H. P. Grice's and R. M. Hare's meta-ethics

SOME REFERENCES 

by Grice 

on emotivism.

R.H. Hare, 'Ontology i n Ethics' i n Moralit y and Objectivit y (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985) p.39. 

 J. Dunn, 'Identity , modernitiy and the claim t o know better' i n Rethinking Modern Politica l Theory (Cambridge Universit y Press, 1985) p.145. 

J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977) p.38. 4. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirro r of Nature (Basil Blackwell, 1980) p.363. 

 R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford, 1963) p.2. 

D. Hume, Appendix I of the Enquiry Concerning the Principle s of Morals (ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd edition , Oxford, 1975). Quoted i n S. Blackburn, 'Reply: Rule-Following and Moral Realism' i n Wittgenstein: t o Follow a Rule (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985) p.48. 

D. Hume, Appendix I of the Enquiry Concerning the Principle s of MpraHs 8. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch , Oxford, 1978), Part III , 1, i . Quoted i n R.M. Hare, 'Ontology i n Ethics', p.48. 9. D. Hume, Treatise p.457. 

J. McDowell, 'Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?' i n Proceedings of the Aristotelia n Society, Supplementary Volume. (1978), p.19. 11. C.L. Stevenson, 'Relativism and Hon-Relativism i n the Theory of Value' (1962) i n Facts and Values: Studies i n Ethica l Analysis (Yale Universit y Press, 1963) p.90. - 215 - 12. A. Maclntyre, 'How Moral Agents became Ghosts' i n Synthase (V, 53, Io.2, 1982) p.298. 13. R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952) p.69. 14. S. Lovibond, Realism and Imagination i n Ethics (Basi l Blackwell, 1983) p.3. 15. R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals p.70. 16. R.M, Hare, Freedom and Reason p.199, 17. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature Book III , p.416. 18. S. Lovibond, Realism and Imagination i n Ethics pp. 4-5. 19. T. ffagel, The Possibilit y of Altruism (Oxford, 1970) p.6. 20. D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principle s of Morals p.275. 2 1. D. Wiggins, 'Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life ' i n The Proceedings of the Britis h Academy (Volume LXII, 1976) p.33S. 22. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature Book III , p.4G9. 23. R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals p.129. 24. B. Williams, Ethics and the Limit s of Philosophy (Fontaiia Press, 1985) p.124. 2. The Form of Ethica l Language, 1. C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (Yale Universit y Press, 1944) p.210. 2. R.M. Hare, Freedom, and Reason p.189. 3. J. McDowell, 'Non-cognitivism and Rule Following' i n Wittgenstein: t o Follow a Rule p,143. 4. B. Williams, Ethics and the Limit s of Philosophy (Fontana Press, 1985) 5. Williams, Ibid. , pp. 120-121. 6. Williams, Ibid. , p.124. 7. Williams, Ibid . 8. R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking: It s Levels. Method and Point (Oxford, 1981) p.21. 9. Williams, op. cit. , p.125. - 216 - 10. Williams, Ibid . 11. Williams, Ibid . 12. Williams, Ibid. , p.126. 13. Williams, Ibid. , p.141. 14. Williams, Ibid., pp. 141-142. 15. J. McDowell, 'Non-cognitivism and Rule Following' p.144. 16. J.R. Searle, 'How t o derive 'ought' from "is " i n The Is - Ought Question (Macmillan, 1969, (reprinte d 1973)) p.128. 17. Searle, Ibid., p.130. 18. Searle, Ibid . 19. A.J.M. Milne, 'Values and Ethics: the Emotive Theory' i n Logical Positivis m i n Perspective (Ed. by B. Gower, Croom Helm, London and Sydney, 1987) p.97. 20. Searle, op. cit. , p.122. 2 1. Milne, op. cit. , p.98. 22. Williams, op. cit. , p.130. 23. Williams, Ibid. , p.129. 24. Williams, Ibid . 25. Williams, Ibid., p.130. 26. Williams, Ibid . 27. Williams, Ibid . 28. Williams, Ibid. , p.127. 29. Williams, Ibid . 30. Williams, Ibid., p.131. 3. The Place of Sentiment and Reason i n Ethica l Life . 1. B. Harrison, 'Moral Sentiments' i n Ethics; Proceedings of the Fift h Internationa l Wittgenstein Symposium 1980, (Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1981) p.77. 