H. P. Grice is slightly inspired by MacIntyre

Haclntyre' s argument agains t liberalism , as expressed most notabl y i n Afte r Virtu e and variou s subsequent articles , constitute s a seriou s challeng e t o any attempte d contemporar y defence o f libera l democrati c mora l and politica l practice , such as tha t made by Dunn, Rort y and Rawls. For i t amounts t o th e clai m that , a t bot h th e theoretica l and practica l level s o f justification , any such attemp t i s doomed t o failure . Maclntyre' s argument opens wit h an observatio n about th e characte r o f contemporary mora l experience . Thi s experienc e possesses, he says, thre e centra l characteristi c features . Firstly , th e riva l arguments endorsed by people i n mora l debate and disagreemen t appear t o be conceptually incommensurable: tha t is , each argument i s internall y logicall y vali d - th e conclusion s reached withi n them logicall y follo w fro m certai n premises - bu t each star t fro m premise s employin g quit e differen t normativ e and evaluativ e concepts. What follow s fro m this , Maclntyr e observes, i s tha t ther e exist s i n our societ y 'DD establishe d way o f decidin g between thes e claims' , and 'the invocatio n o f one premis e agains t anothe r becomes a matte r o f pure assertio n and counter-assertion. ' (1) Put anothe r way, mora l disagreemen t i s logicall y interminabl e because ther e ar e no good reasons o r impersona l rationa l criteri a availabl e by whic h t o settl e a publi c argument. Thi s fac t about contemporar y mora l lif e is , fo r Maclntyre , o f th e utmos t importance . He write s tha t i f we possess no unassailabl e criteria , no se t o f compellin g reasons by means o f whic h we may convinc e our opponents, i t follow s tha t i n th e proces s o f making up our own minds we have made no appeal t o such criteri a o r such reasons. I f I lac k any good reasons t o invok e agains t you, i t must seem tha t I lac k any good reasons. Hence i t seems tha t underlyin g my own positio n - 196 - ther e must be some non-rational decision to adopt that position. Correspondin g t o th e interminabilit y o f publi c argument ther e i s a t leas t th e appearance of a disquietin g private arbitrariness. ( 2) Maclntyr e explain s tha t thi s firs t characteristi c o f modern ethica l arguments lead s one t o suggest tha t 'there i s nothin g t o such contemporar y disagreement s bu t a clas h o f antagonisti c wills , each wil l determine d by some se t o f arbitrar y choice s o f it s own'. (3) However, Maclntyr e notes , i t i s a paradoxica l feature , and a second characteristi c o f such arguments, tha t the y clai m t o be impersona l rationa l arguments, That is , the y ar e arguments whic h purpor t t o appeal t o 'objectiv e standards ' o r externa l criteri a th e allege d existenc e o f whic h stand s independent fro m th e preference s o r attitude s of th e speaker o r hearer . Such an appeal, as a thir d characteristi c o f modern ethica l discourse , i s couched i n a conceptua l vocabular y which employs such notion s as 'rights' , 'duties', 'justice' , 'utility ' and 'universalisability 1 . A conceptua l vocabulary , tha t is , which i s familia r t o th e libera l democrati c traditio n of discourse , Maclntyre' s centra l purpose i s t o 'construc t a tru e historica l narrative ' whic h makes clea r how i t came about tha t contemporary mora l discours e acquire d thi s paradoxica l nature . He wants t o show how 'the characteristic s o f our own mora l arguments' developed i n thi s way, and how we ar e t o explai n 'most notabl y th e fac t tha t we simultaneousl y and inconsistentl y trea t mora l argument as an exercis e o f our rationa l powers and as mere expressiv e assertion' . (4) F or Maclntyre , such an explanatio n relie s upon an appreciatio n o f t h e impac t o f th e emotiv e theor y o f ethic s upon th e publi c mora l consciousnes s o f th e Western world . For i t wil l be recalle d tha t emotivis m amounts t o th e theoretica l clai m tha t al l ethica l discourse , whatever th e historica l and socia l contex t o f it s articulation , amounts t o th e expressio n o f persona l feeling s whic h can i n no sense be rationall y determine d o r resolved . Thi s thesi