Rorty calls himself ("or his self, actually" -- H. P. Grice) a Griceian

Richard Rorty argues i n an articl e entitle d 'Postmodernist
Bourgeois Liberalism* (13) tha t there i s a need fo r the libera l
understanding t o break away from the metaphysical foundations of the
'Kantian' theoretica l project associated most recentl y wit h such writer s
as John Rawls, Robert Nozick and Ronald Dworkin. Rorty, lik e Dunn,
characterises thi s modernist Kantian projec t as an attempt t o establis h
certai n ahistorica l rationa l moral principle s of conduct which
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individua l moral subjects can appeal t o whatever the particula r spatio -
temporal positio n i n which they fin d themselves. As Rorty indicates , i t
i s a projec t which presupposes tha t there exist s some notion of the
self-identifyin g subject who can distinguis h himself from hi s
particula r talents , interest s and views about the good. Further, i t
assumes tha t the moral subject i s capable of engaging i n moral
deliberation s (which establis h rationa l principle s of practica l conduct)
from an abstrac t poin t of view which i s divorced from the particula r
historica l context and cultura l community withi n which he i s located.
Such a project , therefore, seeks t o establis h an ahistorica l distinctio n
between the demands of moralit y and those of prudence through an
appeal t o certai n rationa l foundations which, i t i s claimed, reinforc e
our loyalt y t o the particula r moral practices i n which we engage.
For Rorty, thi s Kantian projec t i s misconceived fo r a number of
interrelate d reasons. Most centrally , i t rest s upon a fals e conception
of the sel f as possessive of an ahistorica l rationality . He argues tha t
we need:
t o thin k of the moral self , the embodiment of rationality , not as
one of Rawls' origina l choosers, somebody who can distinguis h her
self from her talent s and interest s and views about the good, but
as a network of beliefs , desires and emotions wit h nothing behind
i t - no substrate behind the attributes , For purposes of moral and
politica l deliberatio n and conversation, a person jus t i s tha t
network, as fo r the purposes of ballistic s she i s a point-mass, or
f o r purposes of chemistry a linkage of molecules. (14)
Rorty's poin t amounts t o the claim tha t our conception of the moral
sel f i s constitute d by the contingent arrangements of our moral
practices , and our sense of rationa l moral deliberatio n and purpose i s
likewis e determined by those practices . Just as the scientifi c practice s
of ballistic s and chemistry determine the sense of what counts as the
intelligibl e behaviour of a point-mass or molecule, the manifested
behavioural expression of beliefs , desires and emotions i s determined
by a particula r morally relevant rule-followin g practic e which
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constitute s the sense of moral selfhood. This i s a view which, Rorty
says, accepts the Quinean notio n that :
rationa l behaviour i s jus t adaptive behaviour of a sor t which
roughly parallel s the behaviour, i n simila r circumstances, of the
other members of some relevant community. Irrationality , i n both
physics and ethics , i s a matter of behaviour tha t leads one t o
abandon, or be strippe d of, membership i n some such community.
For some purposes thi s adoptive behaviour i s aptl y described as
'learning' or 'computing' or 'redistributio n of electrica l charges
i n neural tissue', and fo r others as 'deliberation' or 'choice*.
None of these vocabularies i s privilege d over against another.
(15)
Rorty's point , then, i s tha t our notion of moral deliberation , choice or
purpose i s set withi n a particula r historica l community whose rule -
followin g practic e determines the sense i n which any adaptive behaviour
counts as being rationa l or irrational . Admittedly the moral subject
expresses intentions as manifest i n deliberativ e choices which are not
present i n atoms, but our moral behaviour, jus t lik e scientifi c atomic
behaviour, i s intelligibl e only i f one focusses on the practice s which
give i t rationa l sense. Consequently, Rorty argues, reasoning i n ethic s
i s always dependent upon historicall y contingent practices , and does
n ot relat e t o some abstrac t notion of ahistorica l rationalit y assumed
by libera l thinker s such as Rawls, Nozick and Dworkin.
Rorty's conception of the (moral) sel f i s clearly , then, t o be
starkl y contrasted wit h the Kantian notion of the subject who employs
an ahistorica l rationa l facult y by which t o discover the sense of
moral conduct independently from any historica l particularity , and who
engages i n moral conversation wit h others who have the same moral
sense i n view. Michael Sandel makes a poin t which supports Rorty's view
when he says tha t we cannot regard ourselves as Kantian subjects or
Rawlsian choosers who constitut e meaning on thei r own
without great cost to those loyaltie s and conviction s whose moral
force consist s partl y i n the fac t tha t livin g by them i s
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inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particula r people
we are - as members of thi s famil y or community or nation Dr
people, as bearers of thi s history , as sons and daughters of tha t
revolution , as citizen s of thi s republic. (16)
For Rorty and Sandel, therefore, any version of Kantian liberalis m
i s defective i n it s perception of the primacy of alleged ahistorica l
rationa l foundations which purportedly support our actual sense of
moral loyalt y and convictio n towards our moral practices. They argue
tha t there i s no such basis which generates and justifie s the moral
force of these loyaltie s and convictions. Rather, as Rorty puts it , the
moral force consist s wholly i n the fac t tha t as members of a
particula r community we share an overlap of beliefs , desires and
emotions which enable us t o identif y ourselves fo r purposes of moral
and politica l deliberatio n as fello w beings. Further, he claims, i t i s
thi s network of shared conviction s which supplies the distinctiv e
features of a particula r group; 'features which i t uses t o construct it s
self-image through contrast s wit h other groups'. (17)
Rorty states tha t thi s view of the ethica l i s t o be associated
wit h what he call s the 'Hegelian' traditio n of moral thinking , as
distinc t from the 'Kantian'. He characterises thi s tradition , exemplified
i n the writing s of Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche, as insistin g on thinkin g
of moralit y as 'the interes t of an historicall y conditioned community
rathe r than "the common interest s of humanity'" (18). According thi s
'Hegelian' view, fo r instance, the Kantian notion of a transcultura l and
ahistorica l rationalit y specifyin g some universall y applicable moral
value such as 'human dignity ' i s t o be rejected. Also, from thi s
perspective, the Kantian version of the distinctio n between moralit y
and prudence i s misconceived, because, i t i s argued, the transcultura l
and ahistoricall y rationa l foundation upon which i t i s buil t i s nonexisten t .
