Grice's Rhapsody on a Theme by Peirce

1948. Peirceian reflections, Grice’s rhapsody on a theme by Peirce, intending, intender, agency, meaning, repr. in Studies in the way of words, part II, explorations in semantics and metaphysics, as essay 14, The Oxford Philosophical Society, The Philosophical Review, vol. 66,  pp. 377-88, C. S. Peirce's theory of signs, cf. meaning revisited, philosophical psychology, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (The Essays of H. P. Grice), carton 1-folder 16 and carton 4-folder 5, and Series V (Topical), carton 8-folder 29, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keyword: sign, meaning, intention, Peirce, Stevenson, Welby, Ewing, Ogden, Richards. The Peirce in Grice’s soul. ‘Meaning’ provides an excellent springboard to Grice to centre his analysis on 'psychological' or 'soul-y' verbs as involving the agent and the first person: smoke only figuratively 'means' fire, and the expression 'smoke' only figuratively (or metabolically) 'means' that there is fire. It is this or that utterer (say, Grice) who means, say, by uttering ‘Where there's smoke there's fire,’ or ‘ubi fumus, ibi ignis,’ that where there's smoke there's fire. A meantNN something by x is (roughly) equivalent to utterer U intends the utterance of x to produce some effect in his addressee A by means of the recognition of this intention’; and we may add that to ask what U means is to ask for a specification of the intended effect - though, of course, it may not always be possible to get a straight answer involving a 'that'-clause, for example, a belief that ... He does provide a more specific example involving the 'that'-clause at a later stage. By uttering x the utterer U means that-ψ­_b-dp iff (Ǝ.φ).(Ǝ.f).(Ǝ.c): I. U utters x intending x to be such that anyone who has φ will think that (i) x has f  (ii) f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p (iii) (Ǝ.φ'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ' will think, via thinking (i) and (ii), that U ψ-s that p (iv) in view of (3), U ψ-s that p; and II (operative only for certain substituends for 'ψ_b-d'). U utters x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has φ, he will, via thinking (iv), himself ψ that p; and III. It is not the case that, for some inference-element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ will both (i') rely on E in coming to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p and (ii') think that (Ǝ.φ'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ' will come to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p without relying on E. Besides St. John The Baptist, and Salome, Grice cites few names in ‘Meaning.’ But he makes a point about C. L. Stevenson! For Stevenson, smoke 'means' fire. ‘Meaning’ develops out of an interest by Grice on the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. In his essays on Peirce, Grice quotes from many other authors, including, besides Peirce himself (!), C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, and A. C. Ewing, or ‘A. C. 'Virtue is not a fire-shovel' Ewing,’ as Grice called him, and this or that cricketer! Grice had no intention to submit ‘Meaning’ to publication! Bennett, however, guessed that Grice had decided to publish it in 1957, just a year after his ‘Defence of a dogma.’ Bennett's argument is that ‘Defence of a dogma’ pre-supposes some notion of 'meaning.’ However, a different story may be told, not necessarily contradicting Bennett's! It is Strawson who submits the essay by Grice to ‘The Philosophical Review.’ Strawson had attended Grice's talk on Meaning for The Oxford Philosophical Society, and liked it! Since ‘In defence of a dogma’ was co-written with Strawson, the intention Bennett ascribes to Grice may well have been Strawson's. Oddly, Strawson later provides a famous alleged counter-example to Grice on meaning in ‘Intention and convention in speech acts,’ which has Grice dedicating a full William James lecture (No. 5) to it! An interesting fact, that confused a few, is that H. L. A. Hart quotes from Grice's ‘Meaning’ in his critical review of Holloway for The Philosophical Quarterly. Hart quotes Grice pre-dating the publication of ‘Meaning.’ Hart's point is that Holloway should have gone to Oxford! In ‘Meaning,’ Grice may be seen as a practitioner of 'ordinary-language' philosophy: witness his explorations of the factivity or lack thereof of various uses of ‘to mean.’ The second part of the essay, for which he became philosophically especially popular, takes up an intention-based approach to semantic notions. The only authority Grice cites, in typical Oxonian fashion, is Stevenson, who, from The New World (and via Yale, too!) had been defending an emotivist theory of ethics, and making a few remarks on how ‘to mean’ is used, with scare quotes, in something like a 'causal' account (‘Smoke 'means' fire.’). After its publication Grice's account received ‘almost as many alleged counterexamples as rule-utilitarianism’ (B. J. Harrison), but mostly outside Oxford, and in The New World. New-World philosophers seem to have seen Grice's attempt as reductionist and as oversimplifying. At Oxford, the sort of counterexample Grice received, before Strawson, was of the Urmson-type: refined, and subtle. 