IMPLICATVRA -- in 18 volumes, vol. V

conversational maxim. The idea of a maxim implies freewill and freedom in general. A beautiful thing about Grice’s conversational maxims is that surely they do not ‘need to be necessarily’ independent, as Strawson and Wiggins emphatically put it (p.520). The important thing is other. A conversational maxim is UNIVERSALISABLE (v. universalierung) into a ‘manual,’ the “Immanuel,” strictly, the “Conversational Immanuel.” Grice is making fun of those ‘conversational manuals’ for the learning of some European language in the Grand Tour (as in “Learn Swiss in five easy lessons”). Grice is echoing Kant. Maximen (subjektive Grundsätze): selbstgesetzte Handlungsregeln, die ein Wollen ausdrücken, vs. Imperative (objektive Grundsätze): durch praktische Vernunft bestimmt; Ratschläge, moralisch relevante Grundsätze. („das Gesetz aber ist das objektive Prinzip, gültig für jedes vernünftige Wesen, und der Grundsatz, nach dem es handeln soll, d. i. ein Imperativ.“) das Problem ist jedoch die Subjektivität der Maxime. When considering Grice’s concept of a ‘conversational maxim,’ one has to be careful. First, he hesitated as to the choice of the label. He used ‘objective’ and ‘desideratum’ before. And while few cite this, in WoW:PandCI he adds one – leading the number of maxims to ten, what he called the ‘conversational catalogue.’ So when exploring the maxims, it is not necessary to see their dependence on the four functions that Kant tabulated: quantitas, qualitas, relatio, and modus, or quantity, quality, relation, and mode (Grice follows Meiklejohn’s translation), but in terms of their own formulation, one by one. Grice formulates the overarching principle: “We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the COOPEHATIVE PIUNCIPLE.”He then goes on to introduce the concept of a ‘conversational maxim.’“On the assumption that some such general principle as this is acceptable, one may perhaps distinguish four categories under one or another of which will fall certain more specific MAXIMS maxims and submaxims, the following of which will, in general, yield results in accordance with the Cooperative Principle.” Note that in his comparative “more specific maxims,” he is implicating that, in terms of the force, the principle is a MAXIM. Had he not wanted this implicaturum, he could have expressed it as: “On the assumption that some such general principle as this is acceptable, one may perhaps distinguish four categories under one or another of which will fall certain MAXIMS.” He is comparing the principle with the maxims in terms of ‘specificity.’ I.e. the principle is the ‘summun genus,’ as it were, the category is the ‘inferior genus,’ and the maxim is the ‘species infima.’He is having in mind something like arbor porphyriana. For why otherwise care to distinguish in the introductory passage, between ‘maxims and submaxims.’ This use of ‘submaxim’ is very interesting. Because it is unique. He would rather call the four maxims as SUPRA-maxims, supermaxim, or supramaxim. And leaving ‘maxim’ for what here he is calling the submaxim.Note that if one challenges the ‘species infima,’ one may proceed to distinguish this or that sub-sub-maxim falling under the maxim. Take “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” Since this, as he grants, applies mainly to informative cases, one may consider that it is actually a subsubmaxim. The submaxim would be: “Do not say that for which you are not entitled” (alla Nowell-Smith). And then provide one subsubmaxim for the desideratum: “Do not give an order which you are not entitled to give” or “Do not order that for you lack adequate authority,” and the other subsubmaxim for the creditum: “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”Grice: “Echoing Kant, I call these categories Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner.” Or Mode. “Manner” may be Ross’s translation of Aristotle’s ‘mode.’ Consider the exploration of Aristotle on ‘modus’ in Categoriae. It is such a mixed bag that surely ‘manner’ is not inappropriate!“The category of QUANTITY” – i. e. either the conversational category of quantity, or as one might prefer, the category of conversational quantity – “relates to the quantity of information to be provided,”So it’s not just ANY QUANTUM, as Aristotle or Kant, or Ariskant have it – just QUANTITY OF INFORMATION, whatever ‘information’ is, and how the quantity of information is to be assessed. E g. Grice surely shed doubts re: the pillar box seems red and the pillar box is red. He had till now used ‘strength,’ even ‘logical strength,’ in terms of entailment – and here, neither the phenomenalist nor the physicalist utterance entail the other.“and under it fall the following maxims:”That is, he goes straight to the ‘conversational maxim.’ He will provide supermaxim for the other three conversational categories.Why is the category of conversational quantity lacking a supermaxim?The reason is that it would seem redundant and verbose: ‘be appropriately informative.’ By having TWO maxims, he is playing with a weighing in, or balance between one maxim and the other. Cf.To say the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the truth.No more no less.One maximm states the ‘at most,’ the other maxim states the ‘at least.’One maxim states the ‘maxi,’ the other maxim states the ‘min.’ Together they state the ‘maximin.’First, “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).”It’s the contribution which is informative, not the utterer. Cf. “Be as informative as is required.” Grice implicates that if you make your contribution as informative as is required YOU are being as informative as is required. But there is a category-shift here. Grice means, ‘required BY the goal of the exchange). e.g.How are youFine thanks – the ‘and you’ depends on whether you are willing to ‘keep the conversation going’ or your general mood. Second, “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.”“ (The second maxim is disputable;”He goes on to give a different reason. But the primary reason is that “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required” is ENTAILED by “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)” – vide R. M. Hare on “Imperative inferences” IN a diagram:Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)Therefore, do not make your contribution more informative than is required (by the current purposes of the exchange).Grice gives another reason (he will give yet a further one) why the maxim is ‘disputable.’“it might be said that to be overinformative is not a transgression of the CP but merely a waste of time.”For both conversationalists, who are thereby abiding by Ferraro’s law of the least conversational effort.”“A waste of time” relates to Grice’s previous elaborations on ‘undue effort’ and ‘unnecessary trouble.’He is proposing a conversational maximin.When he formulates his principle of economy of rational effort, it is a waste of ‘time and energy.’Here it is just ‘time.’ “Energy” is a more generic concept.“However, it might be answered that such overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is liable to raise side issues;”Methinks the lady doth protest too much.His example, “He was in a blacked out city.”It does not seem to relate to the pillar boxA: What color is the pillar boxB: It seems red.Such a ‘confusion’ and ‘side issue,’ if so designed, is part of the implicaturum.“and there may also be an indirect effect, in that the hearers (or addressee) may be misled as a result of thinking that there is some particular POINT in the provision of the excess of information.”Cf. Peter Winch on “H. P. Grice’s Conversational Point.”More boringly, it is part of the utterer’s INTENTION to provide an excess of information.”This may be counterproductive, or not.“Meet Mr. Puddle”“Meet Mr. Puddle, our man in nineteenth-century continental philosophy.”The introducer point: to keep the conversation going.Effect on Grice: Mr. Puddle is hopeless at nineteenth-century continental philosophy (OR HE IS BEING UNDERDESCRIBED). One has to think of philosophically relevant examples here, which is all that Grice cares for. Malcolm says, “Moore knows it; because he’s seen it!” – Malcolm implicates that Grice will not take Malcolm’s word. So Malcom needs to provide the excess of information, and add, to his use of ‘know,’ which Malcolm claims Moore does not know how to use, the ‘reason’ – If knowledge is justified true belief, Malcolm is conveying explicitly that Moore knows and ONE OF THE CONDITIONS for it. Cf.I didn’t know you were pregnant.You still do not. (Here the cancellation is to the third clause). Grice: “However this may be, there is perhaps a different [second] reason for doubt about the admission of this second maxim, viz., that its effect will be secured by a later maxim, which concems relevance.)”He could be a lecturer. His use of ‘later’ entails he knows in advance what he is going to say. Cf. Foucault:“there is another reason to doubt. The effect is secured by a maxim concerning relevance.”No “later” about it!Grice:“Under the category of QUALITY falls a supermaxim” – he forgets to add, as per obvious, “The category of quality relates to the QUALITY of information.” In this way, there is some reference to Aristotle’s summumm genus. PROPOSITIO DEDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO ABDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO INFINITA. Cf. Apuleius and Boethius on QUALITAS of propositio. Dedicatio takes priority over abdicatio. So one expects one’s co-conversationalist to say that something IS the case. Note too, that, if he used “more specific maxims and submaxims,” he means “more specific supermaxims and maxims” – He is following Porophyry in being confusing! Cf. supramaxim. Grice “-'Try to make your contribution one that is true' –“This surely requires generality – and Grice spent the next two decades about it. He introduced the predicate ‘acceptability.’ “Try to make your contribution one that is acceptable”“True for your statements; good for your desiderative-mode utterances.”“and two more specific maxims:”“1. Do not say what you believe to be false.”There is logic here. It is easy to TRY to make your contribution one that is true.” And it is easy NOT to say what you believe to be false. Grice is forbidding Kant to have a maxim on us: “Be truthful!” “Say the true!” “MAKE – don’t just TRY – to make your contribution one that is true.”“I was only trying.”Cf. Moses, “Try not to kill” “Thou shalt trye not to kylle.”Grice:“2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”This is involved with truth. In “Truth and other enigmas,” Dummett claims that truth is, er, an enigma. For some philosophers, all you can guarantee is that you have evidence. Lacking evidence for what?The qualification, “adequate,” turns the maxim slightly otiose. Do not say that for you lack evidence which would make your contribution not a true one.However, Grice is thinking Gettier. And Gettier allows that one CAN have ADEQUATE EVIDENCE, and p NOT be true.If we are talking ‘acceptability’ it’s more ‘ground’ or ‘reason’, rather than ‘evidential justification.’ Grice is especially obsessed with this, in his explorations on ‘intending,’ where ‘acceptance’ is deemed even in the lack of ‘evidential justification,’ and leaving him wondering what he means by ‘non-evidential justification.’“Under the category of RELATION I place a single maxim, viz., 'Be relevant.'”The category comes from Aristotle, ‘pros it.’ And ‘re-‘ in relation is cognate with ‘re-‘ in ‘relevant.’RELATION refers to ‘refer,’ Roman ‘referre.’ But in Anglo-Norman, you do have ‘relate’ qua verb. To ‘refer’ or ‘re-late,’ is to bring y back to x. As Russell well knows in his fight with Bradley’s theory of ‘relation,’ a relation involves x and y. A relation is a two-place predicate. What about X = xIs identity a relation, in the case of x = x?Can a thing relate to itself?In cases where we introduce two variables. The maxim states that one brings y back to x.“Mrs. Smith is an old windbag.”“The weather has been delightful for this time of year, hasn’t it.”If INTENDED to mean, “You ARE ignorant!,” then the conversationalist IS bring back “totally otiose remark about the weather” to the previous insulting comment.To utter an utterly irrelevant second move you have to be Andre Breton.“Though the maxim itself is terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good deal: questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on. I find the treatment of such questions exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them in a later work.”He is having in mind Nowell-Smith, who had ‘be relevant’ as the most important of the rules of conversational etiquette, or how etiquette becomes logical. But Nowell-Smith felt overwhelmed by Grice and left for the north, to settle in the very fashionable Kent. Grice is also having in mind Urmson’s appositeness (Criteria of intensionality). “Why did you title your painting “Maga’s Daughter”? She’s your wife!” – and Grice is also having in mind P. F. Strawson and what Strawson has as the principle of relevance vis-à-vis the principles of presumption of ignorance and knowledge.So it was in the Oxonian air.“Finally, under the category of MODE, which I understand as relating not (like the previous categories) to what is said [THE CONTENT, THE EXPLICITUM, THE COMMUNICATUM, THE EXPLICATUM] but, rather, to HOW what is said is to be said,”Grice says that ‘meaning’ is diaphanous. An utterer means that p reduces to what an utterer means by x. This diaphanousness ‘meaning’ shares with ‘seeing.’ “To expand on the experience of seeing is just to expand on what is seen.’He is having the form-content distinction.If that is a distinction. This multi-layered dialectic displays the true nature of the speculative form/content distinction: all content is form and all form is content, not in a uniform way, but through being always more or less relatively indifferent or posited.    The Role of the Form/Content Distinction in Hegel's Science of ...deontologistics.files.wordpress.com › 2012/01 › formc... PDF Feedback About Featured Snippets Web results    The Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development Researchwww.karger.com › Article › PDF The form-content distinction is a potentially useful conceptual device for understanding certain characteristics of moral development. In the most general sense it ... by CG Levine - ‎1979 - ‎Cited by 25 - ‎Related articles    The Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development Research ...www.karger.com › Article › Abstract Dec 23, 2009 - The Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development Research. Levine C.G.. Author affiliations. University of Western Ontario, London, Ont. by CG Levine - ‎1979 - ‎Cited by 25 - ‎Related articles    Preschool children's mastery of the form/content distinction in ...www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov › pubmed Preschool children's mastery of the form/content distinction in communicative tasks. Hedelin L(1), Hjelmquist E. Author information: (1)Department of Psychology, ... by L Hedelin - ‎1998 - ‎Cited by 10 - ‎Related articles    Form and Content: An Introduction to Formal Logic - Digital ...digitalcommons.conncoll.edu › cgi › viewcontentPDF terminology has to do with anything. In this context, 'material' means having to do with content. This is our old friend, the form/content distinction again. Consider. by DD Turner - ‎2020    Simmel's Dialectic of Form and Content in Recent Work in ...www.tandfonline.com › doi › full May 1, 2019 - This suggests that for Simmel, the form/content distinction was not a dualism; instead, it was a duality.11 Ronald L. Breiger, “The Duality of ...    Are these distinctions between “form” and “content” intentionally ...www.reddit.com › askphilosophy › comments › are_th... The form/content distinction also doesn't quite fit the distinction between form and matter (say, in Aristotle), although Hegel develops the distinction between form ...    Preschool Children's Mastery of the Form/Content Distinction ...link.springer.com › article Preschoolers' mastery of the form/content distinction in language and communication, along its contingency on the characteristics of p. by L Hedelin - ‎1998 - ‎Cited by 10 - ‎Related articles    Verbal Art: A Philosophy of Literature and Literary Experiencebooks.google.com › books Even if form and content were in fact inseparable in the sense indicated, that would not make the form/content distinction unjustified. Form and matter are clearly ... Anders Pettersson - 2001 - ‎Literary Criticism    One Century of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathologybooks.google.com › books He then outlines the most important implications of the form–content distinction in a statement which is identical in the first three editions, with only minor ... Giovanni Stanghellini, ‎Thomas Fuchs - 2013 - ‎Medical“I include the supermaxim-'Be perspicuous' –” Or supramaxim. So the “more specific maxims and submaxims” becomes the clumsier “supermaxims and maxims”Note that in under the first category it is about making your contribution, etc. Now it is the utterer himself who has to be ‘perspicuous,’ as it is the utterer who has to be relevant. It’s not the weaker, “Make your contribution a perspicuous one.” Or “Make your contribution a relevant one (to the purposes of the exchange).”Knowing that most confound ‘perspicacity’ with ‘perspicuity,’ he added “sic,” but forgot to pronounce it, in case it was felt as insulting. He has another ‘sic’ under the prolixity maxim.“and various maxims such as: The “such as” is a colloquialism.Surely it was added in the ‘lecture’ format. In written, it becomes viz. The fact that the numbers them makes for ‘such as’ rather disimplicaturable. “1. Avoid obscurity of expression.”Unless you are Heracleitus. THEY told me, Heraclitus, they told me you were dead, /They brought me bitter news to hear and bitter tears to shed./I wept as I remember'd how often you and I/Had tired the sun with talking and sent him down the sky./And now that thou art lying, my dear old Carian guest,/A handful of grey ashes, long, long ago at rest,/Still are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales, awake;/For Death, he taketh all away, but them he cannot take. In a way this is entailed by “Be perspicuous,” if that means ‘be clear,’ in obtuse English.Be clearTherefore, or what is the same thing. Thou shalt not not be obscure.2. Avoid ambiguity.”Except as a trope, or ‘figure, (schema, figura). “Aequi-vocate, if that will please your clever addressee.” Cf. Parker’s zeugma: “My apartment was so small, that I've barely enough room to lay a hat and a few friends“3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).”Here he added a ‘sic’ that he failed to pronounce in case it may felt as insulting. But the idea of a self-refuting conversational maxim is surely Griceian, in a quessertive way. Since this concerns FORM rather than CONTENT, it is not meant to overlap with ‘informativeness.’So given that p and q are equally informative, if q is less brief (longer – ars longa, vita brevis), utter p. This has nothing to do with logical strength. It is just to be assessed in a SYNTACTICAL way.Vide “Syntactics in Semiotics”“4. Be orderly.”This involves two moves in the contribution or ‘turn.’ One cannot be ‘disorderly,’ if one just utters ‘p.’ So this involves a molecular proposition. The ‘order’ can be of various types. Indeed, one of Grice’s example is “Jones is between Smith and Williams” – order of merit or size?‘Between’ is not ambiguous!There is LOGICAL order, which is prior.But there is a more absolute use of ‘orderly.’ ‘keep your room tidy.’orderly (adj.) 1570s, "arranged in order," from order (n.) + -ly (1). Meaning "observant of rule or discipline, not unruly" is from 1590s. Related: Orderliness.He does not in the lecture give a philosophical example, but later will in revisiting the Urmson example and indeed Strawson, but mainly Urmson, “He went to bed and took off his boots,” and indeed Ryle, “She felt frail and took arsenic.”“And one might need others.”Regarding ‘mode,’ that is. “It is obvious that the observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency than is the observance of others;”Not as per ‘moral’ demands, since he’ll say these are not MORAL.“a man who has expressed himself with undue prolixity would, in general, be open to milder comment than would a man who has said something he believes to be false.”Except in Oscar Wilde’s circle, where they were obsessed with commenting on prolixities! Cf. Hare against Kant, “Where is the prisoner?” “He left [while he is hiding in the attic].”That’s why Grice has the ‘in general.’“Indeed, it might be felt that the importance of at least the first maxim of Quality is such that it should not be included in a scheme of the kind I am constructing;”But since ‘should’ is weak, I will. “other maxims come into operation only on the assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied.”So the keyword is co-ordination.“While this may be correct, so far as the generation of implicaturums is concerned it seems to play a role not totally different from the other maxims, and it will be convenient, for the present at least, to treat it as a member of the list of maxims.”He is having weighing, and clashing in mind. And he wants a conversationalist to honour truth over informativeness, which begs the question that as he puts it, ‘false’ “information” is no information.In the earlier lectures, tutoring, or as a university lecturer, he was sure that his tutee will know that he was introducing maxims ONLY WITH THE PURPOSE, NEVER TO MORALISE, but as GENERATORS of implicatura – in philosophers’s mistakes.But this manoeuver is only NOW disclosed. Those without a philosophical background may not realise about this. “There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as 'Be polite', that are also normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate nonconventional implicaturums.”He is obviously aware that Émile DurkheimWill  Know that ‘conversational’ is subsumed under ‘social,’ if not Williamson (perhaps).  – keyword: ‘norm.’ Grice excludes ‘moral’ because while a moral maxim makes a man ‘good,’ a conversational maxim makes a man a ‘good’ conversationalist. Not because there is a distinction in principle!“The conversational maxims, however, and the conversational implicaturums connected with them, are specially connected (I hope) with”He had this way with idioms.Cf. Einstein,“E =, I hope, mc2.”“the particular purposes that talk (and so, talk exchange)”He is playing Dutch.The English lost the Anglo-Saxon for ‘talk.’ They have ‘language,’ and the Hun has ‘Sprache.’ But only the Dutch have ‘taal.’So he is distinguishing between the TOOL and the USE of the TOOL.“is adapted lo serve and is primlarily employed to serve.”The ‘adapted’ is mechanistic talk. He mentions ‘evolutionarily’ elsewhere. He means ‘the particular goal language evolved to serve, viz.’ groom.Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language is a 1996 book by the anthropologist Robin Dunbar, in which the author argues that language evolved from social grooming. He further suggests that a stage of this evolution was the telling of gossip, an argument supported by the observation that language is adapted for storytelling.  The book has been criticised on the grounds that since words are so cheap, Dunbar's "vocal grooming" would fall short in amounting to an honest signal. Further, the book provides no compelling story[citation needed] for how meaningless vocal grooming sounds might become syntactical speech.  Thesis Dunbar argues that gossip does for group-living humans what manual grooming does for other primates—it allows individuals to service their relationships and thus maintain their alliances on the basis of the principle: if you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours. Dunbar argues that as humans began living in increasingly larger social groups, the task of manually grooming all one's friends and acquaintances became so time-consuming as to be unaffordable.[1] In response to this problem, Dunbar argues that humans invented 'a cheap and ultra-efficient form of grooming'—vocal grooming. To keep allies happy, one now needs only to 'groom' them with low-cost vocal sounds, servicing multiple allies simultaneously while keeping both hands free for other tasks. Vocal grooming then evolved gradually into vocal language—initially in the form of 'gossip'.[1] Dunbar's hypothesis seems to be supported by the fact that the structure of language shows adaptations to the function of narration in general.[2]  Criticism Critics of Dunbar's theory point out that the very efficiency of "vocal grooming"—the fact that words are so cheap—would have undermined its capacity to signal honest commitment of the kind conveyed by time-consuming and costly manual grooming.[3] A further criticism is that the theory does nothing to explain the crucial transition from vocal grooming—the production of pleasing but meaningless sounds—to the cognitive complexities of syntactical speech.[citation needed]  References  Dunbar, R. I. M. (1996). Grooming, gossip and the evolution of language. London: Faber and Faber. ISBN 9780571173969. OCLC 34546743.  von Heiseler, Till Nikolaus (2014) Language evolved for storytelling in a super-fast evolution. In: R. L. C. Cartmill, Eds. Evolution of Language. London: World Scientific, pp. 114-121. https://www.academia.edu/9648129/LANGUAGE_EVOLVED_FOR_STORYTELLING_IN_A_SUPER-FAST_EVOLUTION  Power, C. 1998. Old wives' tales: the gossip hypothesis and the reliability of cheap signals. In J. R. Hurford, M. Studdert Kennedy and C. Knight (eds), Approaches to the Evolution of Language: Social and Cognitive Bases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 111 29. Categories: 1996 non-fiction booksAmerican non-fiction booksBooks by Robin DunbarEnglish-language booksEvolution of languageHarvard University Press booksPopular science booksGrice: “I have stated my maxims”the maxims“as if this purpose were a maximally effective exchange of information;”“MAXIMALLY EFFECTIVE”“this specification is, of course, too narrow,”But who cares?This is slightly sad in that he is thinking Strawson and forgetting his (Grice’s) own controversy with G. A. Paul on the sense-datum, for ‘the pillar box seems red’ and ‘the pillar box is red,’ involving an intensional context, are less amenable to fall under the maxims.“and the scheme needs to be generalized to allow for such general purposes as influencing or directing the actions of others.”He has a more obvious way below:Giving and receving informationInfluencing and being influenced by others.He never sees the purpose as MAXIMAL INFORMATION, but maximally effective EXCHANGE of information – does he mean merely ‘transmission.’ It may well be.If I say, “I rain,” I have ex-changed information.I don’t need anything in return.If so, it makes sense that he is equating INFORMING With  INFLUENCING or better DIRECTION your addresse’s talk.Note that, for all he loved introspection and conversational avowals, and self-commands, these do not count.It’s informing your addressee about some state of affairs, and directing his action. Grice is always clear that the ULTIMATE GOAL is the utterer’s ACTION.“As one of my avowed aims is to see talking as a special case or variety of purposive, indeed rational, behavior, it may be worth noting that the specific expectations or presumptions connected with at least some of the foregoing maxims have their analogues in the sphere of transactions that are not talk exchanges.”Transaction is a good one.TRANS-ACTIO“I list briefly one such analog for each conversational category.”While he uses ‘conversational category,’ he also applies it to the second bit: ‘category of conversational quantity,’ ‘category of conversational quality,’ ‘category of conversational relation,’ and ‘category of conversational mode.’ But it is THIS application that justifies the sub-specifications.They are not categories of thought or ontological or ‘expression’.His focus is on the category as conversation.His focus is on the ‘conversational category.’“1. Quantity. If you are assisting me to mend a car, I expect your contribution to be neither more nor less than is required; if, e. g., at a particular stage I need fourscrews, I expect you to hand me four, rather than two or six. He always passed six, since two will drop.“Make your contribution neither more nor less informative than is required (for the purposes of the exchange).”This would have covered the maxi and the min.“NEITHER MORE NOR LESS” is the formula of effectiveness, and economy, and minimization of expenditure.“2. Quality. I expect your contributions to be genuine and not spurious.”Here again he gives an expansion of the conversational category, which is more general than ‘try to make your contribution one that is true,’ and the point about the ‘quality of information,’ which he did not make.Perhaps because it would have led him to realise that ‘false’ information, i.e. ‘information’ which is not genuine and spurious, is not ‘information.’But “Make your contribution one that is genuine and not spurious.”Be candid.Does not need a generalization as it covers both informational and directive utterances.“If I need sugar as an ingredient in the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not expect you to hand me salt;”Or you won’t eat the cake.“if I need a spoon, I do not expect a trick spoon made of rubber.”Spurious and genuine are different.In the ‘trick spoon,’ the conversationalist is just not being SERIOUS.But surely a maxim, “Be serious” is too serious. – Seriously!“3. Relation. I expect a partner's contribution to be appropriate to immediate needs at each stage of the transaction;”Odd that he would use ‘appropriate,’ which was the topic of the “Prolegomena,” and what he was supposed to EXPLAIN, not to use in the explanation.For each of the philosophers making a mistake are giving a judgment of ‘appropriateness,’ conversational appropriateness. Here it is good that he relativises the ‘appropriateness’ TO the ‘need’.Grice is not quite sticking to the etymology of ‘relatio’ and ‘refer,’ bring y back to x. Or he is. Bring y (your contribution) back to the need x.Odd that he thinks he’ll expand more on relation, when he did a good bit!“if I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to be handed a good book, or even an oven cloth (though this might be an appropriate contribution at a later stage).”“I just expect you to be silent.”“4. Manner. I expect a partner to make it clear what contribution he is making, and to execute his performance with reasonable dispatch.” For Lewis, clarity is not enough!The ‘Execute your performance with reasonable dispatch!’ seems quite different from “Be perspicuous.”“Execute your performance with reasonable dispatch”Is more like“Execute your performance”And not just STAND there!A: What time is it B just stands there“These analogies are relevant to what I regard as a fundamental question about the principle of conversational helpfulness and its attendant conversational maxims,”For Boethius, it is a PRINCIPLE because it does not need an answer!“viz., what the basis is for the assumption which we seem to make, and on which (I hope) it will appear that a great range of implicaturums depend [especially as we keep on EXPLOITING the rather otiose maxims], that talkers will ingeneral (ceteris paribus and in the absence of indications to the contrary) proceed in the manner that these principles prescribe.”Grice really doesn’t care! He is into the EXPLOITING of the maxim, as in his response to the Scots philosopher G. A. Paul:“Paul, I surely do not mean to imply that you may end up believing that I have a doubt about the pillar box being red: it seems red to me, as I have this sense-datum of ‘redness’ which attaches to me as I am standing in front of the pillar box in clear daylight.”Grice is EXPLOITING the desideratum, YET STILL SAYING SOMETHING TRUE, so at least he is not VIOLATING the principle of conversational helpfulness, or the category of conversational quality, or the desideratum of conversational candour.And that is what he is concerned with.  “A dull but, no doubt at a certain level, adequate answer is that it is just a well-recognized empirical fact that *people* (not pirots, although perhaps Oxonians, rather than from Malagasy) DO behave in these ways;”Elinor Ochs was terrified Grice’s maxims are violated – never exploited, she thought – in Madagascar.“they, i. e. people, or Oxonians, have learned to do so in childhood and not lost the habit of doing so; and, indeed, it would involve a good deal of effort to make a radical departure from the habit. It is much easier, for example, to tell the truth than to invent lies.”Effort again; least effort. And ease. Great Griceian guidelines!“I am, however, enough of a rationalist to want to find a basis that underlies these facts,”OR EXPLAIN.“undeniable though they may be;”BEIGIN OF A THEORY FOR A THEORY – not the theory for the generation of implicate, but for the theory of conversation.He is less interested in this than the other. “I would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE for us to follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon. For a time, I was attracted by the idea that observance of the principle of conversational helpfulness and the conversational maxims, in a talk exchange, could be thought of as a quasi-contractual matter, with parallels outside the realm of discourse. If you pass by when I am struggling with my stranded car, I no doubt have some degree of expectation that you will offer help, but once you join me in tinkering under the hood, my expectations become stronger and take more specific forms (in the absence of indications that you are merely an incompetent meddler); and talk exchanges seemed to me to exhibit, characteristically, certain features that jointly distinguish cooperative transactions:”So how is this not quasi-contractual?  He is listing THIS OR THAT FEATURE that jointly distinguishes a cooperative transaction – all grand great words.But he wants to say that ‘quasi-contractual’ is NO RATIONAL!He is playing, as a philosopher, with the very important point of what follows from what.A1. Conversasation is purposiveA2. Conversation is rationalA3. Conversation is cooperativeA4. There is such a thing as non-rational cooperation (is there?)So he is aiming at the fact that the FEATURES that jointly distinguish cooperative transactions NEED NOT BE PRESENT, and Grice surely does not wish THAT to demolish his model. If he bases it in general constraints of rationality, the better.“1. The participants have some common immediate aim, like getting a car mended; their ultimate aims may, of course, be independent and even in conflict-each may want to get the car mended in order to drive off, leaving the other stranded. In characteristic talk exchanges, there is a common aim even if, as in an over-the-wall chat, it is a second-order one,”Is he being logical?“second-order predicate calculus”“meta-language”He means higher or supervenientOr ‘operative’“, that each party should, for the time being, identify himself with the transitory conversational interests of the other.”By identify he means assume.YOU HAVE TO DESIRE what your partner desires.The intersection between your desirability and your addressee’s desirability is not NULL.And the way to do this is conditionalIF: You perceive B has Goal G, you assume Goal G. “2. The contributions of the participants .should be dovetailed, mutually dependent. Unless it’s one of those seminars by Grice and J. F. Thomson!“3. There is some sort of understanding (which may be explicit but which is often tacit)”i.e. implicated rather than explicated – part of the implicaturum, or implicitum, rather than the explicatum or explicitum.“that, other things being equal, the transaction should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it should terminate. You do not just shove off or start doing something else.”This is especially tricky over the phone (“He never ends!” Or in psychiatric interviews!)Note that ‘starting doing something else’ may work. E. g. watch your watch!“But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this may apply to some cases, there are too many types of exchange, like quarreling and letter writing, that it fails to fit comfortably.”TWO OPPOSITE EXAMPLES.Fighting is arguing is competition, adversarial, epagogue, not conversation, cooperation,  friendly, collaborative venture, and diagoge.Letter writing is usually otiose – “what, with the tellyphone!” And letter writing is no conversation.“In any case, one feels that the talker who is irrelevant or obscure has primarily let down not his audience but himself.”And the talker who is mendacious has primarily let Kant down!”“So I would like t< be able to show that observance of the principle of conversational helfpulness and maxims is reasonal de (rational) along the following lines”That any Aristkantian rationalist would agree to.“: that any one who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the principle of conversational helpfulness and the maxims.”Where the keyword is: profit, effort, least effort, no energy, no undue effort, no unnecessary trouble. That conversation is reasonable unless it is unreasonable. That a conversational exchange should be rational unless it shows features of irrationality.“Whether any such conclusion can be reached, I am uncertain;”It’s not clear what the premises are!Plus, he means DEDUCTIVELY reached? Transcendentally reached? Empirically reached? Philosophically reached? Conclusively reached? Etc.It seems the conclusion need not be reached, because we never departed from the state of the affairs that the conclusion describes.“in any case, I am fairly sure that I cannot reach it until I am a good deal clearer about the nature of relevance and of the circumstances in which it is required.”For perhaps “I don’t want to imply any doubt, but that pillar box seems red.”IS irrelevant, yet true!“It is now time to show the connection between the principle of conversational helfpulness and the conversational maxims, on the one hand, and conversational implicaturum on the other.”This is clearer in the seminars. The whole thing was a preamble “A participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfill a maxim in various ways, which include the following: 1. He may quietly and unostentatiously VIOLATE (or fail to observe) a maxim; if so, in some cases he will be liable to mislead.”And be blamed by Kant.Mislead should not worry Grice, cf. “Misleading, but true.”The violate (or fail to observe) shows that (1) covers two specifications. Tom may be unaware that there was such a maxim as to ‘be brief, avoid unnecessary prolixity, unless you need to eschew obfuscation!”This is Grice’s anti-Ryleism. He doesn’t want to say that there is KNOWLEDGE of the maxims. For one may know what the maxims are and fail to observe them “2. He may OPT OUT from the operation both of the maxim and of the principle of conversational helpfulness; he may say, indicate, or allow it to become plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the maxim requires. He may say, e. g., I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.” Where is the criminal?I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.I shall unseal them. What do you mean ‘cannot.’ You don’t mean ‘may not,’ do you?I think Grice means ‘may not.’Is the universe finite? Einstein: I cannot say more; my lips are sealed. “3. He may be faced by a CLASH of maxims [That’s why he needs more than one – or at least two specifications of the same maxim]: He may be unable, e. g., to fulfill the first maxim of Quantity (Be as informative as is required) without violating the second maxim of Quality (Have adequate evidence for what you say).” Odd that he doesn’t think this generates implicaturum: He has obviously studied the sub-perceptualities here.For usually, a phenomenalist, like Sextus, thinks that by utteringThe pillar box seems red to me – that is all I have adequate evidence forHe is conveying that he is unable to answer the question (“What colour is the pillar box?”) And being as ‘informative’ as is requiredWithout saying something for which it is not the case that he has or will ever have adequate evidence.Cf.Student at Koenigsberg to Kant: What’s the noumenon?Kant: My lips are sealed.It may require some research to list ALL CLASHES.Because each clash shows some EVALUATION qua reasoning, and it may be all VERY CETERIS PARIBUS.Cf.Where is the criminal?My lips are sealed.The utterer has NOT opted out. He has answered, via implicaturum, that he is not telling. He is being relevant. He is not telling because he doesn’t want to DISCLOSE the whereabouts of the alleged criminal, etc. For Kant, this is not a conversation! Odd that Grice is ‘echoing Kant,’ where Kant would hardly allow a clash with ‘Be truthful!’“4. He may FLOUT a maxim; that is, he may BLATANTLY fail to fulfill (or observe) it.Mock? Taunt?The magic flute. Grice’s magic flute.flout (v.) "treat with disdain or contempt" (transitive), 1550s, intransitive sense "mock, jeer, scoff" is from 1570s; of uncertain origin; perhaps a special use of Middle English “flowten,”"to play the flute" (compare Middle Dutch “fluyten,” "to play the flute," also "to jeer"). Related: Flouted; flouting.Grice: “One thing we do not know is if the flute came to England via Holland.”“Or he may, as we may say, ‘play the flute’ with a maxim, expecting others to be agreeable.”“Or he may, as we might say, ‘play the flute’ with the conversational maxim, expecting others to join with some other musical instrument – or something – occasionally the same.”“On the assumption that the speaker is able to fulfill the maxim and to do so without violating another maxim (because oi a clash), is not opting out, and is not, in view of the blatancy of his performance, trying to mislead,”This is interesting. It’s the TRYING to mislead.Grice and G. A. Paul:Grice cannot be claimed to have TRIED to mislead, and thus deemed to have misled G. A. Paul, even if he had, when he said, “I hardly think there is any doubt about it, but that pillar box seems red to me.”“the hearer is faced with a minor problem:”Implicaturum: This reasoning is all abductive – to the ‘best’ explanation“How can his saying what he did say be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing the overall principle of conversational helfpulness?”This was one of Grice’s conversations with G. A. Paul:Paul (to Grice): This is what I do not understand, Grice. How can your saying what you did say be reconciled with the supposition that you are not going to mislead me?”Unfortunately, on that Saturday, Paul went to the Irish Sea. Grice “This situation is one that characteristically”There are others – vide clash, above – but not marked by Grice as one such situation – “gives rise to a conversational implicaturum; and when a conversational implicaturum is generated”Chomskyan jargon borrowed from Austin (“I don’t see why Austin admired Chomsky so!”)“in this way, I shall say that a maxim is being EXPLOITED.”Why not ‘flouted’? Some liked the idea of playing the flute.EXPLOIT is figurative.Grice exploits a Griceian maxim.exploit (v.) c. 1400, espleiten, esploiten "to accomplish, achieve, fulfill," from Old French esploitier, espleiter "carry out, perform, accomplish," from esploit (see exploit (n.)). The sense of "use selfishly" first recorded 1838, from a sense development in French perhaps from use of the word with reference to mines, etc. (compare exploitation). Related: Exploited; exploiting.exploit (n.) late 14c., "outcome of an action," from Old French esploit "a carrying out; achievement, result; gain, advantage" (12c., Modern French exploit), a very common word, used in senses of "action, deed, profit, achievement," from Latin explicitum "a thing settled, ended, or displayed," noun use of neuter of explicitus, past participle of explicare "unfold, unroll, disentangle," from ex "out" (see ex-) + plicare "to fold" (from PIE root *plek- "to plait").  Meaning "feat, achievement" is c. 1400. Sense evolution is from "unfolding" to "bringing out" to "having advantage" to "achievement." Related: Exploits. exploitative (adj.) "serving for or used in exploitation," 1882, from French exploitatif, from exploit (see exploit (n.)). Alternative exploitive (by 1859) appears to be a native formation from exploit + -ive.exploitation (n.) 1803, "productive working" of something, a positive word among those who used it first, though regarded as a Gallicism, from French exploitation, noun of action from exploiter (see exploit (v.)). Bad sense developed 1830s-50s, in part from influence of French socialist writings (especially Saint Simon), also perhaps influenced by use of the word in U.S. anti-slavery writing; and exploitation was hurled in insult at activities it once had crowned as praise.  It follows from this science [conceived by Saint Simon] that the tendency of the human race is from a state of antagonism to that of an universal peaceful association -- from the dominating influence of the military spirit to that of the industriel one; from what they call l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme to the exploitation of the globe by industry. ["Quarterly Review," April & July 1831] Grice: “I am now in a position to characterize the notion of conversational implicaturum.”Not to provide a reductive analysis. The concept is too dear for me to torture it with one of my metaphysical routines.”“A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p”That seems good for the analysandumGrice loves the “by (in, when)” “(or making as if to). Note the oratio obliqua.Or ‘that’-clause. So this is not ‘uttering’As in the analysans of ‘meaning that.’“By uttering ‘x’ U means that p.’The “by” already involves a clause with a ‘that’-clause.So this is not a report of a physical event.It is a report embued already with intentionality.The utterer is not just ‘uttering’The utterer is EXPLICITLY conveying that p.We cannot say MEANING that p.Because Grice uses “mean” as opposed to “explicitly convey”His borderline scenarios are such,“Keep me company, dear”“If we are to say that when he uttererd that he means that his wife was to keep him company or not is all that will count for me to change my definition of ‘mean’ or not.”Also irony.But here it is more complicated. A man utters, “Grice defeated Strawson”If he means it ironically, to mean that Strawson defeated Grice, it is not the case that the utterer MEANT the opposite. He explicitly conveyed that.Grice considers the Kantian ‘cause and effect,’“If I am dead, I shall have no time for reading.”He is careful here that the utterer does not explicitly conveys that he will have no time for reading – because it’s conditioned on he being dead.“has implicated that q,” “may be said to have conversationally implicated that q,”So this is a specification alla arbor porphyrana of ‘By explicitly conveying that p, U implicitly conveys that q.’Where he is adding the second-order adverb, ‘conversationally.’By explicitly conveying that p, U has implicitly conveyed that q in a CONVERSATIONAL FASHION” iff or if“PROVIDED THAT”“(1) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the principle of conversational helfpulness;”Especially AT LEAST, because he just said that an implicaturum is ‘generated’ (Chomskyan jargon) when  AT LEAST A MAXIM IS played the flute.“(2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in THOSE terms) consistent with this presumption;”THIS IS THE CRUCIAL CLAUSE – and the one that not only requires ONE’S RATIONALITY, but the expectation that one’s addressee, BEING RATIONAL, will expect the utterer to BE RATIONAL.This is the ‘rationalisation’ he refers to in “Retrospective Epilogue.”Note that ‘q’ is obviously now the content of a state in the utterer’s soul – a desideratum or a creditum --, at least a CREDITUM, in view of Grice’s view of everything at least exhibitive and perhaps protreptic --“and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) IS required.”All that jargon about mutuality is a result of Strawson tutoring Schiffer!“Apply this to my initial example, to B's remark that C has not yet been to prison.”What made Grice think of such a convoluted example?He was laughing at Searle for providing non-philosophical examples, and there he is!“In a suitable setting A might reason as follows:”“(1) B has APPARENTLY violated – indeed he has played the flute with -- the maxim 'Be relevant' and so may be regarded as [ALSO] having flouted one of the maxims conjoining perspicuity,”In previous versions, under the desideratum of conversational clarity Grice had it that the desideratum included the expectation of this ‘relatedness’ AND that of ‘perspicuity’ (sic). In the above, Grice is stating that if you are irrelevant (or provide an unrelated contribution) you are not being perspicuous.But “He hasn’t been to prison” is perspicuous enough.And so is the link to the question --.Plus, wasn’t perspicuity only to apply to the ‘mode,’ to the ‘form,’ rather than the content.Here it is surely the CONTENT – that it is not the case that C is a criminal – that triggers it all.So, since there is a “not,” here this is parallel to the example examined by Strawson in the footnote to “Logical Theory.”The utterer is saying that it is not the case that C has been in prison yet.The ‘yet’ makes all the difference, even if a Fregeian colouring ‘convention’!“It is not the case that C has been in prison” Is, admittedly, not very perspicuous.“So what, neither has the utterer nor the addressee.”So there is an equivocation here as to the utterance perhaps not being perspicuous, while the utterer IS perspicuous.“yet I have no reason to suppose that he is opting out from the operation of the CP;”Or playing the flute with my beloved principle of conversational helpfulness.“(2) given the circumstances, I can regard his irrelevance as only apparent – as when we say that a plastic flower is not a flower, or to use Austin’s example, “That decoy duck is surely not a duck! That trick rubber spoon is no spoon! -- if, and only if, I suppose him to think that C is potentially dishonest;”As many are!The potentially is the trick.Recall Aristotle: “Will I say that I am potentially dishonest?! Not me! PLATO was! Theophrastus WILL! Or is it ‘shall’?”“(3) B knows that I am capable of working out step (2). So B implicates that C is potentially dishonest.'”Unless he goes on like I go with G. A. Paul, “I do not mean of course to mean that I mean that he is potentially dishonest, because although he is, he shouldn’t, or rather, I don’t think you are expecting me to convey explicitly that he shouln’t or should for that matter.”“The presence of a conversational implicaturum must be capable of being worked out; for even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicaturum (if present at all) will not count as a CONVERSATIONAL implicaturum.”This is the Humpty Dumpty in Grice.Cf. Provide the sixteen derivational steps in Jane Austen’s Novel remark, “I sense and sensibilia” – This is what happens sometimes when people who are not philosophers engage with Grice!For a philosopher, it is clear Grice is not being serious there. He is mocking an ‘ideal’-language philosopher (as Waissmann called them). Let’s revise the word:By “counting” he means “DEEM.” He has said that “She is poor, but she is honest,” is NOT CALCULABLE. So if an argument is not produced, this may not be a matter of argument.Philosophers are OBSESSED, and this is Grice’s trick, with ARGUMENT. Recall Grice on Hardie, “Unlike my father, who was rather blunt, Hardie taught me to ARGUE for this or that reason.”His mention of “INTUITION” is not perspicuous. He told J. M. Rountree that meaning is a matter of INTUITION, not a theoretical concept within a theory.So it’s not like Grice does not trust the intuition. So the point is TERMINOLOGICAL and methodological. Terminological, in that this is a specfification of ‘conversationally,’ rather than for cases like “How rude!” (he just flouted the maxim ‘be polite!’ but ‘be polite’ is not a CONVERSATIONAL maxim. Is Grice implicating that nonconversational nonconventional implicate are not calculable? We don’t think so.But he might.I think he will. Because in the case of ‘aesthetic maxim,’ ‘moral maxim,’ and ‘social maxim’ – such as “be polite,” – the calculation may involve such degree of gradation that you better not get Grice started!“it will be a CONVENTIONAL implicaturum.”OK – So perhaps he does allow that non-conventional non-conversational implicate ARE calculable.But he may add:“Unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, it will not be a conversational implicaturum; it will be a conventional implicaturum.”Strawson: “And what nonconventional nonconversational implicate?Grice: You are right, Strawon. Let me modify and refine the point: “It will be a dull, boring, undetachable, conventional implicaturum – OR any of those dull implicate that follow from (or result – I won’t use ‘generate’) one of those maxims that I have explicitly said they were NOT conversational maxims.“For surely, there is something very ‘contradictory-sounding’ to me saying that the implicaturum is involved with the flouting of a maxim which is NOT a conversational maxim, and yet that the maxim is a CONVERSATIONAL implicaturum.”“Therefore, I restrict calculability to CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURUM, because it involves the conversational maxims that contributors are expected to be reciprocal; whereas you’ll agree that Queen Victoria does not need to be abide with ‘be polite,’ as she frequently did not – “We are not amused, you fools! Only Gilbert and Sullivan amuse me!””“To work out that a particular CONVERSATIONAL [never mind nonconversational nonconventional] implicaturum is present, the hearer will reply on the following data:”As opposed to ‘sense-datum.’Perhaps assumption, alla Gettier, is better:“ (1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved;”WoW Quite a Bit. This is the reason why Grice entitled WoW his first book.In he hasn’t been to ‘prison’ we are not using ‘prison’ as Witters does (“My language is my prison”).Strawson: But is that the CONVENTIONAL meaning? Even for King Alfred?He hasn't been to prisonprison (n.) early 12c., from Old French prisoun "captivity, imprisonment; prison; prisoner, captive" (11c., Modern French prison), altered (by influence of pris "taken;" see prize (n.2)) from earlier preson, from Vulgar Latin *presionem, from Latin prensionem (nominative prensio), shortening of prehensionem (nominative *prehensio) "a taking," noun of action from past participle stem of prehendere "to take" (from prae- "before," see pre-, + -hendere, from PIE root *ghend- "to seize, take"). "Captivity," hence by extension "a place for captives," the MAIN modern sense.” (There are 34 other unmain ones). He hasn't been to a place for captives yet.You mean he is one.Cf. He hasn't been to asylum.You mean Foucault?(2) the principle of conversational helpfulness and this and that conversational maxim;”This is more crucial seeing that the utterer may utter something which has no conventional meaning?Cf. Austin, “Don’t ask for the meaning of a word! Less so for the ‘conventional’ one!”What Grice needs is ‘the letter,’ so he can have the ‘spirit’ as the implicaturum. Or he needs the lines, so he can have the implicaturum as a reading ‘between the lines.’If the utterance is a gesture, like showing a bandaged leg, or a Neapolitan rude gesture, it is difficult to distinguish or to identify what is EXPLICITLY conveyed.By showing his bandaged leg, U EXPLICITLY conveys that he has a bandaged leg. And IMPLICITLY conveys that he cannot really play cricket.The requirement of ‘denotatum’ is even tricker, “Swans are beautiful.” Denotata? Quantificational? Substitutional?In any case, Grice is not being circular in requiring that the addressee should use as an assumption or datum that U thinks that the expression E is generally uttered by utterers when they m-intend that p.But there are tricks here.“(3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance;”Cf. Grice, “Is there a general context for a general theory of context?”“(4) other items of background knowledge;”So you don’t get:How is C getting on at the bank? My lips are sealed Why do you care Mind your own business. Note that “he hasn’t been to prison yet” (meaning the tautologous ‘he is potentially dishonest’) is the sort of tricky answer to a tricky question! In asking, the asker KNOWS that he’ll get that sort of reply knowing the utterer as he does. “and (5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case.”This is Schiffer reported by Strawson.“A general pattern for the working out of a conversational implicaturum might be given as follows:”Again the abductive argument that any tutee worth of Hardie might expect 'He has said that p;”Ie explicitly conveys that p.Note the essential oratio obliqua, or that-clause.“there is no reason to suppose. that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the principle of conversational helpfulness”That is, he is not a prisoner of war, or anything.“He could not be doing this unless he thought that q;”Or rather, even if more tautologically still, he could not be doing so REASONABLY, as Austin would forbid, unless…’ For if the utterer is IRRATIONAL (or always playing the flute) surely he CAN do it!“he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q IS required;”Assumed MUTUAL RATIONALITY, which Grice fails to have added as assumption or datum. Cf. paraconsistent logics – “he is using ‘and’ and ‘or’ in a ‘deviant’ logical way, to echo Quine,” – He is an intuitionist, his name is Dummett.“he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q.'”The ‘or’ is delightful, for m-intention requires ‘intention,’ but the intention figures in previous positions, so ‘willingess to allow the addressee to think’ does PERFECTLY FINE! Especially at Oxford where we are ever so subtle!

