Précis of "Aspects of Reason"

By H. P. Grice

(c) J. L. Speranza

for the Grice Circle, &c.



1.1. Reason & Reasoning.

The concept of reasoning. Why is the elucidation of the notion of 'reason' important? Well, it just _is_. Grice suggests one good way to start: the notion of 'reason' qua _verb_ ("Reasoner R reasons from Premiss to Conclusion"). The rationale being, as it were, that reason, qua 'faculty' is manifested in _reasoning_. There will be a connection between 'reason' qua verb and 'reason' qua noun.

1.2. Reason and reasoning. Grice proposes as a 'stalking horse' for reasoning the occurrence (entertaining, often acceptance) -- in either speech or thought -- of a chain of inferences, or more precisely, a sequence of ideas (or propositions) which consist of an initial set (initial premisses) -- which may be suitably expanded on request by the reasoner from the premisses actually entertained (an expansion thought by R to be formally cogent) -- together with further members each of which is
thought by R to be derivable by a principle of inference intended by R to be a canonically formally valid one. An alternative formulation: R reasons from P to C if R think that P & R intends that, in thinking C, he should be thinking of something which would be the conclusion of a formally valid argument the premisses of which are a suplementation of P. In this occurrence, the premiss P (or antecedent sequence) is the 'reason' for the conclusion C.

1.3. _Mis_-reasoning. Not all actual reasoning, however, is _good_ reasoning. ("Some is actually downright appalling"). Hence the proviso: the conclusion is _thought_ by R to be derivable, rather than that it _is_ indeed derivable. Consider:
(1) (Jack to Jill).
Career women always smoke heavily.
You certainly smoke heavily.
You must be a career woman.
"|- ((x) Ax -> Bx) & Ex.Bx) -> Ex.Ax" is _not_ a theorem. ("|- ((x) Ax -> Bx) & Ex.Ax) -> Ex.Bx" is). While there is, indeed, _bad_ reasoning, 'reasoning' is a value-paradigmatic notion (unlike, say, 'climate'). We have to know what _good_ reasoning is in order to elucidate 'reasoning'
_simpliciter_.

1.4. 'Incomplete' (_sic_ with scare quotes) reasoning. A bit of reasoning can be 'incomplete' (albeit expandable). Here his account of conversational maxims is made to work. Most actual reasoning is enthymematic:
(2) Jack is an Englishman.
He is, therefore, brave.
The 'supressed bit' may be understood as 'an inferential schema': "To infer
Bx from Ax if whatever satisfies 'A' _also_ satisfies 'B'. Whatever
satisfies 'Englishman' also satisfies 'brave'). Alternatively, we may speak
of a _suppressed premiss_: "All Englishmen are (always/normally(usually/likely to be) brave." Finicky elaboration of steps is frowned upon, as it offends against conversational maxims, particularly "Do not be more informative than is required". Grice recalls at this point his fellow undergraduate ("Shropshire") in Oxford way back in the 1930s, who in one tutorial, claimed "that the immortality of the human soul is proved by the fact that if you cut off a chicken's head, it will run round the yard for approximately 15 minutes before dropping. A rational reconstruction for "Shropshire" may go:
(3) If the soul is not dependent on the body, the soul is immortal. If the
soul is dependent on the body, it is dependent on that part of the body in which it is located. If the soul is located in the body, it is located in the head. If the chicken's soul was located in the head, the chicken's soul would be destroyed if the head were rendered inoperative by removal from the body. The chicken runs round
thde yard after head-removal. It could do this only if animated, and controlled by a soul. Ergo, the chicken's soul is _not_ located in, and _not_ dependent on, the chicken's head. Ergo, the chicken's soul is _not_ dependent on the chicken's body. Ergo, the chicken's soul is immortal. If the chicken's soul is immortal, _a fortiori_ the human soul is immortal. Ergo, the human soul is immortal. Grice one notes one problem here: he has reconstructed Shropshire's reasoning, but would Shropshire have exanded the reasoning exactly like that. There is an uneliminable 'indeterminacy' here, just as there is in the canonical case of the conversational implicature.