'I think your account leaves bribery behind.' On the other hand, in the New World ‒ in what Grice calls the ‘Latter-Day School of Nominalism,’ Quine is having troubles with empiricism. ‘Meaning’ was reprinted in various collections, notably in P. F. Strawson's Philosophical Logic (and it should be remembered that it was Strawson who had the thing typed and submitted for publication!). Why ‘Meaning’ should be reprinted in a collection on ‘Philosophical Logic’ only Strawson knows! But Grice does say that his account may help clarify the meaning of '... entails...'! It may be Strawson's implicature that Parkinson should have reprinted (and not merely credited) Grice's Meaning in HIS series for Oxford on ‘The theory of meaning’! The preferred quotation for Griceians is of course Grice 1948, seeing that Grice recalled the exact year when he gave the talk for the Philosophical Society at Oxford! It is however, the publication in The Philosophical Review, rather than the quieter evening at the Oxford Philosophical Society, that occasioned a tirade of alleged counter-examples by New-World philosophers. Granted, one or two Oxonians ‒ Urmson and Strawson ‒ fell in! Urmson criticises the sufficiency of Grice's account, by introducing an alleged counter-example involving bribery. Grice will consider a way out of Urmson's alleged counter-example in his fifth Wiliam James Lecture, rightly crediting and thanking Urmson for this! Strawson's alleged counter-example was perhaps slightly more serious, if regressive. It also involves the sufficiency of Grice's analysis. Strawson's ‘rat-infested house’ alleged counter-example started a chain which required Grice to avoid, ultimately, any 'sneaky' intention by way of a recursive clause to the effect that, for utterer U to have meant that p, all meaning-constitutive intentions should be 'above board.' But why this obsession by Grice with 'mean'? He is being funny. Spots surely don't mean, only ‘mean.’They don't have a mind. Yet Grice opens with a specific sample. Those spots mean, to the doctor, that you, dear, have measles. Mean? Yes, dear, 'mean,' doctor's orders. Those spots 'mean' measles. But how does the doctor know? Can't he be in the wrong? Not really, 'mean' is factive, dear! Or so Peirce thought. Grice is amazed that Peirce thought that some meaning is factive. 'The hole in this piece of cloth 'means' that a bullet went through is' is one of Peirce's examples. Surely, as Grice notes, this is an unhappy example. The hole in the cloth may well have caused by something else, or 'fabricated.' (Or 'the postmark 'means' that the letter went through the post.') Yet, Grice was having Oxonian tutees aware that Peirce was krypto-technical. Grice chose for one of his pre-’Meaning’ seminars (i.e. 1947) on Peirce's 'general' theory of signs, with emphasis on 'general,' and Peirce's correspondence with Lady Welby. Peirce, rather than the Vienna circle, becomes, in vein with Grice's dissenting irreverent rationalism, important as a source for Grice's attempt to 'English' Peirce. Grice's implicature seems to be that Peirce, rather than Ayer, cared for the subtleties of 'meaning' and 'sign', never mind a verificationist theory about them! Peirce ultra-Latinate-cum-Greek taxonomies have Grice very nervous, though. He knew that his students were proficient in the classics, but still! Grice thus proposes to reduce all of Peirceian divisions and sub-divisions (‘one sub-division too many’) to 'mean.' In the proceedings, he quotes from Ogden, Richards, and Ewing. In particular, Grice was fascinated by Peirce's correspondence with Lady Viola Welby, as reprinted by Ogden/Richards in, well, their study on the 'meaning' of meaning! Grice thought 'the science of symbolism' pretentious, but then he almost thought Lady Viola Welby 'slightly pretentious, too, if you've seen her; beautiful lady!' It is via Peirce that Grice explores examples such as those spots 'meaning' measles. Peirce's obsession is with weathercocks almost as Ockham was with circles on wine-barrels. Old-World Grice's use of New-World Peirce is illustrative, thus, of the Oxonian linguistic turn focused on 'ordinary' language. While Peirce's background was not philosophical, Grice thought it comical enough. He would say that Peirce is an 'amateur,' but then he said the same thing about Mill, whom Grice had to study by heart to get his B. A. Lit. Hum.! Plus, as Watson commented, ‘What's wrong with 'amateur'? Give me an amateur philosopher ANY day, if I have to choose from 'professional' Hegel!’ In finding Peirce krypo-technical, Grice is ensuing that his tutees, and indeed any Oxonian philosophy student (he was university lecturer) be aware that 'to mean' should be more of a priority than this or that jargon by this or that (New World?) philosopher!? Partly! Grice wanted his students to think on their own, and draw their own conclusions! Grice cites A. C. Ewing, Ogden/Richards, and many others. A. C. Ewing, while Oxford-educated, had ended up at Cambridge (Scruton almost had him as his tutor!) and written some points on ‘Meaninglessness’! ‘Those spots mean measles.’ Grice finds Peirce 'krypto-technical' and proposes to ‘English’ him into an 'ordinary-language' philosopher. Surely it is not 'important' whether we consider a measles spot a 'sign,' a 'symbol,' or an 'icon.' One might just as well find a doctor in London who thinks those spots 'symbolic.' If Grice feels like Englishing Peirce, he does not altogether fail! 1957. Meaning, reprints, of 'Meaning' and other essays, a collection of reprints and offprints of Grice's essays. Meaning becomes a central topic of at least two strands in ‘Retrospective epilogue.’ The first strand concerns the idea of the centrality of the utterer. What Grice there calls ‘meaning BY’ (versus meaning TO), i.e. as he also puts it, ‘active or agent’s meaning.’ Surely he is right in defending an agent-based account to ‘meaning.’ Peirce need not, but Grice must, because he is working with an English root, ‘mean,’ that is only figurative applicable to non-agentive items (‘Smoke ‘means’ rain’). On top, Grice wants to conclude that only RATIONAL creatures (like persons) can meanNN properly. Non-human animals may have a correlate. This is a truly important point for Grice since he surely is seen as promoting a NON-convention-based approach to ‘meaning,’ and also defending from the charge of circularity in the non-semantic account of propositional attitudes. His final picture is a rationalist one. Pirot₁ wants to communicate about a danger to Pirot₂. This presupposes there IS a danger (item of reality). Then Pirot₁ *believes* there is a danger, and communicates to Pirot₂ that there is a danger. This simple view of conversation as rational co-operation underlies Grice’s account of meaning too, now seen as an offshoot of philosophical psychology, and indeed biology, as he puts it. Meaning as yet another survival mechanism. While he would never use a cognate like ‘significance’ in his Oxford Philosophical Society talk, Grice eventually starts to use such Latinate cognates at a later stage of his development. In ‘Meaning,’ Grice does not explain his goal. By sticking with a root that the Oxford curriculum did not necessarily recognised as 'philosophical' (amateur Peirce did!), Grice is implicating that he is starting an 'ordinary-language' botanising on his own repertoire! Grice was amused by A. C. Ewing's reliance on very Oxonian examples contra Freddie Ayer: ‘Surely ‘Virtue ain't a fire-shovel’ is perfectly meaningful, and if fact true, if, I'll admit, somewhat misleading and practically purposeless at Cambridge.’ Again, Grice's dismissal of ‘natural’ meaning is due to the fact that ‘natural meaning’ prohibits its use in the first person and followed by a 'that'-clause. ‘I mean-N that p’ sounds absurd, no communication-function seems in the offing. Grice found, with Suppes, all types of primacy (ontological, axiological, psychological) in utterer's meaning. In 'Retrospective epilgoeu,' he goes back to the topic, as he reminisces that it is his suggestion that there are two allegedly distinguishable meaning concepts, even if one is 'metabolical,' which may be called 'natural' meaning and 'non-natural' meaning. There is this or that test (notably factivity-entailment vs. cancelation, but also scare quotes) which may be brought to bear to distinguish one concept from the other. We may, for example, inquire whether a particular occurrence of the predicate 'mean' is factive or non-factive, i. e., whether for it to be true that [so and so] means that p, it does or does not have to be the case that it is true that p. Again, one may ask whether the use of quotation marks to enclose the specification of what is meant would be inappropriate or appropriate. If factivity is present and quotation marks is be inappropriate, we have a case of natural meaning. Otherwise the meaning involved is non-natural meaning. We may now ask whether there is a single overarching idea which lies behind both members of this dichotomy of uses to which the predicate 'meaning that ...' seems to be subject. If there is such a central idea it might help to indicate to us which of the two concepts is in greater need of further analysis and elucidation and in what direction such elucidation should proceed. Grice confesses that he has only fairly recently come to believe that there is such an overarching idea and that it is indeed of some service in the proposed inquiry. The idea behind both uses of 'mean' is that of consequence, or 'consequentia,' as Hobbes has it. If [x] means that p, something which includes p or the idea of p, is a consequence of [x]. In the metabolic 'natural' use of 'meaning that p,' p, this or that consequence, is this