e: the
‘universalis abdicative.’ Cf. Grice on the Square of Opposition, or figura
quadrata -- Grice, “Circling the square of Opposition.”
Ǝ: Ǝx. The
existential quantifier. When Gentzen used /\ and \/ for ‘all’ and ‘some’ he is
being logical, since ‘all’ and ‘some’ behave like ‘and’ and ‘or.’ This is not
transparently shown at all by the use of the inverted A and the inverted E.
This Grice called Grice’s Proportion: “and:or::every:some”. Grice: “Surely there is a relation of
‘every’ to ‘and’ and ‘some’ to ‘or.’” “Given a
finite domain of discourse D = {a1, ... an} “every” is equivalent to an “and”
propositions “Pai /\, … Pan.””“Analogously, “some (at least one”) is equivalent
to an “or” proposition having the same structure as before:“Pai V, … Pan.”“For
an infinite domain of discourse the equivalences are pretty similar, and I
shouldn’t bother you with it for two long. But consider the statement, “1 + 1,
and 2 + 2, 3 + 3, ..., and 100 + 100, and ..., etc.” This is an infinite “and”
proposition. From the point of view of a system like System G, this may seem
a problem. Syntax
rules are expected to generate finite formulae. But my example above is
fortunate in that there is a procedure to generate every conjunct. Now, as
Austin once suggested to me, having translated Frege, an assertion were to be
made about every *irrational* number, it would seem that is no (Fregeian) way
to enumerate every conjunct, since irrational numbers cannot be enumerated.
However, a succinct equivalent formulation which avoids this problem with the
‘irrational’ number uses “every” quantification. For
each natural number n, n · 2 = n + n. An analogous analysis applies to the “or”
proposition: “1 is equal to 5 + 5,
2\/ is equal to 5 + 5, \/ 3 is
equal to 5 + 5, ... , \/ 100 is equal to 5 + 5, or ..., etc.” This is easily
rephrasable using “some (at least one)” quantification: “For SOME natural
number n, n is equal to 5+5. Aristotelian predicate calculus rescued from undue existential import
As ... universal quantifier
and conjunction and,
on the other, between the existential quantifier and disjunction.
This analogy has
not passed unnoticed in logical circles. ... existential quantifiers correspond
to the conjunction and disjunction operators, ...analogous analysis
applies to propositional logic. ... symbol 'V' for the existential quantifier in
the 'Californian'
notation’ (so-called by H. P. Grice when briefly visiting Berkeley)
which was ... In Grice’s system G, the
quantifiers are symbolized with larger versions of the symbols used for
conjunction and disjunction. Although quantified expressions cannot be
translated into expressions without quantifiers, there is a conceptual
connection between the universal quantifier and conjunction and between the
existential quantifier and disjunction. Consider the sentence ∃xPxxPx, for example. It means
that either the first member of the UD is a PP, or the second one is, or the
third one is, . . . . Such a system uses the symbol ‘⋁’ instead of ‘∃.’ Grice’s manoeuver to think of the quantifier versions of De
Morgan's laws is an interesting one. The statement ∀xP(x)∀xP(x) is very much like a
big conjunction. If the universe of discourse is the positive integers, for
example, then it is equivalent to the statement that “P(1)∧P(2)∧P(3)∧⋯P(1)∧P(2)∧P(3)∧⋯” or, more concisely, we might write “⋀x∈UP(x),⋀x∈UP(x),” using
notation similar to "sigma notation'' for sums. Of course, this is not
really a "statement'' in our official mathematical logic, because we don't
allow infinitely long formulas. In the same way, ∃xP(x)∃xP(x) can be thought of as “⋁x∈UP(x).⋁x∈UP(x). Now the first quantifier law can be
written “¬⋀x∈UP(x)⇔⋁x∈U(¬P(x)),¬⋀x∈UP(x)⇔⋁x∈U(¬P(x)),” which looks
very much like the law “¬(P∧Q)⇔(¬P∨¬Q),¬(P∧Q)⇔(¬P∨¬Q),” but with
an infinite conjunction and disjunction. Note that we can also rewrite De
Morgan's laws for ∧∧ and ∨∨ as “¬⋀i=12(Pi(x))¬⋁i=12(Pi(x))⇔⋁i=12(¬Pi(x))⇔⋀i=12(¬Pi(x)).¬⋀i=12(Pi(x))⇔⋁i=12(¬Pi(x))¬⋁i=12(Pi(x))⇔⋀i=12(¬Pi(x)).” As Grice says, “this may look initially cumbersome, but it reflects the close
relationship with the quantifier forms of De Morgan's laws.” Cited by Grice as translatable by “some (at least
one)”. Noting the divergence that Strawson identified but fails to identify as
a conversational implicaturum. It relates in the case of the square of
opposition to the ‘particularis’ but taking into account or NOT taking into
account the ‘unnecessary implication,’ as Russell calls it. “Take ‘every man is
mortal.’ Surely we don’t need the unnecessary implication that there is a man!”
eco: possibly, after Speranza, one of the most Griceian of
Italian philosophers (Only Speranza calls himself an Oxonian, rather! – “Surely
alma mater trumps all!”). Econ provides a bridge between Graeco-Roman
philosophy and Grice! Eco is one of the few philosophers who considers the very
origins of philosophy in Bologna – and straight from Rome – On top, Eco is one
of the first to generalise most of Grice’s topics under ‘communication,’ rather
than using the Anglo-Saxon ‘mean’ that does not really belong in the
Graeco-Roman tradition. Eco cites H. P. Grice in “Cognitive constraints of
communication.” Umberto b.2,
philosopher, intellectual historian, and novelist. A leading figure in
the field of semiotics, the general theory of signs. Eco has devoted most of
his vast production to the notion of interpretation and its role in
communication. In the 0s, building on the idea that an active process of
interpretation is required to take any sign as a sign, he pioneered
reader-oriented criticism The Open Work, 2, 6; The Role of the Reader, 9 and
championed a holistic view of meaning, holding that all of the interpreter’s
beliefs, i.e., his encyclopedia, are potentially relevant to word meaning. In
the 0s, equally influenced by Peirce and the
structuralists, he offered a unified theory of signs A Theory of
Semiotics, 6, aiming at grounding the study of communication in general. He
opposed the idea of communication as a natural process, steering a middle way
between realism and idealism, particularly of the Sapir-Whorf variety. The
issue of realism looms large also in his recent work. In The Limits of
Interpretation 0 and Interpretation and Overinterpretation 2, he attacks
deconstructionism. Kant and the Platypus 7 defends a “contractarian” form of
realism, holding that the reader’s interpretation, driven by the Peircean
regulative idea of objectivity and collaborating with the speaker’s
underdetermined intentions, is needed to fix reference. In his historical
essays, ranging from medieval aesthetics The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, 6 to
the attempts at constructing artificial and “perfect” languages The Search for
the Perfect Language, 3 to medieval semiotics, he traces the origins of some
central notions in contemporary philosophy of language e.g., meaning, symbol,
denotation and such recent concerns as the language of mind and translation, to
larger issues in the history of philosophy. All his novels are pervaded by
philosophical queries, such as Is the world an ordered whole? The Name of the
Rose, 0, and How much interpretation can one tolerate without falling prey to
some conspiracy syndrome? Foucault’s Pendulum, 8. Everywhere, he engages the
reader in the game of controlled interpretations. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice ed Eco: semantica
filosofica," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa
Grice, Liguria, Italia.
oeconomia:
Cf. Grice on the principle of oeconomia of rational effort. The Greeks used
‘oeconomia’ to mean thrifty. Cf. effort. There were three branches of
philosophia practica: philosophia moralis, oeconomia and politica. Grice would often refer to ‘no undue effort,’
‘no unnecessary trouble,’ to go into the effort, ‘not worth the energy,’ and so
on. These utilitarian criteria suggest he is more of a futilitarian than the
avowed Kantian he says he is. This Grice also refers to as ‘maximum,’
‘maximal,’ optimal. It is part of his principle of economy of rational effort. Grice
leaves it open as how to formulate this. Notably in “Causal,” he allows that
‘The pillar box seems red” and “The pillar box is red” are difficult to
formalise in terms in which we legitimize the claim or intuition that ‘The
pillar box IS red” is ‘stronger’ than ‘The pillar box seems red.’ If this were
so, it would provide a rational justification for going into the effort of
uttering something STRONGER (and thus less economical, and more effortful)
under the circumstances. As in “My wife is
in the kitchen or in the bedroom, and the house has only two rooms (and no
passages, etc.)” the reason why the conversational implicaturum is standardly
carried is to be found in the operation of some such general principle as that
giving preference to the making of a STRONGER rather than a weaker statement in
the absence of a reason for not so doing. The implicaturum therefore is not of
a part of the meaning of the expression “seems.” There is however A VERY
IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE between the case of a ‘phenomenalist’ statement
(Bar-Hillel it does not count as a statement) and that of disjunctives, such as
“My wife is in the kitchen or ind the bedroom, and the house has only two rooms
(and no passages, etc.).” A disjunctive is weaker than either of its disjuncts
in a straightforward LOGICAL fashion, viz., a disjunctive is entailed (alla Moore)
by, but does not entail, each of its disjuncts. The statement “The pillar box
is red” is NOT STRONGER than the statement, if a statement it is, “The pillar
box seems red,” in this way. Neither statement entails the other. Grice thinks
that he has, neverthcless a strong inclination to regard the first of these
statements as STRONGER than the second. But Grice leaves it open the
‘determination’ of in what fashion this might obtain. He suggests that there
may be a way to provide a reductive analysis of ‘strength’ THAT YIELDS that
“The pillar box is red” is a stronger conversational contribution than “The
pillar box seems red.” Recourse to ‘informativeness’ may not do, since Grice is
willing to generalise over the acceptum to cover informative and non-informative
cases. While there is an element of ‘exhibition’ in his account of the
communicatum, he might not be happy with the idea that it is the utterer’s
INTENTION to INFORM his addressee that he, the utterer, INTENDS that his
addressee will believe that he, the utterer, believes that it is raining.
“Inform” seems to apply only to the content of the propositional complexum, and
not to the attending ‘animata.’
eddington: “Some like Einstein, but Eddington’s MY man.” – H. P.
Grice. Einstein – discussed by Grice in “Eddington’s Two Tables” -- Albert
18795, G.-born physicist, founder of the
special and general theories of relativity and a fundamental contributor to
several branches of physics and to the philosophical analysis and critique of
modern physics, notably of relativity and the quantum theory. Einstein was
awarded the Nobel Prize for physics in 2, “especially for his discovery of the
law of the photoelectric effect.” Born in Ulm in the G. state of Württemberg,
Einstein studied physics at the Polytechnic in Zürich, Switzerland. He was
called to Berlin as director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics 4 at
the peak of the G. ultranationalism that surrounded World War I. His reaction
was to circulate an internationalist “Manifesto to Europeans” and to pursue
Zionist and pacifist programs. Following the dramatic confirmation of the
general theory of relativity 9 Einstein became an international celebrity. This
fame also made him the frequent target of G. anti-Semites, who, during one
notable episode, described the theory of relativity as “a Jewish fraud.” In 3
Einstein left G.y for the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Although
his life was always centered on science, he was also engaged in the politics
and culture of his times. He carried on an extensive correspondence whose
publication will run to over forty volumes with both famous and ordinary
people, including significant philosophical correspondence with Cassirer,
Reichenbach, Moritz Schlick, and others. Despite reservations over logical positivism,
he was something of a patron of the movement, helping to secure academic
positions for several of its leading figures. In 9 Einstein signed a letter
drafted by the nuclear physicist Leo Szilard informing President Roosevelt
about the prospects for harnessing atomic energy and warning of the G. efforts
to make a bomb. Einstein did not further participate in the development of
atomic weapons, and later was influential in the movement against them. In 2 he
was offered, and declined, the presidency of Israel. He died still working on a
unified field theory, and just as the founders of the Pugwash movement for
nuclear disarmament adopted a manifesto he had cosigned with Russell.
Einstein’s philosophical thinking was influenced by early exposure to Kant and
later study of Hume and Mach, whose impact shows in the operationalism used to
treat time in his famous 5 paper on special relativity. That work also displays
a passion for unity in science characteristic of nearly all his physical
thinking, and that may relate to the monism of Spinoza, a philosopher whom he
read and reread. Einstein’s own understanding of relativity stressed the
invariance of the space-time interval and promoted realism with regard to the
structure of spacetime. Realism also shows up in Einstein’s work on Brownian
motion 5, which was explicitly motivated by his long-standing interest in
demonstrating the reality of molecules and atoms, and in the realist treatment
of light quanta in his analysis 5 of the photoelectric effect. While he
pioneered the development of statistical physics, especially in his seminal
investigations of quantum phenomena 525, he never broke with his belief in
determinism as the only truly fundamental approach to physical processes. Here
again one sees an affinity with Spinoza. Realism and determinism brought
Einstein into conflict with the new quantum theory 526, whose observer
dependence and “flight into statistics” convinced him that it could not
constitute genuinely fundamental physics. Although influential in its
development, he became the theory’s foremost critic, never contributing to its
refinement but turning instead to the program of unifying the electromagnetic
and gravitational fields into one grand, deterministic synthesis that would
somehow make room for quantum effects as limiting or singular cases. It is
generally agreed that his unified field program was not successful, although
his vision continues to inspire other unification programs, and his critical
assessments of quantum mechanics still challenge the instrumentalism associated
with the theory. Einstein’s philosophical reflections constitute an important
chapter in twentieth-century thought. He understood realism as less a
metaphysical doctrine than a motivational program, and he argued that determinism
was a feature of theories rather than an aspect of the world Einstein, Albert
Einstein, Albert 256 256 directly.
Along with the unity of science, other central themes in his thinking include
his rejection of inductivism and his espousal of holism and constructivism or
conventionalism, emphasizing that meanings, concepts, and theories are free
creations, not logically derivable from experience but subject rather to
overall criteria of comprehensibility, empirical adequacy, and logical
simplicity. Holism is also apparent in his acute analysis of the testability of
geometry and his rejection of Poincaré’s geometric conventionalism.
eductum: eduction, the process of initial clarification, as of
a phenomenon, text, or argument, that normally takes place prior to logical
analysis. Out of the flux of vague and confused experiences certain
characteristics are drawn into some kind of order or intelligibility in order
that attention can be focused on them Aristotle, Physics I. These
characteristics often are latent, hidden, or implicit. The notion often is used
with reference to texts as well as experience. Thus it becomes closely related
to exegesis and hermeneutics, tending to be reserved for the sorts of
clarification that precede formal or logical analyses.
effectum: causa efficiencis -- effective procedure for the
generation of a conversational implicaturum --, a step-by-step recipe for
computing the values of a function. It determines what is to be done at each
step, without requiring any ingenuity of anyone or any machine executing it.
The input and output of the procedure consist of items that can be processed
mechanically. Idealizing a little, inputs and outputs are often taken to be
strings on a finite alphabet. It is customary to extend the notion to
procedures for manipulating natural numbers, via a canonical notation. Each
number is associated with a string, its numeral. Typical examples of effective
procedures are the standard grade school procedures for addition,
multiplication, etc. One can execute the procedures without knowing anything
about the natural numbers. The term ‘mechanical procedure’ or ‘algorithm’ is
sometimes also used. A function f is computable if there is an effective
procedure A that computes f. For every m in the domain of f, if A were given m
as input, it would produce fm as output. Turing machines are mathematical
models of effective procedures. Church’s thesis, or Turing’s thesis, is that a
function is computable provided there is a Turing machine that computes it. In other
words, for every effective procedure, there is a Turing machine that computes
the same function.
egcrateia:
or temperantia. This is a universal. Strictly, it’s the agent who has the power
– Or part of his soul – the rational soul has the power – hence Grice’s
metaphor of the ‘power structure of the soul.’ Grice is interested in the
linguistic side to it. What’s the use of “Don’t p!” if ‘p’ is out of the
emissee’s rational control? Cf. Pears on egcreateia as ‘irrationality,’ if
motivated. Cfr mesotes. the geniality of
Grice was to explore theoretical akrasia. Grice’s genius shows in seeing
egcrateia and lack thereof as marks of virtue. “C hasn’t been to prison yet” He
is potentially dishonest. But you cannot be HONEST if you are NOT potentially
DISHONEST. Of course, it does not paint a good picture of the philosopher why
he should be obsessed with ‘akrasia,’ when Aristotle actually opposed the
notion to that of ‘enkrateia,’ or ‘continence.’ Surely a philosopher needs to
provide a reductive analysis of ‘continence,’ first; and the reductive analysis
of ‘incontinence’ will follow. Aristotle, as Grice well knew, is being a
Platonist here, so by ‘continence,’ he meant a power structure of the soul,
with the ‘rational’ soul containing the pre-rational or non-rational soul
(animal soul, and vegetal soul). And right he was, too! So, Grice's twist is Έγκράτεια, sic in capitals!
Liddell and Scott has it as ‘ἐγκράτεια’ [ρα^], which they render as “mastery
over,” as used by Plato in The Republic: “ἐ. ἑαυτοῦ,” meaning ‘self-control’
(Pl. R.390b; ἐ. ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν control
over them, ib.430e, cf. X.Mem.2.1.1, Isoc.1.21; “περί τι” Arist.EN1149a21, al. Liddell and Scott go on to give a reference to
Grice’s beloved “Eth. Nich.” (1145b8) II. abs., self-control, X. Mem.1.5.1, Isoc.3.44, Arist. EN. 1145b8, al., LXX Si.18.30, Act.Ap. 24.25, etc. Richards, an emotivist, as well as Collingwood
(in “Language”) had made a stereotype of the physicist drawing a formula on the
blackboard. “Full of emotion.” So the idea that there is an UN-emotional life
is a fallacy. Emotion pervades the rational life, as does akrasia. Grice was
particularly irritated by the fact that Davidson, who lacked a background in
the humanities and the classics, could think of akrasia as “impossible”! Grice
was never too interested in emotion (or feeling) because while we do say I feel
that the cat is hungry, we also say, Im feeling byzantine. The concept of
emotion needs a philosophical elucidation. Grice was curious about a linguistic
botany for that! Akrasia for Grice covers both buletic-boulomaic and doxastic
versions. The buletic-boulomaic version may be closer to the concept of an
emotion. Grice quotes from Kennys essay on emotion. But Grice is looking for
more of a linguistic botany. As it happens, Kennys essay has Griceian implicatura.
One problem Grice finds with emotion is that feel that sometimes behaves like thinks that Another is that there is no good Grecian word
for emotio. Kenny, of St. Benets, completed his essay on emotion under
Quinton (who would occasionally give seminars with Grice), and examined by two
members of Grices Play Group: Pears and Gardiner. Kenny connects an emotion to
a feeling, which brings us to Grice on feeling boringly byzantine! Grice
proposes a derivation of akrasia in conditional steps for both
buletic-boulomaic and doxastic akrasia. Liddell
and Scott have “ἐπιθυμία,” which they render as desire, yearning, “ἐ.
ἐκτελέσαι” Hdt.1.32; ἐπιθυμίᾳ by passion, oπρονοίᾳ, generally, appetite, αἱ
κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐ. esp. sexual desire, lust, αἱ πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας ἐ.; longing after
a thing, desire of or for it, ὕδατος, τοῦ πιεῖν;” “τοῦ πλέονος;” “τῆς
τιμωρίας;” “τῆς μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν πολιτείας;’ “τῆς παρθενίας;’ “εἰς ἐ. τινὸς ἐλθεῖν;’ ἐν
ἐ. “τινὸς εἶναι;’ “γεγονέναι;” “εἰς ἐ. τινὸς “ἀφικέσθαι θεάσασθαι;” “ἐ. τινὸς
ἐμβαλεῖν τινί;” “ἐ. ἐμποιεῖν ἔς τινα an inclination towards;” =ἐπιθύμημα, object
of desire, ἐπιθυμίας τυχεῖν;” “ἀνδρὸς ἐ., of woman, “πενήτων ἐ., of sleep. There
must be more to emotion, such as philia, than epithumia! cf. Grice on Aristotle
on philos. What is an emotion? Aristotle, Rhetoric II.1; Konstan “Pathos
and Passion” R. Roberts, “Emotion”; W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion; Simo
Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Aristotle, Rhet.
II.2-12; De An., Eth.N., and Top.; Emotions in Plato and Aristotle; Philosophy
of Emotion; Aristotle and the Emotions, De An. II.12 and III 1-3; De Mem. 1;
Rhet. II.5; Scheiter, “Images, Imagination, and Appearances, V. Caston, Why
Aristotle Needs Imagination” M. Nussbaum, “Aristotle on Emotions and Rational
Persuasion, J. Cooper, “An Aristotelian Theory of Emotion, G. Striker, Emotions
in Context: Aristotles Treatment of the Passions in the Rhetoric and his Moral
Psychology." Essays on Aristotles Rhetoric (J. Dow, Aristotles Theory of
the Emotions, Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle PLATO. Aristotle,
Rhetoric I.10-11; Plato Philebus 31b-50e and Republic IV, D. Frede, Mixed
feelings in Aristotles Rhetoric." Essays on Aristotles Rhetoric, J. Moss,
“Pictures and Passions in Plato”; Protagoras 352b-c, Phaedo 83b-84a, Timaeus 69c
STOICS The Hellenistic philosophers; “The Old Stoic Theory of Emotion” The
Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, eEmotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic
Agitation to Christian Temptation, Sorabji, Chrysippus Posidonius Seneca: A High-Level
Debate on Emotion. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in
Hellenistic Ethics M. Graver, Preface and Introduction to Cicero on Emotion:
Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4 M. Graver, Stoicism and emotion. Tusculan
Disputations 3 Recommended: Graver, Margaret. "Philo of Alexandria and the
Origins of the Stoic Προπάθειαι." Phronesis. Tusculan Disputations; "The
Stoic doctrine of the affections of the soul; The Stoic life: Emotions, duties,
and fate”; Emotion and decision in stoic psychology, The stoics, individual
emotions: anger, friendly feeling, and hatred. Aristotle Rhetoric II.2-3;
Nicomachean Ethics IV.5; Topics 2.7 and 4.5; Konstan, Anger, Pearson, Aristotle
on Desire; Scheiter, Review of Pearsons Aristotle on Desire; S. Leighton,
Aristotles Account of Anger: Narcissism and Illusions of Self‐Sufficiency: The Complex
Evaluative World of Aristotles Angry Man,” Valuing emotions. Aristotle Rhetoric
II. 4; Konstan, “Hatred” Konstan "Aristotle on Anger and the
Emotions: the Strategies of Status." Ancient Anger: Perspectives from
Homer to Galen, C. Rapp, The emotional dimension of friendship: notes on
Aristotles account of philia in Rhetoric II 4” Grice endeavours to give an
answer to the question whether and to what extent philia (friendship), as it is
treated by Aristotle in Rhet. II.4, can be considered a genuine emotion as, for
example, fear and anger are. Three anomalies are identified in the definition
and the account of philia (and of the associated verb philein), which suggest a
negative response to the question. However, these anomalies are analysed and
explained in terms of the specific notes of philia in order to show that
Rhetoric II4 does allow for a consideration of friendship as a genuine
emotion. Seneca, On Anger (De Ira) Seneca, On Anger Seneca, On Anger
(62-96); K. Vogt, “Anger, Present Injustice, and Future Revenge in Senecas De
Ira” FEAR Aristotle, Rhet. II.5; Nicomachean Ethics III.6-9 Aristotles
Courageous Passions, Platos Laws; “Pleasure, Pain, and Anticipation in Platos
Laws, Book I” Konstan, “Fear” PITY Aristotle, Rhetoric II. 8-9; Poetics,
chs. 6, 9-19 ; Konstan, “Pity” E. Belfiore, Tragic pleasures: Aristotle
on plot and emotion, Konstan, Aristotle on the Tragic Emotions, The Soul of
Tragedy: Essays on Athenian Drama SHAME Aristotle, Rhet. II.6; Nicomachean
Ethics IV.9 Konstan, Shame J. Moss, Shame, Pleasure, and the Divided Soul, B.
Williams, Shame and Necessity. Aristotle investigates two character traits,
continence and incontinence, that are not as blameworthy as the vices but not
as praiseworthy as the virtues. The Grecian expressions are’enkrateia,’
continence, literally mastery, and krasia (“incontinence”; literally, lack of
mastery. An akratic person goes against reason as a result of some pathos
(emotion, feeling”). Like the akratic, an enkratic person experiences a feeling
that is contrary to reason; but unlike the akratic, he acts in accordance with
reason. His defect consists solely in the fact that, more than most people, he
experiences passions that conflict with his rational choice. The akratic person
has not only this defect, but has the further flaw that he gives in to feeling
rather than reason more often than the average person. Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of akrasia:
“propeteia,” or impetuosity and “astheneia, or weakness. The person who is weak
goes through a process of deliberation and makes a choice; but rather than act
in accordance with his reasoned choice, he acts under the influence of a
passion. By contrast, the impetuous person does not go through a process of
deliberation and does not make a reasoned choice; he simply acts under the
influence of a passion. At the time of action, the impetuous person experiences
no internal conflict. But once his act has been completed, he regrets what he
has done. One could say that he deliberates, if deliberation were something
that post-dated rather than preceded action; but the thought process he goes
through after he acts comes too late to save him from error. It is important to bear in mind that when
Aristotle talks about impetuosity and weakness, he is discussing chronic
conditions. The impetuous person is someone who acts emotionally and fails to
deliberate not just once or twice but with some frequency; he makes this error
more than most people do. Because of this pattern in his actions, we would be justified
in saying of the impetuous person that had his passions not prevented him from
doing so, he would have deliberated and chosen an action different from the one
he did perform. The two kinds of
passions that Aristotle focuses on, in his treatment of akrasia, are the
appetite for pleasure and anger. Either can lead to impetuosity and weakness.
But Aristotle gives pride of place to the appetite for pleasure as the passion
that undermines reason. He calls the kind of akrasia caused by an appetite for pleasure
(hedone) “unqualified akrasia”—or, as we might say, akrasia simpliciter, “full
stop.’ Akrasia caused by anger he considers a qualified form of akrasia and
calls it akrasia ‘with respect to anger.’ We thus have these four forms of
akrasia: impetuosity caused by pleasure, impetuosity caused by anger, weakness
caused by pleasure, weakness caused by anger. It should be noticed that
Aristotle’s treatment of akrasia is heavily influenced by Plato’s tripartite
division of the soul. Plato holds that either the spirited part (which houses
anger, as well as other emotions) or the appetitive part (which houses the
desire for physical pleasures) can disrupt the dictates of reason and result in
action contrary to reason. The same threefold division of the soul can be seen
in Aristotles approach to this topic. Although Aristotle characterizes akrasia
and enkrateia in terms of a conflict between reason and feeling, his detailed
analysis of these states of mind shows that what takes place is best described
in a more complicated way. For the feeling that undermines reason contains some
thought, which may be implicitly general. As Aristotle says, anger “reasoning
as it were that one must fight against such a thing, is immediately provoked.
And although in the next sentence he denies that our appetite for pleasure
works in this way, he earlier had said that there can be a syllogism that
favors pursuing enjoyment: “Everything sweet is pleasant, and this is sweet”
leads to the pursuit of a particular pleasure. Perhaps what he has in mind is
that pleasure can operate in either way: it can prompt action unmediated by a
general premise, or it can prompt us to act on such a syllogism. By contrast,
anger always moves us by presenting itself as a bit of general, although hasty,
reasoning. But of course Aristotle does
not mean that a conflicted person has more than one faculty of reason. Rather
his idea seems to be that in addition to our full-fledged reasoning capacity,
we also have psychological mechanisms that are capable of a limited range of
reasoning. When feeling conflicts with reason, what occurs is better described
as a fight between feeling-allied-with-limited-reasoning and full-fledged
reason. Part of us—reason—can remove itself from the distorting influence of
feeling and consider all relevant factors, positive and negative. But another
part of us—feeling or emotion—has a more limited field of reasoning—and
sometimes it does not even make use of it.
Although “passion” is sometimes used as a translation of Aristotles word
pathos (other alternatives are emotion” and feeling), it is important to bear
in mind that his term does not necessarily designate a strong psychological
force. Anger is a pathos whether it is weak or strong; so too is the appetite
for bodily pleasures. And he clearly indicates that it is possible for an
akratic person to be defeated by a weak pathos—the kind that most people would
easily be able to control. So the general explanation for the occurrence of
akrasia cannot be that the strength of a passion overwhelms reason. Aristotle
should therefore be acquitted of an accusation made against him by Austin in a
well-known footnote to ‘A Plea For Excuses.’ Plato and Aristotle, Austin says,
collapsed all succumbing to temptation into losing control of ourselves — a
mistake illustrated by this example. I am very partial to ice cream, and a
bombe is served divided into segments corresponding one to one with the persons
at High Table. I am tempted to help myself to two segments and do so, thus
succumbing to temptation and even conceivably (but why necessarily?) going
against my principles. But do I lose control of myself? Do I raven, do I snatch
the morsels from the dish and wolf them down, impervious to the consternation
of my colleagues? Not a bit of it. We often succumb to temptation with calm and
even with finesse. With this, Aristotle can agree. The pathos for the bombe can
be a weak one, and in some people that will be enough to get them to act in a
way that is disapproved by their reason at the very time of action. What is most remarkable about Aristotle’s
discussion of akrasia is that he defends a position close to that of Socrates.
When he first introduces the topic of akrasia, and surveys some of the problems
involved in understanding this phenomenon, he says that Socrates held that
there is no akrasia, and he describes this as a thesis that clearly conflicts
with the appearances (phainomena). Since he says that his goal is to preserve
as many of the appearances as possible, it may come as a surprise that when he
analyzes the conflict between reason and feeling, he arrives at the conclusion
that in a way Socrates was right after all. For, he says, the person who acts
against reason does not have what is thought to be unqualified knowledge; in a
way he has knowledge, but in a way does not.
Aristotle explains what he has in mind by comparing akrasia to the
condition of other people who might be described as knowing in a way, but not
in an unqualified way. His examples are people who are asleep, mad, or drunk; he
also compares the akratic to a student who has just begun to learn a Subjects,
or an actor on the stage. All of these people, he says, can utter the very
words used by those who have knowledge; but their talk does not prove that they
really have knowledge, strictly speaking.
These analogies can be taken to mean that the form of akrasia that
Aristotle calls weakness rather than impetuosity always results from some
diminution of cognitive or intellectual acuity at the moment of action. The
akratic says, at the time of action, that he ought not to indulge in this
particular pleasure at this time. But does he know or even believe that he
should refrain? Aristotle might be taken to reply: yes and no. He has some
degree of recognition that he must not do this now, but not full recognition.
His feeling, even if it is weak, has to some degree prevented him from
completely grasping or affirming the point that he should not do this. And so
in a way Socrates was right. When reason remains unimpaired and unclouded, its
dictates will carry us all the way to action, so long as we are able to
act. But Aristotles agreement with
Socrates is only partial, because he insists on the power of the emotions to
rival, weaken or bypass reason. Emotion challenges reason in all three of these
ways. In both the akratic and the enkratic, it competes with reason for control
over action; even when reason wins, it faces the difficult task of having to
struggle with an internal rival. Second, in the akratic, it temporarily robs
reason of its full acuity, thus handicapping it as a competitor. It is not
merely a rival force, in these cases; it is a force that keeps reason from
fully exercising its power. And third, passion can make someone impetuous; here
its victory over reason is so powerful that the latter does not even enter into
the arena of conscious reflection until it is too late to influence action.
That, at any rate, is one way of interpreting Aristotle’s statements. But it
must be admitted that his remarks are obscure and leave room for alternative
readings. It is possible that when he denies that the akratic has knowledge in
the strict sense, he is simply insisting on the point that no one should be
classified as having practical knowledge unless he actually acts in accordance
with it. A practical knower is not someone who merely has knowledge of general
premises; he must also have knowledge of particulars, and he must actually draw
the conclusion of the syllogism. Perhaps drawing such a conclusion consists in
nothing less than performing the action called for by the major and minor
premises. Since this is something the akratic does not do, he lacks knowledge;
his ignorance is constituted by his error in action. On this reading, there is
no basis for attributing to Aristotle the thesis that the kind of akrasia he
calls weakness is caused by a diminution of intellectual acuity. His
explanation of akrasia is simply that pathos is sometimes a stronger
motivational force than full-fledged reason.
This is a difficult reading to defend, however, for Aristotle says that
after someone experiences a bout of akrasia his ignorance is dissolved and he
becomes a knower again. In context, that appears to be a remark about the form
of akrasia Aristotle calls weakness rather than impetuosity. If so, he is
saying that when an akratic person is Subjects to two conflicting
influences—full-fledged reason versus the minimal rationality of emotion—his
state of knowledge is somehow temporarily undone but is later restored. Here,
knowledge cannot be constituted by the performance of an act, because that is
not the sort of thing that can be restored at a later time. What can be
restored is ones full recognition or affirmation of the fact that this act has
a certain undesirable feature, or that it should not be performed. Aristotle’s
analysis seems to be that both forms of akrasia — weakness and impetuosity
—share a common structure: in each case, ones full affirmation or grasp of what
one should do comes too late. The difference is that in the case of weakness but
not impetuosity, the akratic act is preceded by a full-fledged rational
cognition of what one should do right now. That recognition is briefly and
temporarily diminished by the onset of a less than fully rational affect. There is one other way in which Aristotle’s
treatment of akrasia is close to the Socratic thesis that what people call
akrasia is really ignorance. Aristotle holds that if one is in the special
mental condition that he calls practical wisdom, then one cannot be, nor will
one ever become, an akratic person. For practical wisdom is present only in
those who also possess the ethical virtues, and these qualities require
complete emotional mastery. Anger and appetite are fully in harmony with
reason, if one is practically wise, and so this intellectual virtue is
incompatible with the sort of inner conflict experienced by the akratic person.
