by JLS
for the GC
PAUL DREW seems to be the expert on this type of "Gricean", shall we say, analysis of courtoom interaction. One of his studies quite discussed in the literature being:
Drew, Paul. 1992.
''Contested evidence in courtroom cross-examination:
The case of a trial for rape''.
In Talk at Work: Interaction in Institutional Settings,
P. Drew and J. Heritage (eds), 470-520. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Showing posts with label etc.. Show all posts
Showing posts with label etc.. Show all posts
Thursday, June 17, 2010
"I think that's not an assumption you ought to make"
by JLS
for the GC
An abstract
S. Ehrlich and J. Sidnell.
“I think that's not an assumption you ought to make”: Challenging
presuppositions in inquiry testimony
Language in Society, vol. 35
"This article examines data drawn from a 2001 Ontario (Canada)
provincial inquiry into the deaths of seven people as a result
of water contamination in a small Ontario town. The examination
focuses on
question-answer sequences
in which the premier of Ontario, Michael Harris, attempted to resist
lawyers' attempts to control and restrict his responses. In particular,
on the basis of the data it is argued that
the power of cross-examining lawyers
does not reside solely in
their ability to ask controlling and restrictive questions of witnesses,
but rather is crucially dependent on their ability to
compel witnesses to produce straightforward, or “type-conforming,”
answers to these controlling and restrictive questions.
The witness whose testimony is analyzed was not compelled
to produce answers that logically conformed to the form of
the lawyers' questions
(i.e., “yes” or “no”) and, as a result,
often usurped control over the topical agenda of the proceedings.
In this sense, the present work builds on Eades's conclusion that
“we cannot rely on question form to discover how witnesses are controlled.”
Key Words:
courtroom discourse; conversation analysis; presupposition; question-answer sequences.
for the GC
An abstract
S. Ehrlich and J. Sidnell.
“I think that's not an assumption you ought to make”: Challenging
presuppositions in inquiry testimony
Language in Society, vol. 35
"This article examines data drawn from a 2001 Ontario (Canada)
provincial inquiry into the deaths of seven people as a result
of water contamination in a small Ontario town. The examination
focuses on
question-answer sequences
in which the premier of Ontario, Michael Harris, attempted to resist
lawyers' attempts to control and restrict his responses. In particular,
on the basis of the data it is argued that
the power of cross-examining lawyers
does not reside solely in
their ability to ask controlling and restrictive questions of witnesses,
but rather is crucially dependent on their ability to
compel witnesses to produce straightforward, or “type-conforming,”
answers to these controlling and restrictive questions.
The witness whose testimony is analyzed was not compelled
to produce answers that logically conformed to the form of
the lawyers' questions
(i.e., “yes” or “no”) and, as a result,
often usurped control over the topical agenda of the proceedings.
In this sense, the present work builds on Eades's conclusion that
“we cannot rely on question form to discover how witnesses are controlled.”
Key Words:
courtroom discourse; conversation analysis; presupposition; question-answer sequences.
Friday, June 11, 2010
Implies Grice
From:
Weisstein, Eric W. "Implies."
From MathWorld--A Wolfram Web Resource.
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Implies.html
Weisstein writes:
""Implies" is the connective in propositional
calculus which has the meaning "if p, q" In
formal terminology, the term "conditional" is often
used to refer to this connective
(Mendelson 1997, p. 13)."
"The symbol used to denote "implies" is [)]"
(Carnap 1958, p. 8; Mendelson 1997, p. 13), or >."
"The Mathematica command Experimental`ImpliesRealQ[ineqs1, ineqs2]
can be used to determine if the system of real algebraic equations
and inequalities ineqs1 implies the system of real
algebraic equations and inequalities ineqs2."
"In classical logic, p)q is an abbreviation ~pvq, where ~ denotes NOT
and v denotes OR (though this is not the case, for example, in intuitionistic logic)."
vide Dummett.
") is a binary operator that is implemented in Mathematica as
Implies[A, B], and can not be extended to more than
two arguments."
" ) has the following truth table (Carnap 1958, p. 10; Mendelson 1997, p. 13).
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
If p ) q and q ) p, then p and q are said to be equivalent, a relationship which is written symbolically as p )( q (Carnap 1958, p. 8)."
SEE ALSO: Connective, Equivalent, Exists, For All, Quantifier
REFERENCES:
Carnap, R. Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications.
New York: Dover, p.8, 1958.
Mendelson, E. Introduction to Mathematical Logic, 4th ed. London: Chapman & Hall, 1997.
Weisstein, Eric W. "Implies."
From MathWorld--A Wolfram Web Resource.
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Implies.html
Weisstein writes:
""Implies" is the connective in propositional
calculus which has the meaning "if p, q" In
formal terminology, the term "conditional" is often
used to refer to this connective
(Mendelson 1997, p. 13)."
"The symbol used to denote "implies" is [)]"
(Carnap 1958, p. 8; Mendelson 1997, p. 13), or >."
"The Mathematica command Experimental`ImpliesRealQ[ineqs1, ineqs2]
can be used to determine if the system of real algebraic equations
and inequalities ineqs1 implies the system of real
algebraic equations and inequalities ineqs2."
"In classical logic, p)q is an abbreviation ~pvq, where ~ denotes NOT
and v denotes OR (though this is not the case, for example, in intuitionistic logic)."
vide Dummett.
") is a binary operator that is implemented in Mathematica as
Implies[A, B], and can not be extended to more than
two arguments."
" ) has the following truth table (Carnap 1958, p. 10; Mendelson 1997, p. 13).
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
If p ) q and q ) p, then p and q are said to be equivalent, a relationship which is written symbolically as p )( q (Carnap 1958, p. 8)."
SEE ALSO: Connective, Equivalent, Exists, For All, Quantifier
REFERENCES:
Carnap, R. Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications.
New York: Dover, p.8, 1958.
Mendelson, E. Introduction to Mathematical Logic, 4th ed. London: Chapman & Hall, 1997.
Monday, April 26, 2010
Grice, H. P. -- cited by J. Frits Staal
From:
"Ritual and mantras: rules without meaning"
1996.
"This was developed by H. P. Grice — subsequently by S. Y. Kuroda — and led to Searle's classifications of speech acts based on the assumption that all speech acts are concerned with ... intention."
---
"Ritual and mantras: rules without meaning"
1996.
"This was developed by H. P. Grice — subsequently by S. Y. Kuroda — and led to Searle's classifications of speech acts based on the assumption that all speech acts are concerned with ... intention."