s has, fo r Maclntyre , whatever it s plausibility , shaped th e practica l use o f contemporary mora l debate. He insists , we recall , tha t 'to a larg e degree people now think , tal k and ac t as if emotivis m were true. ' (5) And he - 197 - continue s tha t 'the specifi c characte r o f th e modern age' i s emotivis t because 'emotivism has become embodied i n our culture ' and has determine d 'a wide range of our concept s and modes o f behaviour', such tha t 'our explicitl y mora l debates and judgements presuppose th e trut h o f emotivism , i f no t a t th e leve l o f self-consciou s theorising , a t leas t i n everyda y practice' . (6) Maclntyre' s sociologica l point , then , i s tha t t h e modern mora l agent i s t o be understoo d as an 'emotive man' i n th e sense tha t hi s practica l mora l activit y amounts t o th e assertio n o f h i s own arbitraril y chosen principle s of conduct whic h expres s hi s own persona l feelings . How i s i t then , we may ask, tha t contemporar y mora l debate retain s it s superficia l appearance o f appealin g t o objectiv e rationa l standards ? MacTntyre explain s thi s phenomenon i n term s o f a historica l narrative . He argues tha t th e emotivis t theor y constitute s th e culminatio n o f th e failur e o f th e Enlightenmen t project : an enterpris e whic h sough t t o provid e some se t o f rationa l criteri a by whic h t o justif y our ethica l belief s and mora l practices . But thi s project , he argues, failed . Neithe r Hume no r Kant, who were th e major philosophica l figure s o f th e Enlightenmen t period , were successfu l i n th e tas k o f placin g mora l belief s and practice s upon soli d ground. Further , Maclntyr e posit s tha t th e reason why th e Enlightenmen t projec t was bound t o fai l i s tha t i t was grounded upon certai n premise s relatin g t o th e natio n o f th e sel f which coul d never have secured th e necessary foundation s fo r mora l justification . Emativis m is , fo r Maclntyre , th e logica l culminatio n o f thi s faile d enterprise . I t i s itsel f par t o f th e Enlightenmen t tradition , drawin g most heavil y fro m Hume, and it s contributio n t o tha t traditio n i s shown i n th e fac t tha t i t makes clea r tha t no rationa l justificatio n fo r mora l belie f and practic e i n th e modern worl d can possibl y be give n withi n t h e conceptua l apparatu s o f th e Enlightenmen t project . Tha t is , emotivis m constitute s th e end-poin t o f a traditio n o f philosophica l though t whic h was fundamentall y flawe d i n it s inceptio n because i t was based upon a fals e conceptio n o f th e self ; a sel f which , allegedly , stand s apar t fro m whatever intersectio n o f socia l role s we happen t o occupy. - 198 - I t wil l be recalle d tha t th e emotivis t theor y o f ethic s receive d i t s greates t systemati c expressio n and attentio n i n th e 1930's t o mid - 1940's by such writer s as Ayer, Stevenson and Duncan-Jones. As an analysi s o f th e meaning o f ethica l discourse , i t quickl y became unfashionabl e and was rapidl y dismisse d as inadequat e withi n philosophica l circles . However, Maclntyr e argues, th e 'cultura l power' o f emotivis m as a 'theory o f use' (rathe r tha n a 'theory o f meaning') remain s significan t because i t has retaine d it s dominance i n shapin g t h e practica l mora l consciousnes s o f th e Western world . Also , a t th e theoretica l level , Maclntyr e say s tha t emotivis m di d no t di e and i t i s importan t t o not e how ofte n i n widel y differen t modern philosophica l context s somethin g ver y lik e emotivism's attempte d reductio n o f moralit y t o persona l preferenc e continuall y recur s i n th e writing s o f thos e who do no t thin k o f themselve s as emotivists . (7) F or example, R.M. Hare introduce d th e notio n o f 'universalisability ' as a necessar y logica l principl e fo r mora l judgement by whic h t o plac e mora l reasonin g on a fir m footing . However, i n so doing , Hare acknowledged t h e basi c emotivis t poin t tha t afte r an appea l t o universa l standard s h ad been given , no furthe r rationa l justificatio n coul d be provided . Therefore , as Maclntyr e remarks : The terminu s of justificatio n i s thu s always , on thi s