2. A. Maclntyre, Afte r Virtue: a study i n moral theory (Duckworth, 1981) p.12. 3. Harrison, op. cit. , p.78. - 217 - 4. Harrison, Ibid. , p.79. 5. Harrison, Ibid. , p.80. Q. Harrison, Ibid . 7. Harrison, Ibid . 8. A.J.M. Milne, "Values and Ethics: the Emotive Theory" p.99. Milne's discussion relate s specificall y t o the emotive theory of ethic s as advanced by A.J. Ayer, but the point s which he raise s are equally applicable t o non-cognitivism, and the Humean theory-schema, i n general. 9. A. Macintyre, 'How Moral Agents became Ghosts' i n Synthese (1982). 10. Macintyre, Ibid. , p.299. 11. G. Graham, 'Ideology and the sociologica l understanding' i n The Form of Ideology (Ed. by D.J. Manning, George Allen and Unwin, 1980) p.18. 12. Harrison, op. cit. , p.80. 13. Harrison, Ibid , 14. Harrison, Ibid. , p.81. 4. Objectivit y i n Ethics, 1. B. Williams, Ethics and the Limit s of Philosophy p.138. 2. Quoted i n M, McGinn, 'The Thir d Dogma of Empiricism' i n Aristotelia n Society Proceedings (1981-82) p.94. 3. Crispi n Wright, Wittgenstein on ±iie Foundations o£ Mathematics (Cambridge, Mass; Harvard Universit y Press, 1980) p.58, 4. Wright, Ibid. , p.61. 5. S. LovibDnd, Realism and Imagination i n Ethic s p.37. 6. L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Ed. by G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G.E.M Anscombe, Oxford, Blackwell, 1978) VII : 39. 7. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation s (Blackwell, 1958) I : 241. 8. D. Wiggins, 'Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life ' p.349. - 218 - 9. Wiggins, Ibid. , p.348. 10. Wiggins, Ibid. , p.349. 11. Wiggins, Ibid. , p.339. 12. M. Hidgley, 'The Absence of a Gap between Facts and Values' i n The Aristotelia n Society (Supplementary Volume LIV, 1980) p.219. 13. Midgley, Ibid. , p.216. 14. Midgley, Ibid . 15. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation s XI I p.230. 16. Williams, op. cit. , p.135. 17. Williams, Ibid. , p.140. 18. Williams, Ibid. , pp. 138-139. 19. Williams, Ibid. , p.151. 20. Williams, Ibid . 2 1. Williams, Ibid. , p.154. - 219 - 5. Maclntyre on Emotivism. I . Historica l context, 1. A. Maclntyre, Afte r Virtue: a study i n moral theory (Duckworth, 1981, 2nd editio n wit h Postscript , 1985) p.14. 2. Maclntyre, Ibid . 3. Maclntyre, Ibid . 4. Maclntyre, Ibid. , p.17. 5. Maclntyre, Ibid . 6. Maclntyre, Ibid , 7. Maclntyre, Ibid. , p.18. I I . Social context, 1. Mar.T-ntyre. Afte r Virtu e p.22. 2. Maclntyre, Ibid . 3. Maclntyre, Ibid. , p.23. 4. Maclntyre, Ibid . 5. Maclntyre, Ibid. , pp. 31-32. 6. Maclntyre, Ibid. , p.31. 7. A. Maclntyre, Against the Self-images of the Age (Duckworth, London, 1971) p.92. 8. C. Taylor, 'Justice Afte r Virtue' p.27. 9. Maclntyre, Against the Self-images of the Age p.6. 10. Maclntyre, Ibid . 11. MacTntyre, Afte r Virtu e Preface. p.IX. 12. Maclntyre, Ibid. , p.33. 13. Maclntyre, Ibid . 14. Maclntyre, Ibid. , pp. 33-34. - 220 - 15. Maclntyre, Ibid. , p.34. 16. MacIntyre, Ibid. , p.23. 17. Maclntyre, Ibid. , p.261. 18. Maclntyre, Ibid. , p.22. III . The Histor y of Ideas. 1. A. Maclntyre, 'Postscript' t o the Second Editio n of Afte r Virtu e p.265. 2. W.K. Frankena, Ethics (93, 1983) p.500. Quoted i n Afte r Virtue p.265. 3. Frankena, Ibid . 4. Maclntyre, op. cit . p.265. 5. Maclntyre, Ibid . pp. 265-6. 6. Maclntyre, Ibid , p.268. 7. A. Maclntyre, 'The relationshi p of philosophy t o it s past' i n Philosophy i n History (Ed. by Rorty, Schneewind and Skinner: Cambridge, 1984) p.42. 8. Maclntyre, Ibid . 9. Maclntyre, Ibid. , p.43. 10. Maclntyre, Ibid. , p.42. 11. Maclntyre, Ibid. , p.47. 12. CD. Broad, 'G.E. Moore's Latest Published Views on Ethics' i n Mind 1961. Republished i n G.E Moore: Essays i n Retrospect (Ed. Ambrose and Lazerowitz, George Allan and Unwin, 1970) p.358. 6. The Historica l Emergence of Emotivlsm, I . Towards an emotivis t view. 1. C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (Kegan Paul, 1923, Second edition ) p.125. - 221 - 2. Ogdexi and Richards, Ibid. , p.185. 