How, then, i s the distinctio n between moralit y and prudence
construed, i n Hegelian terms? Rorty write s that , fo r the Hegelian
t he morality/prudence distinctio n appears as a distinctio n
between appeals t o two part s of the network tha t i s the sel f -
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part s separated by blurr y and constantly shiftin g boundaries. One
par t consist s of those belief s and desires and emotions which
overlap wit h those of most other members of some community wit h
which, fo r purposes of deliberation , she identifie s herself , and
which contras t wit h those of most members of other communities
wit h which hers contrast s itself . A person appeals t o moralit y
rathe r than prudence when she appeals t o thi s overlapping, shared
par t of herself , those belief s and desires and emotions which
permit her t o say "We do not do thi s sor t of thing" . Moralit y is ,
as Wilfre d Sellar s has said, a matter of 'we - intentions'. Most
moral dilemmas are thus reflection s of the fac t tha t most of us
identif y wit h a number of differen t communities and are equally
reluctan t t o marginalise ourselves i n relatio n t o any of them.
This diversit y of identification s increases wit h education, jus t as
the number of communities wit h which a person may identif y
increases wit h civilisation . (19)
For Rorty, therefore, any appeal t o moralit y i s determined by a
particula r communal sense of collectiv e identity . To engage i n moral, as
distinc t from prudential , deliberatio n i s t o identif y oneself as a
member of a community who follo w a distinc t set of rules: t o break
those rule s i s t o 'marginalise' oneself and become alie n t o the cultura l
practic e i n question. Further, thi s self-identificatio n wit h these rule -
followin g practice s i s historicall y contingent and 'shifting ' over time,
and withi n a pluralis t society differen t and conflictin g forms of
communal identificatio n may be adhered to .
This fact , however, does not, fo r Rorty, undermine the endurance of
a recognisably moral vocabulary or conceptual understanding between
persons withi n a particula r cultura l tradition . The centra l virtu e of
'intrinsi c human dignity ' is , fo r example, sustained as 'the comparative
dignit y of a group wit h which a person identifie s hersel f (20).
Further, Rorty suggests:
Hations or churches or movements are, on thi s view, shinin g
historica l examples not because they reflec t rays emanating from
a higher source, but because of contrast-effect s - comparisons
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wit h other, worse communities. Persons have dignit y not as an
interio r luminescence, but because they share i n such contrast -
effects . (21)
Rorty picture s moral understanding, then, as being located withi n
t he historicall y contingent traditio n of a cultura l practice . He adds
that :
i t i s a corollar y of thi s view tha t the moral justificatio n of the
institution s and practice s of one's groups i s mostly a matter
of historica l narratives , (includin g scenarios about what i s likel y
t o happen i n certai n futur e contingencies) rathe r than of
philosophica l metanarratives, (22)
What Rorty means here i s tha t our moral justificatio n fo r our
particula r communal moral lif e i s a matter of pragmatically calculatin g
t he general benefit s t o be gained by sustainin g or departing from an
attachment t o those institution s which generate our practica l moral
understanding. This involves a critica l examination of what we hold
dear, or value, withi n our traditiona l culture , and such an
examination i s made possible through a historica l narrativ e assessment
of those conventions which have shaped our cultura l identity . What we
cannot do, Rorty insists , i s t o justif y our particula r moral practice s
i n terms of philosophica l 'metanarratives' which seek t o deduce
general principle s of conduct tha t are transculturall y and
ahistoricall y applicable to al l practices .
How does thi s relat e t o our discussion of liberalis m and libera l
societies? Rorty distinguishe s between two types of contemporary
liberalism : 'postmodernist bourgeois liberalism ' and 'philosophical
liberalism' , He characterises 'philosophical liberalism ' as a collectio n
of Kantian principle s (includin g the notion of inalienabl e human
rights ) which amounts t o a philosophica l 'metanarrative' or stor y tha t
purports t o justif y loyalt y to , or breaks with , certai n contemporary
communities through the formulatio n of general abstrac t principle s of
conduct which these communities eithe r satisf y or fai l t o meet. We have
already seen how Rorty refute s the foundations upon which thi s
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philosophica l Kantian projec t i s built . He argues tha t the Kantian
'buttresses' of accounting fo r moralit y and rationalit y i n transcultura l
and ahistorica l terms i s a nonsense. By contrast , Rorty characterises
'postmodernist bourgeois liberalism ' as 'the Hegelian attempt t o defend
t he institution s and practice s of the ric h Worth Atlanti c democracies
without using such buttresses' (23). I t is , Rorty says, an attempt t o
'convince our society tha t loyalt y t o itsel f i s moralit y enough, and
tha t such loyalt y no longer needs an ahistorica l back-up' (24). Such an
attempt can be successful, fo r Rorty, because i t i s possible t o
construct a historica l narrativ e about what our libera l democratic
communities have achieved i n the past, and some scenario about what
they might do i n the future. I t i s the provisio n of thi s historica l
narrativ e which, Rorty hopes, can succeed i n re-affirmin g the
traditiona l communal identitie s which sustain our Western politica l
practices. There need not be, and there cannot be, fo r Rorty, any
philosphica l justificatio n of our Western cultura l understanding through
an appeal t o a Kantian 'metanarrative'. I t i s not necessary, he argues,
nor i s i t philosophicall y plausible, t o employ the vocabulary of
'inalienable human rights ' or an appeal t o general rationa l principles .