conversational maxim of ambiguity avoidance, the: Grice thought that there should be a way to characterise each maxim other than by its formulation. “It’s a good exercise to grasp the concept behind the maxim.” Quality relates to Strength or Fortitutde, the first  to “at least,” the second to “at most.” For Quality, he has a supra-maxim, “of trust” – the two maxims are “maxim of candour” and “maxim of evidence”. Under relation, “maxim of relevance.” Under manner, suprapaxim “maxim of perspicuity” and four maxims, the first is exactly the same as the supramaxim, “maxim of percpicuity” now becomes “maxim of obscurity avoidance” – or “maxim of clarity” – obscure and clear are exact opposites – perspicuous [sic] is more of a trick. The second maxin under mode is this one of ambiguity avoidance – perhaps there should be a positive way to express this: be univocal. Do not be equivocal. Do not equivocate, univocate! The next two, plus the extra one that makes this a catalogue – the next is ‘maxim of brevity’ or “conversational maxim of unnecessary prolixity avoidance,” here we see the ‘sic’: “Grice’s maxim of conversational brevity, or of avoidance of conversationally unnecessary prolixity.” The next is “maxim of order” – and the one that makes this a decalogue: “maxim of conversational tailoring” --. a phonological or orthographic form having multiple meanings senses, characters, semantic representations assigned by the language system. A lexical ambiguity occurs when a lexical item word is assigned multiple meanings by the language. It includes a homonymy, i.e., distinct lexical items having the same sound or form but different senses  ‘knight’/’night’, ‘lead’ n./‘lead’ v., ‘bear’ n./‘bear’ v.; and b polysemy, i.e., a single lexical item having multiple senses  ‘lamb’ the animal/‘lamb’ the flesh, ‘window’ glass/‘window’ opening. The distinction between homonymy and polysemy is problematic. A structural ambiguity occurs when a phrase or sentence is correlated by the grammar of the language with distinct constituent structures phrase markers or sequences of phrase markers. Example: ‘Competent women and men should apply’  ‘[NP[NPCompetent women] and men] . . .’ vs. ‘[NPCompetent[NPwomen and men]] . . .’, where ‘NP’ stands for ‘noun phrase’. A scope ambiguity is a structural ambiguity deriving from alternative interpretations of scopes of operators see below. Examples: ‘Walt will diet and exercise only if his doctor approves’  sentence operator scope: doctor’s approval is a necessary condition for both diet and exercise wide scope ‘only if’ vs. approval necessary for exercise but not for dieting wide scope ‘and’; ‘Bertie has a theory about every occurrence’  quantifier scope: one grand theory explaining all occurrences ‘a theory’ having wide scope over ‘every occurrence’ vs. all occurrences explained by several theories together ‘every occurrence’ having wide scope. The scope of an operator is the shortest full subformula to which the operator is attached. Thus, in `A & B C’, the scope of ‘&’ is ‘A & B’. For natural languages, the scope of an operator is what it C-commands. X C-commands Y in a tree diagram provided the first branching node that dominates X also dominates Y. An occurrence of an operator has wide scope relative to that of another operator provided the scope of the former properly includes scope of the latter. Examples: in ‘~A & B’, ’-’ has wide scope over ‘&’; in ‘Dx Ey Fxy’, the existential quantifier has wide scope over the universal quantifier. A pragmatic ambiguity is duality of use resting on pragmatic principles such as those which underlie reference and conversational implicaturum; e.g., depending on contextual variables, ‘I don’t know that he’s right’ can express doubt or merely the denial of genuine knowledge. 

maxim of conversational maximin informativeness: a maxim combining the maximum and the minimum.

maxim of maximal conversational informativeness: a maxim only dealing with the ‘maximum,’ not the ‘minimum,’ which is a problem for Grice. “Why regulate volunteerness?”

maxim of minimal conversational informativeness: maxim dealing with the minimum, not the maximum.

maxim of conversational trust: Grice preferred ‘trust’ to ‘truth.’ Grice: “One of the few useful items in the English philosophical vocabulary: a word that encompasses the volitional and the non-volitional. Of course, the same could be said of ‘verum,’ cognate with German ‘wahr.’

maxim of conversational veracity: Grice: “When I’m feeling Latinate, you’ll hear me refer to this as the maxim of conversational veracity – The Romans distinguished the verax and the mendax. I don’t.”

maxim of conversational evidential adequacy: Grice: “We need a maxim to ensure adequate evidence – this would be otiose in the volitional – but then we can always generalise the ‘evidence’ to ‘ground,’ or reason, which is what my American tutee, R. J. Fogelin, did.

maxim of conversational relevance: Grice: “Personally, I prefer ‘relation,’ but Strawson doesn’t. But then Strawson thinks this is ‘unimportant.’ Not to me, ‘relevant,’ like ‘important,’ are the most unrelevant and unimportant pieces, especially as abused by an Oxford philosopher who should know better!”

maxim of conversational perspicuity: Grice: “D. H. Lewis made me ‘hate’ clarity – “clarity is not enough – plus, it’s metaphorical? How can I render clear what is essentially obscure? In fact, I would go on to say that the task of the philosopher is to dramatise the mundane, to render obscure what seems clear. Perspicuity is unclear enough and will do fine.”

maxim of conversational clarity, or maxim of conversational obscurity avoidance: Grice: “It might be said that ‘be perspicuous’ YIELDS ‘avoid obscurity,’ alla ‘be clear, don’t be obscure.’ But I prefer to be repetitive, if not AS repetitive as the Jewish God – the Jews have more than ten commandments!”

maxim of conversational ambiguity avoidance, maxim of conversational equivocation avoidance, maxim of conversational univocity: Grice: “This is a teaser, as how ‘ambiguous’ can ‘ambiguous’ be? And why should I dumb down my wit to help my addressee? Dorothy Parker never did!”

maxim of conversational brevity – or maxim of conversationally unnecessary prolixity avoidance – Grice: “I would call it maxim of redundancy.” “Or maxim of redundancy avoidance,” or maxim of conversational entropy.” A: Did you watch the programme? – Grice: A friend suggested this to me. B: No, I was in a blacked-out city. Versus “No, I was in New York, which was blacked-out.  Grice: "In response to my exploration on conversation, I was given an example by a fellow playgroup member which seems to me, as far as it goes, to provide a welcome kind of support for the picture I am putting forward in that it appears to exhibit a kind of interaction between the members of my list of conversational maxims to which I had not really paid due attention — perhaps for the matter not really concerning directly philosophical methodology.” Suppose that it is generally known that Oxford and London were blacked out the day prior. The following conversation takes place: A: Did Smith see the show on the bobby box last night? Grice: “It will be CONVERSATIONALLY unobjectionable for B, who knows that Smith was in London, to reply, B: No, he was in a blacked-out city. "B could have said that Smith was in *London*, thereby providing a further piece of information.” “However, I should like to be able to argue that, in preferring the conversational move featuring the indefinite descriptor, ‘a blacked-out city' B implicates (or communicates the implicaturum) (by the maxims prescribing relation and redundancy avoidance) a more appropriate piece of information, viz., why_ Smith was prevented from seeing the ‘show’ on the bobby box.” "B could have provided BOTH pieces of information, in an over-prolixic version of the above: ‘Smith was in London , which, as every schoolboy knows, was blacked-out yesterday.” — thereby insulting A. But THE ***GAIN****, as Bentham would put it, would have been **INSUFFICIENT** to **JUSTIFY** the additional conversational **COST**.” “Or so I think.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Bobby-box implicatura.”

maxim of conversational order: Grice: “Order is vague: first is the generalised, then the particularized.” By “the very particularized,” Grice means ‘temporal ordered sequence.” E. g. “Were I to say, Lady Ogilvy fainted and took arsenic, Strawson would get a different feeling if I were to utter instead, ‘Lady Ogilvy took arsenic and fainted.’”

maxim of conversational tailoring: ‘The king of France is not bald – France is a monarchy.”

conversational point: Grice distinguishes between ‘point’ and ‘conversational point.’ “What’s the good of being quoted by another philosopher on the point of ‘point.’?” But that is what Winch does. So, as a revenge, Grice elaborated on the point. P. London-born philosopher. He quotes  Grice in a Royal Philosophy talk: “Grice’s point is that we should distinguish the truth of one’s remark form the point of one’s remarks – Grice’s example is: “Surely I have neither any doubt nor any desire to deny that the pillar box in front of me is red, and yet I won’t hesitate to say that it seems red to me” – Surely pointless, but an incredible truth meant to refute G. A. Paul

conversational reason. With ‘reason,’ Grice is following Ariskant. There’s the ‘ratio’ and there’s the “Vernunft.” “To converse” can mean to have sex (cf. know) so one has to be careful. Grice is using ‘conversational’ casually. First, he was aware of the different qualifications for ‘implication’. There is Nowell-Smith’s contextual implication and C. K. Grant’s ‘pragmatic implication.’ So he chose ‘conversational implication’ himself. Later, when narrowing down the notion, he distinguished between ‘conversational implication’ and ‘non-conversational implication’: “Thank you. B: You’re welcome.” If B is following the maxim, ‘be polite,’ the implication that he is pleased he was able to assist his emissor is IMPLICATED but not conversationally so. It is not a ‘conversational implication.’ Grice needs to restrict the notion for philosophical purposes. Both for the framework of his theory (it is easier to justify transcendentally conversational implication than it is non-conversational implication). Note that ‘I am pleased I was able to assist’ is CANCELLABLE or defeatible, so that’s not the issue. In any case, both ‘conversational impication’ and these type of calculable ‘non-conversational’ implication still yielding from some ‘maxim’ (such as ‘be polite’) Grice covers under the generic “non-conventional” precisely because they can be defeated. When it comes to NON-DEFEASIBLE implicatura, Grice uses ‘conventional implication’ (as in “She was poor but she was honest.”). Grice did not find these fun. And it shows. Strawson stuck with them, but his philosophising about them ain’t precisely ‘fun.’ Used in Retrospective, p. 369. Also: conversational rationality. Surely, “principle of conversational rationality” sounds otiose. Expectation of mutual rationality sounds better. Critique of conversational reason sounds best! Grice is careful here. When he provides a reductive analysis of ‘reasoning,’ this goes as follows: the reasoner reasons from premise to conclusion. That’s the analysandum. What’s the analysans? At least it involves TWO clauses: If the reasoner reasons from premise to conclusion, it is assumed that he BELIEVES that the premise obtains; and he believes that the conclusion obtains. This has to be generalised to cover the desiderative, using ‘accept.’ He accepts that the premise obtains, and he accepts that the conclusion obtains. But there is obviously a SECOND condition: that the conclusion follows from the premise! He uses ‘demonstrably’ for that, or the demonstratum.’ He is open as to what kind of yielding is involved because he wants to allow for inductive reasoning and abductive reasoning, not just deductive reasoning. AND THERE IS A TYPICALLY GRICEIAN third condition, involving CAUSATION. He had used ‘cause’ in reductive analyses before – if not so much in ‘meaning,’ due to Urmson’s counterexample involving ‘bribery,’ where ‘cause’ does not seem to do – but in his analysis of ‘intending’ for the British Academy. So at Oxford he promotes this THIRD causal condition as involving that, naturally enough, it is the rasoner’s BELIEF that demonstrably q follows from p, which CAUSES the reasoner TO BELIEVE (or more generally, accept) that the conclusion obtains. Grice is happy with that belief in the validity of the demonstration ‘populates’ the world of alethic beliefs, and does not concern with generalising that into a generic ‘acceptance.’ The word ‘rationalist’ is anathema at Oxford, because tutor after tutor has brainwashed their tutees that the distinction is ‘empiricst-rationalist’ and that at Oxford we are ‘empiricists.’ So Grice is really being ‘heretic’ here in the words of G. P. Baker. demonstratum: The Eng. word “reason” and the Fr.  word “raison” are both formed on the basis of Roman “reor,” to count or calculate, whence think, believe. The Roman verb translates the Grecian “λέγειν,” two of whose principal meanings it retains, but only two: count and think. The third principal meaning of the Grecian term, speak, discourse, which designates a third type of putting into relation and proportion, is rendered by other Roman series: “dicere” (originally cognate with ‘deixis,’ and so not necessarily ‘verbal’), “loquor,” “orationem habere” (the most ‘vocal’ one, as it relates to the ‘mouth,’ cf. ‘orality’) or “sermonem habere,” so that ultimately the Grecian λόγος is approached by Roman philosophers by means of a syntagm, “ratio et oratio,” reason and discourse. Each vernacular fragments the meaning of logos into a greater or lesser. Cf. ‘principium reddendae rationis.’ Rationality functions as a principle of the intelligibility of the world and history, particularly in Hegel. Then there’s The Partitions of Reason and Semantic diffractions. Although there is no language that retains under a single word all the meanings of logos except by bringing logos into the language in question, the distribution of these meanings is more or less close to Roman. For the classical Fr.  word “raison,” which maintains almost all the Roman meanings including the mathematical sense of proportion, as in “raison d’une série,” or “raison inverse,” a contemporary Fr. -G.  dictionary proposes the following terms: Vernunft, Verstand rational faculty. This example shows that the whole of the vocabulary is thus mobilized. Reason and faculties We can distinguish between two interfering systems. The first designates reason, identified with thought in general, in its relationship to a bodily and/or mental instance. The second situates reason in a hierarchy of faculties whose organization it determines. Regarding the first system, as it is expressed in various languages, where one will find studies of the main distortions, especially around the expressions of the Roman ‘anima.’ Philosophers especially emphasize the ways of designating reason and mind that appear to be the most irreducible from one language to another. Regarding the second system, and the partitions that do not coincide. For Grice, ‘to understand’ presupposes ‘rationality – not for Kant, who sticks with Verstand/Vernunft distinction. Ratio speculatum, praticatum. From Aristotle to Kant, two great domains of rationality have been distinguished: theory, or speculative reason, and practice. The lurality of meanings, each represented by one or more specific words. The first question, from the point of view of the difference of languages, is thus that of the breadth of the meaning of “reason” or its equivalents, and of the systems diffracting the meanings of logos and then of ratio. But another complex of problems immediately arises. The Roman “ratio” absorbs the meanings of other Grecian terms, such as νοῦς and διάνοια, which are also translated in other, more technical ways, such as intellectus; so that reason, in the sense of rationality, is a comprehensive term, whereas ‘reason’ in the sense of intellect or understanding is a singular and differentiated faculty. However, none of the comprehensive terms or systems of opposition coincides with those of another language, which are moreover changing. Then there’s Reason and Rationality: man, animal, god. Since Aristotle’s definition of man as an animal endowed with logos, which Roman writers rendered by “animal rationale” — omitting the discursive dimension—reason, or the logos, is a specific difference that defines man by his difference from other living beings and/or his participation in a divine or cosmic nature. Reason is opposed to madness understood as de-mentia. More broadly, reason is conceived in terms of difference from what does not belong to its domain and falls outside its immediate law, but which man may, in certain ways, share with other animals, such as sensation, passion, imagination, and possibly memory. Rationality and the principle of intelligibility. Rationality, defined by the logos, is connected with logic as the art of speaking and thinking, and with its founding principles. Les quodlibet cinq, six et sept. Ed.  by M. de Wulf and J. Hoffmans. Louvain, Belg.: Institut supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université, 191 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Elements of the Phil.  of Right. Tr.  H. Nisbet and ed.  by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge , . . Science of LogiTr.  V. Miller. London: Allen and Unwin, . . Werke. Ed.  by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel. 20 vols. FrankfuSuhrkamp, . Heidegger, Martin. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Tr.  Albert Hofstadter Bloomington: Indiana , . . Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Tr.  Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: Indiana , . Hume, D. . A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed.  by D.  Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford , . Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Translated and ed.  by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge , . . Critique of Pure Reason. 2nd ed. Tr.  N. Kemp-Smith. : Macmillan, 193 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz. Extraits des manuscrits. Ed.  by Louis Couturat. : Presses Universitaires de France, 190 Reprint. Hildesheim, Ger.: Olms, . . Philosophical Essays. Translated and ed.  by Roger Ariew and Dan Garber. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, . . Philosophical Papers and Letters. 2nd ed. Ed.  and Tr.  Leroy E. Loemker. Dordrecht, Neth.: D. Reidel, . . Die philosophischen Schriften. Ed.  by I. Gerhardt. 7 vols. Berlin, 187590. Reprint. Hildesheim, Ger.: Olms, . . Leibnizens mathematische Schriften. Ed.  by I. Gerhardt. 7 vols. Berlin, 18496 . Textes inédits d’après les manuscrits de la Bibliothèque provinciale de Hanovre. Ed.  by Gaston Gru2 vols. : Presses Universitaires de France, 194 Locke, J.. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed.  by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon, . Micraelius, J. . Lexicon philosophicum terminorum philosophis usitatorum. 2nd ed. Stettin, 166 Paulus, J.. Henri de Gand: Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique. : Vrin, 193 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe. Ed.  by Jörg Jantzen, T.  Buchheim, Jochem Hennigfeld, Wilhelm G. Jacobs, and Siegbert Peetz. 40 vols. StuttgaFrommann-Holzboog, . . Of the I as the Principle of Phil. , or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge. In The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four Early Essays 17949 Translated with commentary by F. Marti. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell , . Spinoza, Baruch. Complete Works. With tr.s by Samuel Shirley. Ed.  by Michael L. Morgan. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, . . Oper2nd ed. Ed.  by Gebhardt. 5 vols. Heidelberg: Carl Winters.

conversational trustworthiness – or just trust. Principle of Conversational trustworthiness -- Conversational desideratum of maximal evidence, information bearing on the truth or falsity of a proposition. In philosophical discussions, a person’s evidence is generally taken to be all the information a person has, positive or negative, relevant to a proposition. The notion of evidence used in philosophy thus differs from the ordinary notion according to which physical objects, such as a strand of hair or a drop of blood, counts as evidence. One’s information about such objects could be evidence in the philosophical sense. The concept of evidence plays a central role in our understanding of knowledge and rationality. According to a traditional and widely held view, one has knowledge only when one has a true belief based on very strong evidence. Rational belief is belief based on adequate evidence, even if that evidence falls short of what is needed for knowledge. Many traditional philosophical debates, such as those about our knowledge of the external world, the rationality of religious belief, and the rational basis for moral judgments, are largely about whether the evidence we have in these areas is sufficient to yield knowledge or rational belief. The senses are a primary source of evidence. Thus, for most, if not all, of our beliefs, ultimately our evidence traces back to sensory experience. Other sources of evidence include memory and the testimony of others. Of course, both of these sources rely on the senses in one way or another. According to rationalist views, we can also get evidence for some propositions through mere reason or reflection, and so reason is an additional source of evidence. The evidence one has for a belief may be conclusive or inconclusive. Conclusive evidence is so strong as to rule out all possibility of error. The discussions of skepticism show clearly that we lack conclusive evidence for our beliefs about the external world, about the past, about other minds, and about nearly any other topic. Thus, an individual’s perceptual experiences provide only inconclusive evidence for beliefs about the external world since such experiences can be deceptive or hallucinatory. Inconclusive, or prima facie, evidence can always be defeated or overridden by subsequently acquired evidence, as, e.g., when testimonial evidence in favor of a proposition is overridden by the evidence provided by subsequent experiences.  evidentialism, in the philosophy of religion, the view that religious beliefs can be rationally accepted only if they are supported by one’s “total evidence,” understood to mean all the other propositions one knows or justifiably believes to be true. Evidentialists typically add that, in order to be rational, one’s degree of belief should be proportioned to the strength of the evidential support. Evidentialism was formulated by Locke as a weapon against the sectarians of his day and has since been used by Clifford among many others to attack religious belief in general. A milder form of evidentialism is found in Aquinas, who, unlike Clifford, thinks religion can meet the evidentialist challenge. A contrasting view is fideism, best understood as the claim that one’s fundamental religious convictions are not subject to independent rational assessment. A reason often given for this is that devotion to God should be one’s “ultimate concern,” and to subject faith to the judgment of reason is to place reason above God and make of it an idol. Proponents of fideism include Tertullian, Kierkegaard, Karl Barth, and some Vittersians. A third view, which as yet lacks a generally accepted label, may be termed experientialism; it asserts that some religious beliefs are directly justified by religious experience. Experientialism differs from evidentialism in holding that religious beliefs can be rational without being supported by inferences from other beliefs one holds; thus theistic arguments are superfluous, whether or not there are any sound ones available. But experientialism is not fideism; it holds that religious beliefs may be directly grounded in religious experience wtihout the mediation of other beliefs, and may be rationally warranted on that account, just as perceptual beliefs are directly grounded in perceptual experience. Recent examples of experientialism are found in Plantinga’s “Reformed Epistemology,” which asserts that religious beliefs grounded in experience can be “properly basic,” and in the contention of Alston that in religious experience the subject may be “perceiving God.”

converse. 1 Narrowly, the result of the immediate logical operation called conversion on any categorical proposition, accomplished by interchanging the subject term and the predicate term of that proposition. Thus, the converse of the categorical proposition ‘All cats are felines’ is ‘All felines are cats’. 2 More broadly, the proposition obtained from a given ‘if . . . then . . .’ conditional proposition by interchanging the antecedent and the consequent clauses, i.e., the propositions following the ‘if’ and the ‘then’, respectively; also, the argument obtained from an argument of the form ‘P; therefore Q’ by interchanging the premise and the conclusion.  converse, outer and inner, respectively, the result of “converting” the two “terms” or the relation verb of a relational sentence. The outer converse of ‘Abe helps Ben’ is ‘Ben helps Abe’ and the inner converse is ‘Abe is helped by Ben’. In simple, or atomic, sentences the outer and inner converses express logically equivalent propositions, and thus in these cases no informational ambiguity arises from the adjunction of ‘and conversely’ or ‘but not conversely’, despite the fact that such adjunction does not indicate which, if either, of the two converses intended is meant. However, in complex, or quantified, relational sentences such as ‘Every integer precedes some integer’ genuine informational ambiguity is produced. Under normal interpretations of the respective sentences, the outer converse expresses the false proposition that some integer precedes every integer, the inner converse expresses the true proposition that every integer is preceded by some integer. More complicated considerations apply in cases of quantified doubly relational sentences such as ‘Every integer precedes every integer exceeding it’. The concept of scope explains such structural ambiguity: in the sentence ‘Every integer precedes some integer and conversely’, ‘conversely’ taken in the outer sense has wide scope, whereas taken in the inner sense it has narrow scope. 

convey: used in index to WoW. Etymology is funny. From con-via – cum-via, go on the road with.

coonway: a., english philosopher whose Principia philosophiae antiquissimae et recentissimae 1690; English translation, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, 1692 proposes a monistic ontology in which all created things are modes of one spiritual substance emanating from God. This substance is made up of an infinite number of hierarchically arranged spirits, which she calls monads. Matter is congealed spirit. Motion is conceived not dynamically but vitally. Lady Conway’s scheme entails a moral explanation of pain and the possibility of universal salvation. She repudiates the dualism of both Descartes and her teacher, Henry More, as well as the materialism of Hobbes and Spinoza. The work shows the influence of cabalism and affinities with the thought of the mentor of her last years, Francis Mercurius van Helmont, through whom her philosophy became known to Leibniz.

co-operatum: Grice previously used ‘help’ – which has a Graeco-Roman counterpart -- Grice is very right in noting that ‘helpfulness’ does not ‘equate’ cooperation. Correspondingly he changed the principle of conversational helpfulness into the principle of conversational co-operation. He also points that one has to distinguish between the general theisis that conversation is rational from the thesis that the particular form of rationality that conversation takes is cooperative rationality, which most libertarians take as ‘irrationality’ personified, almost! Grice is obsessed with this idea that ‘co-operation’ need not just be ‘conversational.’ Indeed, his way to justify a ‘rationalist’ approach is through analogy. If he can find ‘co-operative’ traits in behaviour other than ‘conversational,’ the greater the chance to generalise, and thus justify. The co-operation would be self-justifying. co-operation. The hyphen in Strawson and Wiggins (p. 520). Grice found ‘co-operative’ too Marxist, and would prefer ‘help,’ as in ‘mutual help.’ This element of ‘mutuality’ is necessary. And it is marked grammatical, with the FIRST person and the SECOND person. The third need NOT be a person – can be a dog (as in “Fido is shaggy”). The mututality is necessary in that the emissor’s intention involves the belief that his recipient is rational. You cannot co-operate with a rock. You cannot co-operate with a vegetal. You cannot cooperate with a non-rational animal. You can ONLY cooperate with a co-rational agent. Animal co-operation poses a nice side to the Griceian idea. Surely the stereotype is a member of species S cooperating with another specimen of the same species. But then there are great examples of ‘sym-biosis’: the crane that gets rid off the hippopotamus’s ticks. Is this cooperation? Is this intentional? If Grice thinks that there is a ‘mechanistically derivable’ explanation,, it isn’t. He did not necessarily buy ‘bio-sociological’ approaches. Which was a problem, because we don’t have much philosophical seriouis discourse on ‘cooperation’ at the general level Grice is aiming at. Except in ethics, which is biased. So it is no wonder that Grice had to rely on ‘meta-ethics’ to even conceptualise the field of cooperation: the maximin becomes a balance between a principle of conversational egoism and a principle of conversational altruism. He later found the egoism-tag as ‘understood.’ And his ‘altruism’ became ‘helpfulness,’ became ‘benevolence,’ and became ‘co-operation.’

copulatum: It was an Oxonian exercise to trace the ‘copula.’ “I’ve been working like a dog, should be sleeping like a log.” Where is the copula: Lennon is a dog-like worker – Lennon is a potential log-like sleeper.” Grice uses ‘copula’ in PPQ.  The term is sometimes used ambiguously, for ‘conjunctum.’ A conjunctive is called a copulative. But Grice obviously narrows down the use of copulatum to izz and hazz. He is having in mind Strawson.The formula does not allow for differences in tense and grammatical number; nor for the enormous class of * all '-sentences which do not contain, as their main verb, the verb * to be '. We might try to recast the sentences so that they at least fitted into one of the two patterns * All x is y ' or ' All x are y ' ; but the results would be, as English, often clumsy andt sometimes absurd. for Aristotle, 'Socrates is a man' is true "in virtue of his being that thing which constitutes existing for him (being which constitutes his mode of existence)," Hermann Weidemann, "In Defense of Aristotle's Theory of Predication," p. 84— only so long as that "being" be taken as an assertion of being per se. But Weidemann wants to take it merely copulatively. In "Prädikation," p. 1196, he says that when 'is' is used as tertium adiacens it has no meaning by itself, but merely signifies the connection of subject and predicate. Cf. his "Aristoteles über das isolierte Aussagenwort," p. 154. H. P. Grice, "Aristotle on the Multiplicity of Being," also rejects an existential reading of tertium adiacens and pushes for a copulative one. Cf. Alan Code, "Aristotle: Essence and Accident," pp. 414-7. Aristotle has connected the semantic multiplicity in the copula not with variation between predicates of one subject, but with variation between essential (per se)predications upon different (indeed categorially different) subjects (such ...eads me to wonder whether Aristotle may be maintaining not only that the copula exhibits semantic ...An extended treatment of my views about izzing and hazzing can be found in Alan.  A crucial ... on occasion admit catégorial variation in the sense of the copulative 'is', evidently is ... Aristotle has connected the semantic multiplicity in the copula not with variation ...with the copulative 'is'; so he rather strangely interprets the last remark. (1017a27-30) as alluding to semantic multiplicity in the copula as being. (supposedly) a consequence of semantic multiplicity in the existential 'is'. This interpretation seems difficult to defend. When Aristotle says that predicates sometimes say what a thing is, sometimes what is it like (its quality), sometimes how much it is (its quantity) and so on, he seems to be saying that if we consider the range of predicates which can be applied to some item, for example to a substance like Socrates or a cow, these predicates are categorically various, and so the uses of the copula in the ascription of these predicates will undergo corresponding variation"H. P. Grice brings the question he had considered with J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson at Oxford about Aristotle’s categories.In “Categoriae,” Aristotle distinguishes two sorts of case of the application of word or phrase to a range of situations. In one sort of case, both the word and a single definition (account, “logos”) apply throughout that range. In the other sort of case, the word but no single definition applies through the range.These two sorts of case have a different nature. In the first case, the word is applied synonymously (of better as “sunonuma” – literally “sun-onuma”, cognomen). In the second case the word is applied homonymously (or better “homonuma”, or aequi-vocally, literally “homo-numa.”)Grice notes that a homonymous application has some sort of sub-division which Aristotle calls "paronymy" (“paronuma”), literally ‘para onuma.’To put it roughly, homonyms have multiple meanings – what Grice has as “semantic multiplicity.”Synonyms have one meaning or ONE SENSE, but apply to different kinds of thing.A paronym, such as ‘be,’ derives from other things of a different kind. Paronyms display a ‘UNIFIED semantic multiplicity,’ if that’s not too oxymoronic: how can the multiplicity be unified while remaining a multiplicity? Aristotle states, confusingly, that "being is said in many ways". As Grice notes, ‘good’ (agathon) also is a paronym that displays unified semantic multiplicity.In Nichomachean Ethics, even more confusingly, Aristotle says that "good is said in as many ways as being". He doesn’t number the ways.So the main goal for Grice is to answer the question: If, as Aristotle suggests, at least some expressions connected with the notion of "being" exhibit semantic multiplicity, of which expressions is the suggestion true? Grice faces the question of existential being and Semantic Multiplicity. Grice stresses that Semantic Multiplicity of  "be" is not only the case of it interpretation. Other words he wants to know in what way of interpretation of this word the philosophers can detect the SM. Generally speaking there are four possible interpretations of "being": First, "be" is taken to mean "exist.”Second, "be" is taken as a copula in a predication statement.Third, "be" is taken for expressing the identity.Fourth, "Being" is considered to be a noun (equivalent to ‘object' or ‘entity') – subjectification, category shift: “Smith’s being tall suggests he is an athlete.” (cfr. A. G. N. Flew on the ‘rubbish’ that adding ‘the’ to ‘self’ results in – contra J. R. Jones). Philosophers have some problems for this kind of theory with separating interpretations from each other. It is natural for thinkers to unite the first and the fourth. The object or entity should be the things which already exist. So the SM would attach to such a noun as "entity" if, and only if, it also attaches to the word "exist". Furthermore, it seems to be a good idea to unite the first and the third. In some ways theorist can paraphrase the word "exist" in the terms of self-identity. Grice gives an example: “Julius Caesar exists if and only if Julius Caesar is identical for Julius Caesar.” Cf. Grice on ‘relative identity.’So the philosophers should investigate SM in two possible interpretations – when "be" is understood as "exist" and when "be" is understood as copula. From Aristotle's point of view ‘being’ is predicated of everything. From this statement, Grice draws the conclusion that "exist" can apply to every thing, even a square circle.This word should signify a plurality of universals and exhibits semantic multiplicity. But Grice continue his analyses and tries to show, that "exist" has not merely SM, but UNIFIED semantic multiplicity. God forbid that he breaks M. O. R., Modifed Occam’s Razor – Semantic multiplicies are not to be multiplied unificatory necessity.”In “Metaphysics,” Aristotle says that whatever things are signified by the "forms of predication". Philosophers understood the forms of predication (praedicabilium, praedicamentum) as a category. So in this way "being" has as many significations as there are forms of predication. "Be" in this case indicates what a thing is, what is like or how much it is and ctr. And no reasons to make a difference between two utterances like "man walks (flourishes)" and "the man is walking (flourishing)" – cfr. Strawson on no need to have ‘be’ explicitly in the surface form, which render some utterances absurd. Grice says that it is not a problem with interpretation of verb-forms like ‘walks' and ‘flourishes' while we can replace them by expression in a canonical form like ‘is walking' and ‘is flourishing'. Aristotle names them as canonical in form within the multiplicity of use of "be" because ‘is’ is not existential, but copulative.Cf. Descartes, I think therefore I am – I am a res cogitans, ergo I am a res. "When Aristotle says that predicates sometimes say what a thing is, sometimes what is it like (its quality), sometimes how much it is (its quantity) and so on, he seems to be saying that, if we consider the range of predicates which can be applied to some item, for example to a substance like Socrates or a cow, these predicates are categorically various, and so the uses of the copula in the ascription of these predicates will undergo corresponding variation" It means that, from Aristotle's point of view, "Socrates is F" is not an essential predication, where "F" shows the item in the category C. So the logical form of the proposition “Socrates is F” is understood as "Socrates has something which is (C) F" where is (C) represent essential connection to category C. In conclusion it can be said that the copula is a matter of the logical nature of constant connection expressed by "has" and a categorical variant relation expressed by essential "is". So we have both types of interpretation: as existence and as a copula. (Our gratitude to P. A.  Sobolevsky). ases of ''Unified Semantic Multiplicity'' (USM). Prominent among examples of USM is the application of the word 'be'; according to. Aristotle, “being is said in ... Aristotle and the alleged multiplicity of being (or something). Grice is  all for focal unity. Or, to echo Jones, if there is semantic multiplicity  (homonymy), it is in the end UNIFIED semantic multiplicity (paronymy). Or  something. Copula – H. P. Grice on Aristotle on the copula (“Aristotle on the multiplicity of being”) -- copula, in logic, a form of the verb ‘to be’ that joins subject and predicate in singular and categorical propositions. In ‘George is wealthy’ and ‘Swans are beautiful’, e.g., ‘is’ and ‘are’, respectively, are copulas. Not all occurrences of forms of ‘be’ count as copulas. In sentences such as ‘There are 51 states’, ‘are’ is not a copula, since it does not join a subject and a predicate, but occurs simply as a part of the quantifier term ‘there are’. 

corpus: Grice would not have gone to Oxford had his talent not been in the classics, Greek and Latin. As a Midlander, he was sent to Corpus. At the time, most of Oxford was oriented towards the classics, or Lit. Hum. (Philosophia). At some point, each college attained some stereotypical fame, which Grice detested (“Corpus is for classicists”). By this time, Grice, after a short stay at Merton, accepted the fellowship at St. John’s, which was “a different animal.” In them days, there were only two tutorial fellows in philosophy, Scots Mabbott, and English Grice. But Grice also was “University Lecturer in Philosophy,” which meant he delivered seminars for tutees all over Oxford. St. John’s keeps a record of all the tutees by Grice. They include, alphabetically, a few good names. Why is Corpus so special? Find out! History of “Corpus Christi.” Cf. St. John’s. Cf. Merton. Each should have an entry. Corpus is Grice’s alma mater – so crucial. Hardieian: you only have one tutor in your life, and Grice’s was Hardie. So an exploration on Hardie may be in order. Grice hastens to add that he only learned ‘form,’ not matter, from Hardie, but the ethical and Aristotelian approach he also admitted. Corpus -- Grice, “Personal identity” – soul and body -- disembodiment, the immaterial state of existence of a person who previously had a body. Disembodiment is thus to be distinguished from nonembodiment or immateriality. God and angels, if they exist, are non-embodied, or immaterial. By contrast, if human beings continue to exist after their bodies die, then they are disembodied. As this example suggests, disembodiment is typically discussed in the context of immortality or survival of death. It presupposes a view according to which persons are souls or some sort of immaterial entity that is capable of existing apart from a body. Whether it is possible for a person to become disembodied is a matter of controversy. Most philosophers who believe that this is possible assume that a disembodied person is conscious, but it is not obvious that this should be the case.  Corpus -- Grice’s body -- embodiment, the bodily aspects of human subjectivity. Embodiment is the central theme in European phenomenology, with its most extensive treatment in the works of Maurice MerleauPonty. Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment distinguishes between “the objective body,” which is the body regarded as a physiological entity, and “the phenomenal body,” which is not just some body, some particular physiological entity, but my or your body as I or you experience it. Of course, it is possible to experience one’s own body as a physiological entity. But this is not typically the case. Typically, I experience my body tacitly as a unified potential or capacity for doing this and that  typing this sentence, scratching that itch, etc. Moreover, this sense that I have of my own motor capacities expressed, say, as a kind of bodily confidence does not depend on an understanding of the physiological processes involved in performing the action in question. The distinction between the objective and phenomenal body is central to understanding the phenomenological treatment of embodiment. Embodiment is not a concept that pertains to the body grasped as a physiological entity. Rather it pertains to the phenomenal body and to the role it plays in our object-directed experiences. 

cosmologicum. Grice systematized metaphysics quite carefully. He distinguished between eschatology (or the theory of categories) and ontology proper. Within ontology, there is ‘ontologia generalis’ and ‘ontologia specialis.’ There are at least two branches of ‘ontologia specialis’: ‘cosmologia’ and ‘anthropologia.’ Grice would often refer to the ‘world’ in toto. For example, in “Meaning revisited,” when he speaks of the ‘triangle’: world-denotatum; signum-emissor, and soul. Grice was never a solipsist, and most of his theories are ‘causal’ in nature, including that of meaning and perception. As such, he was constantly fighting against acosmism. While not one of his twelve labours, he took a liking for the coinage. ‘Acosmism’ is formed in analogy to ‘atheism,’ meaning the denial of the ultimate reality of the world. Ernst Platner used it in 1776 to describe Spinoza’s philosophy, arguing that Spinoza did not intend to deny “the existence of the Godhead, but the existence of the world.” Maimon, Fichte, Hegel, and others make the same claim. By the time of Feuerbach it was also used to characterize a basic feature of Christianity: the denial of the world or worldliness.   Cosmologicum -- emanationism, a doctrine about the origin and ontological structure of the world, most frequently associated with Plotinus and other Neoplatonists, according to which everything else that exists is an emanation from a primordial unity, called by Plotinus “the One.” The first product of emanation from the One is Intelligence noûs, a realm resembling Plato’s world of Forms. From Intelligence emanates Soul psuche, conceived as an active principle that imposes, insofar as that is possible, the rational structure of Intelligence on the matter that emanates from Soul. The process of emanation is typically conceived to be necessary and timeless: although Soul, for instance, proceeds from Intelligence, the notion of procession is one of logical dependence rather than temporal sequence. The One remains unaffected and undiminished by emanation: Plotinus likens the One to the sun, which necessarily emits light from its naturally infinite abundance without suffering change or loss of its own substance. Although emanationism influenced some Jewish, Christian, and Islamic thinkers, it was incompatible with those theistic doctrines of divine activity that maintained that God’s creative choice and the world thus created were contingent, and that God can, if he chooses, interact directly with individual creatures. 

cotton onto the implicaturum: this is not cognate with the plant. It’s Welsh, rather.Strawson’s and Wiggins’s example of the ‘suggestio falsi’ – or alternative to Grice’s tutee example. Since Strawson and Wiggins are presenting the thing to the ultra-prestigious British Academy, they thought a ‘tutee’ example would not be prestigious enough. So they have two philosophers, Strawson and Grice, talking about a third party, another philosopher, well known by his mood outbursts. They are assessing the third party’s philosophical abilities at their London club. Strawson volunteers: “And Smith?”. Grice responds: “If he had a more angelic temperament…” Strawson, “like a fool, I rushed in – Strawson Wiggins p. 520. The angelic temperament. To like someone or something; to view someone or something favorably. ... After we explained our plan again, the rest of the group seemed to cotton onto it. 2. To begin to understand something. Has nothing to do with cotton 1560s, "to prosper, succeed;" of things, "to agree, suit, fit," a word of uncertain origin. Perhaps from Welsh cytuno "consent, agree;" but perhaps rather a metaphor from cloth-finishing and thus from cotton (n.). Hensleigh Wedgwood compares cot "a fleece of wool matted together." Meaning "become closely or intimately associated (with)," is from 1805 via the sense of "to get along together" (of persons), attested from c. 1600. Related: Cottoned; cottoning.

cournot: H. P. Grice draws from Cournot for his idea of a scientific law. -- Antoine-Augustin, a critical realist in scientific and philosophical matters, he was a conservative in religion and politics. His Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth 1838, though a fiasco at the time, pioneered mathematical economics. Cournot upheld a position midway between science and metaphysics. His philosophy rests on three basic counteridenticals Cournot, Antoine-Augustin     concepts: order, chance, and probability. The Exposition of the Theory of Chances and Probabilities 1843 focuses on the calculus of probability, unfolds a theory of chance occurrences, and distinguishes among objective, subjective, and philosophical probability. The Essay on the Foundations of Knowledge 1861 defines science as logically organized knowledge. Cournot developed a probabilist epistemology, showed the relevance of probabilism to the scientific study of human acts, and further assumed the existence of a providential and complex order undergirding the universe. Materialism, Vitalism, Rationalism 1875 acknowledges transrationalism and makes room for finality, purpose, and God.

craig: Grice loved his interpolation theorem, a theorem for firstorder logic: if a sentence y of first-order logic entails a sentence q there is an “interpolant,” a sentence F in the vocabulary common to q and y that entails q and is entailed by y. Originally, William Craig proved his theorem in 7 as a lemma, to give a simpler proof of Beth’s definability theorem, but the result now stands on its own. In abstract model theory, logics for which an interpolation theorem holds are said to have the Craig interpolation property. Craig’s interpolation theorem shows that first-order logic is closed under implicit definability, so that the concepts embodied in first-order logic are all given explicitly. In the philosophy of science literature ‘Craig’s theorem’ usually refers to another result of Craig’s: that any recursively enumerable set of sentences of first-order logic can be axiomatized. This has been used to argue that theoretical terms are in principle eliminable from empirical theories. Assuming that an empirical theory can be axiomatized in first-order logic, i.e., that there is a recursive set of first-order sentences from which all theorems of the theory can be proven, it follows that the set of consequences of the axioms in an “observational” sublanguage is a recursively enumerable set. Thus, by Craig’s theorem, there is a set of axioms for this subtheory, the Craig-reduct, that contains only observation terms. Interestingly, the Craig-reduct theory may be semantically weaker, in the sense that it may have models that cannot be extended to a model of the full theory. The existence of such a model would prove that the theoretical terms cannot all be defined on the basis of the observational vocabulary only, a result related to Beth’s definability theorem. 

crazy-bayesy: cited by H. P. Grice, “Aspects of reason.” Bayesian rationality, minimally, a property a system of beliefs or the believer has in virtue of the system’s “conforming to the probability calculus.” “Bayesians” differ on what “rationality” requires, but most agree that i beliefs come in degrees of firmness; ii these “degrees of belief” are theoretically or ideally quantifiable; iii such quantification can be understood in terms of person-relative, time-indexed “credence functions” from appropriate sets of objects of belief propositions or sentences  each set closed under at least finite truth-functional combinations  into the set of real numbers; iv at any given time t, a person’s credence function at t ought to be usually: “on pain of a Dutch book argument” a probability function; that is, a mapping from the given set into the real numbers in such a way that the “probability” the value assigned to any given object A in the set is greater than or equal to zero, and is equal to unity % 1 if A is a necessary truth, and, for any given objects A and B in the set, if A and B are incompatible the negation of their conjunction is a necessary truth then the probability assigned to their disjunction is equal to the sum of the probabilities assigned to each; so that the usual propositional probability axioms impose a sort of logic on degrees of belief. If a credence function is a probability function, then it or the believer at the given time is “coherent.” On these matters, on conditional degrees of belief, and on the further constraint on rationality many Bayesians impose that change of belief ought to accord with “conditionalization”, the reader should consult John Earman, Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory 2; Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach 9; and Richard Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision 5.  Bayes’s theorem, any of several relationships between prior and posterior probabilities or odds, especially 13 below. All of these depend upon the basic relationship 0 between contemporaneous conditional and unconditional probabilities. Non-Bayesians think these useful only in narrow ranges of cases, generally because of skepticism about accessibility or significance of priors. According to 1, posterior probability is prior probability times the “relevance quotient” Carnap’s term. According to 2, posterior odds are Bayesian Bayes’s theorem 74   74 prior odds times the “likelihood ratio” R. A. Fisher’s term. Relationship 3 comes from 1 by expanding P data via the law of total probability. Bayes’s rule 4 for updating probabilities has you set your new unconditional probabilities equal to your old conditional ones when fresh certainty about data leaves probabilities conditionally upon the data unchanged. The corresponding rule 5 has you do the same for odds. In decision theory the term is used differently, for the rule “Choose so as to maximize expectation of utility.” 

credibility: While Grice uses ‘probability’ as the correlatum of desirability, he suggests ‘credibility’ is a better choice. It relates to the ‘creditum.’ Now, what is the generic for ‘trust’ when it comes to the creditum and the desideratum? An indicative utterance expresses a belief. The utterer is candid if he holds that belief. “Candid” applies to imperative utterances which express genuine desires and notably the emissor’s intention that his recipient will form a ‘desideratum.’  Following Jeffrey and Davidson, respectively, Grice uses ‘desirability’ and ‘probability,’ but sometimes ‘credibibility,’ realizing that ‘credibility’ is more symmetrical with ‘desirability’ than ‘probability’ is. Urmson had explored this in “Parenthetical verbs.” Urmson co-relates, ‘certaintly’ with ‘know’ and ‘probably’ with ‘believe.’ But Urmson adds four further adverbs: “knowingly,” “unknowingly,” “believably,” and “unbelievably.” Urmson also includes three more: “uncredibly,” in variation with “incredibly,” and ‘credibly.” The keyword should be ‘credibility.’

creditum: The Romans were good at this. Notably in negative contexts. They distinguished between an emissor being fallax and being mendax. It all has to do with ‘creditum.’ “Creditum’ is vero, more or less along correspondence-theoretical lines. Used by Grice for the doxastic equivalent of the buletic or desideratum. A creditum is an implicaturum, as Grice defines the implicaturum of the content that an addresse has to assume the utterer BELIEVES to deem him rational. The ‘creditum’-condition is essential for Grice in his ‘exhibitive’ account to the communication. By uttering “Smoke!”, U means that there is some if the utterer intends that his addressee BELIEVE that he, the utterer, is in a state of soul which has the propositional complex there is smoke. It is worth noting that BELIEF is not needed for the immediate state of the utterer’s soul: this can always be either a desire or a belief. But a belief is REQUIRED as the immediate (if not ultimate) response intended by the utterer that his addressee adapt. It is curious that given the primacy that Grice held of the desirability over the credibility that many of his conversational maxims are formulated as imperatives aimed at matters of belief, conditions and value of credibility, probability and adequate evidence. In the cases where Grice emphasizes ‘information,’ which one would associate with ‘belief,’ this association may be dropped provided the exhibitive account: you can always influence or be influenced by others in the institution of a common decision provided you give and receive the optimal information, or rather, provided the conversationalists assume that they are engaged in a MAXIMAL exchange of information. That ‘information’ does not necessarily apply to ‘belief’ is obvious in how complicated an order can get, “Get me a bottle”. “Is that all?” “No, get me a bottle and make sure that it is of French wine, and add something to drink the wine with, and drive careful, and give my love to Rosie.” No belief is explicitly transmitted, yet the order seems informative enough. Grice sometimes does use ‘informative’ in a strict context involving credibility. He divides the mode of credibility into informational (when addressed to others) and indicative (when addressed to self), for in a self-addressed utterance such as, “I am being silly,” one cannot intend to inform oneself of something one already knows! The English have ‘credibility’ and belief, which is cognate with ‘love.’ H. P. Grice, “Disposition and belief,” H. P. Grice, “Knowledge and belief.” a dispositional psychological state in virtue of which a person will assent to a proposition under certain conditions. Propositional knowledge, traditionally understood, entails belief. A behavioral view implies that beliefs are just dispositions to behave in certain ways. Your believing that the stove is hot is just your being disposed to act in a manner appropriate to its being hot. The problem is that our beliefs, including their propositional content indicated by a “that”-clause, typically explain why we do what we do. You avoid touching the stove because you believe that it’s dangerously hot. Explaining action via beliefs refers indispensably to propositional content, but the behavioral view does not accommodate this. A state-object view implies that belief consists of a special relation between a psychological state and an object of belief, what is believed. The objects of belief, traditionally understood, are abstract propositions existing independently of anyone’s thinking of them. The state of believing is a propositional attitude involving some degree of confidence toward a propositional object of belief. Such a view allows that two persons, even separated by a long period of time, can believe the same thing. A state-object view allows that beliefs be dispositional rather than episodic, since they can exist while no action is occurring. Such a view grants, however, that one can have a disposition to act owing to believing something. Regarding mental action, a belief typically generates a disposition to assent, at least under appropriate circumstances, to the proposition believed. Given the central role of propositional content, however, a state-object view denies that beliefs are just dispositions to act. In addition, such a view should distinguish between dispositional believing and a mere disposition to believe. One can be merely disposed to believe many things that one does not actually believe, owing to one’s lacking the appropriate psychological attitude to relevant propositional content. Beliefs are either occurrent or non-occurrent. Occurrent belief, unlike non-occurrent belief, requires current assent to the proposition believed. If the assent is self-conscious, the belief is an explicit occurrent belief; if the assent is not self-conscious, the belief is an implicit occurrent behaviorism, supervenient belief 78   78 belief. Non-occurrent beliefs permit that we do not cease to believe that 2 ! 2 % 4, for instance, merely because we now happen to be thinking of something else or nothing at all.  . -- belief revision, the process by which cognitive states change in light of new information. This topic looms large in discussions of Bayes’s Theorem and other approaches in decision theory. The reasons prompting belief revision are characteristically epistemic; they concern such notions as quality of evidence and the tendency to yield truths. Many different rules have been proposed for updating one’s belief set. In general, belief revision typically balances risk of error against information increase. Belief revision is widely thought to proceed either by expansion or by conceptual revision. Expansion occurs in virtue of new observations; a belief is changed, or a new belief established, when a hypothesis or provisional belief is supported by evidence whose probability is high enough to meet a favored criterion of epistemic warrant. The hypothesis then becomes part of the existing belief corpus, or is sufficient to prompt revision. Conceptual revision occurs when appropriate changes are made in theoretical assumptions  in accordance with such principles as simplicity and explanatory or predictive power  by which the corpus is organized. In actual cases, we tend to revise beliefs with an eye toward advancing the best comprehensive explanation in the relevant cognitive domain. 

