Sneak of a Pirot

By J. L. Speranza

for the Grice Club, &c.


* * * *


It is well-known that Grice disliked a 'sneak', a 'cheat'. Everything, S. W. Blackburn, of Pembroke, recalls, "for Grice had to be above-board" (Spreading the Word, Groundings in the Philosophy of Language: Oxford University Press, Chapter iii: Grice).

He would, on occasion, engage in 'sneaky' behaviour, but only "playfully".

M. H. Green considers Grice is slighly inconsistent here.

Consider


I burp; therefore, I have enjoyed the food.


This can be, as Grice notes, either a 'natural' (as we might call it) 'sign' (as in "Smoke means smoked salmon") or an 'artificial' one, depending, of course on the intention or lack thereof, irrespectively, of the 'utterer' (or burper).

Grice gets more serious when he considers the case of 'pain'.

Suppose a "pirot" (his word for almost-anything-you-care-to-bring-onto-the-picture) 'cuts his veins, blood starts to pour out, and he screams in pain.'

Now, is his 'pain' simulated? Is his pain less of a pain if there is a higher intention behind the pirot _expressing_ it. Grice doesn't think so.


"At the stage of deception, not only does the pirot produce this behaviour voluntarily (instead of involuntarily, but his companion, the other pirot, must also assume that it is recognised by this other pirot, call it Pirot', involved with Pirot in some transaction, as being the

voluntary production of a certain form of behaviour the
nonvoluntary production of which evidences pain."

"I.e. Pirot is now supposed not only to _simulate_ pain-behavior, but
also to be recognized as simulating pain-behavior."

Grice adds this crucially:

"The import of the recognition by Pirot' that the production is voluntary
undermines, of course, any tendency on the part of Pirot to come to the
conclusion that Pirot is in pain" (p.293).

M. S. Green (and I) are unhappy with this. Green specifically suggests that we 'question Grice's assumption here that pain behavior that is voluntary must be a simulation of pain behavior not caused by genuine pain." I enthusiastically second his suggestion! Green adds: "Once that assumption is questioned it will become quite
unclear why Pirot''s recognition of Pirot's production as voluntary will undermine
any tendency to produce the belief that Pirot is in pain." Green goes on to consider things which are 'not so powerful that they force themselves out of us nonvoluntarily'. I.e. there are cases where a natural
manifestation can be inhibited. Further, when such a manifestation is _not_
inhibited, at the time it is manifested, it _could have been_, it merits
treatment as 'intentional'.

E.g. Pirot feels anger in response to something that Pirot' is doing, "but not such anger that the feeling manifests itself non-voluntarily. Nevertheless, in order to get Pirot' to refrain from the offending action Pirot allows himself to do what his anger disposes him to do, and he scowls."

"Suppose further that Pirot' does recognises both (i) the scowl and (ii) the
fact that it has been produced voluntarily".

At this point Greene cites work by DePaulo as 'strong evidence' that people are able to detect when facial expression is produced voluntarily -- DePaulo B. Nonverbal behavior & self-presentation. Psychological Bulletin 111/H Friedman, Nonverbal communication. Handbook of Social Psychology II ed D Gilbert, S Fiske, and G. Lindzey. McGraw Hill.

"Knowledge of the scowl’s voluntary nature need _not_ undermine the inference that Pirot' might make as to Pirot's conative state; knowing that anger tends to produce both voluntary and involuntary scowls, Pirot' could justifiably form the belief that the scowl is Pirot’s way of intentionally manifesting his
anger. What is more, if Pirot' has doubts about the authenticity of Pirot’s facial
expression, it is not clear how they will be assuaged by belief that it is
produced with the intention that Pirot' come to believe that Pirot is angry by means
of recognition of that intention! (Social psychology, particularly that
influenced by Goffman, has come to appreciate the importance for smooth
social interaction of deliberate manipulation of expressive behaviour. For
further discussion see DePaulo and DePaulo/Friedman."

"We note here also that, as argued in Frank there may well be physiological
markers distinguishing involuntary smiles from those produced in part by
voluntary means. This does not imply, however, that detection of smiles in
the latter category must be detection of dissimulation)." [Frank M/P. Ekman/W.V. Friesen Behavioral markers & recognizability of the smile of enjoyment. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 64] Green concludes at this point:

"It is clear that Pirot, grasping the line of reasoning that we have just articulated, may know that Pirot' can discern a
voluntary performance of his as just such a manifestation. As a result, Pirot
could do something with the intention of manifesting her cognitive/conative
state, and if her intention is fulfilled she _has_ expressed that state."

Grice concludes: "This applies, of course, to very intelligent, rational pirots -- as Locke called them. Not to your _average_ common or garden regular pirot.