Rather, what i s required i s 'convincing our society tha t i t need be
responsible only t o it s own traditions , and not t o the moral law as
well*. (25)
Rorty i s optimistic , then, about the possibilit y of sustaining a
futur e politica l commitment t o the traditiona l cultura l values of
liberal-democrati c societie s by constructin g a pragmatic historica l
narrative . This optimism stems from a centra l sociologica l assumption.
I t i s tha t
Intra-societa l tensions, of the sor t which Dworkin rightl y says
mark our pluralisti c society, are rarel y resolved by appeals t o
general principle s of the sor t Dworkin think s necessary. More
frequently they are resolved by appeals t o what he call s
'convention and anecdote'. The politica l discourse of the
democracies, a t it s best, i s the exchange of what Wittgenstein
calle d 'reminders fo r a particula r purpose' - anecdotes about the
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past effect s of various practices and prediction s of what wil l
happen if , or unless, some of these are altered . C26)
Rorty's contention tha t socia l and politica l lif e i s primaril y a matter
of pragmaticall y resolvin g practica l difficultie s through an appeal t o
past custom rathe r than abstrac t principl e i s reflecte d i n the writing s
of the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey (who Rorty call s 'a
post-modernist before hi s time") and echoes the politicall y
conservative scepticism of David Hume. I t i s a view of the nature of
moral and politica l discourse which, Rorty insists , i s reflecte d i n the
styl e of deliberatio n conducted by 'postmodernist bourgeois liberals' ,
who, unlike thei r Kantian contemporaries, avoid 'the formulatio n of
general principles' . (27) As a consequence, he argues, postmodernist
bourgeois liberal s are fa r more adept than the Kantians i n
communicating thei r moral conviction s i n a pragmatic way which relate s
more closel y t o 'the moral consensus of the nation' or the practices
and institution s of American citizens . The intellectual s of the Kantian
libera l traditio n have, Rorty contends, become separated from the
actual practice s which they have sought t o justif y because thei r
abstrac t metanarrative theorisin g has had the effec t of mislocating the
issues tha t need t o be resolved i n the defence of these American
practices . The appeal t o general principle s has not, and cannot,
succeed. Rather, an appeal t o traditiona l historica l experience i s
needed, and, fo r Rorty, i t i s the historica l narrativ e provided by the
postmodernist bourgeois liberal s which can secure the futur e of
liberalis m and libera l society.
Rorty's thesi s i s complex, and we need t o examine hi s general
conception of philosophy i n order t o specify hi s understanding of the
relationshi p between philosophy and politics . For i t i s centra l t o hi s
projec t t o establis h what philosophy i s not. In hi s major works
Philosophy and the Mirro r of Nature and Consequences pf Pragmatism he
develops the idea tha t philosophy i s not t o be understood as a 'natural
kind" of disciplin e which has a fixed , essentia l and clearl y demarcated
subject-matter and cluste r of ahistoriea l problems t o resolve.
Philosophy i s not capable of discovering ahistorica l 'Truths', or layin g
down certai n theoretica l foundations of knowledge which can be buil t up
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int o a coherent system of beliefs , because such 'Truths' and foundations
are nowhere t o be found. I t is , fo r Rorty, a misconception of the nature
of philosophy t o assume tha t i t can reach, or even aspire to , an
epistemological certitud e which i s good fo r al l time and al l possible
modes of experience.
Rorty observes, however, tha t thi s misplaced pictur e of philosophy
has been sustained since the Enlightenment, and has been founded upon
t he myth of the transcultura l ahistorica l rationa l self . He shows tha t
afte r Descartes (and Kant) the dominent metaphor of picturin g the mind
as a 'mirror of nature' (i n the sense of the mind representing the
externa l world) took hold, and philosophy became conceived as the
disciplin e which focusses tha t mirro r upon epistemological foundations.
Both the empiricist s and the idealist s were captured by thi s metaphor
of the 'mirroring' mind, although they interprete d i t differently . For
t he empiricist , the mind was the purely passive recipien t of a given
objective reality , and fo r the idealis t i t i n some sense actively shaped
t he contours of tha t reality , but on both accounts the mind represented
or mirrored the world. As a result , Rorty notes, both empiricism and
idealism understood philosophica l enquiry t o be the quest fo r those
rationa l or logica l foundations or ultimat e objective grounds upon
which t o place our representational knowledge of the world. Philosophy,
thus understood, became the analytica l branch of science, and was seen
t o promise the indubitable foundations fo r al l other modes of thought.