Cremonini: essential Italian philosopher. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Cremonini," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.

crescas: h., philosopher, theologian, and statesman. He was a well-known representative of the Jewish community in both Barcelona and Saragossa. Following the death of his son in the anti-Jewish riots of 1391, he wrote a chronicle of the massacres published as an appendix to Ibn Verga, Shevet Yehudah, ed. M. Wiener, 1855. Crescas’s devotion to protecting  Jewry in a time when conversion was encouraged is documented in one extant work, the Refutation of Christian Dogmas 139798, found in the 1451 Hebrew translation of Joseph ibn Shem Tov Bittul ’Iqqarey ha-Nofrim. His major philosophical work, Or Adonai The Light of the Lord, was intended as the first of a two-part project that was to include his own more extensive systematization of halakha Jewish law as well as a critique of Maimonides’ work. But this second part, “Lamp of the Divine Commandment,” was never written. Or Adonai is a philosophico-dogmatic response to and attack on the Aristotelian doctrines that Crescas saw as a threat to the Jewish faith, doctrines concerning the nature of God, space, time, place, free will, and infinity. For theological reasons he attempts to refute basic tenets in Aristotelian physics. He offers, e.g., a critique of Aristotle’s arguments against the existence of a vacuum. The Aristotelian view of time is rejected as well. Time, like space, is thought by Crescas to be infinite. Furthermore, it is not an accident of motion, but rather exists only in the soul. In defending the fundamental doctrines of the Torah, Crescas must address the question discussed by his predecessors Maimonides and Gersonides, namely that of reconciling divine foreknowledge with human freedom. Unlike these two thinkers, Crescas adopts a form of determinism, arguing that God knows both the possible and what will necessarily take place. An act is contingent with respect to itself, and necessary with respect to its causes and God’s knowledge. To be willed freely, then, is not for an act to be absolutely contingent, but rather for it to be “willed internally” as opposed to “willed externally.” Reactions to Crescas’s doctrines were mixed. Isaac Abrabanel, despite his respect for Crescas’s piety, rejected his views as either “unintelligible” or “simple-minded.” On the other hand, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola appeals to Crescas’s critique of Aristotelian physics; Judah Abrabanel’s Dialogues of Love may be seen as accommodating Crescas’s metaphysical views; and Spinoza’s notions of necessity, freedom, and extension may well be influenced by the doctrines of Or Adonai. 

Grice’s criterion for the implicaturum, -- cf. G. P. Baker, “Grice and criterial semantics” -- broadly, a sufficient condition for the presence of a certain property or for the truth of a certain proposition. Generally, a criterion need be sufficient merely in normal circumstances rather than absolutely sufficient. Typically, a criterion is salient in some way, often by virtue of being a necessary condition as well as a sufficient one. The plural form, ‘criteria’, is commonly used for a set of singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. A set of truth conditions is said to be criterial for the truth of propositions of a certain form. A conceptual analysis of a philosophically important concept may take the form of a proposed set of truth conditions for paradigmatic propositions containing the concept in question. Philosophers have proposed criteria for such notions as meaningfulness, intentionality,

creationism, theological criterion     knowledge, justification, justice, rightness, and identity including personal identity and event identity, among many others. There is a special use of the term in connection with Vitters’s well-known remark that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria,” e.g., moans and groans for aches and pains. The suggestion is that a criteriological connection is needed to forge a conceptual link between items of a sort that are intelligible and knowable to items of a sort that, but for the connection, would not be intelligible or knowable. A mere symptom cannot provide such a connection, for establishing a correlation between a symptom and that for which it is a symptom presupposes that the latter is intelligible and knowable. One objection to a criteriological view, whether about aches or quarks, is that it clashes with realism about entities of the sort in question and lapses into, as the case may be, behaviorism or instrumentalism. For it seems that to posit a criteriological connection is to suppose that the nature and existence of entities of a given sort can depend on the conditions for their intelligibility or knowability, and that is to put the epistemological cart before the ontological horse. 

critical legal studies: explored by Grice in his analysis of legal vs. moral right --  a loose assemblage of legal writings and thinkers in the United States and Great Britain since the mid-0s that aspire to a jurisprudence and a political ideology. Like the  legal realists of the 0s and 0s, the jurisprudential program is largely negative, consisting in the discovery of supposed contradictions within both the law as a whole and areas of law such as contracts and criminal law. The jurisprudential implication derived from such supposed contradictions within the law is that any decision in any case can be defended as following logically from some authoritative propositions of law, making the law completely without guidance in particular cases. Also like the  legal realists, the political ideology of critical legal studies is vaguely leftist, embracing the communitarian critique of liberalism. Communitarians fault liberalism for its alleged overemphasis on individual rights and individual welfare at the expense of the intrinsic value of certain collective goods. Given the cognitive relativism of many of its practitioners, critical legal studies tends not to aspire to have anything that could be called a theory of either law or of politics. 

Grice’s critique of conversational reason – “What does Kant mean by ‘critique’? Should he?” – Grice. Critical Realism, a philosophy that at the highest level of generality purports to integrate the positive insights of both New Realism and idealism. New Realism was the first wave of realistic reaction to the dominant idealism of the nineteenth century. It was a version of immediate and direct realism. In its attempt to avoid any representationalism that would lead to idealism, this tradition identified the immediate data of consciousness with objects in the physical world. There is no intermediary between the knower and the known. This heroic tour de force foundered on the phenomena of error, illusion, and perceptual variation, and gave rise to a successor realism  Critical Realism  that acknowledged the mediation of “the mental” in our cognitive grasp of the physical world. ’Critical Realism’ was the title of a work in epistemology by Roy Wood Sellars 6, but its more general use to designate the broader movement derives from the 0 cooperative volume, Essays in Critical Realism: A Cooperative Study of the Problem of Knowledge, containing position papers by Durant Drake, A. O. Lovejoy, J. B. Pratt, A. K. Rogers, C. A. Strong, George Santayana, and Roy Wood Sellars. With New Realism, Critical Realism maintains that the primary object of knowledge is the independent physical world, and that what is immediately present to consciousness is not the physical object as such, but some corresponding mental state broadly construed. Whereas both New Realism and idealism grew out of the conviction that any such mediated account of knowledge is untenable, the Critical Realists felt that only if knowledge of the external world is explained in terms of a process of mental mediation, can error, illusion, and perceptual variation be accommodated. One could fashion an account of mental mediation that did not involve the pitfalls of Lockean representationalism by carefully distinguishing between the object known and the mental state through which it is known. The Critical Realists differed among themselves both epistemologically and metaphysically. The mediating elements in cognition were variously construed as essences, ideas, or sensedata, and the precise role of these items in cognicriterion, problem of the Critical Realism     tion was again variously construed. Metaphysically, some were dualists who saw knowledge as unexplainable in terms of physical processes, whereas others principally Santayana and Sellars were materialists who saw cognition as simply a function of conscious biological systems. The position of most lasting influence was probably that of Sellars because that torch was taken up by his son, Wilfrid, whose very sophisticated development of it was quite influential.  -- critical theory, any social theory that is at the same time explanatory, normative, practical, and self-reflexive. The term was first developed by Horkheimer as a self-description of the Frankfurt School and its revision of Marxism. It now has a wider significance to include any critical, theoretical approach, including feminism and liberation philosophy. When they make claims to be scientific, such approaches attempt to give rigorous explanations of the causes of oppression, such as ideological beliefs or economic dependence; these explanations must in turn be verified by empirical evidence and employ the best available social and economic theories. Such explanations are also normative and critical, since they imply negative evaluations of current social practices. The explanations are also practical, in that they provide a better self-understanding for agents who may want to improve the social conditions that the theory negatively evaluates. Such change generally aims at “emancipation,” and theoretical insight empowers agents to remove limits to human freedom and the causes of human suffering. Finally, these theories must also be self-reflexive: they must account for their own conditions of possibility and for their potentially transformative effects. These requirements contradict the standard account of scientific theories and explanations, particularly positivism and its separation of fact and value. For this reason, the methodological writings of critical theorists often attack positivism and empiricism and attempt to construct alternative epistemologies. Critical theorists also reject relativism, since the cultural relativity of norms would undermine the basis of critical evaluation of social practices and emancipatory change. The difference between critical and non-critical theories can be illustrated by contrasting the Marxian and Mannheimian theories of ideology. Whereas Mannheim’s theory merely describes relations between ideas of social conditions, Marx’s theory tries to show how certain social practices require false beliefs about them by their participants. Marx’s theory not only explains why this is so, it also negatively evaluates those practices; it is practical in that by disillusioning participants, it makes them capable of transformative action. It is also self-reflexive, since it shows why some practices require illusions and others do not, and also why social crises and conflicts will lead agents to change their circumstances. It is scientific, in that it appeals to historical evidence and can be revised in light of better theories of social action, language, and rationality. Marx also claimed that his theory was superior for its special “dialectical method,” but this is now disputed by most critical theorists, who incorporate many different theories and methods. This broader definition of critical theory, however, leaves a gap between theory and practice and places an extra burden on critics to justify their critical theories without appeal to such notions as inevitable historical progress. This problem has made critical theories more philosophical and concerned with questions of justification. 

Grice’s critters: one is never sure if Grice uses ‘creature’ seriously! creation ex nihilo, the act of bringing something into existence from nothing. According to traditional Christian theology, God created the world ex nihilo. To say that the world was created from nothing does not mean that there was a prior non-existent substance out of which it was fashioned, but rather that there was not anything out of which God brought it into being. However, some of the patristics influenced by Plotinus, such as Gregory of Nyssa, apparently understood creation ex nihilo to be an emanation from God according to which what is created comes, not from nothing, but from God himself. Not everything that God makes need be created ex nihilo; or if, as in Genesis 2: 7, 19, God made a human being and animals from the ground, a previously existing material, God did not create them from nothing. Regardless of how bodies are made, orthodox theology holds that human souls are created ex nihilo; the opposing view, traducianism, holds that souls are propagated along with bodies.  creationism, acceptance of the early chapters of Genesis taken literally. Genesis claims that the universe and all of its living creatures including humans were created by God in the space of six days. The need to find some way of reconciling this story with the claims of science intensified in the nineteenth century, with the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species 1859. In the Southern states of the United States, the indigenous form of evangelical Protestant Christianity declared total opposition to evolutionism, refusing any attempt at reconciliation, and affirming total commitment to a literal “creationist” reading of the Bible. Because of this, certain states passed laws banning the teaching of evolutionism. More recently, literalists have argued that the Bible can be given full scientific backing, and they have therefore argued that “Creation science” may properly be taught in state-supported schools in the United States without violation of the constitutional separation of church and state. This claim was challenged in the state of Arkansas in 1, and ultimately rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. The creationism dispute has raised some issues of philosophical interest and importance. Most obviously, there is the question of what constitutes a genuine science. Is there an adequate criterion of demarcation between science and nonscience, and will it put evolutionism on the one side and creationism on the other? Some philosophers, arguing in the spirit of Karl Popper, think that such a criterion can be found. Others are not so sure; and yet others think that some such criterion can be found, but shows creationism to be genuine science, albeit already proven false. Philosophers of education have also taken an interest in creationism and what it represents. If one grants that even the most orthodox science may contain a value component, reflecting and influencing its practitioners’ culture, then teaching a subject like biology almost certainly is not a normatively neutral enterprise. In that case, without necessarily conceding to the creationist anything about the true nature of science or values, perhaps one must agree that science with its teaching is not something that can and should be set apart from the rest of society, as an entirely distinct phenomenon. 

Grice as Croceian: expression and intention -- Croce, B., philosopher. He was born at Pescasseroli, in the Abruzzi, and after 6 lived in Naples. He briefly attended the  of Rome and was led to study Herbart’s philosophy. In 4 he founded the influential journal La critica. In 0 he was made life member of the  senate. Early in his career he befriended Giovanni Gentile, but this friendship was breached by Gentile’s Fascism. During the Fascist period and World War II Croce lived in isolation as the chief anti-fascist thinker in Italy. He later became a leader of the Liberal party and at the age of eighty founded the Institute for Historical Studies. Croce was a literary and historical scholar who joined his great interest in these fields to philosophy. His best-known work in the Englishspeaking world is Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic 2. This was the first part of his “Philosophy of Spirit”; the second was his Logic 5, the third his theory of the Practical 9, and the fourth his Historiography 7. Croce was influenced by Hegel and the Hegelian aesthetician Francesco De Sanctis 181783 and by Vico’s conceptions of knowledge, history, and society. He wrote The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico 1 and a famous commentary on Hegel, What Is Living and What Is critical theory Croce, Benedetto     Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel 7, in which he advanced his conception of the “dialectic of distincts” as more fundamental than the Hegelian dialectic of opposites. Croce held that philosophy always springs from the occasion, a view perhaps rooted in his concrete studies of history. He accepted the general Hegelian identification of philosophy with the history of philosophy. His philosophy originates from his conception of aesthetics. Central to his aesthetics is his view of intuition, which evolved through various stages during his career. He regards aesthetic experience as a primitive type of cognition. Intuition involves an awareness of a particular image, which constitutes a non-conceptual form of knowledge. Art is the expression of emotion but not simply for its own sake. The expression of emotion can produce cognitive awareness in the sense that the particular intuited as an image can have a cosmic aspect, so that in it the universal human spirit is perceived. Such perception is present especially in the masterpieces of world literature. Croce’s conception of aesthetic has connections with Kant’s “intuition” Anschauung and to an extent with Vico’s conception of a primordial form of thought based in imagination fantasia. Croce’s philosophical idealism includes fully developed conceptions of logic, science, law, history, politics, and ethics. His influence to date has been largely in the field of aesthetics and in historicist conceptions of knowledge and culture. His revival of Vico has inspired a whole school of Vico scholarship. Croce’s conception of a “Philosophy of Spirit” showed it was possible to develop a post-Hegelian philosophy that, with Hegel, takes “the true to be the whole” but which does not simply imitate Hegel.  Croce -- expression theory of art, a theory that defines art as the expression of feelings or emotion sometimes called expressionism in art. Such theories first acquired major importance in the nineteenth century in connection with the rise of Romanticism. Expression theories are as various as the different views about what counts as expressing emotion. There are four main variants. 1 Expression as communication. This requires that the artist actually have the feelings that are expressed, when they are initially expressed. They are “embodied” in some external form, and thereby transmitted to the perceiver. Leo Tolstoy 18280 held a view of this sort. 2 Expression as intuition. An intuition is the apprehension of the unity and individuality of something. An intuition is “in the mind,” and hence the artwork is also. Croce held this view, and in his later work argued that the unity of an intuition is established by feeling. 3 Expression as clarification. An artist starts out with vague, undefined feelings, and expression is a process of coming to clarify, articulate, and understand them. This view retains Croce’s idea that expression is in the artist’s mind, as well as explanation, covering law expression theory of art 299   299 his view that we are all artists to the degree that we articulate, clarify, and come to understand our own feelings. Collingwood held this view. 4 Expression as a property of the object. For an artwork to be an expression of emotion is for it to have a given structure or form. Suzanne K. Langer 55 argued that music and the other arts “presented” or exhibited structures or forms of feeling in general. 

Grice’s crucial experiment: a means of deciding between rival theories (or arguments) for this or that impicatum, that, providing parallel explanations of large classes of phenomena, come to be placed at issue by a single fact. For example, the Newtonian emission theory predicts that light travels faster in water than in air; according to the wave theory, light travels slower in water than in air. Dominique François Arago proposed a crucial experiment comparing the respective velocities. Léon Foucault then devised an apparatus to measure the speed of light in various media and found a lower velocity in water than in air. Arago and Foucault concluded for the wave theory, believing that the experiment refuted the emission theory. Other examples include Galileo’s discovery of the phases of Venus Ptolemaic versus Copernican astronomy, Pascal’s Puy-de-Dôme experiment with the barometer vacuists versus plenists, Fresnel’s prediction of a spot of light in circular shadows particle versus wave optics, and Eddington’s measurement of the gravitational bending of light rays during a solar eclipse Newtonian versus Einsteinian gravitation. At issue in crucial experiments is usually a novel prediction. The notion seems to derive from Francis Bacon, whose New Organon 1620 discusses the “Instance of the Fingerpost Instantia  later experimentum  crucis,” a term borrowed from the post set up at crossroads to indicate several directions. Crucial experiments were emphasized in early nineteenth-century scientific methodology  e.g., in John F. Herschel’s A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy 1830. Duhem argued that crucial experiments resemble false dilemmas: hypotheses in physics do not come in pairs, so that crucial experiments cannot transform one of the two into a demonstrated truth. Discussing Foucault’s experiment, Duhem asks whether we dare assert that no other hypothesis is imaginable and suggests that instead of light being either a simple particle or wave, light might be something else, perhaps a disturbance propagated within a dielectric medium, as theorized by Maxwell. In the twentieth century, crucial experiments and novel predictions figured prominently in the work of Imre Lakatos 274. Agreeing that crucial experiments are unable to overthrow theories, Lakatos accepted them as retroactive indications of the fertility or progress of research programs. 

crusius: As C. of E., Grice was pretty protestant -- Christian August, philosopher, theologian, and a devout Lutheran pastor who believed that religion was endangered by the rationalist views especially of Wolff. He devoted his considerable philosophical powers to working out acute and often deep criticisms of Wolff and developing a comprehensive alternative to the Wolffian system. His main philosophical works were published in the 1740s. In his understanding of epistemology and logic Crusius broke with many of the assumptions that allowed Wolff to argue from how we think of things to how things are. For instance, Crusius tried to show that the necessity in causal connection is not the same as logical necessity. He rejected the Leibnizian view that this world is probably the best possible world, and he criticrucial experiment Crusius, Christian August     cized the Wolffian view of freedom of the will as merely a concealed spiritual mechanism. His ethics stressed our dependence on God and his commands, as did the natural law theory of Pufendorf, but he developed the view in some strikingly original ways. Rejecting voluntarism, Crusius held that God’s commands take the form of innate principles of the will not the understanding. Everyone alike can know what they are, so contra Wolff there is no need for moral experts. And they carry their own motivational force with them, so there is no need for external sanctions. We have obligations of prudence to do what will forward our own ends; but true obligation, the obligation of virtue, arises only when we act simply to comply with God’s law, regardless of any ends of our own. In this distinction between two kinds of obligation, as in many of his other views, Crusius plainly anticipated much that Kant came to think. Kant when young read and admired his work, and it is mainly for this reason that Crusius is now remembered. 

cudworth: d. Lady Masham, English philosopher and author of two treatises on religion, A Discourse Concerning the Love of God 1690 and Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Virtuous Christian Life 1705. The first argues against the views of the English Malebranchian, John Norris; the second, ostensibly about the importance of education for women, argues for the need to establish natural religion on rational principles and explores the place of revealed religion within a rational framework. Cudworth’s reputation is founded on her long friendship with John Locke. Her correspondence with him is almost entirely personal; she also entered into a brief but philosophically interesting exchange of letters with Leibniz. 

cumberland -- Law – Grice was obsessed with laws that would introduce psychological concepts -- Cumberland, R. English philosopher and bishop. He wrote a Latin Treatise of the Laws of Nature 1672, tr. twice into English and once into . Admiring Grotius, Cumberland hoped to refute Hobbes in the interests of defending Christian morality and religion. He refused to appeal to innate ideas and a priori arguments because he thought Hobbes must be attacked on his own ground. Hence he offered a reductive and naturalistic account of natural law. The one basic moral law of nature is that the pursuit of the good of all rational beings is the best path to the agent’s own good. This is true because God made nature so that actions aiding others are followed by beneficial consequences to the agent, while those harmful to others harm the agent. Since the natural consequences of actions provide sanctions that, once we know them, will make us act for the good of others, we can conclude that there is a divine law by which we are obligated to act for the common good. And all the other laws of nature follow from the basic law. Cumberland refused to discuss free will, thereby suggesting a view of human action as fully determined by natural causes. If on his theory it is a blessing that God made nature including humans to work as it does, the religious reader must wonder if there is any role left for God concerning morality. Cumberland is generally viewed as a major forerunner of utilitarianism. 

inductum – Grice knew a lot about induction theory via Kneale and Keynes -- curve-fitting problem, the problem of making predictions from past observations by fitting curves to the data. Curve fitting has two steps: first, select a family of curves; then, find the bestfitting curve by some statistical criterion such as the method of least squares e.g., choose the curve that has the least sum of squared deviations between the curve and data. The method was first proposed by Adrian Marie Legendre 17521833 and Carl Friedrich Gauss 1777 1855 in the early nineteenth century as a way of inferring planetary trajectories from noisy data. More generally, curve fitting may be used to construct low-level empirical generalizations. For example, suppose that the ideal gas law, P % nkT, is chosen as the form of the law governing the dependence of the pressure P on the equilibrium temperature T of a fixed volume of gas, where n is the molecular number per unit volume and k is Boltzmann’s constant a universal constant equal to 1.3804 $ 10†16 erg°C†1. When the parameter nk is adjustable, the law specifies a family of curves  one for each numerCudworth, Damaris curve-fitting problem     ical value of the parameter. Curve fitting may be used to determine the best-fitting member of the family, thereby effecting a measurement of the theoretical parameter, nk. The philosophically vexing problem is how to justify the initial choice of the form of the law. On the one hand, one might choose a very large, complex family of curves, which would ensure excellent fit with any data set. The problem with this option is that the best-fitting curve may overfit the data. If too much attention is paid to the random elements of the data, then the predictively useful trends and regularities will be missed. If it looks too good to be true, it probably is. On the other hand, simpler families run a greater risk of making grossly false assumptions about the true form of the law. Intuitively, the solution is to choose a simplefamily of curves that maintains a reasonable degree of fit. The simplicity of a family of curves is measured by the paucity of parameters. The problem is to say how and why such a trade-off between simplicity and goodness of fit should be made. When a theory can accommodate recalcitrant data only by the ad hoc  i.e., improperly motivated  addition of new terms and parameters, students of science have long felt that the subsequent increase in the degree of fit should not count in the theory’s favor, and such additions are sometimes called ad hoc hypotheses. The best-known example of this sort of ad hoc hypothesizing is the addition of epicycles upon epicycles in the planetary astronomies of Ptolemy and Copernicus. This is an example in which a gain in fit need not compensate for the loss of simplicity. Contemporary philosophers sometimes formulate the curve-fitting problem differently. They often assume that there is no noise in the data, and speak of the problem of choosing among different curves that fit the data exactly. Then the problem is to choose the simplest curve from among all those curves that pass through every data point. The problem is that there is no universally accepted way of defining the simplicity of single curves. No matter how the problem is formulated, it is widely agreed that simplicity should play some role in theory choice. Rationalists have championed the curve-fitting problem as exemplifying the underdetermination of theory from data and the need to make a priori assumptions about the simplicity of nature. Those philosophers who think that we have no such a priori knowledge still need to account for the relevance of simplicity to science. Whewell described curve fitting as the colligation of facts in the quantitative sciences, and the agreement in the measured parameters coefficients obtained by different colligations of facts as the consilience of inductions. Different colligations of facts say on the same gas at different volume or for other gases may yield good agreement among independently measured values of parameters like the molecular density of the gas and Boltzmann’s constant. By identifying different parameters found to agree, we constrain the form of the law without appealing to a priori knowledge good news for empiricism. But the accompanying increase in unification also worsens the overall degree of fit. Thus, there is also the problem of how and why we should trade off unification with total degree of fit. Statisticians often refer to a family of hypotheses as a model. A rapidly growing literature in statistics on model selection has not yet produced any universally accepted formula for trading off simplicity with degree of fit. However, there is wide agreement among statisticians that the paucity of parameters is the appropriate way of measuring simplicity. 

Grice’s defense of modernist logic -- cut-elimination theorem, a theorem stating that a certain type of inference rule including a rule that corresponds to modus ponens is not needed in classical logic. The idea was anticipated by J. Herbrand; the theorem was proved by G. Gentzen and generalized by S. Kleene. Gentzen formulated a sequent calculus  i.e., a deductive system with rules for statements about derivability. It includes a rule that we here express as ‘From C Y D,M and M,C Y D, infer C Y D’ or ‘Given that C yields D or M, and that C plus M yields D, we may infer that C yields D’. Cusa cut-elimination theorem     This is called the cut rule because it cuts out the middle formula M. Gentzen showed that his sequent calculus is an adequate formalization of the predicate logic, and that the cut rule can be eliminated; anything provable with it can be proved without it. One important consequence of this is that, if a formula F is provable, then there is a proof of F that consists solely of subformulas of F. This fact simplifies the study of provability. Gentzen’s methodology applies directly to classical logic but can be adapted to many nonclassical logics, including some intuitionistic logics. It has led to some important theorems about consistency, and has illuminated the role of auxiliary assumptions in the derivation of consequences from a theory. 

cybernetic implicaturum – What Grice disliked about the cybernetic implicaturum is that it is ‘mechanisitically derivable” and thus not really ‘rational’ in the way an implicaturum is meant to be rational. A machine cannot implicate. Grice “Method in philosophical psychology” -- cybernetics coined by N. Wiener in 7 from Grecian kubernetes, ‘helmsman’, the study of the communication and manipulation of information in service of the control and guidance of biological, physical, or chemical energy systems. Historically, cybernetics has been intertwined with mathematical theories of information communication and computation. To describe the cybernetic properties of systems or processes requires ways to describe and measure information reduce uncertainty about events within the system and its environment. Feedback and feedforward, the basic ingredients of cybernetic processes, involve information  as what is fed forward or backward  and are basic to processes such as homeostasis in biological systems, automation in industry, and guidance systems. Of course, their most comprehensive application is to the purposive behavior thought of cognitively goal-directed systems such as ourselves. Feedback occurs in closed-loop, as opposed to open-loop, systems. Actually, ‘open-loop’ is a misnomer involving no loop, but it has become entrenched. The standard example of an openloop system is that of placing a heater with constant output in a closed room and leaving it switched on. Room temperature may accidentally reach, but may also dramatically exceed, the temperature desired by the occupants. Such a heating system has no means of controlling itself to adapt to required conditions. In contrast, the standard closed-loop system incorporates a feedback component. At the heart of cybernetics is the concept of control. A controlled process is one in which an end state that is reached depends essentially on the behavior of the controlling system and not merely on its external environment. That is, control involves partial independence for the system. A control system may be pictured as having both an inner and outer environment. The inner environment consists of the internal events that make up the system; the outer environment consists of events that causally impinge on the system, threatening disruption and loss of system integrity and stability. For a system to maintain its independence and identity in the face of fluctuations in its external environment, it must be able to detect information about those changes in the external environment. Information must pass through the interface between inner and outer environments, and the system must be able to compensate for fluctuations of the outer environment by adjusting its own inner environmental variables. Otherwise, disturbances in the outer environment will overcome the system  bringing its inner states into equilibrium with the outer states, thereby losing its identity as a distinct, independent system. This is nowhere more certain than with the homeostatic systems of the body for temperature or blood sugar levels. Control in the attainment of goals is accomplished by minimizing error. Negative feedback, or information about error, is the difference between activity a system actually performs output and that activity which is its goal to perform input. The standard example of control incorporating negative feedback is the thermostatically controlled heating system. The actual room temperature system output carries information to the thermostat that can be compared via goal-state comparator to the desired temperature for the room input as embodied in the set-point on the thermostat; a correction can then be made to minimize the difference error  the furnace turns on or off. Positive feedback tends to amplify the value of the output of a system or of a system disturbance by adding the value of the output to the system input quantity. Thus, the system accentuates disturbances and, if unchecked, will eventually pass the brink of instability. Suppose that as room temperature rises it causes the thermostatic set-point to rise in direct proportion to the rise in temperature. This would cause the furnace to continue to output heat possibly with disastrous consequences. Many biological maladies have just this characteristic. For example, severe loss of blood causes inability of the heart to pump effectively, which causes loss of arterial pressure, which, in turn, causes reduced flow of blood to the heart, reducing pumping efficiency. cybernetics cybernetics     Cognitively goal-directed systems are also cybernetic systems. Purposive attainment of a goal by a goal-directed system must have at least: 1 an internal representation of the goal state of the system a detector for whether the desired state is actual; 2 a feedback loop by which information about the present state of the system can be compared with the goal state as internally represented and by means of which an error correction can be made to minimize any difference; and 3 a causal dependency of system output upon the error-correction process of condition 2 to distinguish goal success from fortuitous goal satisfaction. 

cynical implicaturum, Cynic -- a classical Grecian philosophical school characterized by asceticism and emphasis on the sufficiency of virtue for happiness eudaimonia, boldness in speech, and shamelessness in action. The Cynics were strongly influenced by Socrates and were themselves an important influence on Stoic ethics. An ancient tradition links the Cynics to Antisthenes c.445c.360 B.C., an Athenian. He fought bravely in the battle of Tanagra and claimed that he would not have been so courageous if he had been born of two Athenians instead of an Athenian and a Thracian slave. He studied with Gorgias, but later became a close companion of Socrates and was present at Socrates’ death. Antisthenes was proudest of his wealth, although he had no money, because he was satisfied with what he had and he could live in whatever circumstances he found himself. Here he follows Socrates in three respects. First, Socrates himself lived with a disregard for pleasure and pain  e.g., walking barefoot in snow. Second, Socrates thinks that in every circumstance a virtuous person is better off than a nonvirtuous one; Antisthenes anticipates the Stoic development of this to the view that virtue is sufficient for happiness, because the virtuous person uses properly whatever is present. Third, both Socrates and Antisthenes stress that the soul is more important than the body, and neglect the body for the soul. Unlike the later Cynics, however, both Socrates and Antisthenes do accept pleasure when it is available. Antisthenes also does not focus exclusively on ethics; he wrote on other topics, including logic. He supposedly told Plato that he could see a horse but not horseness, to which Plato replied that he had not acquired the means to see horseness. Diogenes of Sinope c.400c.325 B.C. continued the emphasis on self-sufficiency and on the soul, but took the disregard for pleasure to asceticism. According to one story, Plato called Diogenes “Socrates gone mad.” He came to Athens after being exiled from Sinope, perhaps because the coinage was defaced, either by himself or by others, under his father’s direction. He took ‘deface the coinage!’ as a motto, meaning that the current standards were corrupt and should be marked as corrupt by being defaced; his refusal to live by them was his defacing them. For example, he lived in a wine cask, ate whatever scraps he came across, and wrote approvingly of cannibalism and incest. One story reports that he carried a lighted lamp in broad daylight looking for an honest human, probably intending to suggest that the people he did see were so corrupted that they were no longer really people. He apparently wanted to replace the debased standards of custom with the genuine standards of nature  but nature in the sense of what was minimally required for human life, which an individual human could achieve, without society. Because of this, he was called a Cynic, from the Grecian word kuon dog, because he was as shameless as a dog. Diogenes’ most famous successor was Crates fl. c.328325 B.C.. He was a Boeotian, from Thebes, and renounced his wealth to become a Cynic. He seems to have been more pleasant than Diogenes; according to some reports, every Athenian house was open to him, and he was even regarded by them as a household god. Perhaps the most famous incident involving Crates is his marriage to Hipparchia, who took up the Cynic way of life despite her family’s opposition and insisted that educating herself was preferable to working a loom. Like Diogenes, Crates emphasized that happiness is self-sufficiency, and claimed that asceticism is required for self-sufficiency; e.g., he advises us not to prefer oysters to lentils. He argues that no one is happy if happiness is measured by the balance of pleasure and pain, since in each period of our lives there is more pain than pleasure. Cynicism continued to be active through the third century B.C., and returned to prominence in the second century A.D. after an apparent decline. 

cyrenaic implicaturum -- Cyrenaics, a classical Grecian philosophical school that began shortly after Socrates and lasted for several centuries, noted especially for hedonism. Ancient writers trace the Cyrenaics back to ArisCynics Cyrenaics 200   200 tippus of Cyrene fifth-fourth century B.C., an associate of Socrates. Aristippus came to Athens because of Socrates’ fame and later greatly enjoyed the luxury of court life in Sicily. Some people ascribe the founding of the school to his grandchild Aristippus, because of an ancient report that the elder Aristippus said nothing clear about the human end. The Cyrenaics include Aristippus’s child Arete, her child Aristippus taught by Arete, Hegesius, Anniceris, and Theodorus. The school seems to have been superseded by the Epicureans. No Cyrenaic writings survive, and the reports we do have are sketchy. The Cyrenaics avoid mathematics and natural philosophy, preferring ethics because of its utility. According to them, not only will studying nature not make us virtuous, it also won’t make us stronger or richer. Some reports claim that they also avoid logic and epistemology. But this is not true of all the Cyrenaics: according to other reports, they think logic and epistemology are useful, consider arguments and also causes as topics to be covered in ethics, and have an epistemology. Their epistemology is skeptical. We can know only how we are affected; we can know, e.g., that we are whitening, but not that whatever is causing this sensation is itself white. This differs from Protagoras’s theory; unlike Protagoras the Cyrenaics draw no inferences about the things that affect us, claiming only that external things have a nature that we cannot know. But, like Protagoras, the Cyrenaics base their theory on the problem of conflicting appearances. Given their epistemology, if humans ought to aim at something that is not a way of being affected i.e., something that is immediately perceived according to them, we can never know anything about it. Unsurprisingly, then, they claim that the end is a way of being affected; in particular, they are hedonists. The end of good actions is particular pleasures smooth changes, and the end of bad actions is particular pains rough changes. There is also an intermediate class, which aims at neither pleasure nor pain. Mere absence of pain is in this intermediate class, since the absence of pain may be merely a static state. Pleasure for Aristippus seems to be the sensation of pleasure, not including related psychic states. We should aim at pleasure although not everyone does, as is clear from our naturally seeking it as children, before we consciously choose to. Happiness, which is the sum of the particular pleasures someone experiences, is choiceworthy only for the particular pleasures that constitute it, while particular pleasures are choiceworthy for themselves. Cyrenaics, then, are not concerned with maximizing total pleasure over a lifetime, but only with particular pleasures, and so they should not choose to give up particular pleasures on the chance of increasing the total. Later Cyrenaics diverge in important respects from the original Cyrenaic hedonism, perhaps in response to the development of Epicurus’s views. Hegesias claims that happiness is impossible because of the pains associated with the body, and so thinks of happiness as total pleasure minus total pain. He emphasizes that wise people act for themselves, and denies that people actually act for someone else. Anniceris, on the other hand, claims that wise people are happy even if they have few pleasures, and so seems to think of happiness as the sum of pleasures, and not as the excess of pleasures over pains. Anniceris also begins considering psychic pleasures: he insists that friends should be valued not only for their utility, but also for our feelings toward them. We should even accept losing pleasure because of a friend, even though pleasure is the end. Theodorus goes a step beyond Anniceris. He claims that the end of good actions is joy and that of bad actions is grief. Surprisingly, he denies that friendship is reasonable, since fools have friends only for utility and wise people need no friends. He even regards pleasure as intermediate between practical wisdom and its opposite. This seems to involve regarding happiness as the end, not particular pleasures, and may involve losing particular pleasures for long-term happiness. 

Empiricism – “with a capital E, of course.” – Grice. Czolbe, H., philosopher. He was born in Danzig and trained in theology and medicine. His main works are Neue Darstellung des Sensualismus “New Exposition of Sensualism,” 1855, Entstehung des Selbstbewusstseins “Origin of Self-Consciousness,” 1856, Die Grenzen und der Ursprung der menschlichen Erkenntnis “The Limits and Origin of Human Knowledge,” 1865, and a posthumously published study, Grundzüge der extensionalen Erkenntnistheorie 1875. Czolbe proposed a sensualistic theory of knowledge: knowledge is a copy of the actual, and spatial extension is ascribed even to ideas. Space is the support of all attributes. His later work defended a non-reductive materialism. Czolbe made the rejection of the supersensuous a central principle and defended a radical “senCzolbe, Heinrich Czolbe, Heinrich 201   201 sationalism.” Despite this, he did not present a dogmatic materialism, but cast his philosophy in hypothetical form. In his study of the origin of self-consciousness Czolbe held that dissatisfaction with the actual world generates supersensuous ideas and branded this attitude as “immoral.” He excluded supernatural phenomena on the basis not of physiological or scientific studies but of a “moral feeling of duty towards the natural world-order and contentment with it.” The same valuation led him to postulate the eternality of terrestrial life. Nietzsche was familiar with Czolbe’s works and incorporated some of his themes into his philosophy.

englishry: Grice was first an Englishman, and then an Oxonian – and then a philosopher – and then a genius! Englishness – Englishry, -- St. George for England. A critique of racism, hostility, contempt, condescension, or prejudice, on the basis of social practices of racial classification, and the wider phenomena of social, economic, and political mistreatment that often accompany such classification. The most salient instances of racism include the Nazi ideology of the “Aryan master race,”  chattel slavery, South African apartheid in the late twentieth century, and the “Jim Crow” laws and traditions of segregation that subjugated African descendants in the Southern United States during the century after the  Civil War. Social theorists dispute whether, in its essence, racism is a belief or an ideology of racial inferiority, a system of social oppression on the basis of race, a form of discourse, discriminatory conduct, or an attitude of contempt or heartlessness and its expression in individual or collective behavior. The case for any of these as the essence of racism has its drawbacks, and a proponent must show how the others can also come to be racist in virtue of that essence. Some deny that racism has any nature or essence, insisting it is nothing more than changing historical realities. However, these thinkers must explain what makes each reality an instance of racism. Theorists differ over who and what can be racist and under what circumstances, some restricting racism to the powerful, others finding it also in some reactions by the oppressed. Here, the former owe an explanation of why power is necessary for racism, what sort economic or political? general or contextual?, and in whom or what racist individuals? their racial groups?. Although virtually everyone thinks racism objectionable, people disagree over whether its central defect is cognitive irrationality, prejudice, economic/prudential inefficiency, or moral unnecessary suffering, unequal treatment. Finally, racism’s connection with the ambiguous and controversial concept of race itself is complex. Plainly, racism presupposes the legitimacy of racial classifications, and perhaps the metaphysical reality of races. Nevertheless, some hold that racism is also prior to race, with racial classifications invented chiefly to explain and help justify the oppression of some peoples by others. The term originated to designate the pseudoscientific theories of racial essence and inferiority that arose in Europe in the nineteenth century and were endorsed by G.y’s Third Reich. Since the civil rights movement in the United States after World War II, the term has come to cover a much broader range of beliefs, attitudes, institutions, and practices. Today one hears charges of unconscious, covert, institutional, paternalistic, benign, anti-racist, liberal, and even reverse racism. Racism is widely regarded as involving ignorance, irrationality, unreasonableness, injustice, and other intellectual and moral vices, to such an extent that today virtually no one is willing to accept the classification of oneself, one’s beliefs, and so on, as racist, except in contexts of self-reproach. As a result, classifying anything as racist, beyond the most egregious cases, is a serious charge and is often hotly disputed.

rational Griceian deconstruction of communication -- a demonstration of the incompleteness or incoherence of a philosophical position using concepts and principles of argument whose meaning and use is legitimated only by that philosophical position. A deconstruction is thus a kind of internal conceptual critique in which the critic implicitly and provisionally adheres to the position criticized. The early work of Derrida is the source of the term and provides paradigm cases of its referent. That deconstruction remains within the position being discussed follows from a fundamental deconstructive argument about the nature of language and thought. Derrida’s earliest deconstructions argue against the possibility of an interior “language” of thought and intention such that the senses and referents of terms are determined by their very nature. Such terms are “meanings” or logoi. Derrida calls accounts that presuppose such magical thought-terms “logocentric.” He claims, following Heidegger, that the conception of such logoi is basic to the concepts of Western metaphysics, and that Western metaphysics is fundamental to our cultural practices and languages. Thus there is no “ordinary language” uncontaminated by philosophy. Logoi ground all our accounts of intention, meaning, truth, and logical connection. Versions of logoi in the history of philosophy range from Plato’s Forms through the self-interpreting ideas of the empiricists to Husserl’s intentional entities. Thus Derrida’s fullest deconstructions are of texts that give explicit accounts of logoi, especially his discussion of Husserl in Speech and Phenomena. There, Derrida argues that meanings that are fully present to consciousness are in decision tree deconstruction 209   209 principle impossible. The idea of a meaning is the idea of a repeatable ideality. But “repeatability” is not a feature that can be present. So meanings, as such, cannot be fully before the mind. Selfinterpreting logoi are an incoherent supposition. Without logoi, thought and intention are merely wordlike and have no intrinsic connection to a sense or a referent. Thus “meaning” rests on connections of all kinds among pieces of language and among our linguistic interactions with the world. Without logoi, no special class of connections is specifically “logical.” Roughly speaking, Derrida agrees with Quine both on the nature of meaning and on the related view that “our theory” cannot be abandoned all at once. Thus a philosopher must by and large think about a logocentric philosophical theory that has shaped our language in the very logocentric terms that that theory has shaped. Thus deconstruction is not an excision of criticized doctrines, but a much more complicated, self-referential relationship. Deconstructive arguments work out the consequences of there being nothing helpfully better than words, i.e., of thoroughgoing nominalism. According to Derrida, without logoi fundamental philosophical contrasts lose their principled foundations, since such contrasts implicitly posit one term as a logos relative to which the other side is defective. Without logos, many contrasts cannot be made to function as principles of the sort of theory philosophy has sought. Thus the contrasts between metaphorical and literal, rhetoric and logic, and other central notions of philosophy are shown not to have the foundation that their use presupposes.  

deductum – also demonstratum, argumentum -- deduction, a finite sequence of sentences whose last sentence is a conclusion of the sequence the one said to be deduced and which is such that each sentence in the sequence is an axiom or a premise or follows from preceding sentences in the sequence by a rule of inference. A synonym is ‘derivation’. Deduction is a system-relative concept. It makes sense to say something is a deduction only relative to a particular system of axioms and rules of inference. The very same sequence of sentences might be a deduction relative to one such system but not relative to another. The concept of deduction is a generalization of the concept of proof. A proof is a finite sequence of sentences each of which is an axiom or follows from preceding sentences in the sequence by a rule of inference. The last sentence in the sequence is a theorem. Given that the system of axioms and rules of inference are effectively specifiable, there is an effective procedure for determining, whenever a finite sequence of sentences is given, whether it is a proof relative to that system. The notion of theorem is not in general effective decidable. For there may be no method by which we can always find a proof of a given sentence or determine that none exists. The concepts of deduction and consequence are distinct. The first is a syntactical; the second is semantical. It was a discovery that, relative to the axioms and rules of inference of classical logic, a sentence S is deducible from a set of sentences K provided that S is a consequence of K. Compactness is an important consequence of this discovery. It is trivial that sentence S is deducible from K just in case S is deducible from Dedekind cut deductíon 211   211 some finite subset of K. It is not trivial that S is a consequence of K just in case S is a consequence of some finite subset of K. This compactness property had to be shown. A system of natural deduction is axiomless. Proofs of theorems within a system are generally easier with natural deduction. Proofs of theorems about a system, such as the results mentioned in the previous paragraph, are generally easier if the system has axioms. In a secondary sense, ‘deduction’ refers to an inference in which a speaker claims the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. -- deduction theorem, a result about certain systems of formal logic relating derivability and the conditional. It states that if a formula B is derivable from A and possibly other assumptions, then the formula APB is derivable without the assumption of A: in symbols, if G 4 {A} Y B then GYAPB. The thought is that, for example, if Socrates is mortal is derivable from the assumptions All men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then If Socrates is a man he is mortal is derivable from All men are mortal. Likewise, If all men are mortal then Socrates is mortal is derivable from Socrates is a man. In general, the deduction theorem is a significant result only for axiomatic or Hilbert-style formulations of logic. In most natural deduction formulations a rule of conditional proof explicitly licenses derivations of APB from G4{A}, and so there is nothing to prove. 

defeasibility. Strawson Wiggins ‘somehwere in the kitchen,’ ‘in one of the dining-room cupboards’ unless some feature of the context defeats the implication, there is an implicaturum to the effect that the emissor cannot make a ‘stronger’ move by Grice’s principle of conversational fortitude (“Be ‘a fortiori’”).  Cf. G. P. Baker on H. L. A. Hart. All very Oxonian. Cf. R. Hall, Oxonian, on ‘Excluders.’ For Strawson and Wiggins that a principle holds ‘generally, ceteris paribus, is a condition for the existence of conversation, or of a good conversation. Defeasibility is a sign of the freedom of the will. The communicators can always opt out. Not a salivating dog. Note that defeasibility does not apply just to the implicaturum. Since probabilistic demonstrate are uncertain, there is an element of defeasibility in the EXplicatum of a probabilistic utterance. Levinson’s quote, “Probability, Defeasibility, and Mode Operators.” Defeasibility -- Grice: “So far as generalizations of these kinds are concerned, it seems to me that one needs to be able to mark five features: (1) conditionality; (2) generality; (3) type of generality (absolute, ceteris paribus, etc., thereby, ipso facto, discriminating with respect to defeasibility or indefeasibility).” -- Baker, “Meaning and defeasibility” – defeater – in Aspects of reason -- defeasibility, a property that rules, principles, arguments, or bits of reasoning have when they might be defeated by some competitor. For example, the epistemic principle ‘Objects normally have the properties they appear to have’ or the normative principle ‘One should not lie’ are defeated, respectively, when perception occurs under unusual circumstances e.g., under colored lights or when there is some overriding moral consideration e.g., to prevent murder. Apparently declarative sentences such as ‘Birds typically fly’ can be taken in part as expressing defeasible rules: take something’s being a bird as evidence that it flies. Defeasible arguments and reasoning inherit their defeasibility from the use of defeasible rules or principles. Recent analyses of defeasibility include circumscription and default logic, which belong to the broader category of non-monotonic logic. The rules in several of these formal systems contain special antecedent conditions and are not truly defeasible since they apply whenever their conditions are satisfied. Rules and arguments in other non-monotonic systems justify their conclusions only when they are not defeated by some other fact, rule, or argument. John Pollock distinguishes between rebutting and undercutting defeaters. ‘Snow is not normally red’ rebuts in appropriate circumstances the principle ‘Things that look red normally are red’, while ‘If the available light is red, do not use the principle that things that look red normally are red’ only undercuts the embedded rule. Pollock has influenced most other work on formal systems for defeasible reasoning. 

defensible – H. P. Grice, “Conceptual analysis and the defensible province of philosophy.” Grice uses the ‘territorial’ province, and the further implicaturum is that conceptual analysis as the province of philosophy is a defensible one. Grice thinks it is.

