subject-element (even a lowly tar) as being of an order HIGHER than, rather
than an order LOWER than, the predicate element.”“Second, an individual name,
such as Grice, is in effect treated like a universal quantificational phrase,
thus recalling the practice of old-style traditionalism.“Third, and most
importantly, the account which is offered is, initially, an account of
propositional complexes, not of propositions; as I envisage them, propositions
will be regarded as families of propositional complexes.”“Now the propositional
complexum directly associated with the sentence “Every nice girl loves a
sailor” (WoW: 34) will be both logically equivalent to and numerically distinct
from the propositional complex directly associated with ‘It is not the case
that no nice girl loves no sailor.’ Indeed for any given propositional complex
there will be indefinitely many propositional complexes which are both
equipolent to yet numerically distinct from the original complexum. Strawson
used to play with this. The question of how tight or how relaxed are to be the
family ties which determine the IDENTITY of propositio 1 with propositio 2 remains to be decided. Such conditions will vary
according to context or purpose. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Every nice girl loves a
sailor: the implicatura.”
occam: Grice: “I hate it when people who wouldn’t know London
from their elbow pretentiously use ‘Ockham’ when Aquinas consistently uses
Occam.” -- a picturesque village in Surrey. His most notable resident is
William. When William left Occam, he was often asked, “Where are you from?” In
the vernacular, he would make an effort to aspirate the ‘h’ Ock-Home.’ His
French friends were unable to aspirate, and he ended up accepting that perhaps
he WAS from “Occam.” Vide Modified Occam’s Razor. occamism – Grice, “I’m not so much interested
in Occam as in the Occam Society, that I endured!” -- Occamism: d’Ailly,
P.: Ockhamist philosopher, prelate, and writer. Educated at the Collège de
Navarre, he was promoted to doctor in the Sorbonne in 1380, appointed
chancellor of Paris in 1389, consecrated
bishop in 1395, and made a cardinal in 1411. He was influenced by John of
Mirecourt’s nominalism. He taught Gerson. At the Council of Constance 141418,
which condemned Huss’s teachings, d’Ailly upheld the superiority of the council
over the pope conciliarism. The relation of astrology to history and theology
figures among his primary interests. His 1414 Tractatus de Concordia
astronomicae predicted the 1789
Revolution. He composed a De anima, a commentary on Boethius’s
Consolation of Philosophy, and another on Peter Lombard’s Sentences. His early
logical work, Concepts and Insolubles c.1472, was particularly influential. In
epistemology, d’Ailly contradistinguished “natural light” indubitable knowledge
from reason relative knowledge, and emphasized thereafter the uncertainty of
experimental knowledge and the mere probability of the classical “proofs” of
God’s existence. His doctrine of God differentiates God’s absolute power
potentia absoluta from God’s ordained power on earth potentia ordinata. His
theology anticipated fideism Deum esse sola fide tenetur, his ethics the spirit
of Protestantism, and his sacramentology Lutheranism.
Ocone Corrado
Ocone Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to
search Corrado Ocone Corrado Ocone (Benevento, 5 marzo 1963) è un
filosofo e saggista italiano. Si occupa soprattutto di temi concernenti
il neoidealismo italiano e la teoria del liberalismo. Indice 1 Biografia
2 Attività
e pensiero 3 Curiosità
4 Opere
5 Note
6 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Allievo di Raffaello Franchini, è borsista dell'Istituto
Italiano per gli Studi Storici di Napoli negli anni 1993-1994[1]. Qui ha
l'opportunità di lavorare direttamente nella biblioteca personale di Benedetto
Croce e con l'aiuto di Alda Croce, figlia del filosofo, raccoglie e analizza il
materiale scritto nel mondo su di lui. Un frutto parziale e selezionato del suo
lavoro vede la luce nel 1993 nel volume Bibliografia ragionata degli studi su
Benedetto Croce pubblicata dalla ESI (Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane) di
Napoli, che vince l'anno successivo la prima edizione[2] del "Premio
nazionale di saggistica Benedetto Croce", istituito dall'Istituto
Nazionale Studi Crociani. È stato direttore scientifico della Fondazione
Luigi Einaudi di Roma,[3] dalla quale è stato successivamente allontanato per
le sue posizioni nazionaliste[3][4]. Successivamente è entrato a far parte della
Fondazione Giuseppe Tatarella[5] ed è diventato Direttore Scientifico di
Nazione Futura[6]. È anche membro del Comitato Scientifico della
Fondazione Cortese di Napoli[7], del Comitato Storico Scientifico della
Fondazione Bettino Craxi[8], del Comitato Scientifico dell'Istituto
Internazionale Jacques Maritain[9] e del Comitato Scientifico della Fondazione
Farefuturo[10]. Attività e pensiero Nel 1995 fonda a Napoli, con un
piccolo gruppo di laureati e laureandi della Federico II, cittadini sanniti e
napoletani, il trimestrale "CroceVia" edito dalla ESI (Edizioni
Scientifiche Italiane), che si propone di rinnovare il messaggio crociano e che
entra in poco tempo nel dibattito culturale nazionale. Nel 2008 i suoi studi
crociani prendono corpo nel volume Benedetto Croce, Il liberalismo come
concezione della vita, pubblicato dall'editore Rubbettino nella collana
“Maestri liberali” della Fondazione Luigi Einaudi di Roma[11]. Il volume,
presentando l'immagine originale di un Croce partecipe del processo europeo di
distruzione delle categorie epistemiche, ha numerose recensioni[12][13][14]. A
partire dalla sua interpretazione di Croce, Ocone elabora la prospettiva di un
liberalismo senza teoria, cioè storicistico e non fondazionistico. Il suo
progetto filosofico può essere così formulato: riconquistare il liberalismo
alla filosofia; ritornare in filosofia all'idealismo; ricongiungere il
liberalismo con l'idealismo (si vedano, a tal proposito, gli interventi di
Ocone nella polemica fra neorealisti e postmodernisti).[15] In quest'ordine di
discorso, Ocone ritiene che la critica rivolta a Croce di essere un liberale
anomalo, in quanto nel suo pensiero il concetto di individuo sarebbe
sacrificato, vada ribaltato: l'individualismo non è affatto consustanziale al
liberalismo, ma si è legato ad esso solo in una sua prima fase di sviluppo
(all'inizio della modernità). Quello di Ocone è un liberalismo che non
prescinde né dal senso storico né dal realismo politico. Successivamente il
pensiero di Ocone ha assunto molti caratteri propri dello scetticismo politico
di Michael Oakeshott[16], in particolare della sua critica del razionalismo,
del perfezionismo e del paternalismo. Egli ha pertanto insistito sul carattere
“anticonformistico” e “eretico” del liberalismo, sulla priorità in esso del
momento “negativo” o della contraddizione. La critica delle ideologie, e in
particolare del “politicamente corretto”, diviene in quest'ottica il correlato
pratico degli approdi antimetafisici della filosofia contemporanea. E filosofia
e liberalismo finiscono per coincidere[17] Da ultimo, la sua riflessione
ha messo a tema il significato teorico e storico dell’affermarsi dei cosiddetti
“populismi” e “sovranismi”. Essi, prima di essere ostracizzati, vanno per Ocone
capiti: pur in modo confuso e contraddittorio, lungi dall'essere un “incidente
di percorso” incorso al processo di globalizzazione in atto, essi ne segnalano
la definitiva crisi dell’ideologia portante: il globalismo[18]. Questa
ideologia può essere considerata una radicalizzazione coerente della mentalità
illuministica e progressista, cioè da una parte del processo di
secolarizzazione e razionalizzazione e dall'altra dello speculare e connesso
relativismo e nichilismo[19][20]. I “populismi” sono perciò per Ocone movimenti
di reazione ai meccanismi di spoliticizzazione (e connesso “disciplinamento” in
senso foucaultiano) propri della globalizzazione, che aveva definito la
sua ideologia all’incrocio fra le idee di due “deviazioni” dell’autentico
liberalismo: il neoliberismo, sul versante economico, e la cultura liberal sul
versante di un diritto globale fortemente eticizzato. Ocone ha scritto su
diverse riviste scientifiche e culturali e sui maggiori organi di stampa
nazionali. Attualmente è nella redazione della rivista “LeSfide”[21], edita
dalla Fondazione Craxi, e nel Comitato editoriale dell quotidiano online
“L’Occidentale”[22]. Collaboratore de “Il Giornale” e de “Il Riformista”, è
opinionista politico di “formiche.net”, “Huffpost” e “nicolaporro.it”. Molto
seguita è la sua rubrica domenicale di riflessione politico-culturale “Ocone’s
Corner” sulla rivista online “startmagazine”. Curiosità Un estratto di un
suo articolo (Intervista a Remo Bodei, in Corrado Ocone, Prendiamola con
filosofia, Il Mattino, 30/12/2003) è stato utilizzato dal Ministero
dell'Istruzione, dell'Università e della Ricerca come documento per la stesura
della traccia della prova scritta di Italiano negli esami di Stato conclusivi
dei corsi di studio di istruzione secondaria superiore a.s. 2003/2004
(Tipologia B - Redazione di un saggio breve o di un articolo di giornale - 2.
Ambito socio-economico - Argomento: La riscoperta della necessità di
«pensare»)[23]. Nella sezione Dal dopoguerra ai giorni nostri, Percorso
9f Il dibattito delle idee - Dall'“impegno” al postmoderno, del volume 6 (Dal
periodo tra le due guerre ai giorni nostri) dell'antologia "Il piacere dei
testi"[24], editore Paravia, è contenuto il suo saggio "Né
neorealisti né postmodernisti" da "qdR"[25]. Opere 2020
(con Marco Gervasoni) Coronavirus. Fine della globalizzazione, Il Giornale,
Milano 2019 La chiave del secolo. Interpretazioni del Novecento, Rubbettino,
Soveria Mannelli,[26] 2019 Europa. L'Unione che ha fallito, Historica,
Cesena[18] 2018 La cultura liberale. Breviario per il nuovo secolo, Giubilei
Regnani, Roma-Cesena[27] 2016 Attualità di Benedetto Croce, Castelvecchi,
Roma[28] 2016 Il liberalismo nel Novecento: da Croce a Berlin, Rubbettino,
Soveria Mannelli[29] 2015 (curatore) Il liberale che non c'è. Manifesto per
l'Italia che vorremmo, Castelvecchi, Roma[30] 2014 (con altri autori) I grandi
maestri del pensiero laico, Claudiana, Torino[31] 2014 (curatore) Robin George
Collingwood, Autobiografia, Castelvecchi, Roma[32] 2013 (con Donatella Di
Cesare e Simone Regazzoni) Il nuovo realismo è un populismo, Il Nuovo
Melangolo, Genova[33] 2012 (a cura di Pietro Reichlin e Aldo Rustichini)
Pensare la sinistra. Tra equità e libertà, Laterza, Roma-Bari[34] 2011
Liberalismo senza teoria, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli[35] 2011 (con Dario
Antiseri), Liberali d'Italia, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli[36] 2010 (con altri
autori) Le parole del tempo. Lessico del mondo che cambia, a cura di Pierfranco
Pellizzetti, Manifesto libri, Roma[37] 2010 (con altri autori), Spettri di
Derrida, a cura di Carola Barbero, Simone Regazzoni e Amelia Voltolina, Annali
della Fondazione europea del Disegno (Fondation Adami), 2009/5, Il Nuovo
Melangolo, Genova[38] 2009 Profili riformisti. 15 pensatori liberal per le
nostre sfide, con prefazione di Emanuele Macaluso, Rubbettino, Soveria
Mannelli[39] 2008 Karl Marx visto da Corrado Ocone, con prefazione di Paolo
Savona, Luiss University Press (Collana "Momenti d'oro
dell'economia"), Roma[40] 2006 (curatore con Nadia Urbinati), La libertà e
i suoi limiti. Antologia del pensiero liberale da Filangieri a Bobbio, Laterza,
Roma-Bari[41] 2005 Benedetto Croce. Il liberalismo come concezione della vita,
(prefazione di Valerio Zanone), Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli[42] 2003
(curatore), Bobbio ad uso di amici e nemici, con postfazione di Giuliano Amato,
I libri di Reset, Marsilio Editori, Venezia[43] 1999 (curatore con Enzo Marzo),
Manifesto laico, Laterza, Roma-Bari[44] 1996 (coautore, a cura di Maurizio
Viroli), Lessico repubblicano, Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, Torino[45] 1993
Bibliografia ragionata degli scritti su Benedetto Croce; prefazione di Vittorio
Stella, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli[46] Note ^ Cfr. Archivio
borsisti in Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici ^ Premio Benedetto Croce,
su mediamuseum.it. URL consultato il 13 luglio 2017 (archiviato dall'url
originale il 24 giugno 2017). Comitato Scientifico, su
fondazioneluigieinaudi.it. ^ Riccardo Ficara, La Fondazione Einaudi allontana
Corrado Ocone perché "filo-sovranista", su Secolo Trentino, 17 marzo
2019. URL consultato il 6 maggio 2019 (archiviato dall'url originale il 6
maggio 2019). ^ La Fondazione, su fondazionegiuseppetatarella.it. ^
Organigramma, su nazionefutura.it. ^ Fondazione Cortese di Napoli in
http://www.fondazionecortese.it/ ^ Fondazione Craxi, su fondazionecraxi.org.
URL consultato il 18 settembre 2015 (archiviato dall'url originale il 6 marzo
2016). ^ Comitato Scientifico dell'Istituto Internazionale Jacques Maritain, su
istituto.maritain.net. ^ Comitato Scientifico e di indirizzo, su
farefuturofondazione.it. ^ Copia archiviata (PDF), su rubbettino.it. URL
consultato il 5 dicembre 2010 (archiviato dall'url originale il 10 ottobre
2007). ^ Gianni Vattimo - Pubblicazioni - La recensione Archiviato il 16
febbraio 2006 in Internet Archive. ^ Caffe' Europa, su www.caffeeuropa.it. ^
Duccio Trombadori, Questo don Benedetto somiglia a Nietzsche, su ilGiornale.it,
28 dicembre 2005. ^ Il blog di GIANNI VATTIMO: Corrado Ocone e la filosofia
classica tedesca, su giannivattimo.blogspot.com. ^ La filosofia politica è una
pseudo-scienza. Parola di filosofo. E che filosofo!, su www.reset.it. ^ Corrado
Ocone, Attualità di Benedetto Croce / Corrado Ocone, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno
2020. Corrado Ocone, Europa : l'Unione che ha fallito / Corrado Ocone ;
prefazione di Francesco Giubilei, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^ Corrado
Ocone, La natura del potere svelata dal coronavirus, su ilGiornale.it, 5 aprile
2020. ^ CORONAVIRUS: FINE DELLA GLOBALIZZAZIONE – DI MARCO GERVASONI E CORRADO
OCONE - Store ilGiornale, su store.ilgiornale.it. ^ N°7: FINE DI UNA STORIA. IL
RITORNO DELLA POLITICA?, su leSfide. ^ Chi Siamo, su loccidentale.it. ^ MIUR
Traccia della prova scritta di Italiano per gli esami di Stato conclusivi dei
corsi di studio di istruzione secondaria superiore - anno scolastico 2003/2004
(PDF), su archivio.pubblica.istruzione.it. ^ Il piacere dei testi ^ QDR
Magazine - Qualcosa da Raccontare, su QDR Magazine. ^ Corrado Ocone, La chiave
del secolo : interpretazioni del Novecento / Corrado Ocone, su opac.sbn.it, 22
giugno 2020. ^ Corrado Ocone, La cultura liberale : breviario per il nuovo
secolo / Corrado Ocone, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^ Corrado Ocone,
Attualità di Benedetto Croce / Corrado Ocone, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^
Corrado Ocone, Il liberalismo nel Novecento : da Croce a Berlin / Corrado
Ocone, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^ Il liberale che non c'è : manifesto
per l'Italia che vorremmo / a cura di Corrado Ocone, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno
2020. ^ I grandi maestri del pensiero laico / introduzione di Massimo L.
Salvatori, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^ Robin George Collingwood,
Autobiografia / R. G. Collingwood ; prefazione di Corrado Ocone, su
opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^ Il nuovo realismo è un populismo / a cura di
Donatella Di Cesare, Corrado Ocone, Simone Regazzoni, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno
2020. ^ Pietro Reichlin, Pensare la sinistra : tra equità e libertà / Pietro
Reichlin, Aldo Rustichini, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^ Corrado Ocone,
Liberalismo senza teoria / Corrado Ocone, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^
Corrado Ocone, Liberali d'Italia / Corrado Ocone, Dario Antiseri
; prefazione di Giulio Giorello, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^ Le
parole del tempo / M. Barberis...[et al.] ; a cura di Pierfranco Pellizzetti,
su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^ Spettri di Derrida / a cura di Carola
Barbero, Simone Regazzoni, Amelia Valtolina, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^
Corrado Ocone, Profili riformisti : 15 pensatori liberal per le nostre sfide /
Corrado Ocone ; prefazione di Emanuele Macaluso, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno
2020. ^ Corrado Ocone, Karl Marx : teoria del capitale / [visto da Corrado
Ocone], su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^ La liberta e i suoi limiti :
antologia del pensiero liberale da Filangieri a Bobbio / a cura di Corrado
Ocone e Nadia Urbinati, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^ Corrado Ocone,
Benedetto Croce : il liberalismo come concezione della vita / Corrado Ocone ;
prefazione di Valerio Zanone, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^ Bobbio ad uso
di amici e nemici / a cura della redazione di Reset e di Corrado Ocone ;
postfazione di Giuliano Amato, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^ Manifesto
laico / a cura di Enzo Marzo e Corrado Ocone ; contributi di Sergio Lariccia
... \et al.! ; con un intervento di Norberto Bobbio, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno
2020. ^ Lessico repubblicano : Torino, novembre 1996 / a cura di Maurizio
Viroli, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. ^ Corrado Ocone, Bibliografia ragionata
degli scritti su Benedetto Croce / Corrado Ocone ; prefazione di Vittorio
Stella, su opac.sbn.it, 22 giugno 2020. Collegamenti esterni La genialità di
Marx agli occhi dei liberisti, Ocone riconosce i pregi dell'analisi... in
archiviostorico.corriere.it Premio a C.Ocone nel 1994 al Premio nazionale
Benedetto Croce di saggistica, in premiflaiano.it Sito internet, su
corradoocone.com. Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 9071129 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0000 5555 2006 · LCCN (EN) n94024290 · GND (DE)
136987915 · BNF (FR) cb129821410 (data) · BNE (ES) XX1051366 (data) · WorldCat
Identities (EN) lccn-n94024290 Biografie Portale Biografie: accedi alle voci di
Wikipedia che trattano di biografie Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX
secoloFilosofi italiani del XXI secoloSaggisti italiani del XX secoloSaggisti
italiani del XXI secoloNati nel 1963Nati il 5 marzoNati a Benevento[altre]
Oddi Marco degli Oddi Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Marco degli Oddi
(Padova, 1526 – Padova, 1591) è stato un medico e filosofo italiano. Figlio del medico Oddo degli Oddi, che era
stato convinto sostenitore della scuola di medicina galenica, fu professore per
incarico del Senato veneziano assieme ad Albertino Bottoni nell'Università di
Padova, dove insegnò logica, filosofia, e medicina, e introdusse senza ricevere
emolumenti[1] l'insegnamento della pratica clinica nell'Ospedale di San
Francesco Grande, precedendo così tutte le altre scuole europee[2]. Note ^ Commentari dell'Ateneo di Brescia ^
Giuseppe Vedova,Biografia degli scrittori padovani, coi tipi della Minerva,
1832 p.151 Bibliografia Òddi, Marco degli, in Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on
line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Collegamenti esterni Marco degli
Oddi, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Marco degli Oddi, su Open Library,
Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 19640151 ·
ISNI (EN) 0000 0000 8204 5931 · LCCN (EN) nr2006017539 · GND (DE) 141863366 ·
BNE (ES) XX5556839 (data) · CERL cnp01237897 · WorldCat Identities (EN)
lccn-nr2006017539 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia
Medicina Portale Medicina Categorie: Medici italianiFilosofi italiani del XVI
secoloNati nel 1526Morti nel 1591Nati a PadovaMorti a Padova[altre]
Offredi Apollinare Offredi Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Questa voce è orfana
Questa voce sull'argomento filosofi è orfana, ovvero priva di collegamenti in
entrata da altre voci. Inseriscine almeno uno pertinente e non generico e
rimuovi l'avviso. Segui i suggerimenti del progetto di riferimento. De primo et ultimo instanti in defensionem
communis opinionis adversus Petrum Mantuanum, 1478 Giovan Pietro Apollinare
Offredi (Cremona, XV secolo – XV secolo) è stato un filosofo, astrologo e
medico italiano rinascimentale.[1][2]
Gli era tributata grande autorità negli ambienti filosofici e medici
intorno alla metà del XV secolo.[3]
Indice 1 Biografia 2 Opere
3 Note
4 Bibliografia
Biografia Nativo di Cremona,[4] fu lettore di metafisica nello studio di Pavia
e di Piacenza ed era in buoni rapporti con Eugenio IV, Filippo Maria Visconti e
Francesco Sforza.[1] Opere Apollinare
Offredi, De primo et ultimo instanti in defensionem communis opinionis adversus
Petrum Mantuanum, S.l., Bonus Gallus, 1478. URL consultato il 12 luglio 2015.
Note Giambattista Fantonetti, Effemeridi
delle scienze mediche, compilate da Giovambattista Fantonetti, Paolo-Andrea
Molina, 1838, pp. 312–. ^ Giorgio A. Pinton, History of Italian Philosophy,
Rodopi, 2008, pp. 288–, ISBN 90-420-2321-X. ^ Rinascimento, Istituto nazionale
di studi sul Rinascimento, 1961, p. 5. ^ Giuseppe Robolini, Notizie
appartenenti alla storia della sua patria, raccolte da G. Robolini, pavese,
1834, p. 1. Bibliografia Giambattista Fantonetti, Effemeridi delle scienze
mediche, compilate da Giovambattista Fantonetti, Paolo-Andrea Molina, 1838, pp.
312–. Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 76452082 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0000 7728 9181 · GND (DE) 100236537 · BNF (FR)
cb131640061 (data) · BAV (EN) 495/34509 · CERL cnp01360162 · WorldCat Identities
(EN) viaf-7430153289966632770003 Astrologia Portale Astrologia Biografie
Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Medicina Portale Medicina
Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XV secoloAstrologi italianiMedici italianiNati
nel XV secoloMorti nel XV secoloNati a CremonaAristotele[altre]
Olgiati Francesco Olgiati Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Abbozzo Questa voce
sull'argomento religiosi italiani è solo un abbozzo. Contribuisci a migliorarla
secondo le convenzioni di Wikipedia.
Monsignor Olgiati (a sinistra) con padre Agostino Gemelli e Vico Necchi.
Francesco Olgiati (Busto Arsizio, 1º gennaio 1886 – Milano, 21 maggio 1962) è
stato un presbitero, docente universitario e filosofo neoscolastico
italiano. Indice 1 Biografia 2 Onorificenze
3 Note
4 Opere
5 Bibliografia
6 Altri
progetti 7 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Figlio di Giuseppe Olgiati e Teresa Ferrario, si formò presso
Seminari milanesi e, il 13 giugno 1908, venne ordinato sacerdote dal cardinal
Andrea Carlo Ferrari. Dopo una pausa di alcuni anni in seguito ad una malattia,
collaborò con padre Agostino Gemelli e Ludovico Necchi alla Rivista di
filosofia neo-scolastica e fondò con loro il periodico Vita e Pensiero. Fu
insignito da Pio XI del titolo di Cameriere Segreto e da Pio XII di
Protonotario Apostolico. Inoltre fu, assieme ad Agostino Gemelli, uno dei
fondatori dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore.[1] Presso tale ateneo
insegnò nelle facoltà di Lettere, di Magistero e di Giurisprudenza. Dal 1922 fu
condirettore della Rivista del Clero Italiano insieme ad Agostino Gemelli. Fu
autore di innumerevoli scritti relativi alla religione e all'istruzione. I suoi
allievi più illustri furono Virgilio Melchiorre e Giovanni Reale. Tomba di Agostino Gemelli mons. Olgiati. Il
libro Le lettere di Berlicche, scritto da C.S.Lewis, oltre ad essere dedicato a
J.R.R. Tolkien, è dedicato anche a Mons. Olgiati. Onorificenze Medaglia d'oro ai benemeriti
della scuola, della cultura e dell'arte - nastrino per uniforme ordinaria Medaglia
d'oro ai benemeriti della scuola, della cultura e dell'arte — 1955 Note ^
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore - La storia: Le origini, su
unicattolica.it. URL consultato l'11 settembre 2014 (archiviato dall'url
originale il 18 agosto 2011). Opere Francesco Olgiati Religione e vita, Società
Editrice "Vita e Pensiero", Milano, 1919. Francesco Olgiati, Schemi
di conferenze, Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero", Milano 1938.
Francesco Olgiati, I fondamenti della filosofia classica, Società Editrice
"Vita e Pensiero", Milano 1964. Francesco Olgiati, Il sillabario
della Teologia, Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero", Milano 1952
Francesco Olgiati, Il concetto di giuridicità in san Tommaso d'Aquino, Società
Editrice "Vita e Pensiero", Milano Francesco Olgiati, Carlo Marx,
Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero", Milano Francesco Olgiati, Il
sillabario della morale cristiana, Società Editrice "Vita e
Pensiero", Milano Francesco Olgiati, Il sillabario del Cristianesimo,
Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero", Milano Bibliografia biografias y
vidas. I nuovi soci onorari della Famiglia Bustocca - Mons. Francesco Olgiati,
in Almanacco della Famiglia Bustocca per l'anno 1956, Busto Arsizio, La
Famiglia Bustocca, 1956, pp. 22-35. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote
contiene citazioni di o su Francesco Olgiati Collegamenti esterni Francesco
Olgiati, in Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. URL consultato l'11 settembre 2014.
Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 102323570 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 0929 527X · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\092397 · LCCN
(EN) nr89010656 · BNF (FR) cb10480157r (data) · BAV (EN) 495/130595 · WorldCat
Identities (EN) lccn-nr89010656 Biografie Portale Biografie Cattolicesimo
Portale Cattolicesimo Filosofia Portale Filosofia Categorie: Presbiteri
italianiInsegnanti italiani del XX secoloNati nel 1886Morti nel 1962Nati il 1º
gennaioMorti il 21 maggioNati a Busto ArsizioMorti a MilanoFilosofi italiani
del XX secoloFondatori di riviste italianeProfessori dell'Università Cattolica
del Sacro CuoreFondatori di università[altre]
Olivetti Marco
Maria Olivetti Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to
search Marco Maria Olivetti (Roma, 24 maggio 1943 – Roma, 28 ottobre 2006) è
stato un filosofo e storico della filosofia italiano. È stato dal 1979 fino
alla morte professore ordinario, presso l'Università di Roma La Sapienza, di
Filosofia della religione, e poi preside della Facoltà di filosofia.