view, a no t furthe r t o be justifie d choice , a choic e unguided by criteria . Each individua l implicitl y o r explicitl y has t o adop t hi s o r he r firs t principle s on th e basi s o f such a choice . The utteranc e o f any universa l principl e i s i n th e end an expressio n o f th e preference s o f an individua l wil l and fo r tha t wil l it s principle s have and c an have onl y such authorit y as i t chooses t o confe r upon them by adoptin g them. Thus emotivis m has no t been lef t ver y fa r behin d afte r all . (8) Hare's theory , whic h attempt s t o provid e utilitaria n grounds fo r o ur mora l standard s i n term s o f th e universalisabilit y principle , i s - 199 - not , as Maclntyr e notes , t o be regarde d as th e onl y major contributio n t o modern mora l philosoph y whic h spring s fro m emotivis t premises. Other theorist s such as J.L. Mackie can be included . As such, ther e i s a discernibl e traditio n o f mora l theorisin g tha t we have calle d 'noncognitivism ' whic h presupposes th e basi c allege d trut h o f th e emotivis t analysis . How, though, i s thi s assessment o f th e theoretica l and practica l significanc e o f emotivis m relevan t t o Maclntyre' s attemp t t o addres s t h e problems o f justifyin g libera l democrati c theor y and practice ? It s relevanc e i s tha t Maclntyr e believe s tha t our attachmen t t o emotivis t ways o f thinkin g i n th e modern age i s fata l t o any attemp t t o justif y morall y our ethica l belief s and practices . He contend s tha t althoug h ther e ar e contemporary libera l theorists , such as Rawls, Nozick and Gewirth , who may appear t o be preoccupie d wit h rejectin g emotivis t and subjectivis t accounts o f morality , the y ar e nonetheles s infecte d by th e emotivis t strain . These theorist s have attempted , as Maclntyr e says, t o 'show tha t th e notio n of rationalit y itsel f supplie s moralit y wit h a basis' . (9) However, he note s tha t al l thes e attempt s have failed ; and thi s i s because such writer s cannot agree among themselves eithe r on what th e characte r o f mora l rationalit y i s or on th e substance o f th e moralit y which i s t o be founded on tha t rationality . The diversit y o f contemporary mora l debate and it s interminabilit y ar e indeed mirrore d i n th e controversie s o f analytica l mora l philosophers . (10) Maclntyre' s poin t i s tha t th e leve l o f disagreemen t between contemporar y theorist s as t o how t o establis h a rationa l justificatio n f o r moralit y i s indicativ e o f a deep crisi s i n Western philosophica l thinking . For i t shows tha t thes e theorist s canno t draw upon a conceptua l vocabular y whic h provide s any coheren t and unifor m notio n o f what constitute s 'morality ' o r 'moral rationality' . Rather, ther e i s a plethor a of fragmente d concept s available ; al l o f which , collectively , make th e tas k o f theoretica l agreement impossible . Thi s i s why, fo r Maclntyre , th e irreconcilabl e natur e o f contemporary mora l debate i s - 200 - mirrore d i n th e theoretica l o r philosophica l controversie s o f analytica l mora l philosophy . How, though , has thi s curren t intellectua l crisi s come about? Maclntyr e root s th e problem i n th e fac t tha t thes e contemporar y analytica l philosopher s remai n attache d t o th e Enlightenmen t (and, as a consequence, basicall y emotivist ) conceptua l schema, whic h find s moralit y i n individua l choic e o r expressio n o f preference . Crucially , however, thes e theorist s have faile d t o appreciate , o r have refuse d t o acknowledge, th e basi c lesso n whic h emotivis m has taugh t us; namely, tha t no rationa l justificatio n o f thi s conceptio n o f moralit y i s possibl e withi n th e conceptua l structur e o f thi s schema. What we fin d instead , as Maclntyr e observes, i s tha t a wide range o f concepts , such as 'rights' , 'duties', 'utility' , 'justice ' and 'universalisability' , continu e t o be used by analytica l philosopher s t o justif y rationall y our mora l beliefs ; bu t thes e concept s do no t have any coheren t source because the y do no t relat e t o any conceptio n o f moralit y o r mora l rationalit y whic h can possibl y provid e th e basi s fo r such justifications . Maclntyr e believe s tha t thi s explain s how th e theoretica l dispute s o f contemporar y analytica l philosoph y reflec t th e paradoxica l and indeed inconsisten t characte r o f modern ethica l debate as an attemp t t o asser t persona l preference s and ye t simultaneousl y appeal t o externa l standard s fo r thei r justification . For i t reveal s tha t professiona l analytica l philosophers , no les s tha n th e ordinar y mora l practitioner , a r e deludin g themselve s by thinkin g tha t thei r conceptio n o f moralit y as persona l preferenc e can be give n any externa l rationa l support . Thi s problem facin g us cannot , Maclntyr e contends , be overcome withou t totall y abandoning th e Enlightenmen t (and emotivist ) conceptio n o f moralit y as persona l preference . Whils t we continu e t o employ th e tool s o f th e Enlightenmen t project , he says , 'we have no good reasons t o believ e tha t analytica l philosoph y can provid e any convincin g escape fro m an emotivis m th e substanc e o f whic h i t so ofte n i n fac t concedes'. (11) F or Maclntyre , th e fac t tha t ther e i s an urgen t need fo r such an escape i s apparen t i n th e desperat e natur e o f th e presen t crisis : a crisi s whic h i s symptomati c o f a mora l declin e o r th e 'decay o f mora l - 201 - reasoning ' tha t was consequent on th e historica l contex t o f th e inceptio n o f th e Enlightenmen t project , and has reached it s culminatio n i n th e modern emotivis t age. Evidence o f thi s declin e i s apparent , John Dunn remarks , i n 'the chaoti c heterogeneit y o f normativ e concept s toute d i n th e Western arguments... th e direc t conflic t o f will s and sentiments , lightl y cloake d by th e invocatio n o f standards , th e authorit y and conclusivenes s o f whic h i s now entirel y bogus.' (12) The reaso n tha t any such appea l t o thes e standard s i s fallacious , Maclntyr e writes , i s tha t 'i n th e actua l worl d whic h we inhabi t th e language o f moralit y i s in.. , (a) stat e o f grav e disorder . What we possess... ar e th e fragment s of a conceptua l scheme, part s o f whic h now lac k thos e context s fro m whic h thei r significanc e derived. ' (13) We are , i n othe r words, continuin g t o employ th e pas t vocabular y and concept s o f mora l justificatio n withou t recognisin g tha t th e 'integra l substance* o f moralit y whic h gave thes e concept s thei r significanc e has become fragmente d and i n par t destroyed . Al l tha t we ar e lef t with , Maclntyr e says , i s 'an unharmonious melange o f ill-assorte d fragments.' (14) Thi s proces s o f fragmentatio n was a consequence o f th e attemp t o f Enlightenmen t thinker s t o seek differen t conceptua l approaches by whic h t o addres s th e problem o f establishin g a rationa l mora l justificatio n f o r our principle s whic h i s founded upon th e 'individualist ' conceptio n o f th e mora l person. But th e culminatin g destructio n o f any homogeneous conceptua l understandin g o f moralit y was hastened by th e emotivis t realisatio n tha t no such justificatio n was possibl e withi n thi s schema. Maclntyr e wishe s t o assess what he take s t o be th e disastrou s practica l mora l consequences o f thi s proces s o f conceptua l fragmentation . He argues tha t th e hear t o f th e issu e rest s upon th e fac t tha t th e emotivis t theor y has successfull y obliterate d th e distinctio n between manipulative and non-manipulative relation s i n our contemporar y socia l life ; and he indicate s bow thi s theoretica l obliteratio n i s o f th e utmos t practica l significanc e fo r morality . He centre s bi s argument on th e contras t between Kantia n ethic s and emotivism . He argues tha t Kant i s quit e correc t on one major issu e because - 202 - The differenc e between a human relationshi p uninforme d by moralit y and one so informe d i s precisel y th e differenc e between one i n whic h each perso n treat s th e othe r primaril y as a means t o h i s o r he r ends and one i n whic h each treat s th e othe r as an end. To trea t someone els e as an end i s t o offe r them what I tak e t o be good reasons fo r actin g i n one way rathe r tha n another , bu t t o leave i t t o them t o evaluat e thos e reasons. I