H. P. Grice defends G. M. Moore contra Norman Malcolm

1946. The sceptic’s implicatum, common sense and scepticism, repr. in Studies in the way of words, in part II, explorations in semantics and metaphysics, as essay 8, and 'G. E. Moore and Philosopher's Paradoxes,' as essay 9, 1953, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 4-folder 13, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: common sense, scepticism, implicatum, the sceptic's implicature, philosopher's paradox, paradox, G. E. Moore, ordinary language, 'ordinary-language' philosophy, Norman Malcolm. The sceptic’s implicatum. While Grice groups these two essays as dealing with one single theme, strictly, only this or that philosopher's paradox (not all) may count as 'sceptical.' This or that philosopher's paradox may well NOT be 'sceptic' but rather 'dogmatic' at all. In fact, Grice defines 'philosopher's paradox' as anything ‘repugnant to common sense,’ shocking, or extravagant ‒ to Malcolm's ears, that is! While it is, strictly, slightly odd to quote this as ‘(1946)’ just because, by a stroke of the pen, Grice writes that date in the Harvard volume, we will follow his charming practice. This is vintage Grice. Grice always takes the sceptic's challenge seriously, as any serious philosopher should. Grice's takes both the sceptic's explicatum and the sceptics's implicatum as self-defeating, as a very affront to our idea of rationality, conversational or other. V: ‘Conversations with a sceptic: Can he be slightly more conversational helpful?’ Hume's sceptical attack is partial, and targeted only towards practical reason, though.  Yet, for Grice, reason is one. You cannot really attack 'practical' or buletic reason without attacking 'theoretical' or doxastic reason. There is such thing as a general 'rational acceptance,' to use Grice's term, that the sceptic is getting at. Grice likes to play with the idea that ultimately every syllogism is buletic or practical. If, say, a syllogism by Eddington looks doxastic, that is because Eddington cares to 'omit the practical tail,' as Grice puts it. And Eddington is not even a philosopher, they say. Grice is here concerned with a Cantabrigian topic popularised by G. E. Moore. As Grice recollects, Some like Witters, but Moore's my man. Unlike Cambridge analysts such as Moore, Grice sees himself as a 'linguistic-turn' Oxonian analyst. So it is only natural that Grice would connect time-honoured scepticism (of Pyrrho's vintage) and common sense with 'ordinary language', so mis-called, the elephant in Grice's room. σκέψις , εως, ἡ, (σκέπτομαι)A.viewing, perception by the senses, ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ς. Pl.Phd.83a; observation of auguries, Hdn. 8.3.7. II. examination, speculation, consideration,’τὸ εὕρημα πολλῆς σκέψιος‘ Hp. VM4, cf. Pl. Alc.1.130d; βραχείας ς. Id. Tht. 201a; ϝέμειν ς. take thought of a thing, v.l. in E. Hipp.1323; ἐνθεὶς τῇ τέχνῃ ς. Ar. Ra. 974; ‘ς. ποιεῖσθαι‘ Pl. Phdr.237d;’ς. προβέβληκας‘ Id. Phlb. 65d;’ς. λόγων‘ Id. R.336e; ς. περί τινος inquiry into, speculation on a thing, Id. Grg.487e, etc.; ‘περί τι‘ Id. Lg. 636d;’ἐπὶ σκέψιν τινὸς ἐλθεῖν‘ X. Oec. 6.13.2. speculation, inquiry,’ταῦτα ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως‘ Arist. Pol. 1254a34; ἔξω τῆς νῦν ς. Id. Ph. 228a20; οὐκ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης ς. Id. EN1155b9, etc.3. hesitation, doubt, esp. of the Sceptic or Pyrthonic philosophers, AP7. 576 (Jul.); the Sceptic philosophy, S.E.P.1.5; οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ς. the Sceptics, ib.229.4. in politics, resolution, decree, ‘συνεδρίον‘ Hdn.4.3.9, cf. Poll.6.178. If scepticism attacks common sense and fails, Grice seems to be implicating, that ‘ordinary' language philosophy is a good antidote to scepticism. Since what language other than 'ordinary' language' does common sense speak? Well, strictly, common sense doesn't speak. The man in the street does. Grice addresses this topic in a Mooreian way in a later essay, also repr. in Studies, 'G. E. Moore and philosopher's paradoxes,' repr. in Studies in the Way of Words. As with his earlier 'Common sense and scepticism,' Grice tackles Moore's and Malcolm's claim that 'ordinary' language, so-called, solves a few of 'philosopher''s paradoxes. 