1.5. Too _good_ to be reasoning. Having allowed for _bad_ reasoning, we also face reasoning which is 'too good to be reasoning' (like a child who is too well behaved for his own good). Examples:
(4) John has arrived or Mary has arrived.
Ergo Mary has arrived.
(5) John has arrived.
Ergo John has arrived.
(6) My wife is at home.
Someone is at home.
A related problem: we require, to ascribe reasoning to R, that R is trying
to solve _some_ problem. We are reluctant to call 'reasoning' a pointless
sequence of formally valid steps as in
(7) I have 2 hands. If I had 3 more hands, I would have 5 hands. If I were
to have double 5, I'd have 10 hands. If 4 hands were removed, 6 hands would
remain. Ergo I would have 4 more hands than I have now.
The goal of resoning -- the solution of a problem -- gives us a criterion
for _successful_ reasoning. Successful reasoning achieves its goal.
Intention pervades reasoning: merely _judging_ that there _exists_ a
formally valid supplementation does not _count_ as reasoning. It may be
that |- P -> C, but if that's not the object of R's _intention_, there's no
need to call it even a _possible_ reasoning. "We think of the reasoner as
intending the production of C to _be_ the consequence of P (which clearly
is different from R merely _judging_ that C is derivable from P.

1.6. What can't logic catch. There are factors in reasoning seldom touched on by logic. Consider the philosopher who many months ago understakes to give a set of 10 lectures. One month before the starting date, he is asked for the titles of the individual lectures, and reasons to himself as follows:
(8) Oh God. It's all a mess. I have piles of material. None of it seems
worth listening to. It isn't in shape. I am in a terrible muddle. If I give
them the titles I had in mind I'm not sure they will fit what finally
emerges (if anything). Why do I do these things? Why don't I learn? If I
cancel the whole thing, though my name will be mud. What I'll do is give
them those titles I had planned and ask for latitude to depart from them if
need be.
This lament illustrates what Grice calls the degree-variant notion of
'reasoning' (as opposed to the 'flat' notion). Reasoning is a gradational
notion. It's also specific: one may be good at mathematical reasoning but
not good at theological reasoning. There are, however, basic 'excellences'
as it were (also degree-variant). He lists 4: simplicity, economy,
accuracy, and inventiveness.

1.7. A final point. We usually distinguish between 'rational' and
'reasonable'. Does the distinction hold water? Grice engages here in a bit
of linguistic analysis, old Oxonian style: Consider the negation contexts:
"not rational", "not reasonable". While it would not be 'irrational' to
expect my wife to clean my football boots but it might be _unreasonable_.
Those boots, too, were not bought at a very _rational_ price; only at a
very _reasonable_ price. In a different context: to cheat someone in a
business deal (as such) is not _irrational_ and is not _unreasonable_ --
it's just repulsive. And, while it would not be irrational to cheat a man
when you knew you might be found out and as a result lose a valuable
client, that would be a rather unreasonable thing to do. Irrational would
be to cheat him when you knew it was quite likely that you would be found
out, and when, if you were, you would lose your job at a time when
employment is very difficult to obtain. A third context: yielding to a
tempting invitation to go out drinking when you have already decided to
spend the evening working on tomorrow's lecture would be (as such) neither
irrational nor unreasonable -- Just weak and foolish. To yield to that
temptation when you have _not_ yet decided what do do but know you ought to
get on with that work for tomorrow would yet not be irrational although it
_might_ be unreasonable. A fourth context: if you have bungingly got your
firm into a difficulty, and you go and confess the matter to your boss,
your boss might be both rational and reasonable about it. Rational if he
cooly and in a reasoned way tells you what is the best course to take.
Reasonable in that he is not to hard on you. This suggests some
_rationale_: "reasonable", but not "rational", is, a _privative_ adjective,
an excluder. It's _unreasonable_ the word that wears the trousers: to be
reasonable is to be relatively free from unreasonableness. II. The
'rational' is the realm of what Aristotle in _Nichomachean Ethics_ calls,
the ratiocinative soul which is _intrinsically_ rational. The 'reasonable'
is the realm of the desiderative: the appetites and feelings, the pre- or
sub-rational 'soul' -- which is only _extrinsically_ rational as it heeds
to the dictates of the ratiocinative. This _privative_ notion of
reasonableness is beneficial for the characterisation of a rational being.
Akrasia is not the stumbling block in the theory of rationality, but, quite
contrarily, something the possibility of which we must provide from the
very start.