---
Carton 4, Folder 9, "Conversational Implicature"
--- by J. L. S.
------- for the GC.
Someone should edit this. Who shall I contact?
------- for the GC.
Someone should edit this. Who shall I contact?
Sunday, April 25, 2010
Grice on Hume on Locke on personal identity -- Grice archive, Carton 7 -- Grice's vagaries on the self
--- This relates to Haugeland.
---- It is listed by Grandy/Warner as it being a joint paper with Haugeland.
---
What about Hume in wiki on this?
It's a vagary on the self.
Wiki reads:
"According to the standard interpretation
of Hume on personal identity, he was a
Bundle Theorist, who held that the self is
nothing but a bundle of interconnected perceptions
linked by relations of similarity and causality; or,
more accurately, that our idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle."
"This view is forwarded by, for example, positivist interpreters, who saw Hume as suggesting that terms such as "self", "person", or "mind" referred to collections of "sense-contents" (See, e.g., A. J. Ayer's account of Hume on the self, in Language, Truth and Logic, op.cit., p.135–6)."
"A modern-day version of the bundle theory of the mind has been advanced by Derek Parfit in his Reasons and Persons (1986)."
"However, some philosophers have criticised the bundle-theory interpretation of Hume on personal identity. It is argued that distinct selves can have perceptions which stand in relations of similarity and causality with one another. Thus perceptions must already come parcelled into distinct "bundles" before they can be associated according to the relations of similarity and causality: in other words, the mind must already possess a unity that cannot be generated, or constituted, by these relations alone. Since the bundle-theory interpretation attributes Hume with answering an ontological or conceptual question, philosophers who see Hume as not very concerned with such questions have queried whether the view is really Hume's, or "only a decoy". (See E. J. Craig, op.cit, Ch.2., for this criticism).
"Instead, it is suggested, Hume might have been answering an epistemological question, about the causal origin of our concept of the self."
---- It is listed by Grandy/Warner as it being a joint paper with Haugeland.
---
What about Hume in wiki on this?
It's a vagary on the self.
Wiki reads:
"According to the standard interpretation
of Hume on personal identity, he was a
Bundle Theorist, who held that the self is
nothing but a bundle of interconnected perceptions
linked by relations of similarity and causality; or,
more accurately, that our idea of the self is just the idea of such a bundle."
"This view is forwarded by, for example, positivist interpreters, who saw Hume as suggesting that terms such as "self", "person", or "mind" referred to collections of "sense-contents" (See, e.g., A. J. Ayer's account of Hume on the self, in Language, Truth and Logic, op.cit., p.135–6)."
"A modern-day version of the bundle theory of the mind has been advanced by Derek Parfit in his Reasons and Persons (1986)."
"However, some philosophers have criticised the bundle-theory interpretation of Hume on personal identity. It is argued that distinct selves can have perceptions which stand in relations of similarity and causality with one another. Thus perceptions must already come parcelled into distinct "bundles" before they can be associated according to the relations of similarity and causality: in other words, the mind must already possess a unity that cannot be generated, or constituted, by these relations alone. Since the bundle-theory interpretation attributes Hume with answering an ontological or conceptual question, philosophers who see Hume as not very concerned with such questions have queried whether the view is really Hume's, or "only a decoy". (See E. J. Craig, op.cit, Ch.2., for this criticism).
"Instead, it is suggested, Hume might have been answering an epistemological question, about the causal origin of our concept of the self."
Monday, April 5, 2010
Piggy Backed
--- by JLS
----- for the GC.
AS KRAMER notes, this IS an international club (vide his comment on 'piggy back' as having 'no [intended] sexual connotation', in English (or his English). On the other hand, usually the wrong one -- but not ALWAYS, there's K. Korta. Imagine her problem. To translate a mimeo that Lady Anne (Martin) Strawson typed (without Grice knowing) and that her husband sent to "Philosophical Review". Yes: we mean "Meaning".
Korta proposes:
H. P. Grice,
"Esanahia [Meaning]".
In Korta, K. (atontzailea) (2007),
Hitzaren Lilura. Hizkuntzaren Filosofiako Irakurgaiak. Leioa: UPV-EHU, pp. 145-155.
--- the problem with Basque (for Indo-European speakers us) is that Basque is not (and Indo-European speaker). This complicates matters unnecessarily.
Kemmerling had a similar problem when he was writing his PhD on Grice for Frankfurt. And he was writing in German!
Kemmerling finds that all that Grice says does NOT apply in German. They do not make, the Germans, any of the distinctions that Grice makes.
Mundle objected to this early in his "Critique of Linguistic Philosophy" -- section: "Is all analytic philosophy anglo-linguistic?". Alas, his answer was: yes!
----
Consider again Korta:
Grice, "Esanahia
Hitzaren Lilura. Hizkuntzaren Filosofiako Irakurgaiak.
What does that mean?
Oddly, Korta wrote many papers with a man I do understand: Perry. They wrote so many papers together that Strawson.
I.e. that one thinks of Strawson.
Grice remarks of his collaboration with Strawson: "We shared enough views to write together a piece, which, literally, we called "In defense of a dogma"".
But that was it!
Later Grice wrote a piece with Judith Baker, which, literally, they called, "Davidson on akrasia". It's difficult to see what comes from Grice and what from Baker.
----
"On the whole, it's easier to ascribe
a philosophical view to a philosopher
when his work is NOT a joint
production with some other philosopher".
Similarly it is easier to ascribe
a view to a philosopher when he is dead.
Imagine with blogging. Apparently you can 'delete' things.
Imagine if Kant had deleted his blog entries on the "Critique of the Pure Reason" because, as he wrote to his mother later on,
"I grew increasingly unhappy with all
the idiocies I had written in that
tract. And the sad part about it is
that students were already starting
to quote me."
----
Enough to want to turn onto a ballet dancer. Or something.
----
Kramer notes that it is usually otiose to speak of the implicatures of the Na'vi. It's the speakers, the "Na'vi", who implicate -- hardly the lingo.
But there are contraints by the lingo ON The speakers, some may say.
Recall Grice's nominalism:
First the utterer -- the INDIVIDUAL utterer. "By uttering 'bugger off', U meant 'Happy birthday'".
Then there's the group of individuals. "By uttering in unison, 'For he's a jolly good fellow', the party meant that her transgendered operation had been a success".
---
Then there's Language:
This comprises:
whole utterances:
"As The Pope utterered it, the phrase meant, "Happy Easter to you all"".