or that state of affairs. In the literal, non-metabolic, basic, 'non-natural' use of 'meaning that p,' (as in Smith means that his neighbour's three-year child is an adult), p, this or that consequence is this or that conception or complexus which involves some other conception. This perhaps suggests that of the two concepts it is, as it should, 'non-natural' meaning which is more in need of further elucidation. It seems to be the more specialised of the pair, and it also seems to be the less determinate. We may, e. g., ask how this or that conception enters the picture. Or we may ask whether what enters the picture is the conception itself or its justifiability. On these counts Grice should look favorably on the idea that, if further analysis should be required for one of the pair, the notion of 'non-natural' meaning would be first in line. There are factors which support the suitability of further analysis for the concept of 'non-natural' meaning. 'Meaning_NN that p ('non-natural meaning') does not look as if it names an original feature of items in the world, for two reasons which are possibly not mutually independent. One reason is that, given suitable background conditions, meaning, can be changed by fiat. The second reason is that the presence of meaning_NN is dependent on a framework provided by 'communication,' if that's not too circular. ‘Communication’ is in the philosophical lexicon.. commūnĭcātĭo , ōnis, f. communico (several times in Cic., elsewh. rare), I.a making common, imparting, communicating.I. In gen.: ‘largitio et communicatio civitatis,’ Cic. Balb. 13, 31: ‘quaedam societas et communicatio utilitatum,’ id. Fin. 5, 23, 65: ‘consilii,’ id. Fam. 5, 19, 2: ‘sermonis,’ id. Att. 1, 17, 6: criminis cum pluribus, Tiro ap. Gell. 7, 3, 14: ‘nominum,’ i. e. the like appellation of several objects, Plin. 24, 14, 80, § 129: ‘juris,’ Dig. 23, 2, 1: ‘damni,’ ib. 27, 3, 1, § 14.—II. In rhet., a figure of speech, = ἀνακοίνωσις, in accordance with which one turns to his hearers, and, as it were, allows them to take part in the inquiry, Cic. de Or. 3, 53, 204; Quint. 9, 1, 30; 9, 2, 20 and 23. It seems to Grice, then, at least reasonable and possibly even ephatically mandatory, to treat the claim that a communication vehicle, such as this and that expression 'means' that p, in this transferred, metaphoric, or metabolic use of 'means that ...' as being reductively analysable in terms of this or that feature of this or that utterer, communicator, or user of this or that expression. The use of 'meaning that ...' as applied to this or that expression is posterior to and explicable through the utterer-oriented, or utterer-relativised use, i.e. involving a reference to this or that communicator or user of this or that expression. More specifically, one should license a metaphorical use of 'mean,' where one allows the claim that this or that expression 'means' that p, provided that this or that utterer, in this or that 'standard' fashion, means that p, i.e. in terms of this or that souly statee toward this or that propositional complexus this or that utterer ntends, in a standardly fashion, to produce by his uttering this or that utterance. That this or that expression 'means' (in this metaphorical use) that p is thus  explicable either in terms of this or that souly state which is standardly intended to produce in this or that addressee A by this or that utterer of this or that expression, or in this or that souly staken up by this or that utterer toward this or that activity or action of this or that utterer of this or that expression. ‘Meaning’ was in the air in Oxford’s linguistic turn. Everybody was talking ‘meaning.’ Grice manages to quote from R. M. Hare’s early “Mind” essay on the difference between imperatives and indicatives, also A. E. Duncan-Jones on ‘fugitive propositions,’ and of course his beloved P. F. Strawson. Grice was also concerned by the fact that in the typical ‘ordinary-language’ philosopher’s manoeuvre, there is a constant abuse of ‘mean.’ Surely Grice wants to stick with the utterer’s meaning as the PRIMARY use. Expressions ‘mean’ only derivatively. To do that, he chose Peirce to see if he could clarify it with ‘meaning that.’ Grice knew that the polemic was even stronger in London, with C. K. Ogden and Lady Viola Welby. In the more academic Oxford ‘milieu,’ Grice knew that a proper examination of ‘meaning,’ would lead him, via Kneale and his researches on the history of ‘semantics,’ to the topic of significatio. For what does Lewis and Short say about about this? signĭfĭcātĭo, f. id.. Lewis and Short render it as “a pointing out, indicating, denoting, signifying; an expression, indication, mark, sign, token, = indicium, signum, ἐπισημασία, etc. (freq. and class.). (α). Absol. : “gestus sententiam non demonstratione sed significatione declarans,” Cic. de Or. 3, 59, 220: “aliquem nutu significationeque appellare,” id. Fam. 1, 9, 20: ignibus significatione factā. Caes. B. G. 2, 33: “significatione per castella fumo