Ogden and Richards, Ibid. , p. 150. 4. F.P. Ramsey, 'Epilogue' t o The Foundations of. Mathematics (Cambridge, 1931) p.290. 5. Ramsey, Ibid. , p.291. 6. Ramsey, Ibid. , p.289. 7. R.B. Braithwaite, 'Verbal Ambiguity and Philosophical Analysis' i n Proceedings of the Aristotelia n Society (1927-28) p.137. 8. Braithwaite, Ibid., p. 138. 9. Braithwaite, Ibid . 10. Braithwaite, Ibid . 11. C.L. Stevenson, 

C.L. Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethica l Terms (Unpublished doctora l thesis , Harvard, 1935) p. 194. 2. C.L. Stevenson, 'Essay on the Pragmatic Proof of the Relativit y of Truth' (March 28th, 1929) p.7. 3. C.L. Stevenson, 'Arguments fo r Determinism' (Apri l 22nd, 1929) p.10. 4. Stevenson, Ibid., p.ll . 5. Stevenson, Ibid . 6. C.L. Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethica l Terms p. 194. 7. C.L. Stevenson, 'The Nature of Good (wit h particula r remarks about t he theorie s of Professor G.E. Moore)' (October 19th, 1931) p.l . 8. Stevenson, Ibid . 9. Stevenson, Ibid. , p.3. 10. Stevenson, Ibid., pp. 3-4. 11. Stevenson, Ibid. , p.6. 12. Stevenson, Ibid . 13. Stevenson, Ibid., p.5. 14. Stevenson, Ibid . 15. Stevenson, Ibid . 16. Stevenson, Ibid., p.ll . 17. Stevenson, Ibid., p. 12. 18. Stevenson, Ibid . - 222 - 19. C.L. Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethica l Terms p.179. 20. C.L. Stevenson, 'A Consideration of Justice and the Premises from which it s Nature i s Determined' (October 26th, 1931) p.3. 2 1. C.L. Stevenson, 'The Relation of Logic t o Philosophy, Ethics and Mathematics' (Undated) p.3. 22. C.L. Stevenson, 'A Consideration of Justice' p.3. 23. Stevenson, Ibid. , pp, 4-5. 24. Stevenson, Ibid. , p.6. 25. Stevenson, Ibid . III . A.E, Duncan-Jones. 

A.E. Duncan-Jones, 'Ethical Words and Ethica l Facts' i n Mind (October 1933, Volume XLII No. 168) p.480. 