Then there's sentences:
"The phrase "Happy Easter" means that the utterer of the sentence means that the addressee is to have, if possible, an eventful ('hap-', to 'hap-pen') Easter.
Then there are PARTS of sentences:
""Easter" means chocolate eggs to most of us. Few think of the Via Crucis".
----
The crux, as it were, is the vengeance. For, while indeed it all boils down (metaphorically -- I wonder who was the idiot who used this phrase literally -- it surely stuck) to the utterer, most utterers do respect the 'established' meaning -- the 'received' meaning.
As Grice says, "only in very special circumstances will I find myself meaning by "It is raining" that I want a piece of written work from my tuttee".
We tend to rely TOO often on what words mean, and we forget that they mean what we mean them to mean.
Kramer's example of 'pathos' is an apt one.
Blanche is a pathetic figure. "Pathetic fallacy": prices will raise.
Oddly, "I reared him", one can said of someone. This is sometimes associated with 'rear' as in 'rear-end'. But of course it has NOTHING to do with the rear-end. It has to do with 'raise'. To 'rear' is a variant on 'raise'.
Oddly, Aristotle distrusted what he called the 'pathetic types'. These are NOT the 'active' types -- but the 'passive' homosexuals. Oddly, all that he said on this -- in the Loeb Classical Library -- has been proved to be NOT by him. He said that while it is normal for a FEMALE to be 'pathetic', sexually, it is less normal of a Greek (and he knew them) to be so.
And the eromenos, you may ask? Weren't they all but 'a pathetic lot'? Yes, but there was, as the Ecclesiastes goes, a time to be pathetic, and a time to grow from the pathetic into the 'poetikos' or 'active intellectus', or something. Aristotle thinks that too much pathetism, in a male, is, er, pathetic.
Oddly, I was reading the Argentine novella that is making the hits in Buenos Ayres: the protagonist is described by the author (S. L.) as being 'hysterical', in parts. But this CANNOT literally be. (He is the same author who spells 'speech' speach). Hysteria means womb-bearer, or vag*na bearer, I forget. So how can a man be hysteric?
While Korta has translated the obscure "Meaning" by Grice what we have to focus is the conversational maxims. In Basque, communication is said, 'kommunikatao', which sounds similarly enough. But with 'implicature' I would not know. And then, perhaps I wouldn't care.
---- Korta does because he has to teach them -- the Basques.
Cheers!
----- for the GC.
AS KRAMER notes, this IS an international club (vide his comment on 'piggy back' as having 'no [intended] sexual connotation', in English (or his English). On the other hand, usually the wrong one -- but not ALWAYS, there's K. Korta. Imagine her problem. To translate a mimeo that Lady Anne (Martin) Strawson typed (without Grice knowing) and that her husband sent to "Philosophical Review". Yes: we mean "Meaning".
Korta proposes:
H. P. Grice,
"Esanahia [Meaning]".
In Korta, K. (atontzailea) (2007),
Hitzaren Lilura. Hizkuntzaren Filosofiako Irakurgaiak. Leioa: UPV-EHU, pp. 145-155.
--- the problem with Basque (for Indo-European speakers us) is that Basque is not (and Indo-European speaker). This complicates matters unnecessarily.
Kemmerling had a similar problem when he was writing his PhD on Grice for Frankfurt. And he was writing in German!
Kemmerling finds that all that Grice says does NOT apply in German. They do not make, the Germans, any of the distinctions that Grice makes.
Mundle objected to this early in his "Critique of Linguistic Philosophy" -- section: "Is all analytic philosophy anglo-linguistic?". Alas, his answer was: yes!
----
Consider again Korta:
Grice, "Esanahia
Hitzaren Lilura. Hizkuntzaren Filosofiako Irakurgaiak.
What does that mean?
Oddly, Korta wrote many papers with a man I do understand: Perry. They wrote so many papers together that Strawson.
I.e. that one thinks of Strawson.
Grice remarks of his collaboration with Strawson: "We shared enough views to write together a piece, which, literally, we called "In defense of a dogma"".
But that was it!
Later Grice wrote a piece with Judith Baker, which, literally, they called, "Davidson on akrasia". It's difficult to see what comes from Grice and what from Baker.
----
"On the whole, it's easier to ascribe
a philosophical view to a philosopher
when his work is NOT a joint
production with some other philosopher".
Similarly it is easier to ascribe
a view to a philosopher when he is dead.
Imagine with blogging. Apparently you can 'delete' things.
Imagine if Kant had deleted his blog entries on the "Critique of the Pure Reason" because, as he wrote to his mother later on,
"I grew increasingly unhappy with all
the idiocies I had written in that
tract. And the sad part about it is
that students were already starting
to quote me."
----
Enough to want to turn onto a ballet dancer. Or something.
----
Kramer notes that it is usually otiose to speak of the implicatures of the Na'vi. It's the speakers, the "Na'vi", who implicate -- hardly the lingo.
But there are contraints by the lingo ON The speakers, some may say.
Recall Grice's nominalism:
First the utterer -- the INDIVIDUAL utterer. "By uttering 'bugger off', U meant 'Happy birthday'".
Then there's the group of individuals. "By uttering in unison, 'For he's a jolly good fellow', the party meant that her transgendered operation had been a success".
---
Then there's Language:
This comprises:
whole utterances:
"As The Pope utterered it, the phrase meant, "Happy Easter to you all"".
Then there's sentences:
"The phrase "Happy Easter" means that the utterer of the sentence means that the addressee is to have, if possible, an eventful ('hap-', to 'hap-pen') Easter.
Then there are PARTS of sentences:
""Easter" means chocolate eggs to most of us. Few think of the Via Crucis".
----
The crux, as it were, is the vengeance. For, while indeed it all boils down (metaphorically -- I wonder who was the idiot who used this phrase literally -- it surely stuck) to the utterer, most utterers do respect the 'established' meaning -- the 'received' meaning.
As Grice says, "only in very special circumstances will I find myself meaning by "It is raining" that I want a piece of written work from my tuttee".
We tend to rely TOO often on what words mean, and we forget that they mean what we mean them to mean.
Kramer's example of 'pathos' is an apt one.
Blanche is a pathetic figure. "Pathetic fallacy": prices will raise.
Oddly, "I reared him", one can said of someone. This is sometimes associated with 'rear' as in 'rear-end'. But of course it has NOTHING to do with the rear-end. It has to do with 'raise'. To 'rear' is a variant on 'raise'.
