The Third Sub-Strand of Strand One: Philosophy of Perception

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Grice can be systematic about his own thought.

As Jones has remarked elsewhere -- in our joint CarnapGrice pfd in Jones's site, the first strand -- "Strand One: Philosophy of Perception" -- there are three distinct theses here (Grice suggests that each be seen as independent)

1. CAUSATION
2. QUALIA

and a third one that relates to his two betes-noires: Physicalism AND Phenomenalism, or rather, the other way round: Phenomenalism AND Physicalism. This connects with Carnap.

For Grice says in the headline section (as Jones calls it) of the Strands (WoW:340)

"A third question,"

Grice has 'question' here but he had spoken of 'theses' for the first two --

"about the ANALYSIS

of statements describing

objects of perception

like MATERIAL OBJECTS,

was also prominent in my

THINKING"

--- not writing?

"at the time at which these

essays were written but does

not figure"

----- (and making the collection thus 'unrepresentative')

"largely in these pages."


--- i.e., to summarise, the thesis

about

'the analysis of statements about
material objects'.

What can that be but "PHENOMENALISM".

I recall I once got hold by chance really of Berlin's "Concepts and Categories" book published by Clarendon. A handsome volume. I was fascinated by this Russian's elaboration on this in a VERY early "Aristotelian Society" paper. I think it was called "Verificationism". So this point really involves the

GENERATION

that Grice originally (and always) belonged to:

J. L. Austin, b. 1911
I. Berlin, b. 1911, I think,
H. P. Grice, b. 1913

The analysis of statements ['describing' i.e] on material objects.

--- Grice's phrase is somewhat loose here: "the analysis of statements describing objects [of perception] like material objects."

"like?"

This is a wrong use of 'like'. It can lead to an ambiguity in the interpretation. I take Grice literally to mean:

"analysis of statements" or of A statement if you must

'describing' i.e. on

'percepta'

objects of perception, perceptum

LIKE, -- such as

"material-object"

"material-object" statement.

I find the use of 'material' here VERY unreflective. "Matter" has very little to do with this. In Kantian strict philosophical jargon. An object is NEVER material. The right term to use here is 'thing' (Ding). The THING is material. The object cannot but be a perceptum.

In any case -- chair.

I.e. think chair.

What Grice is having in mind is:

"The chair is empty"

--- "The chair is big"

or something.

How do we analyse a statement describing an object of perception like a 'thing' like a 'chair'?

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This is Carnap galore, indeed!