t i s t o be unwillin g t o influenc e anothe r excep t by reason s whic h tha t othe r he o r she judges t o be good. I t i s t o appeal t o impersona l criteri a of th e validit y o f whic h each rationa l agent must be hi s o r her own judge. By contrast , t o trea t someone els e as a means i s t o seek t o make him o r he r an instrumen t o f my purpose s by advancin g whatever influence s o r consideration s wil l i n fac t be effectiv e on thi s o r tha t occasion . The generalisation s o f th e sociolog y and psycholog y o f persuasion s ar e what I shal l need t o guid e me, no t t h e standard s o f a narrativ e rationality . (15) However, as Maclntyr e remarks: I f emotivis m i s true , thi s distinctio n i s illusory . For evaluativ e utteranc e can i n th e end have no poin t o r use bu t th e expressio n o f my own feeling s o r attitude s and th e transformatio n o f th e feeling s and attitude s o f others . I canno t genuinel y appeal t o impersona l criteria , fo r ther e ar e no impersona l criteria . I may thin k tha t I so appea l and other s may thin k tha t I so appeal, bu t thes e thought s wil l alway s be mistaken . The sol e realit y o f distinctivel y mora l discours e i s th e attemp t o f one wil l t o alig n t h e attitudes , feeling s .preferences and choice s o f anothe r wit h i t own. Other s ar e alway s means, never ends. (16) Maclntyr e is , then , o f th e opinio n tha t th e Kantia n analysi s o f t h e characte r o f moralit y i s superio r t o th e emotivis t analysi s on th e particula r poin t o f th e distinctio n between 'means' and 'ends'. He believe s tha t th e distinctio n between moralit y and prudence i s correctl y t o be discerne d i n term s o f treatin g peopl e as ends rathe r tha n as means, and o f establishin g a distinctio n between non- - 203 - manipulativ e and manipulativ e socia l relations . However, i n contendin g this , Maclntyr e makes tw o relate d points . Firstly , he insist s tha t t h e Kantia n theoretica l approach i s nonetheles s bound t o fai l i n it s attemp t t o establis h th e distinctio n between means and ends upon a fir m philosophica l footing . Thi s i s because i t i s based upon a fals e conceptio n o f man as a transcendenta l rationa l being . Consequently, he claims , th e recen t Kantia n theoretica l arguments advanced by such writer s as Rawls and lozic k have been unsuccessful . Secondly, and more interestingly , Maclntyr e contend s tha t th e conceptua l bankruptc y o f th e Kantia n projec t i s relate d t o a practica l problem. The problem, he insists , i s tha t our contemporar y understandin g o f practica l socia l lif e i s based, t o a larg e degree, on th e assumptio n tha t th e emotivis t conceptio n o f mora l discours e i s true . Tha t is , i t i s widel y presupposed withi n our cultur e tha t th e socia l world , as 'seen wit h emotivis t eyes' i s th e correc t view. Consequently, i t i s a common sociologica l featur e o f our practica l mora l consciousnes s t o believ e tha t moralit y i s a matte r o f expressin g feeling s and imposin g our wil l upon others . As a result , Maclntyr e claim s tha t we no longe r have a theoreticall y roote d understandin g o f th e distinctio n between moralit y a nd prudence, o r treatin g othe r people as ends rathe r tha n as means. Thi s i s reflecte d i n our practica l understandin g because we ac t and behave i n a way tha t reveal s th e degree t o whic h any distinctio n between manipulativ e and non-manipulativ e socia l relation s has been obliterated . Therefore , Maclntyr e argues tha t th e Kantia n theoretica l attemp t t o provid e us wit h a notio n o f moral , a s distinc t fro m prudentia l reasoning , i s bound t o have no practica l effec t on us. Thi s i s because we behave i n a manner whic h indicate s tha t we do no t believ e tha t ther e i s a practicall y relevan t distinctio n t o be made between moralit y and prudence. One o f Maclntyre' s centra l contentions , then , i s tha t contemporar y mora l theor y canno t provid e us wit h a coheren t and well - grounded conceptio n o f mora l reasoning . For analytica l philosopher s ar e trappe d withi n th e confine s o f Enlightenment , and consequentl y emotivist , presuppositions . These presupposition