LECTURE II

2.1. Reasons: justificatory and explanatory. If reasons are the stuff
of which reasoning is made it is proper to proceed to a consideration of
the nominal "reason"

2.2. Flat and variable reason. Grice features five features of _flat_
'reason': It's not variable, basic, non-valuational, essential to the idea
of rational being, and the source for degree-variant reason. He lists
thirteen manifestations ("excellences") of this degree-variant reason:
clear headedness, critical acumen, thoroughness, tenacity in argument,
felixibility, orderliness, breadth, a sense of relevance, intellectual
caution, nose (intuitiveness), inventiveness, subtlety, and memory. Some of
these are truly specificatory (e.g. orderliness, critical acumen); some are
just ancillary (memory) -- just as in tennis a good eyesight is while
indispensable is not itself a part of excellence as having a powerful
service is.


2.3. Justificatory reasons. Grice proposes to focus on what he calls
the 'justicatory' use of the word 'reason'. He distinguishes it from a
purely 'explanatory' use by a number of criteria for Reason: justificatory
and explanatory:



_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
| | Distinctive Features |
| |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|
| Canonical Form |factive|explanatory |causal|mass/count|relative |
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_P _C_ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _|
|i. Justificatory:|No Yes |P justifies C|P ->X | mass | Yes |
|P is a reason for| | | | | |
|x to C. | | | | | |
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| _ _ _ | _ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ | _ _ _ _ _| _ _ _ _ |
|i. Explanatory: |Yes Yes|P explains C | P->C | count | No |
|P is a reason | | | | | |
|why C | | | | | |
|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| _ _ _ | _ _ _ _ _ _ | _ _ _| _ _ _ _ _| _ _ _ _ |


Explanation. A justificatory 'reason' always allow the qualification "good" or "bad" (or "little" or even "no" reason) Not so with explanatory 'reason' "There was a bad reason why the bridge collapsed" sounds terrible. A justifiatory reason
may become an explanatory. This happens when the reasoner _thinks_ that P
is a _justificatory_ reason for C, and acts accordingly.

2.4. Alethic and practical reason. Justificatory reasons can be, to
borrow from von Wright, "alethic" or "deontic". With this Grice introduces
what is in my opinion Grice's main thesis in the lectures, viz. the
so-called Univocality Thesis: is 'reason' univocal in the collocations "alethic" and "deontic"? His approach to conversational implicature suggests so. Grice discusses Davidson's arguments in 'How is weakness of the will possible' viz:
(9) If the barometer falls, it will probably rain.
The barometer falls.
Ergo, ceteris paribus it will probably rain.
-- underlying form: Prob (h, p) = Good (h; a, b). More prob (h; p, q) =
Better (h; a, b).
(10) If, prima facie, Act I would be a lie and Act II would not,
P is better than Q
Act I, but not Act II, would be a lie.
Ergo, ceteris paribus, P is better than Q.
Grice notes one problem with _deontic_ or non-alethic modality: for anyone
else, though, a non-alethic conclusion is _nothing_ that one can draw,
either logically or decently or sensibly. What is a reason for a reasoner
R1 to do something may _not_ be a reason for R2. His example:
(11) If Tommy has been tormenting my cat, it's best
that I ambush him on his way home from school.
Tommy _has_ been tormenting my cat.
Principle of Total Evidence
Ergo, I shall ambush Tommy.

2.5. Mood Indicators. Grice introduces the operator "Acc": "It is reasonable that...". "Acc" is followed by a neustic (or mood operator: .and !) and a phrastic or radical. The scheme for Procedure Specifiers for Mood Operators being:


_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
| mood | sub- | | |
| operator | mood | differential | complement |
|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|
| |exhibitive| | |
| | !1 | none | |
|imperative|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| wills that p |
| ! |protreptic| | |
| | !2 | wills addreseee | |
|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|
| |exhibitive| | |
| | .1 | none | |
|indicative|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| judges that p |
| . |protreptic| | |
| | .2 | wills addressee | |
|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|


Explanation. "Willing" and "Judging" are treated as primitive concepts in a
functionalist theory of psychology ('Method in philosophical psychology').
For the neustic, Grice draws from the idea of "direction of fit", as
distinguishing alethic and deontic or boulomaic. Perceptual beliefs are
_caused_ by the word (the world affects the doxastic system), but in the
case of the boulomaic subsystem it is the system (the will) which _affects_
the world. Grice remarks that he does not limit the scope of the phrastic
for !-utterances: "_They_ shall not pass" as a legitimate intentional
(indicative exhibitive); "The sergeant is to muster the men at dawn" --
uttered by a captain to a lieutenant -- as a legitimate imperative. There
is no need to restrict the realm of the intentional to the first person, or
the imperatives to the second.