Indice 1 Formazione
e orientamento 2 Analogia
del soggetto 3 Attività
accademica e influenza 4 Opere
5 Bibliografia
6 Voci
correlate 7 Collegamenti
esterni Formazione e orientamento Formatosi nella Facoltà di Filosofia di Roma
negli anni sessanta, confrontandosi con i temi del rapporto fede e ragione
nell'ambito di un collegio di docenti orientato sul versante marxista,
storicista, postidealista, trovò in Enrico Castelli Gattinara di Zubiena il suo
maestro. Con lui iniziò una collaborazione intellettuale che lo portò a
studiare i temi della filosofia della religione, partecipando ai colloqui
romani inaugurati dal filosofo piemontese, dapprima come segretario e poi, dopo
la morte di Castelli come organizzatore. Dopo iniziali studi di estetica
religiosa e di filosofia classica tedesca, si dedicò alla ricerca di un
approccio neotrascendentale al tema della religione, insegnando filosofia
morale a Bari e poi sostitundo Castelli nella cattedra romana di filosofia
della religione. Giunse negli anni ottanta, dopo l'incontro decisivo col
pensiero di Emmanuel Lévinas, ad elaborare una concezione di questa disciplina
come antropologia filosofica e etica in quanto «filosofia prima anzi anteriore»
(Analogia del Soggetto, «Prefazione», p. VII) , su base storica, nata dalla
dissoluzione in età tardo settecentesca, soprattutto ad opera di Immanuel Kant
e di Hegel, della onto-teologia. Molta rilevanza aveva nel suo insegnamento lo
studio dei classici tedeschi, in chiave storica, e da ultimo il confronto sia
con la fenomenologia francese, specie con Emmanuel Lévinas e Jean-Luc
Marion,sia con la filosofia analitica. Analogia del soggetto In Analogia
del soggetto (1992), la sua opera maggiore, l'autore elabora una teoria
analogica del soggetto, riprendendo suggestioni di Edmund Husserl, Karl-Otto
Apel ed Emmanuel Lévinas, confrontandosi nell'ultimo capitolo con Martin
Heidegger e suggerendo una teoria dell'"umanesimo dell'altro uomo"
(cfr. Considerazioni introduttive... cit., infra, p. 231) su base staurologica
ed etico-interinale («espropriarsi del caritatevole nell'interim interlocutivo»
- ibidem). «La tesi di questo saggio è che non esiste un'essenza
dell'essere umano. Tale essenza è immaginata, e senza siffatta immaginazione
l'essere e l'umano non si coapparterrebbero. Così si dice, in un certo senso la
fine dell'etica. Tuttavia così si dice anche che l'etica, e non l'ontologia, è
la filosofia prima, anzi anteriore» (Analogia del Soggetto, «Prefazione»,
p. VII) Di seguito l'autore prospetta un ripensamento del soggetto
trascendentale, con un differimento dell'ergo rispetto al cogito cartesiano,
partendo dal loquor, ovvero «dall'origine analogica di ogni logica», in modo da
scomporre la presenza trascendentale in sum-prae-es-abest. Si perverrebbe così,
in questo testo, all'abbozzo di un «ripensamento dell'appercezione
trascendentale» (ibidem), in modo tale da reimmettere il pensiero
rappresentativo nella «giusta traccia della rappresentazione» (ibidem).
Attività accademica e influenza Direttore dell'Istituto degli Studi Filosofici
Enrico Castelli e poi dell'"Archivio di Filosofia", si fece promotore
di colloqui e convegni nei quali conveniva, a Roma, ogni due anni, nei primi
giorni di gennaio, l'élite della filosofia della religione europea e mondiale
(Paul Ricœur, Jean-Luc Marion, Vittorio Mathieu, Sergio Quinzio, Virgilio
Melchiorre, Emmanuel Lévinas, Luigi Lombardi Vallauri, Bruno Forte, Bernard
Casper, Ingolf Dalferth, Jean Greisch, Philippe Capelle, Jean François
Courtine, Emmanuel Falque, Piergiorgio Grassi, Paul Gilbert S.J. Stéphane
Mosès, Paul Mendes-Flor, Pietro Prini, Adriaan Peperzak, Richard Swinburne,
Gabriel Vahanian, Marcel Hénaff, Vincenzo Vitiello, Xavier Tilliette, Michel
Henry, James Taylor, tra gli altri). Nelle sue prolusioni e nei suoi contributi
introduttivi si prospettava lo sfondo su cui si sarebbero esercitati i contributi
e le discussioni del Colloquio, di seguito pubblicati in numeri monografici
della Rivista "Archivio di Filosofia". I temi trattati erano
spesso centrali nell'elaborazione di una filosofia della religione come
filosofia tout court e abbracciavano, negli anni ottanta e novanta del
Novecento, temi centrali come "Teodicea oggi?", l'argomento
ontologico, l'Intersoggettività, il Dono, la Filosofia della Rivelazione,il
Sacrificio, il Terzo. La sua personalità riservata entro l'ambito strettamente
scientifico e il rigore speculativo dei suoi scritti non ne hanno favorito una
conoscenza pubblica al di là dei circuiti accademici, e il suo insegnamento ha
lasciato un traccia significativa costituendo una vera e propria scuola di
filosofia della religione. Opere La sua produzione scientifica vanta
oltre 250 pubblicazioni di materia filosofica nonché giuridica. Tra queste in
particolare: Il tempio simbolo cosmico, Cedam, Padova 1967 L'esito
teologico della filosofia del linguaggio in Jacobi, Cedam, Padova 1970. La philosophie
de la religion et le développement de la philsophie italienne, “Les Études
philosophiques”, 1971, pp. 193–208. Filosofia della religione come problema
storico, Cedam, Padova 1974. Da Leibniz a Bayle: alle radici degli
Spinozabriefe, “Archivio di filosofia”, 46 (1978) n. 1, pp. 147–199. Analogia
del soggetto, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1992. "Filosofia della religione" in
La filosofia, Le filosofie speciali, Utet, Torino 1995. Avant-propos, in Le
Tiers, Archivio di Filosofia – Archives of Philosophy, 2006, n. 1-3.
Considerazioni introduttive sul tema: Postmodernità senza Dio?, in «Humanitas»
[Postmodernità senza Dio?, a.c. di F. P. Ciglia e P. De Vitiis] 62(2/2007) pp.
230–233. Traduzioni e curatele: Kant I., La religione entro i limiti
della sola ragione, a cura di M.M. Olivetti, Roma-Bari, Laterza (Introduzione
del Curatore). La religione nei limiti della sola ragione, con introduzione a
cura di M.M.O, I.Kant, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1980. Saggio di una critica di ogni
rivelazione, con introduzione a cura di M.M.O, J.G. Fichte, Laterza, Roma-Bari
1998. Bibliografia Pierluigi Valenza, «OLIVETTI, Marco Maria» in Dizionario
Biografico degli Italiani, Volume 79, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 2012. Francesco Valerio Tommasi, Nota biografica su Marco Maria
Olivetti in « Archivio di filosofia », 76/3, 2008, p. 267-271. Francesco
Valerio Tommasi, Le persone, infiniti fini in sé. Un ricordo di Marco Maria
Olivetti lettore di Kant, « Studi Kantiani », 21, 2008, p. 121-126. Voci
correlate Filosofia della religione Fenomenologia Ontologia Teologia Fede
Ragione Collegamenti esterni Bruno Forte_Del sacrificio e dell'amore_In memoria
di M.M. Olivetti (PDF), su webdiocesi.chiesacattolica.it. Tributo
dell'Università di Roma 2 (PDF) [collegamento interrotto], su ast.uniroma1.it.
Istituzioni collegate, su filosofia.uniroma1.it. URL consultato il 14 gennaio
2009 (archiviato dall'url originale il 15 marzo 2008). Emanuela Giacca :
'"Marco Maria Olivetti, un filosofo della religione", Giornale di
filosofia, su giornaledifilosofia.net. Archivio di filosofia, su libraweb.net.
Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 55060169 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0000 7141 0606 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\009742 · LCCN
(EN) n83032059 · GND (DE) 123636949 · BNF (FR) cb11918096v (data) · WorldCat
Identities (EN) lccn-n83032059 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale
Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX secoloStorici della filosofia
italianiNati nel 1943Morti nel 2006Nati il 24 maggioMorti il 28 ottobreNati a
RomaMorti a Roma[altre]
Olivi Enrico Palladio degli Olivi (1580
circa1 – Udine, 16291), medico e storico italiano.
one-off communicatum. The
condition for an action to be taken in a specific way in cases where the
audience must recognize the utterer’s intention (a ‘one-off predicament’). The
recognition of the C-intention does not have to occur ‘once we have habits of
taking utterances one way or another.’
Blackburn:
one of the few philosohpers from Pembroke that Grice respects! -- From one-off
AIIBp to one-off GAIIB. Surely we have to generalise the B into the
PSI. Plus, 'action' is too strong, and should be replaced by
'emitting'This yields From EIIψp
GEIIψp. According to this
assumption, an emissor who is not assuming his addressee shares any system of
communication is in the original situation that S. W. Blackburn, of Pembroke,
dubbs “the one-off
predicament, and one can provide a scenario where the Griciean conditions, as
they are meant to hold, do hold, and emissor E communicates that p i. e. C1,
C2, and C3, are fulfilled, be accomplished in the "one-off predicament"
(in which no linguistic or other conventional ...The Gricean mechanism
with its complex communicative intentions has a clear point in what Blackburn
calls “a one-off
predicament” - a . Simon Blackburn's "one-off predicament"
of communicating without a shared language illustrates how Grice's theory can
be applied to iconic signals such as the ...Blackburn's "one-off
predicament" of communicating without a shared language illustrates how
Grice's theory can be applied to iconic signals such as the drawing of a skull
to wam of danger. See his Spreading the Word. III. 112.Thus S may draw a pic- "one-off
predicament"). ... Clarendon, 1976); and Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1984) ...by
Blackburn in “Spreading the word.” Since Grice’s main motivation is to progress
from one-off to philosophers’s mistakes, he does not explore the situation. He
gets close to it in “Meaning Revisited,” when proposing a ‘rational
reconstruction,’ FROM a one-off to a non-iconic system of communication, where
you can see his emphasis and motivation is in the last stage of the progress.
Since he is having the ‘end result,’ sometimes he is not careful in the
description of the ‘one-off,’ or dismissive of it. But as Blackburn notes, it
is crucial that Grice provides the ‘rudiments’ for a ‘meaning-nominalism,’
where an emissor can communicate that p in a one-off scenario. This is all
Grice needs to challenge those accounts based on ‘convention,’ or the idea of a
‘system’ of communication. There is possibly an implicaturum to the effect that
if something is a device is not a one-off, but that is easily cancellable. “He
used a one-off device, and it worked.”
one-piece-repertoire: of hops and rye, and he told me that in twenty-two years
neither the personnel of the three-piece band nor its one-piece repertoire had
undergone a change.
Unum:
One of the transcendentals – see Achillini -- see: one-many problem: also
called one-and-many problem, the question whether all things are one or many.
According to both Plato and Aristotle this was the central question for
pre-Socratic philosophers. Those who answered “one,” the monists, ascribed to
all things a single nature such as water, air, or oneness itself. They appear
not to have been troubled by the notion that numerically many things would have
this one nature. The pluralists, on the other hand, distinguished many
principles or many types of principles, though they also maintained the unity
of each principle. Some monists understood the unity of all things as a denial
of motion, and some pluralists advanced their view as a way of refuting this
denial. To judge from our sources, early Grecian metaphysics revolved around
the problem of the one and the many. In the modern period the dispute between
monists and pluralists centered on the question whether mind and matter
constitute one or two substances and, if one, what its nature is. Unum – see: one over many, a universale;
especially, a Platonic Form. According to Plato, if there are, e.g., many large
things, there must be some one largeness itself in respect of which they are
large; this “one over many” hen epi pollon is an intelligible entity, a Form,
in contrast with the sensible many. Plato himself recognizes difficulties
explaining how the one character can be present to the many and why the one and
the many do not together constitute still another many e.g., Parmenides
131a133b. Aristotle’s sustained critique of Plato’s Forms Metaphysics A 9, Z
1315 includes these and other problems, and it is he, more than Plato, who
regularly uses ‘one over many’ to refer to Platonic Forms.
ontogenesis.
Grice taught his children “not to tell lies” – “as my father and my mother
taught me.” One of his favourite paintings was “When did you last see your
father?” “I saw him in my dreams,” – “Not a lie, you see.” it is interesting
that Grice was always enquiring his childrens playmates: Can a sweater be red
and green all over? No stripes allowed! One found a developmental account of
the princile of conversational helpfulness boring, or as he said,
"dull." Refs.: There is an essay on the semantics of children’s
language, BANC.
Esse – variations
on ‘esse’ give us Grice’s ontological marxism:
As opposed to ‘ontological laisssez-faire’ Note the use of ‘ontological’
in ‘ontological’ Marxism. Is not metaphysical Marxism, so Grice knows what he
is talking about. Many times when he uses ‘metaphysics,’ he means
‘ontological.’ Ontological for Grice is at
least liberal. He is hardly enamoured of some of the motivations which prompt
the advocacy of psycho-physical identity. He has in mind a concern to exclude
an entity such as as a ‘soul,’ an event of the soul, or a property of the soul.
His taste is for keeping open house for all sorts of conditions of entities,
just so long as when the entity comes in it helps with the housework, i. e.,
provided that Grice see the entity work, and provided that it is not detected
in illicit logical behaviour, which need not involve some degree of
indeterminacy, The entity works? Ergo, the entity exists. And, if it comes on
the recommendation of some transcendental argument the entity may even qualify as
an entium realissimum. To exclude an honest working entitiy is metaphysical
snobbery, a reluctance to be seen in the company of any but the best. A
category, a universalium plays a role in Grice’s meta-ethics. A principles or
laws of psychology may be self-justifying, principles connected with the
evaluation of ends. If these same principles play a role in determining
what we count as entia realissima, metaphysics, and an abstractum would be
grounded in part in considerations about value (a not unpleasant
project). This ontological Marxism is latter day. In “Some remarks,” he
expresses his disregard for what he calls a “Wittgensteinian” limitation in
expecting behavioural manifestation of an ascription about a soul. Yet in
“Method” he quotes almost verbatim from Witters, “No psychological postulation
without the behaviour the postulation is meant to explain.” It was possibly D.
K. Lewis who made him change his mind. Grice was obsessed with Aristotle on
‘being,’ and interpreted Aristotle as holding a thesis of unified semantic
‘multiplicity.’ This is in agreement with the ontological Marxism, in more than
one ways. By accepting a denotatum for a praedicatum like ‘desideratum,’ Grice
is allowing the a desideratum may be the subject of discourse. It is an ‘entity’
in this fashion. Marxism and laissez-faire both exaggerate the role of the economy. Society needs a safety
net to soften the rough edges of free enterprise. Refs.: H. P. Grice,
“Ontological Marxism and ontological laissez-faire.” Engels – studied by Grice
for his “Ontological Marxism” -- F, G. socialist and economist who, with Marx,
was the founder of what later was called Marxism. Whether there are significant
differences between Marx and Engels is a question much in dispute among
scholars of Marxism. Certainly there are differences in emphasis, but there was
also a division of labor between them. Engels, and not Marx, presented a
Marxist account of natural science and integrated Darwinian elements in Marxian
theory. But they also coauthored major works, including The Holy Family, The G.
Ideology 1845, and The Communist Manifesto 1848. Engels thought of himself as
the junior partner in their lifelong collaboration. That judgment is correct,
but Engels’s work is both significant and more accessible than Marx’s. He gave
popular articulations of their common views in such books as Socialism: Utopian
and Scientific and AntiDühring 1878. His work, more than Marx’s, was taken by
the Second International and many subsequent Marxist militants to be definitive
of Marxism. Only much later with some Western Marxist theoreticians did his
influence decline. Engels’s first major work, The Condition of the Working
Class in England 1845, vividly depicted workers’ lives, misery, and systematic
exploitation. But he also saw the working class as a new force created by the
industrial revolution, and he developed an account of how this new force would
lead to the revolutionary transformation of society, including collective
ownership and control of the means of production and a rational ordering of
social life; all this would supersede the waste and disparity of human
conditions that he took to be inescapable under capitalism. The G. Ideology,
jointly authored with Marx, first articulated what was later called historical
materialism, a conception central to Marxist theory. It is the view that the
economic structure of society is the foundation of society; as the productive
forces develop, the economic structure changes and with that political, legal,
moral, religious, and philosophical ideas change accordingly. Until the
consolidation of socialism, societies are divided into antagonistic classes, a
person’s class being determined by her relationship to the means of production.
The dominant ideas of a society will be strongly conditioned by the economic
structure of the society and serve the class interests of the dominant class.
The social consciousness the ruling ideology will be that which answers to the
interests of the dominant class. From the 1850s on, Engels took an increasing
interest in connecting historical materialism with developments in natural
science. This work took definitive form in his Anti-Dühring, the first general
account of Marxism, and in his posthumously published Dialectics of Nature.
AntiDühring also contains his most extensive discussion of morality. It was in
these works that Engels articulated the dialectical method and a systematic
communist worldview that sought to establish that there were not only social
laws expressing empirical regularities in society but also universal laws of
nature and thought. These dialectical laws, Engels believed, reveal that both
nature and society are in a continuous process of evolutionary though
conflict-laden development. Engels should not be considered primarily, if at all,
a speculative philosopher. Like Marx, he was critical of and ironical about
speculative philosophy and was a central figure in the socialist movement.
While always concerned that his account be warrantedly assertible, Engels
sought to make it not only true, but also a finely tuned instrument of
working-class emancipation which would lead to a world without classes. Refs.:
H. P. Grice, “Ontological Marxism.”
Esse – variations
on ‘esse’ give us ‘ontological,’ and thus, ontological commitment: the object or
objects common to the ontology fulfilling some regimented theory a term
fashioned by Quine. The ontology of a regimented theory consists in the objects
the theory assumes there to be. In order to show that a theory assumes a given
object, or objects of a given class, we must show that the theory would be true
only if that object existed, or if that class is not empty. This can be shown
in two different but equivalent ways: if the notation of the theory contains
the existential quantifier ‘Ex’ of first-order predicate logic, then the theory
is shown to assume a given object, or objects of a given class, provided that
object is required among the values of the bound variables, or additionally is
required among the values of the domain of a given predicate, in order for the
theory to be true. Thus, if the theory entails the sentence ‘Exx is a dog’,
then the values over which the bound variable ‘x’ ranges must include at least
one dog, in order for the theory to be true. Alternatively, if the notation of
the theory contains for each predicate a complementary predicate, then the
theory assumes a given object, or objects of a given class, provided some
predicate is required to be true of that object, in order for the theory to be
true. Thus, if the theory contains the predicate ‘is a dog’, then the extension
of ‘is a dog’ cannot be empty, if the theory is to be true. However, it is
possible for different, even mutually exclusive, ontologies to fulfill a theory
equally well. Thus, an ontology containing collies to the exclusion of spaniels
and one containing spaniels to the exclusion of collies might each fulfill a
theory that entails ‘Ex x is a dog’. It follows that some of the objects a
theory assumes in its ontology may not be among those to which the theory is ontologically
committed. A theory is ontologically committed to a given object only if that
object is common to all of the ontologies fulfilling the theory. And the theory
is ontologically committed to objects of a given class provided that class is
not empty according to each of the ontologies fulfilling the theory.
casus obliquum
– Grice: “A bit of a redundancy: if it is a casus (ptosis), surely it fell
obliquely – the ‘casus rectum’ is an otiosity! Since ‘recte, ‘menans ‘not
oblique’! -- casus rectum (orthe ptosis) vs. ‘casus obliquus – plagiai ptoseis
– genike, dotike, aitiatike. “ptosis” is not
attested in Grecian before Plato. A noun of action based on the radical of
πίπτω, to fall, ptôsis means literally a fall: the fall of a die Plato,
Republic, X.604c, or of lightning Aristotle, Meteorology, 339a Alongside this
basic value and derived metaphorical values: decadence, death, and so forth, in
Aristotle the word receives a linguistic specification that was to have great
influence: retained even in modern Grecian ptôsê πτώση, its Roman Tr. casus allowed it to designate grammatical case
in most modern European languages. In fact, however, when it first appears in
Aristotle, the term does not initially designate the noun’s case inflection. In
the De Int. chaps. 2 and 3, it qualifies the modifications, both semantic and
formal casual variation of the verb and those of the noun: he was well, he will
be well, in relation to he is well; about Philo, to Philo, in relation to
Philo. As a modification of the noun—that is, in Aristotle, of its basic form,
the nominative—the case ptôsis differs from the noun insofar as, associated
with is, was, or will be, it does not permit the formation of a true or false
statement. As a modification of the verb, describing the grammatical tense, it
is distinguished from the verb that oversignifies the present: the case of the
verb oversignifies the time that surrounds the present. From this we must
conclude that to the meaning of a given verb e.g., walk the case of the verb
adds the meaning prossêmainei πϱοσσημαίνει of its temporal modality he will
walk. Thus the primacy of the present over the past and the future is affirmed,
since the present of the verb has no case. But the Aristotelian case is a still
broader, vaguer, and more elastic notion: presented as part of expression in
chapter 20 of the Poetics, it qualifies variation in number and modality. It
further qualifies the modifications of the noun, depending on the gender ch.21
of the Poetics; Top. as well as adverbs
derived from a substantive or an adjective, like justly, which is derived from
just. The notion of case is thus essential for the characterization of
paronyms. Aristotle did not yet have specialized names for the different cases
of nominal inflection. When he needs to designate them, he does so in a
conventional manner, usually by resorting to the inflected form of a pronoun—
τούτου, of this, for the genitive, τούτῳ, to this, for the dative, and so on —
and sometimes to that of a substantive or adjective. In the Prior Analytics,
Aristotle insists on distinguishing between the terms ὅϱοι that ought always to
be stated in the nominative ϰλῆσεις, e.g. man, good, contraries, but the
premisses ought to be understood with reference to the cases of each
term—either the dative, e.g. ‘equal to this’ toutôi, dative, or the genitive,
e.g. ‘double of this’ toutou, genitive, or the accusative, e.g. ‘that which
strikes or v.s this’ τούτο, accusative, or the nominative, e.g. ‘man is an
animal’ οὗτος, nominative, or in whatever other way the word falls πίπτει in
the premiss Anal. Post., I.36, 48b, 4 In the latter expression, we may find the
origin of the metaphor of the fall—which remains controversial. Some
commentators relate the distinction between what is direct and what is oblique
as pertains to grammatical cases, which may be direct orthê ptôsis or oblique plagiai
ptôseis, but also to the grand metaphoric and conceptual register that stands
on this distinction to falling in the game of jacks, it being possible that the
jack could fall either on a stable side and stand there—the direct case—or on
three unstable sides— the oblique cases. In an unpublished dissertation on the
principles of Stoic grammar, Hans Erich Müller proposes to relate the Stoic
theory of cases to the theory of causality, by trying to associate the
different cases with the different types of causality. They would thus
correspond in the utterance to the different causal postures of the body in the
physical field. For the Stoics, predication is a matter not of identifying an
essence ousia οὖσια and its attributes in conformity with the Aristotelian
categories, but of reproducing in the utterance the causal relations of action
and passion that bodies entertain among themselves. It was in fact with the
Stoics that cases were reduced to noun cases—in Dionysius Thrax TG, 13, the
verb is a word without cases lexis aptôton, and although egklisis means mode,
it sometimes means inflection, and then it covers the variations of the verb,
both temporal and modal. If Diogenes Laertius VII.192 is to be believed,
Chrysippus wrote a work On the Five Cases. It must have included, as Diogenes
VII.65 tells us, a distinction between the direct case orthê ptôsis—the case
which, constructed with a predicate, gives rise to a proposition axiôma,
VII.64—and oblique cases plagiai ptseis, which now are given names, in this
order: genitive genikê, dative dôtikê, and accusative aitiatikê. A
classification of predicates is reported by Porphyry, cited in Ammonius
Commentaire du De Int. d’Aristote, 44, 19f.. Ammonius 42, 30f. reports a
polemic between Aristotle and the Peripatetics, on the one hand, and the Stoics
and grammarians associated with them, on the other. For the former, the
nominative is not a case, it is the noun itself from which the cases are
declined; for the latter, the nominative is a full-fledged case: it is the
direct case, and if it is a case, that is because it falls from the concept,
and if it is direct, that is because it falls directly, just as the stylus can,
after falling, remain stable and straight. Although ptôsis is part of the
definition of the predicate—the predicate is what allows, when associated with
a direct case, the composition of a proposition—and figures in the part of
dialectic devoted to signifieds, it is neither defined nor determined as a
constituent of the utterance alongside the predicate. In Stoicism, ptôsis v.ms
to signify more than grammatical case alone. Secondary in relation to the
predicate that it completes, it is a philosophical concept that refers to the
manner in which the Stoics v.m to have criticized the Aristotelian notion of
substrate hupokeimenon ὑποϰειμένον as well as the distinction between substance
and accidents. Ptôsis is the way in which the body or bodies that our
representation phantasia φαντασία presents to us in a determined manner appear
in the utterance, issuing not directly from perception, but indirectly, through
the mediation of the concept that makes it possible to name it/them in the form
of an appellative a generic concept, man, horse or a name a singular concept,
Socrates. Cases thus represent the diverse ways in which the concept of the
body falls in the utterance though Stoic nominalism does not admit the
existence of this concept—just as here there is no Aristotelian category
outside the different enumerated categorial rubrics, there is no body outside a
case position. However, caring little for these subtleties, the scholiasts of
Technê v.m to confirm this idea in their own context when they describe the
ptôsis as the fall of the incorporeal and the generic into the specific ἔϰ τοῦ
γενιϰοῦ εἰς τὸ εἰδιϰόν. In the work of the grammarians, case is reduced to the
grammatical case, that is, to the morphological variation of nouns, pronouns,
articles, and participles, which, among the parts of speech, accordingly
constitute the subclass of casuels, a parts of speech subject to case-based
inflection πτωτιϰά. The canonical list of cases places the vocative klêtikê ϰλητιϰή
last, after the direct eutheia εὐθεῖα case and the three oblique cases, in
their Stoic order: genitive, dative, accusative. This order of the oblique
cases gives rise, in some commentators eager to rationalize Scholia to the
Technê, 549, 22, to a speculation inspired by localism: the case of the PARONYM
743 place from which one comes in Grecian , the genitive is supposed naturally
to precede that of the place where one is the dative, which itself naturally
precedes that of the place where one is going the accusative. Apollonius’s
reflection on syntax is more insightful; in his Syntax III.15888 he presents,
in this order, the accusative, the genitive, and the dative as expressing three
degrees of verbal transitivity: conceived as the distribution of activity and
passivity between the prime actant A in the direct case and the second actant B
in one of the three oblique cases in the process expressed by a biactantial
verb, the transitivity of the accusative corresponds to the division A all
active—B all passive A strikes B; the transitivity of the genitive corresponds
to the division A primarily active/passive to a small degree—B primarily
passive/active to a small degree A listens to B; and the transitivity of the
dative, to the division A and B equally active-passive A fights with The direct
case, at the head of the list, owes its prmacy to the fact that it is the case
of nomination: names are given in the direct case. The verbs of existence and
nomination are constructed solely with the direct case, without the function of
the attribute being thematized as such. Although Chrysippus wrote about five
cases, the fifth case, the vocative, v.ms to have escaped the division into
direct and oblique cases. Literally appelative prosêgorikon πϱοσηγοϱιϰόν, it
could refer not only to utterances of address but also more generally to
utterances of nomination. In the grammarians, the vocative occupies a marginal
place; whereas every sentence necessarily includes a noun and a verb, the
vocative constitutes a complete sentence by itself. Frédérique Ildefonse REFS.:
Aristotle. Analytica priorTr. J.
Jenkinson. In the Works of Aristotle, vol. 1, ed. and Tr.
W. D. Ross, E. M. Edghill, J. Jenkinson, G.R.G. Mure, and Wallace
Pickford. Oxford: Oxford , 192 . Poetics. Ed.
and Tr. Stephen Halliwell.
Cambridge: Harvard / Loeb Classical
Library, . Delamarre, Alexandre. La notion de ptōsis chez Aristote et les
Stoïciens. In Concepts et Catégories dans la pensée antique, ed. by Pierre Aubenque, 3214 : Vrin, . Deleuze,
Gilles. Logique du sens. : Minuit, . Tr.
Mark Lester with Charles Stivale: The Logic of Sense. Ed. by Constantin V. Boundas. : Columbia , .
Dionysius Thrax. Technē grammatikē. Book I, vol. 1 of Grammatici Graeci,
ed. by Gustav Uhlig. Leipzig: Teubner,
188 Eng. Tr. T. D. son: The Grammar. St. Louis, 187 Fr. Tr. J.
Lallot: La grammaire de Denys le Thrace. 2nd rev. and expanded ed. : CNRS
Éditions, . Frede, Michael. The Origins of Traditional Grammar. In Historical
and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology, and Phil. of Science, ed. by E. H. Butts and J. Hintikka, 517 Dordrecht,
Neth.: Reiderl, . Reprinted, in M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Phil. , 3385 Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, . . The Stoic Notion of a Grammatical Case.
Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of 39 : 132
Hadot, Pierre. La notion de ‘cas’ dans la logique stoïcienne. Pp. 10912 in
Actes du XIIIe Congrès des sociétés de philosophie en langue française. Geneva:
Baconnière, . Hiersche, Rolf. Entstehung und Entwicklung des Terminus πτῶσις,
‘Fall.’ Sitzungsberichte der deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin:
Klasse für Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst 3 1955: 51 Ildefonse, Frédérique. La
naissance de la grammaire dans l’Antiquité grecque. : Vrin, . Imbert, Claude.
Phénoménologies et langues formularies. : Presses Universitaires de France, .
Pinborg, Jan. Classical Antiquity: Greece. In Current Trends in Linguistics,
ed. by Th. Sebeok. Vol. 13 in
Historiography of Linguistics series. The Hague and : Mouton, .-- oratio obliqua: The idea of ‘oratio’ is central. Grice’s
sentence. It expresses ‘a thought,’ a ‘that’-clause. Oratio recta is central,
too. Grice’s example is “The dog is shaggy.” The use of ‘oratio’ here Grice
disliked. One can see a squarrel grabbing a nut, Toby judges that a nut is to
eat. So we would have a ‘that’-clause, and in a way, an ‘oratio obliqua,’ which
is what the UTTERER (not the squarrel) would produce as ‘oratio recta,’ ‘A nut
is to eat,’ should the circumstance obtains. At some points he allows things
like “Snow is white” means that snow is white. Something at the Oxford
Philosohical Society he would not. Grice is vague in this. If the verb is a ‘verbum
dicendi,’ ‘oratio obliqua’ is literal. If it’s a verbum sentiendi or
percipiendi, volendi, credendi, or cognoscenti, the connection is looser. Grice
was especially concerned that buletic verbs usually do not take a that-clause
(but cf. James: I will that the distant table sides over the floor toward me.
It does not!). Also that seems takes a that-clause in ways that might not
please Maucalay. Grice had explored that-clauses with Staal. He was concerned about
the viability of an initially appealing etymological approach by Davidson to
the that-clause in terms of demonstration. Grice had presupposed the logic of
that-clauses from a much earlier stage, Those spots mean that he has
measles.The f. contains a copy of Davidsons essay, On saying that, the
that-clause, the that-clause, with Staal . Davidson quotes from Murray et
al. The Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford. Cf. Onions, An Advanced English
Syntax, and remarks that first learned that that in such contexts evolved
from an explicit demonstrative from Hintikkas Knowledge and Belief. Hintikka
remarks that a similar development has taken place in German Davidson owes the
reference to the O.E.D. to Stiezel. Indeed Davidson was fascinated by the fact
that his conceptual inquiry repeated phylogeny. It should come as no surprise
that a that-clause utterance evolves through about the stages our
ruminations have just carried us. According to the Oxford English Dictionary,
the use of that in a that-clause is generally held to have arisen out of the
demonstrative pronoun pointing to the clause which it introduces. The sequence
goes as follows. He once lived here: we all know that; that, now this, we all
know: he once lived here; we all know that, or this: he once lived here; we all
know that he once lived here. As Hintikka notes, some pedants trying to display
their knowledge of German, use a comma before that: We all know, that he once
lived here, to stand for an earlier :: We all know: that he once lived
here. Just like the English translation that, dass can be omitted in a sentence. Er glaubt, dass die Erde eine Scheibe sei. He believes that the Earth is a disc. Er
glaubt, die Erde sei eine Scheibe. He believes the Earth is a disc. The
that-clause is brought to the fore by Davidson, who, consulting the OED,
reminds philosophers that the English that is very cognate with the German
idiom. More specifically, that is a demonstrative, even if the syntax, in
English, hides this fact in ways which German syntax doesnt. Grice needs
to rely on that-clauses for his analysis of mean, intend, and notably
will. He finds that Prichards genial discovery was the license to use
willing as pre-facing a that-clause. This allows Grice to deals with
willing as applied to a third person. I will that he wills that he wins the
chess match. Philosophers who disregard this third-person use may indulge in
introspection and Subjectsivism when they shouldnt! Grice said that Prichard
had to be given great credit for seeing that the accurate specification of
willing should be willing that and not willing to. Analogously, following
Prichard on willing, Grice does not
stipulate that the radix for an intentional (utterer-oriented or
exhibitive-autophoric-buletic) incorporate a reference to the utterer (be in
the first person), nor that the radix for an imperative (addressee-oriented or
hetero-phoric protreptic buletic) or desiderative in general, incorporate a
reference of the addressee (be in the second person). They shall not pass is a
legitimate intentional as is the ‘you shall not get away with it,’either
involves Prichards wills that, rather than wills to). And the sergeant is to
muster the men at dawn (uttered by a captain to a lieutenant) is a perfectly
good imperative, again involving Prichards wills that, rather than wills to. Refs.:
The allusions are scattered, but there are specific essays, one on the
‘that’-clause, and also discussions on Davidson on saying that. There is a
reference to ‘oratio obliqua’ and Prichard in “Uncertainty,” BANC.
open-close
distinction, the:
open formula: also called open sentence, a sentence with a free occurrence of a
variable. A closed sentence, sometimes called a ‘statement,’ has no free
occurrences of variables. In a language whose only variable-binding operators
are quantifiers, an occurrence of a variable in a formula is bound provided
that occurrence either is within the scope of a quantifier employing that
variable or is the occurrence in that quantifier. An occurrence of a variable
in a formula is free provided it is not bound. The formula ‘xy O’ is open because both ‘x’ and ‘y’ occur as
free variables. In ‘For some real number y, xy
O’, no occurrence of ‘y’ is free; but the occurrence of ‘x’ is free, so
the formula is open. The sentence ‘For every real number x, for some real
number y, xy O’ is closed, since none of
the variables occur free. Semantically, an open formula such as ‘xy 0’ is neither true nor false but rather true
of or false of each assignment of values to its free-occurring variables. For
example, ‘xy 0’ is true of each
assignment of two positive or two negative real numbers to ‘x’ and to ‘y’ and
it is false of each assignment of 0 to either and false at each assignment of a
positive real to one of the variables and a negative to the other. Refs.: H. P.
Grice, “Implicatura of free-variable utterances.”
porosität: porosity -- open texture, the possibility of
vagueness. Waismann “Verifiability,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
introduced the metaphor, claiming that open texture is a universal property of
empirical terms. Waismann claims that an inexhaustible source of vagueness
remains even after measures are taken to make an expression precise. His
grounds were, first, that there are an indefinite number of possibilities for
which it is indeterminate whether the expression applies i.e., for which the
expression is vague. There is, e.g., no definite answer whether a catlike
creature that repeatedly vanishes into thin air, then reappears, is a cat.
Waismann’s explanation is that when we define an empirical term, we frame
criteria of its applicability only for foreseeable circumstances. Not all
possible situations in which we may use the term, however, can be foreseen.
Thus, in unanticipated circumstances, real or merely possible, a term’s
criteria of applicability may yield no definite answer to whether it applies.
Second, even for terms such as ‘gold’, for which there are several precise
criteria of application specific gravity, X-ray spectrograph, solubility in
aqua regia, applying different criteria can yield divergent verdicts, the
result being vagueness. Waismann uses the concept of open texture to explain
why experiential statements are not conclusively verifiable, and why
phenomenalist attempts to translate material object statements fail. Waismanns Konzept
der offenen Struktur oder Porosität, hat in der ... πόρος , ὁ, (πείρω,
περάω) A.means of passing a river, ford, ferry, Θρύον Ἀλφειοῖο π. Thryum the
ford of the Alphëus, Il.2.592, h.Ap.423, cf. h.Merc.398; “πόρον ἷξον Ξάνθου”
Il.14.433; “Ἀξίου π.” A.Pers.493; ἀπικνέεται ἐς τὸν π.τῆς διαβάσιος to the
place of the passage, Hdt.8.115; “π. διαβὰς Ἅλυος” A.Pers.864(lyr.); “τοῦ κατ᾽ Ὠρωπὸν
π. μηδὲν πραττέσθω” IG12.40.22. 2. narrow part of the sea, strait, “διαβὰς
πόρον Ὠκεανοῖο” Hes.Th.292; “παρ᾽ Ὠκεανοῦ . . ἄσβεστον π.” A.Pr.532 (lyr.); π. Ἕλλης
(Dor. Ἕλλας), = Ἑλλήσποντος, Pi.Fr.189, A.Pers. 875(lyr.), Ar.V.308(lyr.); Ἰόνιος
π. the Ionian Sea which is the passage-way from Greece to Italy, Pi.N.4.53;
“πέλαγος αἰγαίου πόρου” E.Hel.130; Εὔξεινος, ἄξενος π. (cf. “πόντος” 11),
Id.Andr.1262, IT253; διάραντες τὸν π., i.e. the sea between Sicily and Africa,
Plb.1.37.1; ἐν πόρῳ in the passage-way (of ships), in the fair-way, Hdt.7.183,
Th. 1.120, 6.48; “ἐν π. τῆς ναυμαχίης” Hdt.8.76; “ἕως τοῦ π. τοῦ κατὰ τὸν ὅρμον
τὸν Ἀφροδιτοπολίτην” PHib.1.38.5(iii B.C.). 3. periphr., πόροι ἁλός the paths
of the sea, i.e. the sea, Od.12.259; “Αἰγαίου πόντοιο πλατὺς π.” D.P.131; “ἐνάλιοι
π.” A.Pers.453; π.ἁλίρροθοι ib.367, S.Aj.412(lyr.); freq. of rivers, π. Ἀλφεοῦ,
Σκαμάνδρου, i.e. the Alphëus, Scamander, etc., Pi.O.1.92, A.Ch.366(lyr.), etc.;
“ῥυτοὶ π.” Id.Eu.452, cf.293; Πλούτωνος π. the river Pluto, Id.Pr.806: metaph.,
βίου π. the stream of life, Pi.I.8(7).15; “π. ὕμνων” Emp.35.1. 4. artificial
passage over a river, bridge, Hdt.4.136,140, 7.10.“γ́;” aqueduct,
IG7.93(Megara, V A.D., restd.), Epigr.Gr.1073.4 (Samos). 5. generally, pathway,
way, A.Ag. 910, S.Ph.705(lyr.), etc.; track of a wild beast, X.Cyr.1.6.40; αἰθέρα
θ᾽ ἁγνὸν πόρον οἰωνῶν their pathway, A.Pr.284(anap.); ἐν τῷ π.εἶναι to be in
the way, Sammelb.7356.11(ii A.D.): metaph., “πραπίδων πόροι” A.Supp.94(lyr.).
6. passage through a porous substance, opening, Epicur.Ep.1pp.10,18 U.; esp.
passage through the skin, οἱ πόροι the pores or passages by which the ἀπορροαί
passed, acc. to Empedocles, “πόρους λέγετε εἰς οὓς καὶ δι᾽ ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ
πορεύονται” Pl.Men.76c, cf. Epicur. Fr.250, Metrod. Fr.7,Ti.Locr.100e; “νοητοὶ
π.” S.E.P.2.140; opp. ὄγκοι, Gal. 10.268; so of sponges, Arist. HA548b31; of
plants, Id.Pr. 905b8, Thphr.CP1.2.4, HP1.10.5. b. of other ducts or openings of
the body, π. πρῶτος, of the womb, Hp. ap. Poll.2.222; πόροι σπερματικοί, θορικοὶ
π., Arist.GA716b17, 720b13; π. “ὑστερικοί” the ovaries. Id.HA570a5, al.; τροφῆς
π., of the oesophagus, Id.PA650a15, al.; of the rectum, Id.GA719b29; of the
urinal duct, ib.773a21; of the arteries and veins, Id.HA510a14, etc. c.
passages leading from the organs of sensation to the brain, “ψυχὴ παρεσπαρμένη
τοῖς π.” Pl.Ax.366a; “οἱ π. τοῦ ὄμματος” Arist.Sens.438b14, cf. HA495a11, PA
656b17; ὤτων, μυκτήρων, Id.GA775a2, cf. 744a2; of the optic nerves, Heroph. ap.
Gal.7.89. II. c. gen. rei, way or means of achieving, accomplishing,
discovering, etc., “οὐκ ἐδύνατο π. οὐδένα τούτου ἀνευρεῖν” Hdt.2.2; “οὐδεὶς π. ἐφαίνετο
τῆς ἁλώσιος” Id.3.156; “τῶν ἀδοκήτων π. ηὗρε θεός” E.Med.1418 (anap.); π. ὁδοῦ a
means of performing the journey, Ar.Pax124; “π. ζητήματος” Pl.Tht.191a; but
also π. κακῶν a means of escaping evils, a way out of them, E.Alc.213 (lyr.):
c. inf., “πόρος νοῆσαι” Emp.4.12; “π. εὐθαρσεῖν” And.2.16; “π. τις μηχανή τε .
. ἀντιτείσασθαι” E.Med.260: with Preps., “π. ἀμφί τινος” A.Supp.806 codd.
(lyr.); περί τινος dub. in Ar.Ec.653; “πόροι πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν” X. An.2.5.20. 2.
abs., providing, means of providing, opp. ἀπορία, Pl. Men.78d sq.; contrivance,
device, “οἵας τέχνας τε καὶ π. ἐμησάμην” A.Pr. 477; δεινὸς γὰρ εὑρεῖν κἀξ ἀμηχάνων
πόρον ib.59, cf. Ar.Eq.759; “μέγας π.” A.Pr.111; “τίνα π. εὕρω πόθεν;” E.IA356
(troch.). 3. π. χρημάτων a way of raising money, financial provision,
X.Ath.3.2, HG1.6.12, D.1.19, IG7.4263.2 (Oropus, iii B.C.), etc.; “ὁ π. τῶν
χρ.” D.4.29, IG12(5).1001.1 (Ios, iv B.C.); without χρημάτων, SIG284.23
(Erythrae, iv B.C.), etc.; “μηχανᾶσθαι προσόδου π.” X.Cyr.1.6.10, cf. PTeb.75.6
(ii B.C.): in pl., 'ways and means', resources, revenue, “πόροι χρημάτων” D.
18.309: abs., “πόρους πορίζειν” Hyp.Eux.37, cf. X.Cyr.1.6.9 (sg.), Arist.
Rh.1359b23; πόροι ἢ περὶ προσόδων, title of work by X.: sg., source of revenue,
endowment, OGI544.24 (Ancyra, ii A.D.), 509.12,14 (Aphrodisias, ii A.D.), etc.
b. assessable income or property, taxable estate, freq. in Pap., as BGU1189.11
(i A.D.), etc.; liability, PHamb.23.29 (vi A.D.), etc. III. journey, voyage,
“μακρᾶς κελεύθου π.” A. Th. 546; “παρόρνιθας π. τιθέντες” Id.Eu.770, cf.
E.IT116, etc.; ἐν τῷ π. πλοῖον ἀνατρέψαι on its passage, Aeschin.3.158. IV. Π
personified as father of Ἔρως, Pl.Smp.203b.
operationalism:
a program in philosophy of science that aims to interpret scientific concepts
via experimental procedures and observational outcomes. P. W. Bridgman
introduced the terminology when he required that theoretical concepts be
identified with the operations used to measure them. Logical positivism’s
criteria of cognitive significance incorporated the notion: Bridgman’s
operationalism was assimilated to the positivistic requirement that theoretical
terms T be explicitly defined via logically equivalent to directly observable
conditions O. Explicit definitions failed to accommodate alternative
measurement procedures for the same concept, and so were replaced by reduction
sentences that partially defined individual concepts in observational terms via
sentences such as ‘Under observable circumstances C, x is T if and only if O’.
Later this was weakened to allow ensembles of theoretical concepts to be
partially defined via interpretative systems specifying collective observable
effects of the concepts rather than effects peculiar to single concepts. These
cognitive significance notions were incorporated into various behaviorisms,
although the term ‘operational definition’ is rarely used by scientists in
Bridgman’s or the explicit definition senses: intervening variables are
theoretical concepts defined via reduction sentences and hypothetical
constructs are definable by interpretative systems but not reduction sentences.
In scientific contexts observable terms often are called dependent or
independent variables. When, as in science, the concepts in theoretical
assertions are only partially defined, observational consequences do not
exhaust their content, and so observational data underdetermines the truth of
such assertions in the sense that more than one theoretical assertion will be
compatible with maximal observational data.
Operatum
– “Unoriginally, I will use “O” to symbolise an ‘operator’” – Grice. if you
have an operaturm, you also have an operator – operans, operaturum, operandum,
operatum – The operans is like the operator: a one-place sentential connective;
i.e., an expression that may be prefixed to an open or closed sentence to
produce, respectively, a new open or closed sentence. Thus ‘it is not the case
that’ is a truth-functional operator. The most thoroughly investigated
operators are the intensional ones; an intensional operator O, when prefixed to
an open or closed sentence E, produces an open or closed sentence OE, whose
extension is determined not by the extension of E but by some other property of
E, which varies with the choice of O. For example, the extension of a closed
sentence is its truth-value A, but if the modal operator ‘it is necessary that’
is prefixed to A, the extension of the result depends on whether A’s extension
belongs to it necessarily or contingently. This property of A is usually
modeled by assigning to A a subset X of a domain of possible worlds W. If X % W
then ‘it is necessary that A’ is true, but if X is a proper subset of W, it is
false. Another example involves the epistemic operator ‘it is plausible that’.
Since a true sentence may be either plausible or implausible, the truth-value
of ‘it is plausible that A’ is not fixed by the truth-value of A, but rather by
the body of evidence that supports A relative to a thinker in a given context.
This may also be modeled in a possible worlds framework, by operant
conditioning operator 632 632
stipulating, for each world, which worlds, if any, are plausible relative to
it. The topic of intensional operators is controversial, and it is even
disputable whether standard examples really are operators at the correct level
of logical form. For instance, it can be argued that ‘it is necessary that’,
upon analysis, turns out to be a universal quantifier over possible worlds, or
a predicate of expressions. On the former view, instead of ‘it is necessary
that A’ we should write ‘for every possible world w, Aw’, and, on the latter,
‘A is necessarily true’.
Opocher
Enrico Opocher Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to
search Enrico Giuseppe Opocher Enrico
Giuseppe Opocher (Treviso, 19 febbraio 1914 – Padova, 3 marzo 2004) è stato un
filosofo e giurista italiano. Con Adolfo
Ravà e Giuseppe Capograssi è considerato uno dei maggiori filosofi del diritto
italiani del Novecento[senza fonte].
Indice 1 Biografia 2 Opere
principali 3 Note
4 Bibliografia
5 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Nacque da Enrico Giovanni, ginecologo di fama, e da Ida Cini.
Durante la Grande Guerra la famiglia, timorosa dei bombardamenti, si trasferì
dapprima nella periferia di Treviso, quindi a Pistoia presso una parente. Gli
anni successivi riportarono un clima di serenità e agiatezza, nel quale Enrico
crebbe, dividendosi tra la città natale e Vittorio Veneto, meta delle sue
vacanze estive[1]. Dopo il liceo fu
avviato, secondo il volere del padre, agli studi giuridici, benché fosse
decisamente più inclinato verso la filosofia. Nel 1931 si iscrisse alla facoltà
di giurisprudenza dell'Università di Padova, ma continuò a coltivare i propri
interessi personali seguendo le lezioni di filosofia del diritto tenute da
Adolfo Ravà. Sotto la guida di quest'ultimo stilò una tesi su La proprietà
nella filosofia del diritto di G. A. Fichte, con la quale si laureò
brillantemente nel 1935[1]. Ottenuta nel
1942 la libera docenza,[1] vinse nel 1948 il concorso per la cattedra di
filosofia del diritto presso la facoltà di giurisprudenza dell'Università di
Padova[1], succedendo a Bobbio che in Veneto era divenuto segretario regionale
del Partito d'Azione.[2] Nell'ateneo padovano insegnò ininterrottamente per
quarant'anni, tenendo lezioni per i corsi di filosofia del diritto, di storia
delle dottrine politiche e di dottrina dello stato Italiano. È ricordato in maniera particolare per i suoi
studi sull'idea di giustizia, e sul rapporto tra diritto e valori, nonché per
la redazione di un celebre manuale, Lezioni di filosofia del diritto, prima
edizione 1949, usato da generazioni di allievi.[3] Fu magnifico rettore dell'Università negli
anni 1968 - 1972.[1][4] È stato Presidente della Società Italiana di Filosofia
Giuridica e Politica dal 1976 al 1983.[1][5]
Influenzato dall'amicizia con il cattolico Capograssi e col laico
Bobbio, fu azionista con Bobbio e Trentin, condividendo (a Palazzo del Bo) le
attività cospirative della Resistenza locale.[6] Nel dopoguerra rimase amico
stretto di Trentin e di Visentini, divenendo a sua volta il maestro di Toni
Negri.[7] Opere principali G. A. Fichte
e il problema dell'individualità, Padova, CEDAM, 1944. Il valore
dell'esperienza giuridica, Treviso, Tipografia Crivellari, 1947. Il problema
della giustizia nel materialismo storico, Milano, Bocca, 1948. Estr. da
"Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto", anno 25, fasc.
3-4, luglio-dicembre 1948. Lezioni di filosofia del diritto. Raccolte ad uso
degli studenti dall'assistente Luigi Caiani, Padova, CEDAM, 1949. Il problema
della natura della giurisprudenza, Padova, CEDAM, 1953. Analisi dell'idea della
giustizia, Milano, Giuffrè, 1977. Note
Dario Ippolito, Enrico Giuseppe Opocher, in Dizionario biografico degli
italiani, vol. 79, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2013. URL
consultato il 26 dicembre 2013. ^ Fulvio Cortese, Liberare e federare:
L'eredità intellettuale di Silvio Trentin, Firenze University Press, 2016, p.
261, ISBN 9788864533117, OCLC 981246161. URL consultato il 10 luglio 2019
(archiviato il 10 luglio 2019)., citando D. Fiorot, La filosofia politica e
civile di E. Opocher, in Scritti in onore di E. Opocher, a cura di G. Netto,
Ateneo di Treviso, Treviso, 1992, pp. 15-37. ^ Vedi G. Zaccaria, Il contributo
italiano alla storia del Pensiero, riferimenti in Bibliografia. ^ Università di
Padova, I rettori Unipd | Università di Padova, su www.unipd.it. URL consultato
il 15 aprile 2018. ^ Denominazione attuale: Società Italiana di Filosofia del
Diritto, vedi Collegamenti esterni. ^ Giuseppe Zaccaria, Il Rettore della
tolleranza, in La Tribuna di Treviso, 19 aprile 2005. URL consultato il 10
luglio 2019 (archiviato il 10 luglio 2019). ^ Toni Negri: «Un uomo davvero
libero nell'università chiusa degli anni '60», in [Il Mattino di Padova]+, 6
marzo 2004 (archiviato il 10 luglio 2019). Bibliografia Giuseppe Zaccaria (a
cura di), Ricordo di Enrico Opocher. Omaggio ad un maestro, Padova, CEDAM,
2006. ISBN 88-13-26174-8 Giuseppe Zaccaria, «Opocher, Enrico» in Il contributo
italiano alla storia del Pensiero – Diritto, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 2012. Dario Ippolito, «Opocher, Enrico» in Dizionario Biografico
degli Italiani, Volume 79, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2013.
Collegamenti esterni Società Italiana di Filosofia del Diritto, su sifd.it. URL
consultato il 6 dicembre 2013 (archiviato dall'url originale il 12 dicembre
2013). Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 88614115 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0000 8345 127X · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\025278 · LCCN
(EN) n80116910 · GND (DE) 119198487 · BNF (FR) cb12478386w (data) · BAV (EN)
495/162595 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n80116910 Biografie Portale Biografie
Diritto Portale Diritto Filosofia Portale Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi
italiani del XX secoloGiuristi italiani del XX secoloNati nel 1914Morti nel
2004Nati il 19 febbraioMorti il 3 marzoNati a TrevisoMorti a PadovaFilosofi del
dirittoProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di PadovaRettori dell'Università
degli Studi di Padova[altre]
adverb
– for the speculative grammarian like Alcuin, or Occam, a part of speech – pars
orationis – surely not one of Plato’s basic ones! -- operator theory of
adverbs, a theory that treats adverbs and other predicate modifiers as
predicate-forming operators on predicates. The theory expands the syntax of
first-order predicate calculus of identity – Sytem G, Gricese -- by adding
operators of various degrees, and makes corresponding additions to the
semantics. Romane Clark, Terence Parsons, and Richard Montague with Hans Kamp
developed the theory independently. Grice discusses it in “Actions and events.”
For example: ‘John runs quickly through the kitchen’ contains a simple one-place
predicate, ‘runs’ applied to John; a zero-place operator, ‘quickly’, and a
one-place operator, ‘through ’ with ‘the kitchen’ filling its place. The
semantics of the expression becomes [O1 1a [O2 0 [Pb]]], which can be read as “[through
the kitchen [quickly [runs John]]]. Semantically ‘quickly’ will be associated
with an operation that takes us from the extension of ‘runs’ to a subset of
that extension. ‘John runs quickly’ entails, but does not implicate, ‘John
runs’. ‘Through the kitchen’ and other operators are handled similarly. The
wide variety of predicate modifiers complicates the inferential conditions and
semantics of the operators. ‘John is finally done’ entails, but does not
implicate, ‘John is done’. Oddly, ‘John is nearly done’ or “John is hardly
done” entails, but does not implicate ‘John is not done’ (whereas “John is
hardly done” entails that it is not the case that John is done. Clark tries to
distinguish various types of predicate modifiers and provides a different
semantic analysis for operators of different sorts. The theory can easily
characterize syntactic aspects of predicate modifier iteration. In addition,
after being modified the original predicates remain as predicates, and maintain
their original degree. Further, there is no need to force John’s running into
subject position as might be the case if we try to make ‘quickly’ an ordinary
predicate. Refs.: Grice, “Actiosn and events,” H. P. Grice, “Why adverbs matter
to philosophy,” Grice, “The semantics of action.” Grice, “Austin on Mly.” --
optimum. Grice: “We must distinguish between the optimum, the
maximum, and the satisficing!” -- If (a) S accepts at t
an alethic acceptability-conditional C 1 , the antecedent of which favours, to
degree d, the consequent of C 1 , (b) S accepts at t the antecedent of C 1 ,
end p.81 (c) after due search by S for such a (further) conditional, there is
no conditional C 2 such that (1) S accepts at t C 2 and its antecedent, (2) and
the antecedent of C 2 is an extension of the antecedent of C 1 , (3) and the
consequent of C 2 is a rival (incompatible with) of the consequent of C 1 , (4)
and the antecedent of C 2 favours the consequent of C 2 more than it favours
the consequent of C 1 : then S may judge (accept) at t that the consequent of C
1 is acceptable to degree d. For convenience, we might abbreviate the complex
clause (C) in the antecedent of the above rule as 'C 1 is optimal for S at t';
with that abbreviation, the rule will run: "If S accepts at t an alethic
acceptability-conditional C 1 , the antecedent of which favours its consequent
to degree d, and S accepts at t the antecedent of C 1 , and C 1 is optimal for
S at C 1 , then S may accept (judge) at t that the consequent of C 1 is
acceptable to degree d." Before moving to the practical dimension, I have
some observations to make.See validum. For
Grice, the validum can attain different shapes or guises. One is the optimum.
He uses it for “Emissor E communicates thata p” which ends up denotating an
‘ideal,’ that can only be deemed, titularily, to be present ‘de facto.’ The
idea is that of the infinite, or rather self-reference regressive closure. Vide
Blackburn on “open GAIIB.” Grice uses ‘optimality’ as one guise of value.
Obviously, it is, as Short and Lewis have it, the superlative of ‘bonum,’ so
one has to be careful. Optimum is used in value theory and decision theory,
too. Cf. Maximum, and minimax. In terms
of the principle of least conversational effort, the optimal move is the least
costly. To utter, “The pillar box seems red” when you can utter, “The pillar
box IS red” is to go into the trouble when you shouldn’t. So this maximin
regulates the conversational exchange. The utterer is meant to be optimally
efficient, and the addressee is intended to recognise that.
order: the level of a system
as determined by the type of entity over which the free variables of that logic
range. Entities of the lowest type, usually called type O, are known as
individuals, and entities of higher type are constructed from entities of lower
type. For example, type 1 entities are i functions from individuals or n-tuples
of individuals to individuals, and ii n-place relations on individuals.