s have, a t bot h th e theoretica l and practica l level s o f modern ethica l thinking , effectivel y - 204 - made i t impossibl e t o provid e any intelligibl e account o f moral , as distinc t fro m prudential , reasoning . I n Maclntyre' s view, then , th e genera l pictur e look s bleak ; and he draws hi s pessimis m fro m th e questio n o f whether liberalism , as a theoretica l and practica l enterpris e o f rationa l mora l justification , h as any future . I n orde r t o examine MacIntyre' s assessment o f th e possibilit y o f thi s future , we need briefl y t o restat e our placement o f liberalis m withi n it s intellectua l context , and specif y it s conception s o f mora l reasoning . Maclntyr e note s tha t philosophica l liberalis m (o r what he call s liberal-individualism ) spran g fro m th e Enlightenmen t project . Also , as he point s out , i t constitute s a distinctiv e traditio n o f philosophica l argument because i t has it s source i n an individualis t notio n o f man a nd hi s relatio n t o th e externa l worl d whic h i s based upon a particula r epistemologica l conceptio n o f th e relationshi p between fact s and values . As such, i t i s a characteristi c featur e o f liberal-individualis m t o maintai n tha t question s of fac t ar e settle d independentl y fro m what anyone wants o r chooses, whereas question s o f valu e (includin g mora l value ) ar e settle d onl y by th e individua l choosin g and standin g by some particuala r se t o f principle s which bes t satisf y hi s desires . I t i s t o pictur e th e individua l confrontin g th e objectiv e fact s wit h a freedom t o make such evaluation s as he wishes i n th e realisatio n o f individua l purposes. I t has been indicate d earlie r tha t liberal-individualis m can be separate d int o two major varietie s o f though t withi n th e Enlightenmen t tradition : namely, th e 'empiricist ' and th e 'Kantian rationalist' . The empiricis t variet y classifie s mora l reasonin g as a kin d o f practica l o r instrumenta l reasoning . Accordin g t o thi s view, we behave morall y so as t o satisf y thos e individua l purposes whic h would no t be guaranteed satisfactio n i n a 'non-moral' o r purel y prudentia l socia l environment . The Kantia n rationalis t strain , by contrast , denotes mora l reasonin g as a distinctiv e intrinsicall y rationa l activity . From thi s perspective , we behave morall y because we ar e compelled, by th e dictate s o f reason, t o recognis e our mora l dut y t o trea t other s as ends, never as means. Consequently our individua l purposes ar e bes t satisfie d withi n mora l arrangements. - 205 - Both varietie s o f liberal-individualism , therefore , seek t o justif y t h e grounds fo r mora l obligatio n upon a distinctio n drawn between moralit y and prudence. Admittedly , th e Kantia n versio n o f th e distinctio n i s much sharper : mora l and prudentia l thinkin g belon g t o t w o differen t specie s o f reasoning . By contrast , th e empiricis t definitio n o f th e distinctio n i s much looser : mora l and prudentia l thinkin g belon g equall y t o th e specie s o f instrumenta l reasoning . A distinctio n i s nonetheles s specified , drawn i n term s o f th e notio n tha t ther e ar e good instrumenta l reasons fo r co-operatin g with , and trusting , each othe r i n socia l activities . I t i s th e establishmen t of thi s mutuall y advantageous socia l trust , and th e development o f th e notion s o f 'promise-keeping', 'sympathy' and 'altruism ' tha t are associate d wit h it , whic h i s sai d t o involv e th e employment o f what constitute s 'moral', as distinc t fro m 'non-moral', practica l reasoning , Maclntyre' s contentio n i s tha t bot h varietie s o f liberal - individualis m fai l i n thei r attemp t t o provid e th e grounds fo r mora l obligation . Thi s enterpris e fail s because i t i s based upon a fals e individualis t theor y o f th e self , and i s unsuccessfu l i n maintainin g t h e distinctio n between moralit y and prudence. The reason fo r this , Maclntyr e contends, i s tha t liberal-individualis m operate s withi n a conceptua l schema th e emotivis t culminatio n o f which has resulte d i n t h e obliteratio n o f th e distinctio n between non-manipulativ e