Furthermore, one is called practically wise not merely on the basis of what one
believes or knows, but also on the basis of what one does. Therefore, the sort
of knowledge that is lost and regained during a bout of akrasia cannot be
called practical wisdom. It is knowledge only in a loose sense. The low-level
grasp of the ordinary person of what to do is precisely the sort of thing that
can lose its acuity and motivating power, because it was never much of an
intellectual accomplishment to begin with. That is what Aristotle is getting at
when he compares it with the utterances of actors, students, sleepers, drunks,
and madmen. Grice had witnessed how Hare had suffere to try and deal with how
to combine the geniality that “The language of morals” is with his account of
akrasia. Most Oxonians were unhappy with Hares account of akrasia. Its like, in
deontic logic, you cannot actually deal with akrasia. You need buletics. You
need the desiderative, so that you can oppose what is desired with the duty,
even if both concepts are related. “Akrasia” has a nice Grecian touch about it,
and Grice and Hare, as Lit. Hum., rejoiced in being able to explore what
Aristotle had to say about it. They wouldnt go far beyond Aristotle. Plato and
Aristotle were the only Greek philosophers studied for the Lit. Hum. To venture
with the pre-socratics or the hellenistics (even if Aristotle is one) was not
classy enough! Like Pears in Motivated irrationality, Grice allows that
benevolentia may be deemed beneficentia. If Smith has the good will to give
Jones a job, he may be deemed to have given Jones the job, even if Jones never
get it. In buletic akrasia we must consider the conclusion to be desiring what
is not best for the agents own good, never mind if he refrains from doing what
is not best for his own good. Video meliora proboque deteriora sequor. We
shouldnt be saying this, but we are saying it! Grice prefers akrasia, but
he is happy to use the translation by Cicero, also negative, of this:
incontinentia, as if continentia were a virtue! For Grice, the alleged paradox
of akrasia, both alethic and practical, has to be accounted for by a theory of
rationality from the start, and not be deemed a stumbling block. Grice is
interested in both the common-or-garden buletic-boulomaic version of akrasia,
involving the volitive soul ‒ in term of desirability ‒ and doxastic
akrasia, involing the judicative soul proper ‒ in terms of
probability. Grice considers buletic akrasia and doxastic akrasia ‒ the latter
yet distinct from Moores paradox, p but I dont want to believe that p, in
symbols p and ~ψb-dp. Akarsia, see
egcrateia. egcrateia: also spelled acrasia, or akrasia, Grecian term for
weakness of will. Akrasia is a character flaw, also called incontinence,
exhibited primarily in intentional behavior that conflicts with the agent’s own
values or principles. Its contrary is enkrateia strength of will, continence,
self-control. Both akrasia and enkrateia, Aristotle says, “are concerned with
what is in excess of the state characteristic of most people; for the continent
abide by their resolutions more, and the incontinent less, than most people
can” Nicomachean Ethics 1152a2527. These resolutions may be viewed as judgments
that it would be best to perform an action of a certain sort, or better to do
one thing than another. Enkrateia, on that view, is the power kratos to act as
one judges best in the face of competing motivation. Akrasia is a want or
deficiency of such power. Aristotle himself limited the sphere of both states
more strictly than is now done, regarding both as concerned specifically with
“pleasures and pains and appetites and aversions arising through touch and
taste” [1150a910]. Philosophers are generally more interested in incontinent
and continent actions than in the corresponding states of character. Various
species of incontinent or akratic behavior may be distinguished, including
incontinent reasoning and akratic belief formation. The species of akratic
behavior that has attracted most attention is uncompelled, intentional action
that conflicts with a better or best judgment consciously held by the agent at
the time of action. If, e.g., while judging it best not to eat a second piece
of pie, you intentionally eat another piece, you act incontinently provided that your so acting is uncompelled
e.g., your desire for the pie is not irresistible. Socrates denied that such
action is possible, thereby creating one of the Socratic paradoxes. In
“unorthodox” instances of akratic action, a deed manifests weakness of will
even though it accords with the agent’s better judgment. A boy who decides,
against his better judgment, to participate in a certain dangerous prank,
might owing to an avoidable failure of
nerve fail to execute his decision. In
such a case, some would claim, his failure to act on his decision manifests
weakness of will or akrasia. If, instead, he masters his fear, his
participating in the prank might manifest strength of will, even though his so
acting conflicts with his better judgment. The occurrence of akratic actions
seems to be a fact of life. Unlike many such apparent facts, this one has
received considerable philosophical scrutiny for nearly two and a half
millennia. A major source of the interest is clear: akratic action raises
difficult questions about the connection between thought and action, a
connection of paramount importance for most philosophical theories of the
explanation of intentional behavior. Insofar as moral theory does not float
free of evidence about the etiology of human behavior, the tough questions
arise there as well. Ostensible akratic action, then, occupies a philosophical
space in the intersection of the philosophy of mind and moral theory. Refs.: The main references here are in three
folders in two different series. H. P. Grice, “Akrasia,” The H. P. Grice Papers,
S. II, c. 2-ff. 22-23 and S. V, c. 6-f. 32, BANC.
Grice’s ego: “I follow Buber in distinguishing ‘ego’ from ‘tu.’
With conversation, there’s the ‘we,’ too.”
“If you were the only girl in the world, there would not be a need for
the personal pronoun ‘ego’” – Grice to his wife, on the day of their
engagement. “I went to Oxford. You went to Cambridge. He went to the London
School of Economics.” egocentric particular, a word whose denotation is
determined by identity of the speaker and/or the time, place, and audience of
his utterance. Examples are generally thought to include ‘I,’ ‘you’, ‘here’,
‘there’, ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘now’, ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’. The term
‘egocentric particular’ was introduced by Russell in An Inquiry into Meaning
and Truth 0. In an earlier work, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” Monist,
819, Russell called such words “emphatic particulars.” Some important questions
arise regarding egocentric particulars. Are some egocentric particulars more
basic than others so that the rest can be correctly defined in terms of them
but they cannot be correctly defined in terms of the rest? Russell thought all
egocentric particulars can be defined by ‘this’; ‘I’, for example, has the same
meaning as ‘the biography to which this belongs’, where ‘this’ denotes a
sense-datum experienced by the speaker. Yet, at the same time, ‘this’ can be
defined by the combination ‘what I-now notice’. Must we use at least some
egocentric particulars to give a complete description of the world? Our ability
to describe the world from a speaker-neutral perspective, so that the
denotations of the terms in our description are independent of when, where, and
by whom they are used, depends on our ability to describe the world without
using egocentric particulars. Russell held that egocentric particulars are not
needed in any part of the description of the world. -- egocentric predicament, each person’s
apparently problematic position as an experiencing subject, assuming that all
our experiences are private in that no one else can have them. Two problems
concern our ability to gain empirical knowledge. First, it is hard to see how
we gain empirical knowledge of what others experience, if all experience is
private. We cannot have their experience to see what it is like, for any
experience we have is our experience and so not theirs. Second, it is hard to
see how we gain empirical knowledge of how the external world is, independently
of our experience. All our empirically justified beliefs seem to rest
ultimately on what is given in experience, and if the empirically given is
private, it seems it can only support justified beliefs about the world as we
experience it. A third major problem concerns our ability to communicate with
others. It is hard to see how we describe the world in a language others
understand. We give meaning to some of our words by defining them by other
words that already have meaning, and this process of definition appears to end
with words we define ostensively; i.e., we use them to name something given in
experience. If experiences are private, no one else can grasp the meaning of
our ostensively defined words or any words we use them to define. No one else
can understand our attempts to describe the world. Egoism: cf. H. P. Grice, “The principle of conversational
self-love and the principle of conversational benevolence,” any view that, in a
certain way, makes the self central. There are several different versions of
egoism, all of which have to do with how actions relate to the self. Ethical
egoism is the view that people ought to do what is in their own selfinterest.
Psychological egoism is a view about people’s motives, inclinations, or
dispositions. One statement of psychological egoism says that, as a matter of
fact, people always do what they believe is in their self-interest and, human
nature being what it is, they cannot do otherwise. Another says that people
never desire anything for its own sake except what they believe is in their own
self-interest. Altruism is the opposite of egoism. Any ethical view that
implies that people sometimes ought to do what is in the interest of others and
not in their self-interest can be considered a form of ethical altruism. The
view that, human nature being what it is, people can do what they do not
believe to be in their self-interest might be called psychological altruism.
Different species of ethical and psychological egoism result from different
interpretations of self-interest and of acting from self-interest,
respectively. Some people have a broad conception of acting from self-interest
such that people acting from a desire to help others can be said to be acting
out of self-interest, provided they think doing so will not, on balance, take
away from their own good. Others have a narrower conception of acting from
selfinterest such that one acts from self-interest only if one acts from the
desire to further one’s own happiness or good. Butler identified self-love with
the desire to further one’s own happiness or good and self-interested action
with action performed from that desire alone. Since we obviously have other
particular desires, such as the desires for honor, for power, for revenge, and
to promote the good of others, he concluded that psychological egoism was
false. People with a broader conception of acting from self-interest would ask
whether anyone with those particular desires would act on them if they believed
that, on balance, acting on them would result in a loss of happiness or good
for themselves. If some would, then psychological egoism is false, but if,
given human nature as it is, no one would, it is true even if self-love is not
the only source of motivation in human beings. Just as there are broader and
narrower conceptions of acting from self-interest, there are broader and
narrower conceptions of self-interest itself, as well as subjective and
objective conceptions of self-interest. Subjective conceptions relate a
person’s self-interest solely to the satisfaction of his desires or to what
that person believes will make his life go best for him. Objective conceptions
see self-interest, at least in part, as independent of the person’s desires and
beliefs. Some conceptions of self-interest are narrower than others, allowing
that the satisfaction of only certain desires is in a person’s self-interest,
e.g., desires whose satisfaction makes that person’s life go better for her.
And some conceptions of self-interest count only the satisfaction of idealized
desires, ones that someone would have after reflection about the nature of
those desires and what they typically lead to, as furthering a person’s
self-interest. See index to all Grice’s
books with index – the first three of them.
Einheitswissenschaft: Used by Grice
ironically. While he was totally ANTI-Einheitwisseschaft, he was ALL for einheitsphilosophie! The phrase is used by Grice in a more causal
way. He uses the expression ‘unity of science’ vis-à-vis the topic of
teleology. Note that ‘einheitswissenschaft,’ literally translates as
unity-science – there is nothing about ‘making’ if one, which is what –fied
implies. The reason why ‘einheitswissenschaft’ was transliterated as ‘unified
science’ was that Neurath thought that ‘unity-science’ would be a yes-yes in
New England, most New Englanders being Unitarians, but they would like to include
Theology there, ‘into the bargain.’ “Die Einheit von Wissenschaft.” Die Einheit der Wissenschaft und
die neopositivistische Theorie der „Einheitswissenschaft”. O. Neurath, „Einheit der Wissenschaft als
Aufgabe“,Einheitswissenschaft oder Einheit der Wissenschaft?
| Frank F Vierter Internationaler Kongress für Einheit der Wissenschaft, Cambridge 1938
... Einheitswissenschaft als
Basis der Wissenschaftsgeschichte (pp. positivists held that no essential differences in aim and
method exist between the various branches of science. The scientists of all
disciplines should collaborate closely with each other and should unify the
vocabulary of sciences by logical analysis. According to this view, there is no
sharp demarcation between natural sciences and social sciences. In particular, to
establish universal laws in the social sciences may be difficult in practice,
but it is not impossible in principle. Through Otto Neurath, this ideal of
scientific unity became a program for logical positivists, who published a series
of books in Vienna under the heading Unified Science. After the dissolution of
the Vienna Circle, Neurath renamed the official journal Erkenntnis as The
Journal of Unified Science, and planned to continue publication of a series of
works in the United States under the general title The International
Encyclopedia of Unified Science. He thought that the work would be similar in
historical importance to the eighteenth-century French Encyclopédie under the
direction of Diderot. Unfortunately, this work was never completed, although
Carnap and Morris published some volumes originally prepared for it under the
title Foundations of the Unity of Science. “We have repeatedly pointed out that
the formation of the constructional system as a whole is the task of unified
science.” Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World.
Griceian
elenchus: a cross-examination or
refutation. Typically in Plato’s early dialogues, Socrates has a conversation
with someone who claims to have some sort of knowledge, and Socrates refutes
this claim by showing the interlocutor that what he thinks he knows is
inconsistent with his other opinions. This refutation Grice calls a
‘conversational elenchus.’ “It is not entirely negative, for awareness of his
own ignorance is supposed to spur one’s conversational interlocutor to further
inquiry, and the concepts and assumptions employed in the refutations serve as
the basis for positive Griceian, and implicatural, treatments of the same
topic.” “Now, in contrast, I’ll grant you that a type of “sophistic elenchi”
that one sometimes sees at Oxford, usually displayed by Rhode scholars from the New World or the
Colonies, under the tutelage of me or others in my group, may be merely
eristic.” “They aim simply at the refutation of an opponent by any means.”
“That is why, incidentally, why Aristotle calls a fallacy that only *appear* to
be a refutation a “sophistici elenchi.”
Grice’s “sc.”:
as the elliptical disimplicaturum -- ellipsis
as implicaturum: an expression from which a ‘part’ has been deleted.. “I
distinguish between the expression-whole and the expression-part.” The term
Grice uses for ‘part’ is ‘incomplete’ versus ‘complete,’ and it’s always for
metabolical ascriptions primarily. Thus Grice has "x (utterance-type)
means '. . .' " which is a specification of timeless meaning for an
utterance-type ad which can be either (i a) “complete” or (i b) non-complete
(partial) or incomplete]. He also has "x (utterance-type) meant here
'...'", which is a specification of applied timeless meaning for an utterance-type
which again can be either (2a) complete or (2b) partial, non-complete, or incomplete.
So ellipsis can now be redefined in terms of the complete-incomplete
distinction. “Smith is” is incomplete. “Smith is clever” is complete. “Uusually for conciseness.” As Grice notes,
“an elliptical or incomplete sentence is often used to answer a questions
without repeating material occurring in the question; e. g. ‘Grice’ may be the answer to the question of
the authorship of “The grounds of morality” or to the question of the
authorship of “Studies in the Way of Words.” ‘Grice’ can be seen as an ‘elliptical’
name when used as an ellipsis of ‘G. R. Grice’ or “H. P. Grice” and “Grice” can
be seen as an elliptical *sentence* when used as an ellipsis for ‘G. R. Grice
is the author of ‘The Grounds of Morality”” or “H. P. Grice is the author of
Studies in the Way of Words.’Other typical elliptical sentences are: ‘Grice is
a father of two [+> children]’, ‘Grice, or Godot, arrived for the tutorial
past twelve [+> midnight]’. A typical ellipsis that occurs in discussion of
ellipses involves citing the elliptical sentences with the deleted material
added in brackets often with ‘sc.’ or ‘scilicet’ – “Grice is a father of two
(sc. Children),” Grice, or Godot, as we tutees call him, arrived for the
tutorial past twelve (sc. midnight)” -- instead of also presenting the complete
sentence. As Grice notes, ellipsis can also occurs above the sentential level,
e.g. where well-known premises are omitted in the course of argumentation, as
in “Grice is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.” ‘Enthymeme,’ literally,
‘in-the-breast,’ designates an elliptical argument expression from which one or
more premise-expressions have been deleted, “or merely implicated.” -- ‘elliptic
ambiguity’ designates ambiguity arising from ellipsis, as does ‘elliptic implicaturum.’
“Sc.” Grice calls “elliptical disimplicaturum.”
Emersonian implicaturum: r. w., New-World (specifically New-England) philosophical
essayist, lecturer, and poet, a leading figure in the transcendentalist
movement. He was born in Boston and educated at Harvard. As a young man he
taught school and served as a Unitarian minister 182632. After he resigned his
pastorate in 1832, he traveled to Europe to visit Coleridge, Carlyle, and
Wordsworth. Upon his return, he settled in Concord, Massachusetts, and began
anew as a public lecturer, essayist, and cultural critic. All the while he
maintained a voluminous correspondence and kept a detailed, evocative journal.
Most of this material has been published, and it casts considerable light on
the depth of his thought, at times more so than his public presentations and
books. His life was pockmarked by personal tragedies, notably the death of his
father when Emerson was eight; the death of his first wife, Ellen, after two
years of marriage; and the death of his oldest son, Waldo, at the age of five.
Such afflictions belie the commonly held assumption that Emerson was a thinker
who did not face the intractable problem of evil. To the contrary, his writings
should be read as a continuing struggle to render the richest possible version
of our situation, given that “things are in the saddle and ride mankind.”
Although Emerson did not write a systematic work in philosophy, he
unquestionably bequeathed an important philosophical vision and countless
philosophical pieces. Beginning with his concentration on the motif of nature,
its embracing quality, and the rhythms of our inextricable presence within its
activities, Emerson details the “compensatory” ebb and flow of the human
journey. The human soul and nature are related as “print” to “seal,” and yet
nature is not always beneficent. In his essay “Compensation,” emanationism
Emerson, Ralph Waldo 258 258 Emerson
writes that “the value of the universe continues to throw itself into every
point. If the good is there, so is the evil; if the affinity, so the repulsion,
if the force, so the limitation.” After the acclaim given the publication of
Emerson’s first book, Nature 1836, he began to gather his public lectures, a
presentational medium at which he was riveting, convincing, and inspiring. In
1841 Emerson published his Essays First
Series, which included the lovely piece “Circles,” wherein he follows the blunt
maxim “we grizzle every day” with the healing affirmation that “life is a
series of surprises.” This volume also contains “Self-Reliance,” which
furnished a motto for the self-proclaiming intrepidity of
nineteenth-century individualism. The
enthusiastic response to Emerson’s essays enabled him to publish three
additional collections within the decade: Essays Second Series 1844, Nature, Addresses and
Lectures 1849, and Representative Men 1850. These books and their successors
contained lectures, orations, poems, and addresses over a wide range of topics,
philosophical, personal, characterological, travel, historical, and literary.
Emerson’s prose is swift, clear, and epigrammatic, like a series of written
stochastic probes, resulting in a Yankee crazy quilt, munificent of shape and
color. Emerson spoke to be heard and wrote to be read, especially by the often
denigrated “common” person. In fact, during Emerson’s European lecture tour in
1848, a letter to a London newspaper requested lowering the admission price so
that poorer people could attend, for “to miss him is to lose an important part
of the Nineteenth Century.” Emerson’s deeply democratic attitude had a
reflective philosophical base. He believed that ordinary experience was
epiphanic if we but open ourselves to its virtually infinite messages. Despite
his Brahmanic appearance and demeanor, Emerson was in continuous touch with
ordinary things. He wrote, “Our chief experiences have been casual.” His belief
in the explosive and pedagogical character of ordinary experience is especially
present in his influential oration “The
Scholar.” After criticizing
thought as thoroughly derivative, he plots the influences necessary to
generate a genuine scholar, paramount among them nature and the learning of the
past, though he cautions us not to be trapped in excessive retrospection at the
expense of “an original relation to the universe.” It is his discussion of
“action” as the third influence on the scholar that enables him to project his
clearest statement of his underlying philosophical commitment. Without action,
“thought can never ripen into truth,” moreover, “thinking is a partial act,”
whereas living is a “total act.” Expressly opposed to any form of
psychological, religious, philosophical, or behavioral dualism, he counsels us
that the spiritual is not set apart, beyond reach of those who toil in the
everyday. Rather, the most profound meanings of the human condition, “lurk” in
the “common,” the “low,” the “familiar,” the “today.” The influence of the
thought of Emerson reaches across class, caste, genre, and persuasion. Thinkers
as diverse as James, Nietzsche, Whitman, Proust, Gertrude Stein, Robert Frost,
Frank Lloyd Wright, Frederick Law Olmsted, and Wallace Stevens are among those
deeply indebted to Emerson. Yet, it was Dewey who best caught the enduring
bequest of Emerson, writing of “the final word of Emerson’s philosophy, [as]
the identity of Being, unqualified and immutable, with character.”
sender and sendee: Emissee: this is crucial. There’s loads of references on this.
Apparently, some philosopher cannot think of communication without the emissee.
But surely Grice loved Virginia Woolf. “And when she was writing ‘The Hours,’
I’m pretty sure she cared a damn whether the rest of the world existed!” Let's explore the issue of the UTTERER'S
OCCASION-MEANING IN THE ABSENCE OF A (so-called) AUDIENCE -- or sender without sendee, as it were. There are various scenarios of utterances by which the utterer or
sender is correctly said to have communicated that so-and-so, such that there
is no actual person or set of persons (or sentient beings) whom the utterer or
sender is addressing and in whom the sender intends to induce a
response. The range of these scenarios includes, or might be thought to
include, such items as -- the posting of a notice, like "Keep
out" or "This bridge is dangerous," -- an entry in a
diary, -- the writing of a note to clarify one's thoughts when working on
some problem, -- soliloquizing, -- rehearsing a part in a projected
conversation, and -- silent thinking. At least some of these
scenarios are unprovided for in the reductive analysis so far
proposed. The examples which Grice's account should cover fall into three
groups: (a) Utterances for which the utterer or sender thinks there may
(now or later) be an audience or sendee (as when Grice's son sent a letter to
Santa). U may think that some particular person, e. g. himself at a future
date in the case of a diary entry, may (but also may not) encounter U's
utterance.Or U may think that there may or may not be some person or other who
is or will be an auditor or sendee or recipient of his utterance. (b) An
utterances which the utterer knows that it is not to be addressed to any actual
sendee, but which the utterer PRETENDS to address or send to some particular
person or type of person, OR which he thinks of as being addressed (or sent) to
some imagined sendee or type of sendee (as in the rehearsal of a speech or of
his part in a projected conversation, or Demosthenes or Noel Coward talking to
the gulls.(c) An utterances (including what Occam calls an "internal"
utterance) with respect to which the utterer NEITHER thinks it possible that
there may be an actual sendee nor imagines himself as addressing sending
so-and-so to a sendee, but nevertheless intends his utterance to be such that
it would induce a certain sort of response in a certain perhaps fairly
indefinite kind of sendee were it the case that such a sendee *were* present.In
the case of silent thinking the idea of the presence of a sendee will have to
be interpreted 'liberally,' as being the idea of there being a sendee for a
public counter-part of the utterer's internal, private speech, if there is
one. Austin refused to discuss Vitters's private-language argument.In this
connection it is perhaps worth noting that some cases of verbal thinking
(especially the type that Vitters engages in) do fall outside the scope of
Grice's account. When a verbal though merely passes through
Vitters's head (or brain) as distinct from being "framed" by Vitters,
it is utterly inappropriate (even in Viennese) to talk of Vitters as having
communicated so-and-so by "the very thought of you," to echo Noble. Vitters is, perhaps, in such a case, more like a sendee than a
sender -- and wondering who such an intelligent sender might (or then might
not) be. In any case, to calm the
neo-Wittgensteinians, Grice propose a reductive analysis which surely accounts
for the examples which need to be accounted for, and which will allow as
SPECIAL (if paradigmatic) cases (now) the range of examples in which there is,
and it is known by the utterer that there is, an actual sendee. A
soul-to-soul transfer. This redefinition is relatively informal. Surely Grice could present a more formal version which would gain
in precision at the cost of ease of comprehension. Let "p" (and
k') range over properties of persons (possible sendees); appropriate
substituends for "O" (and i') will include such diverse expressions
as "is a passer-by," "is a passer-by who sees this
notice," "understands the Viennese cant," "is
identical with Vitters." As will be seen, for Grice to communicate
that so-and-so it will have to be possible to identify the value of
"/" (which may be fairly indeterminate) which U has in mind; but we
do not have to determine the range from which U makes a selection. "U
means by uttering x that *iP" is true iff (30) (3f (3c): I. U utters x intending x to be such that anyone who has q would
think that (i) x has f (2) f is correlated in way c with M-ing that
p (3) (3 0'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has b' would think,
via thinking (i) and (2), that U4's that p (4) in view of (3), U O's that p;
and II. (operative only for certain substituends for
"*4") U utters x intending that, should there actually be anyone
who has 0, he would via thinking (4), himself a that p; ' and III. It is
not the case that, for some inference-element E, U intends x to be such that
anyone who has 0 will both (i') rely on E in coming to O+ that p and (2') think
that (3k'): Uintends x to be such that anyone who has O' will come to /+ that p
without relying on E. Notes: (1) "i+" is to be read as
"p" if Clause II is operative, and as "think that UO's" if
Clause II is non-operative. (2) We need to use both "i" and
"i'," since we do not wish to require that U should intend his
possible audience to think of U's possible audience under the same description
as U does himself. Explanatory comments: (i) It is essential that the
intention which is specified in Clause II should be specified as U's intention
"that should there be anyone who has 0, he would (will) . . ." rather
than, analogously with Clauses I and II, as U's intention "that x should
be such that, should anyone be 0, he would ... ." If we adopt the latter
specification, we shall be open to an objection, as can be shown with the aid
of an example.Suppose that, Vitters is married, and further, suppose he married
an Englishwoman. Infuriated by an afternoon with his mother-in-law, when he is
alone after her departure, Vitters relieves his feelings by saying, aloud and
passionately, in German:"Do not ye ever comest near me again!"It will
no doubt be essential to Vitters's momentary well-being that Vitters should
speak with the intention that his remark be such that were his mother-in-law
present, assuming as we say, that he married and does have one who, being an
Englishwoman, will most likely not catch the Viennese cant that Vitters is
purposively using, she should however, in a very Griceian sort of way, form the
intention not to come near Vitters again. It would, however, be pretty unacceptable
if it were represented as following from Vitters's having THIS intention (that
his remark be such that, were his mother-in-law be present, she should form the
intnetion to to come near Vitters again) that what Vitters is communicating
(who knows to who) that the denotatum of 'Sie' is never to come near Vitters
again.For it is false that, in the circumstances, Vitters is communicating that
by his remark. Grice's reductive analysis is formulated to avoid that
difficulty. (2) Suppose that in accordance with the definiens o U intends x to be such that anyone who is f will think ... , and
suppose that the value of "O" which U has in mind is the property of
being identical with a particular person A. Then it will follow that U
intends A to think . . . ; and given the further condition, fulfilled in any
normal (paradigmatic, standard, typical, default) case, that U intends the
sendee to think that the sendee is the intended sendee, we are assured of the
truth of a statement from which the definiens is inferrible by the rule of
existential generalisation (assuming the legitimacy of this application of
existential generalisation to a statement the expression of which contains such
"intensional" verbs as "intend" and
"think"). It can also be shown that, for any case in which there
is an actual sendee who knows that he is the intended sendee, if the definiens
in the standard version is true then the definiens in the adapted version will
be true. If that is so, given the definition is correct, for any normal
case in which there IS an actual sendee the fulfillment of the definiens will
constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for U's having communicated
that *1p.
sendeeless:
‘audienceless’ “One good example of a sendeeless implicaturum is Sting’s
“Message in a bottle.” – Grice. Grice: “When Sting says, “I’m sending out an
‘s.o.s’ he is being Peirceian.”
emissum: emissor. A construction out of ex- and ‘missum,’ cf. Grice
on psi-trans-mis-sion. Grice’s utterer, but turned Griceian, To emit, to
translate some Gricism or other. Cf. proffer. emissum. emissor-emissum distinction.
Frequently ignored by Austin. Grice usually formulates it ‘roughly.’ Strawson
for some reason denied the reducibility of the emissum to the emissor. Vide his
footnote in his Inaugural lecture at Oxford. it is a truth implicitly
acknowledged by communication theorists themselves -- this acknowledgement is
is certainly implicit in Grice's distinction between what speakers actually
say, in a favored sense of 'say', and what they imply (see "Utterer's
Meaning, SentenceMeaning and Word-Meaning," in Foundations of Language,
1968) -- that in almost all the things we should count as sentences there is a
substantial central core of meaning which is explicable either in terms of
truth-conditions or in terms of some related notion quite simply derivable from
that of a truth-condition, for example the notion, as we might call it, of a
compliance condition in the case of an imperative sentence or a
fulfillment-condition in the case of an optative. If we suppose, therefore,
that an account can be given of the notion of a truthcondition itself, an
account which is indeed independent of reference to communicationintention,
then we may reasonably think that the greater part of the task of a general
theory of meaning has been accomplished without such reference. So let us see
if we can rephrase the distinction for a one-off predicament. By drawing a
skull, Blackburn communicates to his fellow Pembrokite that there is danger
around. The proposition is ‘There is danger around’. Of the claims, one is
literal; the other metabolical. Blackburn means that there is danger around.
Blackburn communicates that there is danger around, possibly leading to death.
The emissum, Blackburn’s drawing of the skull ‘means’ that there is danger
around. Since the fact that Blackburn communicates that p is diaphanous, we
have yet another way of posing the distinction: Blackburn communicates that
there is danger around. What is communicated by Blackburn – his emissum – is
true. Note that in this diaphanous change from ‘Blackburn communicates that
there is danger around’ and ‘What Blackburn communicates, viz. that there is
danger around, is true’ we have progressed quite a bit. There are ways of
involving ‘true’ in the first stage. Blackburn communicates that there is
danger around, and he communicates something true. In the classical languages,
this is done in the accusative case. emissum.
emit. V. emissor. A good verb used by Grice. It gives us ‘emitter, and it is
more Graeco-Roman than his ‘utterer,’ which Cicero would think a barbarism.
emotum: the emotum, the motum. Grice enjoyed a bit of history of
philosophy. Cf. conatum. And Urmson’s company helped. Urmson produced a
brilliant study of the ‘emotive’ theory of ethics, which is indeed linguistic
and based on Ogden. Diog. Laert. of Zeno of Citium. πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα,
"πολλοί σου καταγελῶσιν," "ἀλλ ἐγώ," ἔφη, "οὐ κατα-
γελῶμαι; to the question, who is a friend?, Zeno’s answer is, ‘a second self
(alter ego). One direct way to approach friend is via emotion, as
Aristotle did, and found it aporetic as did Grice. Aristotle discusses philia
in Eth. Nich. but it is in Rhet. where he allows for phulia to be an emotion.
Grice was very fortunate to have Hardie as his tutor. He overused Hardies
lectures on Aristotle, too, and instilled them on his own tutees! Grice is
concerned with the rather cryptic view by Aristotle of the friend (philos,
amicus) as the alter ego. In Grices cooperative, concerted, view of
things, a friend in need is a friend indeed! Grice is interested in Aristotle
finding himself in an aporia. In Nicomachean Ethics IX.ix, Aristotle poses the
question whether the happy man will need friends or not. Kosman correctly
identifies this question as asking not whether friends are necessary in order
to achieve eudæmonia, but why we require friends even when we are happy. The
question is not why we need friends to become happy, but why we need friends
when we are happy, since the eudæmon must be self-sufficient. Philia is
required for the flourishing of the life of practical virtue. The solution by
Aristotle to the aporia here, however, points to the requirement of friendships
even for the philosopher, in his life of theoretical virtue. The olution by
Aristotle to the aporia in Nicomachean Ethics IX.ix is opaque, and the corresponding
passage in Eudeiman Ethics VII.xii is scarcely better. Aristotle thinks he has
found the solution to this aporia. We must take two things into consideration,
that life is desirable and also that the good is, and thence that it is
desirable that such a nature should belong to oneself as it belongs to them. If
then, of such a pair of corresponding s. there is always one s. of the
desirable, and the known and the perceived are in general constituted by their
participation in the nature of the determined, so that to wish to perceive ones
self is to wish oneself to be of a certain definite character,—since, then we
are not in ourselves possessed of each such characters, but only in
participation in these qualities in perceiving and knowing—for the perceiver
becomes perceived in that way in respect in which he first perceives, and
according to the way in which and the object which he perceives; and the knower
becomes known in the same way— therefore it is for this reason that one always
desires to live, because one always desires to know; and this is because he
himself wishes to be the object known. emotion, as conceived by philosophers and
psychologists, any of several general types of mental states, approximately
those that had been called “passions” by earlier philosophers, such as
Descartes and Hume. Anger, e.g., is one emotion, fear a second, and joy a
third. An emotion may also be a content-specific type, e.g., fear of an
earthquake, or a token of an emotion type, e.g., Mary’s present fear that an earthquake
is imminent. The various states typically classified as emotions appear to be
linked together only by overlapping family resemblances rather than by a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions. Thus an adequate philosophical or
psychological “theory of emotion” should probably be a family of theories. Even
to label these states “emotions” wrongly suggests that they are all marked by
emotion, in the older sense of mental agitation a metaphorical extension of the
original sense, agitated motion. A person who is, e.g., pleased or sad about
something is not typically agitated. To speak of anger, fear, joy, sadness,
etc., collectively as “the emotions” fosters the assumption which James said he
took for granted that these are just qualitatively distinct feelings of mental
agitation. This exaggerates the importance of agitation and neglects the
characteristic differences, noted by Aristotle, Spinoza, and others, in the
types of situations that evoke the various emotions. One important feature of
most emotions is captured by the older category of passions, in the sense of
‘ways of being acted upon’. In many lanemotion emotion 259 259 guages nearly all emotion adjectives are
derived from participles: e.g., the English words ‘amused’, ‘annoyed’,
‘ashamed’, ‘astonished’, ‘delighted’, ‘embarrassed’, ‘excited’, ‘frightened’,
‘horrified’, ‘irritated’, ‘pleased’, ‘terrified’, ‘surprised’, ‘upset’, and
‘worried’. When we are, e.g., embarrassed, something acts on us, i.e.,
embarrasses us: typically, some situation or fact of which we are aware, such
as our having on unmatched shoes. To call embarrassment a passion in the sense
of a way of being acted upon does not imply that we are “passive” with respect
to it, i.e., have no control over whether a given situation embarrasses us and
thus no responsibility for our embarrassment. Not only situations and facts but
also persons may “do” something to us, as in love and hate, and mere
possibilities may have an effect on us, as in fear and hope. The possibility
emotions are sometimes characterized as “forward-looking,” and emotions that
are responses to actual situations or facts are said to be “backward-looking.”
These temporal characterizations are inaccurate and misleading. One may be
fearful or hopeful that a certain event occurred in the past, provided one is
not certain as to whether it occurred; and one may be, e.g., embarrassed about
what is going to occur, provided one is certain it will occur. In various
passions the effect on us may include involuntary physiological changes,
feelings of agitation due to arousal of the autonomic nervous system,
characteristic facial expressions, and inclinations toward intentional action
or inaction that arise independently of any rational warrant.
Phenomenologically, however, these effects do not appear to us to be alien and
non-rational, like muscular spasms. Rather they seem an integral part of our
perception of the situation as, e.g., an embarrassing situation, or one that
warrants our embarrassment. emotive
conjugation: I went to Oxford; you went to Cambridge; he went to the London
School of Economics”: a humorous verbal conjugation, designed to expose and
mock first-person bias, in which ostensibly the same action is described in
successively more pejorative terms through the first, second, and third persons
e.g., “I am firm, You are stubborn, He is a pig-headed fool”. This example was
used by Russell in the course of a BBC Radio “Brains’ Trust” discussion. It was
popularized later that year when The New Statesman ran a competition for other
examples. An “unprecedented response” brought in 2,000 entries, including: “I
am well informed, You listen to gossip, He believes what he reads in the
paper”; and “I went to Oxford, You went to Cambridge, He went to the London
School of Economics” Russell was educated at Cambridge and later taught
there. -- emotivism, a noncognitivist
metaethical view opposed to cognitivism, which holds that moral judgments
should be construed as assertions about the moral properties of actions,
persons, policies, and other objects of moral assessment, that moral predicates
purport to refer to properties of such objects, that moral judgments or the
propositions that they express can be true or false, and that cognizers can
have the cognitive attitude of belief toward the propositions that moral
judgments express. Noncognitivism denies these claims; it holds that moral
judgments do not make assertions or express propositions. If moral judgments do
not express propositions, the former can be neither true nor false, and moral
belief and moral knowledge are not possible. The emotivist is a noncognitivist
who claims that moral judgments, in their primary sense, express the
appraiser’s attitudes approval or
disapproval toward the object of
evaluation, rather than make assertions about the properties of that object.
Because emotivism treats moral judgments as the expressions of the appraiser’s
pro and con attitudes, it is sometimes referred to as the boohurrah theory of
ethics. Emotivists distinguish their thesis that moral judgments express the
appraiser’s attitudes from the subjectivist claim that they state or report the
appraiser’s attitudes the latter view is a form of cognitivism. Some versions
of emotivism distinguish between this primary, emotive meaning of moral
judgments and a secondary, descriptive meaning. In its primary, emotive
meaning, a moral judgment expresses the appraiser’s attitudes toward the object
of evaluation rather than ascribing properties to that object. But secondarily,
moral judgments refer to those non-moral properties of the object of evaluation
in virtue of which the appraiser has and expresses her attitudes. So if I judge
that your act of torture is wrong, my judgment has two components. Its primary,
emotive sense is to express my disapproval of your act. Its secondary,
descriptive sense is to denote those non-moral properties of your act upon
which I base my disapproval. These are presumably the very properties that make
it an act of torture roughly, a causing
of intense pain in order to punish, coerce, or afford sadistic pleasure. By
making emotive meaning primary, emotivists claim to preserve the univocity of
moral language between speakers who employ different criteria of application
for their moral terms. Also, by stressing the intimate connection between moral
judgment and the agent’s non-cognitive attitudes, emotivists claim to capture
the motivational properties of moral judgment. Some emotivists have also
attempted to account for ascriptions of truth to moral judgments by accepting the
redundancy account of ascriptions of truth as expressions of agreement with the
original judgment. The emotivist must think that such ascriptions of truth to
moral judgments merely reflect the ascriber’s agreement in noncognitive
attitude with the attitude expressed by the original judgment. Critics of
emotivism challenge these alleged virtues. They claim that moral agreement need
not track agreement in attitude; there can be moral disagreement without
disagreement in attitude between moralists with different moral views, and
disagreement in attitude without moral disagreement between moralists and
immoralists. By distinguishing between the meaning of moral terms and speakers’
beliefs about the extension of those terms, critics claim that we can account for
the univocity of moral terms in spite of moral disagreement without introducing
a primary emotive sense for moral terms. Critics also allege that the emotivist
analysis of moral judgments as the expression of the appraiser’s attitudes
precludes recognizing the possibility of moral judgments that do not engage or
reflect the attitudes of the appraiser. For instance, it is not clear how
emotivism can accommodate the amoralist
one who recognizes moral requirements but is indifferent to them.