2.6. Conditional and Unconditional Rationality: relative vs.
absolute. Further to his Univocality thesis, Grice considers "S must get
the Oxford Chair of Pastoral Theology" (i.e. "There is (some) reason for S
to get the Chair"). Unlike 'alethic' modality, there seems to be a
agency-relative necessity. It's either S or _us_ who must do something
about that. How are we to deal with this apparent asymmetry? Grice examines
general introduction and elimination rules a la natural deduction system:
"Derive Nec.P from P" and "Derive P from Nec.P". This rules may be
interpreted as syntactic (= 'provabilitiy') or semantic (= validity or
demonstrability). In the alethic realm, for example, Fermat's conjecture is
not provable yet valid. The apparent asymmetry ("[]p -> p" vs. "ObligatoryP
~-> P") Grice judges a matter of interpretation only. If R says that R must
eat his hat, R is committed to his saying that he shall eat it. The
agency-relativity of "must" is just _system_-relativity. Consider: "It is
necessary for R1 that R2 becomes his ambassador". We mean: R2's becoming an
ambassador will be advantageous to R1, and that it's R1 who shall bring
about that R1 becomes so. It is as if the introduction rule were: If it is
established in R's system that P, "Nec (relative-to-R) P" is establishable
(i.e. satisfactory-for-R). The elimination rule would read: If it is
necessary (relative-to-R) that R shall eat his hat, 'R shall eat his hat'
will be establishable. A further problem concerns utterances which contain
a _double_ agency-relative modality. E.g. "It is necessary for Joe Gumb
that the American public retains an interest in baseball". Here, we must
distinguish between the agent R1 for whom something is a reason and the
agent R2 the utterance is _about_ when it is said what there is a reason
for. Grice proposes a general universalisability thesis to deal with these
complex cases: It is necessary that, if it is necessary for R1 that p
should be the case, then let there be some condition C such that R1
satisfies & and necessarily for any R2 who satisfies it is also necessary
for R2 that p should be the case".


LECTURE III

3.1. Justificatory reason: alethic and practical. Justificatory
reason can become explanatory: If R judges that P is a justificatory reason
for accepting that Q, and if R does accept Q on account of P, then P
_explains_ his accepting Q. One must distinguish three readings of "Acc",
though: i. The Kantian "must" (full, indefeasible, acceptability). E.g. "A
bishop must get fed up with politicians". Associated conditional: "If x is
a bishop, (unreservedly), x will get fed up with policians". ii. The weaker
"ought" (ceteris paribus acceptability). E.g.
"To keep his job, a bishop ought not to show his irritation with
politicians". Associated conditional: "If one is to keep one's job and if
one is a bishop then ceteris paribus, one is not to show one's irritation
with politicians". iii. Degree-Variant acceptability: it is to
such-and-such a degree acceptable that..." There is _another_ distinction
to be made, a progress as it were, from 'technical' (Kant's "rules of
skill"), via (ii) 'prudential', to (iii) 'categorical' modality.