Oddly, Aristotle distrusted what he called the 'pathetic types'. These are NOT the 'active' types -- but the 'passive' homosexuals. Oddly, all that he said on this -- in the Loeb Classical Library -- has been proved to be NOT by him. He said that while it is normal for a FEMALE to be 'pathetic', sexually, it is less normal of a Greek (and he knew them) to be so.
And the eromenos, you may ask? Weren't they all but 'a pathetic lot'? Yes, but there was, as the Ecclesiastes goes, a time to be pathetic, and a time to grow from the pathetic into the 'poetikos' or 'active intellectus', or something. Aristotle thinks that too much pathetism, in a male, is, er, pathetic.
Oddly, I was reading the Argentine novella that is making the hits in Buenos Ayres: the protagonist is described by the author (S. L.) as being 'hysterical', in parts. But this CANNOT literally be. (He is the same author who spells 'speech' speach). Hysteria means womb-bearer, or vag*na bearer, I forget. So how can a man be hysteric?
While Korta has translated the obscure "Meaning" by Grice what we have to focus is the conversational maxims. In Basque, communication is said, 'kommunikatao', which sounds similarly enough. But with 'implicature' I would not know. And then, perhaps I wouldn't care.
---- Korta does because he has to teach them -- the Basques.
Cheers!
Saturday, March 6, 2010
"We Agree To Disagree" in the Grice Club
---- By J. L. Speranza
------ for the Grice Club.
In "The Taxon", THIS BLOG, I wrote, "Dengler has it (then why wouldn't he) right." In this post I will elaborate on the witty analysis provided by Kramer in his commentary. It touches on larger issues, which are a delight to consider. We are assuming two types of arguments, which I will sketch here briefly
----- WE AGREE TO DISAGREE ---
(or not). Let's have a conversation
EPAGOGE ----------- DIAGOGE
p --------------------- p
--- -----
c COUNTER-EX. c POSITIVE Evidence
In Kramer it is all, rightly, about U's disabusing a notion with the U. As per the above, I have discussed those elsewhere vis a vis R. B. Jones's types of dialectic in "Carnap and Grice" (c) Jones and Speranza. The idea is that conversations can fit the mould of 'epagoge', where a counter-example is counter-evidence to a claim by U, as provided by A. Diagoge, which brings, Grice says, an 'eirenic' or peaceful effect, is when only positive evidence is presented for claims. Kramer focuses on a strict Gricean analysis of "A(ddressee) has it, as he should, right". The utterer who utters that, Kramer submits, is 'clumsy' because he is "cancel[ing] one implicature of [one of his utterances] that is already canceled by another [of his utterances]." To argue like that, Kramer provides the affirmative, "not"-free version, and wonders if (i), implicates (a) and (b) below.
(i) A has it right.
+> (a)
i.e. [A] may believe that [A] has it wrong, but [A] has it right.
+> (b)
i.e. [A] may believe that U believes that [A] has it wrong, but [U] believes that [A] has it right.
Kramer notes: "If (i) implicates either (a) or (b), does U (then why wouldn't he) negate whichever it is? And is it necessary, or when no one has expressly raised the possibility that A is wrong, does (i) have no such implicature?
Or, can we say that (i) always implies that A thinks that A has it wrong, because, otherwise, saying (i) is otiose, and we can't have that."
The question is openly and clearly posited by Kramer: "Can we," then, "say that a statement violates "Be relevant" if it doesn't at least potentially in U's mind disabuse A of something?" (emphasis in bold type mine. JLS)
He continues: "If so, then for (i) not to violate that maxim, it's "first-order" (generalized?) implicature"
NB. I think the idea of a first-order implicature is Geary's own! (vide his "Buckley and Co." -- but I will have to revise the context to see if he took that from someone else).
"is that someone will (or may) be disabused by the utterance. Now U wants to cancel that implicature, so he says "(but then, why wouldn't he?),"
raising the question of whether that addition is otiose. Is the cancellation necessary in the conversational context of no one having raised a doubt?"
What if it's in U's own thoughts? -- but see below as to doubts as to whether 'rhetorical questions' are aptly so named. Plus, what is "it" that Dengler is never doubted as having it wrong?
Kramer: "After all, if someone had raised a doubt, we'd know why A would have it wrong, and it would be absurd to suggest by the rhetorical question that there is no reason to think A has it wrong."
INTERLUDE:
("I seem to recall an early thread - the ladder [Langlish lift] thingy? - putting implicatures in order of control, as lawyers do when we say that the specific controls the general.")
Kramer continues:
"In this case, I would think that the implicature raised by the lack of expressed doubt (again, we need to think of silence as information)"
A good notion here is, I propose,
∅-infomation
Cfr. ∅-tolerance
("He ∅-informed me that he disliked the dress." "He did?". "Well, he didn't compliment it, either". Cfr. (-)-informed, "mis-informed", etc).
Kramer continues:
"cancels the implicature raised by saying "A has it right. Would Grice agree that if
a generalized implicature can be canceled, a conversational implicature of the same sentence can do the cancelling? And if that's the case, does (but then, why wouldn't he?) becomes unnecessary absent a reason to have to disabuse A of the notion that "A" might be wrong?" (bold types, mine. JLS)
AN ALTERNATIVE tag.
Kramer writes: "I thought a bit about"
(ii) I agree with A.
"as an alternative to (i). But the two are different, and the [tag]
(iii) But then why not?
"cancellation points to the difference. Both version imply self-importance (but then, why shouldn't an important person imply his own importance?) but in different ways. [Uttering] (i) suggests that U is an authority on the subject;"
--- Cfr. Grice on "Deutero-Esperanto". "I can invent a rigmarole of a lingo that nobody else speaks. That makes me the authority". (cfr. Humpty Dumpty on who the master is).
Kramer continues:
"[uttering][the less stronger, less presumptuous. JLS] (ii) suggests that one's opinion is of interest, but is, still, only
an opinion."
So it's the 'factuality' vs. 'non-factuality' implicature -- versus the total counterfactuality of "A has 'it' wrong. If A has it wrong, then 'it' is not as A has it, because, strictly A has it _not_. It's like saying the Russians before the Cold War had all of Locke's liberal manifesto for political liberalism wrong, no?
Kramer goes on: "The difference comes clear when we try to cancel the implicature with [the] (iii) [tag]. We get (iv) and (v)."
(iv) A is (but why would not A be?) right.
(v) U agrees (but why would he not) with A.
