Russell's Pirots

In "How Pirots Karulize Elatically: Some Simpler Ways", Chapman wonders about the 'karulise'. We know it's Carnap ("and Russell" Grice adds -- but I haven't been able to trace the Russell), 1943. But he spelt it, 'karulize'(But the transcriber of Grice's tape wrote 'carulize'.

"A pirot", Grice writes,


"can be said to potch of some obble x"


and potch it


"as fang or feng;"


The pirot may be said


"also to cotch of x, or some obble o, as fang or feng;"


-- so far we seem to be dealing with Kant -- Quality, Quantity, Manner
(*)-- and ...


Then Grice adds,


But then a pirot may also be said


"to cotch of one obble o and another obble o'


as being fid to one another."


-----


So what the pirot is he talking about?


He provides the 'code' (Chapman finds it funny that for all his talk in
"Meaning" (1948) on 'intentional', inferential meaning Grice amused himself
with "strict code-languages in his lectures":


Pirots inhabit a world of obbles.


And their goal, designed by the Pirot-Maker is for continued operancy --
"Each pirot strives for its survival, what to do to avoid becoming an
ex-pirot" -- cfr. 'ex-operant' in Grice's "Method".


We have not yet the 'talking pirot'.

Recall too that the 'pirot', some of which should end up karulizing elatically -- the 'intelligent, rational pirot' -- us in our better moments -- is parodied after Locke's "intelligent, rational parOt") in a gaggle of pirots.

We so far have a pirot who, at most,

-- will potch.

"To potch", Grice writes, "is something like to perceive".

In Method he goes to discuss the internalisation of content, the pirot potching that

p v q,

for example. But it can hope for more. A pirot can

-- cotch.

Where "to cotch", Grice notes, is

"something like to think."

"Feng and fang are possible descriptions, much like our adjectives."


"Surely," Grice says, if _this_ pirot tells us that there is, between


potching the obble as FENG i and ii


"the world of difference" -- then we would be somehow at a loss. (I
wouldn't -- but would like to know if we are 'evolutionarily' connected to those
pirots.

And, finally we get that the pirot

can also, Grice just said,


"cotch of one obble o and another obble o' as being fid to one another."


where, he displays the code, "'fid' is

a possible
relation

between obbles."


The Large Moral seems obvious: the operancy of our cognition of relational properties is supervenient on our adaptiveness to survive in a scenario
where objects do not just present to us, but present to us
as basically _in a *de re* relation with one another.


The intricacies from the Relation (cotching two obbles as being fid to one
another) requires a few further rungs up the ladder (as Grice puts it) to
have properly talking -- or chatting as I prefer) pirots.

These are pirots self formulating a sort of 'talking manual' or 'imannuel' where not only obbles are cotched as being fid to one another, but conversational moves in the
conversational 'game' as well to the shared 'converational goal' --

In fact, in the basic sense, it would be that a 'conversational move', i.e. some display of behaviour by a pirot -- is first 'cotched' as being fid not so much to another move but to the 'goal' -- a sort of meta-cotching -- that originated it.

How Clever Language Is, Grice said -- "Especially if a clever one like Russell or like Carnap or like Grice invented it!