definitum: Grice lists ‘the’ in his list of communicative devices. He was interested in the iota operator. After Sluga, he knew there were problems here. He proposed a quantificational approach alla Whitehead and Russell, indeed a Whitehead and Russellian expansion in three clauses, with identity, involved. Why wasn’t Russell not involved with the ‘indefinite’. One would think because that’s rendered already by (Ex), ‘some (at least one)’.  Russell’s interest in definitum is not philosophical. His background was mathematics, rather --. Grice was obsessed with ‘aspects’ in verbs. There’s the ‘imperfect’ and the ‘perfect.’ These translate Aristotle’s ‘teleos’ and ‘ateleos.’ But why the change from “factum” to “fectum”? So it’s better to turn to ‘definitum,’ and ‘indefinitum, as better paraphrases of Aristotle’s jargon – keeping in mind we are talking of his ‘teleos’ and ‘ateleos. Aristotle and telos. In the Met. Y.1048b1835, Aristotle discusses the definition of an action πϱᾶξις. He distinguishes two kinds of activities: kinêseis ϰινήσεις and energeiai ἐνέϱγειαι: Only that movement in which the end is present is an action. E.g., at the same time we are v.ing and have v.n ὁϱᾷ ἅμα, are understanding and have understood φϱονεῖ, are thinking and have thought noei kai nenoêken νοεῖ ϰαὶ νενόηϰεν when it is not true that at the same time we are learning and have learnt ou manthanei kai memathêken οὐ μανθάνει ϰαὶ μεμάθηϰεν, or are being cured and have been cured oud’ hugiazetai kai hugiastai οὐδ᾿ ὑγιάζεται ϰαὶ ὑγίασται. At the same time we are living well and have lived well εὖ ζῇ ϰαὶ εὖ ἔζηϰεν ἅμα, and are happy and have been happy εὐδαιμονεῖ ϰαὶ εὐδαιμόνηϰεν. Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements ϰινήσεις, and the other actualities energeiai ἐνέϱγειαι. We v. that the distinctive properties of these two categories of verbs are provided by relations of inference and semantic compatibility between the form of the present and the form of the perfect. In the case of energeiai, there is a relation of inference between the present and the perfect, in the sense that when someone says I v. we can infer I have v.n. There is also a relation of semantic compatibility since one can very well say I have v.n and continue to v.. Thus the two forms—the present and the perfect— are verifiable at the same time ἅμα, simultaneously. On the other hand, in the case of kinêseis, the present and the perfect are not verifiable at the same time. In fact, when someone says I am building a house, we cannot infer I have built a house, at least in the sense in which the house is finished. In addition, once the house is finished, one is no longer constructing it, which means that there is a semantic incompatibility between the present and the perfect. τέλος, which means both complete action, that is, end, and limit in competition with πέϱας, plays a crucial role in this opposition. In the category of energeiai, we have actions proper, that is, activities that are complete τέλεια because they have an immanent finality ἐνυπάϱχει τὸ τέλος. In the category of kinêseis, we have imperfect activities ἀτελείς that do not carry their own end within themselves but are transitive and aim at realizing something. Thus activities having an external goal that is at the same time a limit peras do not carry their own goal telos within themselves; they are directed toward a goal but this goal is not attained during the activity, but is realized at the end of the activity.  And history repeated itself, in the same terms, regarding Slavic languages, with on the one hand the words perfective and imperfective, modeled on the Roman opposition and imported to describe an opposition in which lexicon and grammar are truly interwoven since it is a question of categories of verbs, which determine the whole organization of conjugation, and on the other hand the Russian words that are used to characterize the same categories of verbs, and that signify the accomplished and the unaccomplished. In the terminological imbroglio, we can once again v. the effects of a confusion connected with the inability to acknowledge the autonomy of lexical aspect, or, in the particular case of Slavic languages, the difficulty of isoRomang the aspectual dimension in the general system of the language. Nevertheless, the same questions, that of the telos and that of accomplishment, are at the foundation of the two aspectual dimensions. They are even so prominent that, alongside the heterogeneous inventory from which we began, we also find, and almost simultaneously in the aspectual tradition, a leveling of all differences in favor of two categories that are supposed to be the categories par excellence of grammatical aspect: the perfective on the one hand, and the imperfective on the other. However, there is also the continuing competition of the perfect, another tr. of the same word, perfectum, designating a category that is not exactly the same as that of the perfective, and which is, for its part, always a grammatical category, never a lexical category: one speaks of perfect to designate compound tenses in G. ic languages, e. g. , of the type I have received  as opposed to I received, which corresponds to the idea that the telos is not only achieved, but transcended in the constitution of a fixed state, given as the result of the completion of the process. Two, or three, grammatical categories that are the same and not the same as the two, three, or four lexical categories. It is in the name of these categories, and literally behind their name, that the aspectual descriptions succeeded in being applicable to all languages, confRomang all the imperfects of all languages and also the Eng. progressive and the Russian imperfective, all the aorists in all languages, and aligning perfects, perfectives, the Eng. perfect, the G.  Perfekt, the Roman perfectum and the Grecian perfect. The facts are different, but the words, and the recurrence of a problematics that v.ms invariable, are too strong. Although it is a matter of conjugations, the lexicon and the relation to ontological questions are too influential. The word imperfectum was invented, we v. a hesitation that is precisely the one that causes a problem here, between imperfectum and infectum a nonachieved finality, an absence of finality. The important point is that the whole history of aspectual terminology is constituted by such exchanges. The invention of the words perfectum and imperfectum itself proceeds from an enterprise of tr., in which it is a question of taking as a model, or rephrasing, the Grecian grammarians’ opposition between suntelikos συντελιϰός and non-suntelikos. However, the difference between the two terminologies is noticeable. A supine past participle, -fectum, has replaced telikos, and hence telos, thereby reintroducing, if not tense was tense really involved in that past participle?, at least the achievement of an act, and consequently merges with the question of the accomplished. In this operation, the Stoics’ opposition between suntelikos which would thus designate the choice of perfects or imperfects and παϱατατιϰός the extensive, in which the question of the telos is not involved was made symmetrical, introducing into aspectual terminology a binariness from which we have never recovered. And this symmetricalization, which sought to describe the organization of a conjugation, was then modeled on the distinction introduced by Aristotle between tτέλειος and aἀτελής, which was not grammatical but lexical. This resulted in a new confusion that is not without foundation because it was already implicit in the montage constructed by the Grecian philosophers, with on the one hand the telos used by Aristotle to differentiate types of process, and on the other the same telos used by the Stoics to structure conjugation. exist in G. , is said to be primarily a matter of discursive construction with the imparfait forming the background of a narration, and the past tenses forming the foreground of what develops and occurs. More recently, this area has been dominated by theories that situate aspect in a theory of discursive representations cf. Kamp’s discourse representation theory, and try to reduce it to a matter of discursive organization: thus the models currently most discussed make the imparfait an anaphoric mark that repeats an element of the context instead of constructing an independent referent. Once again the relations are inextricably confused: the types of discourse clearly have particular aspectual properties we have already v.n this in connection with aoristic utterances that structure both aspect and tense differently, and yet all or almost all aspectual forms can appear anywhere, in all or almost all types of discursive contexts. Thus we have foregrounded imparfaits, which have been recorded and are sometimes called narrative imparfaits— e. g. , in an utterance like Trois jours après, il mourait Three days later, he was dying, where it is a question of narrating a prominent event, and where the distinction between imparfait and passé simple becomes more difficult to evaluate. We also find passé composés in narratives, where they compete with the passé simple: that is why many analysts of the language consider the passé simple an archaic form that is being abandoned in favor of the passé composé. The difficulty is clear: it is hard to attach a given formal procedure to a given enunciative structuration, not only because enunciative structures are supposed to be compatible with several aspectual values, but first of all because the formal procedures themselves are all, more or less broadly, polysemous, their value depending precisely on the context and thus on the enunciative structure in which they are situated. Here again, this is commonplace: polysemy is everywhere in languages. But in this case it affects aspect: it consists precisely in running through aspectual oppositions, the very ones that are also supposed to be associated with some aspectual marker. The case of narrative uses of the imparfait v.ms to indicate that the imparfait can have different aspectual values, of which some are more or less apparently perfective. The narrative passé composés for instance, Il s’est levé et il est sorti He got up and went out describe the process in its advent and thus do not have the same aspectual properties as those that appear in utterances describing the state resulting from the process e.g., Désolé, en ce moment il est sorti Sorry, he left just now. Not to mention the presents, which are highly polysemous in many languages and which, depending on the language, therefore occupy a more or less extensive aspectual terrain. We are obliged to note that aspect is at least partially independent of formal procedures, that it also plays a role elsewhere, in particular, in the enunciative configuration. teleology: the objectivum. Grice speaks of the objective as a maxim. This is very Latinate. So if the maxim is an objective, the goal is the objective, or objectivum. Meaning "goal, aim" (1881) is from military term objective point (1852), reflecting a sense evolution in French. This is an expansion on the desideratum. Cf. ‘desirable,’ and ‘desirability,’ and ‘end.’ Grice feels like introducing goal-oriented conceptual machinery. In a later stage of his career he ensured that this machinery be seen as NOT mechanistically derivable. Which is odd seeing that in the ‘progression’ of the ‘soul,’ he allows for talk of adaptiveness and survival which suggest a mechanist explanation. If an agent has a desideratum that means that, to echo Bennett, A displays a goal-oriented behaviour, where the goal is the ‘telos.’ Smoke cannot ‘mean’ fire, because smoke doesn’t really behave in a goal-oriented matter. Grice does play with the idea of finality in nature, because that would allow him to justify the objectivity of his system. how does soul originate from matter? Does the vegetal soul have a telos. Purposive-behaviour is obvious in plants (phototropism). If it is present in the vegetal soul, it is present in the animal soul. If it is present in the animal soul, it is present in the rational soul. With each stage, alla Hartmann, there are distinctions in the specification of the telos. Grice could be more continental than Scheler! Grices métier. Unity of science was a very New-World expression that Grice did not quite buy. Grice was brought up in a world, the Old World, indeed, as he calls it in his Proem to the Locke lectures, of Snows two cultures. At the time of Grices philosophising, philosophers such as Winch (who indeed quotes fro Grice) were contesting the idea that science is unitary, when it comes to the explanation of rational behaviour. Since a philosophical approach to the explanation of rational behaviour, including conversational behaviour (to account for the conversational implicatura) is his priority, Grice needs to distinguish himself from those who propose a unified science, which Grice regards as eliminationist and reductionist. Grice is ambivalent about science and also playful (philosophia regina scientiarum). Grice seems to presuppose, or implicate, that, since there is the devil of scientism, science cannot get at teleology. The devil is in the physiological details, which are irrelevant. The language Grice uses to describe his Ps as goal-oriented, aimed at survival and reproduction, seems teleological and somewhat scientific, though. But he means that ironically! As the scholastics use it, teleology is a science, the science of telos, or finality (cf. Aristotle on telos aitia, causa finalis. The unity of science is threatened by teleology, and vice versa. Unified science seeks for a mechanistically derivable teleology. But Grices sympathies lie for detached finality. Grice is obsessed with the Greek idea of a telos, as slightly overused by Aristotle. Grice thinks that some actions are for their own sake. What is the telos of Oscar Wilde? Can we speak of Oscar Wilde’s métier? If a tiger is to tigerise, a human is to humanise, and a person is to personise. Grice thought that teleology is a key philosophical way to contest mechanism, so popular in The New World. Strictly, and Grice knew this, teleology is constituted as a discipline. One term that Cicero was unable to translate! For the philosopher, teleology is that part of philosophy that studies the realm of the telos. Informally, teleological is opposed to mechanistic. Grice is interested in the mechanism/teleology debate, indeed jumps into it, with a goal in mind! Grice finds some New-World philosophers too mechanistic-oriented, in contrast with the more two-culture atmosphere he was familiar with at Oxford! Code is the Aristotelian, and he and Grice are especially concerned in the idea of causa finalis. For Grice only detached finality poses a threat to Mechanism, as it should! Axiological objectivity is possible only given finality or purpose in Nature, the admissibility of a final cause. Grice’s “Definition” of Meaning – and Communicatum – Oddly, in “Utterer’s meaning and intentions,” Grice keeps calling his analyses ‘definition,’ and ‘re-definition.’ He is well aware of the trick introduced by Robinson on this. definiendum plural: definienda, the expression that is defined in a definition. The expression that gives the definition is the definiens plural: definientia. In the definition father, male parent, ‘father’ is the definiendum and ‘male parent’ is the definiens. In the definition ‘A human being is a rational animal’, ‘human being’ is the definiendum and ‘rational animal’ is the definiens. Similar terms are used in the case of conceptual analyses, whether they are meant to provide synonyms or not; ‘definiendum’ for ‘analysandum’ and ‘definiens’ for ‘analysans’. In ‘x knows that p if and only if it is true that p, x believes that p, and x’s belief that p is properly justified’, ‘x knows that p’ is the analysandum and ‘it is true that p, x believes that p, and x’s belief that p is properly justified’ is the analysans.  definist, someone who holds that moral terms, such as ‘right’, and evaluative terms, such as ‘good’  in short, normative terms  are definable in non-moral, non-evaluative i.e., non-normative terms. William Frankena offers a broader account of a definist as one who holds that ethical terms are definable in non-ethical terms. This would allow that they are definable in nonethical but evaluative terms  say, ‘right’ in terms of what is non-morally intrinsically good. Definists who are also naturalists hold that moral terms can be defined by terms that denote natural properties, i.e., properties whose presence or absence can be determined by observational means. They might define ‘good’ as ‘what conduces to pleasure’. Definists who are not naturalists will hold that the terms that do the defining do not denote natural properties, e.g., that ‘right’ means ‘what is commanded by God’.  definition, specification of the meaning or, alternatively, conceptual content, of an expression. For example, ‘period of fourteen days’ is a definition of ‘fortnight’. Definitions have traditionally been judged by rules like the following: 1 A definition should not be too narrow. ‘Unmarried adult male psychiatrist’ is too narrow a definition for ‘bachelor’, for some bachelors are not psychiatrists. ‘Having vertebrae and a liver’ is too narrow for ‘vertebrate’, for, even though all actual vertebrate things have vertebrae and a liver, it is possible for a vertebrate thing to lack a liver. 2 A definition should not be too broad. ‘Unmarried adult’ is too broad a definition for ‘bachelor’, for not all unmarried adults are bachelors. ‘Featherless biped’ is too broad for ‘human being’, for even though all actual featherless bipeds are human beings, it is possible for a featherless biped to be non-human. 3 The defining expression in a definition should ideally exactly match the degree of vagueness of the expression being defined except in a precising definition. ‘Adult female’ for ‘woman’ does not violate this rule, but ‘female at least eighteen years old’ for ‘woman’ does. 4 A definition should not be circular. If ‘desirable’ defines ‘good’ and ‘good’ defines ‘desirable’, these definitions are circular. Definitions fall into at least the following kinds: analytical definition: definition whose corresponding biconditional is analytic or gives an analysis of the definiendum: e.g., ‘female fox’ for ‘vixen’, where the corresponding biconditional ‘For any x, x is a vixen if and only if x is a female fox’ is analytic; ‘true in all possible worlds’ for ‘necessarily true’, where the corresponding biconditional ‘For any P, P is necessarily true if and only if P is true in all possible worlds’ gives an analysis of the definiendum. contextual definition: definition of an expression as it occurs in a larger expression: e.g., ‘If it is not the case that Q, then P’ contextually defines ‘unless’ as it occurs in ‘P unless Q’; ‘There is at least one entity that is F and is identical with any entity that is F’ contextually defines ‘exactly one’ as it occurs in ‘There is exactly one F’. Recursive definitions see below are an important variety of contextual definition. Another important application of contextual definition is Russell’s theory of descriptions, which defines ‘the’ as it occurs in contexts of the form ‘The so-and-so is such-and-such’. coordinative definition: definition of a theoretical term by non-theoretical terms: e.g., ‘the forty-millionth part of the circumference of the earth’ for ‘meter’. definition by genus and species: When an expression is said to be applicable to some but not all entities of a certain type and inapplicable to all entities not of that type, the type in question is the genus, and the subtype of all and only those entities to which the expression is applicable is the species: e.g., in the definition ‘rational animal’ for ‘human’, the type animal is the genus and the subtype human is the species. Each species is distinguished from any other of the same genus by a property called the differentia. definition in use: specification of how an expression is used or what it is used to express: e.g., ‘uttered to express astonishment’ for ‘my goodness’. Vitters emphasized the importance of definition in use in his use theory of meaning. definition per genus et differentiam: definition by genus and difference; same as definition by genus and species. explicit definition: definition that makes it clear that it is a definition and identifies the expression being defined as such: e.g., ‘Father’ means ‘male parent’; ‘For any x, x is a father by definition if and only if x is a male parent’. implicit definition: definition that is not an explicit definition. lexical definition: definition of the kind commonly thought appropriate for dictionary definitions of natural language terms, namely, a specification of their conventional meaning. nominal definition: definition of a noun usually a common noun, giving its linguistic meaning. Typically it is in terms of macrosensible characteristics: e.g., ‘yellow malleable metal’ for ‘gold’. Locke spoke of nominal essence and contrasted it with real essence. ostensive definition: definition by an example in which the referent is specified by pointing or showing in some way: e.g., “ ‘Red’ is that color,” where the word ‘that’ is accompanied with a gesture pointing to a patch of colored cloth; “ ‘Pain’ means this,” where ‘this’ is accompanied with an insertion of a pin through the hearer’s skin; “ ‘Kangaroo’ applies to all and only animals like that,” where ‘that’ is accompanied by pointing to a particular kangaroo. persuasive definition: definition designed to affect or appeal to the psychological states of the party to whom the definition is given, so that a claim will appear more plausible to the party than it is: e.g., ‘self-serving manipulator’ for ‘politician’, where the claim in question is that all politicians are immoral. precising definition: definition of a vague expression intended to reduce its vagueness: e.g., ‘snake longer than half a meter and shorter than two meters’ for ‘snake of average length’; ‘having assets ten thousand times the median figure’ for ‘wealthy’. prescriptive definition: stipulative definition that, in a recommendatory way, gives a new meaning to an expression with a previously established meaning: e.g., ‘male whose primary sexual preference is for other males’ for ‘gay’. real definition: specification of the metaphysically necessary and sufficient condition for being the kind of thing a noun usually a common noun designates: e.g., ‘element with atomic number 79’ for ‘gold’. Locke spoke of real essence and contrasted it with nominal essence. recursive definition also called inductive definition and definition by recursion: definition in three clauses in which 1 the expression defined is applied to certain particular items the base clause; 2 a rule is given for reaching further items to which the expression applies the recursive, or inductive, clause; and 3 it is stated that the expression applies to nothing else the closure clause. E.g., ‘John’s parents are John’s ancestors; any parent of John’s ancestor is John’s ancestor; nothing else is John’s ancestor’. By the base clause, John’s mother and father are John’s ancestors. Then by the recursive clause, John’s mother’s parents and John’s father’s parents are John’s ancestors; so are their parents, and so on. Finally, by the last closure clause, these people exhaust John’s ancestors. The following defines multiplication in terms of definition definition 214   214 addition: ‘0 $ n % 0. m ! 1 $ n % m $ n ! n. Nothing else is the result of multiplying integers’. The base clause tells us, e.g., that 0 $ 4 % 0. The recursive clause tells us, e.g., that 0 ! 1 $ 4 % 0 $ 4 ! 4. We then know that 1 $ 4 % 0 ! 4 % 4. Likewise, e.g., 2 $ 4 % 1 ! 1 $ 4 % 1 $ 4 ! 4 % 4 ! 4 % 8. stipulative definition: definition regardless of the ordinary or usual conceptual content of the expression defined. It postulates a content, rather than aiming to capture the content already associated with the expression. Any explicit definition that introduces a new expression into the language is a stipulative definition: e.g., “For the purpose of our discussion ‘existent’ means ‘perceivable’ “; “By ‘zoobeedoobah’ we shall mean ‘vain millionaire who is addicted to alcohol’.” synonymous definition: definition of a word or other linguistic expression by another word synonymous with it: e.g., ‘buy’ for ‘purchase’; ‘madness’ for ‘insanity’.  Refs.: There are specific essays on ‘teleology,’ ‘final cause,’ and ‘finality,’ the The Grice Papers. Some of the material published in “Reply to Richards” (repr. in “Conception”) and “Actions and events,” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

degree: Grice on the flat/variable distinction – Grice considers that ‘ought’ is weaker than ‘must’ – ‘ought’ displays ‘degree-acceptability.’ Grice loved a degree – he uses “d” in aspects of reason -- degree, also called arity, adicity, in formal languages, a property of predicate and function expressions that determines the number of terms with which the expression is correctly combined to yield a well-formed expression. If an expression combines with a single term to form a wellformed expression, it is of degree one monadic, singulary. Expressions that combine with two terms are of degree two dyadic, binary, and so on. Expressions of degree greater than or equal to two are polyadic. The formation rules of a formalized language must effectively specify the degrees of its primitive expressions as part of the effective determination of the class of wellformed formulas. Degree is commonly indicated by an attached superscript consisting of an Arabic numeral. Formalized languages have been studied that contain expressions having variable degree or variable adicity and that can thus combine with any finite number of terms. An abstract relation that would be appropriate as extension of a predicate expression is subject to the same terminology, and likewise for function expressions and their associated functions.  -- degree of unsolvability, a maximal set of equally complex sets of natural numbers, with comparative complexity of sets of natural numbers construed as recursion-theoretic reducibility ordering. Recursion theorists investigate various notions of reducibility between sets of natural numbers, i.e., various ways of filling in the following schematic definition. For sets A and B of natural numbers: A is reducible to B iff if and only if there is an algorithm whereby each membership question about A e.g., ‘17 1 A?’ could be answered allowing consultation of an definition, contextual degree of unsolvability 215   215 “oracle” that would correctly answer each membership question about B. This does not presuppose that there is a “real” oracle for B; the motivating idea is counterfactual: A is reducible to B iff: if membership questions about B were decidable then membership questions about A would also be decidable. On the other hand, the mathematical definitions of notions of reducibility involve no subjunctive conditionals or other intensional constructions. The notion of reducibility is determined by constraints on how the algorithm could use the oracle. Imposing no constraints yields T-reducibility ‘T’ for Turing, the most important and most studied notion of reducibility. Fixing a notion r of reducibility: A is r-equivalent to B iff A is r-reducible to B and B is rreducible to A. If r-reducibility is transitive, r-equivalence is an equivalence relation on the class of sets of natural numbers, one reflecting a notion of equal complexity for sets of natural numbers. A degree of unsolvability relative to r an r-degree is an equivalence class under that equivalence relation, i.e., a maximal class of sets of natural numbers any two members of which are r-equivalent, i.e., a maximal class of equally complex in the sense of r-reducibility sets of natural numbers. The r-reducibility-ordering of sets of natural numbers transfers to the rdegrees: for d and dH r-degrees, let d m, dH iff for some A 1 d and B 1 dH A is r-reducible to B. The study of r-degrees is the study of them under this ordering. The degrees generated by T-reducibility are the Turing degrees. Without qualification, ‘degree of unsolvability’ means ‘Turing degree’. The least Tdegree is the set of all recursive i.e., using Church’s thesis, solvable sets of natural numbers. So the phrase ‘degree of unsolvability’ is slightly misleading: the least such degree is “solvability.” By effectively coding functions from natural numbers to natural numbers as sets of natural numbers, we may think of such a function as belonging to a degree: that of its coding set. Recursion theorists have extended the notions of reducibility and degree of unsolvability to other domains, e.g. transfinite ordinals and higher types taken over the natural numbers. 

demonstratum: Cf. illatum – In act of communication, Grice’s focus is on the reasoning on the emissor’s part. This is end-means. The conversational moves is the most effectively designed move. The potential uptake by the emissee is also taken into the consideration by the emissor. And actual uptake is not of philosophical importance. hen Grice tried to conceptualise what ‘communicating’ and ‘smoke means fire’ have in common he came with the idea of ‘consequentia,’ as a dyadic relation that, eventually, will become triadic, with the missor and the missee brought into the bargain. “Look that smoke, there must be fire somewhere’ – “By that handwave, he meant that he was about to leave me.” In any case, Grice’s arriving at ‘consequentia’ is exactly Hobbes’s idea in “Computatio.’ And ‘con-sequentia’ involves a bit of ‘demonstratio.’ One thing follows the other. One thing YIELDS the other. The link may be causal (smoke means fire) or ‘communicative’). ‘Rationality’ is one of those words Austin forbids to use. Grice would venture with ‘reason,’ and better, ‘reasons’ to make it countable, and good for botanising. Only in the New World, and when he started to get input from non-philosophers, did Grice explore ‘rationality’ itself. Oxonians philosophers take it for granted, and do not have to philosophise about it. Especially those who belong to Grice’s play group of ‘ordinary-language’ philosophers! Oxonian philosophers will quote from the Locke version! Obviously, while each of the four lectures credits their own entry below, it may do to reflect on Grices overall aim. Grice structures the lectures in the form of a philosophical dialogue with his audience. The first lecture is intended to provide a bit of linguistic botanising for reasonable, and rational. In later lectures, Grice tackles reason qua noun. The remaining lectures are meant to explore what he calls the Aequi-vocality thesis: must has only one Fregeian that crosses what he calls the buletic-doxastic divide. He is especially concerned  ‒ this being the Kant lectures  ‒ with Kants attempt to reduce the categorical imperative to a counsel of prudence (Ratschlag der Klugheit), where Kants prudence is Klugheit, versus skill, as in rule of skill, and even if Kant defines Klugheit as a skill to attain what is good for oneself  ‒ itself divided into privatKlugheit and Weltklugheit. Kant re-introduces the Aristotelian idea of eudaimonia. While a further lecture on happiness as the pursuit of a system of ends is NOT strictly part of the either the Kant or the Locke lectures, it relates, since eudaemonia may be regarded as the goal involved in the relevant imperative.  “Aspects”, Clarendon, Stanford, The Kant memorial Lectures, “Aspects,” Clarendon, Some aspects of reason, Stanford; reason, reasoning, reasons. The lectures were also delivered as the Locke lectures. Grice is concerned with the reduction of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical or suppositional imperative. His main thesis he calls the æqui-vocality thesis: must has one unique or singular sense, that crosses the buletic-boulomaic/doxastic divide. “Aspects,” Clarendon, Grice, “Aspects, Clarendon, Locke lecture notes: reason. On “Aspects”. Including extensive language botany on rational, reasonable, and indeed reason (justificatory, explanatory, and mixed). At this point, Grice notes that linguistic botany is indispensable towards the construction of a more systematic explanatory theory. It is an exploration of a range of uses of reason that leads him to his Aequi-vocality thesis that must has only one sense; also ‘Aspects of reason and reasoning,’ in Grice, “Aspects,” Clarendon, the Locke lectures, the Kant lectures, Stanford, reason, happiness. While Locke hardly mentions reason, his friend Burthogge does, and profusely! It was slightly ironic that Grice had delivered these lectures as the Rationalist Kant lectures at Stanford. He was honoured to be invited to Oxford. Officially, to be a Locke lecture you have to be *visiting* Oxford. While Grice was a fellow of St. Johns, he was still most welcome to give his set of lectures on reasoning at the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy. He quotes very many authors, including Locke! In his proemium, Grice notes that while he was rejected the Locke scholarship back in the day, he was extremely happy to be under Lockes ægis now! When preparing for his second lecture, he had occasion to revise some earlier drafts dated pretty early, on reasons, Grice, “Aspects,” Clarendon, reason, reasons. Linguistic analysis on justificatory, explanatory and mixed uses of reason. While Grice knows that the basic use of reason is qua verb (reasoner reasons from premise p to conclusion c), he spends some time in exploring reason as noun. Grice found it a bit of a roundabout way to approach rationality. However, his distinction between justificatory and explanatory reason is built upon his linguistic botany on the use of reason qua noun. Explanatory reason seems more basic for Grice than justificatory reason. Explanatory reason explains the behaviour of a rational agent. Grice is aware of Freud and his rationalizations. An agent may invoke some reason for his acting which is not legitimate. An agent may convince himself that he wants to move to Bournemouth because of the weather; when in fact, his reason to move to Bournemouth is to be closer to Cowes and join the yacht club there. Grice loved an enthymeme. Grices enthymeme. Grice, the implicit reasoner! As the title of the lecture implies, Grice takes the verb, to reason, as conceptually prior. A reasoner reasons, briefly, from a premise to a conclusion. There are types of reason: flat reason and gradual reason. He famously reports Shropshire, another tutee with Hardie, and his proof on the immortality of the human soul. Grice makes some remarks on akrasia as key, too. The first lecture is then dedicated to an elucidation, and indeed attempt at a conceptual analysis in terms of intentions and doxastic conditions reasoner R intends that premise P yields conclusion C and believes his intention will cause his entertaining of the conclusion from his entertaining the premise. One example of particular interest for a study of the use of conversational reason in Grice is that of the connection between implicaturum and reasoning. Grice entitles the sub-section of the lecture as Too good to be reasoning, which is of course a joke. Cf. too much love will kill you, and Theres no such thing as too much of a good thing (Shakespeare, As you like it). Grice notes: I have so far been considering difficulties which may arise from the attempt to find, for all cases of actual reasoning, reconstructions of sequences of utterances or explicit thoughts which the reasoner might plausibly be supposed to think of as conforming to some set of canonical patterns of inference. Grice then turns to a different class of examples, with regard to which the problem is not that it is difficult to know how to connect them with canonical patterns, but rather that it is only too easy (or shall I say trivial) to make the connection. Like some children (not many), some cases of reasoning are too well behaved for their own good. Suppose someone says to Grice, and It is very interesting that Grice gives conversational examples. Jack has arrived, Grice replies, I conclude from that that Jack has arrived. Or he says Jack has arrived AND Jill has *also* arrived, And Grice replies, I conclude that Jill has arrived.(via Gentzens conjunction-elimination). Or he says, My wife is at home. And Grice replies, I reason from that that someone (viz. your wife) is at home. Is there not something very strange about the presence in my three replies of the verb conclude (in example I and II) and the verb reason (in the third example)? misleading, but doxastically fine, professor! It is true, of course, that if instead of my first reply I had said (vii) vii. So Jack has arrived, has he? the strangeness would have been removed. But here so serves not to indicate that an inference is being made, but rather as part of a not that otiose way of expressing surprise. One might just as well have said (viii). viii. Well, fancy that! Now, having spent a sizeable part of his life exploiting it, Grice is not unaware of the truly fine distinction between a statements being false (or axiologically satisfactory), and its being true (or axiologically satisfactory) but otherwise conversationally or pragmatically misleading or inappropriate or pointless, and, on that account and by such a fine distinction, a statement, or an utterance, or conversational move which it would be improper (in terms of the reasonable/rational principle of conversational helfpulness) in one way or another, to make. It is worth considering Grices reaction to his own distinction. Entailment is in sight! But Grice does not find himself lured by the idea of using that distinction here! Because Moores entailment, rather than Grices implicaturum is entailed. Or because explicatu, rather than implicaturum is involved. Suppose, again, that I were to break off the chapter at this point, and switch suddenly to this argument. ix. I have two hands (here is one hand and here is another). If had three more hands, I would have five. If I were to have double that number I would have ten, and if four of them were removed six would remain. So I would have four more hands than I have now. Is one happy to describe this performance as reasoning? Depends whos one and whats happy!? There is, however, little doubt that I have produced a canonically acceptable chain of statements. So surely that is reasoning, if only conversationally misleadingly called so. Or suppose that, instead of writing in my customary free and easy style, I had framed my remarks (or at least the argumentative portions of my remarks) as a verbal realization, so to speak, of sequences of steps in strict conformity with the rules of a natural-deduction system of first-order predicate logic. I give, that is to say, an updated analogue of a medieval disputation. Implicaturum. Gentzen is Ockham. Would those brave souls who continued to read be likely to think of my performance as the production of reasoning, or would they rather think of it as a crazy formalisation of reasoning conducted at some previous time? Depends on crazy or formalisation. One is reminded of Grice telling Strawson, If you cannot formalise, dont say it; Strawson: Oh, no! If I can formalise it, I shant say it! The points suggested by this stream of rhetorical questions may be summarized as follows. Whether the samples presented FAIL to achieve the title of reasoning, and thus be deemed reasoning, or whether the samples achieve the title, as we may figuratively put it, by the skin of their teeth, perhaps does not very greatly matter. For whichever way it is, the samples seem to offend against something (different things in different cases, Im sure) very central to our conception of reasoning. So central that Moore would call it entailment! A mechanical application of a ground rule of inference, or a concatenation thereof, is reluctantly (if at all) called reasoning. Such a mechanical application may perhaps legitimately enter into (i.e. form individual steps in) authentic reasonings, but they are not themselves reasonings, nor is a string of them. There is a demand that a reasoner should be, to a greater or lesser degree, the author of his reasonings. Parroted sequences are not reasonings when parroted, though the very same sequences might be reasoning if not parroted. Ped sequences are another matter. Some of the examples Grice gives are deficient because they are aimless or pointless. Reasoning is characteristically addressed to this or that problem: a small problem, a large problem, a problem within a problem, a clear problem, a hazy problem, a practical problem, an intellectual problem; but a problem! A mere flow of ideas minimally qualifies (or can be deemed) as reasoning, even if it happens to be logically respectable. But if it is directed, or even monitored (with intervention should it go astray, not only into fallacy or mistake, but also into such things as conversational irrelevance or otiosity!), that is another matter! Finicky over-elaboration of intervening steps is frowned upon, and in extreme cases runs the risk of forfeiting the title of reasoning. In conversation, such over-elaboration will offend against this or that conversational maxim, against (presumably) some suitably formulated maxim conjoining informativeness. As Grice noted with regard to ‘That pillar box seems red to me.’ That would be baffling if the addressee fails to detect the communication-point. An utterance is supposed to inform, and what is the above meant to inform its addressee? In thought, it will be branded as pedantry or neurotic caution. If a distinction between brooding and conversing is to be made! At first sight, perhaps, one would have been inclined to say that greater rather than lesser explicitnessness is a merit. Not that inexplicitness, or implicaturum-status, as it were ‒ is bad, but that, other things being equal, the more explicitness the better. But now it looks as if proper explicitness (or explicatum-status) is an Aristotelian mean, or mesotes, and it would be good some time to enquire what determines where that mean lies. The burden of the foregoing observations seems to me to be that the provisional account of reasoning, which has been before us, leaves out something which is crucially important. What it leaves out is the conception of reasoning, as I like to see conversation, as a purposive activity, as something with goals and purposes. The account or picture leaves out, in short, the connection of reasoning with the will! Moreover, once we avail ourselves of the great family of additional ideas which the importation of this conception would give us, we shall be able to deal with the quandary which I laid before you a few minutes ago. For we could say e.g. that R reasons (informally) from p to c just in case R thinks that p and intends that, in thinking c, he should be thinking something which would be the conclusion of a formally valid argument the premisses of which are a supplementation of p. This will differ from merely thinking that there exists some formally valid supplementation of a transition from p to c, which I felt inclined NOT to count as (or deem) reasoning. I have some hopes that this appeal to the purposiveness or goal-oriented character of authentic reasoning or good reasoning might be sufficient to dispose of the quandary on which I have directed it. But I am by no means entirely confident that this is the case, and so I offer a second possible method of handling the quandary, one to which I shall return later when I shall attempt to place it in a larger context. We have available to us (let us suppose) what I might call a hard way of making inferential moves. We in fact employ this laborious, step-by-step procedure at least when we are in difficulties, when the course is not clear, when we have an awkward (or philosophical) audience, and so forth. An inferential judgement, however, is a normally desirable undertaking for us only because of its actual or hoped for destinations, and is therefore not desirable for its own sake (a respect in which, possibly, it may differ from an inferential capacity). Following the hard way consumes time and energy. These are in limited supply and it would, therefore, be desirable if occasions for employing the hard way were minimized. A substitute for the hard way, the quick way, which is made possible by habituation and intention, is available to us, and the capacity for it (which is sometimes called intelligence, and is known to be variable in degree) is a desirable quality. The possibility of making a good inferential step (there being one to be made), together with such items as a particular inferers reputation for inferential ability, may determine whether on a particular occasion we suppose a particular transition to be inferential (and so to be a case of reasoning) or not. On this account, it is not essential that there should be a single supplementation of an informal reasoning which is supposed to be what is overtly in the inferers mind, though quite often there may be special reasons for supposing this to be the case. So Botvinnik is properly credited with a case of reasoning, while Shropshire is not. Drawing from his recollections of an earlier linguistic botany on reason. Grice distinguishes between justificatory reason and explanatory reason. There is a special case of mixed reason, explanatory-cum-justificatory. The lecture can be seen as the way an exercise that Austin took as taxonomic can lead to explanatory adequacy, too! Bennett is an excellent correspondent. He holds a very interesting philosophical correspondence with Hare. This is just one f. with Grices correspondence with Bennett. Oxford don, Christchurh, NZ-born Bennett, of Magdalen, B. Phil. Oxon. Bennett has an essay on the interpretation of a formal system under Austin. It is interesting that Bennett was led to consider the interpretation of a formal system under Austins Play Group. Bennett attends Grices seminars. He is my favourite philosopher. Bennett quotes Grice in his Linguistic behaviour. In return, Grice quotes Bennett in the Preface toWOW. Bennett has an earlier essay on rationality, which evidences that the topic is key at Grices Oxford. Bennett has studied better than anyone the way Locke is Griceian. A word or expression does not just stand for idea, but for the intention of the utterer to stand for it! Grice also enjoyed construal by Bennett of Grice as a nominalist. Bennett makes a narrow use of the epithet. Since Grice does distinguish between an utterance-token (x) and an utterance-type, and considers that the attribution of meaning from token to type is metabolic, this makes Grice a nominalist. Bennett is one of the few to follow Kantotle and make him popular on the pages of the Times Literary Supplement, of all places. Refs.: The locus classicus is “Aspects,” Clarendon. But there are allusions on ‘reason’ and ‘rationality, in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

Griceian Dennett – Dennett knew Grice from the Oxford days – and quotes him extensively – He is what Grice called “a New-World Griceian.” D. C.,  philosopher, author of books on topics in the philosophy of mind, free will, and evolutionary biology, and tireless advocate of the importance of philosophy for empirical work on evolution and on the nature of the mind. Dennett is perhaps best known for arguing that a creature or, more generally, a system, S, possesses states of mind if and only if the ascription of such states to S facilitates explanation and prediction of S’s behavior The Intentional Stance, 7. S might be a human being, a chimpanzee, a desktop computer, or a thermostat. In ascribing beliefs and desires to S we take up an attitude toward S, the intentional stance. We could just as well although for different purposes take up other stances: the design stance we understand S as a kind of engineered system or the physical stance we regard S as a purely physical system. It might seem that, although we often enough ascribe beliefs and desires to desktop computers and thermostats, we do not mean to do so literally  as with people. Dennett’s contention, however, is that there is nothing more nor less to having beliefs, desires, and other states of mind than being explicable by reference to such things. This, he holds, is not to demean beliefs, but only to affirm that to have a belief is to be describable in this particular way. If you are so describable, then it is true, literally true, that you have beliefs. Dennett extends this approach to consciousness, which he views not as an inwardly observable performance taking place in a “Cartesian Theater,” but as a story we tell about ourselves, the compilation of “multiple drafts” concocted by neural subsystems see Conciousness Explained, 1. Elsewhere Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 5 Dennett has argued that principles of Darwinian selection apply to diverse domains including cosmology and human culture, and offered a compatibilist account of free will with an emphasis on agents’ control over their actions Elbow Room, 4. 

denotatum -- denotation, the thing or things that an expression applies to; extension. The term is used in contrast with ‘meaning’ and ‘connotation’. A pair of expressions may apply to the same things, i.e., have the same denotation, yet differ in meaning: ‘triangle’, ‘trilateral’; ‘creature with a heart’, ‘creature with a kidney’; ‘bird’, ‘feathered earthling’; ‘present capital of France’, ‘City of Light’. If a term does not apply to anything, some will call it denotationless, while others would say that it denotes the empty set. Such terms may differ in meaning: ‘unicorn’, ‘centaur’, ‘square root of pi’. Expressions may apply to the same things, yet bring to mind different associations, i.e., have different connotations: ‘persistent’, ‘stubborn’, ‘pigheaded’; ‘white-collar employee’, ‘office worker’, ‘professional paper-pusher’; ‘Lewis Carroll’, ‘Reverend Dodgson’. There can be confusion about the denotation-connotation terminology, because this pair is used to make other contrasts. Sometimes the term ‘connotation’ is used more broadly, so that any difference of either meaning or association is considered a difference of connotation. Then ‘creature with a heart’ and ‘creature with a liver’ might be said to denote the same individuals or sets but to connote different properties. In a second use, denotation is the semantic value of an expression. Sometimes the denotation of a general term is said to be a property, rather than the things having the property. This occurs when the denotation-connotation terminology is used to contrast the property expressed with the connotation. Thus ‘persistent’ and ‘pig-headed’ might be said to denote the same property but differ in connotation. 

Grice’s deontic operator – Grice was aware of Bentham’s play on words with deontology -- as a Kantian, Griceian is a deontologist. However, he refers to the ‘sorry story of deontic logic,’ because of von Wright (from whom he borrowed but to whom he never returned ‘alethic’) deontic logic, the logic of obligation and permission. There are three principal types of formal deontic systems. 1 Standard deontic logic, or SDL, results from adding a pair of monadic deontic operators O and P, read as “it ought to be that” and “it is permissible that,” respectively, to the classical propositional calculus. SDL contains the following axioms: tautologies of propositional logic, OA S - P - A, OA / - O - A, OA / B / OA / OB, and OT, where T stands for any tautology. Rules of inference are modus ponens and substitution. See the survey of SDL by Dagfinn Follesdal and Risto Hilpinin in R. Hilpinin, ed., Deontic Logic, 1. 2 Dyadic deontic logic is obtained by adding a pair of dyadic deontic operators O /  and P / , to be read as “it ought to be that . . . , given that . . .” and “it is permissible that . . . , given that . . . ,” respectively. The SDL monadic operator O is defined as OA S OA/T; i.e., a statement of absolute obligation OA becomes an obligation conditional on tautologous conditions. A statement of conditional obligation OA/B is true provided that some value realized at some B-world where A holds is better than any value realized at any B-world where A does not hold. This axiological construal of obligation is typically accompanied by these axioms and rules of inference: tautologies of propositional logic, modus ponens, and substitution, PA/C S - O-A/C, OA & B/C S [OA/C & OB/C], OA/C / PA/C, OT/C / OC/C, OT/C / OT/B 7 C, [OA/B & OA/C] / OA/B 7 C, [PB/B 7 C & OA/B 7 C] / OA/B, and [P< is the negation of any tautology. See the comparison of alternative dyadic systems in Lennart Aqvist, Introduction to Deontic Logic and the Theory of Normative Systems, 7. 3 Two-sorted deontic logic, due to Castañeda Thinking and Doing, 5, pivotally distinguishes between propositions, the bearers of truth-values, and practitions, the contents of commands, imperatives, requests, and such. Deontic operators apply to practitions, yielding propositions. The deontic operators Oi, Pi, Wi, and li are read as “it is obligatory i that,” “it is permissible i that,” “it is wrong i that,” and “it is optional i denotation deontic logic 219   219 that,” respectively, where i stands for any of the various types of obligation, permission, and so on. Let p stand for indicatives, where these express propositions; let A and B stand for practitives, understood to express practitions; and allow p* to stand for both indicatives and practitives. For deontic definition there are PiA S - Oi - A, WiA S Oi - A, and LiA S - OiA & - Oi - A. Axioms and rules of inference include p*, if p* has the form of a truth-table tautology, OiA / - Oi - A, O1A / A, where O1 represents overriding obligation, modus ponens for both indicatives and practitives, and the rule that if p & A1 & . . . & An / B is a theorem, so too is p & OiA1 & . . . & OiAn / OiB.  -- deontic paradoxes, the paradoxes of deontic logic, which typically arise as follows: a certain set of English sentences about obligation or permission appears logically consistent, but when these same sentences are represented in a proposed system of deontic logic the result is a formally inconsistent set. To illustrate, a formulation is provided below of how two of these paradoxes beset standard deontic logic. The contrary-to-duty imperative paradox, made famous by Chisholm Analysis, 3, arises from juxtaposing two apparent truths: first, some of us sometimes do what we should not do; and second, when such wrongful doings occur it is obligatory that the best or a better be made of an unfortunate situation. Consider this scenario. Art and Bill share an apartment. For no good reason Art develops a strong animosity toward Bill. One evening Art’s animosity takes over, and he steals Bill’s valuable lithographs. Art is later found out, apprehended, and brought before Sue, the duly elected local punishment-and-awards official. An inquiry reveals that Art is a habitual thief with a history of unremitting parole violation. In this situation, it seems that 14 are all true and hence mutually consistent: 1 Art steals from Bill. 2 If Art steals from Bill, Sue ought to punish Art for stealing from Bill. 3 It is obligatory that if Art does not steal from Bill, Sue does not punish him for stealing from Bill. 4 Art ought not to steal from Bill. Turning to standard deontic logic, or SDL, let sstand for ‘Art steals from Bill’ and let p stand for ‘Sue punishes Art for stealing from Bill’. Then 14 are most naturally represented in SDL as follows: 1a s. 2a s / Op. 3a O- s / - p. 4a O - s. Of these, 1a and 2a entail Op by propositional logic; next, given the SDL axiom OA / B / OA / OB, 3a implies O - s / O - p; but the latter, taken in conjunction with 4a, entails O - p by propositional logic. In the combination of Op, O - p, and the axiom OA / - O - A, of course, we have a formally inconsistent set. The paradox of the knower, first presented by Lennart Bqvist Noûs, 7, is generated by these apparent truths: first, some of us sometimes do what we should not do; and second, there are those who are obligated to know that such wrongful doings occur. Consider the following scenario. Jones works as a security guard at a local store. One evening, while Jones is on duty, Smith, a disgruntled former employee out for revenge, sets the store on fire just a few yards away from Jones’s work station. Here it seems that 13 are all true and thus jointly consistent: 1 Smith set the store on fire while Jones was on duty. 2 If Smith set the store on fire while Jones was on duty, it is obligatory that Jones knows that Smith set the store on fire. 3 Smith ought not set the store on fire. Independently, as a consequence of the concept of knowledge, there is the epistemic theorem that 4 The statement that Jones knows that Smith set the store on fire entails the statement that Smith set the store on fire. Next, within SDL 1 and 2 surely appear to imply: 5 It is obligatory that Jones knows that Smith set the store on fire. But 4 and 5 together yield 6 Smith ought to set the store on fire, given the SDL theorem that if A / B is a theorem, so is OA / OB. And therein resides the paradox: not only does 6 appear false, the conjunction of 6 and 3 is formally inconsistent with the SDL axiom OA / - O - A. The overwhelming verdict among deontic logicians is that SDL genuinely succumbs to the deontic operator deontic paradoxes 220   220 deontic paradoxes. But it is controversial what other approach is best followed to resolve these puzzles. Two of the most attractive proposals are Castañeda’s two-sorted system Thinking and Doing, 5, and the agent-and-time relativized approach of Fred Feldman Philosophical Perspectives, 0. 

Grice on types of priority -- Grice often uses ‘depend’ – but not clearly in what sense – there’s ontological dependence, the basic one. dependence, in philosophy, a relation of one of three main types: epistemic dependence, or dependence in the order of knowing; conceptual dependence, or dependence in the order of understanding; and ontological dependence, or dependence in the order of being. When a relation of dependence runs in one direction only, we have a relation of priority. For example, if wholes are ontologically dependent on their parts, but the latter in turn are not ontologically dependent on the former, one may say that parts are ontologically prior to wholes. The phrase ‘logical priority’ usually refers to priority of one of the three varieties to be discussed here. Epistemic dependence. To say that the facts in some class B are epistemically dependent on the facts in some other class A is to say this: one cannot know any fact in B unless one knows some fact in A that serves as one’s evidence for the fact in B. For example, it might be held that to know any fact about one’s physical environment e.g., that there is a fire in the stove, one must know as evidence some facts about the character of one’s own sensory experience e.g., that one is feeling warm and seeing flames. This would be to maintain that facts about the physical world are epistemically dependent on facts about sensory experience. If one held in addition that the dependence is not reciprocal  that one can know facts about one’s sensory experience without knowing as evidence any facts about the physical world  one would be maintaining that the former facts are epistemically prior to the latter facts. Other plausible though sometimes disputed examples of epistemic priority are the following: facts about the behavior of others are epistemically prior to facts about their mental states; facts about observable objects are epistemically prior to facts about the invisible particles postulated by physics; and singular facts e.g., this crow is black are epistemically prior to general facts e.g., all crows are black. Is there a class of facts on which all others epistemically depend and that depend on no further facts in turn  a bottom story in the edifice of knowledge? Some foundationalists say yes, positing a level of basic or foundational facts that are epistemically prior to all others. Empiricists are usually foundationalists who maintain that the basic level consists of facts about immediate sensory experience. Coherentists deny the need for a privileged stratum of facts to ground the knowledge of all others; in effect, they deny that any facts are epistemically prior to any others. Instead, all facts are on a par, and each is known in virtue of the way in which it fits in with all the rest. Sometimes it appears that two propositions or classes of them each epistemically depend on the other in a vicious way  to know A, you must first know B, and to know B, you must first know A. Whenever this is genuinely the case, we are in a skeptical predicament and cannot know either proposition. For example, Descartes believed that he could not be assured of the reliability of his own cognitions until he knew that God exists and is not a deceiver; yet how could he ever come to know anything about God except by relying on his own cognitions? This is the famous problem of the Cartesian circle. Another example is the problem of induction as set forth by Hume: to know that induction is a legitimate mode of inference, one would first have to know that the future will resemble the past; but since the latter fact is establishable only by induction, one could know it only if one already knew that induction is legitimate. Solutions to these problems must show that contrary to first appearances, there is a way of knowing one of the problematic propositions independently of the other. Conceptual dependence. To say that B’s are conceptually dependent on A’s means that to understand what a B is, you must understand what an A is, or that the concept of a B can be explained or understood only through the concept of an A. For example, it could plausibly be claimed that the concept uncle can be understood only in terms of the concept male. Empiricists typically maintain that we understand what an external thing like a tree or a table is only by knowing what experiences it would induce in us, so that the concepts we apply to physical things depend on the concepts we apply to our experideontological ethics dependence 221   221 ences. They typically also maintain that this dependence is not reciprocal, so that experiential concepts are conceptually prior to physical concepts. Some empiricists argue from the thesis of conceptual priority just cited to the corresponding thesis of epistemic priority  that facts about experiences are epistemically prior to facts about external objects. Turning the tables, some foes of empiricism maintain that the conceptual priority is the other way about: that we can describe and understand what kind of experience we are undergoing only by specifying what kind of object typically causes it “it’s a smell like that of pine mulch”. Sometimes they offer this as a reason for denying that facts about experiences are epistemically prior to facts about physical objects. Both sides in this dispute assume that a relation of conceptual priority in one direction excludes a relation of epistemic priority in the opposite direction. But why couldn’t it be the case both that facts about experiences are epistemically prior to facts about physical objects and that concepts of physical objects are conceptually prior to concepts of experiences? How the various kinds of priority and dependence are connected e.g., whether conceptual priority implies epistemic priority is a matter in need of further study. Ontological dependence. To say that entities of one sort the B’s are ontologically dependent on entities of another sort the A’s means this: no B can exist unless some A exists; i.e., it is logically or metaphysically necessary that if any B exists, some A also exists. Ontological dependence may be either specific the existence of any B depending on the existence of a particular A or generic the existence of any B depending merely on the existence of some A or other. If B’s are ontologically dependent on A’s, but not conversely, we may say that A’s are ontologically prior to B’s. The traditional notion of substance is often defined in terms of ontological priority  substances can exist without other things, as Aristotle said, but the others cannot exist without them. Leibniz believed that composite entities are ontologically dependent on simple i.e., partless entities  that any composite object exists only because it has certain simple elements that are arranged in a certain way. Berkeley, J. S. Mill, and other phenomenalists have believed that physical objects are ontologically dependent on sensory experiences  that the existence of a table or a tree consists in the occurrence of sensory experiences in certain orderly patterns. Spinoza believed that all finite beings are ontologically dependent on God and that God is ontologically dependent on nothing further; thus God, being ontologically prior to everything else, is in Spinoza’s view the only substance. Sometimes there are disputes about the direction in which a relationship of ontological priority runs. Some philosophers hold that extensionless points are prior to extended solids, others that solids are prior to points; some say that things are prior to events, others that events are prior to things. In the face of such disagreement, still other philosophers such as Goodman have suggested that nothing is inherently or absolutely prior to anything else: A’s may be prior to B’s in one conceptual scheme, B’s to A’s in another, and there may be no saying which scheme is correct. Whether relationships of priority hold absolutely or only relative to conceptual schemes is one issue dividing realists and anti-realists. 

de re: as opposed to de dicto, of what is said or of the proposition, as opposed to de re, of the thing. Many philosophers believe the following ambiguous, depending on whether they are interpreted de dicto or de re: 1 It is possible that the number of U.S. states is even. 2 Galileo believes that the earth moves. Assume for illustrative purposes that there are propositions and properties. If 1 is interpreted as de dicto, it asserts that the proposition that the number of U.S. states is even is a possible truth  something true, since there are in fact fifty states. If 1 is interpreted as de re, it asserts that the actual number of states fifty has the property of being possibly even  something essentialism takes to be true. Similarly for 2; it may mean that Galileo’s belief has a certain content  that the earth moves  or that Galileo believes, of the earth, that it moves. More recently, largely due to Castañeda and John Perry, many philosophers have come to believe in de se “of oneself” ascriptions, distinct from de dicto and de re. Suppose, while drinking with others, I notice that someone is spilling beer. Later I come to realize that it is I. I believed at the outset that someone was spilling beer, but didn’t believe that I was. Once I did, I straightened my glass. The distinction between de se and de dicto attributions is supposed to be supported by the fact that while de dicto propositions must be either true or false, there is no true proposition embeddable within ‘I believe that . . .’ that correctly ascribes to me the belief that I myself am spilling beer. The sentence ‘I am spilling beer’ will not do, because it employs an “essential” indexical, ‘I’. Were I, e.g., to designate myself other than by using ‘I’ in attributing the relevant belief to myself, there would be no explanation of my straightening my glass. Even if I believed de re that LePore is spilling beer, this still does not account for why I lift my glass. For I might not know I am LePore. On the basis of such data, some philosophers infer that de se attributions are irreducible to de re or de dicto attributions.  Internal-external distinction – de re -- externalism, the view that there are objective reasons for action that are not dependent on the agent’s desires, and in that sense external to the agent. Internalism about reasons is the view that reasons for action must be internal in the sense that they are grounded in motivational facts about the agent, e.g. her desires and goals. Classic internalists such as Hume deny that there are objective reasons for action. For instance, whether the fact that an action would promote health is a reason to do it depends on whether one has a desire to be healthy. It may be a reason for some and not for others. The doctrine is hence a version of relativism; a fact is a reason only insofar as it is so connected to an agent’s psychological states that it can motivate the agent. By contrast, externalists hold that not all reasons depend on the internal states of particular agents. Thus an externalist could hold that promoting health is objectively good and that the fact that an action would promote one’s health is a reason to perform it regardless of whether one desires health. This dispute is closely tied to the debate over motivational internalism, which may be conceived as the view that moral beliefs for instance are, by virtue of entailing motivation, internal reasons for action. Those who reject motivational internalism must either deny that expressive completeness externalism 300   300 sound moral beliefs always provide reasons for action or hold that they provide external reasons. 