Critics also charge emotivism with failure to capture the cognitive aspects of
moral discourse. Because emotivism is a theory about moral judgment or
assertion, it is difficult for the emotivist to give a semantic analysis of
moral predicates in unasserted contexts, such as in the antecedents of
conditional moral judgments e.g., “If he did wrong, then he ought to be
punished”. Finally, one might want to recognize the truth of some moral
judgments, perhaps in order to make room for the possibility of moral mistakes.
If so, then one may not be satisfied with the emotivist’s appeal to redundancy
or disquotational accounts of the ascription of truth. Emotivism was introduced
by Ayer in Language, Truth, and Logic 2d ed., 6 and refined by C. L. Stevenson
in Facts and Values 3 and Ethics and Language 4. Refs.:
There is an essay on “Emotions and akrasia,” but the topic is scattered in
various places, such as Grice’s reply to Davidson on intending. Grice has an
essay on ‘Kant and friendship,’ too, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
conversational empathy – principle of conversational empathy -- Principle of
Conversational Empathy – a term devised by Grice for the expectation a
conversationalist has that his co-partner will honour his conversational goal,
however transitory. imaginative projection into another person’s situation,
especially for vicarious capture of its emotional and motivational qualities.
The term is an English rendering by the Anglo psychologist E. G. Titchener,
1867 7 of the G. Einfühlung, made popular by Theodore Lipps 18514, which also
covered imaginative identification with inanimate objects of aesthetic
contemplation. Under ‘sympathy’, many aspects were earlier discussed by Hume,
Adam Smith, and other Scottish philosophers. Empathy has been considered a
precondition of ethical thinking and a major contributor to social bonding and
altruism, mental state attribution, language use, and translation. The relevant
spectrum of phenomena includes automatic and often subliminal motor mimicry of
the expressions or manifestations of another’s real or feigned emotion, pain,
or pleasure; emotional contagion, by which one “catches” another’s apparent
emotion, often unconsciously and without reference to its cause or “object”;
conscious and unconscious mimicry of direction of gaze, with consequent
transfer of attention from the other’s response to its cause; and conscious or
unconscious role-taking, which reconstructs in imagination with or without
imagery aspects of the other’s situation as the other “perceives” it.
empedocle:
one of the most important Italian philosophers. Grecian preSocratic
philosopher who created a physical theory in response to Parmenides while
incorporating Pythagorean ideas of the soul into his philosophy. Following
Parmenides in his rejection of coming-to-be and perishing, he accounted for
phenomenal change by positing four elements his “roots,” rizomata, earth, water,
air, and fire. When they mix together in set proportions they create compound
substances such as blood and bone. Two forces act on the elements, Love and
Strife, the former joining the different elements, the latter separating them.
In his cyclical cosmogony the four elements combine to form the Sphere, a
completely homogeneous spherical body permeated by Love, which, shattered by
Strife, grows into a cosmos with the elements forming distinct cosmic masses of
earth, water the seas, air, and fire. There is controversy over whether
Empedocles posits one or two periods when living things exist in the cycle. On
one view there are two periods, between which intervenes a stage of complete
separation of the elements. Empedocles accepts the Pythagorean view of
reincarnation of souls, seeing life as punishment for an original sin and
requiring the expiation of a pious and philosophical life. Thus the exile and
return of the individual soul reflects in the microcosm the cosmic movement
from harmony to division to harmony. Empedocles’ four elements became standard
in natural philosophy down to the early modern era, and Aristotle recognized
his Love and Strife as an early expression of the efficient cause. Vide “Italic Griceians” – While in the New
World, ‘Grecian philosophy’ is believed to have happened ‘in Greece,’ Grice was
amused that ‘most happened in Italy!’ Refs.: Luigi
Speranza, "Grice ed Empedocle," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The
Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
empiricism: One of Grice’s
twelve labours -- Condillac, Étienne Bonnot de, philosopher, an empiricist who
was considered the great analytical mind of his generation. Close to Rousseau
and Diderot, he stayed within the church. He is closely perhaps excessively
identified with the image of the statue that, in the Traité des sensations
Treatise on Sense Perception, 1754, he endows with the five senses to explain
how perceptions are assimilated and produce understanding cf. also his Treatise
on the Origins of Human Knowledge, 1746. He maintains a critical distance from
precursors: he adopts Locke’s tabula rasa but from his first work to Logique
Logic, 1780 insists on the creative role of the mind as it analyzes and
compares sense impressions. His Traité des animaux Treatise on Animals, 1755,
which includes a proof of the existence of God, considers sensate creatures
rather than Descartes’s animaux machines and sees God only as a final cause. He
reshapes Leibniz’s monads in the Monadologie Monadology, 1748, rediscovered in
0. In the Langue des calculs Language of Numbers, 1798 he proposes mathematics
as a model of clear analysis. The origin of language and creation of symbols eventually
became his major concern. His break with metaphysics in the Traité des systèmes
Treatise on Systems, 1749 has been overemphasized, but Condillac does replace
rational constructs with sense experience and reflection. His empiricism has
been mistaken for materialism, his clear analysis for simplicity. The
“ideologues,” Destutt de Tracy and Laromiguière, found Locke in his writings.
Jefferson admired him. Maine de Biran, while critical, was indebted to him for
concepts of perception and the self; Cousin disliked him; Saussure saw him as a
forerunner in the study of the origins of language. Empiricism – one of Grice’s
twelve labours – This implicates he saw himself as a Rationalist, rather --
Cordemoy, Géraud de, philosopher and member of the Cartesian school. His most
important work is his Le discernement du corps et de l’âme en six discours,
published in 1666 and reprinted under slightly different titles a number of
times thereafter. Also important are the Discours physique de la parole 1668, a
Cartesian theory of language and communication; and Une lettre écrite à un
sçavant religieux 1668, a defense of Descartes’s orthodoxy on certain questions
in natural philosophy. Cordemoy also wrote a history of France, left incomplete
at his death. Like Descartes, Cordemoy advocated a mechanistic physics
explaining physical phenomena in terms of size, shape, and local motion, and
converse Cordemoy, Géraud de 186 186
held that minds are incorporeal thinking substances. Like most Cartesians,
Cordemoy also advocated a version of occasionalism. But unlike other
Cartesians, he argued for atomism and admitted the void. These innovations were
not welcomed by other members of the Cartesian school. But Cordemoy is often
cited by later thinkers, such as Leibniz, as an important seventeenth-century
advocate of atomism. Empiricism: one of
Grice’s twelve labours -- Cousin, V., philosopher who set out to merge the psychological tradition with the pragmatism
of Locke and Condillac and the inspiration of the Scottish Reid, Stewart and G.
idealists Kant, Hegel. His early courses at the Sorbonne 1815 18, on “absolute”
values that might overcome materialism and skepticism, aroused immense
enthusiasm. The course of 1818, Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien Of the True, the
Beautiful, and the Good, is preserved in the Adolphe Garnier edition of student
notes 1836; other early texts appeared in the Fragments philosophiques
Philosophical Fragments, 1826. Dismissed from his teaching post as a liberal
1820, arrested in G.y at the request of the
police and detained in Berlin, he was released after Hegel intervened
1824; he was not reinstated until 1828. Under Louis-Philippe, he rose to
highest honors, became minister of education, and introduced philosophy into
the curriculum. His eclecticism, transformed into a spiritualism and cult of
the “juste milieu,” became the official philosophy. Cousin rewrote his work
accordingly and even succeeded in having Du Vrai third edition, 1853 removed
from the papal index. In 1848 he was forced to retire. He is noted for his
educational reforms, as a historian of philosophy, and for his translations
Proclus, Plato, editions Descartes, and portraits of ladies of
seventeenth-century society. Empiricism – one of Grice’s twelve labours --
empirical decision theory, the scientific study of human judgment and decision
making. A growing body of empirical research has described the actual
limitations on inductive reasoning. By contrast, traditional decision theory is
normative; the theory proposes ideal procedures for solving some class of
problems. The descriptive study of decision making was pioneered by figures
including Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Richard Nisbett, and Lee Ross, and
their empirical research has documented the limitations and biases of various
heuristics, or simple rules of thumb, routinely used in reasoning. The
representativeness heuristic is a rule of thumb used to judge probabilities
based on the degree to which one class represents or resembles another class.
For example, we assume that basketball players have a “hot hand” during a
particular game producing an
uninterrupted string of successful shots
because we underestimate the relative frequency with which such successful
runs occur in the entire population of that player’s record. The availability
heuristic is a rule of thumb that uses the ease with which an instance comes to
mind as an index of the probability of an event. Such a rule is unreliable when
salience in memory misleads; for example, most people incorrectly rate death by
shark attack as more probable than death by falling airplane parts. For an
overview, see D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky, eds., Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 2. These biases, found in laypeople and
statistical experts alike, have a natural explanation on accounts such as
Herbert Simon’s 7 concept of “bounded rationality.” According to this view, the
limitations on our decision making are fixed in part by specific features of
our psychological architecture. This architecture places constraints on such
factors as processing speed and information capacity, and this in turn produces
predictable, systematic errors in performance. Thus, rather than proposing
highly idealized rules appropriate to an omniscient Laplacean genius more characteristic of traditional normative
approaches to decision theory empirical
decision theory attempts to formulate a descriptively accurate, and thus
psychologically realistic, account of rationality. Even if certain simple rules
can, in particular settings, outperform other strategies, it is still important
to understand the causes of the systematic errors we make on tasks perfectly
representative of routine decision making. Once the context is specified,
empirical decision-making research allows us to study both descriptive decision
rules that we follow spontaneously and normative rules that we ought to follow
upon reflection. empiricism from
empiric, ‘doctor who relies on practical experience’, ultimately from Grecian
empeiria, ‘experience’, a type of theory in epistemology, the basic idea behind
all examples of the type being that experience has primacy in human knowledge
and justified belief. Because empiricism is not a single view but a type of
view with many different examples, it is appropriate to speak not just of
empiricism but of empiricisms. Perhaps the most fundamental distinction to be
drawn among the various empiricisms is that between those consisting of some
claim about concepts and those consisting of some empirical empiricism 262 262 claim about beliefs call these, respectively, concept-empiricisms
and belief-empiricisms. Concept-empiricisms all begin by singling out those
concepts that apply to some experience or other; the concept of dizziness,
e.g., applies to the experience of dizziness. And what is then claimed is that
all concepts that human beings do and can possess either apply to some
experience that someone has had, or have been derived from such concepts by
someone’s performing on those concepts one or another such mental operation as
combination, distinction, and abstraction. How exactly my concepts are and must
be related to my experience and to my performance of those mental operations
are matters on which concept-empiricists differ; most if not all would grant we
each acquire many concepts by learning language, and it does not seem plausible
to hold that each concept thus acquired either applies to some experience that
one has oneself had or has been derived from such by oneself. But though
concept-empiricists disagree concerning the conditions for linguistic
acquisition or transmission of a concept, what unites them, to repeat, is the
claim that all human concepts either apply to some experience that someone has
actually had or they have been derived from such by someone’s actually performing
on those the mental operations of combination, distinction, and abstraction.
Most concept-empiricists will also say something more: that the experience must
have evoked the concept in the person having the experience, or that the person
having the experience must have recognized that the concept applies to his or
her experience, or something of that sort. What unites all belief-empiricists
is the claim that for one’s beliefs to possess one or another truth-relevant
merit, they must be related in one or another way to someone’s experience.
Beliefempiricisms differ from each other, for one thing, with respect to the
merit concerning which the claim is made. Some belief-empiricists claim that a
belief does not have the status of knowledge unless it has the requisite
relation to experience; some claim that a belief lacks warrant unless it has
that relation; others claim that a belief is not permissibly held unless it
stands in that relation; and yet others claim that it is not a properly
scientific belief unless it stands in that relation. And not even this list
exhausts the possibilities. Belief-empiricisms also differ with respect to the
specific relation to experience that is said to be necessary for the merit in
question to be present. Some belief-empiricists hold, for example, that a
belief is permissibly held only if its propositional content is either a report
of the person’s present or remembered experience, or the belief is held on the
basis of such beliefs and is probable with respect to the beliefs on the basis
of which it is held. Kant, by contrast, held the rather different view that if
a belief is to constitute empirical knowledge, it must in some way be about
experience. Third, belief-empiricisms differ from each other with respect to
the person to whose experience a belief must stand in the relation specified if
it is to possess the merit specified. It need not always be an experience of
the person whose belief is being considered. It might be an experience of
someone giving testimony about it. It should be obvious that a philosopher
might well accept one kind of empiricism while rejecting others. Thus to ask
philosophers whether they are empiricists is a question void for vagueness. It
is regularly said of Locke that he was an empiricist; and indeed, he was a
concept-empiricist of a certain sort. But he embraced no version whatsoever of
belief-empiricism. Up to this point, ‘experience’ has been used without
explanation. But anyone acquainted with the history of philosophy will be aware
that different philosophers pick out different phenomena with the word; and
even when they pick out the same phenomenon, they have different views as to
the structure of the phenomenon that they call ‘experience.’ The differences on
these matters reflect yet more distinctions among empiricisms than have been
delineated above.
enantiamorphs: “When Moore said
that he knew he had two hands, he implicated, ‘I have two enantiamorphic
hands,’ before they were able to cancel his talk and his implicaturum.” from
Grecian enantios, ‘opposite’, and morphe, ‘form’, objects whose shapes differ
as do those of a right and left hand. One of a pair of enantiamorphs can be
made to look identical in shape to the other by viewing it in a mirror but not
merely by changing its spatial orientation. Enantiamorphs figure prominently in
the work of Kant, who argued that the existence of enantiamorphic pairs
entailed that Leibnizian relational theories of space were to be rejected in
favor of Newtonian absolutist theories, that some facts about space could be
apprehended empiricism, constructive enantiamorphs 263 263 only by “pure intuition,” and that space
was mind-dependent.
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
GRICEIANA:
-- the way Grice is known in Italy, due to the efforts of Luigi Speranza, of
the Grice Club. Speranza saw that Grice connected, somehow, with philosophy in
general, and tried to pursue a way to make him accessible to anti-Oxonians. The
encyclopædia Griceiana. Grice went to Paris and became enamoured with
encyclopedia, or “encyclopédie,” “or a Descriptive Dictionary of the Sciences,
Arts and Trades,” launched by the Parisian publisher Le Breton, who had secured
d’Alembert’s and Diderot’s editorship, the Encyclopedia was gradually released despite
a temporary revocation of its royal privilege. Comprising seventeen folio
volumes of 17,818 articles and eleven folio volumes of 2,885 plates, the
ENCYCLOPAEDIA GRICEIANA required a staff of 272 Griceian engravers. “But the
good thing,” Grice says, “is that it incorporates the accumulated knowledge and
rationalist, secularist views of the
Enlightenment and prescribed economic, social, and political reforms.”
Strawson adds: “Enormously successful at Oxford, ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA was
reprinted with revisions five times before Grice died.” “Contributions were
made by anyone we could bribe!” – As in the old encycloopaedia, the philosophes
Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, d’Holbach, Naigeon, and Saint-Lambert; the
writers Duclos and Marmontel; the theologians Morellet and Malet; enlightened
clerics, e.g. Raynal; explorers, e.g. La Condamine; natural scientists, e.g.
Daubenton; physicians, e.g. Bouillet; the economists Turgot and Quesnay;
engineers, e.g. Perronet; horologists, e.g. Berthoud; and scores of other
experts. “The purpose of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA,” writes Grice in the
“Foreword”, “is to collect this or that bit of Griceian knowledge dispersed on
the surface of the earth, and to unfold its general system.” “The
Encyclopedia,” Strawson adds, “offers the educated Oxonian a comprehensive,
systematic, and descriptive repository of contemporary liberal and mechanical
arts, with an appendix on implicaturum by Grice hisself.” D’Alembert and
Diderot developed a sensationalist epistemology, “but I don’t.” “Preliminary
Discourse” under the influence of Locke and Condillac. Grice and Strawson (with
the occasional help from Austin, Warnock, Pears and Thomson) compiled and
rationally classified existing knowledge according to the noetic process
memory, imagination, and reason. Based on the assumption of the unity of theory
and praxis, the approach of the ENCYCLOOPÆDIA GRICEIANA is positivistic and ‘futilitarian.’
The ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA vindicates experimental reason and the rule of
nature, fostered the practice of criticism, and stimulated the development of
both old and new sciences. In religious matters, the ENCYCLOPAEDIA GRICEIANA
cultivates ambiguity and implicaturum to escape censorship by Queen Elizabeth
II, an avid reader of the supplements. Whereas most contributors held either
conciliatory or orthodox positions, J. F. Thomson barely concealed his naturalistic
and atheistic opinions. Thomson’s radicalism was pervasive. Supernaturalism, obscurantism,
and fanaticism, and Heideggerianism are among the Encyclopedists’ favorite
targets. The Griceian Encyclopaedists identify Roman Catholicism (of the type
Dummett practiced) with superstition and theology with occult magic; assert the
superiority of natural morality over theological ethics; demand religious
toleration; and champion human rights and conventional implicaturum alike. They
innovatively retrace the historical conditions of the development of Oxford
(“and a little Cambridge”) philosophy. They furthermore pioneer ideas on trade
and industry and anticipate the relevance of historiography, sociology, economics,
and ‘conversational pragmatics.’ As the most ambitious and expansive reference
work Oxford ever saw, the ENCYCLOPÆDIA GRICEIANA crystallizes the confidence of
England’s midlands bourgeoisie in the capacity of reason to dispel the shadows
of ignorance and improve society – “at least Oxonian society, if I can.”
English futilitarians, The: Bergmann’s pun on H. P. Grice and J. L. Austin. from
futile. Cf. conversational futilitarianism. Can there be a futilitarian theory
of communication? Grice’s! The issue is a complex one. Some may interpret
Grice’s theory as resting “on Kantian grounds.” Not everybody was present at
Grice’s seminars at Oxford on helpfulness, where he discusses the kind of
reasoning that a participant to a conversation will display in assuming that
his co-conversationalist is being conversationally helpful, conversationally
benevolent, conversationally ‘altruist,’ almost, and conversationally, well,
co-operative. So, as to the basis for this. We can simplify the scenario by
using the plural. A conversationalist assumes that his co-conversationalist is
being co-operative on Kantian grounds. What are the alternatives, if any? One
can re-describe “Kantian grounds” as “moral grounds.” Conversationalists abide
with the principle of conversational helpfulness on Kantian, moral grounds.
Kant wrote the “Critique of practical reason,” so Kant would allow for a
rephrase of this as follows. Conversationalists abide with the principle of
conversational helpfulness on practical, indeed moral, grounds – which is the
topic of Grice’s last Kant lecture at Stanford. How to turn a ‘counsel of
prudence,’ which is ‘practical’ into something that covers Kant’s “Kategorische
Imperativ.” And then there’s the utilitarian. Utilitarianism IS a moral theory,
or a meta-ethical theory. So one would have to allow for the possibility that
conversationalists abide by the principle of conversational helpfulness on
“utilitarian grounds,” which would be “practical grounds,” AND “moral grounds,”
if not Kantian grounds. In any case, the topic WAS raised, and indeed, for
someone like Grice who wrote on ‘pleasure,’ and ‘happiness,’ it does not seem
futilitarian to see him as a futilitarian. Unfortunately, you need a serious
philosophical background to appreciate all this, since it touches on the very
serious, or ‘deep,’ as Grice would say, “and fascinating,” suburbia or
practicality. But surely the keyword ‘utilitarian’ as per “conversationalists
abide by the principle of conversational helpfulness on utilitarian grounds” is
a possibility. Cf. Grice’s reference to the ‘least effort,’ and in the Oxford
lectures on helpfulness to a conversationalist not getting involved in “undue
effort,” or getting into “unnecessary trouble.” “Undue effort” is ‘forbidden’
by the desideratum of conversational candour; the ‘unnecessary trouble’ is
balanced by the ‘principle of conversational self-love.’ And I don’t think Kant
would ever considered loving himself! Grice being keen on neuter adjectives, he
saw the ‘utile’ at the root of utilitarianism. There is much ‘of value’ in the
old Roman concept of ‘utile.’ Lewis and Short have it as Neutr. absol.:
ūtĭle , is, n., what is useful, the useful: omne tulit punctum, qui miscuit
utile dulci, Hor. A. P. 343: “bonus atque fidus Judex honestum praetulit utili,”
id. C. 4, 9, 41: “utilium tardus provisor,” id. A. P. 164: “sententiae de
utilibus honestisque,” Quint. 3, 8, 13; cf. id. 1, 2, 29. —Ultimately, Grice’s meta-ethics, like Hare’s,
Nowell-Smith’s, Austin’s, Hampshire’s, and Warnock’s derives into a qualified
utilitarianism, with notions of agreeableness and eudaemonia being crucial.
Grice well knows that for Aristotle pleasure is just one out of the three
sources for phulia; the others being profit, and virtue. As an English
utilitarian, or English futilitarian, Grice plays with Griceian
pleasures. Democritus, as Grice remarks, seems to be the earliest
philosopher to have categorically embraced a hedonistic philosophy. Democritus
claims that the supreme goal of life is contentment or cheerfulness, stating
that joy and sorrow are the distinguishing mark of things beneficial and
harmful. The Cyrenaics are an ultra-hedonist Grecoam school of philosophy
founded by Aristippus. Many of the principles of the school were set by his
grandson, Aristippus the Younger, and Theodorus. The Cyrenaic school is one of
the earliest Socratic schools. The Cyrenaics teach that the only intrinsic
‘agathon’ is pleasure ‘hedone,’ which means not just the absence of pain, but a
positively enjoyable momentary sensation. A physical pleasure is stronger than
a pleasure of anticipation or memory. The Cyrenaics do, however, recognize the
value of social obligation, and that pleasure may be gained from altruism. The
Cyrenaic school dies out within a century, and is replaced by Epicureanism.
The Cyrenaics are known for their sceptical epistemology. The Cyrenaics reduce
logic to a basic doctrine concerning the criterion of truth. The Cyrenaics
think that one can only know with certainty his immediate sense-experience, e.
g., that he is having a sweet sensation. But one can know nothing about the
nature of the object that causes this sensation, e.g., that honey is sweet. The
Cyrenaics also deny that we can have knowledge of what the experience of others
are like. All knowledge is immediate sensation. Sensation is a motion which is
purely subjective, and is painful, indifferent or pleasant, according as it is
violent, tranquil or gentle. Further, sensation is entirely individual and can
in no way be described as constituting absolute objective knowledge. Feeling,
therefore, is the only possible criterion of knowledge and of conduct. The way
of being affected is alone knowable. Thus the sole aim for everyone should be
pleasure. Cyrenaicism deduces a single, universal aim for all which is pleasure.
Furthermore, feeling is momentary and homogeneous. It follows that past and
future pleasure have no real existence for us, and that in present pleasure
there is no distinction of kind. Socrates speaks of the higher pleasure of the
intellect. The Cyrenaics denies the validity of this distinction and say that
bodily pleasure (hedone somatike), being more simple and more intense, is
preferable. Momentary pleasure, preferably of a physical kind, is the only good
for a human. However, an action which gives immediate pleasure can create more
than their equivalent of pain. The wise person should be in control (egcrateia)
of pleasure rather than be enslaved to it, otherwise pain results, and this
requires judgement to evaluate this or that pleasure of life. Regard should be
paid to law and custom, because even though neither law nor custom have an
intrinsic value on its own, violating law or custom leads to an unpleasant
penalty being imposed by others. Likewise, friendship and justice are useful
because of the pleasure they provide. Thus the Cyrenaics believe in the
hedonistic value of social obligation and altruistic behaviour.
Epicureanism is a system of philosophy based upon the teachings of Epicurus, an
atomic materialist, following in the steps of Democritus and Leucippus.
Epicurus’s materialism leads him to a general stance against superstition or
the idea of divine intervention. Following Aristippus, Epicurus believes that
the greatest good is to seek modest, sustainable pleasure in the form of a
state of tranquility and freedom from fear (ataraxia) and absence of bodily
pain (aponia) through knowledge of the workings of the world and the limits of
desire. The combination of these two states, ataraxia and aponia, is supposed
to constitute happiness in its highest form. Although Epicureanism is a form of
hedonism, insofar as it declares pleasure as the sole intrinsic good, its
conception of absence of pain as the greatest pleasure and its advocacy of a
simple life make it different from hedonism as it is commonly understood. In
the Epicurean view, the highest pleasure (tranquility and freedom from fear) is
obtained by knowledge, friendship and living a virtuous and temperate life.
Epicurus lauds the enjoyment of a simple pleasure, by which he means abstaining
from the bodily desire, such as sex and the appetite, verging on asceticism.
Epicurus argues that when eating, one should not eat too richly, for it could
lead to dissatisfaction later, such as the grim realization that one could not
afford such delicacies in the future. Likewise, sex could lead to increased
lust and dissatisfaction with the sexual partner. Epicurus does not articulate
a broad system of social ethics that has survived but had a unique version of
the golden rule. It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living
wisely and well and justly, agreeing neither to harm nor be harmed, and it is
impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living a pleasant life.
Epicureanism is originally a challenge to Platonism, though later it became the
main opponent of Stoicism. Epicurus and his followers shun politics. After the
death of Epicurus, his school is headed by Hermarchus. Later many Epicurean
societies flourish in the Late Hellenistic era and during the Roman era, such
as those in Antiochia, Alexandria, Rhodes and Ercolano. The poet Lucretius is
its most known Roman proponent. By the end of the Roman Empire, having
undergone attack and repression, Epicureanism has all but died out, and would
be resurrected in the seventeenth century by the atomist Pierre Gassendi. Some
writings by Epicurus have survived. Some scholars consider the epic poem “De
natura rerum” by Lucretius to present in one unified work the core arguments
and theories of Epicureanism. Many of the papyrus scrolls unearthed at the
Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum are Epicurean texts. At least some are
thought to have belonged to the Epicurean Philodemus. Cf. Barnes on
epicures and connoiseurs. Many a controversy arising out of this or that value
judgement is settled by saying, ‘I like it and you don’t, and that s the end of
the matter.’ I am content to adopt this solution of the difficulty on matters
such as food and drink. Even here, though, we admit the existence of epicures
and connoisseurs.Why are we not content to accept the same solution on every
matter where value is concerned? The reason I am not so content lies in the
fact that the action of one man dictated by his approval of something is
frequently incompatible with the action of another man dictated by his approval
of something. This is obviously philosophical, especially for the Grecian
hedonistic Epicureians made popular by Marius and Walter Pater at Oxford. L and
S have "ἡδονή,” also “ἁδονά,” or in a chorus in tragedy, “ἡδονά,”
ultimately from "ἥδομαι,” which they render it as “enjoyment, pleasure,”
“prop. of sensual pleasure.” αἱ τοῦ σώματος or περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡ.; αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα
ἡ. Plato, Republic, 328d; σωματικαὶ ἡ. Arist. Eth. Nich. 1151a13; αἱ περὶ
πότους καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡ. Plato, Republic, 389e; but also ἀκοῆς ἡ; ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ
εἰδέναι ἡ. Pl. R. 582b; of malicious pleasure, ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, ἐπὶ
ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἡ.; ἡδονῇ ἡσσᾶσθαι, ἡδοναῖς χαρίζεσθαι, to give way to
pleasure; Pl. Lg. 727c; κότερα ἀληθείη χρήσομαι ἢ ἡδονῆ; shall I speak truly or
so as to humour you? εἰ ὑμῖν ἡδονὴ τοῦ ἡγεμονεύειν; ἡ. εἰσέρχεταί τιϝι εἰ, “one
feels pleasure at the thought that …” ; ἡδονὴν ἔχειν τινός to be satisfied
with; ἡδονὴν ἔχει, φέρει; ἡδονὴ ἰδέσθαι (θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι), of a temple; δαίμοσιν
πρὸς ἡδονήν; ὃ μέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡ.; πρὸς ἡ.
Λέγειν, “to speak so as to please another”; δημηγορεῖν; οὐ πρὸς ἡ. οἱ ἦν τὰ
ἀγγελλόμενα; πάντα πρὸς ἡ. ἀκούοντας; later πρὸς ἡδονῆς εἶναί τινι; καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν
κλύειν; καθ᾽ ἡδονήν ἐστί μοι; καθ᾽ ἡ. τι δρᾶν, ποιεῖν; καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ τὰ
πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἐστί τινι, it is a pleasure or delight to another;
ἐν ἡδονῇ ἔχειν τινάς, to take pleasure in them; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, oοἱ λυπηροί;
μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς; ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς; ὑπὸ τῆς ἡ; ἡδονᾷ with pleasure; a pleasure; ἡδοναὶ
τραγημάτων sweetmeats; plural., desires after pleasure, pleasant lusts. In
Ionic philosophers, taste, flavour, usually joined with χροιή. Note that
Aristotle uses somatike hedone. As a Lit. Hum. Oxon., and especially as a
tutee of Hardie at Corpus, Grice is almost too well aware of the centrality of
hedone in Aristotles system. Pleasure is sometimes rendered “placitum,” as in
“ad placitum,” in scholastic philosophy, but that is because scholastic
philosophy is not as Hellenic as it should be. Actually, Grice prefers
“agreeable.” One of Grices requisites for an ascription of eudaemonia (to have
a fairy godmother) precisely has the system of ends an agent chooses to realise
to be an agreeable one. One form or mode of agreeableness, Grice notes, is,
unless counteracted, automatically attached to the attainment of an object of
desire, such attainment being routinely a source of satisfaction. The
generation of such a satisfaction thus provides an independent ground for
preferring one system of ends to another. However, some other mode of agreeableness,
such as e. g. being a source of delight, which is not routinely associated with
the fulfilment of this or that desire, could discriminate, independently of
other features relevant to such a preference, between one system of ends and
another. Further, a system of ends the operation of which is especially
agreeable is stable not only vis-à-vis a rival system, but also against the
somewhat weakening effect of ‘egcrateia,’ incontinence, or akrasia, if you
mustn’t. A disturbing influence, as Aristotle knows from experience, is more
surely met by a principle in consort with a supporting attraction than by the
principle alone. Grices favourite hedonistic implicaturum was “please,” as in
“please, please me,” by The Beatles. While Grice
claims to love Kantotle, he cannot hide his greater reverence for Aristotle,
instilled early on at Corpus. An Oxonian need not recite Kant in what during
the Second World War was referred to as the Hun, and while Aristotle was a
no-no at Clifton (koine!), Hardie makes Grice love him. With eudaemonia, Grice
finds a perfect synthetic futilitarian concept to balance his innate analytic
tendencies. There is Grecian eudaemonism and there is Griceian eudaemonism. L
and S are not too helpful. They have “εὐδαιμονία” (Ion. –ιη), which they render
not as happiness, but as “prosperity, good fortune, opulence;” “χρημάτων
προσόδῳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ εὐ.;” of countries; “μοῖρ᾽ εὐδαιμονίας.” In a
second use, the expression is indeed rendered as “true, full happiness;”
“εὐ. οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἐν χρυσῷ; εὐ. ψυχῆς, oκακοδαιμονίη, cf. Pl.
Def. 412d, Arist. EN 1095a18, sometimes personified as a divinity. There is
eudaemonia and there is kakodaemonia. Of course, Grice’s locus classicus is EN
1095a18, which is Grice’s fairy godmother, almost. Cf. Austin on agathon and
eudaimonia in Aristotle’s ethics, unearthed by Urmson and Warnock, a response
to an essay by Prichard in “Philosophy” on the meaning of agathon in
Aristotle’s ethics. Pritchard argues that Aristotle regards “agathon” to mean
conducive to “eudaemonia,” and, consequently, that Aristotle maintains that
every deliberate action stems, ultimately, from the desire for eudaemonia.
Austin finds fault with this. First, agathon in Aristotle does not have a
single usage, and a fortiori not the one Pritchard suggests. Second, if one has
to summarise the usage of “agathon” in one phrase, “being desired” cannot
fulfil this function, for there are other objects of desire besides “τό
άγαθόν,” even if Davidson would disagree. Prichard endeavours to specify what
Aristotle means by αγαθον. In some contexts, “agathon” seems to mean simply
that being desired or an ultimate or non‐ultimate end or aim of a person. In other
contexts, “αγαθον” takes on a normative quality. For his statements to have
content, argues Prichard, Aristotle must hold that when we pursue something of
a certain kind, such as an honour, we pursue it as “a good.” Prichard argues
that by "αγαθον" Aristotle actually means, except in the Nicomachean
Ethics, conducive to eudaemonia, and holds that when a man acts deliberately,
he does it from a desire to attain eudaemonia. Prichard attributes this
position to Plato as well, despite the fact that both thinkers make statements
inconsistent with this view of man’s ultimate aim. Grice takes life seriously:
philosophical biology. He even writes an essay entitled “Philosophy of life,”
listed is in PGRICE. Grice bases his thought on his tutee Ackrill’s Dawes Hicks
essay for the BA, who quotes extensively from Hardie. Grice also reviews that
“serious student of Greek philosophy,” Austin, in his response to Prichard,
Grice’s fairy godmother. Much the most plausible conjecture regarding what
Grecian eudaimonia means is that eudaemonia is to be understood as the name for
that state or condition which one’s good dæmon would, if he could, ensure for
one. One’s good dæmon is a being motivated, with respect to one, solely by
concern for one’s eudaemonia, well-being or happiness. To change the idiom,
eudæmonia is the general characterisation of what a full-time and unhampered
fairy godmother would secure for one. Grice is concerned with the specific
system of ends that eudaemonia consists for Ariskant. Grice borrows, but never
returns, some reflections by his fomer tuttee at St. Johns, Ackrill. Ackrills
point is about the etymological basis for eudaemonia, from eudaemon, the good
dæmon, as Grice prefers. Grice thinks the metaphor should be disimplicated, and
taken literally. Grice concludes with a set of ends that justify our ascription
of eudaemonia to the agent. For Grice, as for Kantotle, telos and eudaemonia
are related in subtle ways. For eudaemonia we cannot deal with just one end,
but a system of ends, although such a system may be a singleton. Grice
specifies a subtle way of characterising end so that a particular ascription of
an end may entail an ascription of eudaemonia. Grice follows the textual
criticism of his tutee Ackrill, in connection with the Socratic point that
eudaemonia is literally related to the eudaemon. In PGRICE Warner explores
Grice’s concept of eudaemonia. Warner is especially helpful with the third
difficult Carus lecture by Grice, a metaphysical defence of absolute value.
Warner connects with Grice in such topics as the philosophy of perception seen
in an evolutionary light and the Kantotelian idea of eudaemonia. In response to
Warner’s overview of the oeuvre of Grice for the festschrift that Warner
co-edited with Grandy, Grice refers to the editors collectively as Richards.
While he feels he has to use “happiness,” Grice is always having Aristotle’s
eudaemonia in mind. The implicaturum of Smith is ‘happy’ is more complex than
Kantotle thinks. Austen knew. For Emma, you decide if youre happy. Ultimately,
for Grice, the rational life is the happy life. Grice took life seriously:
philosophical biology! Grice is clear when reprinting the Descartes essay in
WOW, where he does quote from Descartes sources quite a bit, even if he
implicates he is no Cartesian scholar – what Oxonian would? It concerns
certainty. And certainty is originally Cantabrigian (Moore), but also Oxonian,
in parts. Ayer says that to know is to assure that one is certain or sure. So
he could connect. Grice will at various stages of his development play and
explore this authoritative voice of introspection: incorrigibility and privileged
access. He surely wants to say that a declaration of an intention is
authoritative. And Grice plays with meaning, too when provoking Malcolm in a
don recollection: Grice: I want you to bring me a paper tomorrow. Strawson: You
mean a newspaper? Grice: No, a philosophical essay. Strawson: How do you know?