Rorty argues, lik e others before him (most notably Wittgenstein),
tha t the notion of the 'foundational given' upon which thi s conception
of philosophy i s buil t i s 'empty'. Consequently, he says, there i s no
strong 'correspondence' notion of 'Truth' availabl e t o us. Rather, 'truth '
i s , i n the words of William James, 'the name of whatever proves itsel f
t o be good i n the way of belief . I t follows , then, fo r Rorty, tha t we
need t o abandon our attachment t o the mythical notion tha t 'Philosophy'
i s foundational i n character, and i s capable of the discovery of
timeless 'Truths'. Rather, he argues tha t philosophy is , properly
understood, lik e other modes of thought; a kin d of narrative . I t i s a
matter of the edification of the historicall y contingent experiences
shared withi n a cultura l traditon ; and i t i s the task of the
philosopher t o engage, as a 'cultura l critic' , i n a 'conversation' wit h
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tha t tradition , and show us how our traditiona l cultura l understanding
enables us, i n a pragmatic sense, t o 'cope wit h the world*.
Philosophical enquiry i s then, fo r Rorty, local, not transcendental: i t
constitute s a historica l narrativ e which edifie s our cultura l
understanding of our world a t a given moment by showing us where we
have travelle d and what we value; i t does not discover certai n
foundations which place tha t knowledge on firme r ground.
I t follow s then that , fo r Rorty, philosophy cannot i n any strong
foundational manner justif y or refut e our understanding of the world. I t
has no privilege d access t o 'knowledge', i n the absolute sense, and
cannot conclusively demonstrate the absolute 'Truth' or Falsity ' of our
beliefs , because these absolutis t notions of 'knowledge', 'Truth' and
'Falsity ' are mythical. Rather, al l tha t philosophy can do i s express
and edif y those convictions which shaped, and have i n tur n been shaped
by, our traditiona l understanding of the world as manifest i n our
cultura l practices. For i t constitute s a narrativ e which leads us up t o
'where we stand a t the moment', and makes clearer t o us our knowledge
of the world i n the pragmatic way of edifyin g the ongoing process of
reflectiv e adjustment between various cultura l needs and interests . This
kin d of narrativ e can never hope t o resolve our philosophica l problems,
as i t were, once and fo r all , because, fo r Rorty, no fina l metanarrative
i s availabl e t o us. For although philosophy may voice the main concerns
of it s own cultura l epoch, i t cannot set itsel f up as a master
disciplin e of knowledge and truth .
Rorty observes tha t withi n our North Atlanti c cultura l tradition ,
'we' are attached to, and identif y ourselves i n terms of, ethica l and
politica l values which can be broadly characterised as 'liberal ' or
'social democratic'. These values, which include the familia r notions of
representative government, freedom of speech and association, and the
righ t t o privat e property, are, as Rorty remarks, centra l t o our
ethical , politica l and socia l heritage. But, he argues, our politica l
convictio n toward these values and institutiona l practice s cannot, and
need not, be philosphicall y justified . In an articl e calle d 'From Logic
t o Language t o Play' he write s tha t
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philosophy, even though i t i s often inspire d by politics , should
n ot be thought of as a foundation fo r politic s nor as a Weapon of
politics... . philosophy should tr y t o express our politica l hopes
rather than t o ground our politica l practices . On the view I am
suggesting, nothing grounds our practices , nothing legitimate s
them, nothing shows them t o be i n touch wit h the way thing s
reall y are. (28)
For Rorty, therefore, politica l theory, lik e other kinds of
philosophica l enquiry, cannot perform the task of layin g down any
foundations by which t o justif y our politica l understanding as manifest
i n practices. No justification , i n the sense of establishin g or logicall y
deducing what practica l conclusions follo w from fixe d premises, i s
possible. Al l tha t i s possible i s a philosophica l articulatio n of our
conviction s or hopes: hopes which are themselves 'ungrounded'.
Rorty's point , then, i s tha t i t i s our politica l conviction s or
hopes which stand prior t o thei r philosophica l expression. In an
articl e entitle d 'The Priorit y of Democracy t o Philosophy' (29) he
insist s tha t controversia l philosophica l claims about human nature or
metaphysical theories of the sel f are not, i n any foundational sense,
relevant t o the issue of articulatin g the convictions , settle d habit s
and shared belief s of those who identif y themselves withi n the
historica l community tha t i s committed t o libera l constitutiona l
democracy. Most notably the effort s of the Kantians t o justif y thi s
commitment i n terms of a foundational enterpris e which i s buil t upon a
distinctiv e notion of rationalit y and the sel f i s both pointles s and
misleading. For what i s needed, and al l tha t can be achieved, i s the
constructio n of a pragmatic narrative , rathe r than a metanarrative.
However, Rorty does concede tha t there nonetheless remains an urge
withi n our present philosophica l community t o offe r philosophica l
theories of the sel f which may serve politica l purposes. He admits tha t
he i s himself tempted t o do so i n the defence of libera l democracy. His
point , though, i s tha t nothing crucia l depends upon such an achievement.