As Kramer notes, the less strong, less presumptuous move, (v), "leaves it unclear whether the notion of which A needs to be disabused is that the A may be wrong, or [perish the thought, god forbid. JLS] that U may be wrong"
Kramer concludes a disabuse should be avoided. Or an abuse, I'm confused now. "But, I would still submit that if the question is not rhetorical,
its answer is already known"
I would part sides (is that the expression? Not take, the opposite). I don't think I meant it as rhetorical. In fact, perhaps I was expecting, "Of course I'm wrong, JL."
In fact, in his commentary, which I have not replied, since I'm having as a self-imposed rule that when there's more than 2 commenters in a thread I'll let the order proceed numerically. Dengler rigthly (surely it would be odd that the does it 'wrongly') points to the 'it'. The 'it' is perhaps key, too, because I never said what 'it' was. This is Alice-in-Wonderland, but I won't expect the incident in the new Johnny Depp film which I have not yet seen. EXCURSUS. The "it" of the Duck, from Alice in Wonderland, ch. iii:
“Edwin and Morcar, the earls of Mercia and Northumbria, declared for him: and even Stigand, the patriotic archbishop of Canterbury, found it advisable—”’‘Found what?’ said the Duck. ‘Found it’ the Mouse replied rather crossly: ‘of course you know what 'it' means.’ ‘I know what 'it' means well enough, when I find a thing,’ said the Duck: ‘it’s generally a frog or a worm. The question is, what did the archbishop find?’ The Mouse did not notice this question, but hurriedly went on, ‘”—found it advisable to go with Edgar Atheling to meet William and offer him the crown."
So one is never _clear_ what Dengler has, let alone if he has "it" right (or alternatively, wrong). Note that Dengler in comment to thread has the 'it', properly, in 'scare quotes', cfr. Elizabeth Hurley, the 'it' girl. Of course the Alice is a red-herring, because the 'it' is NOT anticipatory in the tag we are examining. ("You have it right when you say that..."-- END OF EXCURSUS. Kramer finalises his brilliant commentary:
"; so it must be rhetorical, but if it's rhetorical, it's otiose."
There are keys or clues to suggest it might be rhetorical by the introduction, "but then." I find that 'but then' is USUALLY rhetoric. "But" is a rhetorical particle. "And then" is NEVER rhetorical. "But then" usually is. "And then, why wouldn't you" In this commentary above, in a sort of draft, I have turned the Dengler references, clumsily, to "A" addressee references, making the point pretty moot and silly, because all of Kramer's apt comments make sense when A ≠ "he" in "but then why wouldn't he?", but for clarification purposes I want to complicate the picture. It seems otiose in more than one respect in that one cannot 'flaunt' one's own having it wrong, etc. But will come back to this, I hope.
But the idea of abuse and disabuse are very Gricean, thanks to L. J. Kramer for bringing them to the forum with such insight and wit.
------ for the Grice Club.
In "The Taxon", THIS BLOG, I wrote, "Dengler has it (then why wouldn't he) right." In this post I will elaborate on the witty analysis provided by Kramer in his commentary. It touches on larger issues, which are a delight to consider. We are assuming two types of arguments, which I will sketch here briefly
----- WE AGREE TO DISAGREE ---
(or not). Let's have a conversation
EPAGOGE ----------- DIAGOGE
p --------------------- p
--- -----
c COUNTER-EX. c POSITIVE Evidence
In Kramer it is all, rightly, about U's disabusing a notion with the U. As per the above, I have discussed those elsewhere vis a vis R. B. Jones's types of dialectic in "Carnap and Grice" (c) Jones and Speranza. The idea is that conversations can fit the mould of 'epagoge', where a counter-example is counter-evidence to a claim by U, as provided by A. Diagoge, which brings, Grice says, an 'eirenic' or peaceful effect, is when only positive evidence is presented for claims. Kramer focuses on a strict Gricean analysis of "A(ddressee) has it, as he should, right". The utterer who utters that, Kramer submits, is 'clumsy' because he is "cancel[ing] one implicature of [one of his utterances] that is already canceled by another [of his utterances]." To argue like that, Kramer provides the affirmative, "not"-free version, and wonders if (i), implicates (a) and (b) below.
(i) A has it right.
+> (a)
i.e. [A] may believe that [A] has it wrong, but [A] has it right.
+> (b)
i.e. [A] may believe that U believes that [A] has it wrong, but [U] believes that [A] has it right.
Kramer notes: "If (i) implicates either (a) or (b), does U (then why wouldn't he) negate whichever it is? And is it necessary, or when no one has expressly raised the possibility that A is wrong, does (i) have no such implicature?
Or, can we say that (i) always implies that A thinks that A has it wrong, because, otherwise, saying (i) is otiose, and we can't have that."
The question is openly and clearly posited by Kramer: "Can we," then, "say that a statement violates "Be relevant" if it doesn't at least potentially in U's mind disabuse A of something?" (emphasis in bold type mine. JLS)
He continues: "If so, then for (i) not to violate that maxim, it's "first-order" (generalized?) implicature"
NB. I think the idea of a first-order implicature is Geary's own! (vide his "Buckley and Co." -- but I will have to revise the context to see if he took that from someone else).
"is that someone will (or may) be disabused by the utterance. Now U wants to cancel that implicature, so he says "(but then, why wouldn't he?),"
raising the question of whether that addition is otiose. Is the cancellation necessary in the conversational context of no one having raised a doubt?"
What if it's in U's own thoughts? -- but see below as to doubts as to whether 'rhetorical questions' are aptly so named. Plus, what is "it" that Dengler is never doubted as having it wrong?
Kramer: "After all, if someone had raised a doubt, we'd know why A would have it wrong, and it would be absurd to suggest by the rhetorical question that there is no reason to think A has it wrong."
INTERLUDE:
("I seem to recall an early thread - the ladder [Langlish lift] thingy? - putting implicatures in order of control, as lawyers do when we say that the specific controls the general.")
Kramer continues:
"In this case, I would think that the implicature raised by the lack of expressed doubt (again, we need to think of silence as information)"
A good notion here is, I propose,
∅-infomation
Cfr. ∅-tolerance
("He ∅-informed me that he disliked the dress." "He did?". "Well, he didn't compliment it, either". Cfr. (-)-informed, "mis-informed", etc).