Are you certain you mean that? Grice finds not being certain about what one
means Strawsonian and otiose. Tutees. Grice loved to place himself in the role
of the philosophical hack, dealing with his tutees inabilities, a whole week
long – until he could find refreshment in para-philosophy on the Saturday
morning. Now, the logical form of certain is a trick. Grice would symbolize it
as numbering of operators. If G ψs p, G ψs ψs p, and G ψs ψs ψs p, and so ad infinitum. This is a bit like certainty. But
not quite! When he explores trust, Grice considers something like a backing for
it. But does conclusive evidence yield certainty? He doesnt think so.
Certainty, for Grice should apply to any psychological attitude, state or
stance. And it is just clever of him that when he had to deliver his BA lecture
he chooses ‘intention and uncertainty’ as its topic, just to provoke. Not
surprisingly, the “Uncertainty” piece opens with the sceptics challenge. And he
will not conclude that the intender is certain. Only that theres some good
chance (p ˃0.5) that what he intends will get through! When there is a will,
there is a way, when there is a neo-Prichardian will-ing, there is a
palæo-Griceian way-ing! Perhaps by know Moore means certain. Grice was amused
by the fact that Moore thought that he knew that behind the curtains at the
lecture hall at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, there was a window,
when there wasnt. He uses Moores misuse of know – according to Malcolm – both
in Causal theory and Prolegomena. And of course this relates to the topic of
the sceptics implicaturum, above, with the two essays Scepticism and Common
sense and Moore and Philosophers Paradoxes repr. partially in WOW. With regard
to certainty, it is interesting to compare it, as Grice does, not so much with
privileged access, but with incorrigibility. Do we not
have privileged access to our own beliefs and desires? And, worse still,
may it not be true that at least some of our avowals of our beliefs and
desires are incorrigible? One of Grices problems is, as he puts it,
how to accommodate privileged access and,
maybe, incorrigibility. This or that a second-order state may be, in
some fashion, incorrigible. On the contrary, for Grice, this or that
lower-order, first-order judging is only a matter for privileged
access. Note that while he is happy to allow privileged access to
lower-order souly states, only those who are replicated at a higher-order or
second-order may, in some fashion, be said to count as an incorrigible avowal.
It rains. P judges it rains (privileged access). P judges that P judges that it
rains (incorrigible). The justification is conversational. It rains says the P,
or expresses the P. Grice wants to be able to say that if a P expresses that p,
the P judges2 that p. If the P expresses that it rains, the P
judges that he judges that it rains. In this fashion, his second-order,
higher-order judging is incorrigible, only. Although Grice may allow for it to
be corrected by a third-order judging. It is not required that we should stick
with judging here. Let Smith return the money that he owes to Jones. If P
expresses !p, P ψ-s2 that !p. His second-order, higher-order
buletic state is incorrigible (if ceteris paribus is not corrected by a
third-order buletic or doxastic state). His first-order buletic state is a
matter only of privileged access. For a study of conversation as rational
co-operation this utilitarian revival modifies the standard exegesis of Grice
as purely Kantian, and has him more in agreement with the general Oxonian
meta-ethical scene. Refs.: Under ‘futilitarianism,’ we cover Grice’s views on
‘pleasure’ (he has an essay on “Pleasure,”) and “eudaemonia” (He has an essay
on ‘happiness’); other leads are given under ‘grecianism,’ since this is the
Grecian side to Grice’s Ariskant; for specific essays on ‘pleasure,’ and
‘eudaimonia,’ the keywords ‘pleasure’ and ‘happiness’ are useful. A good source
is the essay on happiness in “Aspects,” which combines ‘eudaemonia’ and
‘agreebleness,’ his futilitarianism turned Kantotelian. BANC.
ens a
se: Grice
defines an ‘ens a se’ as a being
that is completely independent and self-sufficient. Since every creature
depends at least upon God for its existence, only God could be ens a se. In
fact, only God is, and he must be. For if God depended on any other being, he
would be dependent and hence not self-sufficient. To the extent that the
ontological argument is plausible, it depends on conceiving of God as ens a se.
In other words, God as ens a se is the greatest conceivable being. The idea of
ens a se is very important in the Monologion and Proslogion of Anselm, in
various works of Duns Scotus, and later Scholastic thought. Ens a se should be
distinguished from ens ex se, according to Anselm in Monologion. Ens a se is
from itself and not “out of itself.” In other words, ens a se does not depend
upon itself for its own existence, because it is supposed to be dependent on
absolutely nothing. Further, if ens a se depended upon itself, it would cause
itself to exist, and that is impossible, according to medieval and Scholastic
philosophers, who took causality to be irreflexive. It is also transitive and
asymmetric. Hence, the medieval idea of ens a se should not be confused with
Spinoza’s idea of causa sui. Later Scholastics often coined abstract terms to
designate the property or entity that makes something to be what it is, in
analogy with forming, say, ‘rigidity’ from ‘rigid’. The Latin term ‘aseitas’ is
formed from the prepositional phrase in ‘ens a se’ in this way; ‘aseitas’ is
tr. into English as ‘aseity’. A better-known example of forming an abstract noun
from a concrete word is ‘haecceitas’ thisness from ‘haec’ this. -- ens rationis Latin, ‘a being of reason’, a
thing dependent for its existence upon reason or thought; sometimes known as an
intentional being. Ens rationis is the contrasting term for a real being res or
ens in re extra animam, such as an individual animal. Real beings exist
independently of thought and are the foundation for truth. A being of reason
depends upon thought or reason for its existence and is an invention of
Enlightenment ens rationis 266 266 the
mind, even if it has a foundation in some real being. This conception requires
the idea that there are degrees of being. Two kinds of entia rationis are
distinguished: those with a foundation in reality and those without one. The
objects of logic, which include genera and species, e.g., animal and human,
respectively, are entia rationis that have a foundation in reality, but are
abstracted from it. In contrast, mythic and fictional objects, such as a
chimera or Pegasus, have no foundation in reality. Blindness and deafness are
also sometimes called entia rationis. --
ens realissimum: used by Grice. Latin, ‘most real being’, an informal term for
God that occurs rarely in Scholastic philosophers. Within Kant’s philosophy, it
has a technical sense. It is an extension of Baumgarten’s idea of ens
perfectissimum most perfect being, a being that has the greatest number of
possible perfections to the greatest degree. Since ens perfectissimum refers to
God as the sum of all possibilities and since actuality is greater than
possibility, according to Kant, the idea of God as the sum of all actualities,
that is, ens realissimum, is a preferable term for God. Kant thinks that human
knowledge is “constrained” to posit the idea of a necessary being. The
necessary being that has the best claim to necessity is one that is completely
unconditioned, that is, dependent on nothing; this is ens realissimum. He
sometimes explicates it in three ways: as the substratum of all realities, as
the ground of all realities, and as the sum of all realities. Ens realissimum
is nonetheless empirically invalid, since it cannot be experienced by humans.
It is something ideal for reason, not real in experience. According to Kant,
the ontological argument begins with the concept of ens realissimum and
concludes that an existing object falls under that concept Critique of Pure
Reason, Book II, chapter 3.
entelecheia -- used by Grice in his philosophical psychology
-- from Grecian entelecheia, energeia, actuality. Aristotle, who coins both
terms, entelecheia and energeia, treats entelecheia as a near synonym of
Energeia (“which makes me often wonder why he felt the need to coin TWICE” – H.
P. Grice.). Entelecheia figures in Aristotle’s definition of the soul (psyche) as
the first actuality of the natural body (De Anima, II.1). This is explained by
analogy with knowledge: first actuality is to knowledge as second actuality is
to the active use of knowledge. ’Entelechia’ is also a technical term, but in
German, in Leibniz for the primitive active force in every monad, which is
combined with primary matter, and from which the active force, vis viva, is
somehow derived (“But I rather use ‘entelecheia’ in the original Grecian.” –
Grice). “The vitalist philosopher Hans Driesch used the Aristotelian term in
his account of biology, and I feel vitalistic on occasion.” “Life, Driesch
holds, is not a bowl of cherries, but an entelechy; and an entelechy is a
substantial entity, rather like a mind, that controls organic processes.” “To
me, life is rather a bowl of cherries, don’t make it serious! It’s just
mysterious!”
implicaturum – “I am aware that with ‘implicaturum,’ as opposed to ‘implicaturum,’
the distinction with ‘implicatio’ is lost – for ‘what is implied,’ in contrast,
sounds vulgar.” And then there’s ‘entailment” is not as figurative as it
sounds: it inovolves property and limitation -- “Paradoxes of entailment,”
“Paradoxes of implication.” Philo and his teacher. Grice is not sure about ‘implicaturum.’
The quote by Moore, 1919 being:"It might be suggested that we should say
"p ent q" 'means' "p ) q AND this proposition is an instance of
a formal implication, which is not merely true but self-evident, like the laws
of formal logic." This proposed definitions would avoid the paradoxes involved
in Strachey's definition, since such true formal implications as 'All the
persons in this room are more than five years old' are certainly not
self-evident; and, so far as I can see, it may state something which is in fact
true of p and q, whenever and only whenp ent q. I do not myself think that it
gives the meaning of 'p ent q,' since the kind of relation which I see to hold
between the premises and a conclusion of a syllogism seems to me one which is
purely 'objective' in the sense that no psychological term, such as is involved
in the meaning of 'self-evident' is involved in its definition (it it has one).
I am not, however, concerned to dispute that some such definition of "p
ent q" as this may be true." --- and so on. So, it is apparently all Strachey's
fault. This
view as to what φA . ent . ψA means has, for instance, if I understand him
rightly, been asserted by Mr. O. Strachey in Mind, N.S., 93; since he asserts
that, in his opinion, this is what Professor C. I. Lewis means by “φA strictly
implies ψA,” and undoubtedly what Professor Lewis means by this is what I mean
by φA . ent . ψA. And the same view has been frequently suggested (though I do
not know that he has actually asserted it) by Mr. Russell himself (e.g.,
Principia Mathematica, p. 21). I 1903 B. Russell Princ.
Math. ii. 14 How far formal implication is definable in terms
of implication simply, or material implication as it may be called,
is a difficult question. Source : Principles : Chapter III. Implication and Formal Implication.
– Source : Principia, page 7 : "When it is necessary explicitly to
discriminate "implication" [i.e. "if p, then q" ] from
"formal implication," it is called "material implication."
– Source : Principia, page 20 : "When an implication, say ϕx.⊃.ψx, is said to
hold always, i.e. when (x):ϕx.⊃.ψx, we shall say that ϕx formally implies ψx"Many logicians did use ‘implicaturum’ not necessarily to
mean ‘conversational implicaturum,’ but as the result of ‘implicatio’.
‘Implicatio’ was often identified with the Megarian or Philonian ‘if.’ Why? thought
that we probably did need an entailment. The symposium was held in New York
with Dana Scott and R. K. Meyer. The notion had been mis-introduced (according
to Strawson) in the philosophical literature by Moore. Grice is especially
interested in the entailment + implicaturum pair. A philosophical expression
may be said to be co-related to an entailment (which is rendered in terms of a
reductive analysis). However, the use of the expression may co-relate to
this or that implicaturum which is rendered reasonable in the light of the assumption
by the addressee that the utterer is ultimately abiding by a principle of
conversational helfpulness. Grice thinks many philosophers take an implicaturum
as an entailment when they surely shouldnt! Grice was more interested than
Strawson was in the coinage by Moore of entailment for logical consequence. As
an analyst, Grice knew that a true conceptual analysis needs to be reductive
(if not reductionist). The prongs the analyst lists are thus entailments of the
concept in question. Philosophers, however, may misidentify what is an
entailment for an implicaturum, or vice versa. Initially, Grice was interested
in the second family of cases. With his coinage of disimplicaturum, Grice
expands his interest to cover the first family of cases, too. Grice remains a
philosophical methodologist. He is not so much concerned with any area or
discipline or philosophical concept per se (unless its rationality), but with
the misuses of some tools in the philosophy of language as committed by some of
his colleagues at Oxford. While entailment, was, for Strawson mis-introduced in
the philosophical literature by Moore, entailment seems to be less involved in
paradoxes than if is. Grice connects the two, as indeed his tutee Strawson did!
As it happens, Strawsons Necessary propositions and entailment statements is
his very first published essay, with Mind, a re-write of an unpublication
unwritten elsewhere, and which Grice read. The relation of consequence may be
considered a meta-conditional, where paradoxes arise. Grices Bootstrap is
a principle designed to impoverish the metalanguage so that the philosopher can
succeed in the business of pulling himself up by his own! Grice then takes a
look at Strawsons very first publication (an unpublication he had written
elsewhere). Grice finds Strawson thought he could provide a simple solution to
the so-called paradoxes of entailment. At the time, Grice and Strawson were
pretty sure that nobody then accepted, if indeed anyone ever did and did make,
the identification of the relation symbolised by the horseshoe with the
relation which Moore calls entailment, p⊃q,
i. e. ~(pΛ~q) is rejected as an analysis of p entails q because it involves
this or that allegedly paradoxical implicaturum, as that any false proposition
entails any proposition and any true proposition is entailed by any
proposition. It is a commonplace that Lewiss amendment had consequences
scarcely less paradoxical in terms of the implicatura. For if p is impossible,
i.e. self-contradictory, it is impossible that p and ~q. And if q is
necessary, ~q is impossible and it is impossible that p and ~q; i. e., if p
entails q means it is impossible that p and ~q any necessary proposition is entailed
by any proposition and any self-contradictory proposition entails any
proposition. On the other hand, Lewiss definition of entailment (i.e. of the
relation which holds from p to q whenever q is deducible from p) obviously
commends itself in some respects. Now, it is clear that the emphasis laid on
the expression-mentioning character of the intensional contingent statement by
writing pΛ~q is impossible instead of It is impossible that p and ~q does not
avoid the alleged paradoxes of entailment. But it is equally clear that the
addition of some provision does avoid them. One may proposes that one
should use “entails” such that no necessary statement and no negation of a
necessary statement can significantly be said to entail or be entailed by any
statement; i. e. the function p entails q cannot take necessary or
self-contradictory statements as arguments. The expression p entails q is to be
used to mean p⊃q is necessary, and neither p nor q is either necessary or
self-contradictory, or pΛ~q is impossible and neither p nor q, nor either of
their contradictories, is necessary. Thus, the paradoxes are avoided. For let
us assume that p1 expresses a contingent, and q1 a necessary, proposition. p1
and ~q1 is now impossible because ~q1 is impossible. But q1 is necessary. So,
by that provision, p1 does not entail q1. We may avoid the paradoxical
assertion that p1 entails q2 as merely falling into the equally paradoxical
assertion that p1 entails q1 is necessary. For: If q is necessary, q is
necessary is, though true, not necessary, but a contingent intensional
(Latinate) statement. This becomes part of the philosophers lexicon: intensĭo,
f. intendo, which L and S render as a stretching out, straining, effort.
E. g. oculorum, Scrib. Comp. 255. Also an intensifying, increase. Calorem suum
(sol) intensionibus ac remissionibus temperando fovet,” Sen. Q. N. 7, 1, 3. The
tune: “gravis, media, acuta,” Censor. 12. Hence:~(q is necessary) is,
though false, possible. Hence “p1Λ~(q1 is necessary)” is, though false, possible.
Hence p1 does NOT entail q1 is necessary. Thus, by adopting the view that an
entailment statement, and other intensional statements, are non-necessary, and
that no necessary statement or its contradictory can entail or be entailed by
any statement, Strawson thinks he can avoid the paradox that a necessary
proposition is entailed by any proposition, and indeed all the other associated
paradoxes of entailment. Grice objected that Strawsons cure was worse than
Moores disease! The denial that a necessary proposition can entail or be
entailed by any proposition, and, therefore, that necessary propositions can be
related to each other by the entailment-relation, is too high a price to pay
for the solution of the paradoxes. And here is where Grices implicaturum is
meant to do the trick! Or not! When Levinson proposed + for conversationally implicaturum,
he is thinking of contrasting it with ⊢. But things aint that easy.
Even the grammar is more complicated: By uttering He is an adult, U explicitly
conveys that he is an adult. What U explicitly conveys entails that he is not a
child. What U implies is that he should be treated accordingly. Refs.: One
good reference is the essay on “Paradoxes of entailment,” in the Grice papers;
also his contribution to a symposium for the APA under a separate series, The
H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
enthymeme: an incompletely
stated syllogism, with one premise, or even the conclusion, omitted. The term
sometimes designates incompletely stated arguments of other kinds. We are
expected to supply the missing premise or draw the conclusion if it is not
stated. The result is supposed to be a syllogistic inference. For example: ‘He
will eventually get caught, for he is a thief’; or ‘He will eventually be
caught, for all habitual thieves get caught’. This notion of enthymeme as an
incompletely stated syllogism has a long tradition and does not seem
inconsistent with Aristotle’s own characterization of it. Thus, Peter of Spain
openly declares that an enthymeme is an argument with a single premise that
needs to be reduced to syllogism. But Peter also points out that Aristotle
spoke of enthymeme as “being of ycos and signum,” and he explains that ycos
here means ‘probable proposition’ while signum expresses the necessity of
inference. ‘P, therefore Q’ is an ycos in the sense of a proposition that
appears to be true to all or to many; but insofar as P has virtually a double power,
that of itself and of the proposition understood along with it, it is both
probable and demonstrative, albeit from a different point of view.
conversational entropy. -- Principle
of Conversational entropy, a measure of disorder or “information.” The number
of states accessible to the various elements of a large system of particles
such as a cabbage or the air in a room is represented as “W.” Accessible
microstates might be, e. g., energy levels the various particles can reach. One
can greatly simplify the statement of certain laws of nature by introducing a
logarithmic measure of these accessible microstates. This measure, called “entropy”
by H. P. Grice is defined by the formula: SEntropy % df. klnW, where “k” is
Grice’’s constant. When the conversational entropy of a conversational system
increases, the system becomes more random and disordered (“less dove-tailed,”
in Grice’s parlance) in that a larger number of microstates become available
for the system’s particles to enter. If a large system within which exchanges
of energy occur is isolated, exchanging no energy with its environment, the
entropy of the system tends to increase and never decreases. This result is
part of the second law of thermodynamics. In real, evolving physical systems
effectively isolated from their environments, entropy increases and thus
aspects of the system’s organization that depend upon there being only a
limited range of accessible microstates are altered. A cabbage totally isolated
in a container e. g. would decay as complicated organic molecules eventually
became unstructured in the course of ongoing exchanges of energy and attendant
entropy increases. In Grice’s information theory, a state or event (or
conversational move) is said to contain more information than a second state or
event if the former state is less probable and thus in a sense more surprising
(or “baffling,” in Grice’s term) than the latter. Other plausible constraints
suggest a logarithmic measure of information content. Suppose X is a set of
alternative possible states, xi , and pxi
is the probability of each xi 1 X. If state xi has occurred the
information content of that occurrence is taken to be -log2pxi . This function
increases as the probability of xi decreases. If it is unknown which xi will
occur, it is reasonable to represent the expected information content of X as
the sum of the information contents of the alternative states xi weighted in
each case by the probability of the state, giving: This is called the Shannon’s
or Grice’s entropy. Both Shannon’s and Grice’s entropy and physical entropy can
be thought of as logarithmic measures of disarray. But this statement trades on
a broad understanding of ‘disarray’. A close relationship between the two
concepts of entropy should not be assumed, not even by Grice, less so by
Shannon.
environmental
implicaturum:
For Grice, two pirots need to share an environment -- environmental philosophy,
the critical study of concepts defining relations between human beings and
their non-human environment. Environmental ethics, a major component of
environmental philosophy, addresses the normative significance of these
relations. The relevance of ecological relations to human affairs has been
recognized at least since Darwin, but the growing sense of human responsibility
for their deterioration, reflected in books such as Rachel Carson’s Silent
Spring 2 and Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation 5, has prompted the recent
upsurge of interest. Environmental philosophers have adduced a wide variety of
human attitudes and practices to account for the perceived deterioration,
including religious and scientific attitudes, social institutions, and
industrial technology. Proposed remedies typically urge a reorientation or new
“ethic” that recognizes “intrinsic value” in the natural world. Examples
include the “land ethic” of Aldo Leopold 78, which pictures humans as belonging
to, rather than owning, the biotic community “the land”; deep ecology, a stance
articulated by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess b.2, which advocates forms
of identification with the non-human world; and ecofeminism, which rejects
prevailing attitudes to the natural world that are perceived as patriarchal. At
the heart of environmental ethics lies the attempt to articulate the basis of
concern for the natural world. It encompasses global as well as local issues,
and considers the longer-term ecological, and even evolutionary, fate of the
human and non-human world. Many of its practitioners question the
anthropocentric claim that human beings are the exclusive or even central focus
of envelope paradox environmental philosophy 268 268 ethical concern. In thus extending both
the scope and the grounds of concern, it presents a challenge to the stance of
conventional interhuman ethics. It debates how to balance the claims of present
and future, human and non-human, sentient and non-sentient, individuals and
wholes. It investigates the prospects for a sustainable relationship between
economic and ecological systems, and pursues the implications of this relationship
with respect to social justice and political institutions. Besides also
engaging metaethical questions about, for example, the objectivity and
commensurability of values, environmental philosophers are led to consider the
nature and significance of environmental change and the ontological status of
collective entities such as species and ecosystems. In a more traditional vein,
environmental philosophy revives metaphysical debates surrounding the perennial
question of “man’s place in nature,” and finds both precedent and inspiration
in earlier philosophies and cultures.
epistemic
deontologism,
a duty-based view of the nature of epistemic justification. A central concern
of epistemology is to account for the distinction between justified and
unjustified beliefs. According to epistemic deontologism, the concept of
justification may be analyzed by using, in a specific sense relevant to the
pursuit of knowledge, terms such as ‘ought’, ‘obligatory’, ‘permissible’, and
‘forbidden’. A subject S is justified in believing that p provided S does not
violate any epistemic obligations those
that arise from the goal of believing what is true and not believing what is
false. Equivalently, S is justified in believing that p provided believing p
is from the point of view taken in the
pursuit of truth permissible for S.
Among contemporary epistemologists, this view is held by Chisholm, Laurence
BonJour, and Carl Ginet. Its significance is twofold. If justification is a
function of meeting obligations, then it is, contrary to some versions of
naturalistic epistemology, normative. Second, if the normativity of
justification is deontological, the factors that determine whether a belief is
justified must be internal to the subject’s mind. Critics of epistemic
deontologism, most conspicuously Alston, contend that belief is involuntary and
thus cannot be a proper object of obligations. If, e.g., one is looking out the
window and notices that it is raining, one is psychologically forced to believe
that it is raining. Deontologists can reply to this objection by rejecting its
underlying premise: epistemic obligations require that belief be voluntary.
Alternatively, they may insist that belief is voluntary after all, and thus
subject to epistemic obligations, for there is a means by which one can avoid
believing what one ought not to believe: weighing the evidence, or
deliberation. -- epistemic logic, the
logical investigation of epistemic concepts and statements. Epistemic concepts
include the concepts of knowledge, reasonable belief, justification, evidence,
certainty, and related notions. Epistemic logic is usually taken to include the
logic of belief or doxastic logic. Much of the recent work on epistemic logic
is based on the view that it is a branch of modal logic. In the early 0s von
Wright observed that the epistemic notions verified known to be true,
undecided, and falsified are related to each other in the same way as the
alethic modalities necessary, contingent, and impossible, and behave logically
in analogous ways. This analogy is not surprising in view of the fact that the
meaning of modal concepts is often explained epistemically. For example, in the
0s Peirce defined informational possibility as that “which in a given state of
information is not perfectly known not to be true,” and called informationally
necessary “that which is perfectly known to be true.” The modal logic of
epistemic and doxastic concepts was studied systematically by Hintikka in his
pioneering Knowledge and Belief2, which applied to the concepts of knowledge
and belief the semantical method the method of modal sets that he had used
earlier for the investigation of modal logic. In this approach, the truth of
the proposition that a knows that p briefly Kap in a possible world or
situation u is taken to mean that p holds in all epistemic alternatives of u;
these are understood as worlds compatible with what a knows at u. If the
relation of epistemic alternativeness is reflexive, the principle ‘KapPp’ only
what is the case can be known is valid, and the assumption that the
alternativeness relation is transitive validates the so-called KK-thesis, ‘Kap
P Ka Ka p’ if a knows that p, a knows that a knows that p; these two
assumptions together make the logic of knowledge similar to an S4-type modal
logic. If the knowledge operator Ka and the corresponding epistemic possibility
operator Pa are added to quantification theory with identity, it becomes
possible to study the interplay between quantifiers and epistemic operators and
the behavior of individual terms in epistemic contexts, and analyze such
locutions as ‘a knows who what b some F is’. The problems of epistemic logic in
this area are part of the general problem of giving a coherent semantical
account of propositional attitudes. If a proposition p is true in all epistemic
alternatives of a given world, so are all logical consequences of p; thus the
possible-worlds semantics of epistemic concepts outlined above leads to the
result that a person knows all logical consequences of what he knows. This is a
paradoxical conclusion; it is called the problem of logical omniscience. The
solution of this problem requires a distinction between different levels of
knowledge for example, between tacit and
explicit knowledge. A more realistic model of knowledge can be obtained by
supplementing the basic possible-worlds account by an analysis of the processes
by which the implicit knowledge can be activated and made explicit. Modal
epistemic logics have found fruitful applications in the recent work on
knowledge representation and in the logic and semantics of questions and
answers in which questions are interpreted as requests for knowledge or
“epistemic imperatives.” -- epistemic
principle, a principle of rationality applicable to such concepts as knowledge,
justification, and reasonable belief. Epistemic principles include the
principles of epistemic logic and principles that relate different epistemic
concepts to one another, or epistemic concepts to nonepistemic ones e.g.,
semantic concepts. Epistemic concepts include the concepts of knowledge,
reasonable belief, justification, epistemic probability, and other concepts
that are used for the purpose of assessing the reasonableness of beliefs and
knowledge claims. Epistemic principles can be formulated as principles concerning
belief systems or information systems, i.e., systems that characterize a
person’s possible doxastic state at a given time; a belief system may be
construed as a set of accepted propositions or as a system of degrees of
belief. It is possible to distinguish two kinds of epistemic principles: a
principles concerning the rationality of a single belief system, and b
principles concerning the rational changes of belief. The former include the
requirements of coherence and consistency for beliefs and for probabilities;
such principles may be said to concern the statics of belief systems. The
latter principles include various principles of belief revision and adjustment,
i.e., principles concerning the dynamics of belief systems. -- epistemic privacy, the relation a person
has to a proposition when only that person can have direct or non-inferential
knowledge of the proposition. It is widely thought that people have epistemic
privacy with respect to propositions about certain of their own mental states.
According to this view, a person can know directly that he has certain thoughts
or feelings or sensory experiences. Perhaps others can also know that the
person has these thoughts, feelings, or experiences, but if they can it is only
as a result of inference from propositions about the person’s behavior or
physical condition. -- epistemic regress
argument, an argument, originating in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, aiming
to show that knowledge and epistemic justification have a two-tier structure as
described by epistemic foundationalism. It lends itself to the following
outline regarding justification. If you have any justified belief, this belief
occurs in an evidential chain including at least two links: the supporting link
i.e., the evidence and the supported link i.e., the justified belief. This does
not mean, however, that all evidence consists of beliefs. Evidential chains
might come in any of four kinds: circular chains, endless chains, chains ending
in unjustified beliefs, and chains anchored in foundational beliefs that do not
derive their justification from other beliefs. Only the fourth, foundationalist
kind is defensible as grounding knowledge and epistemic justification. Could
all justification be inferential? A belief, B1, is inferentially justified when
it owes its justification, at least in part, to some other belief, B2. Whence
the justification for B2? If B2 owes its justification to B1, we have a
troublesome circle. How can B2 yield justification or evidence for B1, if B2
owes its evidential status to B1? On the other hand, if B2 owes its
justification to another belief, B3, and B3 owes its justification to yet
another belief, B4, and so on ad infinitum, we have a troublesome endless
regress of justification. Such a regress seems to deliver not actual
justification, but at best merely potential justification, for the belief at
its head. Actual finite humans, furthermore, seem not to be able to comprehend,
or to possess, all the steps of an infinite regress of justification. Finally,
if B2 is itself unjustified, it evidently will be unable to provide
justification for B1. It seems, then, that the structure of inferential
justification does not consist of either circular justification, endless
regresses of justification, or unjustified starter-beliefs. We have
foundationalism, then, as the most viable account of evidential chains, so long
as we understand it as the structural view that some beliefs are justified
non-inferentially i.e., without deriving justification from other beliefs, but
can nonetheless provide justification for other beliefs. More precisely, if we
have any justified beliefs, we have some foundational, non-inferentially
justified beliefs. This regress argument needs some refinement before its full
force can be appreciated. With suitable refinement, however, it can seriously
challenge such alternatives to foundationalism as coherentism and
contextualism. The regress argument has been a key motivation for
foundationalism in the history of epistemology.
-- epistemology from Grecian episteme, ‘knowledge’, and logos,
‘explanation’, the study of the nature of knowledge and justification;
specifically, the study of a the defining features, b the substantive
conditions or sources, and c the limits of knowledge and justification. The
latter three categories are represented by traditional philosophical
controversy over the analysis of knowledge and justification, the sources of
knowledge and justification e.g., rationalism versus empiricism, and the
viability of skepticism about knowledge and justification. Kinds of knowledge.
Knowledge can be either explicit or tacit. Explicit knowledge is self-conscious
in that the knower is aware of the relevant state of knowledge, whereas tacit
knowledge is implicit, hidden from self-consciousness. Much of our knowledge is
tacit: it is genuine but we are unaware of the relevant states of knowledge,
even if we can achieve awareness upon suitable reflection. In this regard,
knowledge resembles many of our psychological states. The existence of a
psychological state in a person does not require the person’s awareness of that
state, although it may require the person’s awareness of an object of that
state such as what is sensed or perceived. Philosophers have identified various
species of knowledge: for example, propositional knowledge that something is
so, non-propositional knowledge of something e.g., knowledge by acquaintance,
or by direct awareness, empirical a posteriori propositional knowledge,
nonempirical a priori propositional knowledge, and knowledge of how to do
something. Philosophical controversy has arisen over distinctions between such
species, for example, over i the relations between some of these species e.g.,
does knowing-how reduce to knowledge-that?, and ii the viability of some of
these species e.g., is there really such a thing as, or even a coherent notion
of, a priori knowledge?. A primary concern of classical modern philosophy, in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was the extent of our a priori
knowledge relative to the extent of our a posteriori knowledge. Such
rationalists as Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza contended that all genuine
knowledge of the real world is a priori, whereas such empiricists as Locke,
Berkeley, and Hume argued that all such knowledge is a posteriori. In his Critique
of Pure Reason 1781, Kant sought a grand reconciliation, aiming to preserve the
key lessons of both rationalism and empiricism. Since the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, a posteriori knowledge has been widely regarded as
knowledge that depends for its supporting ground on some specific sensory or
perceptual experience; and a priori knowledge has been widely regarded as
knowledge that does not depend for its supporting ground on such experience.
Kant and others have held that the supporting ground for a priori knowledge
comes solely from purely intellectual processes called “pure reason” or “pure
understanding.” Knowledge of logical and mathematical truths typically serves
as a standard case of a priori knowledge, whereas knowledge of the existence or
presence of physical objects typically serves as a standard case of a
posteriori knowledge. A major task for an account of a priori knowledge is the
explanation of what the relevant purely intellectual processes are, and of how
they contribute to non-empirical knowledge. An analogous task for an account of
a posteriori knowledge is the explanation of what sensory or perceptual
experience is and how it contributes to empirical knowledge. More
fundamentally, epistemologists have sought an account of propositional
knowledge in general, i.e., an account of what is common to a priori and a
posteriori knowledge. Ever since Plato’s Meno and Theaetetus c.400 B.C.,
epistemologists have tried to identify the essential, defining components of
knowledge. Identifying these components will yield an analysis of knowledge. A
prominent traditional view, suggested by Plato and Kant among others, is that
propositional knowledge that something is so has three individually necessary
and jointly sufficient components: justification, truth, and belief. On this
view, propositional knowledge is, by definition, justified true belief. This is
the tripartite definition that has come to be called the standard analysis. We
can clarify it by attending briefly to each of its three conditions. The belief
condition. This requires that anyone who knows that p where ‘p’ stands for any
proposition or statement must believe that p. If, therefore, you do not believe
that minds are brains say, because you have not considered the matter at all, then
you do not know that minds are brains. A knower must be psychologically related
somehow to a proposition that is an object of knowledge for that knower.
Proponents of the standard analysis hold that only belief can provide the
needed psychological relation. Philosophers do not share a uniform account of
belief, but some considerations supply common ground. Beliefs are not actions
of assenting to a proposition; they rather are dispositional psychological
states that can exist even when unmanifested. You do not cease believing that 2
! 2 % 4, for example, whenever your attention leaves arithmetic. Our believing
that p seems to require that we have a tendency to assent to p in certain
situations, but it seems also to be more than just such a tendency. What else
believing requires remains highly controversial among philosophers. Some
philosophers have opposed the belief condition of the standard analysis on the
ground that we can accept, or assent to, a known proposition without actually
believing it. They contend that we can accept a proposition even if we fail to
acquire a tendency, required by believing, to accept that proposition in
certain situations. On this view, acceptance is a psychological act that does
not entail any dispositional psychological state, and such acceptance is
sufficient to relate a knower psychologically to a known proposition. However
this view fares, one underlying assumption of the standard analysis seems
correct: our concept of knowledge requires that a knower be psychologically related
somehow to a known proposition. Barring that requirement, we shall be hard put
to explain how knowers psychologically possess their knowledge of known
propositions. Even if knowledge requires belief, belief that p does not require
knowledge that p, since belief can typically be false. This observation,
familiar from Plato’s Theaetetus, assumes that knowledge has a truth condition.
On the standard analysis, if you know that p, then it is true that p. If,
therefore, it is false that minds are brains, then you do not know that minds
are brains. It is thus misleading to say, e.g., that astronomers before
Copernicus knew that the earth is flat; at best, they justifiably believed that
they knew this. The truth condition. This condition of the standard analysis
has not attracted any serious challenge. Controversy over it has focused
instead on Pilate’s vexing question: What is truth? This question concerns what
truth consists in, not our ways of finding out what is true. Influential
answers come from at least three approaches: truth as correspondence i.e.,
agreement, of some specified sort, between a proposition and an actual
situation; truth as coherence i.e., interconnectedness of a proposition with a
specified system of propositions; and truth as pragmatic cognitive value i.e.,
usefulness of a proposition in achieving certain intellectual goals. Without
assessing these prominent approaches, we should recognize, in accord with the
standard analysis, that our concept of knowledge seems to have a factual requirement:
we epistemology epistemology 274 274
genuinely know that p only if it is the case that p. The pertinent notion of
“its being the case” seems equivalent to the notion of “how reality is” or “how
things really are.” The latter notion seems essential to our notion of
knowledge, but is open to controversy over its explication. The justification
condition. Knowledge is not simply true belief. Some true beliefs are supported
only by lucky guesswork and hence do not qualify as knowledge. Knowledge requires
that the satisfaction of its belief condition be “appropriately related” to the
satisfaction of its truth condition. This is one broad way of understanding the
justification condition of the standard analysis. More specifically, we might
say that a knower must have adequate indication that a known proposition is
true. If we understand such adequate indication as a sort of evidence
indicating that a proposition is true, we have reached the traditional general
view of the justification condition: justification as evidence. Questions about
justification attract the lion’s share of attention in contemporary
epistemology. Controversy focuses on the meaning of ‘justification’ as well as
on the substantive conditions for a belief’s being justified in a way appropriate
to knowledge. Current debates about the meaning of ‘justification’ revolve
around the question whether, and if so how, the concept of epistemic
knowledge-relevant justification is normative. Since the 0s Chisholm has
defended the following deontological obligation-oriented notion of
justification: the claim that a proposition, p, is epistemically justified for
you means that it is false that you ought to refrain from accepting p. In other
terms, to say that p is epistemically justified is to say that accepting p is
epistemically permissible at least in
the sense that accepting p is consistent with a certain set of epistemic rules.