3.2. A fuller exposition of the initial idea. Given akrasia, we
can't accept that if R concludes, via practical resoning, that it is
acceptable that R shall go home', he would _ipso facto_ _will_ to go home.
Similarly, if R concludes, via alethic reasoning, that it is acceptable
that it snows, would, _ipso facto_ _judge_ that it snows. We should allow
for the conditionality involved here formally. Grice proposes:
(12) Acc (Given that S has a red face,
S has high blood pressure)
and this from "Acc (Given that x has a
red face, x has high blood pressure)"
S has a red face
Ergo, Acc S has high blood pressure.
While for indicative-doxastic reasoning we qualify the conclusion with the
phrase "with some degree of probability", for imperative-boulomaic
reasoning we use "with some degree of _desirability_: "Let it be that A. It
is the case that B. Ergo, with some degree of desirabiity, let it be that
C"). Consider (13) and its more formal counterpart (14):
(13) It is acceptable that, given that R is to keep dry
and that it the the case that R is such that it rains,
that R is to take an umbrella.
R is to keep dry.
It rains.
Ceteris paribus, it is desirable
that R takes an umbrella.
(14) Acc (Given !A & .B, !C)
(via Acc (Given !Fx & .Gx, !Hx)
!A
.B
(Principle of Total Evidence)
Ergo, it is desirable that !C
Consider:
(15) Acc, given that x is to one survive
that x is to eat.
by Universal Instantiation,
Acc, given that R is to survive
that R is to eat.
R is to survive.
Ergo, by Det, Acc, R is to eat.
_Ceteris paribus_ generalisations permeate boulomaic reasoning. Consider:
(16) Ceteris Paribus,
Acc (given that R1 likes R2,
R1 wants R2's company
R1 likes R2
No DEFEATER (e.g. R is ill)
Ergo R1 wants R2's company.
(17) Ceteris Paribus
Acc (given that R is to leave USA,
& R is an alien, that R
is to obtain a saling permit from the
Internal Revenue
R is to leave USA and is an alien.
No Defeater (e.g. R is a close friend of the President
and R arranges a travel in Air Force I)
Ergo, R is to obtain a sailing permit.

3.3. The principle of total evidence. Can it be made explicit?
Consider R, the owner a firm which makes & sells ornaments from sea-shells.
Concerned if business will improve during the coming year, R reasons:
(18) These days, every beachcomber is collecting seashells like mad (so as
to sell them to firms such as mine), so I can get seashells more cheaply.
It is thus likely that given that I will get seashells more cheaply, the
business will improve. Yet, my not easily replaceable craftsmen are getting
restive for higher pay. I accept that given that the craftsmen are restive,
the business will _not_ improve. Ornaments from seashells are all the rage
at the moment, so I may be able to put my prices up though & make more
money. Ergo, it is pretty likely, given that I will get seashells more
cheaply, that my employees are restive, & that everyone is eager to buy
sheashell ornament, my business will improve.
Grice provides a correlative boulomaic version. Now R is head accountant of
a firm in Redwood City (it's accounting time) & gets an invited from his
mother to visit her in Milwaukee. Further, his wife has hada head a bad
car accident and is lying in a hospital in Boise, Idaho. We can represent
R's reasoning as:
(19) Acc (Given that R is to give his mother pleasure & that R is her
favourite son, R is to visit her in Milwaukee next week). Acc (Given that R
is to get ready his firm's accounts -- he's head accountant & it's
accounting time, R is to spend next week in his office). Acc, given that R
is to give his mother pleasure and he's to get ready the firm's accounts, &
that he's the favourite son, & head accountant and it's accounting time,
that R visit his for a long weekend & return to the office on Tuesday. Acc,
given that R is to sustain his wife & she is lying, after with two broken
legs, internal injuries, & much pain, that R is to spend next week in Boise
Idaho. Acc, given that R is i. to give his mother pleasure and ii. get
ready the firm's accounts and iii. sustain his wife, and that iv. R is the
favourite son and v. he's head accountant at accounting time, and vi. R is
a husband with a wife lying in Boise, Idaho, that R is to spend next week
in Boise, Idaho, and telephone the mother and the office daily. Ergo Acc (R
is to spend next week in Boise, telephoning his mother and office daily.
A slightly different case concerns a doctor examining a patient: should he
give him electromixosis?
(20) Given that the patient is to be relieved of cephalalgia (symptom:
headache) & he is of blood group G, the patient ought to take an aspirin.
Given that the patient is to be relieved of cepahlalgia _and gasteroplexis_
(symptom: stomach cramp) and that the patient is of blood group G, the
patient ought to be treated by electromixosis. Given that the patient is to
be relieved of cephalalgia and gasteroplexis and that he is of blood group
G & that his blood has an abnormally high alcohol content, the patient
ought to be given gentle message until his condition changes. R does not
find an abnormally high alcohol content in the patient's blood. Ergo (via
the Kantian switch on the face of unqualified indefeasibility), the patient
not just ought, but _must_ be given electromixosis.
The principle of total evidence here seems to be: If R accepts-at-t an
acceptability conditional C1, the antecedent of which _favours_ to degree d
the consequent of C, and R accepts-at-t the antecedent of C1, and C is
optimal-at-t for R (i.e. after _due_ (or proper -- sic valuational) search
by R for such a further conditional, there seems to be _no_ conditional C
such that R accepts-at-t C2 & its antecedent, & the antencent of C2 is an
extension of the antecedent of C1, & the consequent of C2 is a _rival_ of
the consequent of C1, & the antecedent of C2 favours the consequence of C2
more than it favours the consequent of C1, R may accept-at-t, to degree d,
the consequent of C1.

