Do not multiply (complicate) model-theoretic semantics without or beyond necessity

Jones was referring to

truth-conditional semantics

as a sort of

model-theoretic semantics,

with the caveat that while 'model-theoretic' need not be 'truth-conditional', one wonders what authors have been explcit about that.

----

Regarding imperative logic, so-called (or 'deontic' logic, as I prefer), this may be an area of interest.

At this point there are various ways to avoid complications. An easy one is to allow that

"Close the door!"

stands for

"I desire that you close the door"

which IS a _fact_ -- and thus subject to alethic evaluation or appraisal.

This however has not been the 'sophisticated' way to deal with things (alas). When it comes to deontic systems (which tend to be counterfactual) there are still problems.

Consider:

"Keep the door locked!"

--- this does not entail, "The door is unlocked". First, an imperative can hardly be said to _entail_. Second, we need a semantics for thinks like 'keep ensuring', or stuff.

And so on.