Derridaian implicaturum -- J., philosopher, author of deconstructionism, and leading figure in the postmodern movement. Postmodern thought seeks to move beyond modernism by revealing inconsistencies or aporias within the Western European tradition from Descartes to the present. These aporias are largely associated with onto-theology, a term coined by Heidegger to characterize a manner of thinking about being and truth that ultimately grounds itself in a conception of divinity. Deconstruction is the methodology of revelation: it typically involves seeking out binary oppositions defined interdependently by mutual exclusion, such as good and evil or true and false, which function as founding terms for modern thought. The ontotheological metaphysics underlying modernism is a metaphysics of presence: to be is to be present, finally to be absolutely present to the absolute, that is, to the divinity whose own being is conceived as presence to itself, as the coincidence of being and knowing in the Being that knows all things and knows itself as the reason for the being of all that is. Divinity thus functions as the measure of truth. The aporia here, revealed by deconstruction, is that this modernist measure of truth cannot meet its own measure: the coincidence of what is and what is known is an impossibility for finite intellects. Major influences on Derrida include Hegel, Freud, Heidegger, Sartre, Saussure, and structuralist thinkers such as Lévi-Strauss, but it was his early critique of Husserl, in Introduction à “L’Origine de la géometrie” de Husserl 2, that gained him recognition as a critic of the phenomenological tradition and set the conceptual framework for his later work. Derrida sought to demonstrate that the origin of geometry, conceived by Husserl as the guiding paradigm for Western thought, was a supratemporal ideal of perfect knowing that serves as the goal of human knowledge. Thus the origin of geometry is inseparable from its end or telos, a thought that Derrida later generalizes in his deconstruction of the notion of origin as such. He argues that this ideal cannot be realized in time, hence cannot be grounded in lived experience, hence cannot meet the “principle of principles” Husserl designated as the prime criterion for phenomenology, the principle that all knowing must ground itself in consciousness of an object that is coincidentally conscious of itself. This revelation of the aporia at the core of phenomenology in particular and Western thought in general was not yet labeled as a deconstruction, but it established the formal structure that guided Derrida’s later deconstructive revelations of the metaphysics of presence underlying the modernism in which Western thought culminates. Griceians were amused by the bit of a scandal at The Other Place, when D. H. Mellor (of all people) opposed with a “non placet” to the honouring of Derrida. Derrida can be Griceian in a French sort of way.

descriptum: descriptivism, the thesis that the meaning of any evaluative statement is purely descriptive or factual, i.e., determined, apart from its syntactical features, entirely by its truth conditions. Nondescriptivism of which emotivism and prescriptivism are the main varieties is the view that the meaning of full-blooded evaluative statements is such that they necessarily express the speaker’s sentiments or commitments. Nonnaturalism, naturalism, and supernaturalism are descriptivist views about the nature of the properties to which the meaning rules refer. Descriptivism is related to cognitivism and moral realism.  Discussed at large by Grice just because his tutee, P. F. Strawson, showed an interst in it. theory of descriptions, an analysis, initially developed by Peano, and borrowed from (but never returned to) Peano by Russell, of sentences containing descriptions. In Peano’s view, it’s about the ‘article,’ definite (‘the’) and ‘indefinite’ (‘some (at least one).’ Descriptions include indefinite descriptions such as ‘an elephant’ and definite descriptions such as ‘the positive square root of four’. On Russell’s analysis, descriptions are “incomplete symbols” that are meaningful only in the context of other symbols, i.e., only in the context of the sentences containing them. Although the words ‘the first president of the United States’ appear to constitute a singular term that picks out a particular individual, much as the name ‘George Washington’ does, Russell held that descriptions are not referring expressions, and that they are “analyzed out” in a proper specification of the logical form of the sentences in which they occur. The grammatical form of ‘The first president of the United States is tall’ is simply misleading as to its logical form. According to Russell’s analysis of indefinite descriptions, the sentence ‘I saw a man’ asserts that there is at least one thing that is a man, and I saw that thing  symbolically, Ex Mx & Sx. The role of the apparent singular term ‘a man’ is taken over by the existential quantifier ‘Ex’ and the variables it binds, and the apparent singular term disappears on analysis. A sentence containing a definite description, such as ‘The present king of France is bald’, is taken to make three claims: that at least one thing is a present king of France, that at most one thing is a present king of France, and that that thing is bald  symbolically, Ex {[Fx & y Fy / y % x] & Bx}. Again, the apparent referring expression ‘the present king of France’ is analyzed away, with its role carried out by the quantifiers and variables in the symbolic representation of the logical form of the sentence in which it occurs. No element in that representation is a singular referring expression. Russell held that this analysis solves at least three difficult puzzles posed by descriptions. The first is how it could be true that George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverly, but false that George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott. Since Scott is the author of Waverly, we should apparently be able to substitute ‘Scott’ for ‘the author of Waverly’ and infer the second sentence from the first, but we cannot. On Russell’s analysis, ‘George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverly’ does not, when properly understood, contain an expression ‘the author of Waverly’ for which the name ‘Scott’ can be substituted. The second puzzle concerns the law of excluded middle, which rules that either ‘The present king of France is bald’ or ‘The present king of France is not bald’ must be true; the problem is that neither the list of bald men nor that of non-bald men contains an entry for the present king of France. Russell’s solution is that ‘The present king of France is not bald’ is indeed true if it is understood as ‘It is not the case that there is exactly one thing that is now King of France and is bald’, i.e., as -Ex {Fx & y {[Fy / y % x] & Bx}. The final puzzle is how ‘There is no present king of France’ or ‘The present king of France does not exist’ can be true  if ‘the present king of France’ is a referring expression that picks out something, how can we truly deny that that thing exists? Since descriptions are not referring expressions on Russell’s theory, it is easy for him to show that the negation of the claim that there is at least and at most i.e., exactly one present king of France, -Ex [Fx & y Fy / y % x], is true. Strawson offered the first real challenge to Russell’s theory, arguing that ‘The present king of France is bald’ does not entail but instead presupposes ‘There is a present king of France’, so that the former is not falsified by the falsity of the latter, but is instead deprived of a truth-value. Strawson argued for the natural view that definite descriptions are indeed referring expressions, used to single something out for predication. More recently, Keith Donnellan argued that both Russell and Strawson ignored the fact that definite descriptions have two uses. Used attributively, a definite description is intended to say something about whatever it is true of, and when a sentence is so used it conforms to Russell’s analysis. Used referentially, a definite description is intended to single something out, but may not correctly describe it. For example, seeing an inebriated man in a policeman’s uniform, one might say, “The cop on the corner is drunk!” Donnellan would say that even if the person were a drunken actor dressed as a policeman, the speaker would have referred to him and truly said of him that he was drunk. If it is for some reason crucial that the description be correct, as it might be if one said, “The cop on the corner has the authority to issue speeding tickets,” the use is attributive; and because ‘the cop on the corner’ does not describe anyone correctly, no one has been said to have the authority to issue speeding tickets. Donnellan criticized Russell for overlooking referential uses of theory of descriptions theory of descriptions 914   914 descriptions, and Strawson for both failing to acknowledge attributive uses and maintaining that with referential uses one can refer to something with a definite description only if the description is true of it. Discussion of Strawson’s and Donnellan’s criticisms is ongoing, and has provoked very useful work in both semantics and speech act theory, and on the distinctions between semantics and pragmatics and between semantic reference and speaker’s reference, among others.  .

de sensu implicaturum: vide casus obliquus. The casus rectus/casus obliquus distinction. Peter Abelard, Kneale, Grice, Aristotle. Aquinas. de sensu implicaturum. Ariskantian quessertions on de sensu implicate. “My sometimes mischievous friend Richard Grandy once said, in connection with some other occasion on which I was talking, that to represent my remarks, it would be necessary to introduce a new form of speech act, or a new operator, which was to be called the operator of quessertion. It is to be read as “It is perhaps possible that someone might assert that . . .” and is to be symbolized “?├”; possibly it might even be iterable […]. Everything I shall suggest here is highly quessertable.” Grice 1989:297. If Grice had one thing, he had linguistic creativity. Witness his ‘implicaturum,’ and his ‘implicaturum,’ not to mention his ‘pirotologia.’Sometime, somewhere, in the history of philosophy, a need was felt by some Griceian philosopher, surely, for numbering intentions. The verb, denoting the activity, out of which this ‘intention’ sprang was Latin ‘intendere,’ and somewhere, sometime, the need was felt to keep the Latinate /t/ sound, and sometimes to make it sibilate, /s/.  The source of it all seems to be Aristotle in Soph. Elen., 166a24–166a30, which was rendered twice om Grecian to Latin. In the second Latinisation, ‘de sensu’ comes into view. Abelard proposes to use ‘de rebus,’ or ‘de re,’ for what the previous translation had as ‘per divisionem.’ To make the distinction, he also proposes to use ‘de sensu’ for what the previous translation has as ‘per compositionem,’ and ‘per conjunctionem.’ But what did either mean? It was a subtle question, indeed. And trust Nicolai Hartmann, in his mediaevalist revival, to add numbers and a further distinction, now the ‘recte/’oblique’ distinction, and ‘intentio’ being ‘prima,’ ‘seconda,’ ‘tertia,’ and so on, ad infinitum. The proposal is clear. We need a way to conceptualise first-order propositions. But we also need to conceptualise ‘that’-clauses. The ‘that’-clause subordination is indeed open-ended. ‘mean.’ Grice’s motivation in the presentation at the Oxford Philosophical Society is to offer, as he calls it, a ‘proposal.’ In his words, notice the emphasis on the Latinate ‘intend,’ – where it occurs, as applied to an emissor, and as having as content, following that ‘that’-clause, an ‘intensional’ verb like ‘believe,’ which again, involves an ‘intentio tertia,’ now referring to a state back in the emissor expressed by yet another intensional verb – all long for, ‘you communicate that p if you want your addressee to realise that you hold this or that propositional attitude with content p.’ "A meantNN something by x" is (roughly) equivalent to "A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention"; and we may add that to ask what A meant is to ask for a specification of the intended effect (though, of course, it may not always be possible to get a straight answer involving a "that" clause, for example, "a belief that . . ."). (Grice 1989: 220).  Grice’s motivation is to ‘reduce’ “mean” to what has come to be known in the Griceian [sic] literature as a ‘Griceian’ [sic] ‘reflexive’ intention – he prefers M-intention -- which we will read as involving an intentio seconda, and indeed intentio tertia, and beyond, which makes its appearance explicitly in the second clause -- or ‘prong,’ as he’d prefer -- of his ‘reductive’ analysis. Prong 1 then corresponds to the intention prima or intention recta: Utterer U intends₁ that Addressee A believes that Utterer U holds psychological state or attitude ψ with content “p.”  Prong 2 corresponds to the intentio seconda or intentio obliqua: Utterer U intends₂ that Addressee A believes (i) on the ‘rational,’ and not just ‘causal,’ basis of (ii), i.e. of the addressee A’s recognition of the utterer U’s intentio seconda or intentio obliqua i₂, that Addressee A comes to believe that Utterer U holds psychological state or attitude ψ with content “p.” In Grice’s wording, “i₂” acts as a ‘reason,’ and not merely a ‘cause’ for Addressee A’s coming to believe that U holds psychological state or attitude ψ with content “p”. Kemmerling has used “↝” to represent this ‘reason’ (i₁ ↝ i₂, Kemmerling in Grandy/Warner, 1986, cf. Petrus in Petrus 2010). Prong 3 is a closure prong, now involving a self-reflective third-order intention, there is no ‘covert’ higher-order intention involved in (i)-(iii). Meaning-constitutive intentions in utterer u’s meaning that p should be out there ‘in the open,’ or ‘above board,’ to count as having been ‘communicated.Grice quotes only one author in ‘Meaning’: C. L. Stevenson, who started his career with a degree in English from Yale. Willing to allow a ‘metabolical’ use of ‘mean’ he recognises, he scare quotes it: “There is a sense, to be sure, in which a groan “means“ something, just a reduced temperature may at times ”mean” convalescence.” Stevenson 1944:38). This remark will have Grice later attempting an ‘evolutionary’ model of how an ‘x’ causing ‘y’ may proceed from ‘natural’ to less natural ones. Consider ‘is in pain.’ A creature is physically hurt, and the expression of pain comes up naturally as an effect. But if the creature attains rational control over his expressive behaviour, and the creature is in pain (or expects his addressee A to think that he is in pain), U can now imitate or replicate, in a something like a Peirceian iconic mode, the natural behaviour manifested by a spontaneous response to a hurtful stimulus. The ‘simulated’ pain will be an ‘icon’ of the natural pain. Grice is getting Peirceian by the day, and he is not telling us! There are, Grice says, as if to simplify Peirce the most he can, two modes of representation. The primary one is now the explicitly Peirceian iconic one. The ‘risus naturaliter significat interiorem laetitiam’ of Occam. And then, there’s the derivative *non*-iconic representation, in that order. The first is, shall we say, ‘natural,’ and beyond the utterer U’s voluntary control (cf. Darwin on the expression of emotions in man and animals); the second is not. Grice is allowing for smoke representing fire, or if one must, alla Stevenson, ‘representing’ it. In Grice’s motivation to along the right lines, his psychologist austere views of his 1948 ‘Meaning,’ when he rather artificially disjoins a ‘natural’ “mean” and an ‘artificial’ “mean,” when merely different ‘uses’ stand for what he then thought were senses, he wants now to re-introduce into philosophical discourse the iconic natural representation or meaning that he had left aside.If this is part of what he calls a ‘myth,’ even if an evolutionary one, to account for the emergence of ‘systems of communication,’ it does starts with an utterer U expressing (very much alla Croce or Marty) a psychological state or attitude ψ by displaying some behavioural pattern in an unintentional way. Grice is being Wittgensteinian here, and quotes almost verbatim from Anscombe’s rendition, “No psychological concept except when backed in behaviour that manifests it.”  If Ockham notes that “Risus naturaliter significat interiorem laetitiam,” Grice shows this will allow to avoid, also alla Ockham, a polysemy to ‘mean.’In Grice’s three clauses in his 1948 conceptual analysis of ‘meaning’ – the first clause of exhibitiveness, the second clause of intentio seconda or reflexivity, and the third clause of communicative overtness, voluntary control on the part of the utterer U is already in order. Since the utterer’s addressee A is intended to recognise this, no longer is it required any prior ‘iconic’ association between a simulated behaviour and the behaviour naturally displayed as a response to a stimulus. This amounts, for Grice to deeming the system of expression as having become a full system now of intention-based ‘communication.’‘know’’ Intentio seconda or intentio obliqua comes up nicely when Grice delivers the third William James Lecture, later reprinted as “Further notes on logic and conversation.” There, Grice targets one type of anti-Gettier scenario for the use of a factive psychological state or attitude expressed by a verb like “know,” again followed by a “that”-clause. Grice is criticisign Austin’s hasty attempt to analyse ‘know’ in terms of the ‘performatory’ ‘guarantee.’ As Grice puts it in “Prolegomena,” “to say ‘I know’ is to give a guarantee.” (Grice 1989:9) which can be traced back to Austin, although since, as Grice witnessed it, Austin ‘all too frequently ignored’ the real of emissor’s communicatum, one is never sure.  In any case, Grice wants to overcome this ‘performatory’ fallacy, and he expands on the ‘suspect’ example of the Prolegomena in the Third lecture. Grice’s troubles with ‘know’ were long-dated. In Causal Theory he lists as the third philosophical mistake, “What is known by me to be the case is not also believed by me to be the case.” (1989: 237). Uncredited, but he may be having in mind Ryle’s odd characterisations with terms such as ‘occurrence,’ ‘episode,’ and so on.  In the section on ‘stress,’ Grice asks us to assume that Grice knows that p. The question is whether this claim commits the philosopher to the further clause, ‘Grice knows that Grice knows that p, and so on, … to use the scholastic term we started this with, ad infinitum. It is not that Grice is adverse to a regressive analysis per se. This is, in effect, with what the third clause or prong in his analysis of ‘meaning’ does – ‘let all meaning-constitutive intentions be overt, including this one.  Indeed, when it comes to meaning or knowing, we are talking optimal, we are talking ‘virtue.’ Both ‘meaning,’ ‘communicating, ‘and ‘knowing,’ represent an ‘ideal,’ value-paradeigmatic concept – where value, a favourite with Hartmann, appears under the guise of a noumenon in the topos ouranos that only realises imperfectly in the sub-lunary world. In the third William James lecture Grice cursorily dismisses these demanding or restrictive anti-Gettier scenarios as too stipulatory for the colloquial, ordinary, use – and thus ‘sense’ -- of ‘know.’ The approach Gettier is cricising ends up being too convoluted, seeing that conversationalists tend to make a rather loose use of the verb. Grice’s example illustrates linguistic botanising. So we have Grice bringing the examinee who does know that the battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815, with hardly conclusive evidence, or any ‘de sensu’ knowledge that the evidence (which he does not have) is conclusive. Grice grants that, in a specially emphatic utterance of ‘know,’ there might be a cancellable implicaturum to the effect that the knower does have conclusive evidence for what he alleges to know. Grice’s explicit reference to this ‘regressive nature’ (p. 59) touches on the topic of intention de sensu. Grice is contesting the strong view, as represented, according to Gettier, by philosophers ranging from Plato’s Thaetetus to Ayer’s Problem of Empirical Knowledge (indeed the only two loci Gettier cares to cite in his short essay) that a claim, “Grice knows that p” entails a claim to the effect that there is conclusive evidence for p, and which gives Grice a feeling of subjective certainty, and that Grice knows that there is such conclusive evidence, and so on, ad infinitum. Grice casts doubts on the intentio de sensu as applied to the colloquial or ‘ordinary’ uses of ‘know’. If I know that p, must I know that I know that p?  Having just introduced his “Modified Occam’s Razor” – ‘Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity’ --, Grice doesn’t think so. At this point, however, he adds a characteristic bracket: “(cf. causal theory).” With that bracket, Grice is allowing that the denotatum of “p,” qua content of U’s psychological state or attitude of ‘knowing,’ the state-of-affairs itself, as we may put it, should play something like a causal role in U’s knowing that p. Grice is open-minded as to what type of link or connection that is. It need not be strictly causal. He is merely suggesting the open-endness of ‘know in terms of these “further conditions” as to how Grice ‘comes’ to know that p, and refers to the ‘causal theory,’ as later developed by philosophers like E. F. Dretske and others. As a linguistic botanist, Grice is well aware that ‘know,’ like ‘see,’ is what the Kiparskys (whom Grice refers to) call a ‘factive.’An ascription of “Grice knows that p,” or, indeed, “Grice sees that p,” (unless Grice hallucinates) entails “p.” The defeating ‘hallucination’ scenario is key. It involves what Grice calls a dis-implicaturum. The utterer is using ‘know’ or‘see’ in a loose way (and meaning less, rather than more than he explicitly conveys. Note incidentally, as Grice later noted in later seminars, how his analysis proves the philosopher’s adage wrong. Surely what is known by me to be the case is believed by me to be the case. Any divergence to the contrary is a matter of ‘implicatural’ stress – by which he means supra-segmentation.‘want’Soon after his delivering the William James lectures, Grice got involved in a project concerning an evaluation of Quine’s programme, where again he touches on issues of intentio seconda or intentio obliqua, and brings us back to Russell and ‘the author of Waverley.’ Grice’s presentation comes out in Words and Objections, edited by Davidson and Hintikka, a pun on Quine’s Word and Object. Grice’s contribution, ‘Vacuous Names,’ (later reprinted in part in Ostertag’s volume on Definite descriptions) concludes with an exploration of “the” phrases, and further on, with some intriguing remarks on the subtle issues surrounding the scope of an ascription of a predicate standing for a psychological state or attitude. Grice’s choice of an ascription now notably involves an ‘opaque’ (rather than ‘factive,’ like ‘know’) psychological state or attitude: ‘wanting,’ which he symbolizes as “W.” Grice considers a quartet of utterances: Jack wants someone to marry him; Jack wants someone or other to marry him; Jack wants a particular person to marry him, and There is someone whom Jack wants to marry him. Grice notes that “there are clearly at least *two* possible readings” of an utterance like our (i): a first reading “in which,” as Grice puts it, (i) might be paraphrased by (ii).” A second reading is one “in which it might be paraphrased by (iii) or by (iv).” Grice goes on to symbolize the phenomenon in his own version of a first-order predicate calculus. ‘Ja wants that p’ becomes ‘W^jap,’ where ‘ja’ stands for the individual constant “Jack” as a super-script attached to the predicate standing for Jack’s psychological state or attitude. Grice writes: “Using the apparatus of classical predicate logic, we might hope to represent,” respectively, the external reading and the internal reading (involving an intentio secunda or intentio obliqua) as ‘(Ǝx)W^jaFxja’ and ‘W^ja(Ǝx)Fxja.’ Grice then goes on to discuss a slightly more complex, or oblique, scenario involving this second internal reading, which is the one that interests us, as it involves an ‘intentio seconda.’ Grice notes: “But suppose that Jack wants a specific individual, Jill, to marry him, and this because Jack has been “*deceived* into thinking that his friend Joe has a highly delectable sister called Jill, though in fact Joe is an only child.” (The Jill Jack eventually goes up the hill with is, coincidentally, another Jill, possibly existent). Let us recall that Grice’s main focus of the whole essay is, as the title goes, ‘emptiness’! In these circumstances, one is inclined to say that (i) is true only on reading (vii),” where the existential quantifier occurs within the scope of the psychological-state or -attitude verb, “but we cannot now represent (ii) or (iii), with ‘Jill’ being vacuous, by (vi), where the existential quantifier (Ǝx) occurs outside the scope of the psychological-attitude verb, want, “since [well,] Jill does not really exist,” except as a figment of Jack’s imagination. In a manoeuver that I interpret as ‘purely intentionalist,’ and thus favouring by far Suppes’s over Chomsky’s characterisation of Grice as a mere ‘behaviourist,’ Grice hopes that “we should be provided with distinct representations for two familiar readings” of, now: Jack wants Jill to marry him; Jack wants ‘Jill’ to marry him. It is at this point that Grice applies a syntactic scope notation involving sub-scripted numerals, (ix) and (x), where the numeric values merely indicate the order of introduction of the symbol to which it is attached in a deductive schema for the predicate calculus in question. Only the first notation yields the internal de sensu reading (where ‘ji’ stands for ‘Jill’): ‘W₂^ja4F₁ji₃ja₄’ and ‘W₃^ja4F₂ji₁ja₄.’ Note that in the alternative external notation, the individual constant for “Jill,” ‘ji,’ is introduced prior to ‘want,’ – ‘ji’’s sub-script is 1, while ‘W’’s sub-script is the higher numerical value 3. If Russell could have avowed of this he would have had that the Prince Regents, by issuing the invitation, wants to confirm that ‘the author of Waverley’ isN Scott, already having confirmed that the author of Waverley =M the author of Waverley. Grice warns Quine. Given that Jill does not exist, only the internal reading “can be true,” or alethically satisfactory. Similarly, we might imagine an alternative scenario where the butler informs the Prince: ‘We are sorry to inform Your Majesty that your invitation was returned: apparently the author of Waverley does not SEEM to exist.’ Grice sums up his reflections on the representation of the opaqueness of a verb standing for a psychological state or attitude like that expressed by ‘wanting’ with one observation that further marks him as an intentionalist, almost of a Meinongian type. If he justified a loose use of ‘know,’ he is now is ready to allow for ‘existential’ phrases in cases of ‘vacuous’ designata, which however baffling, should not lead a philosopher to the wrong characterisation of the linguistic phenomena (as it led Austin with ‘know’). Provided such a descriptors occur within an opaque, intensional, de sensu, psychological-state or attitude verbs, Grice captures the nuances of ‘ordinary’ discourse, while keeping Quine happy. As Grice puts it, we should also have available to us also three neutral, yet distinct, (Ǝx)-quantificational forms (together with their isomorphs),” as a philosopher who thinks that Wittgenstein denies a distinction, craves for a generality! “Jill” now becomes “x”: ‘W₄^ja5Ǝx₃F₁x₂ja₅,’ ‘Ǝx₅W₂^ja5F₁x₄ja₃’, and ‘Ǝx₅W₃^ja4F₁x₂ja₄ .’ Since in (xii) the individual variable ‘x’ (ranging over ‘Jill’) “does not dominate the segment following the ‘(Ǝx)’ quantifier, the formulation does not display any ‘existential’ or de re, ‘force,’ and is suitable therefore for representing the internal readings (ii) or (iii), “if we have to allow, as we do have, if we want to faithfully represent ‘ordinary’ discourse, for the possibility of expressing the fact that a particular person, Jill, does not actually exist.” At least Grice does not write, “really,” for he knew that Austin detested a ‘trouser word.’ Grice concludes that (xi) and (xiii) are derivable from each of (ix) and (x), while (xii) will be “derivable only” from (ix).‘intend’By this time, Grice had been made a Fellow of the British Academy and it was about time for the delivery of the philosophical lecture that goes with it. It only took him six five years. Grice choses “Intention and uncertainty” as its topic. He was provoked by two members of his ‘playgroup’ at Oxford, Hart and Hampshire, who in an essay published in Mind, what Grice finds, again, as he did with the anti-Gettier cases of ‘know,’ as rather a too strong analysis of ‘intending.’ In his British-Academy lecture, Grice plays now with the psychological state or attitude, realised by the verbal form, ‘intend,’ when specifically followed by a ‘that’-clause, “intends that…,” as an echo of his dealing with “meaning to” as merely ‘natural.’ He calls himself a neo-Prichardian, reviving this ‘willing that’ which Urmson had popularised at Oxford, bringing to publication Prichard’s exploration of William James and his “I will that the distant chair slides over the floor towards me. It does not.”Grice’s ‘intending that…’ is notably a practical, boulemaic, or buletic, or desiderative, rather than alethic or doxastic, psychological state or attitude. It involves not just an itentum, but an intentum that involves both a desideratum AND a factum – for the ‘future indicative’ is conceptually involved. Grice claims that, if the conceptual analysis of “intending that…” is to represent ‘ordinary’ discourse, shows that it contains, as one of its prongs, in the final ‘neo-Prichardian’ version that Grice gives, also a ‘doxastic’ (rather than ‘factive’ and ‘epistemic’) psychological state or attitude, notably a belief on the part of the ‘intender’ that his willing that p has a probability greater than 0.5 to the effect that p be realised. Contra Hart and Hampshire, Grice acknowledges the investigations by the playgroup member Pears on this topic. Interestingly, a polemic arose elsewhere with Davidson, who trying to be more Griceian thatn Grice, sees this doxastic constraint as a mere cancellable implicaturum. Grice grants it may be a dis-implicaturum at most, as in loose cases of ‘know,’ or ‘see.’ Grice is adamant in regarding the doxastic component as a conceptual ‘entailment’ in the ‘ordinary’ use of ‘intend,’ unless the verb is used in a merely ‘disimplicatural,’ loose fashion. Grice’s example, ‘Jill intends to climb Everest next week,’ when the prohibitive conditions are all to evident to anyone concerned with such an utterance of (xv), perhaps Jill included, and ‘intends’ has to be read only ‘internally’ and hyperbolically. At this point, if in “Vacuous Names, he fights with Meinong while enjoying engaging in emptiness, it should be stressed that Grice gives as an illustration of a ‘disimplicaturum,’ along with a use of ‘see’ in a Shakespeareian context.  ‘See,’ like ‘know,’ or ‘mean,’ exhibit what Grice calls diaphaneity. So it’s only natural Grice turns his attention to ‘see.’ Grice’s examples are ‘Macbeth saw Banquo’ and ‘Hamlet saw his father on the ramparts of Elsinore,’ and both involve hallucination! It is worth comparing the fortune of ‘disimplicaturum’ with that of ‘implicaturum.’ Grice coins ‘to dis-implicate’ as an active verb, for a case where the utterer does NOT, as in the case of implicaturum, mean MORE than he says, but LESS. Grice’s point is a subtle one. It involves his concession on something like an explicatum, but alsoo on something like Moore’s entailment. If the ‘doxastic condition’ is entailed by “intending that…,’ an utterer U may STILL use, in an ‘ordinary’ fashion, a strong ‘intending that…’ in a scenario where it is common ground between the utterer U and his addressee A that the probability of ‘p’ being realised is lower than 0.5. The expression of the psychological state or attitude is loose, since the utterer is, as it were, dropping an ‘entailment’ that applies in a use of ‘intending that’ where that ‘common-ground’ assumption is absent. One reason may be echoic. Jill may think that she can succeed in climbing Mt. Everest; she herself has used ‘intend.’ When that information is transmitted, the strong psychological verb is kept when the doxastic constraint is no longer shared by the utterer U and his addressee A (Like an implicaturum, a disimplicaturum has to be recognised as such to count as one.  No such thing as an ‘unwanted’ disimplicaturum.‘motivate’Sometimes, it would seem that, for Grice, the English philosopher of English ‘ordinary-language’ philosophy, English is not enough! Grice would amuse at Berkeley seminars, with things like, ‘A pirot potches o as fang, or potches o and o’ as F-id,’ just to attract his addressee’s attention. The full passage, in what Grice calls, after Carnap, pirotese, reads: “A pirot can be said to potch of some obble x as fang or feng; also to cotch of x, or some obble o, as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o’ as being fid to one another.” Grice’s deciphering, with ‘pirot,” a tribute to Carnap – and Locke -- as any agent, and an ‘obble’ as an object. Grice borrows, but does not return, the ‘pirot’ from Carnap (for whom pirots karulise elatically – Carnap’s example of a syntactically well-formed formula in Introduction to Semantics). Grice uses ‘pirotese’ ‘to potch’ as a correlate for ‘perceive,’ such as the factive ‘see’ and ‘to cotch’ as a correlate for the similarly factive ‘know.’While ‘perceive’ strictly allows for a ‘that’-clause (as in Grice analysis of “I perceive that the pillar box is red” in “The causal theory of perception”), for simplificatory purposes, Grice is using ‘to potch’ as applying directly to an object, which Grice rephrases as an ‘obble.’ Since some perceptual feature or other is required in a predication of ‘perceiving’ and ‘potching,’ ‘feng’ is introduced as a perceptual predicate. And since pirots should also be allowed to perceive an ‘obble’ o in some relation with another ‘obble’ o2, Grice introduces the dyadic ‘relational’ feature ‘fid.’  Grice’s exegesis reads: “‘To potch’ is something like ‘to perceive,’ whereas ‘to cotch’ is something like ‘to think.’ ‘Feng’ and ‘fang’ are possible descriptions, much like our adjectives; ‘fid’ is a possible relation between ‘obbles.’”).  At this point, Grice has been made, trans-territorially, the President of the American Philosophical Association, and is ready to give his Presidential Address (now reprinted in his Conception of Value, for Clarendon. He chooses ‘philosophical psychology’ It’s when Grice goes on to play now with the neo-Wittgensteinian issues of incorrigibility and privileged access, that issues of intentio seconda become prominent.  For any psychological attitude ψ₁, if U holds it, U holds, as a matter of what Grice calls ‘genitorial construction,’ a meta-psychological attitude, ψ₂, a seconda intentio if ever there was one, -- Grice even uses the numeral ‘2’ -- that has, as its content followed the second ‘that’-clause, the very first psychological attitude ψ₁. The general schema being given below, with an instance of specification: ‘ψ^up ⊃ ψ^uψ^up,’ and ‘if U wills that p, U wills that U wills that p.’ The interesting bit, from the perspective of our exploration of ‘intentio seconda,’ is that, if, alla Peano, we apply this to itself, as in the anti-Gettier cases Grice discussed earlier, we end with an ad-infinitum clause. It was Judith Baker, who earned her doctorate under Grice at Berkeley who sees this clearlier than everyone (She was a regular contributor to the Kant Society in Germany). Baker’s publications are, like those of her tutor, scarce. But in a delightful contribution to the Grice festschrift, “Do one’s motives have to be pure?” (in Grandy/Warner 1986), Baker explores the crucial importance of that ad-infinitum chain of intentiones secondæ as it applies to questions of not alethic but practical value or satisfactoriness. Consider ‘ought’. Grice would say that ‘must’ is aequi-vocal, i.e. it is not that ‘must’ has an alethic ‘sense’ and a practical ‘sense.’ Only “one” must, if one must! (As Grice jokes, “Who needs ichthyological necessity?”).  Baker notes that the ad-infinitum chain may explain how ‘duty’ ‘cashes out’ in ‘interest.’ Both Grice and Baker are avowed Kantotelians. By allowing ‘duty’ to cash out in interest they are merging Aristotle’s utilitarian teleology with Kant’s deontology, and succeeding! It is possible to symbolize Grice’s and Baker’s proposal. If there is a “p” SUCH AS, at some point in the iteration of willing and intentiones secondæ, the agent is not willing to accept it, this blocks the potential Kantian universalizability of the content of a teleological attitude “p,” stripping “p” of any absolute value status that it may otherwise attain.In Grice’s reductive analysis of ‘mean,’ ‘know,’ ‘want,’ ‘intend,’ and ‘motivate,’ we witness the subtlety of his approach that is only made possible from the recognition of Aristotle’s insight back in “De Sophisticis Elenchis” to Kant’s explorations on the purity of motives. It should not surprise us. It’s Grice’s nod, no doubt, to an unjustly neglected philosopher, who should be neglected no more.ReferencesBlackburn, S. W. 1984. Spreading the words: groundings in the philosophy of language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Darwin, Charles. 1872. The expression of emotions in man and animals. London: Murray. Grandy, R. E. and R. O. Warner 1986. Philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions, categories, ends. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Grice, H. P. 1948. Meaning, The Oxford Philosophical Society. Repr. in Grice 1989. Grice, H. P. 1961. The causal theory of perception, The Aristotelian Society. Repr. in Grice 1989. Grice, H. P. 1967. Logic and Conversation, The William James lectures. Repr. in a revised 1987 form in Grice 1989. Grice, H. P. 1969. Vacuous Names, in Davidson and Hintikka, Words and objections. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. Grice, H. P. 1971. Intention and uncertainty, The British Academy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Grice, H. P. 1975. How pirots karulise elatically: some simpler ways, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Grice, H. P. 1982. Meaning Revisited, in N. V. Smith, Mutual knowledge. London: Croom Helm, repr. in Grice 1989. Grice, H.P. 1987. Retrospective epilogue, in Studies in the Way of Words. Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the way of words. London and Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Hart, H. L. A. and S. N. Hampshire 1958. Intention, decision, and certainty, Mind, 67:1-12.Kemmerling, A. M. 1986. Utterer’s meaning revisited, in Grandy/Warner 1986. Kneale, W. C. and M. Kneale. 1966. The development of logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Pecocke, C. A. B. 1989. Transcendental Arguments in the Theory of Content: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the University of Oxford on 16 May 1989. Oxford University Press. Prichard, H. A. 1968. Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest. Essays and Lectures, edited by W. D. Ross and J. O. Urmson. Oxford: Oxford University. Stevenson, C. L. 1944. Ethics and language. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Strawson, P. F. 1964 Intention and convention in speech acts, The Philosophical Review, repr. in Logico-Linguistic Papers, London, Methuen, 1971, pp. 149-169  as Blackburn puts it in his discussion of Grice in the intention-based chapter of his “Spreading the word: groundings in the philosophy of language.” Intentio seconda or obliqua bears heavily on Grice’s presentation for the Oxford Philosophical Society. The motivation behind Grice’s analysis pertains to philosophical methodology. Grice is legitimizing an ascription of ‘mean’ to a rational agent, such as … a philosopher. This very ascription Grice finds to be ‘seemingly denied by Wittgenstein’ (Grice 1986). As an exponent of what he would later and in jest dub “The Post-War Oxonian School of ‘Ordinary-Language’ Philosophy,” Grice engages in a bit of language botany, and dealing with the intricacies of ‘communicative’ uses of “mean.” Interestingly, and publicly – although a provision is in order here – Grice acknowledges emotivist Stevenson, who apparently taught Grice about ‘metabolic’ uses of “mean.” Stevenson, who read English as a minor at Yale, would not venture to apply ‘mean’ to moans! Realising it as a colloquial extension, he is allowed to use ‘mean,’ but in scare quotes only! (“Smith’s reduced temperature ‘means’ that he is is convalescent.” “There is a sense, to be sure, in which a groan “means“ something, just a reduced temperature may at times ”mean” convalescence.” Stevenson 1944:38). Close enough but no cigar. Stevenson has ‘groan,’ which at least rhymes with ‘moan.’ (As for the proviso, Grice never ‘meant’ to ‘publish’ his talk on ‘Meaning,’ but one of his tutees submitted for publication, and on acceptance, Grice allowed the publication). In “Meaning” Grice does not provide a conceptual analysis for, ‘by moaning, U means [simpliciter] that p.’ He will in his “Meaning Revisited” – the metabolical scare quotes are justified on two counts: ‘By moaning U means that p’ is legitimized on the basis of the generic ‘x ‘means’ y iff x is a consequence of y.’ But it is also justified on the basis that there is a continuum between U’s involuntarily moaning thereby meaning that he is in pain, and U’s voluntarily moaning, thereby ‘communicating’ that he is in pain. However, and more importantly for our exploration of the ‘intentum,’ Grice hastens to add that he does not agree with Stevenson’s purely ‘causal’ account. The main reason is not ‘anti-naturalistic.’ It is just that Grice sees Stevenson’s proposal as as involving a vicious circle. Typically, Grice extrapolates the relevant quote from Stevenson, slightly out of context. Grice refers to Stevenson’s appeal to "an elaborate process of conditioning attending … communication."Grice: “If we have to take seriously the second part of the qualifying phrase ("attending … communication"), Stevenson’s account of meaning is obviously circular. We might just as well say, "U means” if “U communicates,” which, though true, is not helpful. It MIGHT be helpful for Cicero translating from Grecian to Roman: ‘com-municatio’ indeed translates a Grecian turn of phrase involving ‘what is common.’ f. “con-” and root “mu-,” to bind; cf.: immunis, munus, moenia.’And the suggestion would be helpful if we say that to ‘communicate,’ or ‘mean,’ is just to bring some intentum to be allotted ‘common ground,’ because of the psi-transmission it is shared between the emissor and his intended addressee. This one hopes is both true AND ‘helpful.’ In any case, Grice’s tutee Strawson later found Grice’s elucidation of utterer’s meaning to be ‘objection-proof’ (Starwson and Wiggins, 2001) in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, of an utterer or emissor E meaning that p, by uttering ‘x,’ and appealing to primary and secondary intentionality. But is Grice’s intentionalism a sort of behaviourism? Grice denies that in “Method” calling ‘behaviourism’ ‘silly. Grice further explores intentio obliqua as it pertains to his remarks towards a general theory of “re-presentation.” The place where this excursus takes place is crucial. It is his Valediction to his compilation of essays, Studies in the Way of Words, posthumously published. At this stage, he must have felt that, what he once regarded krypto-technic in Peirce, is no more! Grice has already identified in that ‘Valediction’ many strands of his philosophical thought, and concludes his re-assessment of his ‘philosophy of language’ and semiotics with an attempt to provide some general remarks about ‘to represent’ in general, perhaps to counter the allegations of vicious circularity which his approach had received, seeing that “p” features, as a ‘gap-sign,’ as the content of both an ‘expression’ and a ‘psychological’ attitude. In trying to reconcile his austere views on “Meaning,” back in that evening at the Oxford Philosophical Society, where he distinguished two senses of ‘mean’ (“Smoke ‘means’ fire,” and ““Smoke” means ‘smoke’”). By focusing on the most general of verbs for a psychological state or attitude, ‘to represent,’ that even allows for a non-psychological reading, Grice wants to be seen as answering the challenge of an alleged vicious circle with which his intention-based approach is usually associated. The secondary-intentional non-iconic mode of representation rests on a prior iconic mode and can be understood as ‘pre-conventional,’ without any explicit recourse to the features we associate with a developed system of communication. Grice needs no ‘language of thought’ or sermo mentalis alla Ockham there. Grice allows that one can communicate fully without the need to use what more conventional philosophers call ‘a language.’ Artists do it all the time!  The passage from intentio prima to full intentio seconda is, for Grice, gradual and complex. Grice means to adhere with ‘ordinary’ discourse, in its implicatura and dis-implicaata. The passage also adhering to a functionalist approach qua ‘method in philosophical psychology,’ as he’d prefer, that needs not to postulate a full-blown ‘linguistic entity’ as the object of intentional thought. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the work of C. A. B. Peacocke, who knew Grice from his Oxford days and later joined his seminars at Berkeley, and who has developed this line of thought in a better fashion than less careful philosophers. Grice’s programme has occasionally, and justly, been compared with phenomenological approaches to expression and communication, such as Marty’s. It is hoped that the previous notes have shed some light on those aspects where this interface can further be elaborated. Even as we leave an intentio seconda to resume the discussion for a longer day. In his explorations on the embedding of intensional concepts, Grice should be inspirational to philosophers in more than one way, but especially in the one that he favoured most: the problematicity of it all. As he put it in another context, when defending absolute value. “Such a defence of absolute value is of course, bristling with unsolved or incompletely solved problems. I do not find this thought daunting. If philosophy generated no new problems it would be dead, because it would be finished; and if it recurrently regenerated the same old problems it would not be alive because it could never begin. So those who still look to philosophy for their bread-and-butter should pray that the supply of new problems never dries up.” (Grice 1991). In the Graeco-Roman tradition, philosophers started to use ‘intentio prima,’ ‘intentio secunda,’ ‘intentio tertia,’ and “… ad infinitum,” as they would put it. In post-war Oxford, English philosopher H. P. Grice felt the need. The formalist he was, he found subscribing numbers to embedded intentions has a strong appeal for him. Grice’s main motivation is in the philosophy of language, but as ancillary towards solving this or that problem concerning the ‘linguistic’ methodology of his day. To appreciate Grice’s contribution one need to abstract a little from his own historical circumstances, or rather, place them in the proper context, and connect it with the general history of philosophy. As a matter of history, ‘intentio prima,’ or ‘recta,’ as opposed to ‘obliqua,’ is part of Nicolai Hartmann’s ‘mediaeval revival,’ as a reaction to mediaevalism having made scorn by the likes of Rabelais that amused D. P. Henry. For the mediaeval philosopher, to use Grice’s symbolism, was concerned with whether a chimaera could eat ‘I₂,’ a second intention. The mediaeval philosopher’s implicaturum seems to be that a chimaera can easily eat ‘I₁.’ Such a ‘quaestio subtilissima,’ Rabelais jokes. If ‘I₁,’ or, better, for simplificatory purposes, ‘I_R­’ is a specific state, stance, or attitude of the ‘soul,’ ‘ψ₁’ or ‘ψ­_R’ directed towards its ‘de re’ ‘intentum,’ or ‘prae-sentatum,’ of the noumenon, ‘I­_O,’ ‘intentio obliqua,’ is a state, stance, or attitude of the ‘soul,’ of the same genus, ‘ψ₂,’ or ‘ψ_S’ directed towards ‘ψ­_R,’ its ‘de sensu’ ‘intentum’ now ‘re-prae-sentatum’ of the phainomenon or ob-jectum (Abelard translates Aristotle’s ‘per divisionem’ as ‘de re’ and ‘per compositionem’ and ‘per conjunctionem’ by ‘de sensu,’ and ‘per Soph. Elen., Kneale and Kneale, 1966). Grice’s intentionalism has been widely discussed, but the defense he himself makes of intensionalism (versus extensionalism) has proved inspiring, as when he assumes as an attending commentary to his reductive analysis of the state of affairs by which the emissor communicates that p, that he is putting forward “the legitimacy of [the] application of [existential generalization] to a statement the expression of which contains such [an] "intensional" verb[…] as "intend" (Grice 1989: 116 ). The expression ‘de sensu’ is due to Abelard, but Russell likes it. While serving as Prince Regent of England in 1815, George IV casually remarks his wish to meet ‘the author of Waverley’ in the flesh. The Prince was being funny, you see. The prince would not know this, but when his press becomes embroiled in pecuniary difficulties, Scotts set out to write a cash-cow. The result is Waverley, a novel which did not name its author. It is a tale of the last Jacobite rebellion in England, the “Forty-Five.” The novel meets with considerable success. The next year, Scott. There follows a sequel, the same general vein.  Mindful of his reputation, Scotts maintains the anonymous habit he displays with Waverley, and publishes the sequel under “the Author of Waverley.” The identity “Author of Waverley” = “Scott” is widely rumoured, and Scott is  given the honour of dining with George, Prince Regent, who had wished to meet “Author of Waverley” in the flesh for a ‘snug little dinner’ at Carleton, on hearing ‘the author of Waverley’ was in town. The use of a descriptor may lead to the implicaturum that His Majesty is p’rhaps not sure that ‘the author of Waverley’ has a name, and is_R Scott. Lack of certainty is one thing, yet, to quote from Russell, “an interest in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first gentleman of Europe.” Grice admired Russell profusely and one of his essays is wittily entitled, “Definite descriptions in Russell and in the Vernacular,” so his explorations of ‘intentio’ ‘de sensu’ have an intrinsic interest.  Keywords: H. Paul Grice, intentio seconda, implicaturum, intentionalism, intentum, intentum de sensu, ‘that’-clause, the recte-oblique distinction. Grice explored issues of intentum de sensu in various areas. First, ‘meaning.’ Second, ‘knowing.’ Third, ‘wanting.’ Fourth, ‘intending,’ Fifth, pirots, with incorrigibility and privileged access. Sixth, morality and the regressus. Seventh, the continuum and the unity. With Grice, it all starts, roughly, when Grice comes up with a topic for a talk at The Oxford Philosophical Society.The Society is holding one of those meetings, and Grice thinks of presenting a few conclusions he had reached at his seminars on C. S. Peirce.What’s the good of an Oxford don of keeping tidy lecture notes if you will not be able to lecture to a philosophical addressee? Peirce is the philosopher on whom Grice choses to lecture. In part, for “not being particularly popular on these shores,” and in part because Grice noted the ‘heretic’ in Peirce with which he could identify.Granted, at this stage, Grice disliked the un-Englishness of some of Peirce’s over-Latinate jargon, what Grice finds the ‘krypto-technic.’ ‘Sign,’ ‘symbol,’ ‘icon,’ and the rest of them!Instead, Grice thinks, initially for the sake of his tutees and students – he was university lecturer -- sticking with the simpler, ‘ordinary’, short English lexeme ‘mean.’A. M. Kemmerling, of all people, who wrote the obituary for Grice for Synthese, has precisely cast doubts on the ‘universal’ validity of Grice’s proposed conceptual reductive analysis, notably in his Ph.D dissertation on ‘Meinen.’  Note the irony in Kemmerling’s title: Was Grice mit "Meinen" meint - Eine Rekonstruktion der Griceschen Analyse rationaler Kommunikation.” Nothing jocular in the subtitle, for this indeed is a reconstruction of ‘rational’ communication. The funny bit is in “Was mit “Meinen” Grice meint”! In that very phrase, which is rhetorical, and allows for an answer, because ‘meinen’ is both mentioned and used, Kemmerling allows that he is ‘buying’ Grice’s idea that his reductive analysis of ‘mean’ applies to German ‘meinen.’ Kemmerling is also pointing to the ‘primacy’ (to use Suppes’s phrase) of ‘utterer’s’ or ‘emissor’s “communicatum” or ‘Meinung.” Kemmerling advertises his interest in exploring on what _Grice_ means – by uttering ‘meinen,’ almost! As Kemmerling notes, German ‘meinen,’ cognate via common Germanic with English ‘mean,’ (cf. Frisian ‘mein,’ – and Hazzlitt, “Bread, butter, and green cheese, very good English, very good cheese”) is none other than ‘mean’ that Grice means. And ‘Grice means’ is the only literal, i. e. non-metabolic use of the verb Grice allows – as applied to a rational agent, which features in the subtitle to Kemmerling’s dissertation. Thus one reads in Kluge, “Etymologische Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, 1881, of “meinen,” rendered by J. F. Davis as ‘to think, opine, mean,’ from a MHG used to indicate, in Davis’s rendition, ‘to direct one's thoughts to, have in view, aim at, be affected towards a person, love,’ OHG meinen, meinan, ‘to mean, think, say, declare.’ = OS mênian, Du. meenen, OE mœ̂nan, E mean (to this Anglo-Saxon mœ̂nan, cf. prob. moan – I know your meaning from your moaning), all from WGmc. meinen, mainjan, ‘mênjan,’ and cognate with ‘man,’ ‘to think’ (cf. ‘mahnen,’ ‘Mann,’ and ‘Minne’). Kemmerling is very apropos, because Grice engaged in philosophical discussion with him, as testified by his perceptive contribution to P. G. R. I. C. E. (Kemmerling, 1986). On top, in his presentation for the Oxford Philosophical Society, Grice wants to restrict the philosophical interest to ‘de sensu,’ the ‘that’-clause (cf. the recte-oblique distinction), viz. not just ‘what Grice means,’ if this is going to be expaned as ‘something wonderful.’ Not enough for Grice. It has to be expanded, for the thing to have philosophical interest into a ‘propositional clause,’, an ‘intensional’ context, i. e., ‘Grice means that…’ Grice cavalierly dismisses other use of ‘mean,’ – notably the ubiquitous, ‘mean to…’ – He will later explain his reason for this. It was after William James provoked Prichard. For William James uttered: “I will that the distant table slides on the floor toward me. It doesn’t’. Prichard turns this into the conceptual priority of ‘will that…’ for which Grice gives him the credit he deserved at a later lecture now on his being appointed a Fellow of The British Academy (Grice, 1971).  Strictly, what Grice does in the Oxford Philosophical Socieety presentation is to distinguish between various ‘mean’ and end up focusing on ‘mean’ as followed by a ‘that’-clause. In the typical Oxonian fashion, that Grice borrows (but never returns) from J. C. Wilson, Grice has the I_O as ‘meaning that so-and-so’ (Grice, 1989: 217). Grice explicitly displays the primacy of a reductive analysis of the conceptual circumstances involving an emissor (Anglo-Saxon ‘utterer’) who ‘means’ that p. It will be a longer ‘shaggy-dog’ story Grice tells when he crosses the divide from ‘propositional’ (p) to ‘predicative’ ascriptions (“By uttering ‘Fido is shaggy,’ Grice means that the dog is hairy-coated (Grice 1989). Grice notes that ‘metabolically,’ “mean,” at least in English, can be applied to various other things, sometimes even involving a ‘that’-clause. “By delivering his budget, the major means that we will have a hard year.’ Grice finds that ‘but we won’t’ turns him into a self-contradicter. In Grice’s usage, ‘x ‘means’ y’ iff ‘y is a consequence [consequentia] of x’ --. Quite a departure from Old Frisian. If Hume’s objection to the use of the verb ‘cause,’ is that it covers animistic beliefs (“Charles I’s decapitation willed his death”), English allows for disimplicated or loose ‘metabolic’ uses of ‘will’ (“It ‘will’ rain”) and ‘mean’ (Grice’s moaning means that he is in pain). 

