H. P. Grice reads Dunn and enjoys it!

9. ]G>^nnejtd^j^jHXbfir^^aR;J^HBA,,J{prty aad Rawls, I n the previous section we were concerned t o show how i n the recent past certai n libera l thinker s have adopted the noncognitivis t conception of value t o support thei r moral and politica l convictions. This raise s two furthe r relate d issues. The firs t i s whether non-cognitivism remains a philosophica l influence upon contemporary libera l theory. The second i s whether i t has had, and continues t o have, a practica l effec t on the shaping of liberal - democratic socia l and politica l life . Maclntyre gives reasons t o suggest tha t thi s i s so, and he contends tha t the theoretica l and practica l impact of non-cognitivism (Dr what he call s 'emotivism') on libera l societie s of the Western world has grave consequences. Before, however, we assess Maclntyre's argument, we must attend t o the present discussion on the stat e of liberalism . For various notable commentators have been engaged i n the task of specifyin g how modern liberalis m i s i n a conditio n of crisis , and have sought t o examine the possible futur e of the libera l understanding of moral and politica l life . The debate has focussed upon whether the distinctivel y libera l conception of the good lif e i s grounded upon sound enough theoretica l foundations, and can generate the epistemological and moral force necessary t o justif y practica l politica l actio n i n the world. I t must be noted from the outset, however, tha t any enquiry of thi s kin d wil l be misplaced i f i t i s based upon the mistaken notion tha t liberalis m i s theoretica l i n character. For we have seen tha t liberalis m i s t o be understood as an ideology which does not, strictl y speaking, constitut e a theoretica l understanding a t all . Therefore i t follow s tha t i t i s erroneous t o embark on any enquiry which seeks t o assess, philosophicall y reflec t upon, and resolve the theoretica l weaknesses of the libera l position , i f tha t enquiry i s believed t o be capable of conclusively informin g us of the 'truth ' of the libera l view through the provisio n of a new (and 'better') theoretica l account of it . - 159 - This i s because the libera l ideologica l positio n i s not i n itsel f theoretical , and i s not, therefore, capable of being demonstrated as eithe r tru e or fals e through any philosphica l reflection . lo r i s i t the kin d of account which, properl y comprehended, specifie s any practica l recommendations or programmes of actio n which can be criticall y examined. Rather, the ideologica l character of liberalis m i s such tha t i t constitute s a particula r portraya l of moral ideals which motivate a committed adherent t o act (i n the non-instrumental sense) i n a way appropriate t o the upholding of a relationshi p between persons. I t i s thi s moral sense of affirmin g a relationshi p which i s centra l t o the liberal , qua ideological , view, and i t i s established quit e independently from any elaborate theoretica l arguments which may be employed i n it s defence. What follow s from thi s i s the claim tha t there i s no necessary sense i n which the expositio n of a theoretica l weakness i n an argument which attempts t o justif y libera l ideologica l conviction s would undermine the confidence of the adherent, or endanger the futur e of liberalis m as an understanding which motivates people t o support a cause. I t remains psychologically possible fo r adherents of the libera l portraya l to retai n thei r commitment t o i t because thei r conviction s res t ultimatel y upon an act of faith , not a belie f i n it s theoretica l plausibility . The purpose of restatin g thi s characterisatio n of the form of ideology i s t o indicat e the limit s t o what the debate on the futur e of liberalis m can achieve: limit s which, I suggest, have not been perceived clearl y enough by certai n writers . I t i s t o contend tha t the futur e of liberalis m rest s ultimatel y upon the abilit y of libera l ideologist s t o capture and sustain the popular politica l imagination through the persuasive use of rhetori c i n the politica l arena, and not upon the intellectua l excellence of those politica l theorist s who attempt t o give t he libera l understanding a detailed , coherent, and convincing expression. However, i t i s t o be noted tha t although the success of the former i s not logicall y dependent upon the achievement of the latter , there i s nonetheless a connection between them. There i s a contingent sense i n which a particula r type of politica l actor, one who i