factā,” id. B. C. 3, 65; id. B. G. 7, 81. With subj. gen.: “ex significatione Gallorum,” Caes. B. G. 7, 12 fin.: “litterarum,” Cic. Imp. Pomp. 3, 7. (β). With obj. gen. (so most freq.): “voluntatis,” Cic. Clu. 11, 31: “victoriae,” Caes. B. G. 5, 53: “adventus,” id. ib. 6, 29 fin.: “virtutis,” Cic. Lael. 14, 48; cf. id. Off. 1, 15, 46: “significatio calamitatum,” id. Div. 2, 25, 54: “artificii,” id. de Or. 2, 30, 153: “probitatis,” id. Lael. 9, 32; id. Fam. 5, 7, 2 et saep. Plur.: “valetudinis significationes,” Cic. Div. 2, 69, 142: “rerum futurarum,” id. N. D. 2, 66, 166. (γ). With object-clause (very rare): “ex quibus magna significatio fit, non adesse constantiam,” Cic. Off. 1, 36, 131. Plur.: “multas nec dubias significationes saepe jecit: ne reliquis quidem se parsurum senatoribus,” Suet. Ner. 37. II. In partic.A. Pregn., like the Gr. ἐπισημασία, a sign or token of assent, an expression of approbation, applause: “populi judiciis atque omni significatione florere,” Cic. Sest. 49, 105; cf. id. ib. 57, 122; “59, 127: ut ex ipsā significatione potuit cognosci,” Caes. B. C. 1, 86. Plur., Cic. Q. Fr. 1, 1, 14, § 42: “significationibus acclamationibus multitudinis,” Liv. 31, 15, 2 (corresp. to assentatio). B. Also, like ἐπισημασία, a sign, token, foretoken, prognostic of the weather (Plinian): “est et aquarum significatio, etc .... caeli quidem murmur non dubiam habet significationem. Praesagiunt et animalia,” Plin. 18, 35, 85, § 359 sq. C. In rhet. lang., significance, emphasis: “significatio est, quae plus in suspicione relinquit, quam positum est in oratione,” Auct. Her. 4, 53, 67; Cic. de Or. 3, 53, 203; id. Or. 40, 139; Quint. 9, 2, 3 (as a transl. of the Gr. ἔμφασις). D. In gram., meaning, sense, import, signification of a word or phrase: “verbi,” Varr. L. L. 9, § 40 Müll.: “scripti,” Cic. Part. Or. 31, 108; cf. id. ib. 38, 132: “est igitur tropus sermo a naturali et principali significatione translatus ad aliam,” Quint. 9, 1, 4: “ejusdem verbi contraria significatio,” id. 9, 3, 68: “voces eaedem diversā in significatione ponuntur,” id. 9, 3, 69: “verborum,” id. 10, 1, 10: “latens,” id. 10, 1, 90: “propriae,” Gell. 12, 13, 2.—So the titles of the lexical works of Aelius Gallus, Verrius Flaccus, Festus, etc.: De verborum Significatione or Significationibus. E. Meaning, intent: “duas significationes habet propositio vestra,” includes two assertions, Sen. Ep. 87, 28. Perhaps Grice would turn to ‘significo.’ signĭfĭco (1 (I. dep. collat. form signĭfĭcor , acc. to Gell. 18, 12, 10, without an example), v. a. signum-facio. I. In gen.,), which Lewis and Short render as “to show by signs; to show, point out, express, publish, make known, indicate; to intimate, notify, signify, etc.” Enough to want to coin a word to do duty for them all! (freq. and class.; syn.: monstro, declaro, indico).(α). With acc.: “aliquid alicui,” Plaut. Rud. 4, 1, 5: “hoc mihi significasse et annuisse visus est,” Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 91, § 213: “quae significari ac declarari volemus,” id. de Or. 3, 13, 49: “gratulationem,” id. Att. 4, 1, 5: “stultitiam,” id. Agr. 2, 12, 30: “deditionem,” Caes. B. G. 7, 40: “timorem fremitu et concursu,” id. ib. 4, 14: “vir, quem ne inimicus quidem satis in appellando significare poterat,” Cic. Font. 17, 39 (13, 29): “aliquid per gestum,” Ov. Tr. 5, 10, 36 et saep. With two acc. (rare): “ut eorum ornatus in his regem neminem significaret,” Nep. Ages. 8, 2; id. Them. 2, 7. (β). With object clause: hoc tibi non significandum solum, sed etiam declarandum arbitror, nihil mihi esse potuisse tuis litteris gratius, Cic. Fam. 5, 13, 2; cf. id. Mil. 2, 4: “provocationem a regibus fuisse significant nostri augurales,” id. Rep. 2, 31, 54: “se esse admodum delectatos,” id. ib. 3, 30, 42: “omnes voce significare coeperunt, sese, etc.,” Caes. B. G. 2, 13; 4, 3; cf.: “hoc significant, sese ad statuas tuas pecuniam contulisse,” Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 60, § 148. (γ). With rel. or interrog.-clause: “neque unde, nec quo die datae essent (litterae), aut quo tempore te exspectarem, significabant,” Cic. Fam. 2, 19, 1: “nutu significat, quid velit,” Ov. M. 3, 643: “(anseres et canes) aluntur in Capitolio, ut significent, si fures venerint, etc.,” Cic. Rosc. Am. 20, 56: “significare coeperunt, ut dimitterentur,” Caes. B. C. 1, 86.(δ). With de: “significare de fugā Romanis coeperunt,” Caes. B. G. 7, 26: “est aliquid de virtute significatum tuā,” Cic. Planc. 