First-order logic is that logic whose variables range over individuals, and a
model for first-order logic includes a domain of individuals. The other logics
are known as higher-order logics, and the first of these is second-order logic,
in which there are variables that range over type 1 entities. In a model for
second-order logic, the first-order domain determines the second-order domain.
For every sentence to have a definite truth-value, only totally defined
functions are allowed in the range of second-order function variables, so these
variables range over the collection of total functions from n-tuples of
individuals to individuals, for every value of n. The second-order predicate
variables range over all subsets of n-tuples of individuals. Thus if D is the
domain of individuals of a model, the type 1 entities are the union of the two
sets {X: Dn: X 0 Dn$D}, {X: Dn: X 0 Dn}. Quantifiers may bind second-order
variables and are subject to introduction and elimination rules. Thus whereas
in first-order logic one may infer ‘Someone is wise, ‘DxWx’, from ‘Socrates is
wise’, ‘Ws’, in second-order logic one may also infer ‘there is something that
Socrates is’, ‘DXXs’. The step from first- to second-order logic iterates: in
general, type n entities are the domain of n ! 1thorder variables in n ! 1th
order logic, and the whole hierarchy is known as the theory of types.
ordering: an arrangement of
the elements of a set so that some of them come before others. If X is a set,
it is useful to identify an ordering R of X with a subset R of X$X, the set of
all ordered pairs with members in X. If ‹ x,y
1 R then x comes before y in the ordering of X by R, and if ‹ x,y 2 R and ‹ y,x
2 R, then x and y are incomparable. Orders on X are therefore relations
on X, since a relation on a set X is any subset of X $ X. Some minimal
conditions a relation must meet to be an ordering are i reflexivity: ExRxx; ii
antisymmetry: ExEyRxy & Ryx / x % y; and iii transitivity: ExEyEzRxy &
Ryz / Rxz. A relation meeting these three conditions is known as a partial
order also less commonly called a semi-order, and if reflexivity is replaced by
irreflexivity, Ex-Rxx, as a strict partial order. Other orders are
strengthenings of these. Thus a tree-ordering of X is a partial order with a
distinguished root element a, i.e. ExRax, and that satisfies the backward
linearity condition that from any element there is a unique path back to a:
ExEyEzRyx & Rzx / Ryz 7 Rzy. A total order on X is a partial order
satisfying the connectedness requirement: ExEyRxy 7 Ryx. Total orderings are
sometimes known as strict linear orderings, contrasting with weak linear
orderings, in which the requirement of antisymmetry is dropped. The natural
number line in its usual order is a strict linear order; a weak linear ordering
of a set X is a strict linear order of levels on which various members of X may
be found, while adding antisymmetry means that each level contains only one
member. Two other important orders are dense partial or total orders, in which,
between any two elements, there is a third; and well-orders. A set X is said to
be well-ordered by R if R is total and every non-empty subset of Y of X has an
R-least member: EY 0 X[Y & / / Dz 1 YEw 1 YRzw]. Well-ordering rules out
infinite descending sequences, while a strict well-ordering, which is
irreflexive rather than reflexive, rules out loops. The best-known example is
the membership relation of axiomatic set theory, in which there are no loops
such as x 1 y 1 x or x 1 x, and no infinite descending chains . . . x2 1 x1 1
x0.
order
type omega: in mathematics, the order type of the infinite set of natural
numbers. The last letter of the Grecian alphabet, w, is used to denote this
order type; w is thus the first infinite ordinal number. It can be defined as
the set of all finite ordinal numbers ordered by magnitude; that is, w %
{0,1,2,3 . . . }. A set has order type w provided it is denumerably infinite,
has a first element but not a last element, has for each element a unique
successor, and has just one element with no immediate predecessor. The set of
even numbers ordered by magnitude, {2,4,6,8 . . . }, is of order type w. The
set of natural numbers listing first all even numbers and then all odd numbers,
{2,4,6,8 . . .; 1,3,5,7 . . . }, is not of order type w, since it has two
elements, 1 and 2, with no immediate predecessor. The set of negative integers
ordered by magnitude, { . . . 3,2,1}, is also not of order type w, since it has
no first element. V.K. ordinal logic, any means of associating effectively and
uniformly a logic in the sense of a formal axiomatic system Sa with each
constructive ordinal notation a. This notion and term for it was introduced by
Alan Turing in his paper “Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals” 9. Turing’s aim
was to try to overcome the incompleteness of formal systems discovered by Gödel
in 1, by means of the transfinitely iterated, successive adjunction of unprovable
but correct principles. For example, according to Gödel’s second incompleteness
theorem, for each effectively presented formal system S containing a modicum of
elementary number theory, if S is consistent then S does not prove the purely
universal arithmetical proposition Cons expressing the consistency of S via the
Gödelnumbering of symbolic expressions, even though Cons is correct. However,
it may be that the result S’ of adjoining Cons to S is inconsistent. This will
not happen if every purely existential statement provable in S is correct; call
this condition E-C. Then if S satisfies E-C, so also does S; % S ! Cons ; now
S; is still incomplete by Gödel’s theorem, though it is more complete than S.
Clearly the passage from S to S; can be iterated any finite number of times,
beginning with any S0 satisfying E-C, to form S1 % S; 0, S2 % S; 1, etc. But
this procedure can also be extended into the transfinite, by taking Sw to be
the union of the systems Sn for n % 0,1, 2 . . . and then Sw!1 % S;w, Sw!2 %
S;w!1, etc.; condition EC is preserved throughout. To see how far this and
other effective extension procedures of any effectively presented system S to
another S; can be iterated into the transfinite, one needs the notion of the
set O of constructive ordinal notations, due to Alonzo Church and Stephen C.
Kleene in 6. O is a set ordering ordinal logic 634 634 of natural numbers, and each a in O
denotes an ordinal a, written as KaK. There is in O a notation for 0, and with
each a in O is associated a notation sca in O with KscaK % KaK ! 1; finally, if
f is a number of an effective function {f} such that for each n, {f}n % an is
in O and KanK < Kan!1K, then we have a notation øf in O with KøfK %
limnKanK. For quite general effective extension procedures of S to S; and for
any given S0, one can associate with each a in O a formal system Sa satisfying
Ssca % S;a and Søf % the union of the S{f}n for n % 0,1, 2. . . . However, as
there might be many notations for each constructive ordinal, this ordinal logic
need not be invariant, in the sense that one need not have: if KaK % KbK then
Sa and Sb have the same consequences. Turing proved that an ordinal logic
cannot be both complete for true purely universal statements and invariant.
Using an extension procedure by certain proof-theoretic reflection principles,
he constructed an ordinal logic that is complete for true purely universal
statements, hence not invariant. The history of this and later work on ordinal
logics is traced by the undersigned in “Turing in the Land of Oz,” in The
Universal Turing Machine: A Half Century Survey, edited by Rolf Herken.
‘ordinary’-language
philosophy:
“I never knew what language Austin meant – Greek most likely, given his
background!” – Grice prefers ‘vernacular,’ which is charming. Back in Oxford,
Occam had to struggle against his vernacular (“Englysse”) and speak Roman! Then
Latin was the lingua franca, i.e . tongue of the Franks! vide, H. P. Grice, “Post-War Oxford
Philosophy,” a loosely structured philosophical movement holding that the
significance of concepts, including those central to traditional
philosophy e.g., the concepts of truth
and knowledge is fixed by linguistic
practice. Philosophers, then, must be attuned to the actual uses of words
associated with these concepts. The movement enjoyed considerable prominence
chiefly among English-speaking philosophers between the mid-0s and the early
0s. It was initially inspired by the work of Vitters, and later by John Wisdom,
Gilbert Ryle, Norman Malcolm, J. L. Austin and H. P. Grice, though its roots go
back at least to Moore and arguably to Socrates. ‘Ordinary’-language
philosophers do not mean to suggest that, to discover what truth is, we are to
poll our fellow speakers or consult dictionaries (“Naess philosopher is not” –
Grice). Rather, we are to ask how the word ‘truth’ functions in everyday,
nonphilosophical settings. A philosopher whose theory of truth is at odds with
ordinary usage has simply misidentified the concept. Philosophical error,
ironically, was thought by Vitters to arise from our “bewitchment” by language.
When engaging in philosophy, we may easily be misled by superficial linguistic
similarities. We suppose minds to be special sorts of entity, for instance, in
part because of grammatical parallels between ‘mind’ and ‘body’. When we fail
to discover any entity that might plausibly count as a mind, we conclude that
minds must be nonphysical entities. The cure requires that we remind ourselves
how ‘mind’ and its cognates are actually used by ordinary speakers. Refs.: H.
P. Grice, “Post-war Oxford philosophy,” “Conceptual analysis and the province
of philosophy.”
organic:
having parts that are organized and interrelated in a way that is the same as,
or analogous to, the way in which the parts of a living animal or other
biological organism are organized and interrelated. Thus, an organic unity or
organic whole is a whole that is organic in the above sense. These terms are
primarily used of entities that are not literally organisms but are supposedly
analogous to them. Among the applications of the concept of an organic unity
are: to works of art, to the state e.g., by Hegel, and to the universe as a
whole e.g., in absolute idealism. The principal element in the concept is
perhaps the notion of an entity whose parts cannot be understood except by
reference to their contribution to the whole entity. Thus to describe something
as an organic unity is typically to imply that its properties cannot be given a
reductive explanation in terms of those of its parts; rather, at least some of
the properties of the parts must themselves be explained by reference to the
properties of the whole. Hence it usually involves a form of holism. Other
features sometimes attributed to organic unities include a mutual dependence
between the existence of the parts and that of the whole and the need for a
teleological explanation of properties of the parts in terms of some end or
purpose associated with the whole. To what extent these characteristics belong
to genuine biological organisms is disputed.
organicism,
a theory that applies the notion of an organic unity, especially to things that
are not literally organisms. G. E. Moore, in Principia Ethica, proposed a
principle of organic unities, concerning intrinsic value: the intrinsic value
of a whole need not be equivalent to the sum of the intrinsic values of its
parts. Moore applies the principle in arguing that there is no systematic
relation between the intrinsic value of an element of a complex whole and the
difference that the presence of that element makes to the value of the whole.
E.g., he holds that although a situation in which someone experiences pleasure
in the contemplation of a beautiful object has far greater intrinsic goodness
than a situation in which the person contemplates the same object without
feeling pleasure, this does not mean that the pleasure itself has much
intrinsic value.
organism,
a carbon-based living thing or substance, e.g., a paramecium, a tree, or an
ant. Alternatively, ‘organism’ can mean, as in a typical Gricean gedenke
experiment, a hypothetical living thing
of another natural kind, e.g., a silicon-based living thing, in sum, a pirot –
“Pirots karulise elatically.” -- Defining conditions of a carbon-based living
thing, x, are as follows. 1 x has a layer made of m-molecules, i.e.,
carbonbased macromolecules of repeated units that have a high capacity for
selective reactions with other similar molecules. x can absorb and excrete
through this layer. 2 x can metabolize m-molecules. 3 x can synthesize m-molecular
parts of x by means of activities of a proper part of x that is a nuclear
molecule, i.e., an m-molecule that can copy itself. 4 x can exercise the
foregoing capacities in such a way that the corresponding activities are
causally interrelated as follows: x’s absorption and excretion causally
contribute to x’s metabolism; these processes jointly causally contribute to
x’s synthesizing; and x’s synthesizing causally contributes to x’s absorption,
excretion, and metabolism. 5 x belongs to a natural kind of compound physical
substance that can have a member, y, such that: y has a proper part, z; z is a
nuclear molecule; and y reproduces by means of z’s copying itself. 6 x is not
possibly a proper part of something that satisfies 16. The last condition
expresses the independence and autonomy of an organism. For example, a part of
an organism, e.g., a heart cell, is not an organism. It also follows that a
colony of organisms, e.g., a colony of ants, is not an organism.
Origen
(vide Patrologia – series Graeca – Migne) -- he became head of the catechetical
school in Alexandria. Like his mentor, Clement of Alexandria, he was influenced
by Middle Platonism. His principal works were Hexapla, On First Principles, and
Contra Celsum. The Hexapla, little of which survives, consisted of six Hebrew
and two Grecian versions of the Old Testament with Origen’s commentary. On
First Principles sets forth the most systematic Christian theology of the early
church, including some doctrines subsequently declared heretical, such as the
subordination of the Son “a secondary god” and Spirit to the Father,
preexisting human souls but not their transmigration, and a premundane fall
from grace of each human soul. The most famous of his views was the notion of
apocatastasis, universal salvation, the universal restoration of all creation
to God in which evil is defeated and the devil and his minions repent of their
sins. He interpreted hell as a temporary purgatory in which impure souls were
purified and made ready for heaven. His notion of subordination of the Son of
God to the Father was condemned by the church in 533. Origen’s Contra Celsum is
the first sustained work in Christian apologetics. It defends Christianity
before the pagan world. Origen was a leading exponent of the allegorical
interpretation of the Scriptures, holding that the text had three levels of
meaning corresponding to the three parts of human nature: body, soul, and
spirit. The first was the historical sense, sufficient for simple people; the
second was the moral sense; and the third was the mystical sense, open only to
the deepest souls.
Orphism – ovvero Orfeo a
Crotone -- or as Grice preferred Orpheusianism -- a religious movement in ancient Graeco-Roman
culture that may have influenced Plato and some of the pre-Socratics. Neither
the nature of the movement nor the scope of its influence is adequately
understood: ancient sources and modern scholars tend to confuse Orphism with the
Pythagoreanism school led by the native Crotonian “Filolao” at Crotone, and with
ancient mystery cults, especially the Bacchic or Dionysiac mysteries. “Orphic
poems,” i.e., poems attributed to Orpheus a mythic figure, circulated as early
as the mid-sixth century B.C. We have only indirect evidence of the early
Orphic poems; but we do have a sizable body of fragments from poems composed in
later antiquity. Central to both early and later versions is a
theogonic-cosmogonic narrative that posits Night (Nox) as the primal
entity ostensibly a revision of the
account offered by Hesiod and gives
major emphasis to the birth, death through dismemberment, and rebirth of the
god Dionysus, that the Romans called Bacchus. Plato gives us clear evidence of
the existence in his time of itinerant religious teachers who, drawing on the
“books of Orpheus,” performed and taught rituals of initiation and purification
intended to procure divine favor either in this life or in an afterlife. The
extreme skepticism of such scholars as Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff and
I. M. Linforth concerning the importance of early Orphism for Graeco-Roman
religion and Graeco-Roman philosophy has been undermined by archaeological
findings in recent decades: the Derveni papyrus, which is a fragment of a
philosophical commentary on an Orphic theogony; and inscriptions with Orphic
instructions for the dead, from a funerary sites Crotone.
ostensum: In his
analysis of the two basic procedures, one involving the subjectum, and another
the praedicatum, Grice would play with the utterer OSTENDING that p. This
relates to his semiotic approach to communication, and avoiding to the maximum
any reference to a linguistic rule or capacity or faculty as different from
generic rationality. In WoW:134 Grice explores what he calls ‘ostensive
correlation.’ He is exploring communication scenarios where the Utterer is
OSTENDING that p, or in predicate terms, that the A is B. He is not so much
concerned with the B, but with the fact that “B” is predicated of a particular
denotatum of “the A,” and by what criteria. He is having in mind his uncle’s
dog, Fido, who is shaggy, i.e. fairy coated. So he is showing to Strawson that
that dog over there is the one that belongs to his uncle, and that, as Strawson
can see, is a shaggy dog, by which Grice means hairy coated. That’s the type of
‘ostensive correlation’ Grice is having in mind. In an attempted ostensive
correlation of the predicate B (‘shaggy’) with the feature or property of being
hairy coated, as per a standard act of communication in which Grice, uttering,
“Fido is shaggy’ will have Strawson believe that Uncle Grice’s dog is hairy
coated – (1) U will perform a number of acts in each of which he ostends a
thing (a1, a2, a3, etc.). (2)
Simultaneously with each ostension, he utters a token of the predicate “shaggy.”
(3) It is his intention TO OSTEND, and to be recognised as ostending, only
things which are either, in his view, plainly hairy-coated, or are, in his
view, plainly NOT hairy-coated. (4) In a model sequence these intentions are
fulfilled. Grice grants that this does not finely distinguish between ‘being
hairy-coated’ from ‘being such that the UTTERER believes to be unmistakenly
hairy coated.’ But such is a problem of any explicit correlation, which are
usually taken for granted – and deemed ‘implicit’ in standard acts of
communication. In primo actu non indiget volunta* diiectivo , sed sola_»
objecti ostensio ...
non potest errar* ciica finem in universali ostensum , potest tamen secundum
eos
merton: Oxford
Calculators, a group of philosophers who flourished at Oxford. The name derives
from the “Liber calculationum.”. The author of this work, often called
“Calculator” by later Continental authors, is Richard Swineshead. The “Liber
calculationum” discussed a number of issues related to the quantification or
measurement of local motion, alteration, and augmentation for a fuller description
– v. Murdoch and Sylla, “Swineshead” in Dictionary of Scientific Biography. The
“Liber calculationum” has been studied mainly by historians of science and
grouped together with a number of other works discussing natural philosophical
topics by such authors as Bradwardine, Heytesbury, and Dumbleton. In earlier
histories many of the authors now referred to as Oxford Calculators are
referred to as “The Merton School,” since many of them were fellows of Merton .
But since some authors whose oeuvre appears to fit into the same intellectual
tradition e.g., Kilvington, whose “Sophismata” represents an earlier stage of
the tradition later epitomized by Heytesbury’s Sophismata have no known
connection with Merton , ‘Oxford Calculators’ would appear to be a more
accurate appellation. The works of the Oxford Calculators or Mertonians –
Grice: “I rather deem Kilvington a Mertonian than change the name of his
school!” -- were produced in the context of education in the Oxford arts
faculty – Sylla -- “The Oxford
Calculators,” in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg, eds., The Cambridge History of
Later Medieval Philosophy. At Oxford semantics is the centerpiece of the Lit.
Hum. curriculum. After semantics, Oxford came to be known for its work in
mathematics, astronomy, and natural philosophy. Students studying under the
Oxford faculty of arts not only heard lectures on the seven liberal arts and on
natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and metaphysics. They were also required to
take part in disputations. Heytesbury’s “Regule solvendi sophismatum” explicitly
and Swineshead’s “Liber calculationum” implicitly are written to prepare
students for these disputations. The three influences most formative on the
work of the Oxford Calculators were the tradition of commentaries on the works
of Aristotle; the developments in semantics, particularly the theories of
categorematic and syncategorematic terms and the theory of conseequentia,
implicate, and supposition; and and the theory of ratios as developed in
Bradwardine’s De proportionibus velocitatum in motibus. In addition to Swineshead,
Heytesbury, Bradwardine, Dumbleton, and Kilvington, other authors and works
related to the work of the Oxford Calculators are Burleigh, “De primo et ultimo
instanti, Tractatus Primus De formis accidentalibus, Tractatus Secundus De
intensione et remissione formarum; Swineshead, Descriptiones motuum; and Bode, “A
est unum calidum.” These and other works had a considerable later influence on
the Continent. Refs.: H. P. Grice,
“Sophismata in the Liber calculationum,” H. P. Grice, “My days at Merton.” – H.
P. Grice, “Merton made me.” – H. P. Grice, “Merton and post-war Oxford
philosophy.”
esse -- ousia: The abstractum
behind Grice’s ‘izz’ --. Grecian term traditionally tr. as ‘substance,’
although the strict transliteration is ‘essentia,’ a feminine abstract noun out
of the verb ‘esse.’ Formed from the participle for ‘being’, the term ousia
refers to the character of being, beingness, as if this were itself an entity.
Just as redness is the character that red things have, so ousia is the
character that beings have. Thus, the ousia of something is the character that
makes it be, its nature. But ousia also refers to an entity that possesses
being in its own right; for consider a case where the ousia of something is
just the thing itself. Such a thing possesses being by virtue of itself;
because its being depends on nothing else, it is self-subsistent and has a
higher degree of being than things whose being depends on something else. Such
a thing would be an ousia. Just which entities meet the criteria for ousia is a
question addressed by Aristotle. Something such as redness that exists only as
an attribute would not have being in its own right. An individual person is an
ousia, but Aristotle also argues that his form is more properly an ousia; and
an unmoved mover is the highest type of ousia. The traditional rendering of the
term into Latin as substantia and English as ‘substance’ is appropriate only in
contexts like Aristotle’s Categories where an ousia “stands under” attributes.
In his Metaphysics, where Aristotle argues that being a substrate does not
characterize ousia, and in other Grecian writers, ‘substance’ is often not an
apt translation.
outweighed rationality – the grammar – rationality of the
end, not just the means – extrinsic rationality – not intrinsic to the means. -- The intrinsic-extrinsic – outweigh --
extrinsic desire, a desire of something for its conduciveness to something else
that one desires. An extrinsic desire is distinguished from an intrinsic desire,
a desire of items for their own sake, or as an end. Thus, an individual might
desire financial security extrinsically, as a means to her happiness, and
desire happiness intrinsically, as an end. Some desires are mixed: their
objects are desired both for themselves and for their conduciveness to
something else. Jacques may desire to jog, e.g., both for its own sake as an
end and for the sake of his health. A desire is strictly intrinsic if and only
if its object is desired for itself alone. A desire is strictly extrinsic if
and only if its object is not desired, even partly, for its own sake. Desires
for “good news” e.g., a desire to hear
that one’s child has survived a car accident
are sometimes classified as extrinsic desires, even if the information
is desired only because of what it indicates and not for any instrumental value
that it may have. Desires of each kind help to explain action. Owing partly to
a mixed desire to entertain a friend, Martha might acquire a variety of
extrinsic desires for actions conducive to that goal. Less happily,
intrinsically desiring to be rid of his toothache, George might extrinsically
desire to schedule a dental appointment. If all goes well for Martha and
George, their desires will be satisfied, and that will be due in part to the
effects of the desires upon their behavior.
ordinary
language
– There are two topics about ordinary language, as anyone who ever consulted a
philosophical dictionary will realise. Words like ‘know’ and words like
“transcendental deduction.” Is Austin promoting that we stick with ‘know’ and
that no technical terms are even allowed for their analysis. We don’t thnk so..
The phatic and the rhetic and the phemic and the illocution and the perlocution
are not ‘ordinary’. –as opposed to
‘ideal’ language -- ideal language, a system of notation that would correct
perceived deficiencies of ordinary language by requiring the structure of
expressions to mirror the structure of that which they represent. The notion
that conceptual errors can be corrected and philosophical problems solved (or
dissolved) by properly representing them in some such system figured
prominently in the writings of Leibniz, Carnap, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Frege,
among others. For Russell, the ideal, or “logically perfect,” language is one
in which grammatical form coincides with logical form, there are no vague or
ambiguous expres sions, and no proper names that fail to denote. Frege’s
Begriffsschrift is perhaps the most thorough and successful execution of the
ideal language project. Deductions represented within this system (or its
modern descendants) can be effectively checked for correctness.
Ordine Nuccio Ordine Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Nuccio Ordine
(Diamante, 18 luglio 1958) è un letterato e accademico italiano, professore
ordinario di letteratura italiana presso l'Università della Calabria, ed è
internazionalmente riconosciuto come uno dei massimi studiosi del Rinascimento
e di Giordano Bruno. Di lui il filosofo
francese del Collège de France Pierre Hadot ha scritto : «Nuccio Ordine, ben
noto ai lettori per i suoi eccellenti lavori su Giordano Bruno, è anche uno dei
migliori conoscitori attuali del milieu sociale, artistico, letterario e
spirituale dell'età del Rinascimento e degli inizi dell'Età moderna»[1]. Indice 1 Attività
2 Opere
3 Onorificenze
4 Note
5 Altri
progetti 6 Collegamenti
esterni Attività Fellow dell'Harvard University Center for Italian Renaissance
Studies e della Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, ha insegnato in numerose
università prestigiose quali Università di Yale, New York University, Ecole
Normale Supérieure Paris, Paris IV: Paris-Sorbonne, Paris III Sorbonne
Nouvelle, CESR of Tours, Institut Universitaire de France, Paris VIII:
Vincennes, Institut des Études Avancées de Paris, Warburg Institute e
all'Università Cattolica di Eichstätt-Ingolstadt. È Membro d’Onore
dell’Istituto di Filosofia dell’Accademia Russa delle Scienze e Membro dell’Académie
Royale de Belgique. Ha ricevuto 5 dottorati honoris causa e il Sigillo d’Ateneo
dell’Università di Urbino. È Presidente del Centro Internazionale di Studi
Telesiani, Bruniani e Campanelliani e membro del Comitato scientifico
dell’Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Treccani. Collabora, inoltre, alle pagine
culturali del Corriere della Sera e El País [2]. I suoi libri (in particolare
il best seller L' utilità dell'inutile ormai presente in trentadue Paesi) sono
stati tradotti in numerose lingue tra cui cinese, giapponese, arabo, turco e russo.
Dirige collane di classici in Italia (“Classici della letteratura
europea”, Bompiani) e in vari Paesi: in Francia dirige, con Yves Hersant, due
collane presso Les Belles Lettres le Opere complete di Giordano Bruno e la
«Bibliotheque Italienne»; in Romania, con Smaranda Bratu Elian, 2 collane
presso l’editore Humanitas di Bucarest; in Brasile, con Luiz Carlos Bombassaro,
1 collana presso l’editore Educs di Caxias do Sul; in Bulgaria, con Vladimir
Gradev, 1 collana presso l'editore Iztok Zapad di Sofia; in Russia, con Andrei
Rossius, 1 collana presso l'editore Saint Petersburg University Press di San
Pietroburgo. È membro del Board della collana «Boston Studies in the Philosophy
of Science» (Springer)[3]. Opere La
cabala dell'asino. Asinità e conoscenza in Giordano Bruno, Collana Teorie &
oggetti, Napoli, Liguori, 1996, ISBN 978-88-207-1475-8. - Premessa di Ilya
Prigogine, Prefazione di Eugenio Garin, Collana I fari, Milano, La Nave di
Teseo, 2017, ISBN 978-88-934-4356-2. La soglia dell'ombra. Letteratura,
filosofia e pittura in Giordano Bruno, Collana Biblioteca, Venezia, Marsilio,
2003, ISBN 978-88-317-8149-7. Contro il Vangelo armato. Giordano Bruno, Ronsard
e la religione, Collana Scienze e idee, Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 2007, ISBN
978-88-603-0086-7. Teoria della novella e teoria del riso nel Cinquecento,
Collana Teorie e oggetti della letteratura, Napoli, Liguori, 2009, ISBN
978-88-207-2609-6. Le rendez-vous des savoirs. Littérature, philosophie et
diplomatie à la Renaissance, París, Les Belles Lettres, 2009 [4]. Les portraits
de Gabriel Garcia Marquez : La répétition et la différence, Les Belles Lettres,
2012, 71 p. (ISBN 978-2251444505) L'utilità dell'inutile. Manifesto. Con un
saggio di Abraham Flexner, Milano, Bompiani, 2013, ISBN 978-88-452-7448-0.,
Premio Nazionale Rhegium Julii Saggistica[1] Tre corone per un re. L'impresa di
Enrico III e i suoi misteri, Prefazione di Marc Fumaroli, Collana Saggi,
Milano, Bompiani, 2015, ISBN 978-88-452-7709-2. Classici per la vita. Una
piccola biblioteca ideale, Collana Le onde, Milano, La Nave di Teseo, 2016,
ISBN 978-88-934-4026-4. Una escuela para la vida, Valparaíso, Universidad de
Valparaíso (traducción de Gemma Bayod y Jordi Bayod), noviembre 2018, ISBN
978-956-214-203-8 (https://editorial.uv.cl/portfolio-item/una-escuela-para-la-vida/).
