Orders and Entailments

Perhaps we can consider a few cases.

First, WoW:279, where indeed Grice gives a nod to Moore's 'introduction' of a word in (philosophical discourse) -- although, as Jones notes, the change from a nonlogical to a logical usage is possibly gradual.

Grice writes:

"[H]ere we have a case where there is a
logical implication [rather than
conversational implicature] on the part
of the affirmative, but NOT on the part
of its denial. (That looks like a
case of entailment)."

----

"Looks like a case of entailment", knowing Grice, may well mean:

"That IS a case of entailment" -- cfr. "That looks like a red pillar box to me".

----

The cases:

"The king of France is bald" -- entails: there is a king of France.
"The king of France AIN'T bald" (denial): NOT Logical Implication, but pragmatic implication, inference -- conversational implicature.

In fact Grice is considering 'factive' verbs at this point. He won't credit the Kiparskys on that.

"This is a specimen, I think, of a the kind of verb that has been called 'factive'" (WoW:279) -- by the Kiparskys only, but their views are pretty confused for the Griceian.

----

Grice considers:

Smith discovered that the roof was leaking.

-----

in fact ENTAILS:

the roof was leaking.

----

"On the other hand, I do NOT think (though perhaps this is doubtful -- [that he thinks it? :) -- Speranza] that so-and-so did NOT discover P also implies that P is true."

Grice's reason for rejecting this as a case of entailment:

Captain Cook discovered that the natives were interesting.

---- entails:

the natives were interesting.

Yet,

"I think I CAN say that [Captain Cook] went off to [Australia] expecting to discover that the nativers were interesting in certain respects, but he did not discover that, because they were not."

---- at least they existed.

Cfr.

"Captain Cook did not discover that the natives were interesting --. The islands were uninhabited."

----

Now for

"Give these flowers to your wife!"

and

"Arrest the intruder!"

---- IN NONE of these two cases -- the only imperatival cases in that essay --

is anything STATED. In both cases, the logical form has "!" has having maximal scope. And since this entails 'desire', it is actually counter-factive.

"Close the door!"

means The door is OPEN.

-----

Grice DOES mention 'state' but at the level of the 'pragmatic' (defeated, defeasible, cancellable) logical form, as expanded.

Where in fact we can divide some clauses, and refer to some 'existential presuppositions' (you have a wife, there is an intruder) as having been, as it were 'entailed' (if not stated) by the original utterance.

------

The actual manoeuvre seems, for Grice and me, to be more complex. In a way, it is easy enough with purely indicative cases:

The king of France is bald
----------
----- Therefore, there is a king of France.

entailment.

Captain Cook discovered the natives were interesting
-------- Therefore, the natives were interesting.

Smith discovered the roof was leaking.
----- Therefore, the roof was leaking.

None of these cases yield 'entailment' in their 'denial' versions:

The king of France is NOT bald
----------- NON-SEQUITUR: there is a king of France.
(Proof: cancellation, "The king of France is not bald; France is a republic").

Captain Cook did not discover the natives were interesting.
----------NonSequitur: Captain Cook exists, etc.

Smith (who does not exist) did not discover that the roof was leaking.
--------- NonSequitur: the roof was leaking.

WITH THE imperatival cases, we have to adapt talk of 'entailment' WITHOUT recourse, in principle, to the pragmatic expansion.

Arrest the intruder!

What does this 'entail'?

Moore is vague about 'ent.' in 1919,

p ent. q

Here, the expansion would be

/-p ent. /- q

where /- is the 'assertive' (as Grice has it (WoW:VI)) force indicating device.

But Hare was into things like

!p ent. !q

the very idea of 'Practical Inferences'.

"Implicature" has now made it to the OED -- thanks, inter alia, to [yours truly -- vide ADS-online files. When looking for earlier quotations, earliest quotations, I submitted indeed Hare in _Mind_ "Professor Grice's theory of conversational implicature". This is an EARLY (indeed) -- if not the earliest -- (this is Grice _1966_, elsewhere this Club) of 'implicature' and it all has to do with Hare's defense, contra Kenny, of "practical inferences".

So it may do to revise what Atlas knew about this. Atlas who co-authored things with Levinson, was interested in fiat-explanations of Kenny, Hare, and Grice. The Atlas model -- also Atlas-Levinson -- proposes a good way to deal formally with imperatival mode utterances, or altogether non-alethic ones. Having Grice's "Aspects of Reason" in full -- rather than the mimeo that Levinson misquotes as "Probability, defeasibility and mood operators" (actual title: "Probability, DESIRABILITY, and mood operators" --) helps!