21, 52. ε) Absol.: “diversae state ... Neve inter vos significetis,” Plaut. Truc. 4, 3, 14: “significare inter sese coeperunt,” Cic. de Or. 1, 26, 122: “ut quam maxime significem,” id. Tusc. 2, 20, 46: “ut fumo atque ignibus significabatur,” Caes. B. G. 2, 7 fin.: “ubi major atque illustrior incidit res, clamore per agros regionesque significant,” id. ib. 7, 3.II. In partic.A. To betoken, prognosticate, foreshow, portend, mean (syn. praedico): “futura posse a quibusdam significari,” Cic. Div. 1, 1, 2: “quid haec tanta celeritas festinatioque significat?” id. Rosc. Am. 34, 97: “quid sibi significent, trepidantia consulit exta,” Ov. M. 15, 576; cf.: “quid mihi significant ergo mea visa?” id. ib. 9, 495: “significet placidos nuntia fibra deos,” Tib. 2, 1, 25: “quae fato manent, quamvis significata, non vitantur,” Tac. H. 1, 18.2. To betoken a change of weather (post-Aug.): “ventus Africus tempestatem significat, etc.,” Col. 11, 2, 4 sq.: “serenos dies (luna),” Plin. 18, 35, 79, § 348: “imbrem (occasus Librae),” id. ib. 26, 66, § 246. Absol.: “terreni ignes proxime significant,” Plin. 18, 35, 84, § 357.B. To call, name: “quod Antoninum filium suum ipse significari voluit,” Capitol. Gord. 16.C. To mean, import, signify; of words: “carere hoc significat, egere eo, quod habere velis, etc.,” Cic. Tusc. 1, 36, 88: “multa verba aliud nunc ostendunt, aliud ante significabant, ut hostis,” Varr. L. L. 5, § 3 Müll.; “9, § 85 ib.: videtis hoc uno verbo unde significare res duas, et ex quo et a quo loco,” Cic. Caecin. 30, 88.—Of a fable: “haec significat fabula dominum videre plurimum,” Phaedr. 2, 8, 27; 4, 10, 16. Hence, signĭfĭcans , antis, P. a., in rhet. lang., of speech,  full of meaning, expressive, significant; graphic, distinct, clear: “locorum dilucida et significans descriptio,” Quint. 9, 2, 44: “verba,” id. 11, 1, 2; cf. id. 4, 2, 36; 4, 2, 8, prooem. § 31:“ demonstratio,” Plin. 8, 40, 61, § 147.—Transf., of orators: “Atticos esse lucidos et significantes,” Quint. 12, 10, 21.—Comp.: “quo nihil inveniri possit significantius,” Quint. 8, 2, 9; 8, 6, 6. Sup.: “significantissimum vocabulum,” Gell. 1, 15, 17.—Adv.: signĭfĭcanter , clearly, distinctly, expressly, significantly, graphically: “breviter ac significanter ordinem rei protulisse,” Quint. 11, 1, 53: “rem indicare (with proprie),” id. 12, 10, 52: “dicere (with ornate),” id. 1, 7, 32. Comp.: “apertius, significantius dignitatem alicujus defendere,” Cic. Fam. 3, 12, 3: “narrare,” Quint. 10, 1, 49: “disponere,” id. 3, 6, 65: “appellare aliquid (with consignatius),” Gell. 1, 25, 8: “dicere (with probabilius),” id. 17, 2, 11. Sup., Pseudo Quint. Decl. 247. If perhaps Grice was unhappy about the artificial flavour to saying that a word is a sign, he could have checked with ‘mentire’ and ‘mentare.’ mentĭor , ītus, 4 (I. fut. mentibitur, for mentietur, Plaut. Mil. 1, 1, 35; 2, 2, 99; v. Neue, Formenl. 2, p. 448), v. dep. n. and a. [prob. from root men-, whence mens, memini, q. v. Original meaning, to invent; hence],I. Neutr., to lie, cheat, deceive, etc.: “mentiri palam,” Plaut. Truc. 1, 2, 89: “mentire,” id. Poen. 3, 5, 18: “adversus aliquem,” id. Aul. 4, 7, 9: “apud aliquem,” id. Poen. 1, 1, 24: “sibi,” id. Am. 1, 2, 6: “mihi,” id. Capt. 3, 5, 46; Ter. Eun. 4, 4, 35: “aperte,” Cic. Ac. 2, 6, 18: “in re aliquā,” id. Att. 12, 21, 4: “de re aliquā,” id. N. D. 3, 6, 14: “adeo veritatis diligens, ut ne joco quidem mentiretur,” Nep. Epam. 3, 1. With acc. and inf., to pretend, to declare falsely: “certam me sum mentitus habere Horam, quae, etc.,” Ov. Tr. 1, 3, 53; Plin. 12, 15, 34, § 67: mentior nisi or si mentior, a form of asseveration, I am a liar, if, etc.: “mentior, nisi et quae alunt illud, corpora sunt,” Sen. Ep. 106, 5: “si mentiar, inquit, Ultima, quā fallam, sit Venus illa mihi,” Ov. F. 4, 227. Of things, to deceive, impose upon: frons, oculi, vultus persaepe mentiuntur, oratio vero saepissime, Cic. Q. Fr. 1, 1, 6: “in quibus nihil umquam ... vetustas mentita sit,” id. N. D. 2, 5, 15. B. To deceive one's self, mistake: “mentire, gnate,” Plaut. Trin. 2, 2, 83 Brix ad loc. II. Act., to lie or speak falsely about, to assert falsely, make a false promise about; to feign, counterfeit, imitate a shape, nature, etc.: “cujus consilio tantam rem mentitus esset,” had devised such a falsehood, Sall. C. 48: “originem alicujus,” Just. 35, 2, 4: “auspicium,” Liv. 10, 40: “titulum Lyciscae,” to assume falsely, Juv. 6, 123: “noctem,” to promise falsely, Prop. 3, 9, 1: “cur sese daemonia mentiuntur,” Tert. Apol. 23; also, to invent, feign, of a poetical fiction: “ita mentitur (sc. Homerus),” Hor. A. P. 151; cf.: “poëtae Orionem mentiuntur in pelago incidentem,” Lact. 4, 15, 21. Pass.: “si a debitore, praelato die, pignoris obligatio mentiatur,” Dig. 48, 10, 28.B. Trop., of inanim. subjects: semel fac illud, Mentitur tua quod subinde tussis, do what your cough keeps falsely promising, i. e. die, Mart. 5, 39, 6: “mentiris juvenem tinctis capillis,” id. 3, 43, 1: “color, qui chrysocollam mentitur,” Plin. 35, 6, 29, § 48: “nec varios discet mentiri lana colores,” Verg. E. 4, 42: sexum viris denegatum muliebri motu, Col. praef. 1. Hence, 1. mentĭens , entis, m. subst., a fallacy, sophism: quomodo mentientem, quem ψευδόμενον vocant, dissolvas, Cic. Div. 2, 4, 11. 2. mentītus , a, um, Part., in pass. signif., imitated, counterfeit, feigned (poet.): “mentita tela,” Verg. A. 2, 422: “figurae,” Ov. M. 5, 326: “fama,” id. ib. 10, 28: “nomen,” id. ib. 10, 439; id. H. 11, 73; Sen. Contr. 