Duncan-Jones, Ibid . 3. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p.498. 4. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p.500. 

 A.E. Duncan-Jones, Ethica l Language: an examination of the use and meaning of ethica l expressions (Unpublished Fellowship Dissertation , submitted t o Gonville and Cauis College, Cambridge, 1933) p.11. 

Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , pp. 72-73. 7. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p.35. 8. G.E. Moore, Principl a Ethica (Cambridge Universit y Press, 1903) p.6. 9. A.E. Duncan-Jones, Ethica l Language p.57. 10. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p.53. 11. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p.54. 12. Duncan-Jones, Ibid., p.61. (footnote 17). 13. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p.72. 14. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , pp. 78-79. 15. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p.79. (footnote 24). 16. Duncan-Jones, Ibid . 17. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p.80. 18. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p.81. 

A.E. Duncan-Jones, Meaning and Generality (Fellowship Dissertation , submitted t o Gonville and Cauis College, Cambridge, 1932) p.7. - 223 - 20. Duncan-Jones, Ethica l Language p.81. 2 1. Duncan-Jones, Ibid . p.81. 22. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p.82. 23. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p.84. 24. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p.158. 25. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p. 120. 26. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p.146. 27. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p.145. 28. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , pp. 146-147. 29. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , pp. 161-162. 30. Duncan-Jones, Ibid. , p.163. 


W. H. F. Barnes, 'The Emotive Theory of Ethics 1 , p. l . A paper written i n November 1986 for the benefi t of the author. 