3.4. Satisfactoriness, embedding & mixed mood markers.
"Satisfactory" is the term chosen by Grice to do general duty for both
"truth" -- the radical of an indicative utterance -- and "goodness" -- the
radical of an imperative utterance. It may be possible to define goodness
in terms of truth as follows: It is acceptable that !p if 'It is good that
!p' is true. Satisfactoriness provides general versions for the
truth-conditions of usual operators: "p AND q" is satisfactory if p is
satisfactory AND q is satisfactory. "p OR q" is satisfactory if p is
satisfctory OR q is satisfactory. "IF p, q" is satisfactory if p is not
satisfactory or q is satisfactory. This presents complications with
"mixed-modal" utterances. 'The best is filthy & don't touch it' is alright,
but it's reverse, 'Don't touch the beast & it is filthy' is dubious. 'Touch
the beast & the beast bites you' is not the _conjunction_ that "and"
suggests it is. And, while 'Either he is taking a bath or leave the
bathroom door open' is alright, 'Either leave the bathroom door open or he
is talking a bath' seems less so. Grice proposes that in case of these
utterances, we take the boulomaic operator as having broader scope. There's
also problem with the operation of negation. With doxastic modality there
is really no problem: ".~p" and "~.p" are truth-conditionally equivalent.
With "!" the issue is more complex. It looks as if "~!~A" may read as "you
may (permissive) do A" (one signifies one's refusal to prohibit the
addressee's doing A. Yet another complication is brought by utterances like
"The bicycle is to face north", which he regards as value-indifferent. None
of this complications is insoluble, though.


LECTURE IV

4.1. Crossing the divide. Inferential relations between alethic &
boulomaic modality. Is boulomaic modality reducible to doxastic modality.
Consider: "To preserve a youthful complexion, if one has a relatively
insensitive skin, one should smear one's face with peanut butter before
retiring at night". More formally: It should be, given that R is to
preserve a youthful complexion & that S has a relatively insensitive skin,
that S is to smear the face with peanut butter before retiring" ("SHOULD
(!p, .q; !r). Now, the boulomaic acceptability here seems to be based on
the flat doxastic acceptability of "SHOULD (.q, .r; .p)": "It should be, given that R smears the face with peanut butter skin before retiring & that R has a relatively insensitive skin, that R preserves a youthful complexion". There is one problem with
the reducibility thesis: in the boulomaic version, the phrastic "p"
features in the antecedent; in the doxstic version, it features in the
consequent. Some defeater may be so for the former but not but not for
latter. This, Grice notes, is what concerned Kant in the _Grundlegung_.
Kant's example was: "It's fully acceptable, given that R is to bisect a
line on an unerring principle, that R is to draw from its extremities two
intersecting arcs". Such a conditional is vouched for by the analytic claim
of geometry: "If R bisects a line on an unerring principle, R does so as a
result of having drawn from its extremities two intersecting acts". In its
more general terms, we need to explore the basis for "He who wills the end,
wills the indispensable means". Grice proposes seven steps in the
derivation. Step I: It is a fundamental law of psychology that, ceteris
paribus, for any creature R, for any P and Q, if R wills P & judges if P, P
as a result of Q, R wills Q. Step II: Place this law within the scope of a
"willing" operator: R wills for any P & Q, if R wills P & judges that if P,
P as a result of Q, R wills Q. Step III: "wills" turns to "should": if
rational, R will have to block unsatisfactory (literally) attitudes: R
should (qua rational) judge for any P & Q, if it's satisfactory to will
that P & it's satisfactory to judge that if P, P as a result of Q, it's
sastisfactory to will that q. Step IV: Expliciting mood specifications: R
should (qua rational) judge for any P & Q, if it's satisfactory that !P &
that if it .P, .P only as a result of Q, it's satisfactory that !Q. Step V:
via (p & q -> r) -> (p -> (q -> r)): R should (qua rational) judge for any
P & Q, if it's satisfactory that if .P, .P only because Q, it's
satisfactory that, if let it be that P, let it be that Q. Step VI: R should
(qua rational) judge for any P & Q, if P, P only because p _yields_ if let
it be that P, let it be that Q. Step VII: For any P & Q if P, P only
because Q _yields_ if let it be that P, let it be that Q.