Gli uomini non sono isole. I classici ci aiutano a vivere, Collana Le onde,
Milano, La Nave di Teseo, 2018, ISBN 978-88-934-4671-6. Onorificenze Grande
Ufficiale dell'ordine al Merito della Repubblica italiana , 2018 [5].
Commendatore dell'Ordine delle Palme accademiche, Parigi (Francia), 2014. Cavaliere della Legion d'Onore (Francia) -
nastrino per uniforme ordinaria Cavaliere
della Legion d'Onore (Francia) — 3 dicembre 2012 a Parigi[2] Cavaliere
dell'Ordine delle Palme Accademiche (Francia) - nastrino per uniforme ordinaria Cavaliere
dell'Ordine delle Palme Accademiche (Francia) — 4 dicembre 2009 a Parigi
Commendatore dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica Italiana - nastrino per
uniforme ordinaria Commendatore
dell'Ordine al merito della Repubblica Italiana — 2010 a Roma Dottorato Honoris
Causa de la Université catholique de Louvain, 2020 Sigillo d'Ateneo de la
Universidad de Urbino, 2019 Laurea Honoris Causa de la Universidad de Valparaíso,
2019 Laurea Honoris Causa de la Universidade Federal de Ciências de Saúde de
Porto Alegre, 2017 Laurea Honoris Causa de la Universidade de Caxias do Sul,
2017 Laurea Honoris Causa all'Università federale del Rio Grande do Sul - 2011
[6] ___ Membro del comitato scientifico
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana Treccani, 2020 Membro d'Onore dell'Istituto
di Filosofia dell'Accademia russa delle scienze - 2010 Note ^ Albo vincitori
premi Rhegium Julii (PDF), su rhegiumjulii.it. URL consultato il 13 ottobre 2019.
^ Conferimento al prof. Nuccio Ordine della Legion d'Honneur, su unical.it. URL
consultato il 12-12-2012. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote
contiene citazioni di o su Nuccio Ordine Collegamenti esterni Nuccio Ordine, in
Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Nuccio
Ordine, opere in Google Libri Nuccio Ordine[collegamento interrotto], scheda
nel sito dell'Università della Calabria Per la citazione di Pierre Habot, si
veda l'introduzione de La Soglia dell'ombra,Venezia, Marsilio, 2019, (ed. IV°),
p.VII. [7] Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 112167897 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 1780 0352 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\066012 ·
Europeana agent/base/106214 · LCCN (EN) n87942149 · GND (DE) 120971453 · BNF
(FR) cb120819809 (data) · BNE (ES) XX1053857 (data) · BAV (EN) 495/75202 · NDL
(EN, JA) 00885704 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n87942149 Biografie Portale
Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Letteratura Portale Letteratura
Università Portale Università Categorie: Letterati italianiAccademici italiani
del XX secoloAccademici italiani del XXI secoloNati nel 1958Nati il 18
luglioNati a Diamante (Italia)Ordine delle Palme AccademicheCommendatori della
Legion d'onoreItalianisti[altre]
Orestano Francesco Orestano Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Francesco Orestano
(Alia, 14 aprile 1873 – Roma, 20 agosto 1945) è stato un filosofo italiano,
padre del giurista Riccardo Orestano.
Indice 1 Biografia 2 Opere
3 Note
4 Bibliografia
5 Altri
progetti 6 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Nel 1896 si laureò in giurisprudenza all'Università di
Palermo.[1] Più tardi, nel 1901, in Germania, conseguì la laurea in filosofia
all'Università di Lipsia.[1] Ritornato in Italia, insegnò dal 1903 filosofia
morale, alla Sapienza - Università di Roma[1] e, dal 1907 al 1924, a
Palermo.[1] Collaborò con Filippo
Tommaso Marinetti nella concezione del pensiero futurista, e lavorando ad
alcune pubblicazioni comuni. Fu inoltre vicino alle idee fasciste, collaborando
tra l'altro con la rivista Gerarchia, diretta da Benito Mussolini. Invitato dal
generale Italo Balbo nella Libia italiana, difese gli ideali e gli intenti
fascisti in contrapposizione al nazionalismo.
Orestano fu eticista, fenomenologo e promulgatore d'un'idea filosofica positivista
ispirata anche a Johann Friedrich Herbart, che egli stesso denominò
super-realismo. Nel 1924 si ritirò a vita privata nella sua casa di Roma per
dedicarsi alla sua opera principale Nuovi Principi. Tuttavia in seguito riprese
l'insegnamento universitario come docente di etica nell'Università di Pavia.
"Nel settembre 1929 divenne membro della neonata Accademia d'Italia e nel
1931 presidente della Società filosofica italiana".[2] Morì in povertà raccolto in una profonda fede
religiosa. Autore di noti aforismi, a lui sono intitolate una via di Roma[3] e
una scuola primaria di Palermo. Tutta la
sua produzione, edita e inedita, composta da circa 80 pubblicazioni, è stata
pubblicata negli anni sessanta dalla casa editrice CEDAM, in un'Opera omnia,
suddivisa in cinque sezioni. Opere
Comenio, Roma, Biblioteca Pedagogica de “i Diritti della scuola”, 1906
Angiulli, Roma, Biblioteca Pedagogica de “i Diritti della scuola”, 1907 A
proposito di un libro: principi di pedagogia e didattica, di P. Barth, Città di
Castello, Ed. Dante Alighieri, 1917 Un'aristocrazia di popoli: saggio di una
valutazione aristocratica delle nazionalità, Milano, Fratelli Treves, 1918
Nuovi principi, Roma, Edizioni Optima, 1925 Verità dimostrate, Napoli, Casa
Editrice Rondinella, 1934 Opera letteraria di Benedetta, Roma, Edizioni
Futuriste di Poesia, 1936 Esame critico di Marinetti e del Futurismo, Roma,
Estratto dalla "Rassegna Nazionale", 1938 Civiltà europea e civiltà
americana, Roma, M. Danesi, 1938 Nuove vedute logiche, Milano, F.lli Bocca,
1939 Nuovi principi, Milano, Bocca, 1939 Il nuovo realismo, Milano, F.lli
Bocca, 1939 Verità dimostrate, Milano, F.lli Bocca, 1939 Idee e concetti,
Milano, F.lli Bocca, 1939 Celebrazioni I, Milano, Fratelli Bocca Editori, 1940
Celebrazioni, 2 vol., Padova, CEDAM, 1961 (1ª ediz. 1940) Filosofia del
diritto, Milano, F.lli Bocca, 1941 Gravia levia, Milano, F.lli Bocca, 1941
Saggi giuridici, Milano, F.lli Bocca, 1941 Verso la nuova Europa, Milano, F.lli
Bocca, 1941 Prolegomeni alla scienza del bene e del male, Milano, F. lli Bocca,
1942 Leonardo, Galilei, Tasso, Milano, F.lli Bocca, 1943 La conflagrazione
spirituale e altri Saggi filosofici, Milano, F.lli Bocca, 1944 Opera omnia,
Padova, CEDAM, 1960-1969. Comprende: 1. Opere teoretiche, 1960 2. Opere morali,
1960 3. Opere giuridico-politiche 1: Filosofia del diritto ; Saggi giuridici,
1961 2: Verso la nuova Europa; La conflagrazione spirituale e altri saggi
filosofici, 1961 4. Opere varie 1: Celebrazioni 1. ; Celebrazioni 2. ; Gravia
levia, 1961 2: Pensieri, un libro per tutti ; Leonardo, Galilei, Tasso, 1962 5.
Opere inedite 1: Studi di storia della filosofia : Kant, Rosmini, Nietzsche,
Contributi vari, 1963 2.1: Studi pedagogici, 1., 1964 2.2: Studi pedagogici,
2., 1965 3: Studi danteschi e saggi di estetica e letteratura; conversazioni di
varia filosofia; corsi, ricerche e conferenze, 1966 4: Studi sulla Sicilia,
1967 5: Filosofia della moda e questioni sociali, 1969 Note Fonte: A. Tarquini, Dizionario Biografico
degli Italiani, riferimenti in Bibliografia. ^ (Voce "Orestano
Francesco" di A. Tarquini, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani ^
Municipio VIII, istituzione: 28 febbraio 1970. Vedi SITO Sistema informativo
toponomastica di Roma Capitale Bibliografia Eugenio Guccione, L'idea di Europa
in Francesco Orestano, in AA.VV., Federalisti siciliani tra XIX e XX secolo,
A.R.S. - Intergruppo Federalista Europeo, Palermo, 2000, pp. 309-322. Eugenio
Guccione, Da un diario di Francesco Orestano una nuova pagina di storia, in
AA.VV., La politica tra storia e diritto, Scritti in memoria di L. Gambino, a
cura di G. Giunta, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2012, pp. 326-332. Alessandra
Tarquini, «ORESTANO, Francesco» in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Volume
79, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2013. Altri progetti Collabora a
Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Francesco Orestano
Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Francesco Orestano
Collegamenti esterni Francesco Orestano, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Francesco Orestano /
Francesco Orestano (altra versione), in Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Francesco Orestano, in
Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Francesco Orestano, su Liber Liber. Modifica su
Wikidata Opere di Francesco Orestano, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl.
Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Francesco Orestano, su Open Library,
Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata Quando i vincitori scrivono la storia
della filosofia: il caso di Francesco Orestano di Francesco Lamendola, Arianna
Editrice, 13 gennaio 2011. Ornella Castellana, IL RAPPORTO TRA STATO E CHIESA
NEL PENSIERO POLITICO DI FRANCESCO ORESTANO, I.S.S.P.E. ISTITUTO SICILIANO DI
STUDI POLITICI ED ECONOMICI. URL consultato il 10 gennaio 2016 (archiviato
dall'url originale il 7 settembre 2001). Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 12436890 · ISNI (EN) 0000
0000 8339 3356 · LCCN (EN) n80139116 · GND (DE) 117144428 · BNF (FR)
cb129380832 (data) · NLA (EN) 36278346 · BAV (EN) 495/180254 · WorldCat
Identities (EN) lccn-n80139116 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale
Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX secoloNati nel 1873Morti nel
1945Nati il 14 aprileMorti il 20 agostoMorti a RomaAccademici dell'Accademia
d'ItaliaStudenti dell'Università di LipsiaStudenti dell'Università degli Studi
di Palermo[altre]
Orioli Francesco Orioli Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia
libera. Jump to navigationJump to search
Francesco Orioli Francesco Orioli (Vallerano, 18 marzo 1783[1] – Roma, 5
novembre 1856[1]) è stato uno scienziato, fisico, filosofo, medico, archeologo,
poeta, letterato, avvocato, giornalista e politico italiano. Fu uno dei
fondatori della Repubblica Romana.
Indice 1 Biografia
2 Opere
3 Riconoscimenti
4 Note
5 Bibliografia
6 Altri
progetti 7 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia De' paragrandini
metallici, 1825 (Milano, Fondazione Mansutti). Il padre, medico, lo condusse a
Roma, dove si laureò brillantemente in legge. La professione non lo attraeva
molto: lo troviamo, infatti, professore di fisica e filosofia nei seminari e
nei licei dell'Urbe. Da Roma si trasferì a Perugia, dove si laureò in medicina. Nel 1815 insegnò fisica all'Università di
Bologna. Nel 1831 partecipò con gli
allievi all'insurrezione delle Romagne; successivamente fu eletto membro del
governo provvisorio di Bologna, che fu sciolto in seguito all'intervento
militare dell'Austria. Tentando di mettersi in salvo, Orioli salpò da Ancona
diretto in Francia con un altro centinaio di rivoluzionari; ma il brigantino
Isotta sul quale viaggiava venne catturato dall'allora capitano di vascello
della marina austriaca Francesco Bandiera (padre dei due famosi fratelli Attilio
ed Emilio) e tutti i rivoluzionari furono arrestati. Orioli venne incarcerato a
Venezia. Poco dopo venne liberato, forse per mancanza di risultanze gravi sul
suo conto. Iniziò così l'errare di
Francesco Orioli, costretto a fuggire da terra in terra, inneggiando sempre
all'Italia unita. Nella capitale francese fu professore di archeologia alla
Sorbona. A Bruxelles insegnò psicologia. Soggiornò anche a Corfù, dove tenne un
corso di fisica nell'università della città.
Quando il nuovo papa, Pio IX, nel 1846, concesse l'amnistia, l'Orioli
poté tornare a Roma, dove tenne la cattedra di archeologia. Le sue attitudini
per il giornalismo non attesero molto per farsi notare, e così fondò un
periodico politico che ebbe però vita breve, La Bilancia. Nel 1849 fu eletto deputato al parlamento
della Repubblica Romana. Quando il governo pontificio fu restaurato, in
riconoscimenti dei suoi meriti, fu nominato Consigliere di Stato. Morì a Roma il 5 novembre 1856.[1] Opere Pubblicò molti scritti di archeologia,
fisica, medicina, filosofia, etc. Tra i più famosi sono da menzionare Dei sette
re di Roma e del cominciamento del consolato (Firenze, 1839), Intorno le
epigrafi italiane e l'arte di comporle (Roma, 1856). Orioli prese parte alla polemica sui sistemi
di prevenzione contro i fulmini e la grandine, che coinvolse anche Angelo
Bellani, Paolo Beltrami, Giuseppe Demongeri, Alexandre Lapostolle, Le Normand,
Giovanni Majocchi, Gaetano Melandri Contessi, Pietro Molossi, Giovanni Battista
Nazari, Charles Richardot, Antonio Scaramelli, Charles Tholard e Alessandro
Volta. Le compagnie assicurative usarono questi studi per valutare rischi e
premi per i campi agricoli.
Riconoscimenti Il comune di Vallerano (VT) ha onorato Orioli con l'intitolazione
di una delle vie principali del borgo antico, quella del Teatro comunale, e con
l'apposizione di una lapide commemorativa sulla facciata della casa in cui lo
scienziato nacque. A Viterbo un Istituto Statale di Istruzione Superiore -che
comprende il Liceo Artistico e diversi indirizzi di Istituto Professionale- è
intestato a Francesco Orioli,
https://web.archive.org/web/20170223061740/http://www.orioli.gov.it/. Note
A. M. Ghisalberti, nella voce della Enciclopedia Italiana, vedi
Bibliografia, riporta queste date di nascita e morte: 18 marzo 1785 - 4
novembre 1856. Bibliografia Alberto Maria Ghisalberti, «ORIOLI, Francesco» in
Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1935.
Fondazione Mansutti, Quaderni di sicurtà. Documenti di storia
dell'assicurazione, a cura di M. Bonomelli, schede bibliografiche di C. Di
Battista, note critiche di F. Mansutti. Milano: Electa, 2011, pp. 238-239.
Gaspare Polizzi, Alla ricerca dello «specioso» e dell’«insolito». Francesco
Orioli e Giacomo Leopardi, «Lettere Italiane», anno LX, n. 3, 2008, pp.
394-419. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina
dedicata a Francesco Orioli Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons
contiene immagini o altri file su Francesco Orioli Collegamenti esterni
Francesco Orioli, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Francesco Orioli, su
openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Francesco
Orioli, su Open Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata Controllo di
autorità VIAF (EN) 30305571 ·
ISNI (EN) 0000 0000 8076 8060 · SBN IT\ICCU\LO1V\134782 · LCCN (EN) n88038796 ·
GND (DE) 117145211 · BNF (FR) cb104472525 (data) · BNE (ES) XX4994827 (data) ·
BAV (EN) 495/1837 · CERL cnp01084523 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n88038796
Archeologia Portale Archeologia Biografie Portale Biografie Risorgimento
Portale Risorgimento Stato Pontificio Portale Stato Pontificio Categorie:
Scienziati italianiFisici italiani del XIX secoloFilosofi italiani del XIX
secoloNati nel 1783Morti nel 1856Nati il 18 marzoMorti il 5 novembreNati a
ValleranoMorti a RomaArcheologi italianiStoria dell'assicurazione[altre]
Ornato Luigi Ornato Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search «Visse vita ritirata,
modesta e schiva d'onori e ricchezza intesa soltanto allo studio. Coltivò le
scienze fisiche e matematiche, la filologia, la poesia, la musica e con
singolare amore le discipline metafisiche»
(Luigi Provana) Giacomo Luigi Ornato (Caramagna Piemonte, 13 aprile 1787
– Torino, 28 ottobre 1842) è stato un letterato, filosofo e patriota
italiano. Indice 1 Biografia 2 Opere
3 Bibliografia
4 Altri
progetti 5 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Filologo, filosofo, letterato e patriota italiano. 1801 - si trasferisce a Torino dove frequenta
alcuni esponenti dell'aristocrazia sabauda. Tra le sue amicizie più importanti
Santorre di Santarosa, Luigi Provana del Sabbione ed i fratelli Balbo. 1804 - è
tra i fondatori dell'Accademia dei Concordi 1812 - è insegnante di matematica
nel collegio dei paggi imperiali 1814 - impiegato nella segreteria
dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Torino e successivamente professore presso la
Reale Accademia Militare 1821 - in seguito ai moti rivoluzionari viene nominato
dall'amico Santorre di Santarosa Ministro della Guerra della giunta
rivoluzionaria 1821 - si rifugia in esilio a Parigi 1821/1832 - nella capitale
francese stringe amicizia con il filosofo Cousin e la sua casa è frequentata da
numerosi patrioti italiani 1832 - ottiene di poter rientrare in italia e si
ritira a Caramagna dove riceve le visite dei patrioti Pellico, Provana,
Gioberti e Balbo 1833 - si trasferisce a Torino dove morirà e verrà sepolto nel
cimitero monumentale Opere 1817 - traduzione di Ode a Roma di Erinna 1853 -
traduzione dei Ricordi di Marco Aurelio, Picchioni (pubblicazione postuma)
Bibliografia Vita, studii e lettere inedite di Luigi Ornato, di Leone
Ottolenghi, E. Loescher, 1878 (Google libri) Note Biografiche e risultati di
ricerche su Luigi Ornato, a cura di Oreste Becchio Altri progetti Collabora a
Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Luigi Ornato Collabora a
Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Luigi Ornato Collegamenti
esterni Guido Calogero, ORNATO, Luigi, in Enciclopedia Italiana, vol. 25, Roma,
Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1935, luigi-ornato. URL consultato l'11
febbraio 2019.Modifica su Wikidata Vladimiro Sperber, Luigi Ornato, in
Dizionario biografico degli italiani, vol. 79, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 2013. URL consultato l'11 febbraio 2019. Modifica su Wikidata
Ulteriori approfondimenti su Luigi Ornato possono essere reperiti nei seguenti
siti: Comune di Caramagna Piemonte, su
comune.caramagnapiemonte.cn.it. Associazione Culturale "L'Albero
Grande", su alberogrande.it. URL consultato il 30 luglio 2018 (archiviato
dall'url originale il 30 luglio 2018). Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 251429374 · ISNI (EN)
0000 0003 7510 2418 · LCCN (EN) no2012149794 · WorldCat Identities (EN)
lccn-no2012149794 Biografie Portale Biografie: accedi alle voci di Wikipedia
che trattano di biografie Categorie: Letterati italianiFilosofi italiani del
XVIII secoloFilosofi italiani del XIX secoloPatrioti italiani del XVIII
secoloPatrioti italiani del XIX secoloNati nel 1787Morti nel 1842Nati il 13
aprileMorti il 28 ottobreNati a Caramagna PiemonteMorti a Torino[altre]
Orsi D’ – Domenico D'Orsi Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Niente fonti! Questa
voce o sezione sull'argomento filosofi italiani non cita le fonti necessarie o
quelle presenti sono insufficienti. Puoi migliorare questa voce aggiungendo
citazioni da fonti attendibili secondo le linee guida sull'uso delle fonti.
Abbozzo Questa voce sull'argomento filosofi italiani è solo un abbozzo.
Contribuisci a migliorarla secondo le convenzioni di Wikipedia. Domenico D'Orsi
(Palma di Montechiaro, 10 febbraio 1930 – Catania, 21 gennaio 2010) è stato un
filosofo e accademico italiano. Allievo
di Carmelo Ottaviano, ha insegnato per tutta la sua carriera storia della
filosofia presso l'università di Catania.
Ha pubblicato nella sua attività di ricerca scritti minori di autori
italiani e stranieri e il volume La società filosofica di Berlino e gli hegeliani
di Napoli (nel 1986). A vent'anni dalla morte ha curato l'edizione dell'opera
postuma di Carmelo Ottaviano Tommaso Campilla (1999). Ha inoltre condotto il
progetto di pubblicazione delle Opere psicologiche inedite di Bertrando
Spaventa (quattro volumi pubblicati tra il 1976 e il 2001). Dagli anni sessanta è stato nella segreteria
della rivista Sophia, fondata da Carmelo Ottaviano, insieme a Pasquale
Mazzarella e Francesco Romano. Opere
principali 1957: Lo spirito come atto puro in Giovanni Gentile 1962: Il
tramonto della filosofia moderna (riedizioni nel 1967 e nel 1970) 1973: L'uomo
al bivio: immanentismo o cristianesimo? Saggio di realismo esistenziale 1986:La
società filosofica di Berlino e gli hegeliani di Napoli 1999: Edizione di
Tommaso Campilla di Carmelo Ottaviano Edizione critica delle Opere psicologiche
inedite di Bertrando Spaventa: 1976: Lezioni di antropologia 1978: Psiche e
metafisica 1984: Elementi di psicologia speculativa 2001: Sulle psicopatie in
generale. Controllo di autorità VIAF
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Filosofi italiani del XX secoloAccademici italiani del XX secoloNati nel
1930Morti nel 2010Nati il 10 febbraioMorti il 21 gennaioNati a Palma di
MontechiaroMorti a Catania[altre]
Ortes Giammaria Ortes Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Abbozzo Questa voce
sull'argomento filosofi italiani è solo un abbozzo. Contribuisci a migliorarla
secondo le convenzioni di Wikipedia.
Giovanni Maria Ortes Giovanni Maria Ortes (Venezia, marzo 1713 –
Venezia, 1790) è stato un filosofo, matematico, economista e monaco camaldolese
italiano. Scrisse anche di musica, cioè cinque drammi per musica e due opere
sul teatro musicale. Errori popolari
intorno all'economia nazionale e al governo delle nazioni, 1999 Indice 1 Biografia
1.1 Il
pensiero 2 Opere
3 Note
4 Bibliografia
5 Altri
progetti 6 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Monaco camaldolese, alla morte di suo padre uscì dall'ordine,
ma rimase prete. Considerato uno dei più dotati tra gli economisti veneti
settecenteschi, è stato un precursore nell'analizzare - dal punto di vista
della produzione complessiva - alcuni aspetti come popolazione e consumo. Il pensiero La sua impostazione filosofica si
fondava su un rigoroso razionalismo. Nel mercantilismo vide far gran confusione
fra moneta e ricchezza. In economia fu un sostenitore del libero scambio - pur
con alcune restrizioni della proprietà che interessavano il clero, anche se
appartenevano al passato - ed è considerato per questo un anticipatore di
Thomas Robert Malthus, ma con qualche contraddizione. Malthus prevedeva
l'aumento della popolazione, in trenta anni, in modo esponenziale, quindi molto
di più dell'aumento delle sussistenze.
Opere Vita del padre D. Guido Grandi, abate camaldolese, matematico
dello Studio Pisano, Venezia, Giambatista Pasquali, 1744.[1] Dell'economia
nazionale, Venezia, 1774. Sulla religione e sul governo dei popoli, Venezia,
1780. Saggio della filosofia degli antichi, esposto in versi per musica,
Venezia, 1757.[2] Dei fedecommessi a famiglie e chiese, Venezia, 1784.
Riflessioni sulla popolazione delle nazioni per rapporto all'economia
nazionale, 1790. Giammaria Ortes, Errori popolari intorno all'economia
nazionale e al governo delle nazioni, Milano, Ricciardi, 1999. URL consultato
il 23 giugno 2015. Note ^ Consultabile su Google libri. ^ Edizione moderna, a
cura di Riccardo Donati, Genova, San Marco dei Giustiniani, 2007. Bibliografia
Franco Catalano, Ortes, Gianmaria, in Dizionario Letterario Bompiani. Autori,
III, Milano, Bompiani, 1957, pp. 30. Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote
Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su Giammaria Ortes Collegamenti esterni
Òrtes, Giammaria la voce nella Treccani.it L'Enciclopedia Italiana. URL
visitato il 24 gennaio 2012. Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 32178814 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 1821 4953 · SBN
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Biografie Portale Biografie Cattolicesimo Portale Cattolicesimo Economia
Portale Economia Filosofia Portale Filosofia Matematica Portale Matematica
Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XVIII secoloMatematici italiani del XVIII
secoloEconomisti italianiNati nel 1713Morti nel 1790Nati a VeneziaMorti a
VeneziaReligiosi italiani[altre]
Otranto – Nicola di Nicola di Otranto Da
Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Nicola di
Otranto chiamato Nettario dopo essere diventato monaco (Otranto, 1155/1160
circa – Casole, 9 febbraio 1235) è stato un monaco cristiano, filosofo e
teologo italiano. Biografia
Sull'infanzia e sulla formazione di Nicola poco è noto: si ipotizza sia nato ad
Otranto tra il 1155 e il 1160; non si sa dove abbia soggiornato e studiato, né
chi siano stati i suoi maestri. La sua produzione, però, lascia immaginare una
formazione filosofica e teologica molto solida. Fu insegnante di grammatica e
letteratura greca (grammatikòs) presso il Monastero di San Nicola di Casole,
vicino ad Otranto. Dello stesso monastero divenne abate tra la fine del 1219 e
l'inizio del 1220. Dotato di un'ottima
conoscenza del latino e del greco (sua lingua materna), nonché dell'ebraico,
prima del 1198 tradusse dal greco in latino la liturgia di Basilio ed altri
testi liturgici per volontà del vescovo Guglielmo di Otranto. Le sue competenze
linguistiche gli valsero inoltre degli incarichi diplomatici: fu interprete al
seguito dei legati papali Benedetto, cardinale di Santa Susanna, e Pelagio
Galvani, vescovo di Albano, nei loro viaggi in Oriente, rispettivamente nel 1205/07
e nel 1214/15. Fu inoltre a Nicea al seguito dell'imperatore Federico II di
Svevia nel 1223/24. Fu autore di scritti
poetici, filosofici e teologici. Si conservano di lui: L'arte dello scalpello, una raccolta di testi
geomantici ed astrologici; le traduzioni di testi liturgici; Dialogo contro i
giudei; Tre monografie (syntagmata) contro i Latini su questioni dottrinali
significative nella polemica fra cattolici ed ortodossi (quali la processione
dello Spirito Santo o il pane azzimo); un'appendice ai tre Syntagmata; due
lettere complete e frammenti di altre lettere; alcune poesie. Bibliografia J.M.
Hoeck-R.J. Loenertz, Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto Abt von Casole. Beiträge
zur Geschichte der ost-westlichen Beziehungen unter Innozenz III. und Friedrich
II., Ettal 1965. Michael Chronz: Νεκταρίου, ηγουμένου μονής Κασούλων (Νικολάου
Υδρουντινού): « Διάλεξις κατά Ιουδαίων». Κριτική έκδοση. Athena 2009. ISBN
978-960-931497-8. Lars Martin Hoffmann: Der antijüdische Dialog Kata Iudaion
des Nikolaos-Nektarios von Otranto. Universitätsbibliothek Mainz 2015 (Mainz,
Univ., Diss. 2008; http://d-nb.info/1073879976). Collegamenti esterni Nicola di
Otranto, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Controllo di autorità VIAF (EN) 64362564 ·
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Biografie: accedi alle voci di Wikipedia che trattano di biografie Categorie:
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nel 1235Morti il 9 febbraioNati a Otranto[altre]
Ottaviano: Carmelo Ottaviano Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Carmelo Ottaviano (Modica,
18 gennaio 1906 – Terni, 23 gennaio 1980) è stato un filosofo e accademico
italiano. Indice 1 Biografia e carriera 2 Opere
principali 3 Note
4 Bibliografia
5 Voci
correlate 6 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia e carriera Diplomatosi presso il Liceo Classico Tommaso
Campailla di Modica, si laureò presso l'Università Cattolica di Milano a 21
anni.[1] Straordinario di Storia della
Filosofia prima all'Università di Cagliari, poi all'Università degli Studi di
Napoli Federico II, dove ottenne la sua prima cattedra a 36 anni, conseguendovi
la libera docenza in Storia della Filosofia nel 1939, passò poi all'Università
degli Studi di Catania, dove, nel 1948, fondò e diresse l'Istituto di
Magistero[1], insegnandovi, oltreché Storia della Filosofia, anche Pedagogia e
Psicologia. Nel 1933, fondò la rivista
internazionale di filosofia Sophia.[1]
Grande conoscitore della filosofia del periodo medievale, di cui
peraltro ritrovò e studiò molte opere inedite, elaborò una propria teoria
profondamente permeata di Cattolicesimo.