This deontological construal enjoys wide representation in contemporary
epistemology. A normative construal of justification need not be deontological;
it need not use the notions of obligation and permission. Alston, for instance,
has introduced a non-deontological normative concept of justification that
relies mainly on the notion of what is epistemically good from the viewpoint of
maximizing truth and minimizing falsity. Alston links epistemic goodness to a
belief’s being based on adequate grounds in the absence of overriding reasons
to the contrary. Some epistemologists shun normative construals of
justification as superfluous. One noteworthy view is that ‘epistemic
justification’ means simply ‘evidential support’ of a certain sort. To say that
p is epistemically justifiable to some extent for you is, on this view, just to
say that p is supportable to some extent by your overall evidential reasons.
This construal will be non-normative so long as the notions of supportability
and an evidential reason are nonnormative. Some philosophers have tried to
explicate the latter notions without relying on talk of epistemic permissibility
or epistemic goodness. We can understand the relevant notion of “support” in
terms of non-normative notions of entailment and explanation or, answering
why-questions. We can understand the notion of an “evidential reason” via the
notion of a psychological state that can stand in a certain truth-indicating
support relation to propositions. For instance, we might regard nondoxastic
states of “seeming to perceive” something e.g., seeming to see a dictionary
here as foundational truth indicators for certain physical-object propositions
e.g., the proposition that there is a dictionary here, in virtue of those
states being best explained by those propositions. If anything resembling this
approach succeeds, we can get by without the aforementioned normative notions
of epistemic justification. Foundationalism versus coherentism. Talk of
foundational truth indicators brings us to a key controversy over
justification: Does epistemic justification, and thus knowledge, have
foundations, and if so, in what sense? This question can be clarified as the
issue whether some beliefs can not only a have their epistemic justification
non-inferentially i.e., apart from evidential support from any other beliefs,
but also b provide epistemic justification for all justified beliefs that lack
such non-inferential justification. Foundationalism gives an affirmative answer
to this issue, and is represented in varying ways by, e.g., Aristotle,
Descartes, Russell, C. I. Lewis, and Chisholm. Foundationalists do not share a
uniform account of non-inferential justification. Some construe non-inferential
justification as self-justification. Others reject literal self-justification
for beliefs, and argue that foundational beliefs have their non-inferential
justification in virtue of evidential support from the deliverances of
non-belief psychological states, e.g., perception “seem-ing-to-perceive”
states, sensation “seeming-to-sense” states, or memory “seeming-toremember”
states. Still others understand noninferential justification in terms of a
belief’s being “reliably produced,” i.e., caused and sustained by some
non-belief belief-producing process or source e.g., perception, memory,
introspection that tends to produce true rather than false beliefs. This last
view takes the causal source of a belief to be crucial to its justification.
Unlike Descartes, contemporary foundationalists clearly separate claims to
non-inferential, foundational justification from claims to certainty. They
typically settle for a modest foundationalism implying that foundational
beliefs need not be indubitable or infallible. This contrasts with the radical
foundationalism of Descartes. The traditional competitor to foundationalism is
the coherence theory of justification, i.e., epistemic coherentism. This is not
the coherence definition of truth; it rather is the view that the justification
of any belief depends on that belief’s having evidential support from some
other belief via coherence relations such as entailment or explanatory
relations. Notable proponents include Hegel, Bosanquet, and Sellars. A
prominent contemporary version of epistemic coherentism states that evidential
coherence relations among beliefs are typically explanatory relations. The
rough idea is that a belief is justified for you so long as it either best
explains, or is best explained by, some member of the system of beliefs that
has maximal explanatory power for you. Contemporary coherentism is uniformly
systemic or holistic; it finds the ultimate source of justification in a system
of interconnected beliefs or potential beliefs. One problem has troubled all
versions of coherentism that aim to explain empirical justification: the
isolation argument. According to this argument, coherentism entails that you
can be epistemically justified in accepting an empirical proposition that is
incompatible with, or at least improbable given, your total empirical evidence.
The key assumption of this argument is that your total empirical evidence
includes non-belief sensory and perceptual awareness-states, such as your
feeling pain or your seeming to see something. These are not belief-states.
Epistemic coherentism, by definition, makes justification a function solely of
coherence relations between propositions, such as propositions one believes or
accepts. Thus, such coherentism seems to isolate justification from the
evidential import of non-belief awareness-states. Coherentists have tried to
handle this problem, but no resolution enjoys wide acceptance. Causal and
contextualist theories. Some contemporary epistemologists endorse contextualism
regarding epistemic justification, a view suggested by Dewey, Vitters, and
Kuhn, among others. On this view, all justified beliefs depend for their
evidential support on some unjustified beliefs that need no justification. In
any context of inquiry, people simply assume the acceptability of some
propositions as starting points for inquiry, and these “contextually basic”
propositions, though lacking evidential support, can serve as evidential
support for other propositions. Contextualists stress that contextually basic
propositions can vary from context to context e.g., from theological inquiry to
biological inquiry and from social group to social group. The main problem for
contextualists comes from their view that unjustified assumptions can provide
epistemic justification for other propositions. We need a precise explanation
of how an unjustified assumption can yield evidential support, how a
non-probable belief can make another belief probable. Contextualists have not
given a uniform explanation here. Recently some epistemologists have
recommended that we give up the traditional evidence condition for knowledge.
They recommend that we construe the justification condition as a causal
condition. Roughly, the idea is that you know that p if and only if a you
believe that p, b p is true, and c your believing that p is causally produced
and sustained by the fact that makes p true. This is the basis of the causal
theory of knowing, which comes with varying details. Any such causal theory
faces serious problems from our knowledge of universal propositions. Evidently,
we know, for instance, that all dictionaries are produced by people, but our
believing that this is so seems not to be causally supported by the fact that
all dictionaries are humanly produced. It is not clear that the latter fact
causally produces any beliefs. Another problem is that causal theories
typically neglect what seems to be crucial to any account of the justification
condition: the requirement that justificational support for a belief be
accessible, in some sense, to the believer. The rough idea is that one must be
able to access, or bring to awareness, the justification underlying one’s
beliefs. The causal origins of a belief are, of course, often very complex and
inaccessible to a believer. Causal theories thus face problems from an
accessibility requirement on justification. Internalism regarding justification
preserves an accessibility requirement on what confers justification, whereas
epistemic externalism rejects this requirement. Debates over internalism and externalism
abound in current epistemology, but internalists do not yet share a uniform
detailed account of accessibility. The Gettier problem. The standard analysis
of knowledge, however elaborated, faces a devastating challenge that initially
gave rise to causal theories of knowledge: the Gettier problem. In 3 Edmund
Gettier published a highly influential challenge to the view that if you have a
justified true belief that p, then you know that p. Here is one of Gettier’s
counterexamples to this view: Smith is justified in believing the false
proposition that i Jones owns a Ford. On the basis of i, Smith infers, and thus
is justified in believing, that ii either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in
Barcelona. As it happens, Brown is in Barcelona, and so ii is true. So,
although Smith is justified in believing the true proposition ii, Smith does
not know ii. Gettier-style counterexamples are cases where a person has
justified true belief that p but lacks knowledge that p. The Gettier problem is
the problem of finding a modification of, or an alternative to, the standard
analysis that avoids difficulties from Gettier-style counterexamples. The
controversy over the Gettier problem is highly complex and still unsettled.
Many epistemologists take the lesson of Gettier-style counterexamples to be
that propositional knowledge requires a fourth condition, beyond the
justification, truth, and belief conditions. No specific fourth condition has
received overwhelming acceptance, but some proposals have become prominent. The
so-called defeasibility condition, e.g., requires that the justification
appropriate to knowledge be “undefeated” in the general sense that some
appropriate subjunctive conditional concerning defeaters of justification be
true of that justification. For instance, one simple defeasibility fourth
condition requires of Smith’s knowing that p that there be no true proposition,
q, such that if q became justified for Smith, p would no longer be justified
for Smith. So if Smith knows, on the basis of his visual perception, that Mary
removed books from the library, then Smith’s coming to believe the true
proposition that Mary’s identical twin removed books from the library would not
undermine the justification for Smith’s belief concerning Mary herself. A
different approach shuns subjunctive conditionals of that sort, and contends
that propositional knowledge requires justified true belief that is sustained
by the collective totality of actual truths. This approach requires a detailed
account of when justification is undermined and restored. The Gettier problem
is epistemologically important. One branch of epistemology seeks a precise
understanding of the nature e.g., the essential components of propositional
knowledge. Our having a precise understanding of propositional knowledge
requires our having a Gettier-proof analysis of such knowledge. Epistemologists
thus need a defensible solution to the Gettier problem, however complex that
solution is. Skepticism. Epistemologists debate the limits, or scope, of
knowledge. The more restricted we take the limits of knowledge to be, the more
skeptical we are. Two influential types of skepticism are knowledge skepticism
and justification skepticism. Unrestricted knowledge skepticism implies that no
one knows anything, whereas unrestricted justification skepticism implies the
more extreme view that no one is even justified in believing anything. Some
forms of skepticism are stronger than others. Knowledge skepticism in its strongest
form implies that it is impossible for anyone to know anything. A weaker form
would deny the actuality of our having knowledge, but leave open its
possibility. Many skeptics have restricted their skepticism to a particular
domain of supposed knowledge: e.g., knowledge of the external world, knowledge
of other minds, knowledge of the past or the future, or knowledge of
unperceived items. Such limited skepticism is more common than unrestricted
skepticism in the history of epistemology. Arguments supporting skepticism come
in many forms. One of the most difficult is the problem of the criterion, a
version of which has been stated by the sixteenth-century skeptic Montaigne:
“To adjudicate [between the true and the false] among the appearances of
things, we need to have a distinguishing method; to validate this method, we
need to have a justifying argument; but to validate this justifying argument,
we need the very method at issue. And there we are, going round on the wheel.”
This line of skeptical argument originated in ancient Greece, with epistemology
itself. It forces us to face this question: How can we specify what we know
without having specified how we know, and how can we specify how we know
without having specified what we know? Is there any reasonable way out of this
threatening circle? This is one of the most difficult epistemological problems,
and a cogent epistemology must offer a defensible solution to epistemology
epistemology 277 277 it. Contemporary
epistemology still lacks a widely accepted reply to this urgent problem
erfahrung: Grice used the
German, ‘since I find it difficult to translate.” G. term tr. into English,
especially since Kant, as ‘experience’. Kant does not use it as a technical
term; rather, it indicates that which requires explanation through more
precisely drawn technical distinctions such as those among ‘sensibility’,
‘understanding’, and ‘reason’. In the early twentieth century, Husserl
sometimes distinguishes between Erfahrung and Erlebnis, the former indicating
experience as capable of being thematized and methodically described or
analyzed, the latter experience as “lived through” and never fully available to
analysis. Such a distinction occasionally reappears in later texts of
phenomenology and existentialism.
erigena: j. s. – a
Mediaeval Griceian -- also called John the Scot, Eriugena, and Scottigena, Irish-born
scholar and theologian. He taught grammar and dialectics at the court of
Charles the Bald near Laon from 845 on. In a controversy in 851, John argued
that there was only one predestination, to good, since evil was strictly
nothing. Thus no one is compelled to evil by God’s foreknowledge, since,
strictly speaking, God has no foreknowledge of what is not. But his reliance on
dialectic, his Origenist conception of the world as a place of education
repairing the damage done by sin, his interest in cosmology, and his perceived
Pelagian tendencies excited opposition. Attacked by Prudentius of Troyes and
Flores of Lyons, he was condemned at the councils of Valencia 855 and Langres
859. Charles commissioned him to translate the works of Pseudo-Dionysius and
the Ambigua of Maximus the Confessor from the Grecian. These works opened up a
new world, and John followed his translations with commentaries on the Gospel
of John and Pseudo-Dionysius, and then his chief work, the Division of Nature
or Periphyseon 82666, in the Neoplatonic tradition. He treats the universe as a
procession from God, everything real in nature being a trace of God, and then a
return to God through the presence of nature in human reason and man’s union
with God. John held that the nature of man is not destroyed by union with God,
though it is deified. He was condemned for pantheism at Paris in 1210. J.Lo.
eristic, the art of controversy, often involving fallacious but persuasive
reasoning. The ancient Sophists brought this art to a high level to achieve
their personal goal. They may have found their material in the “encounters” in
the Erfahrung eristic 279 279 law
courts as well as in daily life. To enhance persuasion they endorsed the use of
unsound principles such as hasty generalizations, faulty analogies,
illegitimate appeal to authority, the post hoc ergo propter hoc i.e., “after
this, therefore because of this” and other presumed principles. Aristotle
exposed eristic argumentation in his Sophistical Refutations, which itself
draws examples from Plato’s Euthydemus. From this latter work comes the famous
example: ‘That dog is a father and that dog is his, therefore that dog is his
father’. What is perhaps worse than its obvious invalidity is that the argument
is superficially similar to a sound argument such as ‘This is a table and this
is brown, therefore this is a brown table’. In the Sophistical Refutations
Aristotle undertakes to find procedures for detection of bad arguments and to
propose rules for constructing sound arguments.
erlebnis: G. Grice used the
German term, “since I find it difficult to translate” -- term for experience
used in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century G. philosophy. Erlebnis
denotes experience in all its direct immediacy and lived fullness. It contrasts
with the more typical G. word Erfahrung, denoting ordinary experience as
mediated through intellectual and constructive elements. As immediate, Erlebnis
eludes conceptualization, in both the lived present and the interiority of
experience. As direct, Erlebnis is also disclosive and extraordinary: it
reveals something real that otherwise escapes thinking. Typical examples
include art, religion, and love, all of which also show the anti-rationalist
and polemical uses of the concept. It is especially popular among the Romantic
mystics like Novalis and the anti-rationalists Nietzsche and Bergson, as well
as in phenomenology, Lebensphilosophie, and existentialism. As used in
post-Hegelian G. philosophy, the term describes two aspects of subjectivity.
The first concerns the epistemology of the human sciences and of phenomenology.
Against naturalism and objectivism, philosophers appeal to the ineliminable,
subjective qualities of experience to argue that interpreters must understand
“what it is like to be” some experiencing subject, from the inside. The second
use of the term is to denote extraordinary and interior experiences like art,
religion, freedom, and vital energy. In both cases, it is unclear how such
experience could be identified or known in its immediacy, and much recent G.
thought, such as Heidegger and hermeneutics, rejects the concept.
erotetic: in the strict
sense, pertaining to questions. Erotetic logic is the logic of questions.
Different conceptions of questions yield different kinds of erotetic logic. A
Platonistic approach holds that questions exist independently of
interrogatives. For P. Tichý, a question is a function on possible worlds, the
right answer being the value of the function at the actual world. Erotetic
logic is the logic of such functions. In the epistemic-imperative approach of
L. Bqvist, Hintikka, et al., one begins with a system for epistemic sentences
and embeds this in a system for imperative sentences, thus obtaining sentences
of the form ‘make it the case that I know . . .’ and complex compounds of such
sentences. Certain ones of these are defined to be interrogatives. Then
erotetic logic is the logic of epistemic imperatives and the conditions for
satisfaction of these imperatives. In the abstract interrogative approach of N.
Belnap, T. Kubigski, and many others, one chooses certain types of expression
to serve as interrogatives, and, for each type, specifies what expressions
count as answers of various kinds direct, partial, . . .. On this approach we
may say that interrogatives express questions, or we may identify questions
with interrogatives, in which case the only meaning that an interrogative has
is that it has the answers that it does. Either way, the emphasis is on
interrogatives, and erotetic logic is the logic of systems that provide
interrogatives and specify answers to them. In the broad sense, ‘erotetic’
designates what pertains to utterance-and-response. In this sense erotetic
logic is the logic of the relations between 1 sentences of many kinds and 2 the
expressions that count as appropriate replies to them. This includes not only
the relations between question and answer but also, e.g., between assertion and
agreement or denial, command and report of compliance or refusal, and for many
types of sentence S between S and various corrective replies to S e.g., denial
of the presupposition of S. Erotetic logics may differ in the class of
sentences treated, the types of response counted as appropriate, the assignment
of other content presupposition, projection, etc., and other details.
eschatologicum: Possibly related to Latin ‘summum, ‘as in ‘summum genus,’
and ‘summun bonum. From Greek, 5. in the Logic of Arist., τὰ ἔ. are the last or
lowest species, Metaph.1059b26, or individuals, ib.998b16, cf. AP0.96b12, al.;
“τὸ ἔ. ἄτομον” Metaph.1058b10. b. ὁ ἔ. ὅρος the minor term of a syllogism,
EN1147b14. c. last step in geom. analysis or ultimate condition of action, “τὸ
ἔ. ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως” de An.433a16. II. Adv. -τως to the uttermost, exceedingly,
“πῦρ ἐ. καίει” Hp.de Arte8; “ἐ. διαμάχεσθαι” Arist.HA613a11 ; “ἐ. φιλοπόλεμος”
X.An.2.6.1 ; “φοβοῦμαί σ᾽ ἐ.” Men.912, cf. Epicur.Ep. 1p.31U. b. -τως
διακεῖσθαι to be at the last extremity, Plb.1.24.2, D.S.18.48 ; “ἔχειν”
Ev.Marc.5.23 ; “ἀπορεῖν” Phld.Oec.p.72J. 2. so ἐς τὸ ἔ.,=ἐσχάτως, Hdt.7.229;
“εἰς τὰ ἔ.” X.HG5.4.33 ; “εἰς τὰ ἔ. μάλα” Id.Lac.1.2 ; “τὸ ἔ.” finally, in the
end, Pl.Grg.473c ; but, τὸ ἔ. what is worst of all, ib.508d. Why ontology is
not enough. The philosopher needs to PLAY with cross-categorial barriers. He is
an eschatologist. Socrates was. being and good, for Aristotle and Grice cover
all. Good was a favourite of Moore and Hare, as Barnes was well aware! Like
Barnes, Grice dislikes Prichards analysis of good. He leans towards the
emotion-based approach by Ogden. If Grice, like Humpty Dumpty, opposes the
Establishment with his meaning liberalism (what a word means is what I mean by
uttering it), he certainly should be concerned with category shifts. Plus,
Grice was a closet Platonist. As Plato once remarked, having the ability to see
horses but not horsehood (ἱππότης) is a mark of stupidity – rendered by Liddell
and Scott as “horse-nature, the concept of horse” (Antisth. et Pl. ap. Simp.in
Cat.208.30,32, Sch.AristId.p.167F). Grice would endure the flinty experience of
giving joint seminars at Oxford with Austin on the first two books of
Aristotles Organon, Categoriae, and De Int. Grice finds the use of a
category, κατηγορία, by Aristotle a bit of a geniality. Aristotle is using
legalese, from kata, against, on, and agoreuô [ἀγορεύω], speak in public),
and uses it to designate both the prosecution in a trial and the
attribution in a logical proposition, i. e., the questions that must be asked
with regard to a Subjects, and the answers that can be given. As a
representative of the linguistic turn in philosophy, Grice is attracted to the
idea that a category can thus be understood variously, as applying to the realm
of reality (ontology), but also to the philosophy of language (category of
expression) and to philosophical psychology (category of
representation). Grice kept his explorations on categories under two very
separate, shall we say, categories: his explorations with Austin (very
serious), and those with Strawson (more congenial). Where is Smiths altruism?
Nowhere to be seen. Should we say it is idle (otiose) to speak of altruism? No,
it is just an attribute, which, via category shift, can be made the Subjects of
your sentence, Strawson. It is not spatio-temporal, though, right. Not
really. ‒ I do not particularly like your trouser words. The essay
is easy to date since Grice notes that Strawson reproduced some of the details in
his Individuals, which we can very well date. Grice thought Aristotle was the
best! Or at any rate almost as good as Kantotle! Aristotle saw Categoriæ, along
with De Int. as part of his Organon. However, philosophers of language
tend to explore these topics without a consideration of the later parts of the
Organon dealing with the syllogism, the tropes, and the topics ‒ the boring
bits! The reason Grice is attracted to the Aristotelian category (as Austin and
Strawson equally were) is that category allows for a linguistic-turn reading.
Plus, its a nice, pretentious (in the Oxonian way) piece of philosophical
jargon! Aristotle couldnt find category in the koine, so he had to coin it.
While meant by Aristotle in a primarily ontological way, Oxonian philosophers
hasten to add that a category of expression, as Grice puts it, is just as valid
a topic for philosophical exploration. His tutee Strawson will actually publish
a book on Subjects and predicate in grammar! (Trivial, Strawson!). Grice will
later add an intermediary category, which is the Subjects of his philosophical
psychology. As such, a category can be construed ontologically, or
representationally: the latter involving philosophical psychological concepts,
and expressions themselves. For Aristotle, as Grice and Austin, and Grice and
Strawson, were well aware as they educated some of the poor at Oxford (Only the
poor learn at Oxford ‒ Arnold), there are (at least ‒ at most?) ten
categories. Grice doesnt (really) care about the number. But the first are
important. Actually the very first: theres substantia prima, such as Grice. And
then theres substantia secunda, such as Grices rationality. The essentia. Then
there are various types of attributes. But, as Grice sharply notes, even
substantia secunda may be regarded as an attribute. Grices favourite game with
Strawson was indeed Category Shift, or Subjects-ification, as Strawson preferred.
Essence may be introduced as a sub-type of an attribute. We would have
substantia prima AND attribute, which in turn gets divided into essential, the
izzing, and non-essential, the hazzing. While Austin is not so fun to play
with, Strawson is. Smith is a very altruist person. Where is his altruism?
Nowhere to be seen, really. Yet we may sensically speak of Smiths altruism. It
is just a matter of a category shift. Grice scores. Grice is slightly
disappointed, but he perfectly understands, that Strawson, who footnotes Grice
as the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about logic in Introduction to
logical lheory, fails to acknowledge that most of the research in Strawsons
Individuals: an essay in descriptive (not revisionary) metaphysics derives from
the conclusions reached at his joint philosophical investigations at joint
seminars with Grice. Grice later elaborates on this with Code, who is keen on
Grices other game, the hazz and the hazz not, the izz. But then tutor from whom
I never ceased to learn about metaphysics sounds slightlier clumsier, as far as
the implicaturum goes. Categories, the Grice-Myro theory of identity, Relative
identity, Grice on =, identity, notes, with Myro, metaphysics, philosophy, with
Code, Grice izz Grice – or izz he? The idea that = is unqualified requires
qualification. Whitehead and Russell ignored this. Grice and Myro didnt. Grice
wants to allow for It is the case that a = b /t1 and it is not the case that a
= b /t2. The idea is intuitive, but philosophers of a Leibnizian bent are too
accustomed to deal with = as an absolute. Grice applies this to human vs.
person. A human may be identical to a person, but cease to be so. Indeed,
Grices earlier attempt to produce a reductive analsysis of I may be seen as
remedying a circularity he detected in Locke about same. Cf. Wiggins, Sameness
and substance. Grice makes Peano feel deeply Griceian, as Grice lists his =
postulates, here for consideration. And if you wondered why Grice prefers
Latinate individuum to the Grecian. The Grecian is “ἄτομον,” in logic, rendered
by L and S as ‘individual, of terms,’ Pl. Sph. 229d; of the εἶδος or forma,
Arist. Metaph.1034a8, de An. 414b27.2. individual, Id. APo. 96b11, al.: as a
subst., τό ἄτομον, Id. Cat. 1b6, 3a38, Metaph.1058a18 (pl.), Plot. 6.2.2,
al. subst.; latinised from Grecian. Lewis and Short have “indīvĭdŭum,” an atom,
indivisible particle: ex illis individuis, unde omnia Democritus gigni
affirmat, Cic. Ac. 2, 17 fin.: ne individuum quidem, nec quod dirimi distrahive
non possit, id. N. D. 3, 12, 29. Note the use of individuum in alethic
modalities for necessity and possibility, starting with (11). ⊢ (α izzes α). This would be the principle of
non-contradiction or identity. Grice applies it to war: War is war, as yielding
a most peculiar implicaturum. (α izzes β ∧ β izzes γ) ⊃ α
izzes γ. This above is transitivity, which is crucial for Grices tackling of
Reids counterexample to Locke (and which according to Flew in Locke on personal
identity was predated by Berkeley. α hazzes β ⊃ ~(α izzes β). Or, what is accidental is not essential.
Grice allows that what is essential is accidental is, while misleading,
true. ⊢ α hazzes β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(α hazzes x ∧ x
izzes β) ⊢ (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes a forma). This above defines a universalium as
a forma, or eidos. (α hazzes β ∧ α
izzes a particular) ⊃ (∃γ).(γ≠α ∧ α izzes β) ⊢ α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ ((β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x
izzes α) ⊢ α izzes essentially predicable of β ⊃⊂ β izzes α ⊢ α
izzes non-essentially/accidentally predicable of β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x
izzes α) α = β ⊃⊂ α izzes β ∧ β
izzes α ⊢ α izzes an individuum ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(β izzes α ⊃ α izzes β) ⊢ α
izzes a particular ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(α izzes predicable of β ⊃ (α izzes β ∧ β
izzes α)); α izzes a universalium ⊃⊂ ◊(∃β)(α izzes predicable of α ∧ ~(α izzes β ∧ β
izzes α) ⊢ α izzes some-thing ⊃ α
izzes an individuum. ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ (α izzes some-thing ∧ α izzes a universalium) 16. ⊢ α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ (β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x
izzes α) ⊢ α izzes essentially predicable of α ⊢ α izzes accidentally predicable of β ⊃ α ≠ β; ~(α izzes accidentally predicable of β) ⊃ α ≠ β 20. α izzes a particular ⊃ α izzes an individuum. ⊢ α izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α) 22. ⊢~
(∃x).(x izzes a particular ∧ x
izzes a forma) α izzes a forma ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x
izzes α) x izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃β)(α izz β) ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ ((α
izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ β hazz α); α izzes a forma ∧ β izzes a particular ⊃ (α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ β hazz A) ⊢ (α
izzes a particular ∧ β izzes a universalium ∧ β izzes predicable of α) ⊃ (∃γ)(α ≠ γ ∧ γ
izzes essentially predicable of α) ⊢ (∃x) (∃y)(x izzes a particular ∧ y
izzes a universalium ∧ y izzes predicable of x ⊃ ~(∀x)(x izzes a universalium ∧ x izzes some-thing); (∀β)(β
izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes some-thing) ⊢ α
izzes a particular) ⊃ ~∃β.(α ≠ β ∧ β
izzes essentially predicable of α); (α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β)⊃ α izzes non-essentially or
accidentally predicable of β. The use of this or that doxastic modality, necessity
and possibility, starting above, make this a good place to consider one
philosophical mistake Grice mentions in “Causal theory.” What is actual is not
also possible. Cf. What is essential is also accidental. He is criticising a
contemporary, if possible considered dated in the New World, form of
ordinary-language philosophy, where the philosopher detects a nuance, and
embarks risking colliding with the facts, rushing ahead to exploit it before he
can clarify it! Grice liked to see his explorations on = as belonging to
metaphysics, as the s. on his Doctrines
at the Grice Collection testifies. While Grice presupposes the use of = in his
treatment of the king of France, he also explores a relativisation of =. His motivation
was an essay by Wiggins, almost Aristotelian in spirit, against Strawsons
criterion of space-time continuancy for the identification of the substantia
prima. Grice wants to apply = to cases were the time continuancy is made
explicit. This yields that a=b in scenario S, but that it may not be the case
that a = b in a second scenario S. Myro had an occasion to expand on Grices
views in his contribution on the topic for PGRICE. Myro mentions his System
Ghp, a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of Grices System Q, in
gratitude to to Grice. Grice explored also the logic of izzing and hazzing with
Code. Grice and Myro developed a Geach-type of qualified identity. The formal
aspects were developed by Myro, and also by Code. Grice discussed Wigginss
Sameness and substance, rather than Geach. Cf. Wiggins and Strawson on Grice
for the BA. At Oxford, Grice was more or less given free rein to teach what he
wanted. He found the New World slightly disconcerting at first. At Oxford, he
expected his tutees to be willing to read the classics in the vernacular Greek.
His approach to teaching was diagogic, as Socratess! Even in his details of
izzing and hazzing. Greek enough to me!, as a student recalled! correspondence
with Code, Grice sees in Code an excellent Aristotelian. They collaborated on
an exploration of Aristotles underlying logic of essential and non-essential
predication, for which they would freely use such verbal forms as izzing and
hazing, izzing and hazzing, Code on the significance of the middle book in
Aristotles Met. , Aristotle, metaphysics, the middle book. Very middle.
Grice never knew what was middle for Aristotle, but admired Code too much to
air this! The organisation of Aristotle’s metaphysics was a topic of much
concern for Grice. With Code, Grice coined izzing and hazzing to refer to
essential and non-essential attribution. Izzing and hazzing, “Aristotle on the
multiplicity of being” (henceforth, “Aristotle”) PPQ, Aristotle on
multiplicity, “The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly” (henceforth,
“PPQ,” posthumously ed. by Loar, Aristotle, multiplicity, izzing, hazzing,
being, good, Code. Grice offers a thorough discussion of Owens treatment of
Aristotle as leading us to the snares of ontology. Grice distinguishes between
izzing and hazzing, which he thinks help in clarifying, more axiomatico, what
Aristotle is getting at with his remarks on essential versus non-essential
predication. Surely, for Grice, being, nor indeed good, should not
be multiplied beyond necessity, but izzing and hazzing are already
multiplied. The Grice Papers contains drafts of the essay eventually
submitted for publication by Loar in memoriam Grice. Note that the Grice Papers
contains a typically Griceian un-publication, entitled Aristotle and
multiplicity simpliciter. Rather than Aristotle on, as the title for the
PPQ piece goes. Note also that, since its multiplicity simpliciter, it
refers to Aristotle on two key ideas: being and the good. As Code notes in
his contribution to PGRICE, Grice first presents his thoughts on izzing and hazzing
publicly at Vancouver. Jones has developed the axiomatic treatment favoured by
Grice. For Grice there is multiplicity in both being and good (ton
agathon), both accountable in terms of conversational implicatura, of course.
If in Prolegomena, Grice was interested in criticising himself, in essays of
historical nature like these, Grice is seeing Aristotles Athenian dialectic as
a foreshadow of the Oxonian dialectic, and treating him as an equal. Grice is
yielding his razor: senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.
But then Aristotle is talking about the multiplicity of is and is
good. Surely, there are ways to turn Aristotle into the monoguist
he has to be! There is a further item in the Grice collection that
combines Aristotle on being with Aristotle on good, which is relevant in
connection with this. Aristotle on being and good
(ἀγαθόν). Aristotle, being, good (agathon), ἀγαθός. As from this f.,
the essays are ordered alphabetically, starting with Aristotle, Grice will
explore Aristotle on being or is and good (ἀγαθός) in explorations with Code.
Grice comes up with izzing and hazzing as the two counterparts to Aristotles
views on, respectively, essential and non-essential predication. Grices views
on Aristotle on the good (strictly, there is no need to restrict Arisstotles
use to the neuter form, since he employs ἀγαθός) connect with Grices
Aristotelian idea of eudaemonia, that he explores elsewhere. Strictly:
Aristotle on being and the good. If that had been Grices case, he would have
used the definite article. Otherwise, good may well translate as masculine,
ἀγαθός ‒the agathetic implicaturum. He plays with Dodgson, cabbages and
kings. For what is a good cabbage as opposed to a cabbage? It does not
require very sharp eyes, but only our willingness to use the eyes one has, to
see that speech is permeated with the notion of purpose. To say what a
certain kind of thing is is only too frequently partly to say that it is
for. This feature applies to talk of, e. g., ships, shoes, sailing wax,
and kings; and, possibly and perhaps most excitingly, it extends even to
cabbages! Although Grice suspects Urmson might disagree. v. Grice on
Urmsons apples. Grice at his jocular best. If he is going to be a Kantian,
he will. He uses Kantian jargon to present his theory of conversation. This he
does only at Harvard. The implicaturum being that talking of vaguer assumptions
of helpfulness would not sound too convincing. So he has the maxim, the
super-maxim, and the sub-maxim. A principle and a maxim is Kantian enough. But
when he actually echoes Kant, is when he introduces what he later calls the
conversational categories – the keyword here is conversational category, as
categoria is used by Aristotle and Kant ‒ or Kantotle. Grice surely
knew that, say, his Category of Conversational Modality had nothing to do with
the Kantian Category of Modality. Still, he stuck with the idea of four
categories (versus Aristotles ten, eight or seven, as the text you consult may
tell you): category of conversational quantity (which at Oxford he had
formulated in much vaguer terms like strength and informativeness and
entailment), the category of conversational quality (keyword: principle of
conversational trust), and the category of conversational relation, where again
Kants relation has nothing to do with the maxim Grice associates with this
category. In any case, his Kantian joke may be helpful when considering the
centrality of the concept category simpliciter that Grice had to fight with
with his pupils at Oxford – he was lucky to have Austin and Strawson as
co-lecturers! Grice was irritated by L and S defining kategoria as category. I
guess I knew that. He agreed with their second shot, predicable. Ultimately,
Grices concern with category is his concern with person, or prote ousia, as
used by Aristotle, and as giving a rationale to Grices agency-based approach to
the philosophical enterprise. Aristotle used kategorein in the sense
of to predicate, assert something of something, and kategoria. The prote
ousia is exemplified by o tis anthropos. It is obvious that Grice wants to
approach Aristotles semantics and Aristotles metaphysics at one fell swoop.
Grice reads Aristotles Met. , and finds it understandable. Consider the
adjective French (which Aristotle does NOT consider) ‒ as it occurs in phrases
such as Michel Foucault is a French citizen. Grice is not a French
citizen. Michel Foucault once wrote a nice French poem. Urmson once wrote
a nice French essay on pragmatics. Michel Foucault was a French
professor. Michel Foucault is a French professor. Michel Foucault
is a French professor of philosophy. The following features are perhaps
significant. The appearance of the adjective French, or Byzantine, as the
case might be ‒ cf. I’m feeling French tonight. In these phrases is what
Grice has as adjunctive rather than conjunctive, or attributive. A French poem
is not necessarily something which combines the separate features of being a
poem and being French, as a tall philosopher would simply combine the features
of being tall and of being a philosopher. French in French poem,
occurs adverbially. French citizen standardly means citizen of
France. French poem standardly means poem in French. But it is a mistake to
suppose that this fact implies that there is this or that meaning, or, worse,
this or that Fregeian sense, of the expression French. In any case, only
metaphorically or metabolically can we say that French means this or that or
has sense. An utterer means. An utterer makes sense. Cf. R. Pauls doubts about
capitalizing major. French means, and figuratively at that, only one thing,
viz. of or pertaining to France. And English only means of or
pertaining to England. French may be what Grice (unfollowing his remarks
on The general theory of context) call context-sensitive. One might indeed
say, if you like, that while French means ‒ or means only this or that, or that
its only sense is this or that, French still means, again figuratively, a
variety of things. French means-in-context of or pertaining to
France. Symbolise that as expression E means-in-context that p.
Expression E means-in-context C2 that p2. Relative
to Context C1 French means of France; as in the phrase French
citizen. Relative to context C2, French means in the French language, as in the phrase,
French poem ‒ whereas history does not behave, like this. Whether the
focal item is a universal or a particular is, contra Aristotle, quite
irrelevant to the question of what this or that related adjective means, or
what its sense is. The medical art is no more what an utterer means when he
utters the adjective medical, as is France what an utterer means by the
adjective French. While the attachment of this or that context may suggest an
interpretation in context of this or that expression as uttered by the utterer
U, it need not be the case that such a suggestion is indefeasible. It
might be e.g. that French poem would have to mean, poem composed in French,
unless there were counter indications, that brings the utterer and the
addressee to a different context C3. In which case, perhaps
what the utterer means by French poem is poem composed by a French competitor
in this or that competition. For French professor there would be two
obvious things an utterer might mean. Disambiguation will depend on the
wider expression-context or in the situational context attaching to
the this or that circumstance of utterance. Eschatology. Some like Hegel, but
Collingwoods *my* man! ‒ Grice. Grice participated in two
consecutive evenings of the s. of programmes on metaphysics organised by Pears.