This i s because 'libera l democracy can get along without philosophica l
presuppositions'; although, he also suggests, 'a conception of the sel f
which makes the community constitutiv e of the sel f does comport wel l
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wit h libera l democracy'. (30) There i s then, fo r Rorty, a sense i n
which, fo r the purposes of the articulatio n of libera l democratic
values, a 'sociall y constitutive ' conception of the sel f i s a suitabl e
alternativ e t o the Kantian notion. But i t i s important t o note, he
insists , tha t thi s sense i s not foundational, and tha t nothing crucia l
hangs on fleshin g out 'our self-image as citizen s of such a democracy
wit h a philosophica l view of the self . (31)
The reason why thi s i s so, Rorty claims, i s tha t any effor t t o
provide a philosophica l view of the sel f which attempts t o justif y a
s et of politica l belief s constitute s an articulatio n of a prio r
cultura l image, not it s foundation. Therefore, the philosophica l
achievement reached i n thi s task is , properl y understood, always a
matter of edifyin g a presupposed cultural-politica l identity , rather
than providin g a justificatio n of tha t identity . He tell s us that :
I f ... one has a tast e fo r philosophy - i f one's vocation, one's
privat e pursui t of happiness entail s constructin g models of such
entitie s as 'the self , 'knowledge', 'language', 'nature', 'God' or
'history' and then tinkerin g wit h them unti l they mesh wit h each
other - one will want a pictur e of the self . Since my own
vocation i s of thi s sort , and the moral identit y around which I
wish t o buil d such models i s tha t of a citize n of a libera l
democratic state , I commend the pictur e of the sel f as a
centerless and contingent web t o those wit h simila r tastes and
simila r identities . (32)
I t i s thi s notion of the 'socially constitutiv e self , coupled wit h
h i s attachment t o 'Deweyian pragmatism', which, fo r Rorty, provides the
most appropriate philosophica l expression of the libera l or socia l
democratic view. I t has the advantage of avoiding the foundationalis t
errors , and the liberal-individualis t conception of the self , which i s
intrinsi c t o the Kantian project .
In an articl e entitle d 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward' <33 p="">Richard Bernstein raise s an objection t o Rorty's assessment of hi s
position . For Bernstein suggests tha t Rorty i s not simply constructin g
a pictur e of the sel f tha t fit s wit h hi s prio r libera l convictions, but
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i s , rather , 'arguing against al l notions of a centered and
transcendental self*. Further, he says, of Rorty, tha t
Whatever hi s motivations i n coming up wit h a pictur e of the 'self
as center less, as historica l contingency al l the way through', he
i s arguing tha t thi s i s a more perspicious - one i s tempted t o
say a 'truer' - understanding of the self . (34)
Bernstein's suggestion i s tha t Rorty is , despite hi s claim t o the
contrary, engaged i n an argument wit h the Kantians over a
philosophicall y contestable conception of the self . As a result , he
says, Rorty must be committed t o the assumption tha t hi s notion of
selfhood i s 'truer' i n some absolute sense. We may add tha t i f thi s
assumption i s held by Rorty (however latently ) then i t looks probable
that , despite hi s denials, i t i s hi s philosophica l view of the sel f
which i s the basis of hi s libera l convictions.
However, Rorty does, I think , successfully avoid thi s objection
when he reiterate s the point , i n 'Thugs and Theorists: a Reply t o
Bernstein' (35), tha t 'we pragmatists thin k tha t the tru e i s the good i n
t he way of belief . (36) That is , Rorty claims, what he holds t o be
'true' i n tha t which is , relativ e t o hi s socia l democratic experience,
most useful t o the articulatio n of hi s socia l democratic beliefs . As
such, Rorty insists , hi s conception of the sel f i s tru e only i n the
pragmatic sense tha t i t most clearl y comports wit h bi s prio r
conception of a good society: there i s no absolute sense of 'true'
independently from those beliefs . Further, he insist s tha t ' I do not
know how t o 'justify ' or 'defend' socia l democracy' (37) through the
presentation of thi s philosophica l view of the self . He continues as
follows :
nor would 1 know how t o defend my view of the sel f (to sceptics )
without firs t making socia l democrats out of them. This latte r
fac t i s par t of what I have i n mind when I speak of 'the priorit y
of democracy t o philosophy'. I thin k Dewey showed us tha t we
pragmatists can star t from our socia l hopes and work down from
there t o theories about the standard philosophica l topic s (38)
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i n the sense that , fo r Rorty, Dewey would have endorsed Ungers use of
t he slogan 'everything i s polities' . <39 p="">Rorty"s insistence, then, i s tha t hi s philosophica l view of the
sel f i s bound up wit h and inseparable from hi s prio r socia l democratic
convictions. I t i s i n no sense true independently from those beliefs .
Rather, it s only functio n i s tha t i t 'suits the politica l purposes of us
socia l democrats'. (40)
I t becomes necessary, therefore, t o examine i n greater detai l
Rorty's understanding of politics . He write s tha t 'we should thin k of
politic s as one of the experimental rathe r than of the theoretica l
disciplines ' (41), and thi s view leads him t o question the relevance of
politica l theory upon politica l practice. For he conceives of practica l
politica l lif e as being conducted withi n tradition s and involvin g the
piecemeal experimental changes i n polic y and statut e which articulat e
our critica l reflection s upon our cultura l identity . Such
experimentation i s not, fo r Rorty, based upon any theoretica l
foundations from which practica l solution s t o problems can be logicall y
deduced.
I t can be seen tha t thi s conception of politic s and moralit y has
an intellectua l antecedence i n the work of Hume and Oakeshott, and
Rorty appears t o acknowledge i t as hi s own. Rorty, lik e Hume (i n hi s
conservative moods) and Oakeshott, i s sceptica l about any attempt to
base politica l society upon fixe d rationa l criteria , We can see how
Rorty's specifi c concern fo r the dangers and misconceptions of the
Kantian libera l view of rationalit y reflect s Oakeshott's critiqu e of
'rationalism' i n general when Rorty suggests tha t there i s a need t o
'envisage a socia l democratic utopia - a futur e fo r the human race i n
which Enlightenment liberalis m i s carrie d through t o it s limit ,
eradicatin g i n the process the las t traces of Enlightenment
rationalism ' (42). Further, echoing Hume, he says tha t ' I should lik e the
sentiments of pit y and tolerance t o take the place of belief-systems
(or of what Habermas call s 'the commitment t o rationality' ) i n bonding
libera l societie s together. I want a meta-ethics tha t follow s up on
Hume rathe r than on Kant' (43).