Barnes, 'Is there a Realm of Values?' (Unpublished paper) pp. 2-3. 3. Barnes, Ibid. , pp.7-8. 4. Barnes, Ibid. , p. 13. 5. Barnes, Ibid. , p.15. 6. Barnes, Ibid. , p.18. 7. Barnes, Ibid . 8. Barnes, Ibid. , p.19. 9. Barnes, ; [bid . 10. Barnes, Ibid. , p.20, 11. Barnes, Ibid . 12. Barnes, Ibid. , pp.20-22. 13. Barnes, Ibid. , pp .22-23. 14. Barnes, Ibid. , p.23. 15. Barnes, Ibid. , p.24. 16. Barnes, Ibid. , p.23. 17. Barnes, Ibid. , pp.24-25. 18. Barnes, Lette r t o the author, December 16th, 1986, p.2 19. Barnes, 'The Emotive Theory of Ethics' p.3. 20. Barnes, Ibid. , pp.2-3. - 224 - 21. Barnes, Lette r t o the author, December 16th, 1986, p.2. 22. Barnes, 'The Emotive Theory of Ethics' p.3. V. A.J. Ayer. 1. Letter t o the author, July 3rd, 1986. Also see Freedom and Moralit y (Oxford Universit y Press, 1984) pp. 28-29. 2. A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (Firs t published by Victo r Gollancz, 1936; reprinte d i n Pelican books, 1978) p.142. 3. A.J. Ayer, Part of My Lif e (Oxford Universit y Press, 1978) p.155. 4. A.J Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic pp. 26-27. 5. C.L. Stevenson, Letter t o Doctor R.F, Piper of Syracuse University , 1937. 6. Stevenson, Ibid . 7. W.H.F. Barnes, 'The Emotive Theory of Ethics', November 1985. - 225 - 7. ffon-cognitivism and Liberal-individualis m 1. S.Lovibond, Realism and Imagination i n Ethics (Basil Blackwell, 1983) p.l . 2. C. Taylor, 'Overcoming Epistemology' i n Afte r Philosophy: End or Transformation? (Edited by Baynes, Bohara, McCarthy, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England. 1987) pp.471-472. 3. Taylor, Ibid., p.471. 4. The Marxist would, of course, deny tha t hi s understanding of the relationshi p between persons i s ideologica l i n the sense which I attribut e t o him. 5. I am indebted t o Dr. D.J, Manning fo r hi s views on the form of ideologica l understanding. See D.J. Manning and T.J. Robinson The Place of Ideology i n Politica l Lif e (Croom Helm, 1985)). 6. A.J.Ayer, 'On the Analysis of Moral Judgements' i n Philosophical Essays (MacMillan, 1954) p.246. 7. L.Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigation s (Basil Blackwell, 2nd Edition , 1963) 124, p.49. 8. Later expositions of the non-cognitivis t theory exhibi t a decisive shif t away from thi s conception of the limit s of philosophy. Both Hare and Mackie have recently engaged i n normative ethics , and have justifie d thi s move i n terms of the (purported) connection between theory and practice . Thus, we fin d Hare arguing i n the Preface t o Moral Thinking (P.v.) tha t i f hi s ideas were understood, 'philosophers might do more t o help t o resolve important practica l issues', and assertin g tha t the practica l implication s of hi s theory are grounded upon the combined metaethical and normatively ethica l elements withi n it . This claim appears t o be grounded upon two assumptions: firstly , tha t hi s variet y of ethica l theory i s a purely descriptiv e analysis of ethica l experience (and i s hence non-ideological): secondly, tha t certai n practica l recommendations or guidelines follo w from it . Both these assumptions are t o be questioned. 9. D.Miller, Philosophy and Ideology i n Hume's Politica l Thought (Oxford, 1981). - 226 - Kille r makes the poin t tha t i t may, strictl y speaking, be a contextual erro r t o apply the labels of 'liberal ' and 'conservative' a t al l when analysing the politica l thought of mid 18th century Britain , because there i s a sense i n which the distinctio n between modern liberalis m and conservatism only evolved as responses t o the French Revolution. However i t remains possible, I suggest, t o identif y those elements i n Hume's thought which were late r t o become assimilate d withi n these distinc t traditions . 10. I t i s an understanding which has naturall y generated a variet y of utilitarianis m which i s underpinned by the liberal-individualis t notio n of personal freedom. See fo r example J.S. Mill' s attempt t o justif y libert y i n terms of the utilit y principle . 11. R.G.Collingwood, Preface t o Guido de Rugger i o The Histor y of European Liberalism (Beacon Press, Boston, 1959) p.7. 