s philosophicall y receptive, may fee l tha t hi s ideologica l commitment t o - 160 - libera l values i s undermined by the exposure of the implausibilit y of t he theoretica l argument by which he seeks t o justif y it . I t i s thi s contingent possibilit y of the politica l disillusionmen t of the philosophicall y receptive audience which makes the current debate on t he philosophica l credential s of the various theoretica l arguments used t o defend libera l ideology both interestin g and important. For i t i s t o rais e the question as t o whether modern libera l ideologica l belief s are being given the convincing theoretica l expression which may support, a t t he psychologically contingent level , the ethica l conviction s of the committed. By way of answering thi s question, we shal l firstl y examine t he arguments of John Dunn. ( I ) John Punn, In an articl e entitle d 'The Future of Liberalism' (1) John Dunn identifie s (amongst others) two major varietie s of modern libera l theory which are relevant t o our present discussion. The firs t kind , which Dunn call s 'Cold Var Liberalism', was advanced most notably i n t he 1950's by thinker s such as Berlin , Popper and Talmon. (Bertrand Russell could also be included i n thi s list) . I t i s a theory which concentrates primaril y on the metaphysical assumptions of the 'totalitarian ' politica l understanding, and seeks t o identif y the practica l politica l possibilitie s which i t i s imperative t o avoid, and which have not been avoided i n actual politica l regimes withi n the Soviet bloc. Dunn argues tha t although as a styl e of socia l and politica l theory 'Cold War Liberalism' has a valuable negative appeal i n specifyin g the range of what counts as politicall y prudent action , i t does not generate any positiv e justification s fo r Western liberal - democratic practices. I n short , i t lacks positiv e moral force. The second kin d of theory, which Dunn call s 'Utopian Liberalism', emerged i n the 1970's and i s expressed most notably by John Raw I s and Robert Nozick, As he point s out, thi s Kantian styl e of libera l theory i s Utopian i n the sense tha t i t constitute s an attempt t o construct an idea l or hypothetica l situatio n - which Rawls call s the 'initia l position ' i n a 'vei l of ignorance* - from which i t i s possible t o derive - 161 - certai n rationa l grounds fo r conduct which al l agents would accept despite thei r conflictin g interests - Dunn insist s tha t the weakness of thi s type of revived 'contractarian' theory, lik e it s 17th and 18th century predecessors, i s tha t i t offer s a purely abstrac t account of how ethica l and politica l value should be conceived which does not, as a consequence, provide a convincing account of why 'human beings have good reason t o act i n the politica l setting s i n which they happen t o fin d themselves' (2). That is , i t i s a traditio n of libera l theorisin g which fail s t o guide the actions of politica l actors who fin d themselves i n the specifi c politica l settin g of Western libera l democracies. For Dunn, therefore, both 'Cold War Liberalism' and 'Utopian Liberalism' lack sufficien t practica l moral and politica l force. He suggests tha t the underlying reason why thi s i s so i s tha t both style s of libera l theory appear t o be based on morally anti-realis t assumptions. This assumption i s clearl y apparent i n 'Cold War Liberalism*, where thinker s such as Berlin , Russell and Popper express thei r libera l views i n the (broadly) empiricis t philosophica l traditio n and associated non-cognitivis t styl e of ethica l theorising . Likewise, 'Utopian Liberals ' such as Rawls appear t o be committed, although fo r differen t philosophica l reasons, t o a rejectio n of moral realism. (3) Thus we fin d Rawls arguing, i n typicall y Kantian terms, tha t our notions of moral fact , trut h and objectivit y are not independently given t o us by 'the poin t of view of the universe', but are rather created withi n a suitabl y constructed socia l poin t of view. (4) Dunn argues tha t thi s attachment t o moral anti-realis m makes a difference . He write s tha t The view tha t adult human beings can be and ought t o be sovereign over thei r own live s i s a very differen t view i f i t i s grounded on epistemologically wel l founded claims about the nature of human rationalit y and the character of value fo r man than i t can be i f i t i s grounded merely on the presumption tha t there are no authoritativ e values externa l t o human preference and choice t o which the latte r have any good reason t o