Kramer continues:
"cancels the implicature raised by saying "A has it right. Would Grice agree that if
a generalized implicature can be canceled, a conversational implicature of the same sentence can do the cancelling? And if that's the case, does (but then, why wouldn't he?) becomes unnecessary absent a reason to have to disabuse A of the notion that "A" might be wrong?" (bold types, mine. JLS)
AN ALTERNATIVE tag.
Kramer writes: "I thought a bit about"
(ii) I agree with A.
"as an alternative to (i). But the two are different, and the [tag]
(iii) But then why not?
"cancellation points to the difference. Both version imply self-importance (but then, why shouldn't an important person imply his own importance?) but in different ways. [Uttering] (i) suggests that U is an authority on the subject;"
--- Cfr. Grice on "Deutero-Esperanto". "I can invent a rigmarole of a lingo that nobody else speaks. That makes me the authority". (cfr. Humpty Dumpty on who the master is).
Kramer continues:
"[uttering][the less stronger, less presumptuous. JLS] (ii) suggests that one's opinion is of interest, but is, still, only
an opinion."
So it's the 'factuality' vs. 'non-factuality' implicature -- versus the total counterfactuality of "A has 'it' wrong. If A has it wrong, then 'it' is not as A has it, because, strictly A has it _not_. It's like saying the Russians before the Cold War had all of Locke's liberal manifesto for political liberalism wrong, no?
Kramer goes on: "The difference comes clear when we try to cancel the implicature with [the] (iii) [tag]. We get (iv) and (v)."
(iv) A is (but why would not A be?) right.
(v) U agrees (but why would he not) with A.
As Kramer notes, the less strong, less presumptuous move, (v), "leaves it unclear whether the notion of which A needs to be disabused is that the A may be wrong, or [perish the thought, god forbid. JLS] that U may be wrong"
Kramer concludes a disabuse should be avoided. Or an abuse, I'm confused now. "But, I would still submit that if the question is not rhetorical,
its answer is already known"
I would part sides (is that the expression? Not take, the opposite). I don't think I meant it as rhetorical. In fact, perhaps I was expecting, "Of course I'm wrong, JL."
In fact, in his commentary, which I have not replied, since I'm having as a self-imposed rule that when there's more than 2 commenters in a thread I'll let the order proceed numerically. Dengler rigthly (surely it would be odd that the does it 'wrongly') points to the 'it'. The 'it' is perhaps key, too, because I never said what 'it' was. This is Alice-in-Wonderland, but I won't expect the incident in the new Johnny Depp film which I have not yet seen. EXCURSUS. The "it" of the Duck, from Alice in Wonderland, ch. iii:
“Edwin and Morcar, the earls of Mercia and Northumbria, declared for him: and even Stigand, the patriotic archbishop of Canterbury, found it advisable—”’‘Found what?’ said the Duck. ‘Found it’ the Mouse replied rather crossly: ‘of course you know what 'it' means.’ ‘I know what 'it' means well enough, when I find a thing,’ said the Duck: ‘it’s generally a frog or a worm. The question is, what did the archbishop find?’ The Mouse did not notice this question, but hurriedly went on, ‘”—found it advisable to go with Edgar Atheling to meet William and offer him the crown."
So one is never _clear_ what Dengler has, let alone if he has "it" right (or alternatively, wrong). Note that Dengler in comment to thread has the 'it', properly, in 'scare quotes', cfr. Elizabeth Hurley, the 'it' girl. Of course the Alice is a red-herring, because the 'it' is NOT anticipatory in the tag we are examining. ("You have it right when you say that..."-- END OF EXCURSUS. Kramer finalises his brilliant commentary:
"; so it must be rhetorical, but if it's rhetorical, it's otiose."
There are keys or clues to suggest it might be rhetorical by the introduction, "but then." I find that 'but then' is USUALLY rhetoric. "But" is a rhetorical particle. "And then" is NEVER rhetorical. "But then" usually is. "And then, why wouldn't you" In this commentary above, in a sort of draft, I have turned the Dengler references, clumsily, to "A" addressee references, making the point pretty moot and silly, because all of Kramer's apt comments make sense when A ≠ "he" in "but then why wouldn't he?", but for clarification purposes I want to complicate the picture. It seems otiose in more than one respect in that one cannot 'flaunt' one's own having it wrong, etc. But will come back to this, I hope.
But the idea of abuse and disabuse are very Gricean, thanks to L. J. Kramer for bringing them to the forum with such insight and wit.
Tuesday, February 9, 2010
Poppycock; or, Grice's Eschatology Revisited
for the Grice Circle
For some reason, Chapman (I love her) cannot spell 'eschatology', as spelt (spelled?) by Grice. She spells it 'scatology', I _think_.
In any case, there's poppycock.
A classicist I knew derived this from the Grecian word for 'north': The Greeks pointed to the north, the Romans to the south -- hence 'dexter'.
Quinion disagrees:
"This is a red herring."
"The direct association, her, is with "cack", a fine Old English term, for excrement or dung."
""Cac-hus" was OE for a privy, and both words come from L. "cacare", to defecate.""
Unfortunately, the Oxford Etymological Dictionary fails to give 'cack' an
OE pedigree, alas.
For Onions, it's only 'XV'. "prob. from Middle Low German, MDu cacken (Du kakken), corr. to G. kacken, etc.", via Latin, from
IE *kak- (cognate with Irish 'cacaim').
'Cacare' is neither, alas, listed in the otherwise rather complete glossary of Latin loan-words in Alistair Campbell's _Old English Grammar_ (ch. x, sections B-C).
So here's another OED gap (The other one was for 'implicature' as pointed out quoting me by Horn in ADS-L).
How widespread was the Anglo-Saxon privy, then? And is it listed, say, in
the Doomsday Book then?
No, it's not.
But King Alfred, then, never used 'cacophony':
Weird Words: Cacography
... of cacophony, "bad noises" (despite the association of ideas, it has
nothing to
do with our cack-handed, which derives from Old English cack, "excrement").
...
http://www.quinion.com/words/weirdwords/ww-cac1.htm
Weird Words: Poppycock
... The first half of the word is closely related to our pap for infants'
soft food;
the second half is essentially the same as the old English cack for
excrement ...
http://www.quinion.com/words/weirdwords/ww-pop1.htm
xrefer - Hand
... Hand. [From Old English]. (1) One ... hygiene. The BrE dialect term
cack-handed
for 'left-handed' derives from cack excrement. Because ...
http://www.xrefer.com/entry/442306
Etc.
For some reason, Chapman (I love her) cannot spell 'eschatology', as spelt (spelled?) by Grice. She spells it 'scatology', I _think_.