12. C.L.Stevenson, JM Emotive Meaning e l Ethica l Terms (Harvard, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 1935) pp.142-143. 13. Stevenson, Ibid. , p.144. 14. Stevenson, Ibid . 15. R.M.Hare, The Language Pi Morals pp.77-78. 16. The notion of 'sympathy', or the benevolent concern fo r the predicament of others, i s a centra l feature of Hume's moral theory. 17. C.L.Stevenson, 'Value Judgements: thei r Implici t Generality' i n Ethica l Theory (Edited by Norman E. Bowie, Hackett Publishing Company, 1983). 18. R.M.Hare, Moral Thinking: It s Levels. Method and Point (Oxford, 1981) p.227. 19. Hare, Ibid. , p,228. I t i s t o be noted tha t Hare characterises a person who fail s t o adopt thi s form of critica l moral thinkin g as a 'fanatic'. I take thi s characterisatio n t o be ideological : i t i s t o identif y a type of person who fail s t o thin k and act morally i n the appropriate liberal-individualis t ideologica l sense. 20. J.L.Mackie, Ethics; Inventing Right a M Wrong (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1977) p.165. 2 1. Mackie, Ibid. , p.190. 22. I t i s a distinctio n which I thin k stil l holds independent of the issue as t o whether or not, and i n what sense, philosophica l analysi s - 227 - i s itsel f t o be understood as being always dependent upon the historica l context of it s articulation . 23. I t may be suggested tha t thi s 'self-autonomous* conception of man i s equally applicable t o existentialis t and anarchist ideologica l understandings, and tha t therefore non-cognitivism i s relate d t o these understandings as much as t o liberal-individualism . I suggest tha t thi s i s not so because the liberal-individualist , existentialist , and anarchist notions of self-autonomy possess differen t ideologica l sense as expressed i n differen t philosophica l traditions , and i t i s the liberal-individualis t notio n which i s expressed i n the philosophica l vocabulary of non-cognitivism. 24. J.L.Mackie, Ethics p.199. - 228 - 8. Berli n and Russell. 1. However, both Hare and Mackie have recentl y made thei r intention s more explici t by engaging i n normative ethic s of the kin d which they refraine d from doing i n the earl y expositions of thei r theories. 2. This libera l critiqu e of 'totalitarianism' , as set out i n the 1950's, was also notably expressed i n differen t ways by Popper and Talmon, 3. Non-cognitivist s have not, t o my knowledge, attended t o thi s second point , but i t follow s naturall y from thei r conception of value. 4. I.Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty ' (1958) i n Four Essays on Libert y (Oxford Universit y Press, 1969, Reprinted 1979) p.172. 5. W.H.F.Barnes, 'Is There A Realm Of Objective Values?' (unpublished paper 1933) p.25. 6. John Gray, 'On Negative and Positiv e Liberty ' i n Conceptions of Libert y i n Politica l Philosophy (edited by Pelczynski and Gray, The Athlone Press, London 1984) p.344. 7. I.Berlin, 'John Stuart Mil l and the Ends of Life ' (1959) i n Four Essays on Libert y pp. 200-1. 8. Berlin , Ibid. , p.201. 9. B.Russell, Philosophy and Politic s (Cambridge Universit y Press, 1946) p.7. 10. Russell, Ibid. , p.26. 11. Russell, Ibid. , p.27. 12. B.Russell, Religion and Science (London, Thornton Butterworth Ltd, 1935) pp. 230-231. 13. Russell, Ibid. , p.229. 14. Russell, Ibid. , p.242. 15. Russell, Ibid. , p.232. 16. Russell, Ibid . 17. Russell, Religion and Science p.241. Russell i s not of course assuming the possibilit y of a 'perfect harmony' of interests . This assumption i s metaphysical and Russell i s hostil e t o metaphysics. His use of the term 'harmony' i s purely metaphorical. 18. B.Russell, Philosophy and Politic s p.8. 19. Russell, Ibid . - 229 - 9. Proponents of Liberalism: Dunn. Rorty and Rawls, I . Dunn, 1. J. Dunn, 'The Future of Liberalism' i n Rethinking Modern Politica l Theory (Cambridge Universit y Press, 1985) pp. 154-170. 2. Dunn, Ibid. , p.163. 3. R. Hozick has recentl y advanced a version of moral realism i n Philosophical Explanations, but i t i s not clear how thi s notion relate s t o hi s Utopian theory as developed i n Anarchy, State and Utopia. 