'Philosopher' is Grice's witty way to generalise over your common-or-garden, any, philosopher, especially of the type he found eccentric, the sceptic included. Grice finds this or that problem in this overarching Cantabrigian manoeuvre, as over-simplifying a pretty convoluted terrain. While he cherishes Austin's 'Some like Witters, but Moore's MY man!' Grice finds Moore too Cantabrigian to his taste. While an Oxonian thoroughbred, Grice is a bit like Austin, 'Some like Witters, but Moore's my man,' with this or that caveat. Again, as with his treatment of Descartes or Locke, Grice is hardly interested in finding out what Moore really means. He is a philosopher, not a historian of philosophy, and he knows it. While Grice agrees with Austin's implicature that Moore goes well above Witters, if that's the expression ('even if some like him'), we should find the Oxonian equivalent to Moore. Grice would NOT name Ryle, since he sees him, and his followers, almost every day. There is something apostolic about Moore that Grice enjoys, which is just as well, seeing that Moore is one of the 'twelve.' Grice found it amusing that the members of the Conversazione Society would still be nicknamed 'apostles' 'when their number exceeded the initial 12.' Grice spends some time exploring what Malcolm, a follower of Witters, which does not help, as it were, has to say about Moore in connection with that particularly Oxonian turn of phrase, such as ''ordinary' language' is. For Malcolm's Moore, a 'paradox' by a 'philosopher' arises when 'philosopher' fails to abide by the dictates of 'ordinary' language. This infuriates Grice. Surely the ordinary man says ridiculous, or silly, as Russell prefers, things, such as ‘Smith is lucky,’ ‘Departed spirits walk along this road on their way to Paradise,’ ‘I know there are infinite stars,’ and ‘I wish I were Napoleon,’ or  ’I wish that I had been Napoleon,’ which does not mean that the utterer wishes that he were like Napoleon, but that he wishes that he had lived not in the his century but in the XVIIIth century. Grice is being specific about this. It is true that an ordinary use of language, as Malcolm suggests, cannot be self-contradictory unless the ‘ordinary use of language’ is defined by stipulation as not self-contradictory, in which case an appeal to ordinary language becomes useless against this or that paradox by Philosopher. 'I wish that I had been Napoleon’ seems to involve nothing but an ordinary use of language by any standard but that of freedom from absurdity. ‘I wish that I had been Napoleon’ is not, as far as Grice can see, ‘philosophical,’ but something which may have been said and meant by numbers of ordinary people. Yet, ‘I wish that I had been Napoleon’ is open to the suspicion of self-contradictoriness, absurdity, or some other kind of meaninglessness. And in this context suspicion is all Grice needs. By uttering ‘I wish that I had been Napoleon’ U hardly means the same as he would if he uttered ‘I wish I were like Napoleon.' 'I wish that I had been Napoleon’ is suspiciously self-contradictory, absurd, or meaningless, if, as uttered by an utterer in a century other than the XVIIIth century, say, the utterer is understood as expressing the proposition that the utterer wishes that he had lived in the XVIIIth century, and not in his century, in which case he-1 wishes that he had not been him-1? But blame it on the buletic. That Moore himself is not too happy with Malcolm's criticism can be witnessed by a cursory glimpse at hi 'reply' to Malcolm. Grice is totally against this view that Malcolm ascribes to Moore as a view that is too broad to even claim to be true. Grice's implicature is that Malcolm is appealing to Oxonian turns of phrase, such as 'ordinary' language,' but not taking proper Oxonian care in clarifying the nuances and stuff in dealing with, admittedly, a non-Oxonian philosopher such as Moore. When dealing with Moore, Grice is not necessarily concerned with scepticism. 