This attachment t o Hume would seem t o indicat e a connection
between Rorty and the 'Cold War Liberals ' who are t o be associated wit h
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t he Humean moral theorising . Also, the anti-rationalis t and anti-foundationalis t
tenor of Rorty's arguments indicates a connection wit h the Oakeshottian
conception of politic s as being, properly understood, non-theoretical i n
character. Indeed, the relationshi p between Rorty and Oakeshott i s made
more apparent when Rorty applies Oakeshott's notion of poetry as 'a
conversation of mankind' t o the disciplin e of philosophy (includin g
politica l philosophy) itself . For Rorty argues tha t philosophy i s t o be
seen as one kin d of narrativ e (analogous t o poetry) which i s conducted
withi n a conversation. Thus when Oakeshott says, i n Rationalism i n
Politics , tha t
i n a conversation,... the participant s are not engaged i n an
enquiry or a debate; there i s no Truth t o be discovered, no
proposition s to be affirmed , no conclusions sought,...(44)
we can see how Rorty applies thi s characterisatio n of the sense of a
conversation t o philosophy. For i t fit s Rorty's conception of
philosophy as a disciplin e which cannot reveal t o us any conclusive
foundational Truths.
This discussion of the relationshi p between Rorty and Oakeshott
i s important, I think , because i t has significanc e fo r our understanding
of Rorty's conception of the place of ideology i n politica l life . Where
Rdrty talk s of the form of an ideologica l understanding, he explicitl y
identifie s himself wit h the 'end-of-ideology' theorist s whose views
are, perhaps, most clearl y expressed by the American Daniel Bell . The
centra l contention of these theorist s i s tha t ideology i s the product
of sociologica l conflict , and that , once a cultura l consensus i s
achieved, ideology becomes irrelevan t t o the conduct of politica l
affairs , and has no place i n politica l life . (For these theorists , such
a conditio n had been reached i n the North American society of the
1950's.)
However, i t appears plausibl e t o suggest tha t Rorty's own adoption
of thi s sociologica l thesi s i s coupled wit h the acceptance of
Oakeshott's kin d of characterisatio n of modern ideologica l
understandings as misconceived systems of 'rationalist ' belief . For
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Rorty assumes, i n a manner which i s a t leas t simila r t o Oakeshott, tha t
any ideologica l argument i s a defective form of understanding which
stems from some (false ) rationalis t view of human nature, and which
mistakenly attempts t o put it s theoretica l understanding int o practice .
Thus we fin d Rorty arguing tha t modern ideology i s constitutiv e of, and
belongs to , tha t 'enlightened' mode of thought which imagines tha t
theory can ris e above the conditiona l assumptions of it s own time and
place, the better t o explain or reform them. Put another way, Rorty
identifie s a certai n kin d of theoretica l explanation i n which there i s a
failur e t o consider the conditiona l or temporal situatio n i n which the
theory i s set; and he assumes tha t thi s feature marks out thi s kin d of
theory as being ideologica l i n character. This i s the sense i n which
we are t o classif y the Kantian meta-narrative (wit h it s nation of an
ahistorica l rationalit y featurin g so centrall y withi n it s assumptions)
as being a major ideologica l explanation of the moral and politica l
world.
For Rorty, then, ideologies are t o be understood as misconceived
rationalis t theoretica l explanations, and they have t o be abandoned. In
particular , Rorty insist s tha t the ideologica l liberalis m of the Kantian
traditio n has t o be discarded by our own intellectua l culture. But how
i s thi s practicall y possible? Rorty bases hi s hope upon the
assumption, which i s shared by the 'end-of-ideology' school, tha t the
existin g traditio n of the North Atlanti c liberal-democracies has
generated, or at leas t could generate, a moral consensus of collectiv e
identit y which makes the theoretica l postures of any ideologica l view
irrelevant . Thus he envisages
a society which encourages the 'end of ideology'.... which takes
reflectiv e equilibriu m as the only method needed i n discussing
socia l policy . Vhen such a society deliberates, when i t collect s
t he principle s and intuition s t o be brought int o equilibrium , i t
wil l tend t o discard those drawn from philosophica l accounts of
t he self , or of rationality . (45)
Rorty, then, contends tha t i n the 'postmodern culture ' which he
envisages, al l conflictin g and controversia l philosophical , theoretica l
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or ideologica l understandings of Ban wil l be abandoned; and what wil l
remain i s a historica l narrativ e account of our communal identit y which
relate s t o our particula r moral consensus or practice , and which
enables us t o achieve a reflectiv e equilibriu m tha t secures fo r us nonconflictin g practica l conduct. I t i s t o suggest, i n particular , tha t the
philosophical / theoretical / ideologica l conception of the sel f which i s
expressed by the Kantian liberal s should be replaced by the notion of
communal identit y which i s expressed by the 'postmodernist bourgeois
liberals' .