desideratum: Qua volition, a mental event involved with the initiation of action. ‘To will’ is sometimes taken to be the corresponding verb form of ‘volition’. The concept of volition is rooted in modern philosophy; contemporary philosophers have transformed it by identifying volitions with ordinary mental events, such as intentions, or beliefs plus desires. Volitions, especially in contemporary guises, are often taken to be complex mental events consisting of cognitive, affective, and conative elements. The conative element is the impetus – the underlying motivation – for the action. A velleity is a conative element insufficient by itself to initiate action. The will is a faculty, or set of abilities, that yields the mental events involved in initiating action. There are three primary theories about the role of volitions in action. The first is a reductive account in which action is identified with the entire causal sequence of the mental event (the volition) causing the bodily behavior. J. S. Mill, for example, says: “Now what is action? Not one thing, but a series of two things: the state of mind called a volition, followed by an effect. . . . [T]he two together constitute the action” (Logic). Mary’s raising her arm is Mary’s mental state causing her arm to rise. Neither Mary’s volitional state nor her arm’s rising are themselves actions; rather, the entire causal sequence (the “causing”) is the action. The primary difficulty for this account is maintaining its reductive status. There is no way to delineate volition and the resultant bodily behavior without referring to action. There are two non-reductive accounts, one that identifies the action with the initiating volition and another that identifies the action with the effect of the volition. In the former, a volition is the action, and bodily movements are mere causal consequences. Berkeley advocates this view: “The Mind . . . is to be accounted active in . . . so far forth as volition is included. . . . In plucking this flower I am active, because I do it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition” (Three Dialogues). In this century, Prichard is associated with this theory: “to act is really to will something” (Moral Obligation, 1949), where willing is sui generis (though at other places Prichard equates willing with the action of mentally setting oneself to do something). In this sense, a volition is an act of will. This account has come under attack by Ryle (Concept of Mind, 1949). Ryle argues that it leads to a vicious regress, in that to will to do something, one must will to will to do it, and so on. It has been countered that the regress collapses; there is nothing beyond willing that one must do in order to will. Another criticism of Ryle’s, which is more telling, is that ‘volition’ is an obscurantic term of art; “[volition] is an artificial concept. We have to study certain specialist theories in order to find out how it is to be manipulated. . . . [It is like] ‘phlogiston’ and ‘animal spirits’ . . . [which] have now no utility” (Concept of Mind). Another approach, the causal theory of action, identifies an action with the causal consequences of volition. Locke, e.g., says: “Volition or willing is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. . . . [V]olition is nothing but that particular determination of the mind, whereby . . . the mind endeavors to give rise, continuation, or stop, to any action which it takes to be in its power” (Essay concerning Human Understanding). This is a functional account, since an event is an action in virtue of its causal role. Mary’s arm rising is Mary’s action of raising her arm in virtue of being caused by her willing to raise it. If her arm’s rising had been caused by a nervous twitch, it would not be action, even if the bodily movements were photographically the same. In response to Ryle’s charge of obscurantism, contemporary causal theorists tend to identify volitions with ordinary mental events. For example, Davidson takes the cause of actions to be beliefs plus desires and Wilfrid Sellars takes volitions to be intentions to do something here and now. Despite its plausibility, however, the causal theory faces two difficult problems: the first is purported counterexamples based on wayward causal chains connecting the antecedent mental event and the bodily movements; the second is provision of an enlightening account of these mental events, e.g. intending, that does justice to the conative element. See also ACTION THEORY, FREE WILL PROBLEM, PRACTICAL REASONING, WAYWARD CAUSAL CHAIN. M.B. volition volition. Grice makes a double use of this. It should be thus two entries. There’s the conversational desideratum, where a desideratum is like a maxim or an imperative – and then there are two specific desiderata: the desideratum of conversational clarity, and the desideratum of conversational candour. Grice was never sure what adjective to use for the ‘desiderative.’ He liked buletic. He liked desideratum because it has the co-relate ‘consideratum,’ for belief.  He uses ‘deriderative’ and a few more! Of course what he means is a sub-psychological modality, or rather a ‘soul.’ So he would apply it ‘primarily’ to the soul, as Plato and Aristotle does. The ‘psyche’, or ‘anima’ is what is ‘desiderativa.’ The Grecians are pretty confused about this (but ‘boulemaic’ and ‘buletic’ are used), and the Romans didn’t help. Grice is concerned with a rational-desiderative, that takes a “that”-clause (or oratio obliqua), and qua constructivist, he is also concerned with a pre-rational desiderative (he has an essay on “Needs and Wants,” and his detailed example in “Method” is a squarrel (sic) who needs a nut. On top, while Grice suggest s that it goes both ways: the doxastic can be given a reductive analaysis in terms of the buletic, and the buletic in terms of the doxastic, he only cares to provide the former. Basically, an agent judges that p, if his willing that p correlates to a state of affairs that satisfies his desires. Since he does not provide a reductive analysis for Prichard’s willing-that, one is left wondering. Grice’s position is that ‘willing that…’ attains its ‘sense’ via the specification, as a theoretical concept, in some law in the folk-science that agents use to explain their behaviour. Grice gets subtler when he deals with mode-markers for the desiderative: for these are either utterer-oriented, or addressee-oriented, and they may involve a buletic attitude itself, or a doxastic attitude. When utterer-addressed, utterer wills that utterer wills that p. There is no closure here, and indeed, a regressus ad infinitum is what Grice wants, since this regressus allows him to get univeersabilisability, in terms of conceptual, formal, and applicational kinds of generality. In this he is being Kantian, and Hareian. While Grice praises Kantotle, Aristotle here would stay unashamedly ‘teleological,’ and giving priority to a will that may not be universalisable, since it’s the communitarian ‘good’ that matters. what does Grice have to say about our conversational practice? L and S have “πρᾶξις,” from “πράσσω,” and which they render as ‘moral action,’ oποίησις, τέχνη;” “oποιότης,” “ἤθη καὶ πάθη καὶ π.,” “oοἱ πολιτικοὶ λόγοι;” “ἔργῳ καὶ πράξεσιν, οὐχὶ λόγοις” Id.6.3; ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι ὄντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα, “exhibited in actual life,” action in drama, “oλόγος; “μία π. ὅλη καὶ τελεία.” With practical Grice means buletic. Praxis involves acting, and surely Grice presupposes acting. By uttering, i. e. by the act of uttering, expression x, U m-intends that p. Grice occasionally refers to action and behaviour as the thing which an ascription of a psychological state explains. Grice prefers the idiom of soul. Theres the ratiocinative soul. Within the ratiocinative, theres the executive soul and the merely administrative soul. Cicero had to translate Aristotle into prudentia, every time Aristotle talked of phronesis. Grice was aware that the terminology by Kant can be confusing. Kant used ‘pure’ reason for reason in the doxastic realm. The critique by Kant of practical reason is hardly symmetrical to his critique of doxastic reason. Grice, with his æqui-vocality thesis of must (must crosses the buletic-boulomaic/doxastic divide), Grice is being more of a symmetricalist. The buletic, boulomaic, or volitive, is a part of the soul, as is the doxatic or judicative. And judicative is a trick because there is such a thing as a value judgement, or an evaluative judgement, which is hardly doxastic. Grice plays with two co-relative operators: desirability versus probability. Grice invokes the exhibitive/protreptic distinction he had introduced in the fifth James lecture, now applied to psychological attitudes themselves. This Grice’s attempt is to tackle the Kantian problem in the Grundlegung: how to derive the categorical imperative from a counsel of prudence. Under the assumption that the protasis is Let the agent be happy, Grice does not find it obtuse at all to construct a universalisable imperative out of a mere motive-based counsel of prudence. Grice has an earlier paper on pleasure which relates. The derivation involves seven steps. Grice proposes seven steps in the derivation. 1. It is a fundamental law of psychology that, ceteris paribus, for any creature R, for any P and Q, if R wills P Λ judges if P, P as a result of Q, R wills Q. 2. Place this law within the scope of a "willing" operator: R wills for any P Λ Q, if R wills P Λ judges that if P, P as a result of Q, R wills Q. 3. wills turns to should. If rational, R will have to block unsatisfactory (literally) attitudes. R should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory to will that P Λ it is satisfactory to judge that if P, P as a result of Q, it is sastisfactory to will that Q. 4. Marking the mode: R should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory that !P Λ that if it .P, .P only as a result of Q, it is satisfactory that !Q. 5. via (p & q -> r) -> (p -> (q -> r)): R should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory that if .P, .P only because Q, i is satisfactory that, if let it be that P, let it be that Q. 6. R should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if P, P only because p yields if let it be that P, let it be that Q. 7. For any P Λ Q if P, P only because Q yields if let it be that P, let it be that Q. Grice was well aware that a philosopher, at Oxford, needs to be a philosophical psychologist. So, wanting and needing have to be related to willing. A plant needs water. A floor needs sweeping. So need is too broad. So is want, a non-Anglo-Saxon root for God knows what. With willing things get closer to the rational soul. There is willing in the animal soul. But when it comes to rational willing, there must be, to echo Pritchard, a conjecture, some doxastic element. You cannot will to fly, or will that the distant chair slides over the floor toward you. So not all wants and needs are rational willings, but then nobody said they would. Grice is interested in emotion in his power structure of the soul. A need and a want may count as an emotion. Grice was never too interested in needing and wanting because they do not take a that-clause. He congratulates Urmson for having introduced him to the brilliant willing that … by Prichard. Why is it, Grice wonders, that many ascriptions of buletic states take to-clause, rather than a that-clause? Even mean, as ‘intend.’ In this Grice is quite different from Austin, who avoids the that-clause. The explanation by Austin is very obscure, like those of all grammars on the that’-clause, the ‘that’ of ‘oratio obliqua’ is not in every way similar to the ‘that’-clause in an explicit performative formula. Here the utterer is not reporting his own ‘oratio’ in the first person singular present indicative active. Incidentally, of course, it is not in the least necessary that an explicit performative verb should be followed by a ‘that’-clause. In important classes of cases it is followed by ‘to . . .,’ or by or nothing, e. g. ‘I apologize for…,’ ‘I salute you.’ Now many of these verbs appear to be quite satisfactory pure performatives. Irritating though it is to have them as such, linked with clauses that look like statements, true or false, e. g., when I say ‘I prophesy that …,’ ‘I concede that …’,  ‘I postulate that …,’ the clause following normally looks just like a statement, but the verb itself seems to be  pure performatives. One may distinguish the performative opening part, ‘I state that …,’ which makes clear how the utterance is to be taken, that it is a statement, as distinct from a prediction, etc.), from the bit in the that-clause which is required to be true or false. However, there are many cases which, as language stands at present, we are not able to split into two parts in this way, even though the utterance seems to have a sort of explicit performative in it. Thus, ‘I liken x to y,’ or ‘I analyse x as y.’ Here we both do the likening and assert that there is a likeness by means of one compendious phrase of at least a quasi-performative character. Just to spur us on our way, we may also mention ‘I know that …’, ‘I believe that …’, etc. How complicated are these examples? We cannot assume that they are purely descriptive, which has Grice talking of the pseudo-descriptive. Want etymologically means absence; need should be preferred. The squarrel (squirrel) Toby needs intake of nuts, and youll soon see gobbling them! There is not much philosophical bibliography on these two psychological states Grice is analysing. Their logic is interesting. Smith wants to play cricket. Smith needs to play cricket.  Grice is concerned with the propositional content attached to the want and need predicate. Wants that sounds harsh; so does need that. Still, there are propositional attached to the pair above. Smith plays cricket. Grice took a very cavalier attitude to what linguists spend their lives analysing. He thought it was surely not the job of the philosopher, especially from a prestigious university such as Oxford, to deal with the arbitrariness of grammatical knots attached to this or that English verb. He rarely used English, but stuck with ordinary language. Surely, he saw himself in the tradition of Kantotle, and so, aiming at grand philosophical truths: not conventions of usage, even his own! 1. Squarrel Toby has a nut, N, in front of him. 2. Toby is short on squarrel food (observed or assumed), so, 3. Toby wills squarrel food (by postulate of Folk Pyschological Theory θ connecting willing with intake of N). 4. Toby prehends a nut as in front (from (1) by Postulate of Folk Psychological Theory θ, if it is assumed that nut and in front are familiar to Toby). 5. Toby joins squarrel food with gobbling, nut, and in front (i.e. Toby judges gobbling, on nut in front, for squarrel food (by Postulate of Folk Psychological Theory θ with the aid of prior observation. So, from 3, 4 and 5, 6. Tobby gobbles; and since a nut is in front of him, gobbles the nut in front of him. The system of values of the society to which the agent belongs forms the external standard for judging the relative importance of the commitments by the agent. There are three dimensions of value: universally human, cultural that vary with societies and times; and personal that vary with individuals. Each dimension has a standard for judging the adequacy of the relevant values. Human values are adequate if they satisfy basic needs; cultural values are adequate if they provide a system of values that sustains the allegiance of the inhabitants of a society; and personal values are adequate if the conceptions of well‐being formed out of them enable individuals to live satisfying lives. These values conflict and our well‐being requires some way of settling their conflicts, but there is no universal principle for settling the conflicts; it can only be done by attending to the concrete features of particular conflicts. These features vary with circumstances and values. Grice reads Porter.The idea of the value chain is based on the process view of organizations, the idea of seeing a manufacturing (or service) organization as a system, made up of subsystems each with inputs, transformation processes and outputs. Inputs, transformation processes, and outputs involve the acquisition and consumption of resources – money, labour, materials, equipment, buildings, land, administration and management. How value chain activities are carried out determines costs and affects profits.In his choice of value system and value sub-system, Grice is defending objectivity, since it is usually the axiological relativist who uses such a pretentious phrasing! More than a value may co-ordinate in a system. One such is eudæmonia (cf. system of ends). The problem for Kant is the reduction of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical or suppositional imperative. For Kant, a value tends towards the Subjectsive. Grice, rather, wants to offer a metaphysical defence of objective value. Grice called the manual of conversational maxims the Conversational Immanuel. The keyword to search the H. P. Grice is ‘will,’ and ‘volitional,’ even ‘ill-will,’ (“Metaphysics and ill-will,” s. V, c. 7-f. 28) and ‘benevolence’ (vide below under ‘conversational benevolence”). Also ‘desirability’: “Modality, desirability, and probability,” s. V, c. 8-ff. 14-15, and the conference lecture in a different series, “Probability, desirability, and mood operators,” s. II, c. 2-f.11).  Grice makes systematic use of ‘practical’ to contrast with the ‘alethic,’ too (“Practical reason,” s. V, c. 9-f.1), The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

desideratum of conversational candour: The term ‘desideratum’ has to be taken seriously. It involves freedom. This includes the maximin. It should be noted that candour is DESIRABLE. There is a desirability for candour. Candour is not a given. Ditto for clarity. See conversational desideratum, simpliciter. A rational desideratum is a desideratum by a rational agent and which he expects from another rational agent. One should make the strongest move, and on the other hand try not to mislead.Grice's Oxford "Conversation" Lectures, 1966Grice: Between Self-Love and Benevolence As I was saying (somewhere), Grice uses "self-love", charmingly qualified  with capitals, as "Conversational Self-Love", and, less charmingly,  "Conversational Benevolence", in lectures advertised at Oxford, as "Logic and  Conversation" that he gave at Oxford in 1964 as "University  Lecturer in Philosophy". He also gave seminars on "Conversational helpfulness." A number of the lectures by Grice include discussion of thetypes of behaviour people in general exhibit, and thereforethe types of expectations[cfr. owings]they might bring to a venture such as a conversation.Grice suggests that people in general both exhibitand EXPECT a certain degree of helpfulness [-- alla Rosenschein, epistemic/boulemaic:If A cognizes that B wills p, then A wills p.]  "from OTHERS" [-- reciprocal vs. reflexive, etc.] usually on the understanding that such helpfulness does NOT get in the way of particular goals and does not involve undue effort cf. least effort? - cfr. Hobbes on self-love. It two people, even complete strangers,are going through a gate, the expectation isthat the FIRST ONE through will hold thegate open, or at least leave it open, for thesecond. The expectation is such that todo OTHERWISE without particular reasonwould be interpreted as RUDE. The type of helpfulness exhibited andexpected in conversation is more specificbecause of a particular, although not a unique feature of conversation.It is a COLLABORATIVE venture betweenthe participants.There is a SHARED aimGrice wonders. His words, Does "helpfulness  in something  WE ARE  DOING TOGETHER” equate to 'cooperation'?He seems to have decided that it does. By the later lectures in the series, 'the principle of conversational helpfulness'has been rebranded the expectation of 'cooperation.' During the Oxford lectures, Grice develops his account of the precise nature of this cooperation. It can be seen as governed by certain regularities, or principles, detailing expected behaviour. The expression'maxim' to describe these regularities appears relatively late in the lectures.Grice's INITIAL choices of terms are 'objectives' and 'desiderata'.He was particularly fond of the latter. He was interested in detailing the desirable forms of behaviour for the purpose of achieving a joint goal of the conversation. Initially, Grice posits TWO such desiderata. Those relating to candour on the one hand and clarity on the other. The desideratum of candour contains his general PRINCIPLE of making the strongest (MAX) possible statement and, as a LIMITING (MAX) factor on this, the suggestion that speakers should try not to mislead. (Do not mislead). cfr. our"We are brothers"-- but not mutual."We are married to each other". "You _are_ a boor".----The desideratum of conversational clarity concerns the manner of expression. [His later reference to Modus or Mode as used by Kant as one of the four  categories] for any conversational contribution. It includes the IMPORTANT expectations of relevance to understanding and also insists that the main import of an utterance be clear and explicit. (“Explicate!”) These two factors are constantly to be  WEIGHED against two FUNDAMENTAL and SOMETIMES COMPETING DEMANDS. Contributions to a conversation are aimed towards the agreed current purposes by the PRINCIPLE of Conversational Benevolence. The principle of CONVERSATIONAL SELF-LOVE ensures the assumption on the part of both participants that neither will go to unnecessary trouble [LEAST EFFORT] in framing their contribution. This has been a topic of interest to Noh end. In "Conversational Immanuel" Grice tries different ways of making sense -- it is very easy to do so -- of Grice's distinctions that go over the head of some linguists I know! Reasonable versus rational for example. A Rawlsian distinction of sorts. Rational is too weak. We need 'reasonable'. So, what sort of reasonableness is that which results from this harmonious, we hope, clash of self-love and benevolence? Grice tried, wittily, to extend the purposes of conversation to involve MUTUALLY INFLUENCING EACH OTHER -- a reciprocal. (WoW, ii). And there's a mythical reconstruction of this in his "Meaning Revisited" which he contributed to this symposium organised by N. Smith on Mutua knowledge. But issues remains, we hope. The concept of ‘candour’is especially basic for Grice since it is constitutive of what it means to identify the ‘significatum.’ As he notes, ‘false’ information is no information. This is serious, because it has to do with the acceptum. A contribution which is not trustworthy is not deemed a contribution. It is conceptually impossible to intend to PROVIDE information if you are aware that you are not being trustworthy and not conveying it. As for the degree of explicitness, as Grice puts it. Since in communication in a certain fashion all must be public, if an idea or thesis is heavily obscured, it can no longer be regarded as having been propounded. This gives acceptum justification to the correlative desideratum of conversational clarity. On top, if there is a level of obscurity, the thing is not deemed to have been a communicatum or significatum. It is all about confidence, you know. U expects A will find him confident. Thus we find in Short and Lewis, “confīdo,” wich they render as “to trust confidently in something,” and also, “confide in, rely firmly upon, to believe, be assured of,” as an enhancing of “sperare,” in Cicero’s Att. 6, 9, 1. Trust and rationality are pre-requisites of conversation. Urmson develops this. They phrase in Urmson is "implied claim." Whenever U makes a conversational contribution in a standard context, there is an implied claim to U being trustworthy and reasonable.  What do Grice and Urmson mean by an "implied claim"? It is obvious enough, but they both love to expand. Whenever U utters an expression which can be used to convey truth or falsehood there is an implied claim to trustworthiness by U, unless the situation shows that this is not so. U may be acting or reciting or incredulously echoing the remark of another, or flouting the expectation. This, Grice and Urmson think, may need an explanation.  Suppose that U utters, in an ordinary circumstance, ‘It will rain tomorrow,’ or ‘It rained yesterday,’ or ‘It is raining.’ This act carries with it the claim that U should be trusted and licenses A to believe that it will rain tomorrow. By this is meant that just as it is understood that no U will give an order unless he is entitled to give orders, so it is understood that no U will utter a sentence of a kind which can be used to make a statement unless U is willing to claim that that statement is true, and hence one would be acting in a misleading manner if one uttered the sentence if he was not willing to make that claim. Here, the predicate “implies that …,” Grice, Grant, Moore, Nowell-Smith, and Urmson hasten to add, is being used in such a way that, if there is a an expectation that a thing is done in Circumstance C, U implies that C holds if he does the thing. The point is often made if not always in the terms Grice uses, and it is, Urmson and Grice believe, in substance uncontroversial. Grice and Urmson wish to make the point that, when an utterer U deploys a hedge with an indicative sentence, there is not merely an implied claim that the whole statement is true but also that is true. The implied or expressed claim by the utterer to trustworthiness need not be very strong. The whole point of a hedge is to modify or weaken (if not, as Grice would have it, flout) the claim by U to full trustworthiness which would be implied by the unhedged assertion.  But even if U utters “He is, I suppose, at home;” or “I guess that the penny will come down heads," U expresses, or for Urmson plainly implies, with however little reason, that this is what U accepts as worth the trust by A. Now Grice and Urmson meet an objection which is made by some philosophers to this comparison. Grice and Urmson intend to meet the objection by a fairly detailed examination of the example which they themselves would most likely choose. In doing this Grice and Urmson further explain the use of a parenthetical verb. The adverb is "probably" and the verb is “I believe.” To say, that something is probable, the imaginary objector will say, is to imply that it is reasonable to believe, that the evidence justifies a guarded claim for the trust or trustworthiness of U and the truth of the statement. But to say that someone else, a third person, believes something does not imply that it is reasonable for U or A to believe it, nor that the evidence justifies the guarded or implied claim to factivity or truth which U makes. Therefore, the objector continues, the difference between the use of “I believe” and “probably” is not, as Grice and Urmson suggest, merely one of nuance and degree of impersonality. In one case, “probably,” reasonableness is implied; in the other, “believe,” it is not. This objection is met by Grice and Urmson. They do so by making a general point. To use the rational-reasonable distinction in “Conversational implicaturum” and “Aspects,” there is an implied claim by U to reasonableness.  Further to an implied claim to trust whenever a sentence is uttered in a standard context, now Grice and Urmson add, to meet the sceptical objection about the contrast between “probably” and “I believe” that, whenever U makes a statement in a standard context there is an implied claim to reasonableness. This contention must be explained alla Kant. Cf. Strawson on the presumption of conversational relevance, and Austin, Moore, Nowell-Smith, Grant, and Warnock. To use Hart’s defeasibility, and Hall’s excluder, unless U is acting or story-telling, or preface his remarks with some such phrase as “I know Im being silly, but …” or, “I admit it is unreasonable, but …”  it is, Grice and Urmson think, a presupposition or expectation of communication or conversation that a communicator will not make a statement, thereby implying this trust, unless he has some  ground, however tenuous, for the statement. To utter “The King is visiting Oxford tomorrow,” or “The President of the BA has a corkscrew in his pocket,” and then, when asked why the utterer is uttering that, to answer “Oh, for no reason at all,” would be to sin, theologically, against the basic conventions governing the use of discourse. Grice goes on to provide a Kantian justification for that, hence his amusing talk of maxims and stuff.  Therefore, Urmson and Grice think there is an implied or expressed claim to  reasonableness  which goes with all our statements, i.e. there is a mutual expectation that a communicator will not make a statement unless he is prepared to claim and defend its reasonablenesss. Cf. Grice’s desideratum of conversational candour, subsumed under the over-arching principle of conversational helpfulness (formerly conversational benevolence-cum-self-love). Grice thinks that the principle of conversational benevolence has to be weighed against the principle of conversational self-love. The result is the overarching principle of conversational helpfulness. Clarity gets in the picture. The desideratum of conversational clarity is a reasonable requirement for conversants to abide by. Grice follows some observations by Warnock. The logical grammar of “trust,” “candour,” “charity,” “sincerity,” “decency,” “honesty,” is subtle, especially when we are considering the two sub-goals of conversation: giving and receiving information/influencing and being influenced by others. In both sub-goals, trust is paramount. The explorations of trust has become an Oxonian hobby, with authors not such like Warnock, but Williams, and others. Grice’s essay is entitled, “Trust, metaphysics, value.” Trust as a corollary of the principle of conversational helpfulness. In a given conversational setting, assuming the principle of conversational helpfulness is operating, U is assumed by A to be trustworthy and candid. There are two modes of trust, which relate to the buletic sub-goal and the doxastic sub-goal which Grice assumes the principle of conversational helpfulness captures:  giving and receiving information, and influencing and being influenced by others. In both sub-goals, trust is key. In the doxastic realm, trust has to do, not so much or only, with truth (with which the expression is cognate), or satisfactoriness-value, but evidence and probability. In the buletic realm, there are the dimensions of satisfactoriness-value (‘good’ versus ‘true’), and ‘ground’ versus evidence, which becomes less crucial. But note that one is trustworthy regarding BOTH the buletic attitude and the doxastic attitude. Grice mentions this or that buletic attitudes which is not usually judged in terms of evidential support (“I vow to thee my country.”) However, in the buletic realm, U is be assumed as trustworthy if U has the buletic attitude he is expressing. The cheater, the insincere, the dishonest, the untrustworthy, for Grice is not irrational, just repugnant. How immoral is the idea that honesty is the best policy? Is Kant right in thinking there is no right to refrain from trust? Surely it is indecent. For Kant, there is no motivation or ‘motive,’ pure or impure, behind telling the truth – it’s just a right, and an obligation – an imperative. Being trustworthy for Kant is associated with a pure motive. Grice agrees. Decency comes into the picture. An indecent agent may still be rational, but in such a case, conversation may still be seen as rational (if not reasonable) and surely not be seen as rational helpfulness or co-operation, but rational adversarial competition, rather, a zero-sum game. Grice found the etymology of ‘decent’ too obscure. Short and Lewis have “dĕcet,” which they deem cognate with Sanscrit “dacas,” ‘fame,’ and Grecian “δοκέω,‘to seem,’ ‘to think,’ and with Latin ‘decus,’ ‘dingus.’ As an impersonal verb, Short and Lewis render it as ‘it is seemly, comely, becoming,; it beseems, behooves, is fitting, suitable, proper (for syn. v. debeo init.): decere quasi aptum esse consentaneumque tempori et personae, Cic. Or. 22, 74; cf. also nunc quid aptum sit, hoc est, quid maxime deceat in oratione videamus, id. de Or. 3, 55, 210 (very freq. and class.; not in Caesar). Grice’s idea of decency is connected to his explorations on rational and reasonable. To cheat may be neither unreasonable nor rational. It is just repulsive. Indecent, in other words. In all this, Grice is concerned with ordinary language, and treasures Austin questioning Warnock, when Warnock was pursuing a fellowship at Magdalen. “What would you say the difference is between ‘Smith plays cricket rather properly’ and ‘Smith plays cricket rather incorrectly’?” They spent the whole dinner over the subtlety. By desserts, Warnock was in love with Austin. Cf. Grice on his prim and proper Aunt Matilda. The exploration by Grice on trust is Warnockian in character, or vice versa. In “Object of morality,” Warnock has trust as key, as indeed, the very object of morality. Grice starts to focus on trust in an Oxford seminars on the implicaturum. If there is a desideratum of conversational candour, and the goal of the principle of conversational helpfulness is that of giving and receiving information, and influencing and being influenced by others, ‘false’ ‘information’ is just no information – Since exhibiteness trumps protrepsis, this applies to the buletic, too. Grice loved that Latin dictum, “tuus candor.” He makes an early defence of this in his fatal objection to Malcolm. A philosopher cannot intentionally instill a falsehood in his tutee, such as “Decapitation willed the death of Charles I” (the alleged paraphrase of the paradoxical philosopher saying that ‘causing’ is ‘willing’ and rephrasing “Decapitation was the cause of the death of Charles I.” There is, for both Grice and Apel, a transcendental (if weak) justification, not just utilitarian (honesty as the best policy), as Stalnaker notes in his contribution to the Grice symposium for APA. Unlike Apel, the transcendental argument is a weak one in that Grice aims to show that conversation that did not abide by trust would be unreasonable, but surely still ‘possible.’ It is not a transcendental justification for the ‘existence’ of conversation simpliciter, but for the existence of ‘reasonable,’ decent conversation. If we approach charity in the first person, we trust ourselves that some of our beliefs have to be true, and that some of our desires have to be satisfactory valid, and we are equally trusted by our conversational partners. This is Grice’s conversational golden rule. What would otherwise be the point of holding that conversation is rational co-operation? What would be the point of conversation simpliciter? Urmson follows Austin, so Austin’s considerations on this, notably in “Other minds,” deserve careful examination. Urmson was of course a member of Grice’s play group, and these are the philosophers that we consider top priority. Another one was P. H. Nowell-Smith. At least two of his three rules deserve careful examination. Nowell-Smith notes that this or that ‘rule’ of contextual implication is not meant to be taken as a ‘rigid rule’. Unlike this or that rule of entailment, a conversational rule can be broken without the utterer being involved in self-contradiction or absurdity. When U uses an expression to make a statement, it is contextually implied that he believes it to be true. Similarly, when he uses it to perform any of the other jobs for which sentences are used, it is contextually implied that he is using it for one of the jobs that it normally does. This rule is often in fact broken. Anti-Kantian lying, Bernhard-type play-acting, Andersen-type story-telling, and Wildeian irony is each a case in which U breaks the rule, or flouts the expectation, either overtly or covertly. But each of these four cases is a secondary use, i.e. a use to which an expression cannot logically or conceptually be put unless, as Hart would have it, it has a primary use. There is no limit to the possible uses to which an expression may be put. In many cases a man makes his point by deliberately using an expression in a queer way or even using it in the ‘sense’ opposite to its unique normal one, as in irony (“He is a fine friend,” implying that he is a scoundrel). The distinction between a primary and a secondary use is important because many an argument used by a philosopher consists in pointing out some typical example of the way in which some expression E is used. Such an argument is always illegitimate if the example employed is an example of a secondary use, however common such a use may be. U contextually implies that he has what he himself believes to be good reasons for his statement. Once again, we often break this rule and we have special devices for indicating when we are breaking it. Phrases such as ‘speaking offhand …,’ 'I do not really know but …,’ and ‘I should be inclined to say that …,’ are used by scrupulous persons to warn his addressee that U has not got what seem to him good reasons for his statement. But unless one of these guarding phrases is used we are entitled to believe that U believes himself to have good reasons for his statement and we soon learn to *mistrust* people who habitually infringe this rule. It is, of course, a mistake to infer from what someone says categorically that he has in fact good reasons for what he says. If I tell you, or ‘inform’ to you, that the duck-billed platypus is a bird (because I ' remember ' reading this in a book) I am unreliable; but I am not using language improperly. But if I tell you this without using one of the guarding phrases and without having what I think good reasons, I am. What U says may be assumed to be relevant to the interests of his addressee. This is the most important of the three rules; unfortunately it is also the most frequently broken. Bores are more common than liars or careless talkers. This rule is particularly obvious in the case of answers to questions, since it is assumed that the answer is an answer. Not all statements are answers to questions; information may be volunteered. Nevertheless the publication of a text-book on trigonometry implies that the author believes that there are people who want to learn about trigonometry, and to give advice implies a belief that the advice is relevant to one’s addressee's problem. This rule is of the greatest importance for ethics. For the major problem of ethics is that of bridging the gap between a decisions, an ought-sentence, an injunction, and a sentence used to give advice on the one hand and the statements of *fact*, sometime regarding the U’s soul, that constitute the reasons for these on the other. It is in order to bridge these gaps that insight into necessary synthetic connexions is invoked. This rule of contextual implication may help us to show that there is no gap to be bridged because the reason-giving sentence must turn out to be also *practical* from the start and not a statement of *fact*, even concerning the state of the U’s soul, from which a practical sentence can somehow be deduced. This rule is, therefore, more than a rule of good manners; or rather it shows how, in matters of ordinary language, rules of good manners shade into logical rules. Unless we assume that it is being observed we cannot understand the connexions between decisions, advice, and appraisals and the reasons given in support of them. Refs.: The main reference is in the first set of ‘Logic and conversation.’ Many keywords are useful, not just ‘candour,’ but notably ‘trust.’ (“Rationality and trust,” c. 9-f. 5, “Trust, metaphysics, and value,” c. 9-f. 20, and “Aristotle and friendship, rationality, trust, and decency,” c. 6-f. 18), BANC.

desideratum of conversational clarity. There is some overlap here with Grice’s category of conversational manner – of Grice’s maxim of conversational perspicuity [sic] – and at least one of the maxims proper, ‘obscuirty avoidance,’ or maxim of conversational obscurity avoidance. But at Oxford he defined the philosopher as the one whose profession it is to makes clear things obscure. The word desideratum has to be taken seriously. It involves freedom. In what way is “The pillar box seems red to me” less perspicuous than “The pillar box is red”? In all! If mutual expectation not to mislead and produce the stronger contribution are characteristics of candour, expectation of mutual relevance to interests, and being explicit and clear in your point are two characteristics of this desideratum. “Candour” and “clarity’ are somewhat co-relative for Grice. He is interested in identifying this or that desideratum. By having two of them, he can play. So, how UNCLEAR can a conversationalist be provided he WANTS to be candid? Candour trumps clarity. But too much ‘unperspicuity’ may lead to something not being deemed an ‘implicaturum’ at all. Grice is especially concerned with philosopher’s paradoxes. Why would Strawson say that the usage of ‘not,’ ‘and,’ ‘or,’ ‘if,’ ‘if and only if,’ ‘all,’ ‘some (at least one), ‘the,’ do not correspond to the logician’s use? Questions of candour and clarity interact. Grice’s first application, which he grants is not original, relates to “The pillar box seems red” versus “The pillar box is red.” “I would not like to give the false impression that the pillar box is not red” seems less clear than “The pillar box is red” – Yet the unperspicuous contributin is still ‘candid,’ in the sense that it expresses a truth. So one has to be careful. On top, philosophers like Lewis were using ‘clarity is not enough’ as a battle cry! Grice’s favourite formulations of the imperatives here are ‘self-contradictory,’ and for which he uses ‘[sic]’, notably: “Be perspicuous [sic]’ and “Be brief. Avoid unnecessary prolixity [sic].’

desirability: Correlative: credibility. For Grice, credibility reduces to desirability (He suggests that the reverse may also be possible but does not give a proposal). This Grice calls the Jeffrey operator. If Urmson likes ‘probably,’ Grice likes ‘desirably.’ This theorem is a corollary of the desirability axiom by Jeffrey, which is: "If prob XY = 0, for a prima facie  PF(A V B) A (x E w)] = PFA A (x E w)] + PfB A (x El+ w)]. This is the account by Grice of the adaptability of a pirot to its changeable environs. Grice borrows the notion of probability (henceforth, “pr”) from Davidson, whose early claim to fame was to provide the logic of the notion. Grice abbreviates probability by Pr. and compares it to a buletic operator ‘pf,’ ‘for prima facie,’ attached to ‘De’ for desirability. A rational agent must calculate both the probability and the desirability of his action. For both probability and desirability, the degree is crucial. Grice symbolises this by d: probability in degree d; probability in degree d. The topic of life Grice relates to that of adaptation and surival, and connects with his genitorial programme of creature construction (Pology.): life as continued operancy. Grice was fascinated with life (Aristotle, bios) because bios is what provides for Aristotle the definition (not by genus) of psyche. The steps are as follows. Pf(p ⊃!q)/Pr(p ⊃ q); pf((p1 ^  p2) ⊃!q)/pr(p1 ^  p2 ⊃q); pf((p1 ^ p2 ^  p3) ⊃!q)/pr(p1 ^  p2 ^  p3 ^  p4 ⊃q); pf (all things before me ⊃!q)/pr (all things before me ⊃ q); pf (all things considered ⊃ !q)/pr(all things considered ⊃ q); !q/|- q; G wills !q/G judges q. Strictly, Grice avoids using the noun probability (other than for the title of this or that lecture). One has to use the sentence-modifier ‘probably,’ and ‘desirably.’ So the specific correlative to the buletic prima facie ‘desirably’ is the doxastic ‘probably.’ Grice liked the Roman sound to ‘prima facie,’ ‘at first sight’:  “exceptio, quae prima facie justa videatur.” Refs.: The two main sources are “Probability, desirability, and mood operators,” c. 2-f. 11, and “Modality, desirability and probability,” c. 8-ff. 14-15. But most of the material is collected in “Aspects,” especially in the third and fourth lectures. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