'Time is unreal,' e.g. is hardly a sceptic utterance. Yet Grice lists it as one of Philosopher's paradoxes. So, there are various keywords to consider here. Grice would start with ‘common sense.’ That's what he does when he reprints this essay in Studies in the way of words, with his attending note in both the 'Preface' and the 'Retrospective Epilogue' on how he organizes the themes and strands. 'Common sense' is one keyword there. Scepticism is another. It is intriguing that in the first two essays opening Part II, ‘Explorations in semantics and metaphysics’ in Way of Words, it seems it’s Malcolm, rather than the dryer Moore, who interests Grice most. While he would provide exegeses of this or that dictum by Moore, and indeed, Moore’s response to Malcolm, Grice seems to be more concerned with applications of his own views. Notably in ‘Philosopher’s Paradoxes.’ The ‘fatal’ objection Grice finds for the paradox-propounder (not necessarily a sceptic, although a sceptic may be one of the paradox propounders) significantly rests on Grice's reductive analysis of 'meaning that ...' as ascribed to this or that utterer U. Grice elaborates on circumstances that he’ll later take up in the 'Retrospective Epilogue. 'I find myself not understanding what I mean' is dubiously acceptable. If meaning, Grice is saying, is about an utterer U intending to get his addressee A to believe that U ψ-s that p, U must think there is a good chance that A will recognise what he is supposed to believe, by, perhaps, being aware of the U's practice or by a supplementary explanation which might come from U. In which case, U should not be meaning what Malcolm claims he might mean. No utterer should intend his addressee to believe what is ‘conceptually impossible,’ or incoherent, or blatantly false (‘Charles I’s decapitation willed Charles I’s death.’), unless you are Queen in ‘Through the Looking Glass.’ 'I believe five impossible things before breakfast, and I hope you'll soon get the proper training to follow suit ‒ cf. Tertulian, ‘Credo, quia absurdum est.’ Admittedly, Grice edits the ‘Philosopher’s Paradoxes’ essay. It is only Grice's final objection which is reprinted in Studies, even if he provides a good detailed summary of the previous sections. Grice appeals to Moore on later occasions. In ‘Causal Theory,’ Grice lists, as a third philosophical mistake, the opinion by Malcolm that Moore did not know how to use ‘know.’ Grice brings up the same example again in ‘Prolegomena.’ The use of Moore may well be a misuse. While at Madison, Wisconsin, he is lecturing at that a hall eccentrically-built with indirect lighting simulating actual sun rays, Moore infamously utters, ‘I know that there is a window behind that curtain,’ when there was not. In 'Retrospective Epilogue,' Grice uses ‘M’ to abbreviate Moore’s fairy godmother – along with G (Grice’s), A (Austin’s), R (Ryle’s) and Q (Quine’s)! One simple way to approach Grice's quandary with Malcolm's quandary with Moore is then to focus on 'know.' How can Malcolm claim that Moore is guilty of misusing 'know'? The most extensive exploration by Grice on 'know' is in Grice's third William James lecture (but cf. his seminar on 'Knowledge and belief,' and his remarks on 'Some of our beliefs NEED to be true,' in 'Meaning revisited.' The examinee knows that the battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815. Nothing odd about that, nor about Moore's uttering 'I know these are my hands.' Grice is perhaps the only one of the Oxonian philosophers of Austin's play group who took 'common sense' so seriously, if only to crticise Malcom's zeal with it. For Grice, common sense = ordinary language, whereas for the typical Austinian, ‘ordinary language’ = the language of the man in the street. Grice is contesting the usual criticism that Oxford ‘ordinary-language’ philosophers defend common-sense assumptions just because the way non-common-sense philosophers talk is not ‘ordinary’ language. Grice was infuriated by all this unclear chatter, and chooses Malcolm’s mistreatment of Moore as an example. He possible was fearful to consider Austin’s claims directly!