Actually, charming Pears felt pretentious enough to label the meetings to be
about the nature of metaphysics! Grice ends up discussing, as he should,
Collingwood on presupposition. Met.
remained a favourite topic for Grices philosophical explorations, as it
is evident from his essay on Met. , Philosophical Eschatology, and Platos Republic,
repr. in his WOW . Possibly Hardie is to blame, since he hardly tutored Grice
on metaphysics! Grices two BBC lectures are typically dated in tone. It was the
(good ole) days when philosophers thought they could educate the non-elite by
dropping Namess like Collingwood and stuff! The Third Programme was extremely
popular, especially among the uneducated ones at London, as Pears almost put
it, as it was a way for Londoners to get to know what is going on down at
Oxford, the only place an uneducated (or educated, for that matter) Londoner at
the time was interested in displaying some interest about! I mean, Johnson is
right: if a man is tired of the nature of metaphysics, he is tired of life!
Since the authorship is Grice, Strawson, and Pears, Met. , in Pears, The Nature
of Met., The BBC Third Programme, it is somewhat difficult to identify what
paragraphs were actually read by Grice (and which ones by Pears and which ones
by Strawson). But trust the sharp Griceian to detect the correct implicaturum!
There are many (too many) other items covered by these two lectures: Kant,
Aristotle, in no particular order. And in The Grice Collection, for that
matter, that cover the field of metaphysics. In the New World, as a sort of
tutor in the graduate programme, Grice was expected to cover the discipline at
various seminars. Only I dislike discipline! Perhaps his clearest exposition is
in the opening section of his Met. , philosophical eschatology, and Platos
Republic, repr. in his WOW , where he states, bluntly that all you need is metaphysics! metaphysics, Miscellaneous,
metaphysics notes, Grice would possible see metaphysics as a class – category
figuring large. He was concerned with the methodological aspects of the
metaphysical enterprise, since he was enough of a relativist to allow for one
metaphysical scheme to apply to one area of discourse (one of Eddingtons
tables) and another metaphysical scheme to apply to another (Eddingtons other
table). In the third programme for the BBC Grice especially enjoyed criticising
John Wisdoms innovative look at metaphysics as a bunch of self-evident
falsehoods (Were all alone). Grice focuses on Wisdom on the knowledge of other
minds. He also discusses Collingwoods presuppositions, and Bradley on the
reality-appearance distinction. Grices reference to Wisdom was due to Ewings
treatment of Wisdom on metaphysics. Grices main motivation here is defending
metaphysics against Ayer. Ayer thought to win more Oxonian philosophers than he
did at Oxford, but he was soon back in London. Post-war Oxford had become
conservative and would not stand to the nonsense of Ayers claiming that
metaphysics is nonsense, especially, as Ayers implicaturum also was, that
philosophy is nonsense! Perhaps the best summary of Griceian metaphysics is his
From Genesis to Revelations: a new discourse on metaphysics. It’s an
ontological answer that one must give to Grices metabolic operation from
utterers meaning to expression meaning, Grice had been interested in the
methodology of metaphysics since his Oxford days. He counts as one
memorable experience in the area his participation in two episodes for the BBC
Third Programme on The nature of metaphysics with the organiser, Pears, and his
former tutee, Strawson on the panel. Grice was particularly keen on Collingwoods
views on metaphysical presuppositions, both absolute and relative! Grice
also considers John Wisdoms view of the metaphysical proposition as a blatant
falsehood. Grice considers Bradleys Hegelian metaphysics of the absolute, in
Appearance and reality. Refs.: While Grice’s choice was ‘eschatology,’ as per
WoW, Essay, other keywords are useful, notably “metaphysics,” “ontology,”
“theorizing,” and “theory-theory,” in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
esse, essentia: Explored byy Grice
in “Aristotle on the multiplicity of being”. To avoid equivocation, Grice
distinguishes between the ‘izz’ of essentia, and the ‘hazz’ of accidentia. ssentialism,
a metaphysical theory that objects have essences and that there is a
distinction between essential and non-essential or accidental predications.
Different issues have, however, been central in debates about essences and
essential predication in different periods in the history of philosophy. In our
own day, it is commitment to the notion of de re modality that is generally
taken to render a theory essentialist; but in the essentialist tradition
stemming from Aristotle, discussions of essence and essential predication focus
on the distinction between what an object is and how it is. According to
Aristotle, the universals that an ordinary object instantiates include some
that mark it out as what it is and others that characterize it in some way but
do not figure in an account of what it is. In the Categories, he tells us that
while the former are said of the object, the latter are merely present in it;
and in other writings, he distinguishes between what he calls kath hauto or per
se predications where these include the predication of what-universals and kata
sumbebekos or per accidens predications where these include the predication of
how-universals. He concedes that universals predicated of an object kath hauto
are necessary to that object; but he construes the necessity here as
derivative. It is because a universal marks out an entity, x, as what x is and
hence underlies its being the thing that it is that the universal is
necessarily predicated of x. The concept of definition is critically involved
in Aristotle’s essentialism. First, it is the kind infima species under which an object falls or one of the
items genus or differentia included in the definition of that kind that is
predicated of the object kath hauto. But, second, Aristotle’s notion of an
essence just is the notion of the ontological correlate of a definition. The
term in his writings we translate as ‘essence’ is the expression to ti ein
einai the what it is to be. Typically, the expression is followed by a
substantival expression in the dative case, so that the expressions denoting
essences are phrases like ‘the what it is to be for a horse’ and ‘the what it is
to be for an oak tree’; and Aristotle tells us that, for any kind, K, the what
it is to be for a K just is that which we identify when we provide a complete
and accurate definition of K. Now, Aristotle holds that there is definition
only of universals; and this commits him to the view that there are no
individual essences. Although he concedes that we can provide definitions of
universals from any of his list of ten categories, he gives pride of place to
the essences of universals from the category of substance. Substance-universals
can be identified without reference to essences from other categories, but the
essences of qualities, quantities, and other non-substances can be defined only
by reference to the essences of substances. In his early writings, Aristotle
took the familiar particulars of common sense things like the individual man
and horse of Categories V to be the primary substances; and in these writings
it is the essences we isolate by defining the kinds or species under which
familiar particulars fall that are construed as the basic or paradigmatic
essences. However, in later writings, where ordinary particulars are taken to
be complexes of matter and form, it is the substantial forms of familiar
particulars that are the primary substances, so their essences are the primary
or basic essences; and a central theme in Aristotle’s most mature writings is
the idea that the primary substances and their essences are necessarily one and
the same in number. error theory essentialism 281 281 The conception of essence as the
ontological correlate of a definition
often called quiddity persists
throughout the medieval tradition; and in early modern philosophy, the idea
that the identity of an object is constituted by what it is plays an important
role in Continental rationalist thinkers. Indeed, in the writings of Leibniz,
we find the most extreme version of traditional essentialism. Whereas Aristotle
had held that essences are invariably general, Leibniz insisted that each
individual has an essence peculiar to it. He called the essence associated with
an entity its complete individual concept; and he maintained that the
individual concept somehow entails all the properties exemplified by the
relevant individual. Accordingly, Leibniz believed that an omniscient being
could, for each possible world and each possible individual, infer from the
individual concept of that individual the whole range of properties exemplified
by that individual in that possible world. But, then, from the perspective of
an omniscient being, all of the propositions identifying the properties the
individual actually exhibits would express what Aristotle called kath hauto
predications. Leibniz, of course, denied that our perspective is that of an
omniscient being; we fail to grasp individual essences in their fullness, so
from our perspective, the distinction between essential and accidental
predications holds. While classical rationalists espoused a thoroughgoing
essentialism, the Aristotlelian conceptions of essence and definition were the
repeated targets of attacks by classical British empiricists. Hobbes, e.g.,
found the notion of essence philosophically useless and insisted that
definition merely displays the meanings conventionally associated with
linguistic expressions. Locke, on the other hand, continued to speak of
essences; but he distinguished between real and nominal essences. As he saw it,
the familiar objects of common sense are collections of copresent sensible
ideas to which we attach a single name like ‘man’ or ‘horse’. Identifying the
ideas constitutive of the relevant collection gives us the nominal essence of a
man or a horse. Locke did not deny that real essences might underlie such
collections, but he insisted that it is nominal rather than real essences to
which we have epistemic access. Hume, in turn, endorsed the idea that familiar
objects are collections of sensible ideas, but rejected the idea of some
underlying real essence to which we have no access; and he implicitly
reinforced the Hobbesian critique of Aristotelian essences with his attack on
the idea of de re necessities. So definition merely expresses the meanings we
conventionally associate with words, and the only necessity associated with
definition is linguistic or verbal necessity. From its origins, the
twentieth-century analytic tradition endorsed the classical empiricist critique
of essences and the Humean view that necessity is merely linguistic. Indeed,
even the Humean concession that there is a special class of statements true in
virtue of their meanings came into question in the forties and fifties, when
philosophers like Quine argued that it is impossible to provide a noncircular
criterion for distinguishing analytic and synthetic statements. So by the late
0s, it had become the conventional wisdom of philosophers in the Anglo-
tradition that both the notion of a real essence and the derivative idea that
some among the properties true of an object are essential to that object are
philosophical dead ends. But over the past three decades, developments in the
semantics of modal logic have called into question traditional empiricist
skepticism about essence and modality and have given rise to a rebirth of
essentialism. In the late fifties and early sixties, logicians like Kripke,
Hintikka, and Richard Montague showed how formal techniques that have as their
intuitive core the Leibnizian idea that necessity is truth in all possible
worlds enable us to provide completeness proofs for a whole range of
nonequivalent modal logics. Metaphysicians seized on the intuitions underlying
these formal methods. They proposed that we take the picture of alternative
possible worlds seriously and claimed that attributions of de dicto modality
necessity and possibility as they apply to propositions can be understood to involve
quantification over possible worlds. Thus, to say that a proposition, p, is
necessary is to say that for every possible world, W, p is true in W; and to
say that p is possible is to say that there is at least one possible world, W,
such that p is true in W. These metaphysicians went on to claim that the
framework of possible worlds enables us to make sense of de re modality.
Whereas de dicto modality attaches to propositions taken as a whole, an
ascription of de re modality identifies the modal status of an object’s
exemplification of an attribute. Thus, we speak of Socrates as being
necessarily or essentially rational, but only contingently snub-nosed.
Intuitively, the essential properties of an object are those it could not have
lacked; whereas its contingent properties are properties it exemplifies but
could have failed to exemplify. The “friends of possible worlds” insisted that
we can make perfectly good sense of this intuitive distinction if we say that
an object, x, exhibits a property, P, essentially just in case x exhibits P in
the actual world and in every possible world in which x exists and that x
exhibits P merely contingently just in case x exhibits P in the actual world,
but there is at least one possible world, W, such that x exists in W and fails
to exhibit P in W. Not only have these neo-essentialists invoked the Leibnizian
conception of alternative possible worlds in characterizing the de re
modalities, many have endorsed Leibniz’s idea that each object has an
individual essence or what is sometimes called a haecceity. As we have seen,
the intuitive idea of an individual essence is the idea of a property an object
exhibits essentially and that no other object could possibly exhibit; and
contemporary essentialists have fleshed out this intuitive notion by saying
that a property, P, is the haecceity or individual essence of an object, x,
just in case 1 x exhibits P in the actual world and in all worlds in which x
exists and 2 there is no possible world where an object distinct from x exhibits
P. And some defenders of individual essences like Plantinga have followed
Leibniz in holding that the haecceity of an object provides a complete concept
of that object, a property such that it entails, for every possible world, W,
and every property, P, either the proposition that the object in question has P
in W or the proposition that it fails to have P in W. Accordingly, they agree
that an omniscient being could infer from the individual essence of an object a
complete account of the history of that object in each possible world in which
it exists.
ethos: Grice: “In
German, ‘deutsche’ means ‘tribal.’” -- philosophical ethology – phrase used by
Grice for his creature construction routine. ethical constructivism, a form of
anti-realism about ethics which holds that there are moral facts and truths,
but insists that these facts and truths are in some way constituted by or
dependent on our moral beliefs, reactions, or attitudes. For instance, an ideal
observer theory that represents the moral rightness and wrongness of an act in
terms of the moral approval and disapproval that an appraiser would have under
suitably idealized conditions can be understood as a form of ethical
constructivism. Another form of constructivism identifies the truth of a moral
belief with its being part of the appropriate system of beliefs, e.g., of a
system of moral and nonmoral beliefs that is internally coherent. Such a view
would maintain a coherence theory of moral truth. Moral relativism is a
constructivist view that allows for a plurality of moral facts and truths.
Thus, if the idealizing conditions appealed to in an ideal observer theory
allow that different appraisers can have different reactions to the same
actions under ideal conditions, then that ideal observer theory will be a
version of moral relativism as well as of ethical constructivism. Or, if
different systems of moral beliefs satisfy the appropriate epistemic conditions
e.g. are equally coherent, then the truth or falsity of particular moral
beliefs will have to be relativized to different moral systems or codes. --
ethical objectivism, the view that the objects of the most basic concepts of
ethics which may be supposed to be values, obligations, duties, oughts, rights,
or what not exist, or that facts about them hold, objectively and that
similarly worded ethical statements by different persons make the same factual
claims and thus do not concern merely the speaker’s feelings. To say that a
fact is objective, or that something has objective existence, is usually to say
that its holding or existence is not derivative from its being thought to hold
or exist. In the Scholastic terminology still current in the seventeenth
century ‘objective’ had the more or less contrary meaning of having status only
as an object of thought. In contrast, fact, or a thing’s existence, is
subjective if it holds or exists only in the sense that it is thought to hold
or exist, or that it is merely a convenient human posit for practical purposes.
A fact holds, or an object exists, intersubjectively if somehow its
acknowledgment is binding on all thinking subjects or all subjects in some
specified group, although it does not hold or exist independently of their
thinking about it. Some thinkers suppose that intersubjectivity is all that can
ever properly be meant by objectivity. Objectivism may be naturalist or
non-naturalist. The naturalist objectivist believes that values, duties, or
whatever are natural phenomena detectable by introspection, perception, or
scientific inference. Thus values may be identified with certain empirical
qualities of anybody’s experience, or duties with empirical facts about the
effects of action, e.g. as promoting or hindering social cohesion. The
non-naturalist objectivist eschewing what Moore called the naturalistic fallacy
believes that values or obligations or whatever items he thinks most basic in
ethics exist independently of any belief about them, but that their existence
is not a matter of any ordinary fact detectable in the above ways but can be
revealed to ethical intuition as standing in a necessary but not analytic
relation to natural phenomena. ‘Ethical subjectivism’ usually means the
doctrine that ethical statements are simply reports on the speaker’s feelings
though, confusingly enough, such statements may be objectively true or false.
Perhaps it ought to mean the doctrine that nothing is good or bad but thinking
makes it so. Attitude theories of morality, for which such statements express,
rather than report upon, the speaker’s feelings, are also, despite the
objections of their proponents, sometimes called subjectivist. In a more
popular usage an objective matter of fact is one on which all reasonable
persons can be expected to agree, while a matter is subjective if various
alternative opinions can be accepted as reasonable. What is subjective in this
sense may be quite objective in the more philosophical sense in question
above. -- ethics, the philosophical
study of morality. The word is also commonly used interchangeably with
‘morality’ to mean the subject matter of this study; and sometimes it is used
more narrowly to mean the moral principles of a particular tradition, group, or
individual. Christian ethics and Albert Schweitzer’s ethics are examples. In
this article the word will be used exclusively to mean the philosophical study.
Ethics, along with logic, metaphysics, and epistemology, is one of the main
branches of philosophy. It corresponds, in the traditional division of the
field into formal, natural, and moral philosophy, to the last of these disciplines.
It can in turn be divided into the general study of goodness, the general study
of right action, applied ethics, metaethics, moral psychology, and the
metaphysics of moral responsibility. These divisions are not sharp, and many
important studies in ethics, particularly those that examine or develop whole
systems of ethics, are interdivisional. Nonetheless, they facilitate the
identification of different problems, movements, and schools within the
discipline. The first two, the general study of goodness and the general study
of right action, constitute the main business of ethics. Correlatively, its
principal substantive questions are what ends we ought, as fully rational human
beings, to choose and pursue and what moral principles should govern our
choices and pursuits. How these questions are related is the discipline’s
principal structural question, and structural differences among systems of
ethics reflect different answers to this question. In contemporary ethics, the
study of structure has come increasingly to the fore, especially as a
preliminary to the general study of right action. In the natural order of
exposition, however, the substantive questions come first. Goodness and the
question of ends. Philosophers have typically treated the question of the ends
we ought to pursue in one of two ways: either as a question about the
components of a good life or as a question about what sorts of things are good
in themselves. On the first way of treating the question, it is assumed that we
naturally seek a good life; hence, determining its components amounts to
determining, relative to our desire for such a life, what ends we ought to
pursue. On the second way, no such assumption about human nature is made;
rather it is assumed that whatever is good in itself is worth choosing or
pursuing. The first way of treating the question leads directly to the theory
of human well-being. The second way leads directly to the theory of intrinsic
value. The first theory originated in ancient ethics, and eudaimonia was the
Grecian word for its subject, a word usually tr. ‘happiness,’ but sometimes tr.
‘flourishing’ in order to make the question of human well-being seem more a
matter of how well a person is doing than how good he is feeling. These
alternatives reflect the different conceptions of human well-being that inform
the two major views within the theory: the view that feeling good or pleasure
is the essence of human well-being and the view that doing well or excelling at
things worth doing is its essence. The first view is hedonism in its classical
form. Its most famous exponent among the ancients was Epicurus. The second view
is perfectionism, a view that is common to several schools of ancient ethics.
Its adherents include Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Among the moderns, the
best-known defenders of classical hedonism and perfectionism are respectively
J. S. Mill and Nietzsche. Although these two views differ on the question of
what human well-being essentially consists in, neither thereby denies that the other’s
answer has a place in a good human life. Indeed, mature statements of each
typically assign the other’s answer an ancillary place. Thus, hedonism, as
expounded by Epicurus, takes excelling at things worth doing exercising one’s intellectual powers and
moral virtues in exemplary and fruitful ways, e.g. as the tried and true means to experiencing
life’s most satisfying pleasures. And perfectionism, as developed in
Aristotle’s ethics, underscores the importance of pleasure the deep satisfaction that comes from doing
an important job well, e.g. as a natural
concomitant of achieving excellence in things that matter. The two views, as
expressed in these mature statements, differ not so much in the kinds of
activities they take to be central to a good life as in the ways they explain
the goodness of such a life. The chief difference between them, then, is
philosophical rather than prescriptive. The second theory, the theory of
intrinsic value, also has roots in ancient ethics, specifically, Plato’s theory
of Forms. But unlike Plato’s theory, the basic tenets of which include certain
doctrines about the reality and transcendence of value, the theory of intrinsic
value neither contains nor presupposes any metaphysical theses. At issue in the
theory is what things are good in themselves, and one can take a position on
this issue without committing oneself to any thesis about the reality or
unreality of goodness or about its transcendence or immanence. A list of the
different things philosophers have considered good in themselves would include
life, happiness, pleasure, knowledge, virtue, friendship, beauty, and harmony.
The list could easily be extended. An interest in what constitutes the goodness
of the various items on the list has brought philosophers to focus primarily on
the question of whether something unites them. The opposing views on this
question are monism and pluralism. Monists affirm the list’s unity; pluralists
deny it. Plato, for instance, was a monist. He held that the goodness of
everything good in itself consisted in harmony and therefore each such thing
owed its goodness to its being harmonious. Alternatively, some philosophers
have proposed pleasure as the sole constituent of goodness. Indeed, conceiving
of pleasure as a particular kind of experience or state of consciousness, they
have proposed this kind of experience as the only thing good in itself and
characterized all other good things as instrumentally good, as owing their
goodness to their being sources of pleasure. Thus, hedonism too can be a
species of monism. In this case, though, one must distinguish between the view
that it is one’s own experiences of pleasure that are intrinsically good and
the view that anyone’s experiences of pleasure, indeed, any sentient being’s
experiences of pleasure, are intrinsically good. The former is called by
Sidgwick egoistic hedonism, the latter universal hedonism. This distinction can
be made general, as a distinction between egoistic and universal views of what
is good in itself or, as philosophers now commonly say, between agent-relative
and agent-neutral value. As such, it indicates a significant point of
disagreement in the theory of intrinsic value, a disagreement in which the
seeming arbitrariness and blindness of egoism make it harder to defend. In
drawing this conclusion, however, one must be careful not to mistake these
egoistic views for views in the theory of human well-being, for each set of
views represents a set of alternative answers to a different question. One must
be careful, in other words, not to infer from the greater defensibility of
universalism vis-à-vis egoism that universalism is the predominant view in the
general study of goodness. Right action. The general study of right action
concerns the principles of right and wrong that govern our choices and
pursuits. In modern ethics these principles are typically given a jural
conception. Accordingly, they are understood to constitute a moral code that
defines the duties of men and women who live together in fellowship. This
conception of moral principles is chiefly due to the influence of Christianity
in the West, though some of its elements were already present in Stoic ethics.
Its ascendancy in the general study of right action puts the theory of duty at
the center of that study. The theory has two parts: the systematic exposition
of the moral code that defines our duties; and its justification. The first
part, when fully developed, presents complete formulations of the fundamental
principles of right and wrong and shows how they yield all moral duties. The
standard model is an axiomatic system in mathematics, though some philosophers
have proposed a technical system of an applied science, such as medicine or
strategy, as an alternative. The second part, if successful, establishes the authority
of the principles and so validates the code. Various methods and criteria of
justification are commonly used; no single one is canonical. Success in
establishing the principles’ authority depends on the soundness of the argument
that proceeds from whatever method or criterion is used. One traditional
criterion is implicit in the idea of an axiomatic system. On this criterion,
the fundamental principles of right and wrong are authoritative in virtue of
being self-evident truths. That is, they are regarded as comparable to axioms
not only in being the first principles of a deductive system but also in being
principles whose truth can be seen immediately upon reflection. Use of this
criterion to establish the principles’ authority is the hallmark of intuitionism.
Once one of the dominant views in ethics, its position in the discipline has
now been seriously eroded by a strong, twentieth-century tide of skepticism
about all claims of self-evidence. Currently, the most influential method of
justification consistent with using the model of an axiomatic system to expound
the morality of right and wrong draws on the jural conception of its
principles. On this method, the principles are interpreted as expressions of a
legislative will, and accordingly their authority derives from the sovereignty
of the person or collective whose will they are taken to express. The oldest
example of the method’s use is the divine command theory. On this theory, moral
principles are taken to be laws issued by God to humanity, and their authority
thus derives from God’s supremacy. The theory is the original Christian source
of the principles’ jural conception. The rise of secular thought since the
Enlightenment has, however, limited its appeal. Later examples, which continue
to attract broad interest and discussion, are formalism and contractarianism.
Formalism is best exemplified in Kant’s ethics. It takes a moral principle to
be a precept that satisfies the formal criteria of a universal law, and it
takes formal criteria to be the marks of pure reason. Consequently, moral
principles are laws that issue from reason. As Kant puts it, they are laws that
we, as rational beings, give to ourselves and that regulate our conduct insofar
as we engage each other’s rational nature. They are laws for a republic of
reason or, as Kant says, a kingdom of ends whose legislature comprises all
rational beings. Through this ideal, Kant makes intelligible and forceful the
otherwise obscure notion that moral principles derive their authority from the
sovereignty of reason. Contractarianism also draws inspiration from Kant’s
ethics as well as from the social contract theories of Locke and Rousseau. Its
fullest and most influential statement appears in the work of Rawls. On this
view, moral principles represent the ideal terms of social cooperation for
people who live together in fellowship and regard each other as equals.
Specifically, they are taken to be the conditions of an ideal agreement among
such people, an agreement that they would adopt if they met as an assembly of
equals to decide collectively on the social arrangements governing their
relations and reached their decision as a result of open debate and rational
deliberation. The authority of moral principles derives, then, from the
fairness of the procedures by which the terms of social cooperation would be
arrived at in this hypothetical constitutional convention and the assumption
that any rational individual who wanted to live peaceably with others and who
imagined himself a party to this convention would, in view of the fairness of
its procedures, assent to its results. It derives, that is, from the
hypothetical consent of the governed. Philosophers who think of a moral code on
the model of a technical system of an applied science use an entirely different
method of justification. In their view, just as the principles of medicine
represent knowledge about how best to promote health, so the principles of
right and wrong represent knowledge about how best to promote the ends of
morality. These philosophers, then, have a teleological conception of the code.
Our fundamental duty is to promote certain ends, and the principles of right
and wrong organize and direct our efforts in this regard. What justifies the
principles, on this view, is that the ends they serve are the right ones to
promote and the actions they prescribe are the best ways to promote them. The
principles are authoritative, in other words, in virtue of the wisdom of their
prescriptions. Different teleological views in the theory of duty correspond to
different answers to the question of what the right ends to promote are. The
most common answer is happiness; and the main division among the corresponding
views mirrors the distinction in the theory of intrinsic value between egoism
and universalism. Thus, egoism and universalism in the theory of duty hold,
respectively, that the fundamental duty of morality is to promote, as best as
one can, one’s own happiness and that it is to promote, as best as one can, the
happiness of humanity. The former is ethical egoism and is based on the ideal
of rational self-love. The latter is utilitarianism and is based on the ideal
of rational benevolence. Ethical egoism’s most famous exponents in modern
philosophy are Hobbes and Spinoza. It has had few distinguished defenders since
their time. Bentham and J. S. Mill head the list of distinguished defenders of
utilitarianism. The view continues to be enormously influential. On these
teleological views, answers to questions about the ends we ought to pursue determine
the principles of right and wrong. Put differently, the general study of right
action, on these views, is subordinate to the general study of goodness. This
is one of the two leading answers to the structural question about how the two
studies are related. The other is that the general study of right action is to
some extent independent of the general study of goodness. On views that
represent this answer, some principles of right and wrong, notably principles
of justice and honesty, prescribe actions even though more evil than good would
result from doing them. These views are deontological. Fiat justitia ruat
coelum captures their spirit. The opposition between teleology and deontology
in ethics underlies many of the disputes in the general study of right action.
The principal substantive and structural questions of ethics arise not only
with respect to the conduct of human life generally but also with respect to
specific walks of life such as medicine, law, journalism, engineering, and
business. The examination of these questions in relation to the common
practices and traditional codes of such professions and occupations has
resulted in the special studies of applied ethics. In these studies, ideas and
theories from the general studies of goodness and right action are applied to
particular circumstances and problems of some profession or occupation, and
standard philosophical techniques are used to define, clarify, and organize the
ethical issues found in its domain. In medicine, in particular, where rapid
advances in technology create, overnight, novel ethical problems on matters of
life and death, the study of biomedical ethics has generated substantial
interest among practitioners and scholars alike. Metaethics. To a large extent,
the general studies of goodness and right action and the special studies of
applied ethics consist in systematizing, deepening, and revising our beliefs
about how we ought to conduct our lives. At the same time, it is characteristic
of philosophers, when reflecting on such systems of belief, to examine the
nature and grounds of these beliefs. These questions, when asked about ethical
beliefs, define the field of metaethics. The relation of this field to the
other studies is commonly represented by taking the other studies to constitute
the field of ethics proper and then taking metaethics to be the study of the
concepts, methods of justification, and ontological assumptions of the field of
ethics proper. Accordingly, metaethics can proceed from either an interest in
the epistemology of ethics or an interest in its metaphysics. On the first
approach, the study focuses on questions about the character of ethical
knowledge. Typically, it concentrates on the simplest ethical beliefs, such as
‘Stealing is wrong’ and ‘It is better to give than to receive’, and proceeds by
analyzing the concepts in virtue of which these beliefs are ethical and
examining their logical basis. On the second approach, the study focuses on
questions about the existence and character of ethical properties. Typically,
it concentrates on the most general ethical predicates such as goodness and
wrongfulness and considers whether there truly are ethical properties
represented by these predicates and, if so, whether and how they are interwoven
into the natural world. The two approaches are complementary. Neither dominates
the other. The epistemological approach is comparative. It looks to the most
successful branches of knowledge, the natural sciences and pure mathematics,
for paradigms. The former supplies the paradigm of knowledge that is based on
observation of natural phenomena; the latter supplies the paradigm of knowledge
that seemingly results from the sheer exercise of reason. Under the influence
of these paradigms, three distinct views have emerged: naturalism, rationalism,
and noncognitivism. Naturalism takes ethical knowledge to be empirical and
accordingly models it on the paradigm of the natural sciences. Ethical
concepts, on this view, concern natural phenomena. Rationalism takes ethical
knowledge to be a priori and accordingly models it on the paradigm of pure
mathematics. Ethical concepts, on this view, concern morality understood as
something completely distinct from, though applicable to, natural phenomena,
something whose content and structure can be apprehended by reason
independently of sensory inputs. Noncognitivism, in opposition to these other
views, denies that ethics is a genuine branch of knowledge or takes it to be a
branch of knowledge only in a qualified sense. In either case, it denies that
ethics is properly modeled on science or mathematics. On the most extreme form
of noncognitivism, there are no genuine ethical concepts; words like ‘right’,
‘wrong’, ‘good’, and ‘evil’ have no cognitive meaning but rather serve to vent
feelings and emotions, to express decisions and commitments, or to influence
attitudes and dispositions. On less extreme forms, these words are taken to
have some cognitive meaning, but conveying that meaning is held to be decidedly
secondary to the purposes of venting feelings, expressing decisions, or
influencing attitudes. Naturalism is well represented in the work of Mill;
rationalism in the works of Kant and the intuitionists. And noncognitivism,
which did not emerge as a distinctive view until the twentieth century, is most
powerfully expounded in the works of C. L. Stevenson and Hare. Its central
tenets, however, were anticipated by Hume, whose skeptical attacks on
rationalism set the agenda for subsequent work in metaethics. The metaphysical
approach is centered on the question of objectivity, the question of whether
ethical predicates represent real properties of an external world or merely
apparent or invented properties, properties that owe their existence to the
perception, feeling, or thought of those who ascribe them. Two views dominate
this approach. The first, moral realism, affirms the real existence of ethical
properties. It takes them to inhere in the external world and thus to exist
independently of their being perceived. For moral realism, ethics is an
objective discipline, a discipline that promises discovery and confirmation of
objective truths. At the same time, moral realists differ fundamentally on the
question of the character of ethical properties. Some, such as Plato and Moore,
regard them as purely intellective and thus irreducibly distinct from empirical
properties. Others, such as Aristotle and Mill, regard them as empirical and
either reducible to or at least supervenient on other empirical properties. The
second view, moral subjectivism, denies the real existence of ethical
properties. On this view, to predicate, say, goodness of a person is to impose
some feeling, impulse, or other state of mind onto the world, much as one
projects an emotion onto one’s circumstances when one describes them as
delightful or sad. On the assumption of moral subjectivism, ethics is not a
source of objective truth. In ancient philosophy, moral subjectivism was
advanced by some of the Sophists, notably Protagoras. In modern philosophy,
Hume expounded it in the eighteenth century and Sartre in the twentieth
century. Regardless of approach, one and perhaps the central problem of
metaethics is how value is related to fact. On the epistemological approach,
this problem is commonly posed as the question of whether judgments of value
are derivable from statements of fact. Or, to be more exact, can there be a
logically valid argument whose conclusion is a judgment of value and all of
whose premises are statements of fact? On the metaphysical approach, the
problem is commonly posed as the question of whether moral predicates represent
properties that are explicable as complexes of empirical properties. At issue,
in either case, is whether ethics is an autonomous discipline, whether the
study of moral values and principles is to some degree independent of the study
of observable properties and events. A negative answer to these questions
affirms the autonomy of ethics; a positive answer denies ethics’ autonomy and
implies that it is a branch of the natural sciences. Moral psychology. Even
those who affirm the autonomy of ethics recognize that some facts, particularly
facts of human psychology, bear on the general studies of goodness and right
action. No one maintains that these studies float free of all conception of
human appetite and passion or that they presuppose no account of the human
capacity for voluntary action. It is generally recognized that an adequate
understanding of desire, emotion, deliberation, choice, volition, character,
and personality is indispensable to the theoretical treatment of human
well-being, intrinsic value, and duty. Investigations into the nature of these
psychological phenomena are therefore an essential, though auxiliary, part of
ethics. They constitute the adjunct field of moral psychology. One area of
particular interest within this field is the study of those capacities by
virtue of which men and women qualify as moral agents, beings who are
responsible for their actions. This study is especially important to the theory
of duty since that theory, in modern philosophy, characteristically assumes a
strong doctrine of individual responsibility. That is, it assumes principles of
culpability for wrongdoing that require, as conditions of justified blame, that
the act of wrongdoing be one’s own and that it not be done innocently. Only
moral agents are capable of meeting these conditions. And the presumption is
that normal, adult human beings qualify as moral agents whereas small children
and nonhuman animals do not. The study then focuses on those capacities that
distinguish the former from the latter as responsible beings. The main issue is
whether the power of reason alone accounts for these capacities. On one side of
the issue are philosophers like Kant who hold that it does. Reason, in their
view, is both the pilot and the engine of moral agency. It not only guides one
toward actions in conformity with one’s duty, but it also produces the desire
to do one’s duty and can invest that desire with enough strength to overrule
conflicting impulses of appetite and passion. On the other side are
philosophers, such as Hume and Mill, who take reason to be one of several
capacities that constitute moral agency. On their view, reason works strictly
in the service of natural and sublimated desires, fears, and aversions to
produce intelligent action, to guide its possessor toward the objects of those
desires and away from the objects of those fears. It cannot, however, by itself
originate any desire or fear. Thus, the desire to act rightly, the aversion to
acting wrongly, which are constituents of moral agency, are not products of
reason but are instead acquired through some mechanical process of
socialization by which their objects become associated with the objects of
natural desires and aversions. On one view, then, moral agency consists in the
power of reason to govern behavior, and being rational is thus sufficient for
being responsible for one’s actions. On the other view, moral agency consists
in several things including reason, but also including a desire to act rightly
and an aversion to acting wrongly that originate in natural desires and
aversions. On this view, to be responsible for one’s actions, one must not only
be rational but also have certain desires and aversions whose acquisition is
not guaranteed by the maturation of reason. Within moral psychology, one
cardinal test of these views is how well they can accommodate and explain such
common experiences of moral agency as conscience, weakness, and moral dilemma.
At some point, however, the views must be tested by questions about freedom.
For one cannot be responsible for one’s actions if one is incapable of acting
freely, which is to say, of one’s own free will. The capacity for free action
is thus essential to moral agency, and how this capacity is to be explained,
whether it fits within a deterministic universe, and if not, whether the notion
of moral responsibility should be jettisoned, are among the deepest questions
that the student of moral agency must face. What is more, they are not
questions to which moral psychology can furnish answers. At this point, ethics
descends into metaphysics. ethnography,
an open-ended family of techniques through which anthropologists investigate
cultures; also, the organized descriptions of other cultures that result from
this method. Cultural anthropology
ethnology is based primarily on
fieldwork through which anthropologists immerse themselves in the life of a
local culture village, neighborhood and attempt to describe and interpret
aspects of the culture. Careful observation is one central tool of
investigation. Through it the anthropologist can observe and record various
features of social life, e.g. trading practices, farming techniques, or
marriage arrangements. A second central tool is the interview, through which
the researcher explores the beliefs and values of members of the local culture.
Tools of historical research, including particularly oral history, are also of
use in ethnography, since the cultural practices of interest often derive from
a remote point in time. ethnology, the
comparative and analytical study of cultures; cultural anthroplogy.
Anthropologists aim to describe and interpret aspects of the culture of various
social groups e.g., the hunter-gatherers
of the Kalahari, rice villages of the Chin. Canton Delta, or a community of
physicists at Livermore Laboratory. Topics of particular interest include
religious beliefs, linguistic practices, kinship arrangements, marriage
patterns, farming technology, dietary practices, gender relations, and power
relations. Cultural anthropology is generally conceived as an empirical
science, and this raises several methodological and conceptual difficulties.