defer. The view tha t what the good fo r the human individua l i s i s something which i s - 162 - ultimatel y and full y and solel y up t o tha t individua l t o see, t o judge, and therefore t o decide, i s corrosiv e of any conception of externa l obligatio n and of society as a frame of non-discretionary responsibilities . (5) Dunn's idea appears t o be tha t both 'Cold War Liberalism' and 'Utopian Liberalism' have been guilt y of overzealously rejectin g the possibilit y of basing our sense of obligatio n and responsibilit y upon some version of moral realism. He wishes t o indicat e how the underlying assumption tha t there i s no sense whatsoever i n which human values relat e t o something externa l t o the expressed desires or purposes of individual s has the consequence of placin g these varietie s of liberalis m on very shaky ground. Referring t o the Utopian variety , Dunn continues: To see society as a whole simply as a facilit y fo r the provisio n of individuall y acceptable experiences and t o seek t o reconstitut e i t i n imagination so tha t i t can furnis h these t o the larges t possible degree wil l only be a morally commanding visio n where t he experiences which individual s happen t o fin d acceptable have already been rendered (through effectiv e socialisation ) reasonably unrevoltin g t o each other or where the force of human values has been so devastated tha t the idea of a visio n possessing the force of moral command has become utterl y incoherent. (6) For Dunn, therefore, t o adopt an anti-realis t and individualis t conception of value i s t o face a serious dilemma i n attempting t o sustain the moral force required t o establis h a clear sense of moral obligatio n amongst persons. For one of two condition s must obtain: eithe r the moral force rest s upon the contingent fac t tha t people happen t o be able t o harmonise thei r 'self-interest ' wit h the socia l good, i n which case i f and when such socia l harmony breaks down, then there i s no sense of moral value or obligatio n which can be firml y distinguishe d from the purely prudentia l pursui t of sel f gain; or thi s harmony has already broken down and, i n consequence, the danger of nihilis m i s realised , and the notio n of a moral command has become incoherent. This must be, Dunn argues, the dilemma which most acutely - 163 - faces any libera l theoretica l argument which excludes the possibilt y of accounting fo r moralit y withi n some version of moral realism. I t i s only i f libera l theory seeks a 'solid foundation i n moral realism' (7) tha t these dangers can be overcome, and, i n particular , 'Utopian Liberalism i n any form' can be 'robust enough t o stand the gales of the future'. (8) For what i s needed, he suggests, i s a prudentia l and sociologicall y sensitiv e liberalis m which casts prudence as the centra l politica l virtue , but i n a manner which sustains the collectiv e sense of moral obligatio n i n Western societies . What, then, i s the type of moral realism which Dunn i s suggesting tha t liberalis m should targe t i n the possible achievement of thi s task? I t i s not one which i s founded upon a metaphysically idealis t or 'Platonic' conception of absolute value. (I t i s thi s kin d of metaphysics which the libera l theoretica l tradition , i n both it s empiricis t and Kantian modes, has been a t great pains t o refute.) Nor i s i t one which can be stated along straightforwar d naturalist-utilitaria n lines . Nonetheless, i t would be a version of moral realism which established tha t 'what tru e human values are i s vali d apprehensions of key aspects of what i s the case about human existence' (9). How one obvious feature of human existence i s it s socia l dimension, and Dunn discerns the possibilit y of establishin g a morally realis t conception of value which relate s t o the socia l character of man and the socia l relation s and environment which has (at leas t partially ) shaped him. Thus he argues tha t 'the most promising approach.... would be tD construct a libera l politica l theory i n direc t relatio n t o the institutiona l substance of (and the distributio n of power within ) existin g states.' (10) For what he wants i s the formulation of a libera l conception of politica l value as a theory of modern politic s which i s not dependent upon a purely abstrac t and 'supposedly timeless meditation on the Form of the Good (or Just) ' (11), and which avoids the difficultie s of justificatio n which i s inherent i n both the individualis t or subjective views advanced by 'Cold War Liberalism' and 'Utopian Liberalism'. Such