Delle due opere, Critica dell'Idealismo (Napoli, 1936) e Metafisica
dell'essere parziale (Padova, 1941), la prima, tra i pochissimi lavori italiani
ad avere l'onore di una sollecita traduzione in tedesco,[1] in un palcoscenico
di enorme rilievo[quale? quello degli studiosi tedeschi?], fu pubblicata pure
nella Germania nazista (Kritik der Idealismus, Münster, 1941), ma fu ben presto
censurata e poi bruciata pubblicamente a causa della sua dura critica
all'Idealismo di Giovanni Gentile. Questa sua opposizione a Gentile, nonché le
sue critiche a Benedetto Croce, gli valsero dure vessazioni accademiche. Pubblicò inoltre un ampio e comprensivo
Manuale di storia della filosofia (Napoli, 1970-72). Membro dell'Accademia d'Italia, nel 1931 si
occupò, per primo, del pensiero di Gioacchino da Fiore (circa 1130-1202),
l'abate calabrese esaltato da Dante nel suo Paradiso, pubblicandone il primo
saggio. Nel 1934, pubblicò il codice di Oxford Joachimi Abbatis Liber contra
Lombardum, che egli attribuì a qualche seguace della scuola di Gioacchino da
Fiore. Nel 1935, nel mentre celebrava, a Novara, Pietro Lombardo, riprese a
parlare di Gioacchino da Fiore, presentandolo come un romantico "ante
litteram" e un fautore della nazione italiana. Nello stesso anno, segnalò
pure due ignorati codici gioachimiti della biblioteca Casanatense di Roma,
occupandosi altresì della condanna di Gioacchino da parte del Concilio
Lateranense IV ed evidenziandone lo sgomento suscitato. Inoltre, nella rivista
Sophia, diretta da lui ed allora edita dalla CEDAM di Padova, diede spazio a
vari studiosi gioachimiti italiani e stranieri. Sempre sull'argomento, ritenne
dapprima Gioacchino un triteista, ma, dopo aver visionato le tavole del Liber
figurarum, scoperto da Leone Tondelli nel 1937 e pubblicato nel 1940, propese
invece per un'ortodossia trinitaria dell'abate calabrese. Infine, negli ultimi anni della sua carriera
di docente all'Università di Catania, fondò e diresse un partito nazionale
d'impronta social-liberale, che però non ebbe seguito[senza fonte]. Opere principali Pietro Abelardo. La vita, le
opere, il pensiero, Tipografia Poliglotta, Roma, 1929. Il "Tractatus super
quatuor evangelia" di Gioacchino da Fiore, Archivio di filosofia, Padova,
1931, Parte I. Testi medioevali inediti. Alcuino, Avendanth, Raterio, S.
Anselmo, Pietro Abelardo, Incertus auctor, a cura di Carmelo Ottaviano,
Olschki, Firenze, 1933. Joachimi abbatis Liber contra Lombardum (Scuola di
Gioacchino da Fiore), a cura di Carmelo Ottaviano, Reale Accademia d'Italia -
Studi e documenti, Roma, 1934. Un documento intorno alla condanna di Gioacchino
da Fiore nel 1215, Rondinella, Napoli, 1935 (poi ripubblicato per i tipi
dell'Università di Catania, 1949). Pier Lombardo, in Celebrazioni piemontesi,
Istituto d'Arte per la Decorazione e la Illustrazione del Libro, Urbino, 1936.
Critica dell'Idealismo, Rondinella, Napoli, 1936. Kritik des Idealismus, mit
einer Einfuhrung von Fritz-Joachim Von Rintelen: Realismus-Idealismus?,
Aschendorff, Munster, 1941. Metafisica dell'essere parziale, CEDAM, Padova,
1941. La tragicità del reale, ovvero la malinconia delle cose. Saggio sulla mia
filosofia, CEDAM, Padova, 1964. L'Ars compendiosa de R. Lulle, avec une étude
sur la bibliographie et le Fond Ambrosien de Lulle, par Carmelo Ottaviano, Librairie
philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 1981. Tommaso Campailla. Contributo
all'interpretazione e alla storia del cartesianesimo in Italia, introduzione e
note a cura di Domenico D'Orsi, CEDAM, Padova, 1999. Note E. Scarcella, Dizionario Biografico degli
Italiani, riferimenti in Bibliografia. Bibliografia Domenico D'Orsi, Il
filosofo della quarta età: ricordo di Carmelo Ottaviano nel trigesimo della
morte, quotidiano “La Sicilia”, Catania, del 23/02/1980. Domenico D'Orsi, Tra
Socrate e Gesù: quattro anni fa moriva il filosofo Carmelo Ottaviano,
quotidiano “La Sicilia”, Catania, del 24/01/1984. Emilia Scarcella, «OTTAVIANO,
Carmelo» in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Volume 79, Istituto
dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma, 2013. Voci correlate Gioacchino da Fiore
Collegamenti esterni Massimiliano Pace, Il filosofo Carmelo Ottaviano, Modica
Info Magazine, 27 giugno 2007. URL consultato il 27-1-2008. Controllo di
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Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX
secoloAccademici italiani del XX secoloNati nel 1906Morti nel 1980Nati il 18
gennaioMorti il 23 gennaioNati a ModicaMorti a Terni[altre]
Oxford
idealism:
Grice is a member of “The F. H. Bradley Society,” at Mansfield. -- ideal
market, a hypothetical market, used as a tool of economic analysis, in which
all relevant agents are perfectly informed of the price of the good in question
and the cost of its production, and all economic transactions can be undertaken
with no cost. A specific case is a market exemplifying perfect competition. The
term is sometimes extended to apply to an entire economy consisting of ideal
markets for every good. -- ideal
observer, a hypothetical being, possessed of various qualities and traits,
whose moral reactions (judgments or attitudes) to actions, persons, and states
of affairs figure centrally in certain theories of ethics. There are two main
versions of ideal observer theory: (a) those that take the reactions of ideal
observers as a standard of the correctness of moral judgments, and (b) those
that analyze the meanings of moral judgments in terms of the reactions of ideal
observers. Theories of the first sort – ideal observer theories of correctness
– hold, e.g., that judgments like ‘John’s lying to Brenda about her father’s
death was wrong (bad)’ are correct provided any ideal observer would have a
negative attitude toward John’s action. Similarly, ‘Alison’s refusal to divulge
confidential information about her patient was right (good)’ is correct
provided any ideal observer would have a positive attitude toward that action.
This version of the theory can be traced to Adam Smith, who is usually credited
with introducing the concept of an ideal observer into philosophy, though he
used the expression ‘impartial spectator’ to refer to the concept. Regarding
the correctness of moral judgments, Smith wrote: “That precise and distinct
measure can be found nowhere but in the sympathetic feelings of the impartial
and well-informed spectator” (A Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759). Theories of
a second sort – ideal observer theories of meaning – take the concept of an
ideal observer as part of the very meaning of ordinary moral judgments. Thus,
according to Roderick Firth (“Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1952), moral judgments of the form ‘x
is good (bad)’, on this view, mean ‘All ideal observers would feel moral
approval (disapproval) toward x’, and similarly for other moral judgments
(where such approvals and disapprovals are characterized as felt desires having
a “demand quality”). Different conceptions of an ideal observer result from
variously specifying those qualities and traits that characterize such beings.
Smith’s characterization includes being well informed and impartial. However,
according to Firth, an ideal observer must be omniscient; omnipercipient, i.e.,
having the ability to imagine vividly any possible events or states of affairs,
including the experiences and subjective states of others; disinterested, i.e.,
having no interests or desires that involve essential reference to any
particular individuals or things; dispassionate; consistent; and otherwise a
“normal” human being. Both versions of the theory face a dilemma: on the one
hand, if ideal observers are richly characterized as impartial, disinterested,
and normal, then since these terms appear to be moral-evaluative terms, appeal
to the reactions of ideal observers (either as a standard of correctness or as
an analysis of meaning) is circular. On the other hand, if ideal observers
receive an impoverished characterization in purely non-evaluative terms, then
since there is no reason to suppose that such ideal observers will often all
agree in their reactions to actions, people, and states of affairs, most moral
judgments will turn out to be incorrect. Grice: “We have to distinguish between
idealism and hegelianism; but the English being as they are, they don’t! And
being English, I shouldn’t, either!” – “There is so-called ‘idealist’ logic; if
so, there is so called ‘idealist implicaturum’” “My favourite idealist
philosopher is Bosanquet.” “I like Bradley because Russell was once a
Bradleyian, when it was fashionable to be so! But surely Russell lacked the
spirit to understand, even, Bradley! It is so much easier to mock him!” --. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Pre-war Oxford philosophy.” The
reference to mentalism in the essay on ‘modest mentalism,’ after Myro, in The
H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
oxonian or oxford
aristototelian:
or the Oxonian peripatos – or the Peripatos in the Oxonian lycaeum -- Cambridge
Platonists: If Grice adored Aristotle, it was perhaps he hated the Cambridge
platonists so! a group of seventeenth-century philosopher-theologians at
the of Cambridge, principally including
Benjamin Whichcote 160983, often designated the father of the Cambridge Platonists;
Henry More; Ralph Cudworth 161788; and John Smith 161652. Whichcote, Cudworth,
and Smith received their education in or
were at some time fellows of Emmanuel , a stronghold of the Calvinism in which
they were nurtured and against which they rebelled under mainly Erasmian,
Arminian, and Neoplatonic influences. Other Cambridge men who shared their
ideas and attitudes to varying degrees were Nathanael Culverwel 1618?51, Peter
Sterry 161372, George Rust d.1670, John Worthington 161871, and Simon Patrick 1625
1707. As a generic label, ‘Cambridge Platonists’ is a handy umbrella term
rather than a dependable signal of doctrinal unity or affiliation. The
Cambridge Platonists were not a self-constituted group articled to an explicit
manifesto; no two of them shared quite the same set of doctrines or values.
Their Platonism was not exclusively the pristine teaching of Plato, but was
formed rather from Platonic ideas supposedly prefigured in Hermes Trismegistus,
in the Chaldean Oracles, and in Pythagoras, and which they found in Origen and
other church fathers, in the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and Proclus, and in the
Florentine Neoplatonism of Ficino. They took contrasting and changing positions
on the important belief originating in Florence with Giovanni Pico della
Mirandola that Pythagoras and Plato derived their wisdom ultimately from Moses
and the cabala. They were not equally committed to philosophical pursuits, nor
were they equally versed in the new philosophies and scientific advances of the
time. The Cambridge Platonists’ concerns were ultimately religious and
theological rather than primarily philosophical. They philosophized as
theologians, making eclectic use of philosophical doctrines whether Platonic or
not for apologetic purposes. They wanted to defend “true religion,” namely,
their latitudinarian vision of Anglican Christianity, against a variety of
enemies: the Calvinist doctrine of predestination; sectarianism; religious
enthusiasm; fanaticism; the “hide-bound, strait-laced spirit” of Interregnum Puritanism;
the “narrow, persecuting spirit” that followed the Restoration; atheism; and
the impieties incipient in certain trends in contemporary science and
philosophy. Notable among the latter were the doctrines of the mechanical
philosophers, especially the materialism and mechanical determinism of Hobbes
and the mechanistic pretensions of the Cartesians. The existence of God, the
existence, immortality, and dignity of the human soul, the existence of spirit
activating the natural world, human free will, and the primacy of reason are
among the principal teachings of the Cambridge Platonists. They emphasized the
positive role of reason in all aspects of philosophy, religion, and ethics,
insisting in particular that it is irrationality that endangers the Christian
life. Human reason and understanding was “the Candle of the Lord” Whichcote’s
phrase, perhaps their most cherished image. In Whichcote’s words, “To go
against Reason, is to go against God . . . Reason is the Divine Governor of
Man’s Life; it is the very Voice of God.” Accordingly, “there is no real
clashing at all betwixt any genuine point of Christianity and what true
Philosophy and right Reason does determine or allow” More. Reason directs us to
the self-evidence of first principles, which “must be seen in their own light,
and are perceived by an inward power of nature.” Yet in keeping with the
Plotinian mystical tenor of their thought, they found within the human soul the
“Divine Sagacity” More’s term, which is the prime cause of human reason and therefore
superior to it. Denying the Calvinist doctrine that revelation is the only
source of spiritual light, they taught that the “natural light” enables us to
know God and interpret the Scriptures. Cambridge Platonism was uncompromisingly
innatist. Human reason has inherited immutable intellectual, moral, and
religious notions, “anticipations of the soul,” which negate the claims of
empiricism. The Cambridge Platonists were skeptical with regard to certain
kinds of knowledge, and recognized the role of skepticism as a critical
instrument in epistemology. But they were dismissive of the idea that
Pyrrhonism be taken seriously in the practical affairs of the philosopher at
work, and especially of the Christian soul in its quest for divine knowledge
and understanding. Truth is not compromised by our inability to devise
apodictic demonstrations. Indeed Whichcote passed a moral censure on those who
pretend “the doubtfulness and uncertainty of reason.” Innatism and the natural
light of reason shaped the Cambridge Platonists’ moral philosophy. The
unchangeable and eternal ideas of good and evil in the divine mind are the
exemplars of ethical axioms or noemata that enable the human mind to make moral
judgments. More argued for a “boniform faculty,” a faculty higher than reason
by which the soul rejoices in reason’s judgment of the good. The most
philosophically committed and systematic of the group were More, Cudworth, and
Culverwel. Smith, perhaps the most intellectually gifted and certainly the most
promising note his dates, defended Whichcote’s Christian teaching, insisting
that theology is more “a Divine Life than a Divine Science.” More exclusively
theological in their leanings were Whichcote, who wrote little of solid
philosophical interest, Rust, who followed Cudworth’s moral philosophy, and
Sterry. Only Patrick, More, and Cudworth all fellows of the Royal Society were
sufficiently attracted to the new science especially the work of Descartes to
discuss it in any detail or to turn it to philosophical and theological
advantage. Though often described as a Platonist, Culverwel was really a
neo-Aristotelian with Platonic embellishments and, like Sterry, a Calvinist. He
denied innate ideas and supported the tabula rasa doctrine, commending “the
Platonists . . . that they lookt upon the spirit of a man as the Candle of the
Lord, though they were deceived in the time when ‘twas lighted.” The Cambridge
Platonists were influential as latitudinarians, as advocates of rational
theology, as severe critics of unbridled mechanism and materialism, and as the
initiators, in England, of the intuitionist ethical tradition. In the England
of Locke they are a striking counterinstance of innatism and non-empirical
philosophy.
camera obscura: cited by H. P.
Grice and G. J. Warnock on “Seeing” – and the Causal Theory of Seeing – “visa”
-- a darkened enclosure that focuses light from an external object by a
pinpoint hole instead of a lens, creating an inverted, reversed image on the
opposite wall. The adoption of the camera obscura as a model for the eye
revolutionized the study of visual perception by rendering obsolete previous
speculative philosophical theories, in particular the emanation theory, which
explained perception as due to emanated copy-images of objects entering the eye,
and theories that located the image of perception in the lens rather than the
retina. By shifting the location of sensation to a projection on the retina,
the camera obscura doctrine helped support the distinction of primary and
secondary sense qualities, undermining the medieval realist view of perception
and moving toward the idea that consciousness is radically split off from the
world.
oxonian
dialectic, or rather Mertonian dialectic – (“You need to go to Merton to do
dialectic” – Grice).- dialectic: H. P. Grice, “Athenian dialectic and Oxonian
dialectic,” an argumentative exchange involving contradiction or a technique or
method connected with such exchanges. The word’s origin is the Grecian
dialegein, ‘to argue’ or ‘converse’; in Aristotle and others, this often has
the sense ‘argue for a conclusion’, ‘establish by argument’. By Plato’s time,
if not earlier, it had acquired a technical sense: a form of argumentation
through question and answer. The adjective dialektikos, ‘dialectical’, would
mean ‘concerned with dialegein’ or of persons ‘skilled in dialegein’; the
feminine dialektike is then ‘the art of dialegein’. Aristotle says that Zeno of
Elea invented diagonalization dialectic 232
232 dialectic. He apparently had in mind Zeno’s paradoxical arguments
against motion and multiplicity, which Aristotle saw as dialectical because
they rested on premises his adversaries conceded and deduced contradictory
consequences from them. A first definition of dialectical argument might then
be: ‘argument conducted by question and answer, resting on an opponent’s
concessions, and aiming at refuting the opponent by deriving contradictory
consequences’. This roughly fits the style of argument Socrates is shown
engaging in by Plato. So construed, dialectic is primarily an art of
refutation. Plato, however, came to apply ‘dialectic’ to the method by which
philosophers attain knowledge of Forms. His understanding of that method
appears to vary from one dialogue to another and is difficult to interpret. In
Republic VIVII, dialectic is a method that somehow establishes
“non-hypothetical” conclusions; in the Sophist, it is a method of discovering
definitions by successive divisions of genera into their species. Aristotle’s
concept of dialectical argument comes closer to Socrates and Zeno: it proceeds
by question and answer, normally aims at refutation, and cannot scientifically
or philosophically establish anything. Aristotle differentiates dialectical
arguments from demonstration apodeixis, or scientific arguments, on the basis
of their premises: demonstrations must have “true and primary” premises,
dialectical arguments premises that are “apparent,” “reputable,” or “accepted”
these are alternative, and disputed, renderings of the term endoxos. However,
dialectical arguments must be valid, unlike eristic or sophistical arguments.
The Topics, which Aristotle says is the first art of dialectic, is organized as
a handbook for dialectical debates; Book VIII clearly presupposes a
ruledirected, formalized style of disputation presumably practiced in the
Academy. This use of ‘dialectic’ reappears in the early Middle Ages in Europe,
though as Aristotle’s works became better known after the twelfth century
dialectic was increasingly associated with the formalized disputations practiced
in the universities recalling once again the formalized practice presupposed by
Aristotle’s Topics. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant declared that the
ancient meaning of ‘dialectic’ was ‘the logic of illusion’ and proposed a
“Transcendental Dialectic” that analyzed the “antinomies” deductions of
contradictory conclusions to which pure reason is inevitably led when it
extends beyond its proper sphere. This concept was further developed by Fichte
and Schelling into a traidic notion of thesis, opposing antithesis, and
resultant synthesis. Hegel transformed the notion of contradiction from a
logical to a metaphysical one, making dialectic into a theory not simply of
arguments but of historical processes within the development of “spirit”; Marx
transformed this still further by replacing ‘spirit’ with ‘matter’.
oxonian
Epicureanism, -- cf. Grice, “Il giardino di Epicuro a Roma.” -- Walter Pater,
“Marius, The Epicurean” -- one of the three leading movements constituting
Hellenistic philosophy. It was founded by Epicurus 341271 B.C., together with
his close colleagues Metrodorus c.331 278, Hermarchus Epicurus’s successor as
head of the Athenian school, and Polyaenus d. 278. He set up Epicurean
communities at Mytilene, Lampsacus, and finally Athens 306 B.C., where his
school the Garden became synonymous with Epicureanism. These groups set out to
live the ideal Epicurean life, detached from political society without actively
opposing it, and devoting themselves to philosophical discussion and the cult
of friendship. Their correspondence was anthologized and studied as a model of
the philosophical life by later Epicureans, for whom the writings of Epicurus
and his three cofounders, known collectively as “the Men,” held a virtually
biblical status. Epicurus wrote voluminously, but all that survives are three
brief epitomes the Letter to Herodotus on physics, the Letter to Pythocles on
astronomy, etc., and the Letter to Menoeceus on ethics, a group of maxims, and
papyrus fragments of his magnum opus On Nature. Otherwise, we are almost
entirely dependent on secondary citations, doxography, and the writings of his
later followers. The Epicurean physical theory is atomistic, developed out of
the fifth-century system of Democritus. Per se existents are divided into bodies
and space, each of them infinite in quantity. Space is, or includes, absolute
void, without which motion would be impossible, while body is constituted out
of physically indivisible particles, “atoms.” Atoms are themselves further
analyzable as sets of absolute “minima,” the ultimate quanta of magnitude,
posited by Epicurus to circumvent the paradoxes that Zeno of Elea had derived
from the hypothesis of infinite divisibility. Atoms themselves have only the
primary properties of shape, size, and weight. All secondary properties, e.g.
color, are generated out of atomic compounds; given their dependent status,
they cannot be added to the list of per se existents, but it does not follow,
as the skeptical tradition in atomism had held, that they are not real either.
Atoms are in constant rapid motion, epapoge Epicureanism 269 269 at equal speed since in the pure void
there is nothing to slow them down. Stability emerges as an overall property of
compounds, which large groups of atoms form by settling into regular patterns
of complex motion, governed by the three motive principles of weight,
collisions, and a minimal random movement, the “swerve,” which initiates new
patterns of motion and blocks the danger of determinism. Our world itself, like
the countless other worlds, is such a compound, accidentally generated and of
finite duration. There is no divine mind behind it, or behind the evolution of
life and society: the gods are to be viewed as ideal beings, models of the
Epicurean good life, and therefore blissfully detached from our affairs.
Canonic, the Epicurean theory of knowledge, rests on the principle that “all
sensations are true.” Denial of empirical cognition is argued to amount to
skepticism, which is in turn rejected as a self-refuting position. Sensations
are representationally not propositionally true. In the paradigm case of sight,
thin films of atoms Grecian eidola, Latin simulacra constantly flood off
bodies, and our eyes mechanically report those that reach them, neither
embroidering nor interpreting. Inference from these guaranteed photographic, as
it were data to the nature of external objects themselves involves judgment,
and there alone error can occur. Sensations thus constitute one of the three
“criteria of truth,” along with feelings, a criterion of values and
introspective information, and prolepseis, or naturally acquired generic
conceptions. On the basis of sense evidence, we are entitled to infer the
nature of microscopic or remote phenomena. Celestial phenomena, e.g., cannot be
regarded as divinely engineered which would conflict with the prolepsis of the
gods as tranquil, and experience supplies plenty of models that would account
for them naturalistically. Such grounds amount to consistency with directly
observed phenomena, and are called ouk antimarturesis “lack of
counterevidence”. Paradoxically, when several alternative explanations of the
same phenomenon pass this test, all must be accepted: although only one of them
can be true for each token phenomenon, the others, given their intrinsic
possibility and the spatial and temporal infinity of the universe, must be true
for tokens of the same type elsewhere. Fortunately, when it comes to the basic
tenets of physics, it is held that only one theory passes this test of
consistency with phenomena. Epicurean ethics is hedonistic. Pleasure is our
innate natural goal, to which all other values, including virtue, are
subordinated. Pain is the only evil, and there is no intermediate state.
Philosophy’s task is to show how pleasure can be maximized, as follows: Bodily
pleasure becomes more secure if we adopt a simple way of life that satisfies
only our natural and necessary desires, with the support of like-minded
friends. Bodily pain, when inevitable, can be outweighed by mental pleasure,
which exceeds it because it can range over past, present, and future. The
highest pleasure, whether of soul or body, is a satisfied state, “katastematic
pleasure.” The pleasures of stimulation “kinetic pleasures”, including those
resulting from luxuries, can vary this state, but have no incremental value:
striving to accumulate them does not increase overall pleasure, but does
increase our vulnerability to fortune. Our primary aim should instead be to
minimize pain. This is achieved for the body through a simple way of life, and
for the soul through the study of physics, which achieves the ultimate
katastematic pleasure, ”freedom from disturbance” ataraxia, by eliminating the
two main sources of human anguish, the fears of the gods and of death. It
teaches us a that cosmic phenomena do not convey divine threats, b that death
is mere disintegration of the soul, with hell an illusion. To fear our own
future non-existence is as irrational as to regret the non-existence we enjoyed
before we were born. Physics also teaches us how to evade determinism, which
would turn moral agents into mindless fatalists: the swerve doctrine secures
indeterminism, as does the logical doctrine that future-tensed propositions may
be neither true nor false. The Epicureans were the first explicit defenders of
free will, although we lack the details of their positive explanation of it.
Finally, although Epicurean groups sought to opt out of public life, they took
a keen and respectful interest in civic justice, which they analyzed not as an
absolute value, but as a contract between humans to refrain from harmful
activity on grounds of utility, perpetually subject to revision in the light of
changing circumstances. Epicureanism enjoyed widespread popularity, but unlike
its great rival Stoicism it never entered the intellectual bloodstream of the
ancient world. Its stances were dismissed by many as philistine, especially its
rejection of all cultural activities not geared to the Epicurean good life. It
was also increasingly viewed as atheistic, and its ascetic hedonism was
misrepresented as crude sensualism hence the modern use of ‘epicure’. The
school nevertheless continued to flourish down to and well beyond the end of
the Hellenistic age. In the first century B.C. its exponents Epicureanism Epicureanism
270 270 included Philodemus, whose
fragmentarily surviving treatise On Signs attests to sophisticated debates on
induction between Stoics and Epicureans, and Lucretius, the Roman author of the
great Epicurean didactic poem On the Nature of Things. In the second century
A.D. another Epicurean, Diogenes of Oenoanda, had his philosophical writings
engraved on stone in a public colonnade, and passages have survived. Thereafter
Epicureanism’s prominence declined. Serious interest in it was revived by Renaissance
humanists, and its atomism was an important influence on early modern physics,
especially through Gassendi. Refs.:
Luigi Speranza, “Grice e il giardino di Epicuro a Roma,” per il Club
Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
oxonianism:
Grice was “university lecturer in philosophy” and “tutorial fellow in
philosophy” – that’s why he always saw philosophy, like virtue, as entire. He
would never accept a post like “professor of moral philosophy” or “professor of
logic,” or “professor of metaphysical philosophy,” or “reader in natural
theology,” or “reader in mental philosophy.” So he felt a responsibility
towards ‘philosophy undepartmentilised’ and he succeded in never disgressing
from this gentlemanly attitude to philosophy as a totum, and not a technically
specified field of ‘expertise.’ See playgroup. The playgroup was Oxonian. There
are aspects of Grice’s philosophy which are Oxonian but not playgroup-related,
and had to do with his personal inclinations. The fact that it was Hardie who
was his tutor and instilled on him a love for Aristotle. Grice’s rapport with
H. A. Prichard. Grice would often socialize with members of Ryle’s group, such
as O. P. Wood, J. D. Mabbott, and W. C. Kneale. And of course, he had a knowleddge
of the history of Oxford philosophy, quoting from J. C. Wilson, G. F. Stout, H.
H. Price, Bosanquet, Bradley. He even had his Oxonian ‘enemies,’ Dummett,
Anscombe. And he would quote from independents, like A. J. P. Kenny. But if he
had to quote someone first, it was a member of his beloved playgroup: Austin,
Strawson, Warnock, Urmson, Hare, Hart, Hampshire. Grice cannot possibly claim
to talk about post-war Oxford philosophy, but his own! Cf. Oxfords post-war
philosophy. What were Grices first impressions when arriving at
Oxford. He was going to learn. Only the poor learn at Oxford was an adage he
treasured, since he wasnt one! Let us start with an alphabetical listing
of Grices play Group companions: Austin, Butler, Flew, Gardiner, Grice, Hare,
Hampshire, Hart, Nowell-Smith, Parkinson, Paul, Pears, Quinton, Sibley,
Strawson, Thomson, Urmson, and Warnock. Grices main Oxonian
association is St. Johns, Oxford. By Oxford Philosophy, Grice notably
refers to Austins Play Group, of which he was a member. But Grice had
Oxford associations pre-war, and after the demise of Austin. But back to the
Play Group, this, to some, infamous, playgroup, met on Saturday mornings at
different venues at Oxford, including Grices own St. John’s ‒ apparently,
Austins favourite venue. Austin regarded himself and his kindergarten as
linguistic or language botanists. The idea was to list various ordinary uses of
this or that philosophical notion. Austin: They say philosophy is about
language; well, then, let’s botanise! Grices involvement with Oxford
philosophy of course predated his associations with Austins play group. He
always said he was fortunate of having been a tutee to Hardie at Corpus.