I n saying this , Rorty i s making the general assumption tha t any
ideologica l conflic t withi n a traditio n of thought (eg. communism) i s
ultimatel y the resul t of difference s i n the interpretation s of the
orthodox philosophica l or theoretica l understanding of man which
underpins tha t ideologica l tradition . One way t o avoid thi s ideologica l
conflic t i s t o ignore any theoretica l controversy, and, fo r Rorty, the
achievement of thi s task i s possible withi n the socia l democratic
tradition . For he write s tha t 'one advantage we socia l democrats have
always had over the radical s i s tha t we have traditionall y worried less
about ideologica l purity , and have relie d on what Rawls call s
"overlapping consensus" '. (46) I t i s thi s fac t which, Rorty argues,
enables socia l democrats t o concentrate upon the pragmatically
experimental considerations i n politics , as distinc t from the
theoreticall y inflexibl e ones. I t i s t o suggest tha t i t i s possible
withi n the socia l democratic traditio n t o avoid any ideologica l or
philosophica l conflic t because tha t traditio n can draw upon, i n a
pragmatic sense, the moral consensus which exist s i n actual socia l
democratic practices,
His claim, then, i s tha t because socia l democrats tend t o agree
about thei r practica l objectives, thi s enables them t o ignore any
theoretica l controversy which may hamper them. But a t present thi s
possibilit y i s not being full y realise d because there remains a
theoretica l dispute between the 'Kantians' and others which ought t o be
abandoned. I t i s thi s dispute which, fo r Rorty, articulate s the crisi s
withi n liberalism ; and i t i s a dispute which can only be avoided once
i t i s recognised tha t there i s nothing which can be theoreticall y
resolved by it . Rather, what i s needed, he claims, i s tha t socia l
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democrats (includin g himself) concentrate upon the practica l politica l
issues tha t unite the libera l or socia l democratic tradition . Because,
he says, 'we al l are working fo r a utopia i n which equal access t o a
fre e press, a free judiciary , and fre e universities ' (47) i s sought
after , i t follow s tha t 'differences i n philosophica l tast e between us
socia l democrats can easil y be deferred unti l we have come a good deal
closer t o tha t utopia' (48).
Rorty's suggestions concerning the possibilit y of unit y withi n the
socia l democratic traditio n appears plausible enough as an empirica l
claim about practica l politica l conduct. For i t does seem t o be the case
tha t socia l democrats tend t o be able t o co-operate wit h each other i n
t he achievement of practica l ends i n a fa r more cohesive fashion than,
f o r example, Marxists, whose abilit y t o co-operate i n practica l
politica l matters i s noticabl y more restricte d due t o thei r paying
obsessive attentio n t o the intricat e detail s of thei r various
theoretica l positions . However, as a conceptual poin t about the
character of socia l democratic thought, i t i s t o be questioned; fo r i t
amounts t o the suggestion tha t there i s something intrinsi c t o the
socia l democratic traditio n which enables i t t o avoid such ruptures.
For Rorty assumes, as we have seen, tha t although socia l democratic
thought of the past has falle n int o the tra p of engaging i n
theoretica l disputes which have generated ideologica l conflicts , i t
remains possible fo r the socia l democratic traditio n t o transcend tha t
ideologica l or theoretica l conflic t and recognise it s irrelevance t o the
world of practica l politica l life .
The reason why thi s conceptual poin t i s mistaken, I suggest, i s
because i t follow s from a relate d number of erroneous assumptions.
Firstly , i t rest s upon a mistaken conception of ideology as a kin d of
theoretica l understanding which i s put int o practice . This conception
fail s t o capture, I suggest, the nature of the form of an ideologica l
understanding. For an ideologica l understanding constitutes , a t bottom,
an ethica l portraya l of idea l moral relationships ; and i t i s thi s idea l
portraya l which always stands prio r t o any particula r theoretica l or
philosophica l expression of it s sense. For example, the evaluative
pictur e of the relationshi p between the 'proletariat ' and the
'bourgeoisie', as presented i n Marxist thought, stands logicall y prio r
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t o , and i s not synonomous with , it s elaborate theoretica l expression i n
t he writing s of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Luxemburg and so on. Ah ideologica l
understanding, therefore, primarily constitute s an ethical , not a
theoretical , achievement. The fac t tha t committed adherents t o an
ideologica l portraya l tend t o be immune t o any indicatio n of the
theoretica l and practica l implausibilit y of thei r argument suggests, not
tha t they have faile d t o see the theoretica l error s of thei r position ,
b ut tha t such an indicatio n of erro r is , i n the ethica l sense,
irrelevant t o thei r commitment t o the understanding.
This leads t o the poin t tha t a commitment t o the ethica l
portraya l tha t constitute s an 'ideology' i s sustainable independently
from any refutatio n of the theoretica l arguments employed t o support
i t . Further, an ideologica l view, understood as being primaril y ethical ,
does not generate any technica l knowledge which can be put int o
practic e i n the world. Rather, i t portray s how committed adherents
ought t o conceive of themselves: i t does not specify i n any technica l
detai l 'what i s t o be done'.
The point , then, i s tha t although ideologist s employ theoretica l
arguments and make practica l recommendations fo r politica l actions,
such theories and prescription s are not centra l t o thei r ideologica l
understanding. Therefore, although Rorty i s correc t t o observe tha t
certai n ideologies present themselves as temporally non-specific and
ahistoriea l theories, these 'rationalist ' features are not, as he
assumes, what i s essentia l t o the form of al l ideologica l expressions
of ethica l conviction . Rather, these features are, as i t were, the
theoretica l baggage which i s carrie d by a traditio n of ideologica l
thought. In equating 'ideology' wit h (rationalist ) theory Rorty i s
failin g t o appreciate tha t the ethica l dimension of an ideologica l
convictio n constitute s the form of the understanding, and i s prio r to ,
and distinguishabl e from, it s theoretica l expression.