4. J. Rawls. 'Kantian Constructivism i n Moral Theory': the Dewey Lectures i n Journal of Philosophy (77, 1980) p.570. 5. J. Dunn, op. cit. , p,162. 6. Dunn, Ibid. , pp. 162-163. 7. Dunn, Ibid. , p.162. 8. Dunn, Ibid. , p.163. 9. Dunn, Ibid. , p.162. 10. Dunn, Ibid. , p.163. 11. Dunn, Ibid . 12. Dunn state s tha t thi s version of moral realism i s based on 'metaphysical foundations': I do not understand the sense i n which thi s i s so. I I . Rorty, 13. R. Rorty, 'Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism' i n the Journal of Philosophy (80, 1983) pp. 583-589. 14. Rorty, Ibid. , pp. 585-586. 15. Rorty, Ibid. , p.586. - 230 - 16. M. Sandel, Liberalism ami the Limit s of Justice (Mew York: Cambridge, 1982) p.179. 17. Rorty, op. cit. , p.586. 18. Rorty, Ibid. , p.584. 19. Rorty, Ibid. , p.587. 20. Rorty, Ibid. , p.586. 21. Rorty, Ibid. , pp. 586-587. 22. Rorty, Ibid. , p.587. 23. Rorty, Ibid. , pp. 584-585. 24. Rorty, Ibid. , p.585. 25. Rorty, Ibid . 26. Rorty, Ibid. , p.587. 27. Rorty, Ibid . 28. R. Rorty, 'From Logic t o Language t o Play' i n Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (June 1986) pp. 752-753. 29. R. Rorty, 'The Priorit y of Democracy t o Philosophy' i n The Virgini a Statute. o i ReUgiqus Freedom; It s Evolution and, Consequences la. American History. (Ed. by M.D. Peterson and R. Vaughan, Cambridge Universit y Press, 1988). Quoted i n R. Bernstein, 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward' i n Politica l Theory (November 1987). 30. Rorty, 'The Priorit y of Democracy t o Philosophy' p.9. 31. Rorty, Ibid . 32. Rorty, Ibid. , p.36. 33. R. Bernstein, 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward' i n Politica l Theory (November 1987) 34. Bernstein, Ibid. , p.557. 35. R. Rorty, 'Thugs and Theorists: A Reply t o Bernstein' i n Politica l Theory (November 1987). 36. Rorty, Ibid. , p.577. 37. Rorty, Ibid. , pp. 577-578. 38. Rorty, Ibid. , p.578. 39. Rorty, Ibid . 40. Rorty, Ibid. , p.577. 41. Rorty, 'From Logic t o Language t o Play' pp. 752-753. 42. Rorty, 'Thugs and Theorists' p.571. - 231 - 43. Rorty, Ibid. , p.578. 44. M. Oakeshott, Rationalism i n Politic s (Metbuen Press, 1962) p.197. 45. Rorty, 'The Priorit y of Democracy t o Philosophy* p.20. 46. Rorty, 'Thugs and Theorists' p.573. 47. Rorty, Ibid . 48. Rorty, Ibid , p.573. 49. R. Bernstein, 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward' p.556. We would not, however, want t o use the distinctl y Marxist sense of ideology which i s employed by Bernstein. III . Rawls. 1. J. Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness: Politica l not Metaphysical* i n Philosophy and Public Affair s (Summer 1985, Volume 14, No.3) p.223. 2. Rawls, Ibid., p.230. 3. Rawls, Ibid., p.228. 4. Rawls, Ibid., pp. 225-226. 5. Rawls, Ibid., p.227. 6. Rawls, Ibid. , p.231. 7. Rawls, Ibid . 8. Rawls, Ibid., p.240. 9. Rawls, Ibid., p.241. 10. Rawls, Ibid . 11. Rawls, Ibid. , p.242. 12. Rawls, Ibid. , p.243. 13. Rawls, Ibid. , p.244. 14. Rawls, Ibid. , p.230. 15. Rawls, Ibid . 16. Rawls, Ibid . - 232 - 10. Opposition t o Liberalism: Maclntyre, 1. A. Maclntyre, Afte r Virtue: a study i n moral theory (Duckworth, Second Edition , 1985) p.8. 2. Maclntyre, Ibid . 3. Maclntyre, Ibid. , p.9. 4. Macintyre, Ibid. , p.ll . 5. Maclntyre, Ibid,, p.22. 6. Maclntyre, Ibid . 7. Maclntyre, Ibid. , p.20. 8. Maclntyre, Ibid., pp. 20-21. 9. Maclntyre, Ibid., p.21. 10. Maclntyre, Ibid . 11. Maclntyre, Ibid . 12. J. Dunn, 'Identity , modernity, and the claim t o know better' (1981) i n Rethinking Modern Politica l Theory pp. 144-145. 13. A. Maclntyre, Afte r Virtue p.2. 14. Maclntyre, Ibid. , p.10. 15. Maclntyre, Ibid. , pp. 23-24. 16. Maclntyre, Ibid. , p.24. 17. A. Maclntyre, 'Moral Arguments and Social Contexts' i n the Journal of Philosophy (80, 1983) p.590. 

Maclntyre, Ibid . 19. Maclntyre, Ibid. , pp. 590-591. 

J. Dunn, 'Identity , modernity, and the claim t o know better' i n Rethinking Modern Politica l Theory p.144. 

R. Rorty, 'Thugs and Theorists' i n Politica l Theory (November 1987) p.574. 

J. Dunn, 'The Future of Liberalism' i n Rethinking Modern Politica l Theory p.169.