Corpus, Oxford. Grice would occasionally refer to the emblematic pelican,
so prominently displayed at Corpus. Grice had an interim association with
the venue one associates most directly with philosophy, Merton
‒: Grice, Merton, Oxford. While Grice loved to drop Oxonian
Namess, notably his rivals, such as Dummett or Anscombe, he knew when not to.
His Post-war Oxford philosophy, as opposed to more specific items in The Grice
Collection, remains general in tone, and intended as a defense of the
ordinary-language approach to philosophy. Surprisingly, or perhaps not (for
those who knew Grice), he takes a pretty idiosyncratic characterisation of
conceptual analysis. Grices philosophical problems emerge with Grices
idiosyncratic use of this or that expression. Conceptual analysis is meant to
solve his problems, not others, repr. in WOW . Grice finds it important to
reprint this since he had updated thoughts on the matter, which he displays in
his Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy. The topic
represents one of the strands he identifies behind the unity of his philosophy. By
post-war Oxford philosophy, Grice meant the period he was interested
in. While he had been at Corpus, Merton, and St. Johns in the pre-war
days, for some reason, he felt that he had made history in the post-war
period. The historical reason Grice gives is understandable
enough. In the pre-war days, Grice was the good student and the new fellow
of St. Johns ‒ the other one was Mabbott. But he had not been able to
engage in philosophical discussion much, other than with other tutees of
Hardie. After the war, Grice indeed joins Austins more popular, less secretive
Saturday mornings. Indeed, for Grice, post-war means all philosophy after the
war (and not just say, the forties!) since he never abandoned the methods he
developed under Austin, which were pretty congenial to the ones he had himself
displayed in the pre-war days, in essays like Negation and Personal identity.
Grice is a bit of an expert on Oxonian philosophy. He sees himself as
a member of the school of analytic philosophy, rather than the abused term
ordinary-language philosophy. This is evident by the fact that he
contributed to such polemic ‒ but typically Oxonian ‒
volumes such as Butler, Analytic Philosophy, published by Blackwell (of all
publishers). Grice led a very social life at Oxford, and held frequent
philosophical discussions with the Play group philosophers (alphabetically
listed above), and many others, such as Wood. Post-war Oxford philosophy,
miscellaneous, Oxford philosophy, in WOW, II, Semantics and Met. , Essay. By
Oxford philosophy, Grice means his own. Grice went back to the topic of
philosophy and ordinary language, as one of his essays is precisely entitled,
Philosophy and ordinary language, philosophy and ordinary language, :
ordinary-language philosophy, linguistic botanising. Grice is not really
interested in ordinary language as a philologist might. He spoke
ordinary language, he thought. The point had been brought to the fore by
Austin. If they think philosophy is a play on words, well then, lets play
the game. Grices interest is methodological. Malcolm had been claiming
that ordinary language is incorrigible. While Grice agreed that language can be
clever, he knew that Aristotle was possibly right when he explored ta
legomena in terms of the many and the selected wise, philosophy and
ordinary language, philosophy and ordinary language, : philosophy, ordinary
language. At the time of writing, ordinary-language philosophy had become,
even within Oxford, a bit of a term of abuse. Grice tries to defend
Austins approach to it, while suggesting ideas that Austin somewhat ignored,
like what an utterer implies by the use of an ordinary-language expression,
rather than what the expression itself does. Grice is concerned, contra
Austin, in explanation (or explanatory adequacy), not taxonomy (or descriptive
adequacy). Grice disregards Austins piecemeal approach to ordinary
language, as Grice searches for the big picture of it all. Grice never used
ordinary language seriously. The phrase was used, as he explains, by those who
HATED ordinary-language philosophy. Theres no such thing as ordinary language.
Surely you cannot fairly describe the idiosyncratic linguistic habits of an Old
Cliftonian as even remotely ordinary. Extra-ordinary more likely! As far as the
philosophy bit goes, this is what Bergmann jocularly described as the
linguistic turn. But as Grice notes, the linguistic turn involves both the
ideal language and the ordinary language. Grice defends the choice by Austin of
the ordinary seeing that it was what he had to hand! While Grice seems to be in
agreement with the tone of his Wellesley talk, his idioms there in. Youre
crying for the moon! Philosophy need not be grand! These seem to contrast with
his more grandiose approach to philosophy. His struggle was to defend the
minutiæ of linguistic botanising, that had occupied most of his professional
life, with a grander view of the discipline. He blamed Oxford for that. Never
in the history of philosophy had philosophers shown such an attachment to
ordinary language as they did in post-war Oxford, Grice liked to say.
Having learned Grecian and Latin at Clifton, Grice saw in Oxford a way to go
back to English! He never felt the need to explore Continental modern languages
like German or French. Aristotle was of course cited in Greek, but Descartes is
almost not cited, and Kant is cited in the translation available to Oxonians
then. Grice is totally right that never has philosophy experienced such a
fascination with ordinary use except at Oxford. The ruthless and unswerving
association of philosophy with ordinary language has been peculiar to the
Oxford scene. While many found this attachment to ordinary usage insidious, as
Warnock put it, it fit me and Grice to a T, implicating you need a sort of
innate disposition towards it! Strawson perhaps never had it! And thats why
Grices arguments contra Strawson rest on further minutiæ whose detection by
Grice never ceased to amaze his tutee! In this way, Grice felt he WAS Austins
heir! While Grice is associated with, in chronological order, Corpus, Merton,
and St. Johns, it is only St. Johns that counts for the Griceian! For it is at
St. Johns he was a Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy! And we love him as a
philosopher. Refs.: The obvious keyword is “Oxford.” His essay in WoW on
post-war Oxford philosophy is general – the material in the H. P. Grice papers
is more anecdotic. Also “Reply to Richards,” and references above under
‘linguistic botany’ and ‘play group,’ in BANC.
Pace
Italian Essential philosopher
Pace
Italian essential philosopher Giulio Pace Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera.
Jump to navigationJump to search Giulio
Pace Giulio Pace, latinizzato in Iulius Pacius a Beriga, noto anche come Giulio
Pace da Beriga (Vicenza, 9 aprile 1550 – Valence, 1635), è stato un giurista e
filosofo italiano. Indice 1 Biografia 2 Opere
3 Note
4 Bibliografia
5 Altri
progetti 6 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Giulio Pace nacque a Vicenza, nel borgo Berga, e studiò
filosofia e diritto all'Università di Padova, dove fu allievo di Jacopo
Menochio e Guido Panciroli. Aderì in giovane età alla religione riformata e nel
1574, intimorito dagli ammonimenti delle autorità religiose patavine, si
rifugiò a Ginevra, il principale centro del Calvinismo. L'anno successivo
divenne professore; conoscitore della lingua greca antica tradusse Aristotele
in latino (In Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Organum: Commentarius
analyticus). A Ginevra sposò Isabella (o Lucrezia) Venturina, una ragazza
protestante originaria di Lucca. Nel
1585 ottenne la cattedra di diritto all'Università di Heidelberg che conservò
fino al 1594. Ad Heidelberg pronunciò una famosa prolusione dal titolo De iuris
civilis difficultate ac docendi methodo. Sempre ad Heidelberg Pace fu coinvolto
in una polemica con Scipione Gentili. Gentili, non avendo ottenuto nel 1587 la
cattedra di Istituzioni alla quale aspirava, accusò Pace di averlo boicottato e
gli rivolse delle offese in un componimento poetico indirizzato a Ippolito
Colli (Epos ad Hippolitum a Collibus). Offeso, Pace denunciò Gentili davanti al
Senato accademico, costringendolo infine a lasciare Heidelberg per Altdorf bei
Nürnberg[1]. Ebbe anch'egli fastidi con le autorità accademiche di Heidelberg
per le sue simpatie per il Ramismo[2]
Dal 1594 al 1619 Pace insegnò in numerose università (Sedan, Ginevra,
Montpellier, Nîmes, Aiax, Valence). Nel 1619 rese pubblica la sua abiuria al
protestantesimo; quell'anno ebbe la cattedra all'Università di Padova e scrisse
De Dominio maris Adriatici, un'opera a favore della Repubblica di Venezia che
gli valse anche il cavalierato. Nel 1621 tornò nuovamente a Valence dove rimase
fino alla morte, avvenuta all'età di 85 anni.
La sua edizione dell'Organon di Aristotele,[3] fu inclusa in un'edizione
bilingue (greco-latino) delle opere di Aristotele edita da Isaac Casaubon ed
ebbe ampia diffusione soprattutto nel Nord Europa.[4] Nel 1595 pubblicò a Sedan le Institutiones
logicae e nel 1597 a Francoforte il suo importante commento In Porphyrii
Isagogen et Aristotelis Organum, Commentarius Analyticus.[5] Opere
De dominio maris Hadriatici, 1619 Imp. Caes. Iustiniani Institutionum
libri IV, Adnotationibus ac notis doctiss. scriptorum illustrati & adaucti.
Quibus adiunximus appendicis loco, leges XII tab. explicatas. Vlpiani tit. XXIX
adnotatos. Caii libros II Institut. Studio & opera Ioannis Crispini At. In
ac postrema editione accesserunt; Iul. Pacio I.C. auctore, Ginevra: apud
Eustathium Vignon, 1578 Ἐναντιόφαν. seu Legum conciliatarum centuriae III,
Spirae: typis Bernardi Albini, 1586 De rebus creditis, seu De obligationibus
qua re contrahuntur, et earum accessionibus, ad quartum librum Iustinianei
Codicis, Commentarius; accesserunt tres indices, Spirae Nemetum: apud
Bernardinum Albinum, 1596 Tractatus de contractibus et rebus creditis, seu de
obligationibus quae re contrahuntur et earum accessionibus, ad quartum librum
Iustinianei Codicis, doctissimi cuiusdam I.C. commentarius. Accesserunt tres
indices, vnus titulorum, eo quo explicantur ordine descriptorum, alter eorundem
titulorum ordine alphabetico, tertius rerum & verborum in toto opere
memorabilium, Parisiis: apud Franciscum Lepreus, 1598 (LA) Isagogica in
Institutiones imperiales, vol. 1, Lyon, Barthélemy Vincent, 1616. (LA)
Oeconomia iuris utriusque, tam civilis quam canonici, vol. 2, Lyon, Barthélemy
Vincent, 1616. (LA) Methodicorum ad iustinianeum Codicem libri, vol. 3, Lyon,
Barthélemy Vincent, 1616. (LA) Analysis Codicis, vol. 4, Lyon, Barthélemy
Vincent, 1616. Artis Lullianae emendatae libri IV Quibus docetur methodus, ad
inueniendum sermonem de quacumque re, Valentiae: apud Petrum Pinellum, 1618
(LA) De dominio maris Hadriatici, Lyon, Barthélemy Vincent, 1619. Note ^ Angela
De Benedictis, «Gentili, Scipione». In: Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani,
Vol. LIII, Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, pp.268-272, 1999 ^ Cesare
Vasoli, Scienza, dimostrazione e metodo in un maestro aristotelico dell'età di
Galileo: Giulio Pace da Beriga, logico e giurista, in Id., Profezia e ragione.
Studi sulla cultura del Cinquecento e del Seicento, Napoli, Morano 1974, pp.
649–777. ^ Aristotelis Stagiritae peripateticorum principis Organum, Morges,
1584. ^ Operum Aristotelis, Ginevra 1590, ma con la falsa indicazione:
"Lyon, chez l’imprimeur Guillaume de Laimarie" ^ Ristampa anastatica:
Hildesheim, Georg Olms 1966. Bibliografia Pace, Giulio, in Dizionario
biografico degli italiani, vol. 80, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana,
2014. Guido Acquaviva e Tullio Scovazzi (a cura di), Il dominio di Venezia sul
mare Adriatico nelle opere di Paolo Sarpi e Giulio Pace, Milano: Giuffrè, 2007,
pp. 48-50, ISBN 88-14-13440-5 (Google libri) Antonio Franceschini, Giulio Pace
da Beriga e la giurisprudenza dei suoi tempi, Venezia: Officine Grafiche di
Carlo Ferrari, 1903. (FR) Philippe Tamizey de Larroque, Jules Pacius de Beriga:
compte-rendu du mémoire de M. Ch. Revillout avec documents inédits, Paris: V.
Palmé, (FR) Marine Bohar, « Giulio Pace da Beriga (1550-1635) et sa De iuris
civilis difficultate ac docendi methodo oratio (1585), Présentation et
traduction », Revue d'Histoire des Facultés de Droit, n°34 (2014), p. 265-302.
Altri progetti Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene
immagini o altri file su Giulio Pace Collegamenti esterni Giulio Pace, su
Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Modifica su Wikidata (IT, DE, FR) Giulio Pace, su hls-dhs-dss.ch, Dizionario
storico della Svizzera. Modifica su Wikidata Opere di Giulio Pace, su openMLOL,
Horizons Unlimited srl. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Opere di Giulio Pace, su Open
Library, Internet Archive. Modifica su Wikidata Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 24648753 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 0879 5707 · LCCN (EN) n83022668 · GND (DE)
100383300 · BNF (FR) cb122001691 (data) · BNE (ES) XX1057139 (data) · NLA (EN)
42182116 · BAV (EN) 495/16789 · CERL cnp01302558 · WorldCat Identities (EN)
lccn-n83022668 Biografie Portale Biografie Diritto Portale Diritto Filosofia
Portale Filosofia Categorie: Giuristi italiani del XVI secoloGiuristi italiani
del XVII secoloFilosofi italiani del XVI secoloFilosofi italiani del XVII secoloNati
nel 1550Morti nel 1635Nati il 9 aprileNati a VicenzaMorti a ValenceTraduttori
dal greco al latino[altre]
Paci
Italian essential philosopher Enzo Paci Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Nota disambigua.svg
Disambiguazione – Se stai cercando l'omonimo attore, vedi Enzo Paci (attore).
«Avevo ben presto compreso che il costume di Paci era quello di discutere
liberamente con chiunque di tutto, senza alcuna prevenzione o
pregiudizio.» (Carlo Sini[1]) Enzo Paci Enzo Paci (Monterado, 18
settembre 1911 – Milano, 21 luglio 1976) è stato un filosofo e accademico
italiano, tra i più espressivi rappresentanti della fenomenologia e
dell'esistenzialismo in Italia. Indice 1 Biografia 2 Pensiero
2.1 L'esistenzialismo
2.2 Il
negativo come risorsa 2.3 L'epoché
2.4 Relazione
e riflessione 3 Opere[2]
4 Note
5 Bibliografia
6 Voci
correlate 7 Altri
progetti 8 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Nato a Monterado (provincia di Ancona), intraprese gli studi
elementari e medi a Firenze e Cuneo.[2] Nel 1930 si iscrisse al corso di
filosofia dell'Università degli Studi di Pavia,[2] seguendo soprattutto le
lezioni di Adolfo Levi. Nel frattempo collaborò con Anceschi alla rivista
Orpheus. Si trasferì dopo due anni all'Università degli Studi di Milano dove
divenne allievo di Antonio Banfi, con il quale si laureò nel novembre del 1934
discutendo una tesi dal titolo Il significato del Parmenide nella filosofia di
Platone.[2][3] Collabora alla rivista Il Cantiere. Nel 1935 iniziò il
servizio militare nell'esercito, ma nell'ottobre del 1937 viene congedato.
Richiamato nel 1943 come ufficiale allo scoppio della seconda guerra mondiale,
venne catturato in Grecia[3] dopo l'8 settembre 1943 e inviato presso il campo
di prigionia di Sandbostel. Trasferito successivamente nella struttura di
Wietzendorf, qui ebbe modo di conoscere Paul Ricœur, con il quale riuscì in
quella sede a leggere Idee per una fenomenologia pura e per una filosofia
fenomenologica di Edmund Husserl[3] e a costruire un rapporto di amicizia.
Incominciò la sua carriera di docente insegnando filosofia teoretica
all'Università di Pavia (1951-1957), mentre, a partire dall'anno accademico
1957-1958, successe a Giovanni Emanuele Barié all'Università Statale di
Milano.[2][3] Dopo aver inizialmente collaborato con la rivista
Filosofia,[4] nel 1951 fondò la rivista aut aut, che diresse fino al 1976[5];
il periodico costituisce una testimonianza dei suoi variegati interessi
letterari e culturali. Il nome della rivista richiama dei testi più famosi del
filosofo danese Søren Kierkegaard, precursore dell'esistenzialismo nel suo
proposito di accogliere l'irriducibile paradossalità dell'esistenza e
l'ostacolo che questa impone al sapere.[3] Tra i suoi allievi più famosi
ricordiamo Giovanni Piana, Carlo Sini, Salvatore Veca, Pier Aldo Rovatti, Mario
Vegetti, Guido Davide Neri. Pensiero Carlo Sini individua l'inizio
dell'intera speculazione filosofica di Paci già a partire dalla sua tesi di
laurea: in alcune frasi della breve Prefazione vediamo il filosofo marchigiano,
ancora ventitreenne, esprimere una specifica interpretazione della filosofia
dell'esistenza, dimostrando già un grado elevato di comprensione del proprio
tempo e delle proprie inclinazioni.[3] L'esistenzialismo Paci giunge
perciò all'esistenzialismo attraverso lo studio di Platone.[3] Base
dell'esistenzialismo di Paci è la relazione, intesa come condizione di
esistenza di tutti gli avvenimenti che costituiscono il mondo. Evento è anche
l'io, che si conosce come esistenza finita ed empirica in rapporto ad altre
esistenze. Dalla pura condizione esistenziale del fatto, attraverso la
conoscenza, Paci definisce la condizione dell'uomo come personalità
morale. L'io conoscente è la chiara forma della legge morale che fa sì
che ogni io, in quanto conosciuto e molteplice e in quanto esistenza, possa
diventare soggetto singolo come soggetto di scelta etica. Poiché in virtù del
principio di irreversibilità – che, insieme al principio di indeterminazione
(impossibilità che il conoscente si conosca a un tempo come conosciuto e come
conoscente), è uno dei punti di riferimento del sistema di Paci – la forma non
è mai definitiva, e al contempo ogni questione risolta pone sempre nuovi
problemi, ne deriva che il realizzarsi dell'esistente "uomo" nella
forma significa un continuo progresso che va dal passato, il quale non si può
ripetere e non è annullato dal presente, verso il futuro. Il non realizzarsi in
questa forma, non seguendo il progresso e arrestandosi a una forma di ordine
più basso, costituisce l'immoralità, il male. Il negativo come risorsa La
riflessione filosofica di Paci parte dalla consapevolezza del negativo, della
mancanza come base e nucleo iniziale dell'esistenza umana. Un negativo che si
fonda soprattutto sulla base del tempo e della sua irreversibilità, che ci
costringe a fare i conti perennemente con un passato irreversibile, con un
futuro sconosciuto e con un presente inesistente perché continuamente in fuga.
Ma il negativo si riflette anche nella soggettività e nella limitazione del
nostro punto di vista: non possiamo avere nessuna visione della realtà che non
sia filtrata dalla nostra "singolarità", dal nostro essere un io.
Tuttavia questa "mancanza" eterna, questo limite, è nello stesso
tempo una risorsa: il tempo, quindi, non è una condanna per l'uomo, ma è ciò
che permette la sua esistenza come temporalità; d'altra parte l'alterità è
risorsa proprio in quanto altro da sé. L'io infatti si riconosce solo in quanto
confrontato con un altro, e sono quindi gli altri a dare conformazione e identità
al nostro io, e questo processo è fruttuoso, forte e orientato se il soggetto
sa e si impegna a stringere "relazioni". Da qui si possono
capire le due definizioni date alla filosofia paciana: l'una dello stesso
filosofo che definiva il suo pensiero come relazionismo, e l'altra invece di
Nicola Abbagnano, che lo definì "esistenzialismo positivo": positivo
proprio perché cerca di capovolgere l'insensatezza e la mancanza alla base
dell'esistenza in una possibilità, una risorsa di riflessione e progettualità.
La vita umana per Paci si fonda infatti su un bisogno (bisogno di senso nel
tempo, bisogno di altro); questo bisogno si traduce in un lavoro esistenziale,
che implica un consumo: di tempo, di vita, di riflessione. Questo sistema
bisogno-consumo-lavoro sta alla base di ogni vita umana. Tuttavia l'uomo ha una
possibilità, una possibilità di "salvarsi" dall'insensatezza (o di
provarci, quantomeno), e tale possibilità si trova nel lavoro. Il lavoro
esistenziale (inteso come l'impegno che si investe nel condurre la propria
vita) può infatti essere orientato dalla consapevolezza e dal continuo impegno
intellettuale di ricerca di senso anche e soprattutto mediante la relazione.
Questa ricerca di senso si traduce, alla base, nell'esercizio
dell'epoché. L'epoché Termine fondamentale della filosofia di Husserl,
filosofo che Paci ebbe come punto di riferimento per tutta la vita,[6] l'epoché
si traduce in una ricerca di senso continua e inesausta che presuppone un
abbandono di tutte le categorie di pensiero che siamo abituati ad utilizzare.
In questo senso è emblematico l'episodio che Paci stesso racconta riguardo al
suo approccio all'epoché. Studente di filosofia, si recò nell'ufficio di
Antonio Banfi (il suo "maestro" per eccellenza) per chiedere spiegazioni sul
concetto di epoché. Banfi gli chiese di descrivere un vaso che si trovava lì
vicino a loro. Tuttavia, qualunque definizione Paci provasse a dare (colore,
forma geometrica, uso) cadeva in una categoria di giudizio posteriore
all'oggetto stesso, o comunque soggettiva (il colore dipende dalla luce, la
forma geometrica si rifà a categorie astratte che l'uomo ha inventato, l'uso è
indipendente dall'oggetto stesso). L'epoché, quindi, si costituisce come
ricerca di una visione "originaria". Compito difficilissimo (Husserl
lo definiva impossibile ed inevitabile), l'esercizio dell'epoché non si deve
tradurre in un'impossibilità di giudizio, ma nella consapevolezza che qualunque
giudizio è parziale, soggettivo. Se applicata alla vita, all'esistenza,
l'epoché si traduce in una continua ricerca dell'originario, della verità, di
una verità ulteriore che si annida nel mondo, negli altri, negli oggetti, nei
luoghi, in tutto ciò che forgia la nostra esistenza. Una verità che l'uomo può
cercare, e che si annida nel percorso stesso di ricerca e riflessione, e
soprattutto nella capacità di creare relazioni autentiche. In Tempo e verità
nella fenomenologia di Husserl, Paci individua nell'epoché quasi un carattere
religioso, criticando la ridotta disamina del concetto da parte di Martin
Heidegger ed Emmanuel Lévinas, che lo considerarono come se si trattasse di un
metodo puramente gnoseologico.[7] Relazione e riflessione La relazione è
per Paci qualcosa di fondamentale e ulteriore dotato di un profondo significato
esistenziale. Paci scriveva che la relazione prescinde i due soggetti che la
intrecciano: è un concetto "nuovo", "terzo", che è tanto
più significativo quanto più i soggetti sono disposti a farsi mutare
consapevolmente da essa e dal lavoro di riflessione che ne segue. La relazione
va cercata, coltivata, resa e mantenuta continuamente autentica, anche se
conflittuale. La riflessione infine, come salvezza dall'irreversibilità del
tempo, ricrea e analizza il passato per ricercarne ancora il senso, e
proiettare questa ricerca nel futuro di un progetto. Epoché, riflessione e
relazione costituiscono, riassumendo, il lavoro esistenziale di ricerca di
senso. La filosofia di Paci si traduce dunque in una continua,
consapevole e dolorosa ricerca di un senso che possa capovolgere la situazione
tragica dell'esistenza mediante il lavoro, l'impegno. In questo Paci si
distanzia da Jean-Paul Sartre e dalle conclusioni del filosofo francese, che
Paci ammirava e considerava uno stimolo continuo per la sua riflessione. Il
negativo, infine, sempre presente nell'investigazione filosofica di Paci (ancor
di più nell'ultima parte della sua vita), rimane punto essenziale della ricerca
umana, laica e faticosa di un senso, di una verità ulteriore. Opere[2]
Enzo Paci, Il significato del Parmenide nella filosofia di Platone, Milano,
Principato, 1938. Enzo Paci, Principii di una filosofia dell'essere, Modena,
Guanda, 1939. Enzo Paci, Pensiero, esistenza e valore: studi sul pensiero
contemporaneo, Milano-Messina, Principato, 1940. Enzo Paci, L'esistenzialismo,
Padova, CEDAM, 1943. Enzo Paci, Esistenza ed immagine, Milano, Tarantola, 1947.
Enzo Paci, Socialità della nuova scuola, Firenze, Le Monnier, 1947. Enzo Paci,
Ingens Sylva. Saggio sulla filosofia di G. B. Vico, Milano, Mondadori, 1949.
Enzo Paci, Studi di filosofia antica e moderna, Torino, Paravia, 1949. Enzo
Paci, Il nulla e il problema dell'uomo, Torino, Taylor, 1950. Enzo Paci,
Esistenzialismo e storicismo, Milano, Mondadori, 1950. Enzo Paci, Il pensiero
scientifico contemporaneo, Firenze, Sansoni, 1950. Enzo Paci,
L'esistenzialismo, in Luigi Rognoni e Enzo Paci (a cura di), L'espressionismo e
l'esistenzialismo, Torino, Edizioni Radio Italiana, 1953. Enzo Paci, Tempo e
relazione, Torino, Taylor, 1954. Enzo Paci, L'opera di Dostoevskij, Torino, Edizioni
Radio Italiana, 1956. Enzo Paci, Ancora sull'esistenzialismo, Torino, Edizioni
Radio Italiana, 1956. Enzo Paci, Dall'esistenzialismo al relazionismo,
Messina-Firenze, D'Anna, 1957. Enzo Paci, Storia del pensiero presocratico,
Torino, Edizioni Radio Italiana, 1957. Enzo Paci, La filosofia contemporanea,
Milano, Garzanti, 1957. Enzo Paci, Diario fenomenologico, Milano, Il
Saggiatore, 1961. Enzo Paci, Breve dizionario dei termini greci, in Andrea
Biraghi (a cura di), Dizionario di filosofia, Milano, Edizioni di Comunità,
1957. Enzo Paci, Tempo e verità nella fenomenologia di Husserl, Bari, Laterza,
1961. Enzo Paci, Funzione delle scienze e significato dell'uomo, Milano, Il
Saggiatore, 1963. Enzo Paci, Relazioni e significati, Milano, Lampugnani Nigri,
1965-1966. Enzo Paci, Idee per una enciclopedia fenomenologica, Milano,
Bompiani, 1973. Enzo Paci, Fenomenologia e dialettica, Milano, Feltrinelli,
1974. Enzo Paci, Il senso delle parole (1963-1974), a cura di Pier Aldo
Rovatti, Milano, Bompiani, 1987. Note ^ Sini, p. 22. Civita. Sini.
^ Pecora, p. 356. ^ Storia, aut aut. URL consultato il 5 luglio 2020. ^
Vigorelli. ^ Paci. Bibliografia Alfredo Civita, Bibliografia degli scritti di
Enzo Paci (PDF), Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1983, ISBN 8822100530. URL consultato
il 5 luglio 2020 (archiviato dall'url originale l'11 dicembre 2013). Andrea Di
Miele, La cifra nel tappeto: note su Paci interprete di Vico, in Bollettino del
Centro di studi vichiani. Anno XXXVII, Roma, Edizioni di storia e letteratura,
2007. Paolo Ercolani, Enzo Paci, il caldo romanzo di una prassi teorica, in Il
manifesto, 17 marzo 2015. URL consultato il 5 luglio 2020. Costantino Esposito,
Esistenzialismo e fenomenologia. La crisi dell'idealismo e l'arrivo
dell'esistenzialismo in Italia, in Il contributo italiano alla storia del
Pensiero – Filosofia, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2012. URL
consultato il 5 luglio 2020. Enzo Paci, Tempo e verità nella fenomenologia di
Edmund Husserl, Bari, Laterza, 1961. Massimiliano Pecora, La cultura filosofica
italiana dal 1945 al 2000 attraverso le riviste, in Rivista di storia della
filosofia, n. 2, 2009, pp. 355-357, DOI:10.3280/SF2009-002009. Giovanni Piana,
Una ricerca ininterrotta. La lezione di Enzo Paci, in L'Unità, 3 agosto 1976.
