Rawls advises H. P. Grice to reconstruct Thrasymachus's argument in "Politeia" -- after quoting his "Personal Identity"

 i s worth notin g i n the context of thi s discussion of the futur e of liberalis m tha t John Rawls has attempted t o address the type of objection which theorist s such as Dunn and Rorty have levelle d against him. For Rawls has sought t o deny the charge tha t hi s approach i s too abstract , and fail s t o relat e t o the specifi c practica l realitie s of politica l lif e i n the Western libera l democratic societies . Indeed, Rawls has gone so fa r as t o offe r a defence of the libera l democratic constitutiona l regimes which resembles i n many strikin g ways the approaches suggested by Dunn and Rorty. In an articl e entitle d 'Justice as Fairness: Politica l not Metaphysical' (1985), Rawls argues tha t hi s analysi s of justic e does not depend upon any metaphysical or philosophica l claims about 'universal truth ' or the 'essential nature and identit y of persons'. (1) Rather, he insist s tha t hi s conception of justic e i s 'public' or 'political ' i n character, and rest s upon the basic structur e of the 'intuitiv e ideas' which actuall y obtain withi n the practices or cultura l tradition s of constitutiona l democratic regimes. This insistence may strik e us as being rathe r Ddd because i t has become commonplace t o understand Rawls' argument as being explicitl y philosophica l i n character, and stemming from a recognisably Kantian notion of the self . Most critic s have interprete d hi s major work A. Theory of Justice (1972) along these lines . Perhaps, though, we should give Rawls the benefit of the doubt. For whatever the merits of suggesting tha t Rawls' presentation i n 'Justice as Fairness; Politica l not Metaphysical' eithe r constitute s a radica l change of view, or merely amounts t o a clarificatio n of themes not full y articulate d i n earlie r writings , i t i s clear tha t Rawls' lates t argument must severely undermine both Dunn's and Rorty's previous classification s of Rawls withi n the 'Utopian Liberalism' and 'philosophical liberalism ' tradition s respectively. I t i s t o dismantle thei r centra l contention tha t Rawls' enterpris e rest s upon an erroneous philosophica l conception of the free, rationa l individua l as the Kantian subject, Therefore i t i s of interes t t o examine Rawls' positio n i n some detail . - 188 - Rawls says tha t i t i s hi s purpose t o avoid, as fa r as possible, any controversia l metaphysical or philosophica l claims the validit y of which stands independently from the 'public' conception of justic e which he seeks t o defend. Most notably, he wishes t o distinguis h hi s variet y of liberalis m as a 'politica l doctrine ' from those 'comprehensive moral conceptions' of the good which sprin g from both t he 'teleological ' traditio n of libera l thought (which seeks to establis h the metaphysical validit y of the 'One Rational Good'), and t he liberalism s of Kant and Mil l (which are grounded upon 'the moral ideals of autonomy and individuality') . He claims tha t these varietie s of liberalism , based as they are upon certai n metaphysical claims about the nature of the 'good' and the essentia l nature and identit y of persons, are theoreticall y contestable, and are, as such, unable t o provide the necessary practica l justificatio n fo r our actual democratic practices. Echoing Berlin , Rawls start s from the observation tha t i t i s an incontestable socia l fac t tha t our differin g conceptions of the 'good* are conflictin g and even incommensurable, and stem from our adherence t o differen t moral and religiou s doctrines. I t i s these adherences which generate ethica l disagreements the nature of which may be theoreticall y irresolvable . Further, he suggests, these theoretica l disputes cannot be resolved politically. Therefore, he states tha t 'philosophy as the search fo r trut h about an independent metaphysical and moral order', albei t important i n itself , 'cannot... provide a workable and shared basis fo r a politica l conception of justic e i n a democratic society'. (2) For Rawls, therefore, the limit s of philosophy are such tha t no practical resolutio n of actual moral disputes i n society can necessarily follo w from it . Any effor t t o provide a philosophica l theory which essays t o place on a fir m metaphysical basis, and theoreticall y resolve, our moral disputes, may