detachability. A rather abstract notion. One thinks of ‘detach’ in physical terms (‘semi-detached house’). Grice means it in an abstract way. To detach – what is it that we detach? We detach an implicaturum. Grice is not so much concerned with how to DETACH an implicaturum, but how sometimes you cannot. It’s NON-detachability that is the criterion. And this should be a matter of a prioricity. However, since style gets in the picture, he has to allow for exceptions to this criterion. A conversational, even philosophically interesting one, generated by the conversational category of modus (as the maxim of orderliness: “he went to bed and took off his boots”) is detachable. How to interpret this in an one-off predicament. Cf. non-detachability. And the other features or tests or catalysts that Grice uses. In Causal Theory of Perception, the ideas are FOUR, which he nicely summarises in WoW on the occasion of eliminating the excursus. And then he expands on Essay II, as an update. His tutees at Oxford are aware of the changes. Few care, though. Even his colleagues don’t, they are into their own things. So let’s compare the two versions of the catalysts in Causal and Essay II. Version of the four catalysts up to the first two examples in “Causal”: The first cxample is a stock case of what is sometimes called " prcsupposition " and it is often held that here 1he truth of what is irnplicd is a necessary condition of the original statement's beirrg cither true or false. This might be disputed, but it is at lcast arguable that it is so, and its being arguable might be enough to distinguish-this type of case from others. I shall however for convenience assume that the common view mentioned is correct. This consideration clearly distinguishes (1) from (2); even if the implied proposition were false, i.e. if there were no reason in the world to contrast poverty with honesty either in general or in her case, the original statement could still be false; it would be false if for example she were rich and dishonest. One might perhaps be less comfortable about assenting to its truth if the implied contrast did not in fact obtain; but the possibility of falsity is enough for the immediate purpose. My next experiment on these examples is to ask what it is in each case which could properly be said to be the vehicle of implication (to do the implying). There are at least four candidates, not necessarily mutually exclusive. Supposing someone to have uttered one or other of my sample sentences, we may ask whether the vehicle of implication would be (a) what the speaker said (or asserted), or (b) the speaker (" did he imply that . . . .':) or (c) the words the speaker used, or (d) his saying that (or again his saying that in that way); or possibly some plurality of these items. As regards (a) I think (1) and (2) differ; I think it would be correct to say in the case of (l) that what he speaker said (or asserted) implied that Smith had been beating this wife, and incorrect to say in the case of (2) that what te said (or asserted) implied that there was a contrast between e.g., honesty and poverty. A test on which I would rely is the following : if accepting that the implication holds involves one in r27 128 H. P. GRICE accepting an hypothetical' if p then q ' where 'p ' represents the original statement and ' q' represents what is implied, then what the speaker said (or asserted) is a vehicle of implication, otherwise not. To apply this rule to the given examples, if I accepted the implication alleged to hold in the case of (1), I should feel compelled to accept the hypothetical " If Smith has left off beating his wife, then he has been beating her "; whereas if I accepted the alleged implication in the case of (2), I should not feel compelled to accept the hypothetical " If she was poor but honest, then there is some contrast between poverty and honesty, or between her poverty and her honesty." The other candidates can be dealt with more cursorily; I should be inclined to say with regard to both (l) and (2) that the speaker could be said to have implied whatever it is that is irnplied; that in the case of (2) it seems fairly clear that the speaker's words could be said to imply a contrast, whereas it is much less clear whether in the case of (1) the speaker's words could be said to imply that Smith had been beating his wife; and that in neither case would it be evidently appropriate to speak of his saying that, or of his saying that in that way, as implying what is implied. The third idea with which I wish to assail my two examples is really a twin idea, that of the detachability or cancellability of the implication. (These terms will be explained.) Consider example (1): one cannot fi.nd a form of words which could be used to state or assert just what the sentence " Smith has left off beating his wife " might be used to assert such that when it is used the implication that Smith has been beating his wife is just absent. Any way of asserting what is asserted in (1) involves the irnplication in question. I shall express this fact by saying that in the case of (l) the implication is not detqchable from what is asserted (or simpliciter, is not detachable). Furthermore, one cannot take a form of words for which both what is asserted and what is implied is the same as for (l), and then add a further clause withholding commitment from what would otherwise be implied, with the idea of annulling the implication without annulling the assertion. One cannot intelligibly say " Smith has left off beating his wife but I do not mean to imply that he has been beating her." I shall express this fact by saying that in the case of (1) the implication is not cancellable (without THE CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION r29 cancelling the assertion). If we turn to (2) we find, I think, that there is quite a strong case for saying that here the implication ls detachable. Thcrc sccms quitc a good case for maintaining that if, instead of sayirrg " She is poor but shc is honcst " I were to say " She is poor and slre is honcst", I would assert just what I would havc asscrtcct ii I had used thc original senterrce; but there would now be no irnplication of a contrast between e.g', povery and honesty. But the question whether, in tl-re case of (2), thc inrplication is cancellable, is slightly more cornplex. Thcrc is a sonse in which we may say that it is non-cancellable; if sorncone were to say " She is poor but she is honest, though of course I do not mean to imply that there is any contrast between poverty and honesty ", this would seem a puzzling and eccentric thing to have said; but though we should wish to quarrel with the speaker, I do not think we should go so far as to say that his utterance was unintelligible; we should suppose that he had adopted a most peculiar way of conveying the the news that she was poor and honesl. The fourth and last test that I wish to impose on my exarnples is to ask whether we would be inclined to regard the fact that the appropriate implication is present as being a matter of the meaning of some particular word or phrase occurring in the sentences in question. I am aware that this may not be always a very clear or easy question to answer; nevertheless Iwill risk the assertion that we would be fairly happy to say that, as regards (2), the factthat the implication obtains is a matter of the meaning of the word ' but '; whereas so far as (l) is concerned we should have at least some inclination to say that the presence of the implication was a matter of the meaning of some of the words in the sentence, but we should be in some difficulty when it came to specifying precisely which this word, or words are, of which this is true. After third example introduced:It is plain that there is no case at all for regarding the truth of what is implied here as a pre-condition of the truth or falsity cf 130 H. P. GRICB what I have asserted; a denial of the truth of what is implied would have no bearing at all on whether what I have asserted is true or false. So (3) is much closer to (2) than (1) in this respect. Next, I (the speaker) could certainly be said to have implied that Jones is hopeless (provided that this is what I intended to get across) and my saying that (at any rate my saying /s/ that and no more) is also certainly a vehicle of implication. On the other hand my words and what I say (assert) are, I think, not here vehicles of implication. (3) thus differs from both (1) and (2). The implication is cancellable but not detachable; if I add o'I do not of course mean to imply that he is no good at philosophy " my whole utterance is intelligible and linguistically impeccable, even though it may be extraordinary tutorial behaviour; and I can no longer be said to have implied that he was no good, even though perhaps that is what my colleagues might conclude to be the case if I had nothing else to say. The implication is not however, detachable; any other way of making, in the same context of utterance, just the assertion I have made would involve the same implication. Finally, the fact that the implication holds is not a matter of any particular word or phrase within the sentence which I have uttered; so in this respect (3) is certainly different from (2) and, possibly different from (1). One obvious fact should be mentioned before I pass to the last example. This case of implication is unlike the others in that the utterance of the sentence " Jones has beautiful handwriting etc." does not standardly involve the implication here attributed to it; it requires a special context (that it should be uttered at Collections) to attach the implication to its uttgrance. After fourth and last example is introduced: in the case of (a) I can produce a strong argument in favour of holding that the fulfllment of the THE CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION implication of the speaker's ignorance is not a precaution of the truth or falsity of the disjunctive statement. Suppose (c) that the speaker knows that his wife is in the kitchen, (b) that the house has only two rooms (and no passages etc.) Even though (a) is the casc, thc spcaker can certainly say truly " My wife is in the housc "; he is merely not being as informative as he could bc if nccd arose. But the true proposition that his wife is in thc housc together with the true proposition that the house consists entirely of a kitchen and a bedroom, entail the proposition that his wife is either in the kitchen or in the bedroom. But il to cxpress the proposition p in certain circumstances would bc to spcak truly, and p, togelher with another true proposition, crrtails q, then surely to express 4 in the same circvmstances must be to speak truly. So I shall take it that the disjunctive statement in (4) does not fail to be true or false if the implied ignorance is in fact not realized. Secondly, I think it is fairly clear that in this case, as in the case of (3), we could say that the speaker had irnplied that he did not know, and also that his saying that (or his saying that rather than something else, v2., in which room she was) implied that he did not know. Thirdly, the irnplication is in a sense non-detachable, in that if in a given context the utterance of the disjunctive sentence would involve the implication that the speaker did not know in which room his his wife was, this implication would also be involved in the utterance of any other form of words which would make the same assertion(e.g., "The alternatives are (1) .(2) " or " One of the following things is the case: (a) (r) "). ln another possible sense, however, the implication could perhaps bc said to be detachable: for there will be some contexls of ruttcrance in Which the normal implication will not hold; e.g., thc spokesman who announces, " The next conference will be cither in Geneva or in New York " perhaps does not imply that lrc does not know which; for he may well be just not saying which. This points to the fact that the implication is cancellablg; :r nrarl could say, " My wife is either in the kitchen or in the bctlroorn " in circumstances in which the implication would rrornrally be present, and then go on, " Mind you, I'm not saying tlrrrt I don't know which"; this might be unfriendly (and grcr'lrrps ungrammatical) but would be perfectly intelligible, I2 131 132 H. P. GRICB Finally, the fact that the utterance of the disjunctive sentence normally involves the implication of the speaker's ignorance of the truth-values of the disjuncts is, I should like to say, to be explained by reference to a general principle governing the use of language. Exactly what this principle is I am uncertain, but L first sftol would be the following: "One should not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one unless there is a good reason for so doing." This is certainly not an adequate formulation but will perhaps be good enough for my present purpose. On the assumption that such a principle as this is of general application, one can draw the conclusion that the utterance of a disjunctive sentence would imply the speaker's ignorance of the truth-values of the disjuncts, given that (a) the obvious reason for not making a statemcnt which there is some call on one to make is that one is not in a position to make it, and given (6) the logical fact that each disjunct entails the disjunctive, but not vice versa; which being so, the disjuncts are stronger than the disjunctive. lf the outline just given js on the right lines, then I would wish to say, we have a reason for refusing in the case of (4) to regard the implication of the speaker's ignorance as being part of the meaning of the word'or'; someone who knows about the logical relation between a disjunction and its disjuncts, and who also knew about the alleged general principle governing discourse, could work out for hirnself that disjunctive utterances would involve the implication which they do in fact involve. I must insist, however, that my aim in discussing this last point has been merelyto indicate the position I would wish to take up, and not to argue scriously in favour of it. My main purpose in this sub-section has been to introduce four ideas of which l intend to make some use; and to provide some conception of tlre ways in which they apply or fail to apply to various types of implication. By the numbering of it, it seems he has added an extra. It’s FIVE catalysts now. He’ll go back to them in Essay IV, and in Presupposition and Conversational Impicature. He needs those catalysts. Why? It seems like he is always thinking that someone will challenge him! This is Grice: “We can now show that, it having been stipulated as being what it is, a conversational implicaturum must possess certain features. Or rather here are some catalyst ideas which will help us to determine or individuate. Four tests for implicaturum as it were. First, CANCELLABILITY – as noted in “Causal Theory” – for two of the examples (‘beautiful handwriting’ and ‘kitchen or bedroom’ and NEGATIVE version of “You don’t cease to eat iron”) and the one of the pillar box -- Since, to assume the presence of a conversational implicum, we have to assume that the principle of conversational co-operation is being observed, and since it is possible to opt out of the observation of this principle, it follows that an implicaturum can be canceled in a particular case. It may be explicitly canceled, if need there be, by the addition of a clause by which the utterer states or implies that he  has opted out (e. g. “The pillar box seems red but it is.”). Then again it may be contextually (or implicitly) canceled (e. g. to a very honest person, who knows I disbelieve the examiner exists, “The loyalty examiner won’t be summoning you at any rate”). The utterance that usually would carry an implicaturum is used on an occasion that makes it clear or obvious that the utterer IS opting out without having to bore his addressee by making this obviousness explicit. There is a second litmus test or catalyst idea. nsofar as the calculation that a implicaturum is present requires, besides contextual and background information only a knowledge or understanding or processing of what has been said or explicitly conveyed (‘are you playing squash? B shows bandaged leg) (or the ‘conventional’ ‘commitment’ of the utterance), and insofar as the manner or style, of FORM, rather than MATTER, of expression plays no role in the calculation, it will NOT be possible to find another way of explicitly conveying or putting forward the same thing, the same so-and-so (say that q follows from p) which simply ‘lacks’ the unnecessary implicaturum in question -- except [will his excluders never end?] where some special feature of the substituted version [this other way which he says is not conceivable] is itself relevant to the determination of the implicaturum (in virtue of this or that conversational maxims pertaining to the category of conversational mode. If we call this feature, as Grice does in “Causal Theory,” ‘non-detachability’ – in that the implicaturum cannot be detached from any alternative expression that makes the same point -- one may expect the implicaturum carried by this or that locution to have a high degree of non-detachability. ALTERNATIVES FOR “NOT” Not, it is not the case, it is false that. There’s nothing unique about ‘not’.ALTERNATIVES FOR “AND” and, nothing, furthermore, but. There isnothing unique about ‘and’ALTERNATIVES FOR “OR”: One of the following is true. There is nothing unique about ‘or’ALTERNATIVES FOR “IF” Provided. ‘There is nothing unique about ‘if’ALTERNATIVES FOR “THE” – There is at least one and at most one. And it exists. (existence and uniqueness). There is nothing unique about ‘the’.THIS COVERS STRAWSON’S first problem.What about the other English philosophers?AUSTIN – on ‘voluntarily’ ALTERNATIVES to ‘voluntarily,’ with the will, willingly, intentionally. Nothing unique about ‘voluntarily.’STRAWSON on ‘true’ – it is the case, redundance theory, nothing. Nothing unique about ‘true’HART ON good. To say that ‘x is commendable’ is to recommend x. Nothing unique about ‘good.’HART on ‘carefully.’ Da Vinci painted Mona Lisa carefully, with caution, with precaution. Nothing unique about ‘carefully.’THIRD LITMUS TEST or idea. To speak approximately, since the calculation of the presence of an implicaturum presupposes an initial knowledge, or grasping, or understanding, or taking into account of the ‘conventional’ force (not in Austin’s sense, but translating Latin ‘vis’) of the expression the utterance of which carries the implicaturum, a conversational implicaturum will be a condition that is NOT, be definition, on risk of circularity of otiosity, included in the original specification of the expression's conventional force. If I’m saying that ‘seems’ INVOLVES, as per conventional force, ‘doubt or denial,’what’s my point? If Strawson is right that ‘if’ has the conventional force of conventionally committing the utterer with the belief that q follows from p, why bother? And if that were so, how come the implicaturum is still cancellable?Though it may not be impossible for what starts life, so to speak, as a conversational implicaturum to become conventionalized, to suppose that this is so in a given case would require special justification. (Asking Lewis). So, initially at least, a conversational implicaturum is, by definition and stipulation, not part of the sense, truth-condition, conventional force, or part of what is explicitly conveyed or put forward, or ‘meaning’ of the expression to the employment of which the impicatum attaches. FOURTH LITMUS TEST or catalyst idea.Mentioned in “Causal theory” The alethic value – conjoined with the test about the VEHICLE --. He has these as two different tests in “Causal”. Since the truth of a conversational implicaturum is not required by (is not a condition for) the truth of what is said or explicitly conveyed (what is said or explicated – the explicatum or explcitum, or what is explicitly conveyed or communicated) may be true -- what is implicated may be false – that he has beautiful handwriting, that q follows from p, that the utterer is ENDORSING what someone else said, that the utterer is recommending x, that the person who is said to act carefully has taken precaution), the implicaturum is NOT carried by what is said or the EXPLICATUM or EXPLICITUM, or is explicitly conveyed, but only by the ‘saying’ or EXPLICATING or EXPLICITING of what is said or of the explicatum or explicitum, or by 'putting it that way.’.The fifth and last litmus test or catalyst idea. Since, to calculate a conversational implicaturum is to calculate what has to be supposed in order to preserve the supposition that the utterer is a rational, benevolent, altruist agent, and that the principle of conversational cooperation is being observed, and since there may be various possible specific explanations or alternatives that fill the gap here – as to what is the content of the psychological attitude to be ascribed to the utterer, a list of which may be open, or open-ended, the conversational implicaturum in such cases will technically be an open-ended disjunction of all such specific explanations, which may well be infinitely non-numerable. Since the list of these IS open, the implicaturum will have just the kind of INDETERMINACY or lack of determinacy that an implicaturum appears in most cases to possess.

determinatum: determinable, a general characteristic or property analogous to a genus except that while a property independent of a genus differentiates a species that falls under the genus, no such independent property differentiates a determinate that falls under the determinable. The color blue, e.g., is a determinate with respect of the determinable color: there is no property F independent of color such that a color is blue if and only if it is F. In contrast, there is a property, having equal sides, such that a rectangle is a square if and only if it has this property. Square is a properly differentiated species of the genus rectangle. W. E. Johnson introduces the terms ‘determinate’ and ‘determinable’ in his Logic, Part I, Chapter 11. His account of this distinction does not closely resemble the current understanding sketched above. Johnson wants to explain the differences between the superficially similar ‘Red is a color’ and ‘Plato is a man’. He concludes that the latter really predicates something, humanity, of Plato; while the former does not really predicate anything of red. Color is not really a property or adjective, as Johnson puts it. The determinates red, blue, and yellow are grouped together not because of a property they have in common but because of the ways they differ from each other. Determinates under the same determinable are related to each other and are thus comparable in ways in which they are not related to determinates under other determinables. Determinates belonging to different determinables, such as color and shape, are incomparable. ’More determinate’ is often used interchangeably with ‘more specific’. Many philosophers, including Johnson, hold that the characters of things are absolutely determinate or specific. Spelling out what this claim means leads to another problem in analyzing the relation between determinate and determinable. By what principle can we exclude red and round as a determinate of red and red as a determinate of red or round?  determinism, the view that every event or state of affairs is brought about by antecedent events or states of affairs in accordance with universal causal laws that govern the world. Thus, the state of the world at any instant determines a unique future, and that knowledge of all the positions of things and the prevailing natural forces would permit an intelligence to predict the future state of the world with absolute precision. This view was advanced by Laplace in the early nineteenth century; he was inspired by Newton’s success at integrating our physical knowledge of the world. Contemporary determinists do not believe that Newtonian physics is the supreme theory. Some do not even believe that all theories will someday be integrated into a unified theory. They do believe that, for each event, no matter how precisely described, there is some theory or system of laws such that the occurrence of that event under that description is derivable from those laws together with information about the prior state of the system. Some determinists formulate the doctrine somewhat differently: a every event has a sufficient cause; b at any given time, given the past, only one future is possible; c given knowledge of all antecedent conditions and all laws of nature, an agent could predict at any given time the precise subsequent history of the universe. Thus, determinists deny the existence of chance, although they concede that our ignorance of the laws or all relevant antecedent conditions makes certain events unexpected and, therefore, apparently happen “by chance.” The term ‘determinism’ is also used in a more general way as the name for any metaphysical doctrine implying that there is only one possible history of the world. The doctrine described above is really scientific or causal determinism, for it grounds this implication on a general fact about the natural order, namely, its governance by universal causal law. But there is also theological determinism, which holds that God determines everything that happens or that, since God has perfect knowledge about the universe, only the course of events that he knows will happen can happen. And there is logical determinism, which grounds the necessity of the historical order on the logical truth that all propositions, including ones about the future, are either true or false. Fatalism, the view that there are forces e.g., the stars or the fates that determine all outcomes independently of human efforts or wishes, is claimed by some to be a version of determinism. But others deny this on the ground that determinists do not reject the efficacy of human effort or desire; they simply believe that efforts and desires, which are sometimes effective, are themselves determined by antecedent factors as in a causal chain of events. Since determinism is a universal doctrine, it embraces human actions and choices. But if actions and choices are determined, then some conclude that free will is an illusion. For the action or choice is an inevitable product of antecedent factors that rendered alternatives impossible, even if the agent had deliberated about options. An omniscient agent could have predicted the action or choice beforehand. This conflict generates the problem of free will and determinism. 

deutero-esperanto: Also Gricese – Pirotese. “Gricese” is best. Arbitrariness need not be a two-party thing. E communicates to himself that there is danger by drawing a skull. Grice genially opposed to the idea of a convention. He hated a convention. A language is not conventional. Meaning is not conventional. Communication is not conventional. He was even unhappy with the account of convention by Lewis in terms of an arbitrary co-ordination. While the co-ordination bit passes rational muster, the arbitrary element is deemed a necessary condition, and Grice hated that. For Grice there is natural, and iconic. When a representation ceases to be iconic and becomes, for lack of a better expression, non-iconic, things get, we may assume conventional. One form of correlation in his last definition of meaing allows for a conventional correlation. “Pain!,” the P cries. There is nothing in /pein/ that minimally resembles the pain the P is suffering. So from his involuntary “Ouch” to his simulated “Ouch,” he thinks he can say “Pain.” Bennett explored the stages after that. The dog is shaggy is Grices example. All sorts of resultant procedures are needed for reference and predication, which may be deemed conventional. One may refer nonconventionally, by ostension. It seems more difficult to predicate non-conventionally. But there may be iconic predication. Urquhart promises twelve parts of speech: each declinable in eleven cases, four numbers, eleven genders (including god, goddess, man, woman, animal, etc.); and conjugable in eleven tenses, seven moods, and four voices. The language will translate any idiom in any other language, without any alteration of the literal sense, but fully representing the intention. Later, one day, while lying in his bath, Grice designed deutero-esperanto. The obble is fang may be current only for Griceian members of the class of utterers. It is only this or that philosophers practice to utter The obble is fang in such-and-such circumstances. In this case, the utterer U does have a readiness to utter The obble is feng in such-and-such circumstances. There is also the scenario in which The obble is fang is may be conceived by the philosopher not to be deemed current at all, but the utterance of The obble is feng in such-and-such circumstances is part of some system of communication which the utterer U (Lockwith,, Urquart, Wilkins, Edmonds, Grice) has devised but which has never been put into operation, like the highway code which Grice invent another day again while lying in his bath. In that case, U does this or that basic or resultant procedure for the obble is feng in an attenuated but philosophically legitimate fashion. U has envisaged a possible system of practices which involve a readiness to utter Example by Grice that does NOT involve a convention in this usage. Surely Grice can as he indeed did, invent a language, call it Deutero-Esperanto, Griceish, or Pirotese, which nobody at Oxford ever uses to communicat. That makes Grice the authority - cf. arkhe, authority, government (in plural), "authorities" - and Grice can lay down, while lying in the tub, no doubt - what is proper. A P can be said to potch of some obble o as fang or as feng. Also to cotch of some obble o, as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o as being fid to one another.” In symbols: (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ potch(x, y, fang) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ potch(x, y, feng) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ cotch(x, y, fang) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Ox ^ cotch(x, y, feng) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oz ^ Oy ^ cotch(x, fid(y,z)). Let’s say that Ps (as Russell and Carnap conceived them) inhabit a world of obbles, material objects, or things. To potch is something like to perceive; to cotch something like to think. Feng and fang are possible descriptions, much like our adjectives. Fid is a possible relation between obbles. Grice provides a symbolisation for content internalisation.  The perceiver or cognitive Subjects perceives or cognises two objects, x, y, as holding a relation of some type.  There is a higher level that Ps can reach when the object of their potchings and cotchings is not so much objects but states of affairs.  Its then that the truth-functional operators will be brought to existence “^”: cotch(p ^ q) “V”:  cotch(p v q) “)”: )-cotch(p ) q)  A P will be able to reject a content, refuse-thinking: ~. Cotch(~p). When P1 perceives P2, the reciprocals get more complicated.  P2 cotches that P1!-judges that p.  Grice uses ψ1 for potching and ψ2 for cotching. If P2 is co-operative, and abides by "The Ps Immanuel," P2 will honour, in a Kantian benevolent way, his partners goal by adopting temporarily his partners goal potch(x (portch(y, !p)) ⊃ potch(x, !p). But by then, its hardly simpler ways. Especially when the Ps outdo their progenitor Carnap as metaphysicians. The details are under “eschatology,” but the expressions are here “α izzes α.” This would be the principle of non-contradiction or identity. P1 applies it war, and utters War is war which yields a most peculiar implicaturum. “if α izzes β ∧ β izzes γ, α izz γ.” This is transitivity, which is crucial for Ps to overcome Berkeley’s counterexample to Locke, and define their identity over time. “if α hazzes β, α izzes β.” Or, what is accidental is not essential. A P may allow that what is essential is accidental while misleading, is boringly true. “α hazzes β iff α hazzes x ∧ x izzes β.” “If β is a katholou or universalium, β is an eidos or forma.” For surely Ps need not be stupid to fail to see squarrelhood. “if α hazzes β ∧ α izzes a particular, γ≠α ∧ α izz β.” “α izzes predicable of β iff ((β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α). “α izzes essentially predicable of β ⊃⊂ β izzes α  α izzes non-essentially/accidentally predicable of β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α). α = β iff α izzes β ∧ β izzes α. “α izzes an atomon, or individuum ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(β izzes α ⊃ α izzes β). “α izzes a particular ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(α izzes predicable of β ⊃ (α izzes β ∧ β izzes α)). α izzes a universalium ⊃⊂ ◊(∃β)(α izzes predicable of α ∧ ~(α izzes β ∧ β izzes α). α izzes some-thing ⊃ α izzes an individuum. α izzes an eidos or forma ⊃ (α izzes some-thing ∧ α izzes a universalium); α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ (β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α). “ α izzes essentially predicable of α  α izzes accidentally predicable of β ⊃ α ≠ β.  ~(α izzes accidentally predicable of β) ⊃ α ≠ β. α izzes an kathekaston or particular ⊃ α izzes an individuum; α izz a particular ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izz α). ~(∃x).(x izzes a particular ∧ x izzes a forma)  ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α). x izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃β)(α izzes β); α izzes a forma ⊃ ((α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ β hazzes α);  α izzes a forma ∧ β izzes a particular ⊃ (α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ β hazzes A); (α izzes a particular ∧ β izzes a universalium ∧ β izzes predicable of α) ⊃ (∃γ)(α ≠ γ ∧ γ izzes essentially predicable of α). (∃x) (∃y)(x izzes a particular ∧ y izzes a universalium ∧ y izzes predicable of x ⊃ ~(∀x)(x izzes a universalium ∧ x izzes some-thing).  (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes some-thing). α izzes a particular) ⊃ ~∃β.(α ≠ β ∧ β izzes essentially predicable of α). (α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ α izzes non-essentially or accidentally predicable of β.   Grice is following a Leibnizian tradition. A philosophical language is any constructed language that is constructed from first principles or certain ideologies.  It is considered a type of engineered language.  Philosophical languages were popular in Early Modern times, partly motivated by the goal of recovering the lost Adamic or Divine language.  The term “ideal language” is sometimes used near-synonymously, though more modern philosophical languages such as “Toki Pona” are less likely to involve such an exalted claim of perfection.  It may be known as a language of pure ideology.  The axioms and grammars of the languages together differ from commonly spoken languages today.  In most older philosophical languages, and some newer ones, words are constructed from a limited set of morphemes that are treated as "elemental" or fundamental. "Philosophical language" is sometimes used synonymously with "taxonomic language", though more recently there have been several conlangs constructed on philosophical principles which are not taxonomic. Vocabularies of oligo-synthetic communication-systems are made of compound expressions, which are coined from a small (theoretically minimal) set of morphemes; oligo-isolating communication-systems, such as Toki Pona, similarly use a limited set of root words but produce phrases which remain s. of distinct words.  Toki Pona is based on minimalistic simplicity, incorporating elements of Taoism. Láadan is designed to lexicalize and grammaticalise the concepts and distinctions important to women, based on muted group theory.  A priori languages are constructed languages where the vocabulary is invented directly, rather than being derived from other existing languages (as with Esperanto, or Grices Deutero-Esperanto, or Pirotese or Ido). It all starts when Carnap claims to know that pritos karulise elatically. Grice as engineer.  Pirotese is the philosophers engaging in Pology. Actually, Pirotese is the lingo the Ps parrot. Ps karulise elatically. But not all of them. Grice finds that the Pological talk allows to start from zero.  He is constructing a language, (basic) Pirotese, and the philosophical psychology and world that that language is supposed to represent or denote.  An obble is a Ps object. Grice introduces potching and cotching. To potch, in Pirotese, is what a P does with an obble: he perceives it. To cotch is Pirotese for what a P can further do with an obble: know or cognise it. Cotching, unlike potching, is factive.  Pirotese would not be the first language invented by a philosopher. Deutero-Esperanto -- Couturat, L., philosopher and logician who wrote on the history of philosophy, logic, philosophy of mathematics, and the possibility of a universal language. Couturat refuted Renouvier’s finitism and advocated an actual infinite in The Mathematical Infinite 6. He argued that the assumption of infinite numbers was indispensable to maintain the continuity of magnitudes. He saw a precursor of modern logistic in Leibniz, basing his interpretation of Leibniz on the Discourse on Metaphysics and Leibniz’s correspondence with Arnauld. His epoch-making Leibniz’s Logic 1 describes Leibniz’s metaphysics as panlogism. Couturat published a study on Kant’s mathematical philosophy Revue de Métaphysique, 4, and defended Peano’s logic, Whitehead’s algebra, and Russell’s logistic in The Algebra of Logic 5. He also contributed to André Lalande’s Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie 6. Refs.: While the reference to “Deutero-Esperanto’ comes from “Meaning revisited,” other keywords are useful, notably “Pirotese” and “Symbolo.” Also keywords like “obble,” and “pirot.” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

Grice the Deweyian: Grice was John Dewey Lecturer -- Dewey, J., philosopher, social critic, and theorist of education. During an era when philosophy was becoming thoroughly professionalized, Dewey remained a public philosopher having a profound international influence on politics and education. His career began inauspiciously in his student days at the  of Vermont and then as a high school teacher before he went on to study philosophy at the newly formed Johns Hopkins . There he studied with Peirce, G. S. Hall, and G. S. Morris, and was profoundly influenced by the version of Hegelian idealism propounded by Morris. After receiving his doctorate in 4, Dewey moved to the  of Michigan where he rejoined Morris, who had relocated there. At Michigan he had as a colleague the young social psychologist G. H. Mead, and during this period Dewey himself concentrated his writing in the general area of psychology. In 4 he accepted an appointment as chair of the Department of Philosophy, Psychology, and Education at the  of Chicago, bringing Mead with him. At Chicago Dewey was instrumental in founding the famous laboratory school, and some of his most important writings on education grew out of his work in that experimental school. In 4 he left Chicago for Columbia , where he joined F. J. E. Woodbridge, founder of The Journal of Philosophy. He retired from Columbia in 0 but remained active in both philosophy and public affairs until his death in 2. Over his long career he was a prolific speaker and writer, as evidenced by a literary output of forty books and over seven hundred articles. Philosophy. At the highest level of generality Dewey’s philosophical orientation can be characterized as a kind of naturalistic empiricism, and the two most fundamental notions in his philosophy can be gleaned from the title of his most substantial book, Experience and Nature 5. His concept of experience had its origin in his Hegelian background, but Dewey divested it of most of its speculative excesses. He clearly conceived of himself as an empiricist but was careful to distinguish his notion of experience both from that of the idealist tradition and from the empiricism of the classical British variety. The idealists had so stressed the cognitive dimension of experience that they overlooked the non-cognitive, whereas he saw the British variety as inappropriately atomistic and subjectivist. In contrast to these Dewey fashioned a notion of experience wherein action, enjoyment, and what he called “undergoing” were integrated and equally fundamental. The felt immediacy of experience what he generally characterized as its aesthetic quality was basic and irreducible. He then situated cognitive experience against this broader background as arising from and conditioned by this more basic experience. Cognitive experience was the result of inquiry, which was viewed as a process arising from a felt difficulty within our experience, proceeding through the stage of conceptual elaboration of possible resolutions, to a final reconstruction of the experience wherein the initial fragmented situation is transformed into a unified whole. Cognitive inquiry is this mediating process from experience to experience, and knowledge is what makes possible the final more integrated experience, which Dewey termed a “consummation.” On this view knowing is a kind of doing, and the criterion of knowledge is “warranted assertability.” On the first point, Dewey felt that one of the cardinal errors of philosophy from Plato to the modern period was what he called “the spectator theory of knowledge.” Knowledge had been viewed as a kind of passive recording of facts in the world and success was seen as a matter of the correspondence of our beliefs to these antecedent facts. To the contrary, Dewey viewed knowing as a constructive conceptual activity that anticipated and guided our adjustment to future experiential interactions with our environment. It was with this constructive and purposive view of thinking in mind that Dewey dubbed his general philosophical orientation instrumentalism. Concepts are instruments for dealing with our experienced world. The fundamental categories of knowledge are to be functionally understood, and the classical dualisms of philosophy mindbody, meansend, fact value are ultimately to be overcome. The purpose of knowing is to effect some alteration in the experiential situation, and for this purpose some cognitive proposals are more effective than others. This is the context in which “truth” is normally invoked, and in its stead Dewey proposed “warranted assertability.” He eschewed the notion of truth even in its less dangerous adjectival and adverbial forms, ‘true’ and ‘truly’ because he saw it as too suggestive of a static and finalized correspondence between two separate orders. Successful cognition was really a more dynamic matter of a present resolution of a problematic situation resulting in a reconstructed experience or consummation. “Warranted assertability” was the success characterization, having the appropriately normative connotation without the excess metaphysical baggage. Dewey’s notion of experience is intimately tied to his notion of nature. He did not conceive of nature as “the-world-as-it-would-be-independent-of-human-experience” but rather as a developing system of natural transactions admitting of a tripartite distinction between the physicochemical level, the psychophysical level, and the level of human experience with the understanding that this categorization was not to be construed as implying any sharp discontinuities. Experience itself, then, is one of the levels of transaction in nature and is not reducible to the other forms. The more austere, “scientific” representations of nature as, e.g., a purely mechanical system, Dewey construed as merely useful conceptualizations for specific cognitive purposes. This enabled him to distinguish his “naturalism,” which he saw as a kind of nonreductive empiricism, from “materialism,” which he saw as a kind of reductive rationalism. Dewey and Santayana had an ongoing dialogue on precisely this point. Dewey’s view was also naturalistic to the degree that it advocated the universal scope of scientific method. Influenced in this regard by Peirce, he saw scientific method not as restricted to a specific sphere but simply as the way we ought to think. The structure of all reflective thought is future-oriented and involves a movement from the recognition and articulation of a felt difficulty, through the elaboration of hypotheses as possible resolutions of the difficulty, to the stage of verification or falsification. The specific sciences physics, biology, psychology investigate the different levels of transactions in nature, but the scientific manner of investigation is simply a generalized sophistication of the structure of common sense and has no intrinsic restriction. Dewey construed nature as an organic unity not marked by any radical discontinuities that would require the introduction of non-natural categories or new methodological strategies. The sharp dualisms of mind and body, the individual and the social, the secular and the religious, and most importantly, fact and value, he viewed as conceptual constructs that have far outlived their usefulness. The inherited dualisms had to be overcome, particularly the one between fact and value inasmuch as it functioned to block the use of reason as the guide for human action. On his view people naturally have values as well as beliefs. Given human nature, there are certain activities and states of affairs that we naturally prize, enjoy, and value. The human problem is that these are not always easy to come by nor are they always compatible. We are forced to deal with the problem of what we really want and what we ought to pursue. Dewey advocated the extension of scientific method to these domains. The deliberative process culminating in a practical judgment is not unlike the deliberative process culminating in factual belief. Both kinds of judgment can be responsible or irresponsible, right or wrong. This deliberative sense of evaluation as a process presupposes the more basic sense of evaluation concerning those dimensions of human experience we prize and find fulfilling. Here too there is a dimension of appropriateness, one grounded in the kind of beings we are, where the ‘we’ includes our social history and development. On this issue Dewey had a very Grecian view, albeit one transposed into a modern evolutionary perspective. Fundamental questions of value and human fulfillment ultimately bear on our conception of the human commuDewey, John Dewey, John 230   230 nity, and this in turn leads him to the issues of democracy and education. Society and education. The ideal social order for Dewey is a structure that allows maximum selfdevelopment of all individuals. It fosters the free exchange of ideas and decides on policies in a manner that acknowledges each person’s capacity effectively to participate in and contribute to the direction of social life. The respect accorded to the dignity of each contributes to the common welfare of all. Dewey found the closest approximation to this ideal in democracy, but he did not identify contemporary democracies with this ideal. He was not content to employ old forms of democracy to deal with new problems. Consistent with instrumentalism, he maintained that we should be constantly rethinking and reworking our democratic institutions in order to make them ever more responsive to changing times. This constant rethinking placed a considerable premium on intelligence, and this underscored the importance of education for democracy. Dewey is probably best known for his views on education, but the centrality of his theory of education to his overall philosophy is not always appreciated. The fundamental aim of education for him is not to convey information but to develop critical methods of thought. Education is future-oriented and the future is uncertain; hence, it is paramount to develop those habits of mind that enable us adequately to assess new situations and to formulate strategies for dealing with the problematic dimensions of them. This is not to suggest that we should turn our backs on the past, because what we as a people have already learned provides our only guide for future activity. But the past is not to be valued for its own sake but for its role in developing and guiding those critical capacities that will enable us to deal with our ever-changing world effectively and responsibly. With the advent of the analytic tradition as the dominant style of philosophizing in America, Dewey’s thought fell out of favor. About the only arenas in which it continued to flourish were schools of education. However, with the recent revival of a general pragmatic orientation in the persons of Quine, Putnam, and Rorty, among others, the spirit of Dewey’s philosophy is frequently invoked. Holism, anti-foundationalism, contextualism, functionalism, the blurring of the lines between science and philosophy and between the theoretical and the practical  all central themes in Dewey’s philosophy  have become fashionable. Neo-pragmatism is a contemporary catchphrase. Dewey is, however, more frequently invoked than read, and even the Dewey that is invoked is a truncated version of the historical figure who constructed a comprehensive philosophical vision.

diagoge: Grice makes a triad here: apagoge, diagoge, and epagoge. Cf. Grice’s emphasis on the ‘argument’ involved in the conversational implciatum, though. To work out an impilcatum is to reach it ‘by argument.’ No argument, no conversational implicaturum. But cf. argument in Emissor draws skull and communicates that there is danger. ARGUMENT involved in that Emissor intends his addressee WILL REASON. Can the lady communicate to the pigeons that she is selling ‘twopence a bag’ for their pleasure? Grice contrasted epagoge with diagoge. Cooperation with competition. Cooperative game with competitive game. But epagoge is induction, so here we’ll consider his views on probability and how it contrastds with diagoge. The diagoge is easy to identity: Grice is a social animal, with the BA, Philosophy, conferences, discussion, The American Philosophical Association, transcripts by Randall Parker, from the audio-tapes contained in c. 10 within the same s. IV miscellaneous, Beanfest, transcripts and audio-cassettes, s. IV, c. 6-f. 8, and f. 10, and s. V, c. 8-f.  4-8 Unfortunately, Parker typed carulise for karulise, or not. Re: probability, Grice loves to reminisce an anecdote concerning his tutor Hardie at Corpus when Hardie invoked Mills principles to prove that Hardie was not responsible for a traffic jam. In drafts on word play, Grice would speak of not bringing more Grice to your Mill. Mills System of Logic was part of the reading material for his degree in Lit. Hum.at Oxford, so he was very familiar with it. Mill represents the best of the English empiricist tradition. Grice kept an interest on inductive methodology. In his Life and opinions he mentions some obscure essays by Kneale and Keynes on the topic. Grice was interested in Kneales secondary induction, since Grice saw this as an application of a construction routine. He was also interested in Keyness notion of a generator property, which he found metaphysically intriguing. Induction. Induction ‒ Mill’s Induction, induction, deduction, abduction, Mill. More Grice to the Mill. Grice loved Hardies playing with Mill’s method of difference with an Oxford copper. He also quotes Kneale and Keynes on induction. Note that his seven-step derivation of akrasia relies on an inductive step! Grice was fortunate to associate with Davidson, whose initial work is on porbability. Grice borrows from Davidson the idea that inductive probability, or probable, attaches to the doxastic, while prima facie attaches to desirably, or desirability.  Jeffreys notion of desirability is partition-invariant in that if a proposition, A, can be expressed as the disjoint disjunction of both {B1, B2, B3} and {C1, C2, C3}, ∑ Bi ∈ AProb (Bi ∣∣ A). Des (Bi) = ∑Ci ∈ A Prob (Ci ∣∣ A). Des (Ci). It follows that applying the rule of desirability maximization will always lead to the same recommendation, irrespective of how the decision problem is framed, while an alternative theory may recommend different courses of action, depending on how the decision problem is formulated.  Here, then, is the analogue of Jeffreys desirability axiom (D), applied to sentences rather than propositions: (D) (prob(s and t) = 0 and prob(s or t) "# 0, ⊃ d ( ) prob(s)des(s)+ prob(t)des(t) es s or t =-"---- prob( s) + prob(t ) (Grice writes prob(s) for the Subjectsive probability of sand des(s) for the desirability or utility of s.) B. Jeffrey admits that "desirability" (his terms for evidential value) does not directly correspond to any single pre-theoretical notion of desire. Instead, it provides the best systematic explication of the decision theoretic idea, which is itself our best effort to make precise the intuitive idea of weighing options. As Jeffrey remarks, it is entirely possibly to desire someone’s love when you already have it. Therefore, as Grice would follow, Jeffrey has the desirability operator fall under the scope of the probability operator. The agents desire that p provided he judges that p does not obtain. Diagoge/epagoge, Grices audio-files, the audio-files, audio-files of various lectures and conferences, some seminars with Warner and J. Baker, audio files of various lectures and conferences. Subjects: epagoge, diagoge. A previous folder in the collection contains the transcripts. These are the audio-tapes themselves, obviously not in folder. The kind of metaphysical argument which I have in mind might be said, perhaps, to exemplify a dia-gogic or trans-ductive as opposed to epa-gogic or in-ductive approach to philosophical argumentation. Hence Short and Lewis have, for ‘diagoge,’ the cognates of ‘trādūco,’ f. transduco. Now, the more emphasis is placed on justification by elimination of the rival, the greater is the impetus given to refutation, whether of theses or of people. And perhaps a greater emphasis on a diagogic procedure, if it could be shown to be justifiable, would have an eirenic effect. Cf. Aristotle on diagoge, schole, otium. Liddell and Scott have “διαγωγή,” which they render as “literally carrying across,” -- “τριήρων” Polyaen.5.2.6, also as “carrying through,” and “hence fig.” “ἡ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν δ., “taking a person through a subject by instruction, Pl. Ep.343; so, course of instruction, lectures, ἐν τῇ ἐνεστώσῃ δ. prob. in Phld. Piet.25; also passing of life, way or course of life, “δ. βίου” Pl. R.344e: abs., Id. Tht.177a, etc., way of passing time, amusement, “δ. μετὰ παιδιᾶς” Arist. EN 1127b34, cf. 1177a27; “δ. ἐλευθέριος” Id. Pol.1339b5; διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν public pastimes, ib.1280b37, cf. Plu.126b (pl.). also delay, D.C. 57.3. management, τῶν πραγμάτων δ. dispatch of business, Id.48.5. IV. station for ships, f. l. in Hdn.4.2.8. And there are other entries to consider: διαγωγάν: διαίρεσιν, διανομήν, διέλευσιν. Grice knew what he was talking about! Refs.: The main sources listed under ‘desirability,’ above. There is a specific essay on ‘probability and life.’ Good keywords, too, are epagoge and induction The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

dialogical implicaturum – Grice seldom uses ‘dialogue.’ It’s always conversational with him. He must have thought that ‘dialogue’ was too Buberian. In Roman, ‘she had a conversation with him’ means ‘she had sex with him.’ “She had a dialogue with him” does not. Classicists are obsessed with the beginning of Greek theatre: it all started with ‘dialogue.’ It wasn’t like Aeschylus needed a partner. He wrote the parts for BOTH. Was he reconstructing naturally-occurring Athenian dialogue? Who knows! The *two*-actor rule, which was indeed preceded by a convention in which only a single actor would appear on stage, along with the chorus. It was in 471 B. C. that Aeschylus introduces a second actor, called Cleander. You see, Aeschylus always cast himself as protagonist in his own plays. For the season of 471 B. C., the Athenians were surprised when Aeschylus introduced Cleander as his deuteragonist. “I can now conversationally implicate!” he said to a cheering crowd! Dialogism -- Bakhtin: m. m., philosopher of dialogism -- and cultural theorist whose influence is pervasive in a wide range of academic disciplines  from literary hermeneutics to the epistemology of the human sciences, and cultural theory. He may legitimately be called a philosophical anthropologist in the venerable Continental tradition. Because of his seminal work on Rabelais and Dostoevsky’s poetics, Baden School Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich 70   70 his influence has been greatest in literary hermeneutics. Without question dialogism, or the construal of dialogue, is the hallmark of Bakhtin’s thought. Dialogue marks the existential condition of humanity in which the self and the other are asymmetrical but double-binding. In his words, to exist means to communicate dialogically, and when the dialogue ends, everything else ends. Unlike Hegelian and Marxian dialectics but like the Chin. correlative logic of yin and yang, Bakhtin’s dialogism is infinitely polyphonic, open-ended, and indeterminate, i.e., “unfinalizable”  to use his term. Dialogue means that there are neither first nor last words. The past and the future are interlocked and revolve around the axis of the present. Bakhtin’s dialogism is paradigmatic in a threefold sense. First, dialogue is never abstract but embodied. The lived body is the material condition of social existence as ongoing dialogue. Not only does the word become enfleshed, but dialogue is also the incorporation of the self and the other. Appropriately, therefore, Bakhtin’s body politics may be called a Slavic version of Tantrism. Second, the Rabelaisian carnivalesque that Bakhtin’s dialogism incorporates points to the “jesterly” politics of resistance and protest against the “priestly” establishment of officialdom. Third, the most distinguishing characteristic of Bakhtin’s dialogism is the primacy of the other over the self, with a twofold consequence: one concerns ethics and the other epistemology. In modern philosophy, the discovery of “Thou” or the primacy of the other over the self in asymmetrical reciprocity is credited to Feuerbach. It is hailed as the “Copernican revolution” of mind, ethics, and social thought. Ethically, Bakhtin’s dialogism, based on heteronomy, signals the birth of a new philosophy of responsibility that challenges and transgresses the Anglo- tradition of “rights talk.” Epistemologically, it lends our welcoming ears to the credence that the other may be right  the attitude that Gadamer calls the soul of dialogical hermeneutics. 

diaphaneity: Grice unique in his subtlety. Strawson and Wiggins. 'the quality of being freely pervious to light; transparency', OED. This is a crucial concept for Grice. He applies it ‘see,’ which which, after joint endeavours with G. J. Warnock, he was obsessed! Grice considers the ascription, “Warnock sees that it is raining.” And then he adds, “And it is true, I see that it is raining, too.” What’s the diference. Then comes Strawson. “Strawson, you see that it is raining, right?” So we have an ascription in the first, second, and third persons. When it comes to the identification of a sense (like vision) via experience or qualia, we are at a problem, because ‘see,’ allowing for what Ryle calls a ‘conversational avowal,’ that nobody has an authority to distrust, is what Grice calls a ‘diaphanous’ predicate. More formally. That means that “Grice sees that it is raining,” in terms of experience, cannot really be expanded except by expanding into WHAT IS that Grice sees, viz. that it is raining. The same with “communicating that p,” and “meaning that p.”

dictum: Cf. dictor, and dictivenss. Not necessarily involved with ‘say,’ but with ‘deixis,’ So a dictum is involved in Emissor E drawing a skull, communicating that there is danger. It is Hare who introduced ‘dictum’ in the Oxonian philosophical literature in his T. H. Green Essay. Hare distinguishes between the ‘dictum,’ that the cat is on the mat, from the ‘dictor,’ ‘I state that the cat is on the mat, yes.’ ‘Cat, on the mat, please.’ Grice often refers to Hare’s play with words, which he obviously enjoys. In “Epilogue,” Grice elaborates on the ‘dictum,’ and turns it into ‘dictivitas.’ How does he coin that word? He starts with Cicero, who has ‘dictivm,’ and creates an abstract noun to match. Grice needs a concept of a ‘dictum’ ambiguous as it is. Grice distinguishes between what an Utterer explicitly conveys, e. g. that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. Then there’s what Grice implicitly conveys, to wit: that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed – in that order. Surely Grice has STATED that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. Grice has ASSERTED that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. But if Grice were to order Strawson: “Put on your parachute and jump!” the implicatura may differ. By uttering that utterance, Grice has not asserted or stated anything. So Grice needs a dummy that will do for indicatives and imperatives. ‘Convey’ usually does – especially in the modality ‘explicitly’ convey. Because by uttering that utterance Grice has explicitly conveyed that Strawson is to put on his parachute and jump. Grice has implicitly conveyd that Strawson is to put on his parachute and THEN jump, surely.

Griceian dignitas: a moral worth or status usually attributed to human persons. Persons are said to have dignity as well as to express it. Persons are typically thought to have 1 “human dignity” an dichotomy paradox dignity 234   234 intrinsic moral worth, a basic moral status, or both, which is had equally by all persons; and 2 a “sense of dignity” an awareness of one’s dignity inclining toward the expression of one’s dignity and the avoidance of humiliation. Persons can lack a sense of dignity without consequent loss of their human dignity. In Kant’s influential account of the equal dignity of all persons, human dignity is grounded in the capacity for practical rationality, especially the capacity for autonomous self-legislation under the categorical imperative. Kant holds that dignity contrasts with price and that there is nothing  not pleasure nor communal welfare nor other good consequences  for which it is morally acceptable to sacrifice human dignity. Kant’s categorical rejection of the use of persons as mere means suggests a now-common link between the possession of human dignity and human rights see, e.g., the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. One now widespread discussion of dignity concerns “dying with dignity” and the right to conditions conducive thereto.