In any case, there's poppycock.
A classicist I knew derived this from the Grecian word for 'north': The Greeks pointed to the north, the Romans to the south -- hence 'dexter'.
Quinion disagrees:
"This is a red herring."
"The direct association, her, is with "cack", a fine Old English term, for excrement or dung."
""Cac-hus" was OE for a privy, and both words come from L. "cacare", to defecate.""
Unfortunately, the Oxford Etymological Dictionary fails to give 'cack' an
OE pedigree, alas.
For Onions, it's only 'XV'. "prob. from Middle Low German, MDu cacken (Du kakken), corr. to G. kacken, etc.", via Latin, from
IE *kak- (cognate with Irish 'cacaim').
'Cacare' is neither, alas, listed in the otherwise rather complete glossary of Latin loan-words in Alistair Campbell's _Old English Grammar_ (ch. x, sections B-C).
So here's another OED gap (The other one was for 'implicature' as pointed out quoting me by Horn in ADS-L).
How widespread was the Anglo-Saxon privy, then? And is it listed, say, in
the Doomsday Book then?
No, it's not.
But King Alfred, then, never used 'cacophony':
Weird Words: Cacography
... of cacophony, "bad noises" (despite the association of ideas, it has
nothing to
do with our cack-handed, which derives from Old English cack, "excrement").
...
http://www.quinion.com/words/weirdwords/ww-cac1.htm
Weird Words: Poppycock
... The first half of the word is closely related to our pap for infants'
soft food;
the second half is essentially the same as the old English cack for
excrement ...
http://www.quinion.com/words/weirdwords/ww-pop1.htm
xrefer - Hand
... Hand. [From Old English]. (1) One ... hygiene. The BrE dialect term
cack-handed
for 'left-handed' derives from cack excrement. Because ...
http://www.xrefer.com/entry/442306
Etc.
Grice Abroad
For the Grice Club
Mikes writes in "How to become a Brit"
"Furriners should not regret, and recall that
they provide an endless source of mirth to
some Englishmen"
--- And he knew -- but that was before we's got swamped by them -- them Hungarians!
---
Anyway, Grice was perhaps right in restricting 'implicature' to "intended implicature".
"An implicatura," he writes, "is not like a baby. An unwanted baby is _still_ a baby; an unwanted implicature is not". He meant, not an implicature, no not a baby, which we know.
Thus, when travelling abroad, never mind. Never mind the implicature. People don't _KNOW_.
It's useless to _try_.
Just consider this random sample of signs from around the world. That is, English signs in foreign places. And why is it that the _wrong_ people travel? Now you know!
Cocktail lounge, Norway:
LADIES ARE REQUESTED NOT TO HAVE CHILDREN IN THE BAR.
At a Budapest zoo:
PLEASE DO NOT FEED THE ANIMALS. IF YOU HAVE ANY SUITABLE FOOD, GIVE IT TO THE GUARD ON DUTY.
Doctors office, Rome:
SPECIALIST IN WOMEN AND OTHER DISEASES.
Information booklet about using a hotel air conditioner, Japan:
COOLS AND HEATS: IF YOU WANT CONDITION OF WARM AIR IN YOUR
ROOM, PLEASE CONTROL YOURSELF.
Car rental brochure, Tokyo:
WHEN PASSENGER OF FOOT SIGHT, BLOW THE HORN, MELODIOUSLY AT FIRST,
BUT IF HE STILL OBSTACLES YOUR PASSAGE THEN BLOW HIM WITH VIGOUR.
In a Nairobi restaurant:
CUSTOMERS WHO FIND OUR WAITRESSES RUDE OUGHT TO SEE THE MANAGER.
On a River highway:
TAKE NOTICE: WHEN THIS SIGN IS UNDER WATER, THIS ROAD IS IMPASSABLE.
On a poster at Kencom:
ARE YOU AN ADULT THAT CANNOT READ? IF SO, WE CAN HELP.
In a City restaurant:
OPEN SEVEN DAYS A WEEK, AND WEEKENDS TOO.
In a maternity ward:
NO CHILDREN ALLOWED.
In a cemetery:
PERSONS ARE PROHIBITED FROM PICKING FLOWERS FROM ANY GRAVES BUT THEIR OWN .
Tokyo hotel's rules and regulations:
GUESTS ARE REQUESTED NOT TO SMOKE OR DO OTHER DISGUSTING BEHAVIOURS IN BED.
On the menu of a Swiss restaurant:
OUR WINES LEAVE YOU NOTHING TO HOPE FOR.
In a Tokyo bar:
SPECIAL COCKTAILS FOR THE LADIES WITH NUTS.
In a Bangkok temple:
IT IS FORBIDDEN TO ENTER A WOMAN EVEN A FOREIGNER IF DRESSED AS A MAN.
Hotel room notice, Thailand:
PLEASE DO NOT BRING SOLICITORS INTO YOUR ROOM.
Hotel brochure, Italy:
THIS HOTEL IS RENOWNED FOR ITS PEACE AND SOLITUDE. CROWDS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD FLOCK HERE TO ENJOY ITS SOLITUDE.
Hotel lobby, Bucharest:
THE LIFT IS BEING FIXED FOR THE NEXT DAY. DURING THAT TIME WE REGRET THAT YOU WILL BE UNBEARABLE.
Hotel elevator, Paris:
PLEASE LEAVE YOUR VALUES AT THE FRONT DESK.
Hotel, Japan:
YOU ARE INVITED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CHAMBERMAID.
In a Russian Orthodox monastery:
YOU ARE WELCOME TO VISIT THE CEMETERY WHERE FAMOUS RUSSIAN AND SOVIET COMPOSERS, ARTISTS, AND WRITERS ARE BURIED DAILY EXCEPT THURSDAY.
Supermarket, Hong Kong:
FOR YOUR CONVENIENCE, WE RECOMMEND COURTEOUS, EFFICIENT SELF-SERVICE.
From the "Soviet Weekly":
THERE WILL BE A MOSCOW EXHIBITION OF ARTS BY 15,000 SOVIET REPUBLIC PAINTERS AND SCULPTORS. THESE WERE EXECUTED OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS.
In an East African newspaper:
A NEW SWIMMING POOL IS RAPIDLY TAKING SHAPE SINCE THE CONTRACTORS HAVE THROWN IN THE BULK OF THEIR WORKERS.
Hotel, Zurich:
BECAUSE OF THE IMPROPRIETY OF ENTERTAINING GUESTS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX IN THE BEDROOM, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE LOBBY BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE.