First is the role of the observer. The injection of an alien observer into the
local culture unavoidably disturbs that culture. Second, there is the problem
of intelligibility across cultural systems
radical translation. One goal of ethnographic research is to arrive at
an interpretation of a set of beliefs and values that are thought to be
radically different from the researcher’s own beliefs and values; but if this
is so, then it is questionable whether they can be accurately tr. into the
researcher’s conceptual scheme. Third, there is the problem of empirical
testing of ethnographic interpretations. To what extent do empirical procedures
constrain the construction of an interpretation of a given cultural milieu?
Finally, there is the problem of generalizability. To what extent does
fieldwork in one location permit anthropologists to generalize to a larger context other villages, the dispersed ethnic group
represented by this village, or this village at other times? ethnomethodology, a phenomenological approach
to interpreting everyday action and speech in various social contexts. Derived
from phenomenological sociology and introduced by Harold Garfinkel, the method
aims to guide research into meaningful social practices as experienced by
participants. A major objective of the method is to interpret the rules that
underlie everyday activity and thus constitute part of the normative basis of a
given social order. Research from this perspective generally focuses on mundane
social activities e.g., psychiatrists
evaluating patients’ files, jurors deliberating on defendants’ culpability, or
coroners judging causes of death. The investigator then attempts to reconstruct
an underlying set of rules and ad hoc procedures that may be taken to have
guided the observed activity. The approach emphasizes the contextuality of
social practice the richness of unspoken
shared understandings that guide and orient participants’ actions in a given
practice or activity. H. P. Grice, “The Teutons, according to Tacitus.”
eudaemonia: from Grecian
eudaimonia, and then there’s eudaemonism --‘happiness’, ‘flourishing’, the
ethical doctrine that happiness is the ultimate justification for morality. The
ancient Grecian philosophers typically begin their ethical treatises with an
account of happiness, and then argue that the best way to achieve a happy life
is through the cultivation and exercise of virtue. Most of them make virtue or
virtuous activity a constituent of the happy life; the Epicureans, however,
construe happiness in terms of pleasure, and treat virtue as a means to the end
of pleasant living. Ethical eudaimonism is sometimes combined with
psychological eudaimonism i.e., the view
that all free, intentional action is aimed ultimately at the agent’s happiness.
A common feature of ancient discussions of ethics, and one distinguishing them
from most modern discussions, is the view that an agent would not be rationally
justified in a course of action that promised less happiness than some
alternative open to him. Hence it seems that most of the ancient theories are
forms of egosim. But the ancient theories differ from modern versions of egoism
since, according to the ancients, at least some of the virtues are dispositions
to act from primarily other-regarding motives: although the agent’s happiness
is the ultimate justification of virtuous action, it is not necessarily what
motivates such action. Since happiness is regarded by most of the ancients as
the ultimate end that justifies our actions, their ethical theories seem
teleological; i.e., right or virtuous action is construed as action that
contributes to or maximizes the good. But appearances are again misleading, for
the ancients typically regard virtuous action as also valuable for its own sake
and hence constitutive of the agent’s happiness.
event: used by Grice in
“Actions and Events,” -- anything that happens; an occurrence. Two fundamental
questions about events, which philosophers have usually treated together, are:
1 Are there events?, and 2 If so, what is their nature? Some philosophers
simply assume that there are events. Others argue for that, typically through
finding semantic theories for ordinary claims that apparently concern the fact
that some agent has done something or that some thing has changed. Most
philosophers presume that the events whose existence is proved by such
arguments are abstract particulars, “particulars” in the sense that they are
non-repeatable and spatially locatable, “abstract” in the sense that more than
one event can occur simultaneously in the same place. The theories of events
espoused by Davidson in his causal view, Kim though his view may be unstable in
this respect, Jonathan Bennett, and Lawrence Lombard take them to be abstract
particulars. However, Chisholm takes Euler diagram event 292 292 events to be abstract universals; and
Quine and Davidson in his later view take them to be concrete particulars. Some
philosophers who think of events as abstract particulars tend to associate the
concept of an event with the concept of change; an event is a change in some
object or other though some philosophers have doubts about this and others have
denied it outright. The time at which an event, construed as a particular,
occurs can be associated with the shortest time at which the object, which is
the subject of that event, changes from the having of one property to the
having of another, contrary property. Events inherit whatever spatial locations
they have from the spatial locations, if any, of the things that those events
are changes in. Thus, an event that is a change in an object, x, from being F
to being G, is located wherever x is at the time it changes from being F to
being G. Some events are those of which another event is composed e.g., the
sinking of a ship seems composed of the sinkings of its parts. However, it also
seems clear that not every group of events comprises another; there just is no
event composed of a certain explosion on Venus and my birth. Any adequate
theory about the nature of events must address the question of what properties,
if any, such things have essentially. One issue is whether the causes or
effects of events are essential to those events. A second is whether it is
essential to each event that it be a change in the entity it is in fact a
change in. A third is whether it is essential to each event that it occur at
the time at which it in fact occurs. A chief component of a theory of events is
a criterion of identity, a principle giving conditions necessary and sufficient
for an event e and an event eH to be one and the same event. Quine holds that
events may be identified with the temporal parts of physical objects, and that
events and physical objects would thus share the same condition of identity:
sameness of spatiotemporal location. Davidson once proposed that events are
identical provided they have the same causes and effects. More recently,
Davidson abandoned this position in favor of Quine’s. Kim takes an event to be
the exemplification of a property or relation by an object or objects at a
time. This idea has led to his view that an event e is the same as an event eH
if and only if e and eH are the exemplifications of the same property by the
same objects at the same time. Lombard’s view is a variation on this account,
and is derived from the idea of events as the changes that physical objects
undergo when they alter.
Evola: Italian
philosopher – Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice ed Evola," per Il Club
Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
evolutum: evolutionary
Grice -- Darwinism, the view that biological species evolve primarily by means
of chance variation and natural selection. Although several important
scientists prior to Charles Darwin 180982 had suggested that species evolve and
had provided mechanisms for that evolution, Darwin was the first to set out his
mechanism in sufficient detail and provide adequate empirical grounding. Even
though Darwin preferred to talk about descent with modification, the term that
rapidly came to characterize his theory was evolution. According to Darwin,
organisms vary with respect to their characteristics. In a litter of puppies,
some will be bigger, some will have longer hair, some will be more resistant to
disease, etc. Darwin termed these variations chance, not because he thought
that they were in any sense “uncaused,” but to reject any general correlation
between the variations that an organism might need and those it gets, as
Lamarck had proposed. Instead, successive generations of organisms become
adapted to their environments in a more roundabout way. Variations occur in all
directions. The organisms that happen to possess the characteristics necessary
to survive and reproduce proliferate. Those that do not either die or leave
fewer offspring. Before Darwin, an adaptation was any trait that fits an
organism to its environment. After Darwin, the term came to be limited to just
those useful traits that arose through natural selection. For example, the
sutures in the skulls of mammals make parturition easier, but they are not
adaptations in an evolutionary sense because Danto, Arthur Coleman Darwinism
204 204 they arose in ancestors that
did not give birth to live young, as is indicated by these same sutures
appearing in the skulls of egg-laying birds. Because organisms are integrated
systems, Darwin thought that adaptations had to arise through the accumulation
of numerous, small variations. As a result, evolution is gradual. Darwin
himself was unsure about how progressive biological evolution is. Organisms
certainly become better adapted to their environments through successive
generations, but as fast as organisms adapt to their environments, their
environments are likely to change. Thus, Darwinian evolution may be
goal-directed, but different species pursue different goals, and these goals
keep changing. Because heredity was so important to his theory of evolution,
Darwin supplemented it with a theory of heredity pangenesis. According to this theory, the
cells throughout the body of an organism produce numerous tiny gemmules that
find their way to the reproductive organs of the organism to be transmitted in
reproduction. An offspring receives variable numbers of gemmules from each of
its parents for each of its characteristics. For instance, the male parent
might contribute 214 gemmules for length of hair to one offspring, 121 to
another, etc., while the female parent might contribute 54 gemmules for length
of hair to the first offspring and 89 to the second. As a result, characters
tend to blend. Darwin even thought that gemmules themselves might merge, but he
did not think that the merging of gemmules was an important factor in the blending
of characters. Numerous objections were raised to Darwin’s theory in his day,
and one of the most telling stemmed from his adopting a blending theory of
inheritance. As fast as natural selection biases evolution in a particular
direction, blending inheritance neutralizes its effects. Darwin’s opponents
argued that each species had its own range of variation. Natural selection
might bias the organisms belonging to a species in a particular direction, but
as a species approached its limits of variation, additional change would become
more difficult. Some special mechanism was needed to leap over the deep, though
possibly narrow, chasms that separate species. Because a belief in biological
evolution became widespread within a decade or so after the publication of
Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859, the tendency is to think that it was
Darwin’s view of evolution that became popular. Nothing could be further from
the truth. Darwin’s contemporaries found his theory too materialistic and
haphazard because no supernatural or teleological force influenced evolutionary
development. Darwin’s contemporaries were willing to accept evolution, but not
the sort advocated by Darwin. Although Darwin viewed the evolution of species
on the model of individual development, he did not think that it was directed
by some internal force or induced in a Lamarckian fashion by the environment.
Most Darwinians adopted just such a position. They also argued that species
arise in the space of a single generation so that the boundaries between
species remained as discrete as the creationists had maintained. Ideal
morphologists even eliminated any genuine temporal dimension to evolution.
Instead they viewed the evolution of species in the same atemporal way that
mathematicians view the transformation of an ellipse into a circle. The
revolution that Darwin instigated was in most respects non-Darwinian. By the
turn of the century, Darwinism had gone into a decided eclipse. Darwin himself
remained fairly open with respect to the mechanisms of evolution. For example,
he was willing to accept a minor role for Lamarckian forms of inheritance, and
he acknowledged that on occasion a new species might arise quite rapidly on the
model of the Ancon sheep. Several of his followers were less flexible, rejecting
all forms of Lamarckian inheritance and insisting that evolutionary change is
always gradual. Eventually Darwinism became identified with the views of these
neo-Darwinians. Thus, when Mendelian genetics burst on the scene at the turn of
the century, opponents of Darwinism interpreted this new particulate theory of
inheritance as being incompatible with Darwin’s blending theory. The difference
between Darwin’s theory of pangenesis and Mendelian genetics, however, did not
concern the existence of hereditary particles. Gemmules were as particulate as
genes. The difference lay in numbers. According to early Mendelians, each
character is controlled by a single pair of genes. Instead of receiving a
variable number of gemmules from each parent for each character, each offspring
gets a single gene from each parent, and these genes do not in any sense blend
with each other. Blue eyes remain as blue as ever from generation to
generation, even when the gene for blue eyes resides opposite the gene for
brown eyes. As the nature of heredity was gradually worked out, biologists
began to realize that a Darwinian view of evolution could be combined with
Mendelian genetics. Initially, the founders of this later stage in the
development of neoDarwinism exhibited considerable variation in Darwinism
Darwinism 205 205 their beliefs about
the evolutionary process, but as they strove to produce a single, synthetic
theory, they tended to become more Darwinian than Darwin had been. Although
they acknowledged that other factors, such as the effects of small numbers,
might influence evolution, they emphasized that natural selection is the sole
directive force in evolution. It alone could explain the complex adaptations
exhibited by organisms. New species might arise through the isolation of a few
founder organisms, but from a populational perspective, evolution was still
gradual. New species do not arise in the space of a single generation by means
of “hopeful monsters” or any other developmental means. Nor was evolution in
any sense directional or progressive. Certain lineages might become more
complex for a while, but at this same time, others would become simpler.
Because biological evolution is so opportunistic, the tree of life is highly
irregular. But the united front presented by the neo-Darwinians was in part an
illusion. Differences of opinion persisted, for instance over how heterogeneous
species should be. No sooner did neo-Darwinism become the dominant view among
evolutionary biologists than voices of dissent were raised. Currently, almost
every aspect of the neo-Darwinian paradigm is being challenged. No one proposes
to reject naturalism, but those who view themselves as opponents of
neo-Darwinism urge more important roles for factors treated as only minor by
the neo-Darwinians. For example, neoDarwinians view selection as being
extremely sharp-sighted. Any inferior organism, no matter how slightly
inferior, is sure to be eliminated. Nearly all variations are deleterious.
Currently evolutionists, even those who consider themselves Darwinians,
acknowledge that a high percentage of changes at the molecular level may be
neutral with respect to survival or reproduction. On current estimates, over 95
percent of an organism’s genes may have no function at all. Disagreement also exists
about the level of organization at which selection can operate. Some
evolutionary biologists insist that selection occurs primarily at the level of
single genes, while others think that it can have effects at higher levels of
organization, certainly at the organismic level, possibly at the level of
entire species. Some biologists emphasize the effects of developmental
constraints on the evolutionary process, while others have discovered
unexpected mechanisms such as molecular drive. How much of this conceptual
variation will become incorporated into Darwinism remains to be seen. Evolutionary griceianism -- evolutionary
epistemology, a theory of knowledge inspired by and derived from the fact and
processes of organic evolution the term was coined by the social psychologist
Donald Campbell. Most evolutionary epistemologists subscribe to the theory of
evolution through natural selection, as presented by Darwin in the Origin of
Species 1859. However, one does find variants, especially one based on some kind
of neoLamarckism, where the inheritance of acquired characters is central
Spencer endorsed this view and another based on some kind of jerky or
“saltationary” evolutionism Thomas Kuhn, at the end of The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, accepts this idea. There are two approaches to
evolutionary epistemology. First, one can think of the transformation of
organisms and the processes driving such change as an analogy for the growth of
knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge. “Darwin’s bulldog,” T. H. Huxley,
was one of the first to propose this idea. He argued that just as between
organisms we have a struggle for existence, leading to the selection of the
fittest, so between scientific ideas we have a struggle leading to a selection
of the fittest. Notable exponents of this view today include Stephen Toulmin,
who has worked through the analogy in some detail, and David Hull, who brings a
sensitive sociological perspective to bear on the position. Karl Popper
identifies with this form of evolutionary epistemology, arguing that the
selection of ideas is his view of science as bold conjecture and rigorous
attempt at refutation by another name. The problem with this analogical type of
evolutionary epistemology lies in the disanalogy between the raw variants of
biology mutations, which are random, and the raw variants of science new
hypotheses, which are very rarely random. This difference probably accounts for
the fact that whereas Darwinian evolution is not genuinely progressive, science
is or seems to be the paradigm of a progressive enterprise. Because of this
problem, a second set of epistemologists inspired by evolution insist that one
must take the biology literally. This evidence of the senses evolutionary
epistemology 294 294 group, which
includes Darwin, who speculated in this way even in his earliest notebooks,
claims that evolution predisposes us to think in certain fixed adaptive
patterns. The laws of logic, e.g., as well as mathematics and the
methodological dictates of science, have their foundations in the fact that
those of our would-be ancestors who took them seriously survived and
reproduced, and those that did not did not. No one claims that we have innate
knowledge of the kind demolished by Locke. Rather, our thinking is channeled in
certain directions by our biology. In an update of the biogenetic law,
therefore, one might say that whereas a claim like 5 ! 7 % 12 is
phylogenetically a posteriori, it is ontogenetically a priori. A major division
in this school is between the continental evolutionists, most notably the late
Konrad Lorenz, and the Anglo-Saxon supporters, e.g. Michael Ruse. The former
think that their evolutionary epistemology simply updates the critical
philosophy of Kant, and that biology both explains the necessity of the synthetic
a priori and makes reasonable belief in the thing-in-itself. The latter deny
that one can ever get that necessity, certainly not from biology, or that
evolution makes reasonable a belief in an objectively real world, independent
of our knowing. Historically, these epistemologists look to Hume and in some
respects to the pragmatists, especially
William James. Today, they acknowledge a strong family resemblance to such
naturalized epistemologists as Quine, who has endorsed a kind of evolutionary
epistemology. Critics of this position, e.g. Philip Kitcher, usually strike at
what they see as the soft scientific underbelly. They argue that the belief
that the mind is constructed according to various innate adaptive channels is
without warrant. It is but one more manifestation of today’s Darwinians
illicitly seeing adaptation everywhere. It is better and more reasonable to
think knowledge is rooted in culture, if it is person-dependent at all. A mark
of a good philosophy, like a good science, is that it opens up new avenues for
research. Although evolutionary epistemology is not favored by conventional
philosophers, who sneer at the crudities of its frequently nonphilosophically
trained proselytizers, its supporters feel convinced that they are contributing
to a forward-moving philosophical research program. As evolutionists, they are
used to things taking time to succeed. -- evolutionary psychology, the subfield
of psychology that explains human behavior and cultural arrangements by
employing evolutionary biology and cognitive psychology to discover, catalog,
and analyze psychological mechanisms. Human minds allegedly possess many
innate, special-purpose, domain-specific psychological mechanisms modules whose
development requires minimal input and whose operations are context-sensitive,
mostly automatic, and independent of one another and of general intelligence.
Disagreements persist about the functional isolation and innateness of these
modules. Some evolutionary psychologists compare the mind with its specialized modules to a Swiss army knife. Different modules
substantially constrain behavior and cognition associated with language,
sociality, face recognition, and so on. Evolutionary psychologists emphasize
that psychological phenomena reflect the influence of biological evolution.
These modules and associated behavior patterns assumed their forms during the
Pleistocene. An evolutionary perspective identifies adaptive problems and
features of the Pleistocene environment that constrained possible solutions.
Adaptive problems often have cognitive dimensions. For example, an evolutionary
imperative to aid kin presumes the ability to detect kin. Evolutionary
psychologists propose models to meet the requisite cognitive demands. Plausible
models should produce adaptive behaviors and avoid maladaptive ones e.g., generating too many false positives
when identifying kin. Experimental psychological evidence and social scientific
field observations aid assessment of these proposals. These modules have
changed little. Modern humans manage with primitive hunter-gatherers’ cognitive
equipment amid the rapid cultural change that equipment produces. The pace of
that change outstrips the ability of biological evolution to keep up.
Evolutionary psychologists hold, consequently, that: 1 contrary to
sociobiology, which appeals to biological evolution directly, exclusively
evolutionary explanations of human behavior will not suffice; 2 contrary to
theories of cultural evolution, which appeal to biological evolution analogically,
it is at least possible that no cultural arrangement has ever been adaptive;
and 3 contrary to social scientists, who appeal to some general conception of
learning or socialization to explain cultural transmission, specialized
psychological evolutionary ethics evolutionary psychology 295 295 mechanisms contribute substantially to
that process.
exsistentia: Grice: “A rather
complex Ciceronian construction!” – Grice: “The correct spelling, at Clifton,
was ‘ex-sistentia.’” -- ex-sisto or existo , stĭti,
stĭtum, 3, v. n. ( I.act. August. Civ. D. 14, 13), to step out or forth, to
come forth, emerge, appear (very freq. and class.). I. Prop. A. In gen.: “e
latebris,” Liv. 25, 21, 3: “ab inferis,” Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 37, § 94; Liv. 39,
37, 3: “anguem ab ara exstitisse,” Cic. Div. 2, 80 fin.; cf.: vocem ab aede
Junonis ex arce exstitisse (shortly before: voces ex occulto missae; and:
“exaudita vox est a luco Vestae),” id. ib. 1, 45, 101: “est bos cervi figura,
cujus a media fronte inter aures unum cornu exsistit excelsius,” Caes. B. G. 6,
26, 1: “submersus equus voraginibus non exstitit,” Cic. Div. 1, 33, 73; cf.
Cic. Verr. 2, 4, 48, § 107: “nympha gurgite medio,” Ov. M. 5, 413: “hoc vero
occultum, intestinum ac domesticum malum, non modo non exsistit, verum, etc.,”
does not come to light, Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 15, § 39.— B. In partic., with the
accessory notion of originating, to spring, proceed, arise, become: “vermes de
stercore,” Lucr. 2, 871: “quae a bruma sata sunt, quadragesimo die vix
exsistunt,” Varr. R. R. 1, 34, 1: “ut si qui dentes et pubertatem natura dicat
exsistere, ipsum autem hominem, cui ea exsistant, non constare natura, non
intelligat, etc.,” Cic. N. D. 2, 33 fin.: “ex hac nimia licentia ait ille, ut
ex stirpe quadam, exsistere et quasi nasci tyrannum,” id. Rep. 1, 44; id. Off.
2, 23, 80; cf.: “ex luxuria exsistat avaritia necesse est,” id. Rosc. Am. 27,
75; “ut exsistat ex rege dominus, ex optimatibus factio, ex populo turba et
confusio,” id. Rep. 1, 45: “ut plerumque in calamitate ex amicis inimici exsistunt,”
Caes. B. C. 3, 104, 1; “for which: videtisne igitur, ut de rege dominus
exstiterit? etc.,” Cic. Rep. 2, 26: “ex quo exsistit id civitatis genus,” id.
ib. 3, 14: “hujus ex uberrimis sermonibus exstiterunt doctissimi viri,” id.
Brut. 8, 31; cf. id. Or. 3, 12: “ex qua (disserendi ratione) summa utilitas
exsistit,” id. Tusc. 5, 25, 72: “sermo admirantium, unde hoc philosophandi
nobis subito studium exstitisset,” id. N. D. 1, 3, 6: “exsistit hoc loco
quaestio subdifficilis,” id. Lael. 19, 67: “magna inter eos exsistit
controversia,” Caes. B. G. 5, 28, 2: “poëtam bonum neminem sine inflammatione
animorum exsistere posse,” Cic. de Or. 2, 46 fin.: exsistit illud, ut, etc., it
ensues, follows, that, etc., id. Fin. 5, 23, 67; cf.: “ex quo exsistet, ut de nihilo
quippiam fiat,” id. Fat. 9, 18. II. Transf., to be visible or manifest in any
manner, to exist, to be: “ut in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt, sic in
animis exsistunt majores etiam varietates,” Cic. Off. 1, 30, 107: “idque in
maximis ingeniis exstitit maxime et apparet facillime,” id. Tusc. 1, 15, 33:
“si exstitisset in rege fides,” id. Rab. Post. 1, 1: “cujus magnae exstiterunt
res bellicae,” id. Rep. 2, 17: “illa pars animi, in qua irarum exsistit ardor,”
id. Div. 1, 29, 61: “si quando aliquod officium exstitit amici in periculis
adeundis,” id. Lael. 7, 24 et saep.: “neque ullum ingenium tantum exstitisse
dicebat, ut, etc.,” Cic. Rep. 2, 1; cf.: “talem vero exsistere eloquentiam,
qualis fuit in Crasso, etc.,” id. de Or. 2, 2, 6; “nisi Ilias illa
exstitisset,” id. Arch. 10, 24: “cujus ego dignitatis ab adolescentia fautor,
in praetura autem et in consulatu adjutor etiam exstitissem,” id. Fam. 1, 9,
11; cf.: “his de causis ego huic causae patronus exstiti,” id. Rosc. Am. 2, 5:
“timeo, ne in eum exsistam crudelior,” id. Att. 10, 11, 3: “sic insulsi
exstiterunt, ut, etc.,” id. de Or. 2, 54, 217.Grice learned to use \/x
for the existential quantifier, since “it shows the analogy with ‘or’ and
avoids you fall into any ontological trap, of existential generalization, a
rule of inference admissible in classical quantification theory. It allows one
to infer an existentially quantified statement DxA from any instance A a/x of
it. Intuitively, it allows one to infer ‘There exists a liar’ from ‘Epimenides is
a liar’. It is equivalent to universal instantiation the rule that allows one to infer any
instance A a/x of a universally quantified statement ExA from ExA. Intuitively,
it allows one to infer ‘My car is valuable’ from ‘Everything is valuable’. Both
rules can also have equivalent formulations as axioms; then they are called
specification ExA / A a/x and particularization Aa/x / DxA. All of these
equivalent principles are denied by free logic, which only admits weakened
versions of them. In the case of existential generalization, the weakened
version is: infer DxA from Aa/x & E!a. Intuitively: infer ‘There exists a
liar’ from ‘Epimenides is a liar and Epimenides exists’. existential import, a commitment to the existence
of something implied by a sentence, statement, or proposition. For example, in
Aristotelian logic though not in modern quantification theory, any sentence of
the form ‘All F’s are G’s’ implies ‘There is an F that is a G’ and is thus said
to have as existential import a commitment to the existence of an F that is a
G. According to Russell’s theory of descriptions, sentences containing definite
descriptions can likewise have existential import since ‘The F is a G’ implies
‘There is an F’. The presence of singular terms is also often claimed to give
rise to existential commitment. Underlying this notion of existential import is
the idea long stressed by W. V.
Quine that ontological commitment is
measured by existential sentences statements, propositions of the form Dv
f. existential instantiation, a rule of
inference admissible in classical quantification theory. It allows one to infer
a statement A from an existentially quantified statement DxB if A can be
inferred from an instance Ba/x of DxB, provided that a does not occur in either
A or B or any other premise of the argument if there are any. Intuitively, it
allows one to infer a contradiction C from ‘There exists a highest prime’ if C
can be inferred from ‘a is a highest prime’ and a does not occur in C. Free
logic allows for a stronger form of this rule: with the same provisions as
above, A can be inferred from DxB if it can be inferred from Ba/x & E!a.
Intuitively, it is enough to infer ‘There is a highest natural number’ from ‘a
is a highest prime and a exists’.
existentialism, a philosophical and literary movement that came to
prominence in Europe, particularly in France, immediately after World War II,
and that focused on the uniqueness of each human individual as distinguished
from abstract universal human qualities. Historians differ as to antecedents.
Some see an existentialist precursor in Pascal, whose aphoristically expressed
Catholic fideism questioned the power of rationalist thought and preferred the
God of Scripture to the abstract “God of the philosophers.” Many agree that Kierkegaard,
whose fundamentally similar but Protestant fideism was based on a profound
unwillingness to situate either God or any individual’s relationship with God
within a systematic philosophy, as Hegel had done, should be exact similarity
existentialism 296 296 considered the
first modern existentialist, though he too lived long before the term emerged.
Others find a proto-existentialist in Nietzsche, because of the aphoristic and
anti-systematic nature of his writings, and on the literary side, in Dostoevsky.
A number of twentiethcentury novelists, such as Franz Kafka, have been labeled
existentialists. A strong existentialist strain is to be found in certain other
theist philosophers who have written since Kierkegaard, such as Lequier,
Berdyaev, Marcel, Jaspers, and Buber, but Marcel later decided to reject the
label ‘existentialist’, which he had previously employed. This reflects its
increasing identification with the atheistic existentialism of Sartre, whose
successes, as in the novel Nausea, and the philosophical work Being and
Nothingness, did most to popularize the word. A mass-audience lecture,
“Existentialism Is a Humanism,” which Sartre to his later regret allowed to be
published, provided the occasion for Heidegger, whose early thought had greatly
influenced Sartre’s evolution, to take his distance from Sartre’s
existentialism, in particular for its self-conscious concentration on human
reality over Being. Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism, written in reply to a admirer, signals an important turn in his
thinking. Nevertheless, many historians continue to classify Heidegger as an
existentialist quite reasonably, given
his early emphasis on existential categories and ideas such as anxiety in the
presence of death, our sense of being “thrown” into existence, and our
temptation to choose anonymity over authenticity in our conduct. This
illustrates the difficulty of fixing the term ‘existentialism’. Other thinkers of the time, all acquaintances of
Sartre’s, who are often classified as existentialists, are Camus, Simone de
Beauvoir, and, though with less reason, Merleau-Ponty. Camus’s novels, such as
The Stranger and The Plague, are cited along with Nausea as epitomizing the
uniqueness of the existentialist antihero who acts out of authenticity, i.e., in
freedom from any conventional expectations about what so-called human nature a
concept rejected by Sartre supposedly requires in a given situation, and with a
sense of personal responsibility and absolute lucidity that precludes the “bad
faith” or lying to oneself that characterizes most conventional human behavior.
Good scholarship prescribes caution, however, about superimposing too many
Sartrean categories on Camus. In fact the latter, in his brief philosophical
essays, notably The Myth of Sisyphus, distinguishes existentialist writers and
philosophers, such as Kierkegaard, from absurdist thinkers and heroes, whom he
regards more highly, and of whom the mythical Sisyphus condemned eternally by
the gods to roll a huge boulder up a hill before being forced, just before
reaching the summit, to start anew is the epitome. Camus focuses on the concept
of the absurd, which Kierkegaard had used to characterize the object of his
religious faith an incarnate God. But for Camus existential absurdity lies in
the fact, as he sees it, that there is always at best an imperfect fit between
human reasoning and its intended objects, hence an impossibility of achieving
certitude. Kierkegaard’s leap of faith is, for Camus, one more pseudo-solution
to this hard, absurdist reality. Almost alone among those named besides Sartre
who himself concentrated more on social and political thought and became
indebted to Marxism in his later years, Simone de Beauvoir 886 unqualifiedly
accepted the existentialist label. In The Ethics of Ambiguity, she attempted,
using categories familiar in Sartre, to produce an existentialist ethics based
on the recognition of radical human freedom as “projected” toward an open
future, the rejection of inauthenticity, and a condemnation of the “spirit of seriousness”
akin to the “spirit of gravity” criticized by Nietzsche whereby individuals
identify themselves wholly with certain fixed qualities, values, tenets, or
prejudices. Her feminist masterpiece, The Second Sex, relies heavily on the
distinction, part existentialist and part Hegelian in inspiration, between a
life of immanence, or passive acceptance of the role into which one has been
socialized, and one of transcendence, actively and freely testing one’s
possibilities with a view to redefining one’s future. Historically, women have
been consigned to the sphere of immanence, says de Beauvoir, but in fact a
woman in the traditional sense is not something that one is made, without
appeal, but rather something that one becomes. The Sartrean ontology of Being
and Nothingness, according to which there are two fundamental asymmetrical
“regions of being,” being-in-itself and being-for-itself, the latter having no
definable essence and hence, as “nothing” in itself, serving as the ground for
freedom, creativity, and action, serves well as a theoretical framework for an
existentialist approach to human existence. Being and Nothingness also names a
third ontological region, being-for-others, but that may be disregarded here.
However, it would be a mistake to treat even Sartre’s existentialist insights,
much less those of others, as dependent on this ontology, to which he himself
made little direct existentialism existentialism 297 297 reference in his later works. Rather, it
is the implications of the common central claim that we human beings exist
without justification hence “absurdly” in a world into which we are “thrown,”
condemned to assume full responsibility for our free actions and for the very
values according to which we act, that make existentialism a continuing
philosophical challenge, particularly to ethicists who believe right choices to
be dictated by our alleged human essence or nature.
explanatum: cf. iustificatum –
That the distinction is not absolute shows in that explanatum cannot be
non-iustificatum or vice versa. To explain is in part to justify – but Grice
was in a hurry, and relying on an upublication not meant for publication! Grice
on explanatory versus justificatory reasons -- early 15c., explanen, "make (something)
clear in the mind, to make intelligible," from Latin explanare "to explain, make
clear, make plain," literally "make level, flatten," from ex "out" (see ex-) + planus "flat" (from PIE root *pele- (2) "flat; to
spread"). The spelling was altered by influence of plain. Also see plane (v.2). In 17c.,
occasionally used more literally, of the unfolding of material things: Evelyn
has buds that "explain into leaves" ["Sylva, or, A discourse of
forest-trees, and the propagation of timber in His Majesties dominions,"
1664]. Related: Explained; explaining; explains. To explain
(something) away "to deprive of significance by explanation,
nullify or get rid of the apparent import of," generally with an adverse
implication, is from 1709. I
think we may find, in our talk about reasons, three main kinds of case. (1) The
first is that class of cases exemplified by the use of such a sentence as
"The reason why the bridge collapsed was that the girders were made of
cellophane". Variant forms would be exemplified in "The (one) reason
for the collapse of the bridge was that . . ." and "The fact that the
girders were made of cellophane was the (one) reason for the collapse of the
bridge (why the bridge collapsed)", and so on. This type of case includes
cases in which that for which the (a) reason is being given is an action. We
can legitimately use such a sentence form as "The reason why he resigned
his office (for his resigning his office) was that p"; and, so far as I
can see, the same range of variant forms will be available. I shall take as
canonical (paradigmatic) for this type of case (type (1)) the form "The
(a) reason why A was (is) that B". The significant features of a type (1)
case seem to me to include the following. (a) The canonical form is 'factive'
both with respect to A and to B. If I use it, I imply both that it is true that
A and that it is true that B. (b) If the reason why A was that B, then B is the
explanation of its being the case that A; and if one reason why A was (that) B,
then B is one explanation of its being the case that A, and if there are other
explanations (as it is implicated that there are, or may be) then A is
overdetermined; and (finally) if a part of the reason why A was that B, then B
is a part of the explanation of A's being so. This feature is not unconnected
with the previous one; if B is the explanation of A, then both B and A must be
facts; and if one fact is a reason for another fact, then it looks as if the
connection between them must be that the first explains the second. (c) In
some, but not all, cases in which the reason why A was that B, we can speak of
B as causing, or being the cause of, A (A's being the case). If the reason why
the bridge collapsed was that the girders were made of cellophane, then we can
say that the girders' being made of cellophane caused the bridge to collapse
(or, at least, caused it to collapse when the bus drove onto it). But not end
p.37 in all cases; it might be true that the reason why X took offence was that
all Tibetans are specially sensitive to comments on their appearance, though it
is very dubious whether it would be proper to describe the fact, or
circumstance, that all Tibetans have this particular sensitivity as the cause
of, or as causing, X to take offence. However, it may well be true that if B
does cause A, then the (or a) reason why A is that B. (d) The canonical form
employs 'reason' as a count-noun; it allows us to speak (for example) of the
reason why A, of there being more than one reason why A, and so on. But for
type (1) cases we have, at best, restricted licence to use variants in which
'reason' is used as a massnoun. "There was considerable reason why the
bridge collapsed (for the bridge collapsing)" and "The weakness of
the girders was some reason why the bridge collapsed" are oddities; so is
"There was good reason why the bridge collapsed", though "There
was a good reason why the bridge collapsed" is better; but "There was
(a) bad reason why the bridge collapsed" is terrible. The discomforts
engendered by attempts to treat 'reason' as a mass-noun persist even when A specifies an
action; "There was considerable reason why he resigned his office" is
unhappy, though one would not object to, for example, "There was
considerable reason for him to resign his office", which is not a type (1)
case. (e) Relativization to a person is, I think, excluded, unless (say) the
relativizing 'for X' means "in X's opinion", as in "for me, the
reason why the bridge collapsed was . . .". Again, this feature persists
even when A specifies an action: "For him, the reason why he resigned was
. . ." and "The reason for him why he resigned was . . ." are
both unnatural (for different reasons). I shall call type (1) cases
"reasons why" or "explanatory reasons" – for
etymologically, they make something ‘plain’ – out of nothing, almost – vide
Latin explanare – but never IM-planare – and in any case, not to be confused
with what Carnap calls an ‘explication’! (2) The cases which I am allocating to
type (2) are a slightly less tidy family than those of type (1). Examples are:
"The fact that they were a day late was some (a)reason for thinking that
the bridge had collapsed." "The fact that they were a day late was a
reason for postponing the conference." We should particularly notice the
following variants and allied examples (among others): end p.38 That they were
a day late was reason to think that the bridge had collapsed. There was no
reason why the bridge should have collapsed. The fact that they were so late
was a (gave) good reason for us to think that . . . He had reason to think that
. . . (to postpone . . .) but he seemed unaware of the fact. The fact that they
were so late was a reason for wanting (for us to want) to postpone the meeting.
