A metaphor. A category mistake alla Ryle. To be given proper but not improper due by philosophers.
Metaphor
from the OED
"From the L. metaphora, Gr. metafora, from "metaferein to transfer, from meta- + ferein (root fer-: for-) to bear, carry.
Def.
The figure of speech in which a name or descriptive term is transferred to some object different from, but analogous to, that to which it is properly applicable; an
instance of this, a metaphorical expression. mixed metaphor.
First cite:
1533 Hen. VIII in Wotton Lett. (1654) Suppl. 8
& rather then men would note a lie when they know what is meant, they will sooner by allegory or metaphor draw the word to the truth.
1553 T. Wilson Rhet. 91 b,
A metaphor is an alteration of a word
from the proper and natural meaninge,
((as Grice would say))
to that which is not proper, and yet agrees
therunto, by some likenes
((or resemblance as Grice would say))
that appears to be in it.
1555 Bonner Homilies 71
Christ always in his speaking did use figures, metaphors and tropes.
((His most famous being, "this bread will be my body, this wine will be my
blood").
1563 Mirr. for Mag., Collingbourne xxxvii,
These metaphors I use with other more.
1646 Sir T. Browne Pseud. Ep. v. ix. 247
An horn is the hieroglyphic of authority, power,
& dignity, and in this metaphor is often used in scripture.
1712 Addison Spect. No 289 p.8
Those beautiful metaphors in scripture,
where Life is termed a Pilgrimage.
===========================
1821 Lamb Elia Ser. i. Imperf. Sympathies,
He stops a metaphor like a suspected person in an enemy's country.
"A healthy book!" "Did I catch rightly what you said?"
============THIS IS A VERY ENGLISH THING.
I'm examining this. For Grice, metaphor seems to be
1. low class
(who other than an incurably Cockney romantic would say
things like "You're the cream in my coffee!"?
2. Cambridge rather than Oxford
(Note that Mary Hesse and Max Black were both at Cambridge.
Margaret Thatcher at Oxford!). :(
3. thus to be avoided, if possible.
1824 L. Murray Eng. Gram. (ed. 5) I. 493
We should avoid making two inconsistent metaphors meet on one object.
This is what is called mixed metaphor.
1841 Trench Parables i. (1877) 9
The allegory stands to the metaphor in the same relation that the parable
does to the simile.
1876 Mozley Univ. Serm. xvi. (1877) 265
The metaphor of the poet is perfectly true in fact,
for life is a stage.
=====THEN IT'S _NOT_ A METAPHOR, I'd say!
If it's true, it cannot be by "daffy deffy-nition"
a metafor, as my son would say!
(but then I haven't got a son).
1586 A. Day Eng. Secretary ii. (1625) 77
Metaphor, which is, when a word from the proper
or right signification is transferred to another
near unto the meaning.
1598 Sylvester Du Bartas ii. ii. 11. Babylon 369
Better then Greek with her Fit Epithets, and fine Metaphors.
1650 Earl Monm. tr. Senault's Man bec. Guilty 175
The Metaphor, which is so frequent with them, is it not an imposture?
============IT IS! AND IT SHOULD BE AVOIDED
OR DISQUALIFIED AS A MERE (mere, _mere_) CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE.
b Comb., as metaphor-making, -monger.
1670 Eachard Cont. Clergy 46
These indiscreet and horrid metaphor-mongers.
=========INDEED!
1889 Mivart Orig. Hum. Reason 273 This power of metaphor-making.
=====
Etc. Enjoy!
JL
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Recall Grice (WoW:ii) "Examples of metaphor like 'You are the cream in my coffee' characteristically involve categorical falsity, so the contradictory of what the speaker has made as if to say will, strictly speaking, be a truism; so it cannot be that that such a speaker is trying to get across. The most likely supposition is that the speaker is attributing to his audience some feature or features in respect of which the audience resembles (more or less fancifully)
ReplyDeletethe mentioned substance"
I'm analysing what he meant by "fancy", since people have said that my posts are "fancy"! (i.e. useless!). Isn't that a charming metaphor, Wilson and JP. But let's leave aside for now Grice's problematic assumption that a
metaphor is a "fanciful resemblance," in order to focus on his approach to recognising metaphors. Of course, the Gricean search for a categorical falsity is roughly modeled on a general pattern of rational behaviour. But
so far, Grice seems to have no means of identifying an ironic proposition, and it is difficult to see how to fully implement a model of Grice's theory. (see bibliography on Grice's PRETENSE theory of irony vs. the echoic theory). Now, for Grice, a metaphor is apparently a Quality maxim violation whose negation does *not* constitute a Quantity
maxim violation (!). Grice's theory seems to suggest a linear, algorithmic approach to metaphor recognition, which would have to look something like this:
A Gricean Linear Algorithm
(Input)
Proposition P: The A is B.
e.g.
the addressee is the cream in the utterer's coffee.
1. Does "the A is B" violate the Quality maxim?
If not, P is truth-conditional.
If yes, continue.
2. Does "not (the A is B)"
violate the Quantity maxim?
If not, P is ironic. If yes,
continue.
3. P is metaphorical.
Seek a fanciful resemblance between A and B.
The fact that the Gricean algorithm is linear should not be in itself perhaps problematic. We might note, first of all, that a unidirectional, linear algorithm separates the process of metaphor *recognition* from
ReplyDeletemetaphor *interpretation*. Are they really separate processes? Try to imagine an AI programme, let's call her
"Speranza",
that always identifies metaphors correctly (perhaps giving an answer of
5a. Yes, the utterance is metaphorical.
5b. No, would not prima facie say
the utterance seems metaphorical to me
5c. Please supply more context.
but which cannot arrive at a meaning for the utterance. Such a program seems impossible, as some of the examples discussed below should
illustrate. Now, GN Lakoff and M Johnson (and R Turner) who stand on the antipodes of Grice, would object to the very idea of Step 1 in the Gricean algorithm above, i.e. the notion that "we look first for the truth-conditions of the utterance ... and seek a metaphorical meaning only as a fallback, if we are not content with the primary literal meaning". Johnson & Lakoff argue that such an approach reinforces the false claim that metaphorical language is "deviant" (itself a metaphor) and
secondary to truth-conditional meaning. They attempt to show, in contrast, that the universe of conventional idioms in at least English is in many domains remorselessly (irredeemably) metaphorical. Our understanding of certain domains (such as mind, death, time, and metaphor!) is primarily metaphorical. Now, even for a pro-Gricean, a linear metaphor recognition algorithm may also be insufficient because not all metaphorical utterances
seem violate the Quality maxim. Some metaphors violate _other maxims. A metaphor can certainly be recognised as "a categorical falsity" when taken truth-conditional.