fail ; and, more importantly , no such effor t can possibly secure practica l moral agreement. How, then, are we t o secure agreement i n socia l life ? Rawls' contention i s tha t we must 'look tD our publi c politica l cultur e itself.. . as the shared fund of implicitl y recognised basic ideas and - 189 - principles' . (3) I t i s these basic ideas and principle s which provide our 'overlapping consensus' of shared 'considered convictions ' : 'a consensus tha t includes al l the opposing philosophica l and religiou s doctrines likel y t o persis t and t o gain adherents i n a more or less jus t constitutiona l democratic society'. (4) Rawls' hope i s t o show how the principle s of 'justice as fairness ' are t o be found withi n our constitutiona l democratic societies . In short , he wishes t o demonstrate how these principle s are deeply held convictions withi n our Western politica l culture. He restates the two principle s of 'justice as fairness ' as: 1. Each person has an equal righ t t o a full y adequate scheme of equal basic right s and liberties , which scheme i s compatible wit h a simila r scheme fo r all . 2. Social and economic inequalitie s are t o satisf y two conditions: first , they must be attached t o office s and position s open t o al l under conditions of fai r equality of opportunity; and second, they must be t o the greatest benefi t of the least advantaged members of society. (5) These principles , Rawls maintains, are based on a conception of 'society as a fai r system of co-operation between free and equal persons'. (6) They constitute , he says, 'one of the basic intuitiv e ideas which... (is).. . implici t i n the public cultur e of a democratic society'. (7) They also relate , he says, t o another basic intuitiv e idea: tha t of the concept of the person as free and equal. Rawls goes on t o specify thi s conception of the free and equal person i n terms of three interrelate d notions. Firstly , citizen s are free i n the sense tha t 'they conceive of themselves and of one other as having the moral power t o have a conception of the good' (8), and they recognise each other t o be 'capable of revisin g and changing thi s conception on reasonable and rationa l grounds, and they may do thi s i f they so desire*. (9) What follow s from this , he claims, i s the recognitio n tha t - 190 - as free persons, citizen s claim the righ t t o view thei r persons as independent from and as not identifie d wit h any particula r conception of the good. Given thei r moral power t o form, and revise, and rationall y t o pursue a conception of the good, thei r public identity as free persons i s not affecte d by changes over time i n thei r conception of the good. (10) Rawls' suggestion, therefore, i s tha t citizen s of a democratic regime have a publi c identit y as free persons - 'an identit y as a matter of basic law* - which i s sustained whatever thei r particula r 'non-public' identit y or conception of the good. Secondly, he argues, these free and equal citizen s regard themselves as self-originatin g sources of vali d claims. They thin k thei r claims have weight apart from being derived from duties or obligation s specifie d by the politica l conception of justice , fo r example, from duties and obligation s owed t o society. (11) Thirdly , he says tha t these citizen s are 'capable of takin g responsibilit y fo r thei r ends' i n tha t they are 'capable of adjusting thei r aims and aspiration s i n the ligh t of what they can reasonably expect t o provide for'. (12). I t i s not our major concern t o assess i n any detai l the plausibilit y of Rawls' claim tha t hi s conception of 'justice as fairness ' i s something which i s implicitl y adopted as a basic cultura l idea which relate s t o the actual conceptions of citizen s i n a democratic regime: citizen s who 'conceive of themselves as free' i n t he three respects outline d above. (13) However, one poin t may be made. I t i s tha t when Rawls makes the distinctio n between the 'nonpublic' and the 'public' identit y of the person i n a democratic society, he appears t o want t o assert tha t however important and comprehensive i n shaping 'a persons way of life ' certai n particula r conviction s about a conception of the good may be, these conviction s are always distinguishabl e from the publi c identit y of a free and equal citizen . This i s certainl y tru e of an ideologicall y committed libera l democrat, - 