and manipulativ e socia l relations . As a consequence th e theoretica l and practicall y applicabl e dichotom y between moralit y and prudence has become incoheren t withi n th e liberal-individualis t understanding . We can see tha t i t is , accordin g t o Maclntyre' s assessment, a profoun d iron y and indeed a cultura l traged y tha t thos e non-cognitivis t thinker s who have presupposed and attempte d t o justif y th e empiricis t variet y o f th e liberal-individualis t conceptio n o f moralit y have relie d on fo r thei r defence th e emotivis t analysi s o f ethica l discours e whic h h as effectivel y obliterate d th e possibilit y o f such a defence. Thus we fin d writer s such as Hare and Mackie, who have trie d t o construc t a utilitaria n foundatio n fo r mora l obligatio n i n libera l terms , failin g i n thei r tas k precisel y because the y have presupposed th e emotivis t premise s whic h make any rationa l justificatio n o f mora l practice s impossible . - 206 - B ut accordin g t o Maclntyre' s view th e Kantia n rationalist s far e no better . Equall y th e attempt s o f Rawls and lozic k fai l because thei r respectiv e account s o f what i s intrinsicall y reasonabl e mora l actio n a r e theoreticall y conflictin g and redundant. Thei r appea l t o thes e standard s is , a t th e practica l level , effectivel y ignore d by th e unreceptiv e contemporar y audience who thin k and ac t as thoug h ther e i s no distinctio n t o be made between people conceive d as ends and people conceive d as means. F or Maclntyre , then , th e curren t crisi s i n analytica l philosoph y reflect s bot h th e decay o f contemporar y mora l lif e and th e failur e o f liberal-individualis m t o fin d a way o f justifyin g tha t lif e i n distinctiv e ethica l terms . I t may, however, be suggested tha t th e attempt s o f Rort y and Rawls t o provid e a pragmati c justificatio n o f t h e actua l cultura l practice s o f libera l democrati c regimes have prove d t o be more successfu l because the y have deliberatel y avoide d th e assumption s o f th e previou s non-cognitivis t and Kantia n libera l enterprises , I t wil l be recalle d tha t Rort y seeks a situatio n i n whic h 'Enlightenment liberalism ' can be carrie d throug h t o it s logica l limi t whils t eradicatin g i n th e proces s th e las t trace s o f 'Enlightenment rationalism' . Likewis e Rawls denies tha t hi s approach depends upon any metaphysica l claim s about 'the essentia l natur e and identit y o f persons ' based on th e 'Enlightenment' notio n o f a transcendenta l rationality . We wonder, then , i f Rort y and Rawls have paved th e way fo r th e successfu l denouement o f th e crisi s whic h Maclntyr e has describe d fo r us. Maclntyr e suggest s not , mainl y because he contends tha t thes e theoretica l revision s o f th e libera l positio n can do nothin g t o resolv e th e practica l difficultie s tha t ar e inheren t i n our contemporar y mora l predicament . I n particular , Maclntyr e take s issu e wit h Rorty's assumptio n tha t i t i s possibl e fo r th e 'postmodern bourgeoi s liberal ' t o provid e a justificatio n o f our libera l democrati c practice s by engaging i n a cultura l conversatio n tha t draws upon 'our common stoc k o f convention s and anecdotes'. There i s no possibilit y o f this , he says , because ther e i s i n fac t no common identit y o f mora l person s upon whic h t o draw upon. Rather, modern Western lif e i s conducted withi n 'a societ y o f strangers ' and ther e i s no actua l practica l communal consensus o f share d mora l belief s wit h whic h t o sustai n any - 207 - distinctivel y ethica l attachmen t t o th e convention s withi n whic h we operate . Consequently, ther e can be no possibilit y o f constructin g a theoretica l justificatio n o f thes e conventions . As Haclntyr e argues, 'there ar e to o many riva l conventions , to o many conflictin g anecdotes; a nd th e repetitio n o f assertion s and denial s does no t constitut e conversation' . (17) Therefore , 'what postmodern bourgeoi s liberalis m exhibit s i s no t mora l argument free d fro m unwarrante d philosophica l pretentious , bu t th e decay o f mora l reasoning'. (18) I n othe r words, what postmodern bourgeoi s liberalis m reflect