5, 5, 3; Luc. 2, 512; Val. Fl. 6, 698; 7, 155; Sil. 15, 796; Stat. S. 4, 6, 21; id. Th. 1, 256; 7, 303; 10, 875; Poët. ap. Suet. Oth. 3; Prop. 4 (5), 7, 58. “mentiti fictique terrores,” Plin. Ep. 6, 20, 15; id. Pan. 81, 3: “divinitas,” Lact. 2, 16, 2; Quint. 12, 10, 76. For “mentior,” the meaning "to lie" stems from a semantic shift "to be inventive, have second thoughts" > "to lie, conjure up". But Grice would also have a look at “memini,” since this is also cognate with “mind,” “mens,” and covers subtler instances of ‘mean,’ as in Latinate, “mention,” as in Grice’s “use-mention” distinction. mĕmĭni, v. n. Sanscr. man, think; upaman = Gr. ὑπομένειν, await; Gr. μεν- in μένω, Μέντωρ; μαν- in μαίνομαι, μάντις; μνᾶ- in μιμνήσκω, etc.; cf.: maneo [as in ‘remain,’ the idea being that if you think, you hesitate, and therefore, ‘wait’ and ‘remain’], moneo, reminiscor [cf. reminiscence], mens, Minerva, etc., I.to remember, recollect, to think of, be mindful of a thing; not to have forgotten a person or thing, to bear in mind (syn.: reminiscor, recordor); constr. with gen., with acc. of the person and of the thing, with de, with a rel.-clause, with ut, with cum; with the acc. and inf. (usually the inf. pres., sometimes the inf. perf.; class.).1. With gen.: “vivorum memini,” Cic. Fin. 5, 1, 3: “constantiae tuae,” id. Fam. 13, 75, 1: “leti paterni,” to be mindful of, not forget to revenge, Val. Fl. 1, 773.2. With acc.: “suam quisque homo rem meminit,” Plaut. Merc. 5, 4, 51: “praecepta facito ut memineris,” id. Mil. 4, 4, 1: “officium suum,” id. Trin. 3, 2, 71: “omnia meminit,” Cic. Ac. 2, 33, 106: “Cinnam memini,” id. Phil. 5, 6, 17: “numeros,” Verg. E. 9, 45.—With ellips. of acc.: “neque adeo edepol flocci facio, quando egomet memini mihi (sc. nomen),” Plaut. Trin. 4, 2, 73.3. With de: “de pallā memento,” Plaut. As. 5, 2, 84: “de Herode,” Cic. Att. 15, 27, 3; Juv. 11, 81.4. With a rel.-clause: “meministi, quanta hominum esset admiratio,” Cic. Lael. 1, 2.5. With ut: “meministin', olim ut fuerit vestra oratio?” Ter. Phorm. 1, 4, 47; Col. 11, 2, 55.6. With cum: “memini, cum mihi desipere videbare,” Cic. Fam. 7, 28, 1.7. With acc. and inf.(α). With pres. inf. (so usually of the direct memory of an eyewitness): memini me fiere pavum, Enn. ap. Don. ad Ter. And. 2, 5, 18 (Ann. v. 15 Vahl.): “memini Catonem mecum disserere,” Cic. Lael. 3, 11: “memini Pamphylum mihi narrare,” Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 4, § 32: “memini te mihi Phameae cenam narrare,” id. Fam. 9, 16, 8; id. Deiot. 14, 38: “meministis fieri senatusconsultum referente me,” id. Mur. 25, 57: “mementote hos esse pertimescendos,” id. Cat. 2, 3, 5: “memento mihi suppetias ferre,” Plaut. Ep. 5, 1, 51. So impers. memento with inf., remember to, i. e. be sure to, do not fail to: “memento ergo dimidium mihi istinc de praeda dare,” Plaut. Ps. 4, 7, 66: “ei et hoc memento (sc. dicere),” id. Merc. 2, 2, 11: “dextram cohibere memento,” Juv. 5, 71. (β). With inf. perf. (so usu. when the subject is not an eye-witness; “esp. with second and third persons of memini): peto, ut memineris. te omnia mihi cumulate recepisse,” Cic. Fam. 13, 72, 2: “meministis me ita distribuisse initio causam,” id. Rosc. Am. 42, 112: “memineram ... divinum virum ... senile corpus paludibus occultasse demersum,” id. Sest. 22, 50: “memini gloriari solitum esse Q. Hortensium, quod, etc.,” id. Fam. 2, 16, 3: memento me, son de meā, sed de oratoris facultate dixisse, id. de Or. 1, 17, 78. Poet., of inanim. things: “meminit lēvor praestare salutem,” Lucr. 4, 153, Luc. 5, 109. 8. Absol., memini et scio, Plaut. Curc. 3, 1, 14: “recte meministi,” your recollection is accurate, id. Ps. 4, 7, 57. II. Transf., to make mention of, to mention a thing, either in speaking or writing (rare but class.): “meministi ipse de exsulibus,” Cic. Phil. 2, 36, 91: “neque omnino hujus rei meminit us quam poëta ipse,” Quint. 11, 2, 16: Achillam, cujus supra meminimus. Caes. B. C. 3, 108, 1: “sed tu, qui hujus judicii meministi, cur oblitus es illius,” Plin. Ep. 1, 5, 13; Col. 1, 1, 13: meminerunt hujus conjurationis Janusius Geminus in historia. M. Bibulus in edictis. Suet. Caes. 9; id. Gram. 11. Hence. mĕmĭnens , entis, P. a., mindful (ante- and post-class.): meminens corde volutat, Liv Andr ap Prisc. p. 922 P.: “aevi, quod periit. meminens,” Aus. Prof. 2, 4: “meminens naturae et professionis oblitus,” Sid. Ep. 4, 12. And cf. ‘moneo,’ as in ‘admonish,’ also cognate. mŏnĕo , ŭi, ĭtum, 2 (I.inf. pres. pass. monerier, Plaut. Capt. 2, 3, 36; perf. subj. moneris pro monueris, Pac. ap. Non. 507, 24 sq.; cf. Trag. Rel. p. 66 Rib.; likewise: di monerint meliora, Pac. ap. Non. l. l. p. 74 Rib.), v. a. causative from the root men; whence memini, q. v., mens, mentio; lit. to cause to think. I. Lit., to remind, put in mind of, bring to one's recollection; to admonish, advise, warn, instruct, teach (syn.: hortor, suadeo, doceo): bene mones; tute ipse cunctas, Enn. ap. Non. 469, 25 (Com. v. 3 Vahl.): “ea (auctoritas) adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte, sed etiam acriter,” Cic. Lael. 13, 44: “melius nos Zenonis praecepta monent,” Juv. 15, 107. (β). Aliquem de re: “oro, ut Terentiam moneatis de testamento,” Cic. Att. 11, 16, 5; id. Q. Fr. 2, 3, 6. (γ). Aliquem aliquid: “Fabius ea me ex tuis mandatis monuit,” Cic. Fam. 3, 3, 1: “id ipsum, quod me mones,” id. Att. 14, 19, 1: “sed eos hoc moneo, desinant furere,” id. Cat. 2, 9, 20: “vos quo pauca monerem advocavi,” Sall. C. 58, 3; id. H. 2, 96, 8.