191 - who believes i n the notions of right s and civi l laws protectin g free citizen s and allowing them tolerantl y t o express differen t and conflictin g views i n the privat e sphere of life . However, thi s i s clearl y not so of all persons who are located i n a democratic society. A committed Marxist, fo r example, find s himself as a matter of contingent historica l fac t livin g i n a democratic society; but there i s no ideologica l sense i n which he identifie s himself as a 'law abiding publi c citizen ' i n the Rawlsian manner, and there i s no ideologica l sense i n which he feel s a commitment t o the conception of himself as 'free' i n the libera l view described by Rawls. Rather, hi s Marxist politica l conviction s serve t o shape hi s lif e i n a way which makes the Rawlsian libera l democratic distinctio n between publi c and non-public identitie s irrelevan t t o him. Therefore, i t looks as though i t simply i s not true , as Rawls appears t o suggest, tha t al l people i n the libera l democratic regimes acknowledge a notion of freedom which rest s upon a distinctio n between the public and the non-public spheres of life . I t may be suggested tha t thi s type of person (fo r example, a Marxist) does not form par t of what Rawls call s the 'overlapping consensus' of rationa l belie f and behaviour, and therefore does not qualify , on 'rational ' grounds, as a member of tha t socia l culture. But t o say thi s i s merely to beg the question. For i t rest s fundamentally upon the assumption tha t the libera l democratic conception of a person as a 'free citizen ' i s i n some sense more 'rational ' and 'truer' than others. This i s not so because the notions of rationalit y and truth , as relate d t o ideologica l understandings, are internal t o those belie f systems, and therefore i t follow s tha t there are no externa l criteri a by which t o judge tha t one ideologica l view i s better than another. Yet i t appears tha t Rawls' analysi s does res t upon an assumption of thi s kind. The point , then, i s tha t Rawls' contention tha t the two principle s of 'justice as fairness ' are reflecte d i n the convictions of t he citizen s of the libera l democratic regime cannot simply be an empirica l descriptio n alone. Rather, i t must res t upon an ideologica l assumption tha t the libera l democratic man is , qua citizen , rationall y - 192 - superio r t o other s because he conceive s o f himsel f as free , and recognise s th e distinctio n between a publi c and non-publi c identity . Leavin g thi s poin t aside , we can now tur n t o anothe r issue ; tha t i s , th e examinatio n o f th e natur e o f Raw Is ' procedur e fo r justifyin g libera l democrati c practices . Hi s argument, restated , i s tha t 'the conceptio n o f citizen s as fre e and equa l person s need no t involve.... question s o f philosophica l psycholog y or a metaphysica l doctrin e o f t h e natur e o f th e self.. . (because)... no politica l view tha t depends on thes e deep and unresolve d matter s can serv e as a publi c conceptio n of justic e i n a constitutiona l democrati c state ' (14) . How, i n proceedin g i n thi s manner, and i n attemptin g t o distanc e himsel f fro m any unresolve d metaphysica l matter s tha t include s any attachmen t t o th e Kantia n notio n o f th e universal , ahistorica l rationa l self , Rawls certainl y appears t o have dented th e claim s o f thos e who had previousl y sough t t o characteris e him as a Kantia n 'contractarian ' theorist , i n shar p contras t t o th e 'communitarian' theorists . Rort y has himsel f acknowledged this , and he now interpret s Rawls' enterpris e t o be close r t o th e historicis t strai n i n Hegel and Dewey rathe r tha n th e transcendenta l foundationalis t approach tha t i s eviden t i n Kant. As distinc t fro m hi s characterisatio n o f Rawls' positio n i n 'Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism' , i n 'The Priorit y of Democracy t o Philosophy ' Eort y argues tha t Rawls i s no t committe d t o a fals e Kantia n theor y o f th e self , o r i s inten t on providin g some philosophica l justificatio n fo r liberal-democracy . Rather, he maintain s tha t Rawls i s seekin g t o giv e an 'articulation ' (i n term s o f 'justic e as fairness' ) t o th e intuitions , shared belief s and settle d habit s o f thos e who identif y themselve s wit h th e historica l communities committe d t o libera