URL consultato il 5 luglio 2020. Giuseppe Semerari, L'opera e il pensiero di
Enzo Paci, in Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia, vol. 32, n. 1,
gennaio-marzo 1977, pp. 78-94. Carlo Sini, Enzo Paci. Il filosofo e la vita,
Milano, Feltrinelli, 2015, ISBN 978-88-07-22700-4. Carlo Sini, Paci, Enzo, in
Enciclopedia Italiana - IV Appendice, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia
Italiana, 1979. URL consultato il 5 luglio 2020. Amedeo Vigorelli,
L'esistenzialismo positivo di Enzo Paci, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1987. Amedeo
Vigorelli, La fenomenologia husserliana nell'opera di Enzo Paci, Milano, Franco
Angeli, 2001. Voci correlate aut aut Edmund Husserl Esistenzialismo Scuola di
Milano Altri progetti Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o
su Enzo Paci Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene immagini
o altri file su Enzo Paci Collegamenti esterni Enzo Paci, in Enciclopedia
Italiana, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata Enzo Paci,
in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.
Modifica su Wikidata Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 7406482 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 0866 6112 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\068334 · LCCN
(EN) n79039756 · GND (DE) 119488442 · BNF (FR) cb120341698 (data) · BAV (EN)
495/175628 · NDL (EN, JA) 00472655 · WorldCat Identities (EN) lccn-n79039756
Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia Categorie: Filosofi
italiani del XX secoloAccademici italiani del XX secoloNati nel 1911Morti nel
1976Nati il 18 settembreMorti il 21 luglioMorti a MilanoFenomenologiFondatori
di riviste italianeStudenti dell'Università degli Studi di PaviaStudenti
dell'Università degli Studi di MilanoProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di
PaviaProfessori dell'Università degli Studi di MilanoDirettori di periodici italiani[altre]
pacifism:
Grice fought in the second world war with the Royal Navy and earned the rank of
captain. 1 opposition to war, usually on moral or religious grounds, but
sometimes on the practical ground pragmatic pacifism that it is wasteful and ineffective;
2 opposition to all killing and violence; 3 opposition only to war of a
specified kind e.g., nuclear pacifism. Not to be confused with passivism,
pacifism usually involves actively promoting peace, understood to imply
cooperation and justice among peoples and not merely absence of war. But some
usually religious pacifists accept military service so long as they do not
carry weapons. Many pacifists subscribe to nonviolence. But some consider
violence and/or killing permissible, say, in personal self-defense, law
enforcement, abortion, or euthanasia. Absolute pacifism rejects war in all
circumstances, hypothetical and actual. Conditional pacifism concedes war’s
permissibility in some hypothetical circumstances but maintains its wrongness
in practice. If at least some hypothetical wars have better consequences than
their alternative, absolute pacifism will almost inevitably be deontological in
character, holding war intrinsically wrong or unexceptionably prohibited by
moral principle or divine commandment. Conditional pacifism may be held on
either deontological or utilitarian teleological or sometimes consequentialist
grounds. If deontological, it may hold war at most prima facie wrong
intrinsically but nonetheless virtually always impermissible in practice
because of the absence of counterbalancing right-making features. If
utilitarian, it will hold war wrong, not intrinsically, but solely because of
its consequences. It may say either that every particular war has worse
consequences than its avoidance act utilitarianism or that general acceptance
of or following or compliance with a rule prohibiting war will have best
consequences even if occasional particular wars have best consequences rule
utilitarianism.
Padova-Marsilio
da – Marsilio da Padova (Padova, 1275 – Monaco di
Baviera, 1342) è stato un filosofo e scrittore italiano. Non vi è
certezza sulla sua data di nascita: alcuni storici sono soliti indicarla nel
1270, ipotesi però opponibile poiché egli verrebbe ad avere 41 anni nel 1311,
quando cioè Albertino Mussato gli rivolge un'epistola latina, facendo peraltro
cenno alla sua florida gioventù. Altri collocano la sua nascita attorno al
1290, data però forse troppo tarda, poiché porterebbe poco credibilmente ad
ipotizzare un suo incarico come professore oltreché rettore all'università di
Parigi, ad appena 22 anni. Da ciò dunque, la necessità di individuare, quale
data di nascita maggiormente probabile, l'anno 1275. Risulta già da qui
evidente, come le notizie sulla sua vita non siano affatto molte. Nato da
una famiglia di giudici e notai che viveva vicino al Duomo di Padova, completò
i suoi studi nell'università della Sorbona presso la facoltà delle arti, dove
fu insignito dell'autorità di rettore nel 1313. Il tempo trascorso nella città influì
moltissimo sull'evoluzione del suo pensiero. Gli anni parigini furono molto
importanti e fecondi per l'evoluzione del suo pensiero e la visione dello stato
di corruzione in cui versava il clero lo portò a diventare
anticurialista. A Parigi incontrò Guglielmo di Ockham e Giovanni di
Jandun, con cui condivise passione politica e atteggiamento di avversione verso
il potere temporale della Chiesa. Con Giovanni di Jandun rimase legato da
grande amicizia e assieme a lui subì l'esilio. Marsilio dopo le sue dure affermazioni
contro la Chiesa venne bollato con l'epiteto di figlio del
diavolo. Marsilio si trovava a Parigi quando si sviluppò la lotta tra
Filippo il Bello, re di Francia, e il Papato. Tutto ciò, assieme al vivace
contesto culturale in cui si muoveva, lo portò alla compilazione della sua
opera maggiore il Defensor Pacis, l'opera cui deve la sua fama e che influì
moltissimo sia sul pensiero filosofico-politico contemporaneo che su quello
successivo. A Parigi sperimentò una monarchia decisa ad accrescere il
proprio potere e la propria autorità su tutte le forze politiche centrifughe
del momento ivi compresa la Chiesa di Bonifacio VIII. Diventato consigliere
politico ed ecclesiastico di Ludovico il Bavaro lo seguì a Roma nel 1327 in
occasione della sua incoronazione imperiale e qui fu nominato dallo stesso
Ludovico vicario spirituale della città. L'incoronazione imperiale avvenne ad
opera del popolo romano anziché del papa inaugurando, così, quella stagione
dell'impero laico che Marsilio vagheggiava e che avrebbe aperto la strada alla
laicizzazione dell'elezione imperiale e alla cosiddetta Bolla d'Oro (1356) di
Carlo IV di Boemia. Con la Bolla d'Oro fu eliminata ogni ingerenza del
papa nell'elezione imperiale diventando così un fatto esclusivamente tedesco. Fu
ancora con Ludovico quando questi si ritirò, dopo il fallimento dell'impresa
romana, in Germania dove rimase fino alla morte avvenuta tra il 1342 e il 1343.
È del periodo immediatamente antecedente la sua morte la compilazione di alcune
opere minori tra cui spicca il Defensor Minor, un piccolo capolavoro. Si può
definire l'opera di Marsilio come il prodotto di tempi in cui confluiscono la
virtù del cittadino, il nazionalismo francese e l'imperialismo
renano-germanico. Il Defensor pacis (difensore della pace), scritto nel
1324 è la sua opera più conosciuta in cui, fra l'altro, tratta dell'origine
della legge. Il suo fondamento era il concetto di pace, intesa come base
indispensabile dello Stato e come condizione essenziale dell'attività umana. Si
tratta di un'opera laica, chiara, priva di retorica, moderna e per alcuni versi
ancora attuale. La necessità dello Stato non discendeva più da finalità
etico-religiose, ma dalla natura umana nella ricerca di una vita sufficiente e
dall'esigenza di realizzare un fine prettamente umano e non altro. Da questa
esigenza nascono le varie comunità, dalla più piccola alla più grande e
complessa, lo Stato. Ne deriva la necessità di un ordinamento nella comunità
che ne assicuri la convivenza e l'esercizio delle proprie funzioni. Per
Marsilio questa esigenza ha caratteristiche prettamente umane che non
rispondono a finalità etiche ma civili, contingenti e storiche. Alla base
dell'ordinamento c'è la volontà comune dei cittadini, superiore a qualsiasi
altra volontà. È la volontà dei cittadini che attribuisce al Governo, Pars
Principans, il potere di comandare su tutte le altre parti, potere che sempre,
e comunque, è un potere delegato, esercitato in nome della volontà popolare. La
conseguenza di questo principio era che l'autorità politica non discendeva da
Dio o dal papa, ma dal popolo, inteso come sanior et melior pars. In questa
ottica egli proponeva che i vescovi venissero eletti da assemblee popolari e
che il potere del papa fosse subordinato a quello del concilio. Ludovico
il Bavaro Marsilio pone il problema, che tratterà anche nel Defensor Minor, del
rapporto con il Papato e con i suoi principi politici costruiti. (LA)
«[...] occulta valde, qua romanum imperium dudum laboravit, laboratque
continuo, vehementer contagiosa, nil minus et prona serpere in reliquas omnes
civitates et regna ipsorum iam plurima sui aviditate temptavit invadere
[...]» (IT) «[...] segretamente, con i quali aveva cercato, e continua a
cercare, di insinuarsi subdolamente in tutte le altre comunità e regni che
aveva già tentato di attaccare con la propria enorme avidità [...]»
(Marsilio da Padova, Defensor pacis, Hannover, Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 1933) Il
giudizio di Marsilio sulla chiesa come istituzione è molto negativo e lo
manifesta con la crudezza di linguaggio che gli è solita quando affronta
l'argomento dei rapporti fra lo Stato e la Chiesa. Lo scalpore suscitato da
questa opera obbligò Marsilio a fuggire presso l'imperatore Ludovico il Bavaro,
con il quale scese in Italia nel 1327-1328. Il Defensor minor composto
attorno al 1342 si colloca fra le opere minori di Marsilio da Padova, ma si
distingue per la sua importanza. Si differenzia dal Defensor pacis per essere
un'opera più propriamente teologica mentre l'altra è prevalentemente politica.
Lo studio condotto nel Defensor Minor riguarda la giurisdizione civile ed
ecclesiastica, la confessione auricolare, la penitenza, le indulgenze, le
crociate, i pellegrinaggi, la plenitudo potestatis, il potere legislativo,
l'origine della sovranità, il matrimonio e il divorzio. Tractatus de
iurisdictione imperatoris in causis matrimonialibus Magnifying glass icon
mgx2.svg Lo
stesso argomento in dettaglio: Tractatus de iurisdictione imperatoris in causis
matrimonialibus. Il Tractatus de iurisdictione imperatoris in causis
matrimonialibus che Marsilio compilò in occasione del divorzio di Giovanni di
Moravia e Margherita di Tirolo-Gorizia si trova nell'ultima parte del Defensor
Minor. Attorno al 1341 le relazioni tra i coniugi Giovanni di Moravia e
Margherita del Tirolo erano tanto insostenibili che la sposa preferì fuggire.
Intervenne l'Imperatore, imparentato con la sposa, e progettò il matrimonio tra
la fuggitiva e Ludovico di Brandeburgo ma a ciò ostavano il precedente
matrimonio e alcuni legami di sangue. Tractatus de translatione Imperii
Magnifying glass icon mgx2.svg Lo
stesso argomento in dettaglio: Tractatus de translatione Imperii. Il Tractatus
de translatione imperii è un'opera che niente aggiunge alla fama derivatagli
dal Defensor Pacis anche se ebbe una certa diffusione in Europa. Si può
considerare questo trattato come una storia sintetica dell'Impero dalla
fondazione di Roma fino al secolo XIV. Modernità di Marsilio In Marsilio
lo Stato è concepito come prodotto umano, al di fuori da premesse teologiche
quali il peccato o simili. È fortemente affermato il principio della legge
quale prodotto della comunità dei cittadini, legge dotata di imperatività e
coattività oltre che ispirata ad un ideale di giustizia. Questo ideale di
giustizia deriva dal consorzio civile, l'unico soggetto che può stabilire ciò
che è giusto e ciò che non lo è. Per Marsilio l'uomo deve essere inteso come
libero e consapevole. Nel Defensor Pacis appare diffuso un
costituzionalismo affermato fortemente nei confronti sia dello Stato che della
Chiesa. È tra i primi studiosi a distinguere e separare il diritto dalla
morale, attribuendo il primo alla vita civile e il secondo alla coscienza.
Marsilio è sempre un uomo del suo tempo, saldamente ancorato nella sua epoca,
il Medioevo, ma con intuizioni che ne fanno un uomo nuovo, anticipatore per
certi versi del Rinascimento. La definizione del nuovo concetto di Stato,
autonomo, indipendente da qualsiasi altra istituzione umana o, a maggior
ragione, ecclesiastica è il grande merito di Marsilio. Anche nella Chiesa
viene affermata una forma di costituzionalismo contro il dilagante strapotere
dei vescovi e dei papi. È ancora l'universitas fidelium a prendere, attraverso
il Concilio, ogni decisione riguardante qualsiasi materia di ordine spirituale.
Il nostro autore non teme di scagliarsi contro la Chiesa, a negare il primato
di Pietro e di Roma, affermare la necessità del ritorno del clero a quella
povertà evangelica tanto cara ad alcune sette riformiste di cui lui certamente
conobbe e comprese il pensiero. Lotta contro la Chiesa ma solo per conservarne
o rivalutarne il più vero, autentico e originario contenuto e significato.
Quasi riformista e conservatore nello stesso tempo, riformista là dove è contro
la corruzione dilagante nella Chiesa di quel periodo, conservatore là dove
accetta la necessità di un ordine costituito, della religione, della morale,
intese nel senso più puro. La modernità di Marsilio consiste anche nel
metodo della sua trattazione e della terminologia che usa, sempre stringata ed
esaustiva, aliena da qualsiasi di quelle forme di retorica che era
caratteristica degli autori medievali. Bibliografia Opere di Marsilio da
Padova Marsilio da Padova. Il difensore della pace, a cura di C. Vasoli. UTET,
Torino, 1975, BNI 76-4683. Marsilio da Padova. Il difensore della pace (testo
latino a fronte). BUR, Milano, 2001, ISBN 8817125059. Opere su Marsilio da
Padova Ancona E., Marsilio da Padova (con testo latino del Difensore della pace
e traduzione di C. Vasoli), CEDAM, Padova (collana Lex naturalis; 4) 2007, ISBN
9788813272357 Battaglia F., Marsilio da Padova e la filosofia politica del
medio Evo, Milano, CLUEB 1987, BNI 89 12235. Battocchio R., Ecclesiologia e
politica in Marsilio da Padova. Prefazione di G. Piaia, Padova, Istituto per la
Storia Ecclesiastica Padovana, 2005. Beonio-Brocchieri Fumagalli M.T., Storia
della filosofia medievale: da Boezio a Wyclif, Bari, Laterza, 1996, ISBN
8842048577. Berti E., Il regnum di Marsilio tra la polis aristotelica e lo
Stato moderno, Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale 1979. Briguglia G.,
Marsilio da Padova, Carocci Editore, 2013, ISBN 9788843067169 Cadili A.,
Marsilio da Padova amministratore della Chiesa di Milano, in Pensiero Politico
Medievale, 3-4 (2005-2006), pp. 193-225. Capitani O., Medioevo ereticale,
Bologna, Il Mulino, 1983, ISBN 8815000534. Capitani O., Il medioevo, Torino,
UTET, 1983 ISBN 8802038821. Cavallara C., La pace nella filosofia politica di
Marsilio da Padova, Ferrara 1973. Codren C., On interpreting Marsilius' use of Augustine,
Augustiniana 1975. Damiata M., Plenitudo potestas e universitas civium in
Marsilio da Padova, Firenze, Studi francescani, 1983, BNI 83-9454. Del Prete
D., Il pensiero politico ed ecclesiologico di Marsilio da Padova, Annali di
storia, Università degli studi di Lecce 1980. Dolcini C., Introduzione a
Marsilio da Padova, Bari, Laterza, 1995, ISBN 8842046264. Maiolo F., Medieval
Sovereignty. Bartolus of Saxoferrato and Marsilius of Padua, Delft, Eburon,
2007, ISBN 9789059720817 Merlo M., Marsilio da Padova: il pensiero della
politica come grammatica del mutamento, Milano, F. Angeli, 2003, ISBN
8846451465. Passerin d'Entréves A., Saggi di storia del pensiero politico. Dal
medioevo alla società contemporanea, Milano 1992, ISBN 8820472333. Piaia G., Marsilio
e dintorni: contributi alla storia delle idee, Padova, Antenore, 1999. Piaia
G., Marsilio da Padova nella Riforma e nella Controriforma: fortuna ed
interpretazione, Padova, Antenore, 1977, BNI 783266. Simonetta S., Dal
difensore della pace al Leviatano: Marsilio da Padova nel Seicento inglese,
Milano, UNICOPLI, 2000, ISBN 8840005811. Toscano A., Marsilio da Padova e
Niccolo Machiavelli, Ravenna, Longo, 1981, BNI 8110292. Voci correlate Defensor
pacis Defensor minor Tractatus de translatione Imperii Tractatus de
iurisdictione imperatoris in causis matrimonialibus Altri progetti Collabora a
Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina dedicata a Marsilio da Padova
Collabora a Wikisource Wikisource contiene una pagina in lingua latina dedicata
a Marsilio da Padova Collabora a Wikiquote Wikiquote contiene citazioni di o su
Marsilio da Padova Collabora a Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons contiene
immagini o altri file su Marsilio da Padova Collegamenti esterni Marsilio da
Padova, in Dizionario di storia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 2010.
Modifica su Wikidata Marsilio da Padova, su sapere.it, De Agostini. Modifica su
Wikidata (EN) Marsilio da Padova, su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia
Britannica, Inc. Modifica su Wikidata Marsilio da Padova, in Dizionario
biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su
Wikidata Opere di Marsilio da Padova, su openMLOL, Horizons Unlimited srl.
Modifica su Wikidata (FR) Bibliografia su Marsilio da Padova, su Les Archives
de littérature du Moyen Âge. Modifica su Wikidata (EN) Marsilio da Padova, in
Catholic Encyclopedia, Robert Appleton Company. Modifica su Wikidata Controllo
di autorità VIAF (EN) 34445104
· ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 0886 109X · SBN IT\ICCU\RAVV\039761 · LCCN (EN) n79045307
· GND (DE) 118578170 · BNF (FR) cb11886889k (data) · BNE (ES) XX1057533 (data)
· NLA (EN) 35788035 · BAV (EN) 495/44399 · CERL cnp00395765 · WorldCat
Identities (EN) viaf-316902739 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale
Filosofia Letteratura Portale Letteratura Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XIV
secoloScrittori italiani del XIV secoloNati nel 1275Morti nel 1342Nati a
PadovaMorti a Monaco di BavieraFilosofi della politicaScolasticiCritici
bibliciReligione e politicaScrittori medievali in lingua latina[altre]
Padovani
– essential Italian philosopher Umberto Antonio Padovani Da Wikipedia,
l'enciclopedia libera. Jump to navigationJump to search Umberto Antonio
Padovani (Ancona, 27 novembre 1894 – Gaggiano, 5 aprile 1968) è stato un
filosofo, docente universitario e filosofo neoscolastico italiano. Indice 1 Biografia
2 Il
pensiero filosofico 3 Opere
4 Bibliografia
5 Collegamenti
esterni Biografia Umberto Antonio Padovani nacque ad Ancona il 27 novembre
1894, figlio di Attilio Padovani, generale di artiglieria, e di sua moglie, la
ricca possidente veneta Elisabetta Rossati. Mentre, nelle parole stesse di
Padovani, il padre "educò i suoi figli ad una rigorosa etica dell'onore e
del dovere", egli ebbe un rapporto privilegiato con sua madre che fu colei
che per prima lo introdusse agli ambienti letterari di Padova grazie alla
vicinanza dei terreni della sua famiglia che erano posti a Bottrighe, nel
Polesine, dove tutta la famiglia si trasferiva durante il periodo invernale. La
solerte religiosità della madre, lo spinse a non frequentare la scuola
elementare pubblica (che ella riteneva troppo "laicizzata" dopo
l'unità d'Italia) ma a servirsi di un precettore, un ex abate che per primo lo
instradò alla lettura ed alla filosofia.
Si iscrisse quindi al liceo Parini di Milano dove ebbe i suoi primi
contatti col positivismo che procureranno in lui e nel suo pensiero una
profonda crisi nel saper controbilanciare il più correttamente possibile questa
visione innovativa della vita con la teologia cattolica. Il padre lo avrebbe
voluto ingegnere, ma egli terminati gli studi del liceo si iscrisse
all'università a Milano dove seguì i corsi del positivista Piero Martinetti,
pur prendendo a frequentare Guido Mattiussi (convinto tomista) e monsignor
Francesco Olgiati, teologo e filosofo, convinto assertore della necessità di
fondere insieme la metafisica classica con il pensiero moderno. Monsignor Francesco Olgiati (a sinistra) con
padre Agostino Gemelli (al centro) e Vico Necchi. I primi due furono tra i
principali ispiratori del Padovani Fu su consiglio di questi due ultimi che il
Padovani alla fine decise di intraprendere la carriera filosofica, sviluppando
una sua corrente di pensiero permeata di tutti gli spunti che nel corso della
sua carriera aveva saputo trarre dai pensieri dei suoi insegnanti e ispiratori,
basandosi molto anche sull'opera di Schopenhauer. Si laureò in filosofia con
una tesi su Spinoza e in lettere con una su Vito Fornari, proseguendo poi la
sua carriera lavorativa in ambito universitario divenendo dapprima assistente e
poi direttore della biblioteca nel 1921.
Sempre nel 1921 divenne membro della Società italiana per gli studi
filosofici e psicologici e dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore da poco
fondata a Milano da padre Agostino Gemelli. Grazie all'influsso di padre
Gemelli, il Padovani iniziò a collaborare anche con la "Rivista di
filosofia neoscolastica" di cui divenne ben presto uno dei principali
rappresentanti. Nel 1924 venne nominato
professore di filosofia della religione e nell'anno accademico 1924-25 divenne
anche supplente di Introduzione alla storia delle religioni. Nel 1934, in
seguito alla riforma De Vecchi, si trasferì all'Università degli Studi di
Padova dove divenne professore di filosofia morale, avendo per collega
monsignor Olgiati col quale dimostrò una particolare sintonia. Sempre affiancato da Gemelli, anche durante
gli anni della Seconda guerra mondiale riunì presso la propria casa di Milano
diversi intellettuali cattolici avversi al fascismo (noti col nome di
"Gruppo di Casa Padovani") come Giuseppe Dossetti, Sofia Vanni
Rovighi e Amintore Fanfani. Si avvicinò durante questi stessi anni al pensiero
filosofico e teologico del Gemelli che puntava ad un rinnovamento attivo
teorico e morale, affiancando personaggi del calibro di Carlo Giacon, Luigi
Stefanini, Augusto Guzzo e Felice Battaglia, coi quali nel 1945 diede vita al
Centro di studi filosofici di Gallarate da cui poi scaturirà il cosiddetto
"Movimento di Gallarate" per il dialogo aperto tra i filosofi
italiani. Quando nel 1946 lo spiritualista Michele Federico Sciacca fondò il
"Giornale di metafisica" egli ne fu il primo redattore. Nel 1948 venne accolto come professore di
filosofia morale e filosofia teoretica all'Università di Padova. Morì il 5 aprile 1968 a Gaggiano, in provincia
di Milano, dove si era trasferito da qualche tempo. Volle per sua espressa
volontà che la notizia della sua morte fosse resa pubblica a sepoltura avvenuta
come estremo esempio della propria esistenza di stampo ascetico, come tale era
stata la sua scelta di non sposarsi. Il
pensiero filosofico La tomba di
Elisabetta Rossati, madre di Umberto Antonio Padovani e figura ispiratrice del
suo pensiero filosofico e teologico. È sepolta nel piccolo cimitero di San Vito
di Gaggiano (MI) Durante gli anni del suo insegnamento a Milano, l'attività
filosofica del Padovani fu particolarmente prolifica: egli iniziò col
pubblicare la sua tesi dal titolo Il problema fondamentale della filosofia di
Spinoza (Milano 1920), poi Vito Fornari. Saggio sul pensiero religioso in
Italia nel secolo XIX (Milano, 1924), Vincenzo Gioberti e il cattolicesimo
(Milano, 1927) e il primo volume (unico dei tre previsti) di un’opera su
Schopenhauer dal titolo Schopenhauer. L’ambiente, la vita, le opere. In questi scritti egli dimostrò di saper
guardare attentamente non solo alla storia della filosofia, ma anche alle
suggestioni provenienti da altri panorami filosofici e religiosi. Nel 1937
pubblicò il testo più importante del suo pensiero filosofico, La filosofia
della religione e il problema della vita (riedito successivamente anche col
titolo Il problema religioso nel pensiero occidentale), dove per la prima volta
delineò chiaramente la matrice del suo pensiero, ovvero che la religione era
l'unica strada per risolvere il problema esistenziale della vita, ovvero il
male, elemento che limita le possibilità umane, rileggendo in questo la
struttura originale della storiografia filosofica e della metafisica
classica. Nel 1953, con la pubblicazione
del suo Filosofia e teologia della storia, egli si espresse anche riguardo allo
studio della storia, il quale secondo Padovani ci rivela quotidianamente il
male, ovvero i limiti dell'uomo rispetto al mondo che lo circonda, ma non è in
grado (come del resto la filosofia) di fornire soluzioni. Tali soluzioni
possono pervenire unicamente dalla teologia, magari nella sua declinazione di
teologia della storia. Questo pensiero si acuì particolarmente con una
riflessione anche sulla morte negli ultimi anni del Padovani, in particolare
dopo la morte della madre Elisabetta col quale egli aveva sempre avuto un forte
legame. Opere Il problema fondamentale
della filosofia di Spinoza, Milano, 1920 Vito Fornari. Saggio sul pensiero
religioso in Italia nel secolo XIX, Milano, 1924 Vincenzo Gioberti e il
cattolicesimo, Milano, 1927 Schopenhauer. L’ambiente, la vita, le opere,
Milano, 1934 La storia della filosofia con particolare riguardo ai problemi
politici, morali e religiosi, Como 1942 San Tommaso d'Aquino nella storia della
cultura, Como, 1945 Il fondamento e il contenuto della morale, Como, 1947
Filosofia e teologia della storia, Como, 1953 Sommario di storia della
filosofia, Roma, 1966 Bibliografia P. Faggiotto, Umberto Antonio Padovani Nel
centenario della nascita, Padova 1995 A. Cova, Storia dell’Università cattolica
del Sacro Cuore, Milano 2007, pp. 27–29, 50 A. M. Moschetti, Cercatori
dell’assoluto: maestri nell'Ateneo padovano, Santarcangelo di Romagna 1981, pp.
68–90 Collegamenti esterni Umberto Antonio Padovani, in Dizionario biografico
degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Modifica su Wikidata
Controllo di autorità VIAF
(EN) 113651089 · ISNI (EN) 0000 0001 0937 2917 · SBN IT\ICCU\CFIV\007917 · LCCN
(EN) n87883405 · GND (DE) 124114032 · BAV (EN) 495/179557 · WorldCat Identities
(EN) lccn-n87883405 Biografie Portale Biografie Filosofia Portale Filosofia
Categorie: Filosofi italiani del XX secoloInsegnanti italiani del XX secoloNati
nel 1894Morti nel 1968Nati il 27 novembreMorti il 5 aprileNati ad
AnconaProfessori dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro CuorePersone legate
all'Università degli Studi di Padova[altre]
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