Griceian dilemma, a trilemma, tetralemma, monolemma, lemma  – Grice thought that Ryle’s dilemmas were overrated. Strictly, a ‘dilemma’ is a piece of reasoning or argument or argument form in which one of the premises is a disjunction, featuring “or.” Constructive dilemmas take the form ‘If A and B, if C, D, A or C; therefore, B or D’ and are instances of modus ponendo ponens in the special case where A is C and B is D; A so-called ‘destructive’ dilemma is of the form ‘If A, B, if C, D, not-B or not-D; therefore, not-A or not-C’ and it is  likewise an instance of modus tollendo tollens in that special case. A dilemma in which the disjunctive premise is false is commonly known as a “false” dilemma, which is one of Ryle’s dilemmas: “a category mistake!”

diminutive: diminished capacity: explored by Grice in his analysis of legal versus moral right -- a legal defense to criminal liability that exists in two distinct forms: 1 the mens rea variant, in which a defendant uses evidence of mental abnormality to cast doubt on the prosecution’s assertion that, at the time of the crime, the defendant possessed the mental state criteria, the mens rea, required by the legal definition of the offense charged; and 2 the partial responsibility variant, in which a defendant uses evidence of mental abnormality to support a claim that, even if the defendant’s mental state satisfied the mens rea criteria for the offense, the defendant’s responsibility for the crime is diminished and thus the defendant should be convicted of a lesser crime and/or a lesser sentence should be imposed. The mental abnormality may be produced by mental disorder, intoxication, trauma, or other causes. The mens rea variant is not a distinct excuse: a defendant is simply arguing that the prosecution cannot prove the definitional, mental state criteria for the crime. Partial responsibility is an excuse, but unlike the similar, complete excuse of legal insanity, partial responsibility does not produce total acquittal; rather, a defendant’s claim is for reduced punishment. A defendant may raise either or both variants of diminished capacity and the insanity defense in the same case. For example, a common definition of firstdegree murder requires the prosecution to prove that a defendant intended to kill and did so after premeditation. A defendant charged with this crime might raise both variants as follows. To deny the allegation of premeditation, a defendant might claim that the killing occurred instantaneously in response to a “command hallucination.” If believed, a defendant cannot be convicted of premeditated homicide, but can be convicted of the lesser crime of second-degree murder, which typically requires only intent. And even a defendant who killed intentionally and premeditatedly might claim partial responsibility because the psychotic mental state rendered the agent’s reasons for action nonculpably irrational. In this case, either the degree of crime might be reduced by operation of the partial excuse, rather than by negation of definitional mens rea, or a defendant might be convicted of first-degree murder but given a lesser penalty. In the United States the mens rea variant exists in about half the jurisdictions, although its scope is usually limited in various ways, primarily to avoid a defendant’s being acquitted and freed if mental abnormality negated all the definitional mental state criteria of the crime charged. In English law, the mens rea variant exists but is limited by the type of evidence usable to support it. No  jurisdiction has adopted a distinct, straightforward partial responsibility variant, but various analogous doctrines and procedures are widely accepted. For example, partial responsibility grounds both the doctrine that intentional killing should be reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter if a defendant acted “in the heat of passion” upon legally adequate provocation, and the sentencing judge’s discretion to award a decreased sentence based on a defendant’s mental abnormality. In addition to such partial responsibility analogues, England, Wales, and Scotland have directly adopted the partial responsibility variant, termed “diminished responsibility,” but it applies only to prosecutions for murder. “Diminished responsibility” reduces a conviction to a lesser crime, such as manslaughter or culpable homicide, for behavior that would otherwise constitute murder. 

direction of fit – referred to by Grice in “Intention and uncertainty,” and symbolized by an upward arrow and a downward arrow – there are only TWO directions (or senses) of fit: expressum to ‘re’ and ‘re’ to expressum. The first is indicativus modus; the second is imperativus modus -- according to his thesis of aequivocality – the direction of fit is overrated -- a metaphor that derives from a story in Anscombe’s Intention 7 about a detective who follows a shopper around town making a list of the things that the shopper buys. As Anscombe notes, whereas the detective’s list has to match the way the world is each of the things the shopper buys must be on the detective’s list, the shopper’s list is such that the world has to fit with it each of the things on the list are things that he must buy. The metaphor is now standardly used to describe the difference between kinds of speech act assertions versus commands and mental states beliefs versus desires. For example, beliefs are said to have the world-to-mind direction of fit because it is in the nature of beliefs that their contents are supposed to match the world: false beliefs are to be abandoned. Desires are said to have the opposite mind-to-world direction of fit because it is in the nature of desires that the world is supposed to match their contents. This is so at least to the extent that the role of an unsatisfied desire that the world be a certain way is to prompt behavior aimed at making the world that way. 

disgrice: In PGRICE, Kemmerling speaks of disgricing as the opposite of gricing. The first way to disgrice Kemmerling calls ‘strawsonising.’For Strawson, even the resemblance (for Grice, equivalence in terms of 'iff' -- cf. his account of what an syntactically structured non-complete expression) between (G) There is not a single volume in my uncle’s library which is not by an English author,’and the negatively existential form (LFG) ~ (Ex)(Ax . ~ Bx)’ is deceptive, ‘It is not the case that there exists an x  such that x is a book in Grice’s uncle’s library and x is written by an Englishman. FIRST, 'There is not a single volume in uncle’s library which is not by an English author' -- as normally used, carries the presupposition -- or entails, for Grice --  (G2) Some (at least one) book is in Grice’s uncle’s library. SECOND, 'There is not a single volume in Grice’s uncle’s library which is not by an English author,’ is far from being 'entailed' by (G3e) It is not the case that there is some (at least one) book in my room. If we give ‘There not a single book in my room which is not by an English author’ the modernist logical form ‘~ (Ex)(Ax .~ Bx),’ we see that this is ENTAILED by the briefer, and indeed logicall stronger (in terms of entailments) ~ (Ex)Ax. So when Grice, with a solemn face, utters, ‘There is not a single foreign volume in my uncle’s library, to reveal later that the library is empty, Grice should expect his addressee to get some odd feeling. Surely not the feeling of having been lied to -- or been confronted with an initial false utterance --, because we have not. Strawson gets the feeling of having been made "the victim of a sort of communicative outrage." "What you say is outrageous!" This sounds stronger than it is. An outrage is believed to be an evil deed, offense, crime; affront, indignity, act not within established or reasonable limits," of food, drink, dress, speech, etc., from Old French outrage "harm, damage; insult; criminal behavior; presumption, insolence, overweening" (12c.), earlier oltrage (11c.), From Vulgar Latin ‘ultraticum,’ excess," from Latin ultra, beyond" (from suffixed form of PIE root *al- "beyond"). Etymologically, "the passing beyond reasonable bounds" in any sense. The meaning narrowed in English toward violent excesses because of folk etymology from out + rage. Of injuries to feelings, principles, etc., from outrage, v. outragen, "to go to excess, act immoderately," from outrage (n.) or from Old French oultrager. From 1580s with meaning "do violence to, attack, maltreat." Related: Outraged; outraging. But Strawson gets the feeling of having been made "the victim of a sort of communicative outrage.” When Grice was only trying to tutor him in The Organon. Of course it is not the case that Grice is explicitly conveying or expressing that there there is some (at least one) book in his uncle's room. Grice has not said anything false. Or rather, it is not the case that Grice utters an utterance which is not alethically or doxastically satisfactory. Yet what Grice gives Strawson the defeasible, cancellable, license to to assume that Grice thinks there is at least one book. Unless he goes on to cancel the implicaturum, Grice may be deemed to be misleading Strawson. What Grice explicitly conveys to be true (or false) it is necessary (though not sufficient) that there should at least one volume in his uncle’s library -- It is not the case that my uncle has a library and in that library all the books are autochthonous to England, i.e. it is not the case that Grice’s uncle has a library; for starters, it is not the case that Grice has a literate uncle. Of this SUBTLE, nuantic, or cloudy or foggy, "slight or delicate degree of difference in expression, feeling, opinion, etc.," from Fr. nuance "slight difference, shade of colour,” from nuer "to shade," from nue "cloud," from Gallo-Roman nuba, from Latin nubes "a cloud, mist, vapour," sneudh- "fog," source also of Avestan snaoda "clouds,"  Latin obnubere "to veil," Welsh nudd "fog," Greek nython, in Hesychius "dark, dusky") According to Klein, the French usage is a reference to "the different colours of the clouds,” in reference to color or tone, "a slight variation in shade; of music, as a French term in English --  'sort' is the relation between ‘There is not a volume in my uncle's library which is not by an English author,’ and ‘My uncle's library is not empty. RE-ENTER GRICE. Grice suggested that Strawson see such a fine point such as that, which Grice had the kindness to call an 'implicaturum', the result of an act of an ‘implicatura’ (they were both attending Kneale’s seminar on the growth and ungrowth of logic) is irrelevant to the issue of ‘entailment’. It is a 'merely pragmatic’ implicaturum, Grice would say, bringing forward a couple of distinctions: logical/pragmatic point; logical/pragmatic inference; entailment/implicaturum; conveying explicitly/conveying implicitly; stating/implicating; asserting/implying; what an utterer means/what the expression 'means' -- but cf. Nowell-Smith, who left Oxford after being overwhelmed by Grice, "this is how the rules of etiquette inform the rules of logic -- on the 'rule' of relevance in "Ethics," 1955. If to call such a point, as Grice does, as "irrelevant to logic" is vacuous in that it may be interpreted as saying that that such a fine foggy point is not considered in a modernist formal system of first-order predicate calculus with identity, this Strawson wishes not to dispute, but to emphasise. Call it his battle cry! But to 'logic' as concerned with this or that relation between this or that general class of statement occurring in ordinary use, and the attending general condition under which this or that statement is correctly called 'true' or 'false,' this fine foggy nice point would hardly be irrelevant. GRICE'S FORMALIST (MODERNIST) INTERPRETATION. Some 'pragmatic' consideration, or assumption, or expectation, a desideratum of conversational conduct obviously underlies and in fact 'explains' the implicaturum, without having to change the ‘sense’ of Aristotle’s syllogistics in terms of the logical forms of A, E, I, and O. If we abide by an imperative of conversational helpfulness, enjoining the maximally giving and receiving of information and the influencing and being influenced by others in the institution of a decisions, the sub-imperative follows to the effect, ‘Thou shalt NOT make a weak move compared to the stronger one that thou canst truthfully make, and with equal or greater economy of means.’ Assume the form ‘There is not a single … which is not . . .,’ or ‘It is not the case that ... there is some (at least one) x that ... is not ... is introduced in ‘ordinary’ language with the same SENSE as the expression in the ‘ideal’ language, ~(Ex)(Ax and ~Bx). Then prohibition inhibits the utterance of the form where the utterer can truly and truthfully simply convey explicitly ‘There is not a single ..., i. e. ~(Ex)(Fx). It is defeasible prohibition which tends to confer on the overprolixic form ('it is not the case that ... there is some (at least one) x that is not ...')  just that kind of an implicaturum which Strawson identifies.  But having detected a nuance in a conversational phenomenon is not the same thing as rushing ahead to try to explain it BEFORE exploring in some detail what kind of a nuance it is. The mistake is often commited by Austin, too (in "Other Minds," and "A Plea for Excuses"), and by Hart (on 'carefully'), and by Hare (on "good"), and by Strawson on 'true,' (Analysis), ‘the,’ and 'if -- just to restrict to the play group. Grice tries to respond to anti-sense-datum in "That pillar box seems red to me,” but Strawson was not listening.  The overprolixic form in the ‘ordinary’ language, ‘It is not the case that there is some (at least one x) such that ... x is not ...’ would tend, if it does not remain otiose, to develop or generate just that baffling effect in one's addressee ('outrage!') that Strawson identifies, as opposed to the formal-device in the ‘ideal’ language with which the the ‘ordinary’ language counterpart is co-related. What weakens our resistance to the negatively existential analysis in this case more than in the case of the corresponding "All '-sentence is the powerful attraction of the negative opening phrase There is not …'.  To avoid misunderstanding one may add a point about the neo-traditionalist interpretation of the forms of the traditional Aristotelian system. Strawson is not claiming that it faithfully represents this or that intention of the principal exponent of the Square of Opposition. Appuleius, who knows, was perhaps, more interested in formulating this or that theorem governing this or that logical relation of this or that more imposing general statement than this or that everyday general statement that Strawson considers. Appuleius, who knows, might have been interested, e. g., in the logical powers of this or that generalisation, or this or that sentence which approximates more closely to the desired conditions that if its utterance by anyone, at any time, at any place, results in a true statement, so does its utterance by anyone else, at any other time, at any other place.  How far the account by the neo-traditionalist of this or that general sentence of 'ordinary' langauge is adequate for every generalization may well be under debate. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “In defence of Appuleius,” BANC.

disimplicaturum: “We should not conclude from this that an implication of the existence of thing said to be seen is NOT part of the conventional meaning of ‘see’ nor even (as some philosophers have done) that there is one sense of ‘see’ which lacks this implication!” (WoW:44). If Oxonians are obsessed with ‘implication,’ do they NEED ‘disimplicaturum’? Grice doesn’t think so! But sometimes you have to use it to correct a mistake. Grice does not give names, but he says he has heard a philosopher claim that there are two SENSES of ‘see,’ one which what one sees exists, and one in which it doesn’t! It would be good to trace that! It relates, in any case to ‘remembers,’but not quite, and to ‘know.’ But not quite. The issue of ‘see’ is not that central, since Grice realizes that it is just a modality of perception, even if crucial. He coined ‘visum’ with Warnock to play with the idea of ‘what is seen’ NOT being existent.  On another occasion, when he cannot name a ridiculous philosopher, he invents him: “A philosopher will not be given much credit if he comes with an account of the indefinite ‘one’ as having three senses: one proximate to the emissor (“I broke a finger”), one distant (“He’s meeting a woman”) and one where the link is not specified (“A flower”). he target is of course Davidson having the cheek to quote Grice’s Henriette Herz Trust lecture for the BA! Lewis and Short have ‘intendere’ under ‘in-tendo,’ which they render as ‘to stretch out or forth, extend, also to turn ones attention to, exert one’s self for, to purpose, endeavour,” and finaly as “intend”! “pergin, sceleste, intendere hanc arguere?” Plaut. Mil. 2, 4, 27 Grices tends towards claiming that you cannot extend what you dont intend. In the James lectures, Grice mentions the use of is to mean seem (The tie is red in this light), and see to mean hallucinate. Denying Existence: The Logic, Epistemology and Pragmatics of ...books.google.com › books ... then it seems unidiomatic if not ungrammatical to speak of hallucinations as ... that fighting people and 156 APPEARING UNREALS 4 Two Senses of "See"? A. Chakrabarti - 1997 - ‎Language Arts & Disciplines    The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and ...books.google.com › books sight, say sense-data; others will then say that there are two senses of 'see'. ... wrong because I am dreaming or hallucinating them, which of course could ... Stanley Cavell - 1999 - ‎Philosophy    Wittgenstein and Perception - Page 37 - Google Books Resultbooks.google.com › books For example, Gilbert Harman characterises the two senses of see as follows: see† = 'the ... which is common to genuine cases of seeing and to hallucinations. Michael Campbell, ‎Michael O'Sullivan - 2015 - ‎Philosophy    The Alleged Ambiguity of'See'www.jstor.org › stable including dreams, hallucinations and the perception of physical objects. ... existence of at least two senses of ' see' were his adherence to the doctrine that 'see' ... by AR White - ‎1963 - ‎Cited by 3 - ‎Related articles    Seeing and Naming - jstorwww.jstor.org › stable there are or aren't two senses of 'see'. If there are, I'm speaking of ... The third kind of case is illustrated by Macbeth's dagger hallucination, at least if we assume ... by RJ Hall - ‎1977 - ‎Cited by 3 - ‎Related articles    Philosophy at LaGuardia Community Collegewww.laguardia.edu › Philosophy › GADFLY-2011 PDF Lastly, I will critically discuss Ayer's two senses of 'see', ... (e.g., hallucinations); it thus seems correct to say that ... Hallucinations are hallucinations. There are.    Talking about seeing: An examination of some aspects of the ...etd.ohiolink.edu › ... I propose a distinction between delusions and hallucinations,'and argue ... say that there are two senses of .'see* in ordinary language or not, he does, as I will ... by KA Emmett - ‎1974 - ‎Related articles    Wittgenstein and Perceptionciteseerx.ist.psu.edu › viewdoc › download PDF 2 Two senses of 'see'. 33 ... may see things that are not there, for example in hallucinations. ... And so, hallucinations are not genuine perceptual experiences. by Y Arahata - ‎Related articles    Allen Blur - University of Yorkwww-users.york.ac.uk › Publications_files PDF of subjectively indistinguishable hallucination (e.g. Crane 2006). ... and material objects of sight, and correlatively for a distinction between two senses of 'see',. by K Allen - ‎Related articles    Austin and sense-data - UBC Library Open Collectionsopen.library.ubc.ca › ... › UBC Theses and Dissertations Sep 15, 2011 - (5) Illusions and Hallucinations It is not enough to reject Austin's way of ... I will not deal with Austin and Ayer on "two senses of 'see'" because I ... by DD Todd - ‎1967 - ‎Cited by 1 - ‎Related articles. Godfrey Vesey (1965, p. 73) deposes, "if a person sees something at all it must look like something to him, even if it only looks like 'somebody doing something.' With Davidson, Grice was more cavalier, because he could blame it on a different ‘New-World’ dialect or idiolect, about ‘intend.’ When Grice uses ‘disimplicaturum’ to apply to ‘cream in coffee’ that is a bit tangential – and refers more generally to his theory of communication. What would the rationale of disimplicaturum be? In this case, if the emissee realizes the obvious category mistake (“She’s not the cream in your coffee”) there may be a need to disimplicate explicitly. To consider. There is an example that he gives that compares with ‘see’ and it is even more philosophical but he doesn’t give examples: to use ‘is’ when one means ‘seem’ (the tie example).  The reductive analyses of being and seeing hold. We have here two cases of loose use (or disimplicaturum). Same now with his example in “Intention and Uncertainty” (henceforth, “Uncertainty”): Smith intends to climb Mt. Everest + [common-ground status: this is difficult]. Grices response to Davidsons pretty unfair use of Grices notion of conversational implicaturum in Davidsons analysis of intention caught a lot of interest. Pears loved Grices reply. Implicaturum here is out of the question ‒ disimplicaturum may not. Grice just saw that his theory of conversation is too social to be true when applied to intending. The doxastic condition is one of the entailments in an ascription of an intending. It cannot be cancelled as an implicaturum can. If it can be cancelled, it is best seen as a disimplicaturum, or a loose use by an utterer meaning less than what he says or explicitly conveys to more careful conversants. Grice and Davidson were members of The Grice and Davidson Mutual Admiration Society. Davidson, not being Oxonian, was perhaps not acquainted with Grices polemics at Oxford with Hart and Hampshire (where Grice sided with Pears, rather). Grice and Pears hold a minimalist approach to intending. On the other hand, Davidson makes what Grice sees as the same mistake again of building certainty into the concept. Grice finds that to apply the idea of a conversational implicaturum at this point is too social to be true. Rather, Grice prefers to coin the conversational disimplicaturum: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees. The utterance above, if merely reporting what Bloggs thinks, may involve a loose use of intends. The certainty on the agents part on the success of his enterprise is thus cast with doubt. Davidson was claiming that the agents belief in the probability of the object of the agents intention was a mere conversational implicaturum on the utterers part. Grice responds that the ascription of such a belief is an entailment of a strict use of intend, even if, in cases where the utterer aims at a conversational disimplicaturum, it can be dropped.  The addressee will still regard the utterer as abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness. Pears was especially interested in the Davidson-Grice polemic on intending, disimplicaturum, disimplicaturum. Strictly, a section of his reply to Davidson. If Grices claim to fame is implicaturum, he finds disimplicaturum an intriguing notion to capture those occasions when an utterer means LESS than he says. His examples include: a loose use of intending (without the entailment of the doxastic condition), the uses of see in Shakespeareian contexts (Macbeth saw Banquo, Hamlet saw his father on the ramparts of Elsinore) and the use of is to mean seems (That tie is blue under this light, but green otherwise, when both conversants know that a change of colour is out of the question. He plays with Youre the cream in my coffee being an utterance where the disimplicaturum (i.e. entailment dropping) is total. Disimplicaturum does not appeal to a new principle of conversational rationality. It is perfectly accountable by the principle of conversational helpfulness, in particular, the desideratum of conversational candour. In everyday explanation we exploit, as Grice notes, an immense richness in the family of expressions that might be thought of as the wanting family. This wanting family includes expressions like want, desire, would like to, is eager to, is anxious to, would mind not…, the idea of  appeals to me, is thinking of, etc. As Grice remarks, The likeness and differences within this wanting family demand careful attention. In commenting on Davidsons treatment of wanting in Intending, Grice notes: It seems to Grice that the picture of the soul suggested by Davidsons treatment of wanting is remarkably tranquil and, one might almost say, computerized. It is the picture of an ideally decorous board meeting, at which the various heads of sections advance, from the standpoint of their particular provinces, the case for or against some proposed course of action. In the end the chairman passes judgement, effective for action; normally judiciously, though sometimes he is for one reason or another over-impressed with the presentation made by some particular member. Grices soul doesnt seem to him, a lot of the time, to be like that at all. It is more like a particularly unpleasant department meeting, in which some members shout, wont listen, and suborn other members to lie on their behalf; while the chairman, who is often himself under suspicion of cheating, endeavours to impose some kind of order; frequently to no effect, since sometimes the meeting breaks up in disorder, sometimes, though it appears to end comfortably, in reality all sorts of enduring lesions are set up, and sometimes, whatever the outcome of the meeting, individual members go off and do things unilaterally. Could it be that Davidson, of the New World, and Grice, of the Old World, have different idiolects regarding intend? Could well be! It is said that the New World is prone to hyperbole, so perhaps in Grices more cautious use, intend is restricted to the conditions HE wants it to restrict it too! Odd that for all the generosity he displays in Post-war Oxford philosophy (Surely I can help you analyse you concept of this or that, even if my use of the corresponding expression does not agree with yours), he goes to attack Davidson, and just for trying to be nice and apply the conversational implicaturum to intend! Genial Grice! It is natural Davidson, with his naturalistic tendencies, would like to see intending as merely invoking in a weak fashion the idea of a strong psychological state as belief. And its natural that Grice hated that! Refs.: The source is Grice’s comment on Davidson on intending. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

disjunctum: Strangely enough Ariskant thought disjunctum, but not conjunctum a categorial related to the category of ‘community’!Aulus Gellius (The Attic Nights, XVI, 8) tells us about this disjunction: “There also is ■ another type of a^twpa which the Greeks call and we call disjunctum, disjunctive sentence. Gellius notes that ‘or’ is by default ‘inclusive’: where one or several propositions may be simultaneously true, without ex- cluding one another, although they may also all be false. Gellius expands on the non-default reading of exclusive disjunction: pleasure is either good or bad or it is neither good nor bad (“Aut malum est voluplas, aut bonum, aul neque bonum, neque malum est”). All the elements of the exclusive disjunctive exclude one another, and their contradictory elements, Gr. avTtxs'-p.sva, are incompatible with one another”. “Ex omnibus quae disjunguntiir, unum esse verum debet, falsa cetera.”Grice lists ‘or’ as the second binary functor in his response to Strawson. But both Grice and Strawson agreed that the Oxonian expert on ‘or’ is Wood. Mitchell is good, too, though. The relations between “v” and “or” (or “either ... or …”) are, on the whole, less intimate than those between “.” and “and,” but less distant than those between “D” and “if.” Let us speak of a statement made by coupling two clauses by “or” as an alternative statement ; and let us speak of the first and second alternatesof such a statement, on analogy with our talk of the antecedent and consequent of a hypothetical statement. At a bus-stop, someone might say: “Either we catch this bus or we shall have to walk all the way home.” He might equally well have said “If we don't catch this bus, we shall have to walk all the way home.” It will be seen that the antecedent of the hypothetical statement he might have made is the negation of the first alternate of the alternative statement he did make. Obviously, we should not regard our catching the bus as a sufficient condition of the 'truth' of either statement; if it turns out that the bus we caught was not the last one, we should say that the man who had made the statement had been wrong. The truth of one of the alternates is no more a sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement than the falsity of the antecedent is a sufficient condition of the truth of the hypothetical statement. And since 'p"Dpyq' (and, equally, * q"3p v q ') is a law of the truth-functional system, this fact sufficiently shows a difference between at least one standard use of “or” and the meaning given to “v.” Now in all, or almost all, the cases where we are prepared to say something of the form “p or q,” we are also prepared to say something of the form 4 if not-p, then q \ And this fact may us to exaggerate the difference between “v” and “or” to think that, since in some cases, the fulfilment of one alternate is not a sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement of which It is an alternate, the fulfilment of one alternate is a sufficient condition of the truth of an alternative statement. And this is certainly an exaggeration. If someone says ; “Either it was John or it was Robert but I couldn't tell which,” we are satisfied of the truth of the alternative statement if either of the alternates turns out to be true; and we say that the speaker was wrong only if neither turns out to be true. Here we seem to have a puzzle ; for we seem to be saying that * Either it was John or it was Robert ' entails 4 If it wasn't John, it was Robert * and, at the same time, that ‘It was John’ entails the former, but not the latter. What we are suffering from here is perhaps a crudity in our notion of entailraent, a difficulty In applying this too undifferentiated concept to the facts of speech ; or, if we prefer it, an ambiguity in the notion of a sufficient condition. The statement that it was John entails the statement that it was either John or Robert in the sense thai it confirms it; when It turns out to have been John, the man who said that either It was John or it was Robert is shown to have been right. But the first statement does not entail the second in the sense that the step ‘It was John, so it was either John or Robert’ is a logically proper step, unless the person saying this means by it simply that the alternative statement made previously was correct, i.e., 'it was one of the two '. For the alternative statement carries the implication of the speaker's uncertainty as to which of the two it was, and this implication is inconsistent with the assertion that it was John. So in this sense of * sufficient condition ', the statement that it was John is no more a sufficient condition of (no more entails) the statement that it was either John or Robert than it is a sufficient condition of (entails) the statement that if it wasn't John, it was Robert. The further resemblance, which we have already noticed, between the alternative statement and the hypothetical statement, is that whatever knowledge or experience renders it reasonable to assert the alternative statement, also renders it reasonable to make the statement that (under the condition that it wasn't John) it was Robert. But we are less happy about saying that the hypothetical statement is confirmed by the discovery that it was John, than we are about saying that the alternative statement is confirmed by this discovery. For we are inclined to say that the question of confirmation of the hypothetical statement (as opposed to the question of its reasonableness or acceptability) arises only if the condition (that it wasn't John) turns out to be fulfilled. This shows an asymmetry, as regards confirmation, though not as regards acceptability, between 4 if not p, then q ' and * if not qy then p ' which is not mirrored in the forms ‘either p or q’ and ‘either q or p.’ This asymmetry is ignored in the rule that * if not p, then q ' and ‘if not q, then p’ are logically equivalent, for this rule regards acceptability rather than confirmation. And rightly. For we may often discuss the l truth ' of a subjunctive conditional, where the possibility of confirmation is suggested by the form of words employed to be not envisaged. It is a not unrelated difference between * if ' sentences and ‘or’ sentences that whereas, whenever we use one of the latter, we should also be prepared to use one of the former, the converse does not hold. The cases in which it does not generally hold are those of subjunctive conditionals. There is no ‘or’ sentence which would serve as a paraphrase of ‘If the Germans had invaded England in 1940, they would have won the war’ as this sentence would most commonly be used. And this is connected with the fact that c either . . . or . . .' is associated with situations involving choice or decision. 4 Either of these roads leads to Oxford ' does not mean the same as ' Either this road leads to Oxford or that road does’ ; but both confront us with the necessity of making a choice. This brings us to a feature of * or ' which, unlike those so far discussed, is commonly mentioned in discussion of its relation to * v ' ; the fact, namely, that in certain verbal contexts, ‘either … or …’ plainly carries the implication ‘and not both . . . and . . .', whereas in other contexts, it does not. These are sometimes spoken of as, respectively, the exclusive and inclusive senses of ‘or;’ and, plainly, if we are to identify 4 v’ with either, it must be the latter. The reason why, unlike others, this feature of the ordinary use of “or” is commonly mentioned, is that the difference can readily be accommodated (1 Cf. footnote to p. 86.In the symbolism of the truth-functional system: It is the difference between “(p y q) .~ (p . q)” (exclusive sense) and “p v q” (inclusive sense). “Or,” like “and,” is commonly used to join words and phrases as well as clauses. The 4 mutuality difficulties attending the general expansion of 4 x and y are/ 5 into * x is /and y is/' do not attend the expansion of 4 x or y isf into c r Is/or y is/ ? (This is not to say that the expansion can always correctly be made. We may call “v” the disjunctive sign and, being warned against taking the reading too seriously, may read it as ‘or.' While he never approached the topic separately, it’s easy to find remarks about disjunction in his oeuvre. A veritable genealogy of disjunction can be traced along Griceian lines. DISJUNCTUM -- disjunction elimination. 1 The argument form ‘A or B, if A then C, if B then C; therefore, C’ and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of inference that permits one to infer C from a disjunction together with derivations of C from each of the disjuncts separately. This is also known as the rule of disjunctive elimination or V-elimination.  disjunction introduction. 1 The argument form ‘A or B; therefore, A or B’ and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of inference that permits one to infer a disjunction from either of its disjuncts. This is also known as the rule of addition or Vintroduction.  . disjunctive proposition, a proposition whose main propositional operator main connective is the disjunction operator, i.e., the logical operator that represents ‘and/or’. Thus, ‘P-and/orQ-and-R’ is not a disjunctive proposition because its main connective is the conjunction operation, but ‘P-and/or-Q-and-R’ is disjunctive. Refs.: Grice uses an illustration involving ‘or’ in the ‘implication’ excursus in “Causal Theory.” But the systematic account comes from WoW, especially essay 4.

dispositum. Grice: “The –positum is a very formative Roman expression: there’s the suppositum, the praepositum, and the dispositum. All very apposite!” -- H. P. Grice, “Disposition and intention” – Grice inspired D. F. Pears on this, as they tried to refute Austin’s rather dogmatic views in ‘ifs’ and ‘cans’ – where the ‘can’ relates to the disposition, and the ‘if’ to the conditional analysis for it. Grice’s phrase is “if I can”. “I intend to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees,” Marmaduke Bloggs says, “if a can.” A disposition, more generally is, any tendency of an object or system to act or react in characteristic ways in certain situations. Fragility, solubility, and radioactivity, and intentionality, are typical dispositions. And so are generosity and irritability. For Ryle’s brand of analytic behaviorism, functionalism, and some forms of materialism, an event of the soul, such as the occurrence of an idea, and states such as a belief, a will, or an intention, is  also a disposition. A hypothetical or conditional statement is alleged to be ‘implicated’ by dispositional claims. What’s worse, this conditional is alleged to capture the basic meaning of the ascription of a state of the soul. The glass would shatter if suitably struck. Left undisturbed, a radium atom will probably decay in a certain time. An ascription of a disposition is taken as subjunctive rather than material conditionals to avoid problems like having to count as soluble anything not immersed in water. The characteristic mode of action or reaction  shattering, decaying, etc.  is termed the disposition’s manifestation or display. But it need not be observable. Fragility is a regular or universal disposition. A suitably struck glass invariably shatters. Radio-activity on the other hand is alleged to be a variable or probabilistic disposition. Radium may (but then again may not) decay in a certain situation. A dispositions may be what Grice calls “multi-track,” i. e.  multiply manifested, rather than “single-track,” or singly manifested. Hardness or elasticity may have different manifestations in different situations. In his very controversial (and only famous essay), “The Concept of Mind,” Ryle, who held, no less, the chair of metaphysical philosophy at Oxford, argues – just to provoke -- that there is nothing more to a dispositional claim than its associated conditional. A dispositional property is not an occurrent property. To possess a dispositional property is not to undergo any episode or occurrence, or to be in a particular state. Grice surely refuted this when he claims that the soul is in this or that a state. Consider reasoning. The soul is in state premise; then the soul is in state conclusion. The episode or occurrence is an event, when the state of the premise causes the state of the conclusion. Coupled with a ‘positivist’ (or ultra-physicalist, ultra-empiricist, and ultra-naturalist) rejection of any unobservable, and a conception of an alleged episode or state of the soul as a dispositios, this supports the view of behaviorism that such alleged episode or state is nothing but a disposition TO observable behaviour – if Grice intends to climb Mt. Everest on hands and knees if he can, there is no ascription without the behaviour that manifests it – the ascription is meant to EXPLAIN (or explicate, or provide the cause) for the behaviour. Grice reached this ‘functionalist’ approach later in his career, and presented it with full fanfare in “Method in philosophoical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre.” By contrast, realism holds that dispositional talk is also about an actual or occurrent property or a state, possibly unknown or unobservable – the ‘black box’ of the functionalist, a function from sensory input to behavioural output. In particular, it is about the bases of dispositions in intrinsic properties or states. Thus, fragility is based in molecular structure, radioactivity in nuclear structure. A disposition’s basis is viewed as at least partly the cause of its manifestation in behaviour. Some philosophers, for fear of an infinite regress, hold that the basis is categorical, not dispositional D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind, 8. Others, notably Popper, Madden, and Harre (Causal powers) hold that every property is dispositional. Grice’s essay has now historical interest – but showed the relevance of these topics among two tightly closed groups in post-war Oxford: the dispositionalists led by Ryle, and the anti-dispositionalists, a one-member group led by Grice. Refs.: Grice, “Intention and dispositions.”

distributum: distributio -- undistributed middle: a logical fallacy in traditional syllogistic logic, resulting from the violation of the rule that the middle term (the term that appears twice in premises) must be distributed at least once in the premises. Any syllogism that commits this error is invalid. Consider “All philosophers are persons,” and “Some persons are bad.” No conclusion follows from these two premises because “persons” in the first premise is the predicate of an affirmative proposition, and in the second is the subject of a particular proposition. Neither of them is distributed. “If in a syllogism the middle term is distributed in neither premise, we are said to have a fallacy of undistributed middle.” Keynes, Formal Logic. DISTRIBUTUM -- distribution, the property of standing for every individual designated by a term. The Latin term distributio originated in the twelfth century; it was applied to terms as part of a theory of reference, and it may have simply indicated the property of a term prefixed by a universal quantifier. The term ‘dog’ in ‘Every dog has his day’ is distributed, because it supposedly refers to every dog. In contrast, the same term in ‘A dog bit the mailman’ is not distributed because it refers to only one dog. In time, the idea of distribution came to be used only as a heuristic device for determining the validity of categorical syllogisms: 1 every term that is distributed in a premise must be distributed in the conclusion; 2 the middle term must be distributed at least once. Most explanations of distribution in logic textbooks are perfunctory; and it is stipulated that the subject terms of universal propositions and the predicate terms of negative propositions are distributed. This is intuitive for A-propositions, e.g., ‘All humans are mortal’; the property of being mortal is distributed over each human. The idea of distribution is not intuitive for, say, the predicate term of O-propositions. According to the doctrine, the sentence ‘Some humans are not selfish’ says in effect that if all the selfish things are compared with some select human one that is not selfish, the relation of identity does not hold between that human and any of the selfish things. Notice that the idea of distribution is not mentioned in this explanation. The idea of distribution is currently disreputable, mostly because of the criticisms of Geach in Reference and Generality 8 and its irrelevance to standard semantic theories. The related term ‘distributively’ means ‘in a manner designating every item in a group individually’, and is used in contrast with ‘collectively’. The sentence ‘The rocks weighed 100 pounds’ is ambiguous. If ‘rocks’ is taken distributively, then the sentence means that each rock weighed 100 pounds. If ‘rocks’ is taken collectively, then the sentence means that the total weight of the rocks was 100 pounds.  distributive laws, the logical principles A 8 B 7 C S A 8 B 7 A 7 C and A 7 B 8 C S A 7 B 8 A 7 C. Conjunction is thus said to distribute over disjunction and disjunction over conjunction. 

ditto: Or Strawson’s big mistake. Strawson quite didn’t understand what “Analysis” was for, and submits this essay on the perlocutionary effects of ‘true.’ Grice comes to the resuce of veritable analysis. cf. verum. Grice disliked Strawson’s ditto theory in Analysis of ‘true’ as admittive performatory. 1620s, "in the month of the same name," Tuscan dialectal ditto "(in) the said (month or year)," literary Italian detto, past participle of dire "to say," from Latin dicere "speak, tell, say" (from PIE root *deik- "to show," also "pronounce solemnly").  Italian used the word to avoid repetition of month names in a series of dates, and in this sense it was picked up in English. Its generalized meaning of "the aforesaid, the same thing, same as above" is attested in English by 1670s. In early 19c. a suit of men's clothes of the same color and material through was ditto or dittoes (1755). Dittohead, self-description of followers of U.S. radio personality Rush Limbaugh, attested by 1995. dittoship is from 1869.

dodgson: c. l. – Grice quotes Carroll often. Cabbages and kings – Achilles and the Tortoise – Humpty Dumpty and his Deutero-Esperanto -- Carroll, Lewis, pen name of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson 183298, English writer and mathematician. The eldest son of a large clerical family, he was educated at Rugby and Christ Church, Oxford, where he remained for the rest of his uneventful life, as mathematical lecturer until 1 and curator of the senior commonroom. His mathematical writings under his own name are more numerous than important. He was, however, the only Oxonian of his day to contribute to symbolic logic, and is remembered for his syllogistic diagrams, for his methods for constructing and solving elaborate sorites problems, for his early interest in logical paradoxes, and for the many amusing examples that continue to reappear in modern textbooks. Fame descended upon him almost by accident, as the author of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 1865, Through the Looking Glass 1872, The Hunting of the Snark 1876, and Sylvie and Bruno 9 93; saving the last, the only children’s books to bring no blush of embarrassment to an adult reader’s cheek. Dodgson took deacon’s orders in 1861, and though pastorally inactive, was in many ways an archetype of the prim Victorian clergyman. His religious opinions were carefully thought out, but not of great philosophic interest. The Oxford movement passed him by; he worried about sin though rejecting the doctrine of eternal punishment, abhorred profanity, and fussed over Sunday observance, but was oddly tolerant of theatergoing, a lifelong habit of his own. Apart from the sentimental messages later inserted in them, the Alice books and Snark are blessedly devoid of religious or moral concern. Full of rudeness, aggression, and quarrelsome, if fallacious, argument, they have, on the other hand, a natural attraction for philosophers, who pillage Carneades Carroll, Lewis 119   119 them freely for illustrations. Humpty-Dumpty, the various Kings and Queens, the Mad Hatter, the Caterpillar, the White Rabbit, the Cheshire Cat, the Unicorn, the Tweedle brothers, the Bellman, the Baker, and the Snark make fleeting appearances in the s of Russell, Moore, Broad, Quine, Nagel, Austin, Ayer, Ryle, Blanshard, and even Vitters an unlikely admirer of the Mock Turtle. The first such allusion to the March Hare is in Venn’s Symbolic Logic 1. The usual reasons for quotation are to make some point about meaning, stipulative definition, the logic of negation, time reversal, dream consciousness, the reification of fictions and nonentities, or the absurdities that arise from taking “ordinary language” too literally. For exponents of word processing, the effect of running Jabberwocky through a spell-checker is to extinguish all hope for the future of Artificial Intelligence. Though himself no philosopher, Carroll’s unique sense of philosophic humor keeps him and his illustrator, Sir John Tenniel effortlessly alive in the modern age. Alice has been tr. into seventy-five languages; new editions and critical studies appear every year; imitations, parodies, cartoons, quotations, and ephemera proliferate beyond number; and Carroll societies flourish in several countries, notably Britain and the United States.

dominium -- domain – used by Grice in his treatment of Extensionalism -- of a science, the class of individuals that constitute its subject matter. Zoology, number theory, and plane geometry have as their respective domains the class of animals, the class of natural numbers, and the class of plane figures. In Posterior Analytics 76b10, Aristotle observes that each science presupposes its domain, its basic concepts, and its basic principles. In modern formalizations of a science using a standard firstorder formal language, the domain of the science is often, but not always, taken as the universe of the intended interpretation or intended model, i.e. as the range of values of the individual variables. 

donkey – quantification – considered by Grice -- sentences, sentences exemplified by ‘Every man who owns a donkey beats it’, ‘If a man owns a donkey, he beats it’, and similar forms (“Every nice girl loves a sailor”), which have posed logical puzzles since medieval times but were noted more recently by Geach. At issue is the logical form of such sentences  specifically, the correct construal of the pronoun ‘it’ and the indefinite noun phrase ‘a donkey’. Translations into predicate logic by the usual strategy of rendering the indefinite as existential quantification and the pronoun as a bound variable cf. ‘John owns a donkey and beats it’ P Dx x is a donkey & John owns x & John beats x are either ill-formed or have the wrong truth conditions. With a universal quantifier, the logical form carries the controversial implication that every donkey-owning man beats every donkey he owns. Efforts to resolve these issues have spawned much significant research in logic and linguistic semantics. 

dossier: Grice is not clear about the status of this – but some philosophers have been too mentalistic. How would a genitorial programme proceed. Is there a dossier in a handwave by which the emissor communicates that he knows the route or that he is about to leave his emissee. It does not seem so, because the handwave is unstructured. Unlike “Fido is shaggy.” In the case of “Fido is shaggy,” there must be some OVERLAP between the emissor’s soul and the emissee’s soul – in terms of dossier. So perhaps there is overlap in the handwave. There must be an overlap as to WHICH route he means. By making the handwave the emissor communicates that HE, the emissor, subject IS (copula) followed by predicate “knower of the route.” So here we have a definite ‘the route.’ Which route? To heaven, to hell. Cf. The scots ‘high road,’ ‘low road.’ To Loch Lomond. If there is not this minimal common ground nothing can be communicated. In the alternative meaning, “I (subject) am (copula) about to leave you – where again there must be an overlap in the identification of the denotata of the pronouns. In the case of Blackburn’s skull or the arrow at the fork of a road, the common ground is instituted in situu in the one-off predicament, and there still must be some overlap of dossier. In its most technical usage, Grice wants to demystify Donnellan’s identificatory versus non-identificatory uses of ‘the,’ as unnecessary implications to Russell’s otherwise neat account. The topic interested Strawson (“Principle of assumption of ignorance, knowledge and relevance”) and Urmson’s principle of aptitude. Grice’s favourite vacuous name is ‘Bellerophon.’ ‘Vacuous names’ is an essay commissioned by Davison and Hintikka for Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine (henceforth, W and O) for Reidel, Dordrecht. “W and O” had appeared (without Grices contribution) as a special issue of Synthese. Grices contribution, along with Quines Reply to Grice, appeared only in the reprint of that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht. Grice cites from various philosophers (and logicians ‒ this was the time when logic was starting to be taught outside philosophy departments, or sub-faculties), such as Mitchell, Myro, Mates, Donnellan, Strawson, Grice was particularly proud to be able to quote Mates by mouth or book. Grice takes the opportunity, in his tribute to Quine, to introduce one of two of his syntactical devices to allow for conversational implicatura to be given maximal scope. The device in Vacuous Namess is a subscription device to indicate the ordering of introduction of this or that operation. Grice wants to give room for utterances of a special existential kind be deemed rational/reasonable, provided the principle of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the addressee to be followed by the utterer. Someone isnt attending the party organised by the Merseyside Geographical Society. That is Marmaduke Bloggs, who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees. But who, as it happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at the Merseyside Newsletter, “W and O,” vacuous name, identificatory use, non-identificatory use, subscript device. Davidson and Hintikka were well aware of the New-World impact of the Old-World ideas displayed by Grice and Strawson in their attack to Quine. Quine had indeed addressed Grices and Strawsons sophisticated version of the paradigm-case argument in Word and Object.  Davidson and Hintikka arranged to publish a special issue for a periodical publication, to which Strawson had already contributed. It was only natural, when Davidson and Hintikka were informed by Reidel of their interest in turning the special issue into a separate volume, that they would approach the other infamous member of the dynamic duo! Commissioned by Davidson and Hintikka for “W and O.” Grice introduces a subscript device to account for implicatura of utterances like Marmaduke Bloggs won’t be attending the party; he was invented by the journalists. In the later section, he explores identificatory and non identificatory uses of the without involving himself in the problems Donnellan did! Some philosophers, notably Ostertag, have found the latter section the most intriguing bit, and thus Ostertag cared to reprint the section on Descriptions for his edited MIT volume on the topic. The essay is structured very systematically with an initial section on a calculus alla Gentzen, followed by implicatura of vacuous Namess such as Marmaduke Bloggs, to end with definite descriptions, repr. in Ostertag, and psychological predicates. It is best to focus on a few things here. First his imaginary dialogues on Marmaduke Bloggs, brilliant! Second, this as a preamble to his Presupposition and conversational implicaturum. There is a quantifier phrase, the, and two uses of it: one is an identificatory use (the haberdasher is clumsy, or THE haberdasher is clumsy, as Grice prefers) and then theres a derived, non-identificatory use: the haberdasher (whoever she was! to use Grices and Mitchells addendum) shows her clumsiness. The use of the numeric subscripts were complicated enough to delay the publication of this. The whole thing was a special issue of a journal. Grices contribution came when Reidel turned that into a volume. Grice later replaced his numeric subscript device by square brackets. Perhaps the square brackets are not subtle enough, though. Grices contribution, Vacuous Namess, later repr. in part “Definite descriptions,” ed. Ostertag, concludes with an exploration of the phrases, and further on, with some intriguing remarks on the subtle issues surrounding the scope of an ascription of a predicate standing for a psychological state or attitude.  Grices choice of an ascription now notably involves an opaque (rather than factive, like know) psychological state or attitude: wanting, which he symbolizes as W.  At least Grice does not write, really, for he knew that Austin detested a trouser word! Grice concludes that (xi) and (xiii) will be derivable from each of (ix) and (x), while (xii) will be derivable only from (ix).Grice had been Strawsons logic tutor at St. Johns (Mabbott was teaching the grand stuff!) and it shows! One topic that especially concerned Grice relates to the introduction and elimination rules, as he later searches for generic satisfactoriness. Grice wonders [W]hat should be said of Takeutis conjecture (roughly) that the nature of the introduction rule determines the character of the elimination rule? There seems to be no particular problem about allowing an introduction rule which tells us that, if it is established in Xs personalized system that φ, then it is necessary with respect to X that φ is true (establishable). The accompanying elimination rule is, however, slightly less promising. If we suppose such a rule to tell us that, if one is committed to the idea that it is necessary with respect to X that φ, then one is also committed to whatever is expressed by φ, we shall be in trouble; for such a rule is not acceptable; φ will be a volitive expression such as let it be that X eats his hat; and my commitment to the idea that Xs system requires him to eat his hat does not ipso facto involve me in accepting (buletically) let X eat his hat. But if we take the elimination rule rather as telling us that, if it is necessary with respect to X that let X eat his hat, then let X eat his hat possesses satisfactoriness-with-respect-to-X, the situation is easier; for this version of the rule seems inoffensive, even for Takeuti, we hope. A very interesting concept Grice introduces in the definite-descriptor section of Vacuous Namess is that of a conversational dossier, for which he uses δ for a definite descriptor. The key concept is that of conversational dossier overlap, common ground, or conversational pool. Let us say that an utterer U has a dossier for a definite description δ if there is a set of definite descriptions which include δ, all the members of which the utterer supposes to be satisfied by one and the same item and the utterer U intends his addressee A to think (via the recognition that A is so intended) that the utterer U has a dossier for the definite description δ which the utterer uses, and that the utterer U has specifically selected (or chosen, or picked) this specific δ from this dossier at least partly in the hope that his addressee A has his own dossier for δ which overlaps the utterers dossier for δ, viz. shares a substantial, or in some way specially favoured, su-bset with the utterers dossier. Its unfortunate that the idea of a dossier is not better known amog Oxonian philosophers. Unlike approaches to the phenomenon by other Oxonian philosophers like Grices tutee Strawson and his three principles (conversational relevance, presumption of conversational knowledge, and presumption of conversational ignorance) or Urmson and his, apter than Strawsons, principle of conversational appositeness (Mrs.Smiths husband just delivered a letter, You mean the postman!?), only Grice took to task the idea of formalising this in terms of set-theory and philosophical psychology  ‒ note his charming reference to the utterers hope (never mind intention) that his choice of d from his dossier will overlap with some d in the dossier of his his addressee. The point of adding whoever he may be for the non-identificatory is made by Mitchell, of Worcester, in his Griceian textbook for Hutchinson. Refs.: The main reference is Grice’s “Vacuous names,” in “W and O” and its attending notes, BANC.

doxastic – discussed by J. L. Austin in the myth of the cave. Plato is doing some form of linguistic botany when he distinguishes between the doxa and the episteme – Stich made it worse with his ‘sub-doxastic’! from Grecian doxa, ‘belief’, of or pertaining to belief. A doxastic mental state, for instance, is or incorporates a belief. Doxastic states of mind are to be distinguished, on the one hand, from such non-doxastic states as desires, sensations, and emotions, and, on the other hand, from subdoxastic states. By extension, a doxastic principle is a principle governing belief. A doxastic principle might set out conditions under which an agent’s forming or abandoning a belief is justified epistemically or otherwise. 

doxographia griceiana -- Griceian doxographers. A Griceian doxographer is a a compiler of andcommentators on the opinions of Grice. “I am my first doxographer,” Grice said. Grice enjoyed the term coined by H. Diels for the title of his work “Doxographi Graeci,” which Grice typed “Doxographi Gricei”. In his “Doxographi,” Diels assembles a series of Grecian texts in which the views of Grecian philosophers from the archaic to the Hellenistic era are set out in a relatively schematic way. In the introduction, Diels reconstructs the history of the writing of these opinions, viz. the doxography strictly – the ‘writing’ (graphein) of the ‘opinion’ (“doxa”) – cfr. the unwritten opinions; Diels’s ‘Doxographi’ is now a standard part of the historiography of philosophy. Doxography is important both as a source of information about a philosopher, and also because a later philosopher (later than Grice, that is), ancient, medieval, and modern, should rely on it besides what Diels calls the ‘primary’ material – “what Grice actually philosophised on.” The crucial text for Diels’s reconstruction is the book Physical Opinions of the Philosophers Placita Philosophorum, traditionally ascribed to Plutarch but no longer thought to be by him. “Placita philosophorum” lists the views of various philosophers and schools under subject headings such as “What Is Nature?” and “On the Rainbow.” Out of this oeuvre and others Diels reconstructs a Collection of Opinions that he ascribes to Aetius, a philosopher mentioned by Theodoret as its author. Diels takes Aetius’s ultimate source to be Theophrastus, who wrote a more discursive Physical Opinions. Because Aetius mentions the views of Hellenistic philosophers writing after Theophrastus, Diels postulates an intermediate source, which he calls the “Vetusta Placita.” The most accessible doxographical material for Grice is in “The Life of Opinions of the Eminent Philosopher H. P. Grice,” “Vita et sententiae H. P. Griceiani quo in philosophia probatus fuit.” by H. P. Grice, après “Vitae et sententiae eorum qui in philosophia probati fuerunt,” by Diogenes Laertius, who is, however, mainly interested in gossip. Laertius arranges philosophers by schools and treats each school chronologically.

dummett – Dummett on ‘implicaturum’ in “Truth and other enigmas” – Note the animosity by Dummett against Grice’s playgroup for Grice never inviting him to a Saturday morning! “I will say this: conversational implicaturum, or as he fastidiously would prefer, the ‘implicaturum,’ was, yes, ‘invented,’ by H. P. Grice, of St. John’s, but University Lecturer, to boot, to replace an abstract semantic concept such as Frege’s ‘Sinn,’ expelled in Grice’s original Playgroup’s determination to pay attention, in the typical Oxonian manner, to nothing but what an *emisor* (never mind his emission!) ‘communicates’ in a ‘particularised’ context — so that was a good thing -- for Grice!” “Truth and other enigmas.” Cited by Grice in Way of Words -- dummett, m. a. e. – cited by H. P. Grice. philosopher of language, logic, and mathematics, noted for his sympathy for metaphysical antirealism and for his exposition of the philosophy of Frege. Dummett regards allegiance to the principle of bivalence as the hallmark of a realist attitude toward any field of discourse. This is the principle that any meaningful assertoric sentence must be determinately either true or else false, independently of anyone’s ability to ascertain its truth-value by recourse to appropriate empirical evidence or methods of proof. According to Dummett, the sentences of any learnable language cannot have verification-transcendent truth conditions and consequently we should query the intelligibility of certain statements that realists regard as meaningful. On these grounds, he calls into question realism about the past and realism in the philosophy of mathematics in several of the papers in two collections of his essays, Truth and Other Enigmas 8 and The Seas of Language 3. In The Logical Basis of Metaphysics 1, Dummett makes clear his view that the fundamental questions of metaphysics have to be approached through the philosophy of language, and more specifically through the theory of meaning. Here his philosophical debts to Frege and Vitters are manifest. Dummett has been the world’s foremost expositor and champion of Frege’s philosophy, above all in two highly influential books, Frege: Philosophy of Language 3 and Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics 1. This is despite the fact that Frege himself advocated a form of Platonism in semantics and the philosophy of mathematics that is quite at odds with Dummett’s own anti-realist inclinations. It would appear, however, from what Dummett says in Origins of Analytical Philosophy 3, that he regards Frege’s great achievement as that of having presaged the “linguistic turn” in philosophy that was to see its most valuable fruit in the later work of Vitters. Vitters’s principle that grasp of the meaning of a linguistic expression must be exhaustively manifested by the use of that expression is one that underlies Dummett’s own approach to meaning and his anti-realist leanings. In logic and the philosophy of mathematics this is shown in Dummett’s sympathy for the intuitionistic approach of Brouwer and Heyting, which involves a repudiation of the law of excluded middle, as set forth in Dummett’s own book on the subject, Elements of Intuitionism 7. 

dworkin: analysed by Grice in his exploration of legal versus moral right -- Ronald M. b.1,  jurist, political philosopher, and a central contributor to recent legal and political theory. He has served as professor of jurisprudence,  of Oxford 998, professor of law, New York  5, and Quain Professor of Jurisprudence,  , London 8. He was the first significant critic of Hart’s positivist analysis of law as based on a determinable set of social rules. Dworkin argues that the law contains legal principles as well as legal rules. Legal principles are standards phrased generally e.g., ‘No one shall profit from his own wrong’; they do not have a formal “pedigree,” but are requirements of morality. Nonetheless, courts are obliged to apply such principles, and thus have no lawmaking discretion. Judicially enforceable legal rights must derive from antecedent political rights. Dworkin characterizes rights as political “trumps”  hence his title Taking Rights Seriously 2d ed., 8, which collects the papers that defend the views sketched. Dworkin postulates an idealized judge, Hercules, who can invariably determine what rights are legally enforceable. Dworkin denies any metaphysical commitments thereby, and emphasizes instead the constructive and interpretive nature of both adjudication and legal theory. These arguments are made in papers collected in A Matter of Principle 5. Law’s Empire 6 systematizes his view. He presents there a theory of “law as integrity.” The court’s obligation is to make the community’s law the best it can be by finding decisions that best fit both institutional du Vair, Guillaume Dworkin, Ronald M. 249   249 history and moral principle. Hercules always best determines the best fit. Dworkin has also contributed to substantive political theory. He defends a form of liberalism that makes equality as prominent as liberty. His account of equality is found in a number of independent papers; see, e.g., “Foundations of Liberal Equality,” Tanner Lectures on Human Values XI 0. Dworkin has applied his liberal theory in two ways. He has continually acted as a critical watchdog of the U.S. Supreme Court, assessing decisions for their adherence to the ideals of principle, respect for equality, and achievement of best fit. Some of these essays are in the two collections mentioned; the most recent are in Freedom’s Law 6. Life’s Dominion 3 derives from these ideals an account of abortion and euthanasia. Dworkin’s philosophizing has a conceptual richness and rhetorical fire that, when not wholly under control, give his theoretical positions a protean quality at the level of detail. Nonetheless, the ideas that adjudication should be principled and enforce rights, and that we all deserve equal dignity and respect, exercise a powerful fascination.