4.2. 'Counsels of prudence'. Prudential acceptability can be dealt
with in a similar fashion, i.e. as analtyical consequences of indicative
statemetns to the effect that so-and-so is the means to such-and-such, with
the proviso that there is a special end: "let R be happy". Grice regards
that end as what Hume would call a "natural disposition", i.e. a matter of
_natural_ necessity. One complication is drawn from Austin: one thing is to
know what is to be done (the realm of "wisdom" qua _administrative_
rationality), another how to do what is to be done (the realm of
_phronesis_ as the executive rationality). A further complication is
brought by ends which are not only _finitely_ non specific (I may want a
large fierce dog to guard my house, and don't care which kind) but
antecedently _indeterminately_ non specific -- i.e. not yet deliberated: I
may want a large fierce dog to guard my house, but may have not yet decided
which kind. Is the boundary between prhonesis and wisdom clear-cut?
Consider the case of ever dilligent Secretary. If a boss empowers his
secreatary to make determinate the boss's indeterminately non-specific
desires not on behalf of his boss, but as _she_ thinks best, she just
ceases to be a secretary. She's best described as an administrative
assistant. A further problem is that ends relating to prudence may be
nonpropositional (just as an amimal desires food, and not _to eat an
apple_). Grice explores at this stage an extremem scheme of "Crazy-Bayesy"
deliberation which rests on a mechanical model of the vectoring of forces
(with desires -- or animal spirits -- as such drives). In the scenario, R
has two ends E1 & E2; each has a different degree of desirability: d1 and
d2. Now for any action A1 which will realise E1 or E2 -- to this or that
degreee -- there is a probability p1 that A1 will realise E1 & a
probability p2 that A1 will realise E2. The desirability of the action,
relative to E1 & E2 is a function of the desirabiity of E1 and E2 & the
probability that A1 will realise E1 and E2. Only if A1 scores higher (in
action-desirability relative to E1) than any alternative action, should R
should choose to do A1. Provisions should be made for, e.g. long-term
(standing) vs. situational ends. R may priorise family over business, and
his children over Aunt Jemima (who's been living with R all these years).
On a particular occasion, though, R may priorise Aunt Jemima (to get her
out of one of her tantrums) over taking R's son to see the hippopotami at
the zoo. While prudential rationality is perhaps _not_ just means-end
rationality, the determination over desires certainly does involve
means-end rationality.


BONUS TRACK:
LECTURE 5 (Not a Kant Lecture)

5.1. Ends, systems of ends, and 'happiness'. Grice proposes to
explore the_inclusive_ end of "counsels of prudence", viz. let R be happy.
Grice tries: to be happy is to be well-off, and this is analytic. Qua
inclusive end, this not only connects with the phenomenon of diminishing
marginal utility, but of _vanishing_ marginal utility. It may be, as Grice
puts it, that that, on occasions, the bucket of happiness is filled, and no
further inpouring of a desirable has any effect on its contents. One
feature to be preserved in the analysis is that what gives rise to the end
of happiness is not, strictly, a _means_ to happiness. Being a inclusive
end -- and a _rationally_ inclusive end at that -- it means it's rather, a
a set, or better, harmonic system, of ends, an end for the sake of which
certain desirables are desirable.