s i s th e fragmente d and disjointe d characte r o f contemporar y mora l life ; a lif e i n whic h th e distinctio n between mora l reasonin g and practica l reasonin g has t o a larg e degree decayed and become obfuscated . The philosophica l posturin g o f postmodern bourgeoi s liberal s (o r indee d anyone else ) cannot, he says, disguis e th e fac t tha t our notio n o f mora l reasonin g has become theoreticall y incoheren t and practicall y inapplicable . He writes : Tha t decay i s unsurprisin g i n a societ y whose worl d view ... obscures th e connectio n between th e possibilit y o f mora l reasonin g a nd th e exercis e o f a certai n typ e o f tradition-bearin g community. Any particula r piec e o f practica l reasonin g has rationa l forc e onl y fo r thos e who bot h have desire s and disposition s ordere d t o some good and recognis e tha t good as furthere d by doin g what tha t piec e o f practica l reasonin g bids . Only withi n a community wit h share d belief s about goods and share d disposition s educated i n accordance wit h thos e beliefs , bot h roote d i n share d practices , c an practica l reason-givin g be an ordered , teachabl e activit y wit h standard s o f success and failure . (19) Haclntyre' s contention , then , i s tha t practica l mora l reasonin g i s onl y possibl e withi n a 'tradition-bearin g community' whose share d belief s ar e manifeste d i n cultural , socia l and politica l practices . I t i s thes e share d belief s and practice s tha t se t th e standard s by whic h any though t and behaviou r i s t o be considere d rationa l and objective . Therefore , i n orde r t o thin k and ac t i n a morall y rationa l manner i t i s necessar y t o have grasped th e sense i n whic h such though t and actio n accord s wit h th e give n cultura l standard s o f what constitute s th e - 208 - 'good' or 'goods'. Maclntyre's point , of course, i s tha t we have no notion of moral reasoning i n modern society because we have no uniform s et of ethica l standards, or conception of the 'good', which can underpin any 'tradition-bearin g community'. We do not liv e i n a world tha t strictl y speaking constitute s a moral community a t all . Rather, we liv e i n a world whose 'world view' has been shaped by the emotivis t conception of ethica l discourse; a world where 'moral' reasoning i s conceived t o be a matter of self-assertio n and manipulative persuasion, and where the notio n of achieving purposes fo r the end of some harmonious communal good i s absent. This stat e of affair s constitutes , fo r Haclntyre, a grave moral disorder. I t may be overcome i n the future , he says, i f we resuscitat e t he concept of a practica l telos tha t i s nurtured i n the 'Aristotelian ' view of the moral virtues ; a view which has survived, albei t fragmentedly, the ravages of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment period. This suggestion need not concern us here. What does concern us i s Maclntyre's contention tha t thi s stat e of affair s cannot be overcome i n the futur e whils t we remain attached t o the emotivis t presuppositions which inform our theoretica l and practica l view of the world. For i t leads us t o conclude tha t liberalis m cannot effec t the changes tha t are needed. Indeed, according t o Maclntyre's account, liberalis m has largel y contributed t o the crisi s tha t we fin d ourselves i n . For Maclntyre, liberal-individualis m and emotivism have reflecte d and contribute d t o the descent int o nihilis m tha t we are increasingl y witnessing. We observe tha t i n everyday practic e 'emotivist man' find s no moral reasons fo r the distinctivel y ethica l activit y of pursuing 'the good life' . The practica l consequence of thi s i s tha t emotivis t man i s compelled as hi s cultur e faces deeper crisi s t o abandon hi s commitment t o the libera l democratic practice s which have shaped him. The decay of moral reasoning which has accompanied thi s decline i n ethica l and politica l convictio n must make the attempts of Dunn, Rorty and Rawls t o represent liberalis m i n a 'pragmatic' ligh t quit e futile . This i s because the basic distinctio n between moralit y and prudence, which Dunn, Rorty and Rawls al l assume t o be established, has been obliterated .