An advertisement by a Hong Kong dentist:
TEETH EXTRACTED BY THE LATEST METHODISTS.
A laundry in Rome:
LADIES, LEAVE YOUR CLOTHES HERE AND SPEND THE AFTERNOON HAVING A GOOD TIME.
Tourist agency, Czechoslovakia:
TAKE ONE OF OUR HORSE-DRIVEN CITY TOURS. WE GUARANTEE NO MISCARRIAGES.
The box of a clockwork toy made in Hong Kong:
GUARANTEED TO WORK THROUGHOUT ITS USEFUL LIFE.
In a Swiss mountain inn:
SPECIAL TODAY - NO ICE-CREAM.
Airline ticket office, Copenhagen:
WE TAKE YOUR BAGS AND SEND THEM IN ALL DIRECTIONS.
Etc.
As an exercise take your pick and analyse in some detail where the misimplicature lies.
Mikes writes in "How to become a Brit"
"Furriners should not regret, and recall that
they provide an endless source of mirth to
some Englishmen"
--- And he knew -- but that was before we's got swamped by them -- them Hungarians!
---
Anyway, Grice was perhaps right in restricting 'implicature' to "intended implicature".
"An implicatura," he writes, "is not like a baby. An unwanted baby is _still_ a baby; an unwanted implicature is not". He meant, not an implicature, no not a baby, which we know.
Thus, when travelling abroad, never mind. Never mind the implicature. People don't _KNOW_.
It's useless to _try_.
Just consider this random sample of signs from around the world. That is, English signs in foreign places. And why is it that the _wrong_ people travel? Now you know!
Cocktail lounge, Norway:
LADIES ARE REQUESTED NOT TO HAVE CHILDREN IN THE BAR.
At a Budapest zoo:
PLEASE DO NOT FEED THE ANIMALS. IF YOU HAVE ANY SUITABLE FOOD, GIVE IT TO THE GUARD ON DUTY.
Doctors office, Rome:
SPECIALIST IN WOMEN AND OTHER DISEASES.
Information booklet about using a hotel air conditioner, Japan:
COOLS AND HEATS: IF YOU WANT CONDITION OF WARM AIR IN YOUR
ROOM, PLEASE CONTROL YOURSELF.
Car rental brochure, Tokyo:
WHEN PASSENGER OF FOOT SIGHT, BLOW THE HORN, MELODIOUSLY AT FIRST,
BUT IF HE STILL OBSTACLES YOUR PASSAGE THEN BLOW HIM WITH VIGOUR.
In a Nairobi restaurant:
CUSTOMERS WHO FIND OUR WAITRESSES RUDE OUGHT TO SEE THE MANAGER.
On a River highway:
TAKE NOTICE: WHEN THIS SIGN IS UNDER WATER, THIS ROAD IS IMPASSABLE.
On a poster at Kencom:
ARE YOU AN ADULT THAT CANNOT READ? IF SO, WE CAN HELP.
In a City restaurant:
OPEN SEVEN DAYS A WEEK, AND WEEKENDS TOO.
In a maternity ward:
NO CHILDREN ALLOWED.
In a cemetery:
PERSONS ARE PROHIBITED FROM PICKING FLOWERS FROM ANY GRAVES BUT THEIR OWN .
Tokyo hotel's rules and regulations:
GUESTS ARE REQUESTED NOT TO SMOKE OR DO OTHER DISGUSTING BEHAVIOURS IN BED.
On the menu of a Swiss restaurant:
OUR WINES LEAVE YOU NOTHING TO HOPE FOR.
In a Tokyo bar:
SPECIAL COCKTAILS FOR THE LADIES WITH NUTS.
In a Bangkok temple:
IT IS FORBIDDEN TO ENTER A WOMAN EVEN A FOREIGNER IF DRESSED AS A MAN.
Hotel room notice, Thailand:
PLEASE DO NOT BRING SOLICITORS INTO YOUR ROOM.
Hotel brochure, Italy:
THIS HOTEL IS RENOWNED FOR ITS PEACE AND SOLITUDE. CROWDS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD FLOCK HERE TO ENJOY ITS SOLITUDE.
Hotel lobby, Bucharest:
THE LIFT IS BEING FIXED FOR THE NEXT DAY. DURING THAT TIME WE REGRET THAT YOU WILL BE UNBEARABLE.
Hotel elevator, Paris:
PLEASE LEAVE YOUR VALUES AT THE FRONT DESK.
Hotel, Japan:
YOU ARE INVITED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CHAMBERMAID.
In a Russian Orthodox monastery:
YOU ARE WELCOME TO VISIT THE CEMETERY WHERE FAMOUS RUSSIAN AND SOVIET COMPOSERS, ARTISTS, AND WRITERS ARE BURIED DAILY EXCEPT THURSDAY.
Supermarket, Hong Kong:
FOR YOUR CONVENIENCE, WE RECOMMEND COURTEOUS, EFFICIENT SELF-SERVICE.
From the "Soviet Weekly":
THERE WILL BE A MOSCOW EXHIBITION OF ARTS BY 15,000 SOVIET REPUBLIC PAINTERS AND SCULPTORS. THESE WERE EXECUTED OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS.
In an East African newspaper:
A NEW SWIMMING POOL IS RAPIDLY TAKING SHAPE SINCE THE CONTRACTORS HAVE THROWN IN THE BULK OF THEIR WORKERS.
Hotel, Zurich:
BECAUSE OF THE IMPROPRIETY OF ENTERTAINING GUESTS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX IN THE BEDROOM, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE LOBBY BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE.
An advertisement by a Hong Kong dentist:
TEETH EXTRACTED BY THE LATEST METHODISTS.
A laundry in Rome:
LADIES, LEAVE YOUR CLOTHES HERE AND SPEND THE AFTERNOON HAVING A GOOD TIME.
Tourist agency, Czechoslovakia:
TAKE ONE OF OUR HORSE-DRIVEN CITY TOURS. WE GUARANTEE NO MISCARRIAGES.
The box of a clockwork toy made in Hong Kong:
GUARANTEED TO WORK THROUGHOUT ITS USEFUL LIFE.
In a Swiss mountain inn:
SPECIAL TODAY - NO ICE-CREAM.
Airline ticket office, Copenhagen:
WE TAKE YOUR BAGS AND SEND THEM IN ALL DIRECTIONS.
Etc.
As an exercise take your pick and analyse in some detail where the misimplicature lies.
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