5.2. We need to analyse the contributiveness relation, i.e. the
predicate "... is contributive in way w to ...". Grice proposes: R wills to
do P for the sake of Q just in case R wills to do P because R judges his
doing P as somehting which is contributive in way w to the realisation of
Q, and R _wills_ Q. This involves all sorts of sub-modalities. Take
'causal': The causal element may be an initiating factor ("I stop Jones
talking by knocking him cold") or a sustaining one ("I stop Jones's talking
by keeping my hand over his mouth"). Take 'specificatory': A host's seating
someone at this right hand side at dinner may be a specification of
treating him with respect. Take 'inclusive proper': R may wish to take a
certainly advertised cruise because it includes a visit to Naples. R may be
hospitable to someone today because R desires to be hospitable to that
someone throughhout his visit to R's town. Perhaps Aristotle's
considerations on the practical syllogism may help us here. Grice notes two
versions of such a syllogism. R wills to realise Q, he enquires what would
lead to Q & decides that doing P would. So, R comes to will, & do, P. Or: R
conceives his doing P, enquires what doing P would lead to, sees that it
would lead to Q, which he finds himself willing. So R comes to will, and
do, P. There are complications, with regard to inclusive ends with _special
circumstances_. For one, a man wrecked on a desert island where he has thus
to spend some time (fixed scenario, not chosen) decides to study the local
flora and fauna. A second complication is with reason versus
rationalisation: a man wants to move to Ipswhich, but he decides it's
because of the salubrious climate. Here the reason (though not,
consciously, _his_ reason) why he desires to move to a salubrious climate
is that such a desire will justify the desire to move to Ipswich. A third
type of case is illustrated by the tyrant who punishes a minister by
conferring to him the organisation of the disposal of the garbage of the
palace. Now, just to frustrate the tyrant's plan to humiliate the minister,
the ministe decides to take pride in the discharge of his duty. Here a
higher-order desire is involved: the minister wants to discharge his office
efficiently, "for its own sake" as it were, and he wants to want this
because he wants by so wanting to frustrate the tyrant. Grice thus notes
that "wanting p for the sake of q" covers indeed two different cases: R
wants P because R judges it to be a means for R, and (the minister case), R
wants P because he judges that _wanting_ P will help to realise Q. This is
important: with the inclusive end, "that R be happy", its components are
not, strictly, the realisation of a specific end but, rather, the desire
for that realisation. Wanting p for the sake of q, where q is happiness
does not strictly require that R judges P is a means for Q; only that R
judges that _wanting_ P will help realise Q; or, in other words, judging P
is one of a set of items which collectively exhibit the open feature
associated with happiness.

5.3. "R is to be happy" being a rationally inclusive end, it follows
that happiness is a higher-order desire, i.e. a desire to have, and
satisfy, a set of desires which exemplifies some open feature. Willing is
crucial here: R's _decides_ that certain items are constitutive of his
happiness. One may still wish to list some features which are conducive to
stability and flexibility, which will characteristic of happiness qua
realisation of a system of ends. Such features are: Feasibility: the
adopted system of ends should be workable. Autonomy: or self-sufficiency.
It's better, for example, not to have to rely on government grants (p.132).
Compatibility or 'harmony' of component ends: i.e. the practical analogue
of consistency or coherence. Comprehensiveness: the practical analogue of
completeness. Supportiveness of component ends: one's devotion to one's
wife, for example, may inspire one to heightened endeavour in one's
business of selling encyclopaedias. Simplicity: related to feasibility.
Agreebleness, understood not as the mere satisfaction of a desire, but as
the idea of an activity being a source of delight, or an attraction
supporting an otherwise not very desirable principle. Grice is aware of
limitations. One may wish to add ideals such as maximal development of
one's natural talents, or the provision of scope for outstanding or
distinctive achievement. Perhaps a more serious problem is the closed
systematicity of the listed features. Except for "agreebleness" they seem
all internal, and thus prone to objections such as those directed to the
coherence theory of truth. It will thus be difficult, in the present
scheme, to decide between the real happy life, and, say, the life of a
hermit, a monomaniacal stamp collector, an unwavering egoist, and a
well-balanced, kindly country gentleman. A way out of this objection
concerns the importation of the notion of value. Rationality is after all,
man's metier of man, the capacity with which the Genitor has endowed us in
order to make us maximally viable in our living condition, i.e. in the
widest manageable range of different environments.

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