a theory would, fo r Dunn, have the advantage of justifyin g the practica l actions of persons who fin d themselves occupying the actual socia l settin g of Western libera l democracies, and providin g the moral reasons f o r sustainin g the relationship s established therein . (12) - 164 - This variet y of moral realism, therefore, i s being required t o perform the task of providin g a theoretica l justificatio n fo r practica l politica l actio n conducted withi n libera l democratic societies . Where, however, are it s philosophica l root s t o be discerned? What Dunn appears t o have i n mind (although he does not specif y thi s i n any detail ) i s tha t these foundations relat e broadly t o what has been calle d the 'Wittgensteinian' notio n of objectivity ; a nation which explicitl y reject s the traditiona l classificatio n of what counts as a claim t o objective knowledge i n terms of a knowing subject who possesses a given 'sel f standing independently from the externa l world of objects which he more or less accurately represents. Rather, thi s notion of objectivit y (and the sense of moral realism which relate s t o it ) presupposes tha t our conception of selfhood i s (at least partially ) sociall y constitute d by the ethical , cultural , and ultimatel y linguisti c practices withi n which i t find s itself . Thus our claims t o objective knowledge are specifiabl e i n terras of our mastery of the linguisti c rules which constitut e these practices. According t o thi s theory, the meaning of the linguisti c practice s i s established prio r to , and independently from, any individua l appreciative understanding of them, and determines the possible range of intelligibl e individua l responses t o them. I t i s a view which i s associated wit h the conceptual poin t that , withi n a particula r linguisti c practice , i t i s our communal sense of who 'we' are which stands prio r to , determines, and (at least partially ) constitute s our individua l sense of who 'I ' am. I t i s thi s notio n of the priorit y and independence of the communal understanding i n relatio n t o individua l experiences of i t which generates the sense of objectivit y i n terms of our individua l mastery of something (tha t is , linguisti c rules ) which stands independently from us. According t o thi s view, fo r example, the arithmetica l rul e tha t 2+2=4 i s an objective trut h which i s determined by a convention: the sense of thi s trut h has t o be learn t by a subject who recognises it s validit y afte r being taught t o master the practic e of addition . Further, thi s process of learning t o master the rule s of a practic e generates a sense of objectivit y which, i t i s argued, i s equally applicable t o our ethica l as much as t o our scientifi c rule - followin g practices. This i s because, i t i s claimed, although the nature - 165 - of our moral and scientifi c understandings diffe r i n tha t they possess differen t substantive contents, and refe r t o differen t kinds of objects, they are nonetheless both based upon certai n human practice s of conventional rule-followin g which take the same logical form, and are therefor e on an equal objective footing . I t seems plausibl e t o suggest, then, tha t i t i s (at leas t broadly speaking) thi s notion of objectivity , and the variet y of (moral) realism generated withi n it , which Dunn i s requirin g libera l theory t o adopt. For he reject s the individualis t and anti-realis t arguments advanced i n the two major varietie s of contemporary libera l moral and politica l thought. And we can see tha t he i s also implicitl y rejectin g the noncognitivis t conception of value tha t the 'Cold War Liberals ' have tended t o rel y on. A similia r lin e of approach has been employed by Richard Rorty and Alasdair Maclntyre, who have both sought t o undermine the theoretica l plausibilit y of the liberal-individualis t positio n by criticisin g the notion of the individua l subject as being possessed of a given self-identit y which i s clearl y distinguishabl e from the externa l world of objects. I t becomes our task, then, t o examine the arguments of Rorty and Maclntyre i n detail , and consider Rawls' most recent response t o criticism s levelle d a t hi s position . For i t i s important t o note tha t i n making these criticism s of Rawls' theory i n particula r and liberal-individualis m i n general, Rorty and Itaclntyr e diffe r radicall y about the question of the possibilit y of the libera l understanding as such being re-evaluated and justifie d withi n a suitabl y transformed theoretica l framework.