This i s not, I think , merely t o quibble wit h Rorty over the issue
of what i s the correc t verbal definitio n of the term 'ideology'. Rather,
i t has significanc e fo r our understanding of the place of ideology i n
politica l life , and this , i n turn , relate s t o our assessment Df Rorty's
own politica l arguments and moral hopes. For i t leads t o the second,
correlativ e poin t tha t Rorty's own commitment t o the ideals and
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'utopian vision ' of socia l democracy i s itsel f constitutiv e of an
ideologica l understanding. That is , hi s ethica l commitment t o these
ideal s i s not, as he assumes, made any the less ideologica l because
they are not purported t o be based upon any theoretica l foundations.
This i s because, as we have seen, Rorty's assumption tha t what counts
as 'ideology' i s rationalis t theoretica l understanding i s mistaken.
Rather, i n expressing a commitment t o a recognisably socia l democratic
ethica l portrayal , Rorty i s making an ideologica l assumption about the
moral and politica l world.
Let us put thi s another way. Rorty i s quite correct , I think , t o
argue tha t our ethica l conviction s can never be justified , but only
expressed, by a theoretica l or philosophica l argument: and he i s
likewis e quit e correc t t o poin t t o the priorit y of our values (eg.
democracy) over thei r philosophica l articulation . However, he i s wrong
t o assume tha t the ethica l conviction s of the 'postmodernist bourgeois
liberal ' are non-ideological i n character because they are not purported
t o be based on theoretica l foundations. The way i n which the moral
belief s of the 'postmodernist bourgeois liberal ' are expressed i s
certainl y different from the way i n which, fo r example, the belief s of
t he 'Kantian liberal ' are expressed, but the libera l belief s which are
shared by both the 'postmodernist bourgeois liberal ' and the 'Kantian
liberal ' take the same form, and they are ideologica l i n character.
The point , then, i s tha t Rorty, lik e any other ideologist , does
believe i n a coherent body of ethica l and politica l beliefs , and these
belief s take the form of an idea l portraya l of the moral and politica l
relationship s between persons. Further, he seeks t o give thi s presumed
portraya l a convincing and coherent philosophica l expression. He
believes tha t the socia l democratic ideals which he i s committed t o
are most suitabl y articulate d withi n the 'Deweyian pragmatist'
philosophica l tradition ; a traditio n which seeks t o avoid any unmerited
metaphysical presuppositions i n it s argument.
I t i s worth notin g tha t a similarl y anti-metaphysical articulatio n
of libera l values was presented by the 'Cold War Liberals ' i n the
1950's. Therefore, we can see a sense i n which Bernstein i s correc t t o
contend tha t Rorty's claim t o have pointed up the irrelevance of any
continued use of the out-worn philsophica l (notably rationalist )
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vocabularies of the past t o justif y our own libera l conviction s i s
itsel f 'littl e more than an ideologica l apologia fo r an old-fashioned
versio n of cold war liberalis m dressed up i n a fashionable 'postmodern' discourse', (49)
What conclusions, then, can be drawn from thi s discussion of
Rorty's assessment of the futur e of liberalism ? Firstly , we can agree
wit h Rorty tha t the kin d of 'philosophical liberalism * which has been
advanced withi n the 'Kantian rationalist ' traditio n rest s upon a
theoreticall y impoverished conception of the self , and i t i s t o be
rejected on philosophica l grounds alone. Secondly, we can agree wit h
Rorty tha t there are good reasons t o suggest tha t the theoretica l
disputes conducted withi n the libera l traditio n of discourse are
irrelevan t t o the pragmatic issue of how liberal s can sustain thei r
commitment to thei r moral ideals i n the future. For we can acknowledge
Rorty's poin t tha t our politica l belief s are prio r to, and not dependent
upon, thei r theoretica l expression.
However, i t has been argued tha t Rorty has faile d t o provide a
correc t account of the form of an ideologica l understanding, and, as a
result , he has faile d t o locate the centra l place tha t ideology has i n
politica l life . Because Rorty's own ethica l conviction s are ideologica l
i n character, i t follow s tha t the possible success of the 'postmodernist bourgeois liberals ' i n unitin g the intellectua l community of
liberal s would itsel f be an ideologica l achievement. Likewise, the
abandonment of the metaphysical presuppositions of the Kantian
theorist s would be done on ideologica l grounds, i n the sense tha t the
reasons fo r doing so would be contingentl y relate d t o the practica l
issue as t o whether the (philosophicall y receptive) citizen s of the
Western democracies could, or could not, continue t o sustain thei r
libera l commitments i n terms of Kantian theoretica l justifications .
The poin t i s tha t Rorty, by incorrectl y marginalisin g ideology as
a defective form of theoretica l understanding, underestimates it s
centralit y i n past, present, and more importantly , futur e libera l or
socia l democratic politica l life . For i t i s the endurance of the
ethica l ideals of the libera l view which determines the futur e of
libera l politica l institutions , and the 'moral consensus' which he
wishes t o draw upon i s itsel f underpinned by tha t ideologica l belief .
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Without sustainin g a belie f i n these ideals , the practica l poin t of
defending these institution s would become unintelligible . Ideology i s
not, as Rorty assumes, something tha t can be transcended by the
pragmatically minded 'postmodernist bourgeois liberals' ; i t is , rather ,
something which i s centra l t o thei r task of mapping out the futur e
directio n of the defence of libera l theory and practice .
The question becomes, then, whether the practica l task of
successfully achieving a futur e defence of liberalis m i s likel y t o be
possible, Haclntyre, as we shal l see later , think s not. He does so
because he believes tha t non-cognitivism (or 'emotivism') has had a
disruptiv e theoretica l and practica l impact on our Western libera l
democratic societies : an impact the consequences of which Rorty has
overlooked. Before considering thi s issue though, we shal l examine the
arguments of Rawls.