— Hence also in pass., moneri aliquid: “ut moneatur semper servos homo officium suam,” Plaut. Stich. 1, 2, 1: “nec ea, quae ab eā (naturā) monemur, audimus,” Cic. Lael. 24, 88; cf. infra. ξ. (δ). Aliquem alicujus rei (post-Aug., and only in Tac.; cf.: “admoneo, commonefacio): Caecina milites temporis ac necessitatis monet,” Tac. A. 1, 67 Nipperd. ad loc.: “Plancinam Augusta monuit Agrippinam insectandi,” id. ib. 2, 43.— (ε) With ut, ne, or the simple subj.: “monere te atque hortari, ut in rem publicam incumberes,” Cic. Fam. 10, 1, 2: “monet ut suspiciones vitet,” Caes. B. G. 1, 20: moneo, praedico, ante denuntio, abstineant, manus Cic. Verr. 1, 12, 36: “moneo obtestorque ut, etc.,” Sall. J. 10, 3; 49, 2; id. H. 4, 61, 23: “vos, ne amittatis, etc.,” id. J. 31, 25: “Macedonas monebat, ne multitudine hostium ... moverentur,” Just. 11, 13: “quamquam edicto monuisset ne quis quietem ejus interrumperet,” Tac. A. 4, 67 init. ξ) With an object- or rel.-clause: “(Caesar) monuit ejus diei victoriam in earum cohortium virtute constare,” Caes. B. C. 3, 89, 4: “moneret rationem frumenti esse habendam,” Hirt. B. G. 8, 34: “Cerealis propinquos monebat fortunam belli mutare, etc.,” Tac. H. 5, 24: “Arminius colligi suos et propinquare silvis monitos vertit,” id. A. 1, 63: “ultro struebantur qui monerent perfugere ad Germaniae exercitus,” id. ib. 4, 67 fin.: “Radamistum obpugnationem celerare,” id. ib. 12, 46; 13, 37; 16, 11; id. H. 4, 33: “si te unum illud monuerimus, artem sine assiduitate dicendi non multum juvare,” Auct. Her. 1, 1, 1: “moneo, quid facto opus sit,” Ter. Ad. 3, 4, 65: “res monet cavere, consultare,” Sall. C. 52, 3: “alio properare tempus monet,” id. J. 19, 2.—Pass.: “cum Nicanorem insidiari Piraeo a Dercillo moneretur,” Nep. Phoc. 2, 4.b. Of inanim. and abstr. subjects: “res ipsa monebat tempus esse,” Cic. Att. 10, 8, 1: “(sol) caecos instare tumultus Saepe monet,” Verg. G. 1, 464: “immortalia ne speres, monet annus,” Hor. C. 4, 7, 7: “natura monet festinare,” Plin. 18, 25, 60, § 227: “ut monet ira,” Sall. H. 2, 41, 8: “ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare,” Cic. Fin. 1, 20, 66. II. Transf. (mostly poet. and in post-Aug. prose).A. Without the accessory notion of reminding or admonishing, in gen., to teach, instruct, tell, inform, point out; also, to announce, predict, foretell: “tu vatem, tu diva, mone,” instruct thy bard, Verg. A. 7, 42: “velut divinitus mente monitā,” Liv. 26, 19: “hoc moneas precor,” Ov. F. 4, 247: “amici somnio monitus,” Suet. Aug. 91: “reddebant parvuli, quae monebantur,” what they were taught, Plin. Pan. 26: “vates Helenus cum multa horrenda moneret,” announced, foretold, Verg. A. 3, 712; cf.: “ante sinistra cavā monuisset ab ilice cornix, etc.,” id. E. 9, 15: “quid augurales alites vel cantus monerent,” Amm. 28, 1: “recte monemur, causas non utique ab ultimo esse repetendas,” Quint. 5, 10, 83. B. To punish, chastise (only in Tacitus): “puerili verbere moneri,” Tac. A. 5, 9. And surely if Grice once reminisced, he earlier on just ‘minisced.’ I.v. dep. n. and a. [root men; whence mens, memini; v. comminiscor]. I. To recall to mind, recollect, remember (syn. recordor): “reminisci, quom ea quae tenuit mens ac memoria, cogitando repetuntur,” Varr. L. L. 6, § 44 Müll.: “se non tum illa discere, sed reminiscendo recognoscere,” Cic. Tusc. 1, 24, 57; cf. id. Sen. 21, 78: “te de aliis quibusdam quaestoribus reminiscentem recordari,” id. Lig. 12, 35.— With gen.: reminisceretur veteris incommodi populi Romani, * Caes. B. G. 1, 13: “veteris famae,” Nep. Phoc. 4, 1: “Satyri,” Ov. M. 6, 383: “facti,” Suet. Claud. 41: “reminiscere quae traduntur mysteriis,” Cic. Tusc. 1, 13, 29. — With acc.: ea potius reminiscere, quae, etc., Sulp. ap. Cic. Fam. 4, 5, 5: “acerbitatem pristini temporis,” Nep. Alcib. 6, 3: “dulces Argos,” Verg. A. 10, 782: “animo dulces amicos,” Ov. P. 1, 8, 31: “tempus illud,” id. Tr. 5, 4, 31: “acta,” id. M. 11, 714; Vulg. 2 Cor. 7, 15.—With obj.-clause: “reminiscere, totius imum Nil esse in summā,” Lucr. 2, 90; 6, 649; Ov. M. 1, 256; cf. id. ib. 7, 293. —With rel.-clause: “reminiscerentur quam majestatem accepissent,” Liv. 4, 2, 4; Nep. Dat. 5, 1.II. To call to mind, imagine, conceive: “ut, si ipse fingere vellet, neque plura bona reminisci, neque majora posset consequi, quam vel fortuna vel natura tribuerat,” Nep. Alcib. 2, 1 dub. (al. comminisci): “reminiscimini quod respondeatis,” App. Mag. p. 338, 38: “finge quidvis, reminiscere, excogita, quid possit magicum videri,” id. ib. p. 308, 33.?*! Act. collat. form rĕmĭnisco , ĕre, acc. to Prisc. p. 799 P.; censured by Aus. Epigr. 48 and 49.