l constitutiona l democracy. For Rorty , then , Rawls' enterpris e i s 'pragmatic1 , no t 'philosophical ' i n character . We can agree tha t Rorty's re-interpretatio n o f Rawls i s plausibl e enough when we conside r how Rawls define s th e limit s o f philosophica l justificatio n and th e sense o f objectivit y i n th e way whic h i s closel y aki n t o Rorty . For Rawls argues tha t he seeks t o 'avoid th e problem o f trut h and th e controvers y between realis m and subjectivis m about th e statu s o f mora l and politica l values'; and he insist s tha t hi s for m o f argument 'neithe r assert s o r denies thes e - 193 - doctrines' . (15) Kather, he says tha t bi s argument 'recasts idea s fro m t h e traditio n of th e socia l contrac t t o achiev e a practicabl e conceptio n o f objectivit y and justificatio n founded on publi c agreement i n judgement on due reflection' . (16) Thus, fo r Rawls, th e philosophica l controvers y about th e statu s o f value , althoug h important , i s no t relevan t t o th e tas k i n hand, whic h i s th e practica l justificatio n of libera l democrati c practices . F or such practica l justificatio n amounts t o th e articulation , i n a precis e conceptua l manner, o f thos e intuitiv e idea s whic h ar e objectiv e i n th e pragmati c sense o f bein g 'believed i n ' by thos e who a r e committe d t o th e value s inheren t i n libera l democrati c practices . Such an articulatio n involve s th e adaptatio n o f th e notio n o f a 'socia l contract ' i n th e 'origina l position' . But thi s notio n onl y serve s as a 'device o f representation ' whic h makes cleare r our actua l conviction s i n th e libera l democrati c world . I t i s not , fo r Rawls, t o be understoo d as a philosophica l conceptio n whic h attempt s t o ground or metaphysicall y justif y thes e beliefs : rather , i t merely serve s as an analytica l too l which bes t articulate s thes e beliefs . For Rawls, then , h i s argument i s no t t o be understoo d as bein g 'foundational' . Ve can therefor e see how Rort y i s abl e t o interpre t Rawls' enterpris e as an attemp t t o elaborat e upon certai n 'conceptual mechanisms' or 'theories ' which fi t i n with , or comport with , our actua l politica l intuitions ; rathe r tha n attemp t t o justif y o r base them upon a Kantia n metaphysica l theory . However, Rawls' argument run s int o th e same difficult y whic h we identifie d wit h Rorty's enterprise . For th e problem i s tha t neithe r Rawls no r Rort y adequatel y conside r th e plac e o f ideolog y i n thei r analysis . Tha t is , i n attemptin g t o offe r a 'pragmatic', rathe r tha n a 'philosophical ' justificatio n o f libera l democrati c politica l life , bot h Rawls and Rort y assume some sor t of ideologica l conceptio n o f th e perso n and hi s relatio n t o th e ethica l and politica l world , I n th e case o f Rawls, hi s notio n o f citizen s conceivin g o f themselve s as havin g a 'non-public' identity , and 'free and equal' statu s wit h others , presumes a libera l ideologica l conceptio n o f th e sel f as possessin g th e 'moral power', 'self-origination ' and 'responsibility ' necessary t o be capabl e of rationall y choosin g thos e conception s o f th e good which reflec t - 194 - individuall y specifiabl e desires , wants and needs. Thi s conceptio n may indeed avoi d any explicitl y Kantia n association , bu t i t remain s ideologica l nonetheless . Tha t is , i t i s a conceptio n o f idea l mora l and politica l relationship s between persons, and i t i s a t th e roo t o f Bawls' analysis . As such, i t i s thi s presumed ideologica l view which i s t h e basi s of , and generates , Rawls' attemp t t o provid e a practica l justificatio n o f libera l democrati c societies , For withou t thi s presumed ideologica l view, ther e would be no (moral ) poin t i n Rawls undertakin g thi s enterprise . Leavin g thi s poin t aside , however, a crucia l issu e remain s t o be discussed . I t i s whether any 'pragmatic' justificatio n o f th e belief s and convention s o f th e libera l democrati c societie s i s likel y t o be successful , a t bot h a theoretica l and practica l level , i n maintainin g a futur e commitment t o them. Thi s issu e i s addressed by Maclntyre , who suggest s tha t th e influenc e o f non-cognitivis m as a correc t theor y o f use i s such tha t liberalis m canno t hope t o maintai n it s appeal i n th e future .