I shall take as the paradigmatic form for type (2) "That B was (a) reason
(for X) to A", where "A" may conceal a psychological verb like
"think", "want", or "decide", or may specify an
action. Salient features seem to me to include the following. (a) Unlike type
(1), where there is double factivity, the paradigmatic form is non-factive with
respect to A, but factive with respect to B; with regard to B, however,
modifications are available which will cancel factivity; for example, "If
it were (is) the case that B, that would be a reason to A." (b) In
consonance with the preceding feature, it is not claimed that B explains A
(since A may not be the case), nor even that if A were the case B would explain
it (since someone who actually does the action or thinks the thought specified
by A may not do so because of B). It is, however, in my view (though some might
question my view) claimed that B is a justification (final or provisional) for
doing, wanting, or thinking whatever is specified in A. The fact that B goes at
least some way towards making it the case that an appropriate person or persons
should (or should have) fulfil (fulfilled) A. (c) The word "cause" is
still appropriate, but in a different grammatical construction from that used
for type (1). In Example (1), the fact that they were so late is not claimed to
cause anyone to think that the bridge had collapsed, but it is claimed to be
(or to give) cause to think just that. (d) Within type (2), 'reason' may be
treated either as a count-noun or as a mass-noun. Indeed, the kinds of case
which form type (2) seem to be the natural habitat of 'reason' as a mass-noun.
A short version of an explanation of this fact (to which I was helped end p.39
by George Myro) seems to me to be that (i) there are no degrees of explanation:
there may be more than one explanation, and something may be a part (but only a
part) of the explanation, but a set of facts either does explain something or
it does not. There are, however, degrees of justification (justifiability); one
action or belief may be more justifiable, in a given situation, than another
(there may be a better case for it). (ii) Justifiability is not just a matter
of the number of supporting considerations, but rather of their combined weight
(together with their outweighing the considerations which favour a rival action
or belief). So a mass-term is needed, together with specifications of degree or
magnitude. (e) That B may plainly be a reason for a person or people to A;
indeed, when no person is mentioned or implicitly referred to, it is very
tempting to suppose that it is being claimed that the fact that B would be a
reason for anyone, or any normal person, to A. One might call type (2) cases "justificatory reasons" or
"reasons for (to)". (3) Examples: John's reason for thinking Samantha
to be a witch was that he had suddenly turned into a frog. John's reason for wanting
Samantha to be thrown into the pond was that (he thought that) she was a witch.
John's reason for denouncing Samantha was that she kept turning him into a
frog. John's reason for denouncing Samantha was to protect himself against
recurrent metamorphosis. If X's reason for doing (thinking) A was that B, it
follows that X A-ed because B (because X knew (thought) that B). If X's reason
for doing (wanting, etc.) A was to B, it follows that X A-ed in order to (so as
to) B. The sentence form "X had several reasons for A-ing, such as that
(to) B" falls, in my scheme, under type (3), unlike the seemingly similar
sentence "X had reason to A, since B", which I locate under type (2).
The paradigmatic form I take as being "X's reason(s) for A-ing was that B
(to B)". Salient features of type (3) cases should be fairly obvious. end
p.40 (a) In type (3) cases reasons may be either of the form that B or of the
form to B. If they are of the former sort, then the paradigmatic form is doubly
factive, factive with respect both to A and to B. It is always factive with
respect to A (A-ing). When it is factive with respect to B, factivity may be
cancelled by inserting "X thought that" before B. (b) Type (3)
reasons are "in effect explanatory". If X's reason for A-ing was that
(to) B, X's thinking that B (or wanting to B) explains his A-ing. The
connection between type (3) reasons being, in effect, explanatory, and their
factivity is no doubt parallel to the connection which obtains for type (1)
reasons. I reserve the question of the applicability of "cause" to a
special concluding comment. (c) So far as I can see, "reason" cannot,
in type (3) cases, be treated as a mass-noun. This may be accounted for by the
explanatory character of reasons of this type. We can, however, here talk of
reasons as being bad; X's reasons for A-ing may be weak or appalling. In type
(2) cases, we speak of there being little reason, or even no reason, to A. But
in type (3) cases, since X's reasons are explanatory of his actions or
thoughts, they have to exist. (I doubt if this is the full story, but it will
have to do for the moment.) (d) Of their very nature, type (3) reasons are
relative to persons. Because of their hybrid nature (they seem, as will in a
moment, I hope, emerge, in a way to partake of the character both of type (1)
and of type (2)) one might call them "Justificatory-Explanatory"
reasons. Strawson said my explanation required an explanation. ex-plāno , āvi, ātum, 1, v. a. * I. Lit., to flatten or
spread out: “suberi cortex in denos pedes undique explanatus,” Plin. 16, 8, 13,
§ 34.— II. Trop., of speech, to make plain or clear, to explain (class.: “syn.:
explico, expono, interpretor): qualis differentia sit honesti et decori,
facilius intelligi quam explanari potest,” Cic. Off. 1, 27, 94; cf. Quint. 5,
10, 4: “rem latentem explicare definiendo, obscuram explanare interpretando,
etc.,” Cic. Brut. 42, 152: “explanare apertiusque dicere aliquid,” id. Fin. 2,
19, 60: “docere et explanare,” id. Off. 1, 28, 101: “aliquid conjecturā,” id.
de Or. 2, 69, 280: “rem,” id. Or. 24, 80: “quem amicum tuum ais fuisse istum,
explana mihi,” Ter. Ph. 2, 3, 33: “de cujus hominis moribus pauca prius
explananda sunt, quam initium narrandi faciam,” Sall. C. 4, 5.—Pass. impers.:
“juxta quod flumen, aut ubi fuerit, non satis explanatur,” Plin. 6, 23, 26, §
97.— 2. To utter distinctly: “et ille juravit, expressit, explanavitque verba,
quibus, etc.,” Plin. Pan. 64, 3.—Hence, explānātus , a, um, P. a. (acc. to
II.), plain, distinct (rare): “claritas in voce, in lingua etiam explanata
vocum impressio,” i. e. an articulate pronunciation, Cic. Ac. 1, 5, 19: parum
explanatis vocibus sermo praeruptus, Sen. de Ira, 1, 1, 4.—Adv. ex-plānāte ,
plainly, clearly, distinctly: “scriptum,” Gell. 16, 8, 3.—Comp.: “ut definire
rem cum explanatius, tum etiam uberius (opp. presse et anguste),” Cic. Or. 33,
117.
heteroclitical
implicaturum:--
Greek κλιτικός (klitikós, “inflexional”, but transliterated
as ‘heterocliticum’) -- signifying a stem which alternates between more than
one form when declined for grammatical case. Examples of heteroclitic noun
stems in Proto-Indo-European include *wod-r/n- "water"
(nominoaccusative *wódr; genitive *udnés; locative *udén) and *yékw-r/n-
"liver" (nominoaccusative *yékwr, genitive *ikwnés). In
Proto-Indo-European, heteroclitic stems tend to be noun stems with
grammatically inanimate gender. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The heteroclitical implicaturum:
implicaturum, implicitum, explicatum, explicitum: what I learned at Clifton,
and why.”
explicatum: Grice is clear here. There is explicat- and explicit-.
Both yield different fields. The explicit- has to do with what is shown. The
explicat- does not. But both are cognate. And of course, the ambiguity
replicates in implicit- and implicat- Short and Lewis have both ‘explicatus’ and
‘explicitus’ as Part. and P. a., from explico. “I wonder why they had to have
TWO!” – Grice.He once asked this to his master at
Clifton. And he said, “because this is a participium heteroclitum.” Grice never
forgot that! An Heteroclite Participle. R E D U N D A N S
abounding. Art'cipium the Participle faepe o/?em redundat abounds, ut as
Perfe&tum the perfe&? ter/? [aid] priùs before ; ut as explico to
unfold conduplicat doubles [its Participle] explicitus explicatufque, making
both explicitus and explicatus. Et and fic /3 fevi I have plantea folet is wont
dare to give fatus planted, & and ferui I have put fertus placed. Cello to
bcat vult will mittere produce -celfus ab -ui from [the perfe&* tenfe in]
-ui ; fed but -culfus ab -i -cu!fus from [its perfr&7 in] -i. Compofitum à
fto the Compound offlo to /fand [ makes] - ftaturus, pariterque amd aff?
-ftiturus [in the future Participle.] Etiam alfo duplex two Participles fit are
made à fimplice perfeéto from one perfe&i tenfe ; tendo to/lretch habet
hath tentus, and tenfus; pando to opem takes fibi to itfejf paffus, and panfus
: Item affo mifcui I have mixed miftus, vel or mixtus ; alo to breed up, altus
and alitus ; Poto to drink makes potatus & and potus ; lavo to wa/h, lautus
and lotus. A tundo from [tundo] to knock down -tufus is made ; retundo to blunt
[makes] both -tufus and -tunfus. Pinfo to bake effert makes triplex three
Participles piftus, pinfufque, & pinfitus, piftus, and pinfus, and
pinfitus. Civi, the perfe&? tenfe à cieo ofcieo to provoke makes the
participle citus [with the i. -- Vult tendo tenfus, tentus , vult flectere
pando - Panfus Panfus paffus 5 pinfo vult piftus dare pinfus Pinfitus
; & fevi fatus, & ferui dare fertus. Compofitum à
fto-ftaturus meliufque-ftiturus. * Conftaturus
Lucan. Mart. Obftaturus Quint. _ Tundo in compofitis -tufus ;
-tunfufque retundo Congeminat ; plico & explicitus facit,
éx-que-plicatus. Verba in-uo &-vo-ütus tendunt ; ruo fed
breve-ütus dat. A cieo pariter manat citus , à cio citus. - Cello
ab -ui celfus , fed ab-i vult mittere -culfus. At
Oxford, nobody was interested in the explication. That’s too explicit. It was,
being English, all about the ‘innuendo,’ the ‘understatement,’ the implication.
The first Oxonian was C. K. Grant, with his ‘pragmatic implication.’ Then came
Nowell-Smith with his ‘contextual implication.’ Urmson was there with his
‘implied’ claims. And Strawson was saying that ‘the king of France is not bald’
implies that thereis a king of France. So, it was enough, Grice thought! We
have to analyse what we imply by imply, or at least what _I_ do. He thought
publishing was always vulgar. But when he was invited for one of those
popularisations, when he was invited to contribute to a symposium on a topic of
his choice – he chose “The causal theory of perception” and dedicates an
‘extensum excursus’ on ‘implication.’ The conclusion is simple: “The pillar box
seems red” implies. And implies a LOT. So much so that neo-Wittgensteinians
were saying that what Grice implies is part of what Grice is committed in terms
of ‘satisfactoriness’ of what he is expressing. Not so! What Grice implies is,
surely, that the pillar box may not be red. But surely he can cancel that
EXPLICITLY “The pillar box seems red and is red.” So, what he implies is not
part of what he explicitly commits in terms of value satisfactoriness. In terms
of value satisfactoriness, Grice distinguishes between the subperceptual (“The
pillar box seems red”) and the perceptual proper (“Grice perceives that the
pillar box is red”). The causal theory merely states that “Grice perceives that
the pillar box is red” (a perceptum for the subperceptum, “the pillar box seems
red”) if and only if, first, the pillar
box is red; second, the subperceptum: the pillar box seems red; and third and
last, the fact that the pillar box is red CAUSES the pillar box seeming red.
None of that is explicit, but none of it is implicit. It is merely a
philosophical reductive analysis which has cleared away an unnecessary
implication out of the picture. The philosopher, involved in conceptual
analysis, has freed from the ‘pragmatic implication’ and can provide, for his
clearly stated ‘analysans,’ three different prongs which together constitute
the necessary and sufficient conditions – the analysandum. And his problem is
resolved. Grice’s cavalier attitude towards the explicit is obvious in the way
he treats “Wilson is a great man,” versus “the prime minister is a great man”
“I don’t care if I’m not sure if I want to say that an emissor of (i) and an
emissor of (ii) have put forward, in an explicit fashion, the same proposition.
His account of ‘disambiguation’ is meant even more jocularly. He knows that in
the New World, they spell ‘vice’ as
‘vyse’ – So Wilson being in the grip of a vyse is possibly the same
thing put forward as the prime minister being caught in the grip of either a
carpenter’s tool or a sort of something like a sin – if not both.
(Etymologically, ‘vice’ and ‘vice’ are cognate, since they are ‘violent’ things
– cf. violence. While ‘implicare’ developed into vulgar Engish as ‘employ,’
“it’s funny explicature did not develop into ‘exploy.’”A logical construction
is an explication. A reductive analysis is an explication. Cf. Grice on
Reductionism as a bete noire, sometimes misquoted as Reductivism. Grice used
both ‘explanation’ and ‘explication’, so one has to be careful. When he said
that he looked for a theory that would explain conversation or the implicaturum,
he did not mean explication. What is the difference, etymologically,
between explicate and explain? Well,
explain is from ‘explanare,’ which gives ‘explanatum.’Trop., of speech, to make
plain or clear, to explain (class.:“syn.: explico, expono, interpretor): qualis
differentia sit honesti et decori, facilius intelligi quam explanari potest,”
Cic.Off. 1, 27, 94; cf. Quint. 5, 10, 4: “rem latentem explicare definiendo,
obscuram explanare interpretando, etc.,” Cic. Brut. 42, 152: “explanare
apertiusque dicere aliquid,” id. Fin. 2, 19, 60: “docere et explanare,” id.
Off. 1, 28, 101: “aliquid conjecturā,” id. de Or. 2, 69, 280: “rem,” id. Or.
24, 80: “quem amicum tuum ais fuisse istum, explana mihi,” Ter. Ph. 2, 3, 33: “de
cujus hominis moribus pauca prius explananda sunt, quam initium narrandi
faciam,” Sall. C. 4, 5.—Pass.impers.: “juxta quod flumen, aut ubi fuerit, non
satis explanatur,” Plin. 6, 23, 26, § 97.—2. To utter distinctly: “et ille
juravit, expressit, explanavitque verba, quibus, etc.,” Plin. Pan. 64, 3.Hence,
explānātus , a, um, P. a. (acc. to II.), plain, distinct (rare): “claritas in
voce, in lingua etiam explanata vocum impressio,” i. e. an articulate
pronunciation, Cic. Ac. 1, 5, 19: parum explanatis vocibus sermo praeruptus,
Sen. de Ira, 1, 1, 4. Adv. ex-plānāte , plainly, clearly, distinctly:
“scriptum,” Gell. 16, 8, 3.—Comp.: “ut definire rem cum explanatius, tum etiam
uberius (opp. presse et anguste),” Cic. Or. 33, 117.Cr. Occam. M. O. R. the
necessity is explanatory necessity. Senses or conventional implicaturata (not
reachable by ‘argument’) and Strawson do not explain. G. A. Paul does not
explain. Unlike Austin, who was in love with a taxonomy, Grice loved an
explanation. “Ἀρχὴν δὲ τῶν πάντων ὕδωρ ὑπεστήσατο, καὶ τὸν κόσμον ἔμψυχον καὶ
δαιμόνων πλήρη. “Arkhen de ton panton hudor hupestesato.” Thales’s doctrine is
that water is the universal primary substance, and that the world is animate
and full of divinities. “Ἀλλὰ Θαλῆς μὲν ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας ὕδωρ
φησὶν εἶναι (διὸ καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος ἀπεφήνατο εἶναι), λαβὼν ἴσως τὴν
ὑπόληψιν ταύτην ἐκ τοῦ πάντων ὁρᾶν τὴν τροφὴν ὑγρὰν οὖσαν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν ἐκ
τούτου γιγνόμενον καὶ τούτῳ ζῶν (τὸ δ᾽ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ πάντων)
– διά τε δὴ τοῦτο τὴν ὑπόληψιν λαβὼν ταύτην καὶ διὰ τὸ πάντων τὰ σπέρματα τὴν
φύσιν ὑγρὰν ἔχειν, τὸ δ᾽ ὕδωρ ἀρχὴν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι τοῖς ὑγροῖς. εἰσὶ δέ τινες
οἳ καὶ τοὺς παμπαλαίους καὶ πολὺ πρὸ τῆς νῦν γενέσεως καὶ πρώτους θεολογήσαντας
οὕτως οἴονται περὶ τῆς φύσεως ὑπολαβεῖν‧ Ὠκεανόν τε γὰρ καὶ Τηθὺν ἐποίησαν τῆς γενέσεως πατέρας
[Hom. Ξ 201], καὶ τὸν ὅρκον τῶν θεῶν ὕδωρ, τὴν καλουμένην ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν Στύγα τῶν
ποιητῶν‧ τιμιώτατον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πρεσβύτατον,
ὅρκος δὲ τὸ τιμιώτατόν ἐστιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν [984a] ἀρχαία τις αὕτη καὶ παλαιὰ
τετύχηκεν οὖσα περὶ τῆς φύσεως ἡ δόξα, τάχ᾽ ἂν ἄδηλον εἴη, Θαλῆς μέντοι λέγεται
οὕτως ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας. (Ἵππωνα γὰρ οὐκ ἄν τις ἀξιώσειε
θεῖναι μετὰ τούτων διὰ τὴν εὐτέλειαν αὐτοῦ τῆς διανοίας)‧ Ἀναξιμένης δὲ ἀέρα καὶ Διογένης πρότερον ὕδατος καὶ μάλιστ᾽
ἀρχὴν τιθέασι τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων.” De caelo: “Οἱ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος κεῖσθαι [sc. τὴν
γὴν]. τοῦτον γὰρ ἀρχαιότατον παρειλήφαμεν τὸν λόγον, ὅν φασιν εἰπεῖν Θαλῆν τὸν
Μιλήσιον, ὡς διὰ τὸ πλωτὴν εἶναι μένουσαν ὥσπερ ξύλον ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον (καὶ
γὰρ τούτων ἐπ᾽ ἀέρος μὲν οὐθὲν πέφυκε μένειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος), ὥσπερ οὐ τὸν
αὐτὸν λόγον ὄντα περὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος τοῦ ὀχοῦντος τὴν γῆν‧ οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὕδωρ πέφυκε μένειν μετέωρον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπί τινός
[294b] ἐστιν. ἔτι δ᾽ ὥσπερ ἀὴρ ὕδατος κουφότερον, καὶ γῆς ὕδωρ‧ ὥστε πῶς οἷόν τε τὸ κουφότερον κατωτέρω κεῖσθαι τοῦ
βαρυτέρου τὴν φύσιν; ἔτι δ᾽ εἴπερ ὅλη πέφυκε μένειν ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
τῶν μορίων ἕκαστον [αὐτῆς]‧
νῦν δ᾽ οὐ φαίνεται τοῦτο γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τυχὸν μόριον φέρεται εἰς βυθόν,
καὶ θᾶττον τὸ μεῖζον. The problem of the nature of matter, and its
transformation into the myriad things of which the universe is made, engaged
the natural philosophers, commencing with Thales. For his hypothesis to be
credible, it was essential that he could explain how all things could come into
being from water, and return ultimately to the originating material. It is
inherent in Thaless hypotheses that water had the potentiality to change to the
myriad things of which the universe is made, the botanical, physiological,
meteorological and geological states. In Timaeus, 49B-C, Plato had Timaeus
relate a cyclic process. The passage commences with that which we now call
“water” and describes a theory which was possibly that of Thales. Thales would
have recognized evaporation, and have been familiar with traditional views,
such as the nutritive capacity of mist and ancient theories about spontaneous
generation, phenomena which he may have observed, just as Aristotle believed
he, himself had, and about which Diodorus Siculus, Epicurus (ap. Censorinus,
D.N. IV.9), Lucretius (De Rerum Natura) and Ovid (Met. I.416-437) wrote. When
Aristotle reported Thales’s pronouncement that the primary principle is water,
he made a precise statement: Thales says that it [the nature of things] is
water, but he became tentative when he proposed reasons which might have
justified Thaless decision. Thales’s supposition may have arisen from
observation. It is Aristotle’s opinion that Thales may have observed, that the
nurture of all creatures is moist, and that warmth itself is generated from
moisture and lives by it; and that from which all things come to be is their
first principle. Then, Aristotles tone changed towards greater confidence. He
declared: Besides this, another reason for the supposition would be that the
semina of all things have a moist nature. In continuing the criticism of
Thales, Aristotle wrote: That from which all things come to be is their first
principle (Metaph. 983 b25). Simple
metallurgy had been practised long before Thales presented his hypotheses, so
Thales knew that heat could return metals to a liquid state. Water exhibits
sensible changes more obviously than any of the other so-called elements, and
can readily be observed in the three states of liquid, vapour and ice. The
understanding that water could generate into earth is basic to Thaless watery
thesis. At Miletus it could readily be observed that water had the capacity to
thicken into earth. Miletus stood on the Gulf of Lade through which the
Maeander river emptied its waters. Within living memory, older Milesians had
witnessed the island of Lade increasing in size within the Gulf, and the river
banks encroaching into the river to such an extent that at Priene, across the
gulf from Miletus the warehouses had to be rebuilt closer to the waters edge.
The ruins of the once prosperous city-port of Miletus are now ten kilometres
distant from the coast and the Island of Lade now forms part of a rich
agricultural plain. There would have been opportunity to observe other areas
where earth generated from water, for example, the deltas of the Halys, the
Ister, about which Hesiod wrote (Theogony, 341), now called the Danube, the
Tigris-Euphrates, and almost certainly the Nile. This coming-into-being of land
would have provided substantiation of Thaless doctrine. To Thales water held
the potentialities for the nourishment and generation of the entire cosmos.
Aëtius attributed to Thales the concept that even the very fire of the sun and
the stars, and indeed the cosmos itself is nourished by evaporation of the
waters (Aëtius, Placita). It is not
known how Thales explained his watery thesis, but Aristotle believed that the
reasons he proposed were probably the persuasive factors in Thaless
considerations. Thales gave no role to the Olympian gods. Belief in generation
of earth from water was not proven to be wrong until A.D. 1769 following
experiments of Antoine Lavoisier, and spontaneous generation was not disproved
until the nineteenth century as a result of the work of Louis Pasteur.The first
philosophical explanation of the world was speculative not practical. has its
intelligibility in being identified with one of its parts (the world is water).
First philosophical explanation for Universe human is rational and the world in
independent; He said the arché is water; Monist: He believed reality is
one Thales of Miletus, first
philosophical explanation of the origin and nature of justice (and Why after all, did a Thales is Water.” Without the millions of species
that make up the biosphere, and the billions of interactions between them that
go on day by day,.Oddly, Grice had spent some time on x-questions in the Kant
lectures. And why is an x-question. A philosophical explanation of
conversation. A philosophical explanation of implicaturum. Description vs.
explanation. Grice quotes from Fisher, Never contradict. Never explain.
Taxonomy, is worse than explanation, always. Grice is exploring the
taxonomy-description vs. explanation dichotomy. He would often criticise
ordinary-language philosopher Austin for spending too much valuable time on
linguistic botany, without an aim in his head. Instead, his inclination, a
dissenting one, is to look for the big picture of it all, and disregard a
piece-meal analysis. Conversation is a good example. While Austin would
Subjectsify Language (Linguistic Nature), Grice rather places rationality
squarely on the behaviour displayed by utterers as they make conversational
moves that their addressees will judge as rational along specific lines. Observation
of the principle of conversational helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along
the following lines: anyone who cares about the two goals which are central to
conversation, viz. giving and receiving information, and influencing and being
influenced by others, is expected to have an interest in taking part in a
conversation which will only be profitable (if not possible) under the
assumption that it is conducted along the lines of the principle of
conversational helpfulness. Grice is not interested in conversation per se, but
as a basis for a theory that explains the mistakes ordinary-language
philosophers are making. The case of What is known to be the case is not
believed to be the case. EXPLICATUM
-- “to understand” – to explain -- Dilthey, W. philosopher and historian whose
main project was to establish the conditions of historical knowledge, much as
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason had for our knowledge of nature. He studied
theology, history, and philosophy at Heidelberg and Berlin and in 2 accepted
the chair earlier held by Hegel at the
of Berlin. Dilthey’s first attempt at a critique of historical reason is
found in the Introduction to the Human Sciences 3, the last in the Formation of
the Historical World in the Human Sciences 0. He is also a recognized
contributor to hermeneutics, literary criticism, and worldview theory. His Life
of Schleiermacher and essays on the Renaissance, Enlightenment, and Hegel are
model works of Geistesgeschichte, in which philosophical ideas are analyzed in
relation to their social and cultural milieu. Dilthey holds that life is the
ultimate nexus of reality behind which we cannot go. Life is viewed, not
primarily in biological terms as in Nietzsche and Bergson, but as the
historical totality of human experience. The basic categories whereby we
reflect on life provide the background for the epistemological categories of
the sciences. According to Dilthey, Aristotle’s category of acting and
suffering is rooted in prescientific experience, which is then explicated as
the category of efficacy or influence Wirkung in the human sciences and as the
category of cause Ursache in the natural sciences. Our understanding of
influence in the human sciences is less removed from the full reality of life
than are the causal explanations arrived at in the natural sciences. To this
extent the human sciences can claim a priority over the natural sciences.
Whereas we have direct access to the real elements of the historical world
psychophysical human beings, the elements of the natural world are merely
hypothetical entities such as atoms. The natural sciences deal with outer
experiences, while the human sciences are based on inner experience. Inner
experience is reflexive and implicitly self-aware, but need not be
introspective or explicitly self-conscious. In fact, we often have inner
experiences of the same objects that outer experience is about. An outer
experience of an object focuses on its physical properties; an inner experience
of it on our felt responses to it. A lived experience Erlebnis of it includes
both. The distinction between the natural and the human sciences is also
related to the methodological difference between explanation and understanding.
The natural sciences seek causal explanations of nature connecting the discrete representations of
outer experience through hypothetical generalizations. The human sciences aim
at an understanding Verstehen that articulates the typical structures of life
given in lived experience. Finding lived experience to be inherently connected
and meaningful, Dilthey opposed traditional atomistic and associationist
psychologies and developed a descriptive psychology that Husserl recognized as
anticipating phenomenological psychology. In Ideas 4 Dilthey argued that
descriptive psychology could provide a neutral foundation for the other human
sciences, but in his later hermeneutical writings, which influenced Heidegger
and Hans-Georg Gadamer, he rejected the possibility of a foundational
discipline or method. In the Formation, he asserted that all the human sciences
are interpretive and mutually dependent. Hermeneutically conceived,
understanding is a process of interpreting the “objectifications of life,” the
external expressions of human experience and activity. The understanding of
others is mediated by these common objectifications and not immediately
available through empathy Einfühlung. Moreover, to fully understand myself I
must interpret the expressions of my life just as I interpret the expressions
of others. Whereas the natural sciences aim at ever broader generalizations,
the human sciences place equal weight on understanding individuality and
universality. Dilthey regarded individuals as points of intersection of the
social and cultural systems in which they participate. Any psychological contribution
to understanding human life must be integrated into this more public framework.
Although universal laws of history are rejected, particular human sciences can
establish uniformities limited to specific social and cultural systems. In a
set of sketches 1 supplementing the Formation, Dilthey further developed the
categories of life in relation to the human sciences. After analyzing formal
categories such as the partwhole relation shared by all the sciences, he
distinguished the real categories of the human sciences from those of the
natural sciences. The most important human science categories are value,
purpose, and meaning, but they by no means exhaust the concepts needed to
reflect on the ultimate sense of our existence. Such reflection receives its
fullest expression in a worldview Weltanschauung, such as the worldviews
developed in religion, art, and philosophy. A worldview constitutes an overall
perspective on life that sums up what we know about the world, how we evaluate
it emotionally, and how we respond to it volitionally. Since Dilthey
distinguished three exclusive and recurrent types of worldview naturalism e.g.,
Democritus, Hume, the idealism of freedom e.g., Socrates, Kant, and objective
idealism e.g., Parmenides, Hegel he is
often regarded as a relativist. But Dilthey thought that both the natural and
the human sciences could in their separate ways attain objective truth through
a proper sense of method. Metaphysical formulations of worldviews are relative
only because they attempt an impossible synthesis of all truth. Explicatum --
explanation, an act of making something intelligible or understandable, as when
we explain an event by showing why or how it occurred. Just about anything can
be the object of explanation: a concept, a rule, the meaning of a word, the
point of a chess move, the structure of a novel. However, there are two sorts
of things whose explanation has been intensively discussed in philosophy:
events and human actions. Individual events, say the collapse of a bridge, are usually
explained by specifying their cause: the bridge collapsed because of the
pressure of the flood water and its weakened structure. This is an example of
causal explanation. There usually are indefinitely many causal factors
responsible for the occurrence of an event, and the choice of a particular
factor as “the cause” appears to depend primarily on contextual considerations.
Thus, one explanation of an automobile accident may cite the icy road
condition; another the inexperienced driver; and still another the defective
brakes. Context may determine which of these and other possible explanations is
the appropriate one. These explanations of why an event occurred are sometimes
contrasted with explanations of how an event occurred. A “how” explanation of
an event consists in an informative description of the process that has led to
the occurrence of the event, and such descriptions are likely to involve
descriptions of causal processes. The covering law model is an influential
attempt to represent the general form of such explanations: an explanation of
an event consists in “subsuming,” or “covering,” it under a law. When the
covering law is deterministic, the explanation is thought to take the form of a
deductive argument: a statement the
explanandum describing the event to be
explained is logically derived from the explanans the law together with statements of
antecedent conditions. Thus, we might explain why a given rod expanded by
offering this argument: ‘All metals expand when heated; this rod is metallic
and it was heated; therefore, it expanded’. Such an explanation is called a
deductive-nomological explanation. On the other hand, probabilistic or
statistical laws are thought to yield statistical explanations of individual
events. Thus, the explanation of the contraction of a contagious disease on the
basis of exposure to a patient with the disease may take the form of a
statistical explanation. Details of the statistical model have been a matter of
much controversy. It is sometimes claimed that although explanations, whether
in ordinary life or in the sciences, seldom conform fully to the covering law
model, the model nevertheless represents an ideal that all explanations must
strive to attain. The covering law model, though influential, is not universally
accepted. Human actions are often explained by being “rationalized’ i.e., by citing the agent’s beliefs and
desires and other “intentional” mental states such as emotions, hopes, and
expectations that constitute a reason for doing what was done. You opened the
window because you wanted some fresh air and believed that by opening the
window you could secure this result. It has been a controversial issue whether
such rationalizing explanations are causal; i.e., whether they invoke beliefs
and desires as a cause of the action. Another issue is whether existential
polarity explanation 298 298 these
“rationalizing” explanations must conform to the covering law model, and if so,
what laws might underwrite such explanations.
Refs.: One good source is the
“Prejudices and predilections.” Also the first set of ‘Logic and conversation.”
There is also an essay on the ‘that’ versus the ‘why.’ The H. P. Grice Papers,
BANC.
exportatum – exportation: in
classical logic, the principle that A 8 B / C is logically equivalent to A / B
/ C. 2 The principle A 8 B P C P A P B P C, which relevance logicians hold to
be fallacious when ‘P’ is read as ‘entails’. 3 In discussions of propositional
attitude verbs, the principle that from ‘a Vs that b is an f’ one may infer ‘a
Vs f-hood of b’, where V has its relational transparent sense. For example,
exportation in sense 3 takes one from ‘Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy’ to
‘Ralph believes spyhood of Ortcutt’, wherein ‘Ortcutt’ can now be replaced by a
bound variable to yield ‘Dx Ralph believes spyhood of x’.
exhibitum: Grice: “For one,
I will introduce a pair of not really antonyms: the exhibitive and not the
inhibitive, but the protreptic.” Grice contrasts this with the protrepticum – A
piece of a communicatum is an exhitibum if it is a communication-device for the
emisor to display his psychological attitude. It is protrepticum if the emisor
intends the sendee to entertain a state other than the uptake – i. e. form a
volition to close the door, for how else will he comply with the order in the
imperative modeprotrepticum: the opposite of the exhibitium.
expositum: Grice: “My
preferred term for what Strawson calls the exponible.’ In dialectica, an
exponible proposition is that which needs to be expounded, i.e., elaborated or
explicated in order to make clear their true ‘form,’ as opposed to its mere
‘matter.’ ‘Giorgione is so called because of his size.’ ‘Giorgione is so called
because of his size’ has a misleading ‘matter’ (implicating at least two
forms). It may suggestin a simple predication. In fact, it means, ‘Giorgione is
called ‘Giorgione’ because of his size’. Grice’s examples: “An English pillar
box is called ‘red’ because it is red,” “Grice is called ‘Grice’ because he is
Grice.” “Grice is called ‘Grice’ because his Anglo-Norman ancestors had ‘grey’
in their coat of arms.” “Grice is called ‘Grice’ because his ancestor kept
grice, i. e. pigs.” Another example by Grice: ‘Every man except Strawson is running’,
expounded as ‘Strawson is not running and every man other than Strawson is
running (for Prime Minister)’; and ‘Only Strawson says something true’, uttered
by Grice. Grice claims ‘Only Strawson says something true’ should be expounded (or
explicated, or explciited, or exposed, or provided ‘what is expositum, or the
expositum provided: not only as ‘Strawson says something true and no one other
than Strawson says something true’, but needs an implicated third clause,
‘Grice says something false’ for surely Grice is being self-referentially
ironic. If only Strawson says something true – that proposition can only be
uttered by Strawson. Grice borrowed it from Descartes: “Only Descarets says
something ture.” This last example brings out an important aspect of exponible
propositions, viz., their use in a sophisma. Sophismatic treatises are a common
genre at Oxford in which this or that semantic issue is approached
dialectically (what Grice calls “the Oxonian dialectic”) by its application in
solving a puzzle case. Another important ingredient of an exponible proposition
is its containing a particular term, sometimes called the exponible term
(terminus exponibilis in Occam). Attention on such a term is focused in the
study of the implicaturum of a syncategorematic expression, Note that such an
exponible term could only be expounded in context, not by an explicit
definition. A syncategorematic term that generates an exponible proposition is
one such as: ‘twice’, ‘except’, ‘begins’ and ‘ceases [to eat iron, or ‘beat
your wife,’ to use Grice’s example in “Causal Theory of Perception”]’, and
‘insofar as’ e.g. ‘Strawson insofar as he is rational is risible’. H. P. Grice, “Implicaturum and explicaturum”
expressum: At
one time, Oxford was all about the Croceans! It all changed! The oppositum is
the impressum, or sense-datum. In a functionalist model, you have perceptual
INPUT and behavioural OUTPUT, the expressum. In between, the black box of the
soul. Darwin, Eckman. Drawing a skull
meaning there is danger. cf. impressum. Inside out. Expression of Impressions. As
an empiricist, Grice was into ‘impress.’ But it’s always good to have a
correlatum. Grice liked an abbreviation, especially because he loved
subscripts. So, he starts to analyse the ‘ordinary-language’ philosohper’s
mistake by using a few symbols: there’s the phrase, or utterance, and there’s
the expression, for which Grice uses ‘e’ for a ‘token,’ and ‘E’ for a type. So,
suppose we are considering Hart’s use of ‘carefully.’ ‘Carefully’ would be the
‘expression,’ occurring within an utterance. Surely, since Grice uses ‘expression’
in that way, he also uses to say what Hart is doing, Hart is expressing. Grice
notes that ‘expressing’ may be too strong. Hart is expressing the belief THAT
if you utter an utterance containing the ‘expression’ ‘carefully,’ there is an implicaturum
to the effect that the agent referred to is taking RATIONAL steps towards
something. IRRATIONAL behaviour does not count as ‘careful’ behaviour. Grice
uses the same abbreviations in discussing philosophy as the ‘conceptual
analysis’ of this or that expression. It is all different with Ogden,
Collingwood, and Croce, that Collingwood loved! "Ideas, we may say generally, are
symbols, as serving to express some actual moment or phase of experience and
guiding towards fuller actualization of what is, or seems to be, involved in
its existence or MEANING . That no idea is ever wholly adequate MEANS that the
suggestiveness of experience is inexhaustible" Forsyth, English
Philosophy, 1910, . Thus the significance of sound, the meaning of an utterance
is here identical with the active response to surroundings and with the natural
expression of emotions According to Husserl, the function of expression is only
directly and immediately adapted to what is usually described as the meaning
(Bedeutung) or the sense (Sinn) of the speech or parts of speech. Only because
the meaning associated with a wordsowid expresses something, is that word-sound
called 'expres- sion' (Ideen, p. 256 f). "Between the ,nearnng and the
what is meant, or what it expresses, there exists an essential relation,
because the meaning is the expression of the meant through its own content
(Gehalt) What is meant (dieses Bedeutete) lies in the 'object' of the thought
or speech. We must therefore distinguish these three-Word, Meaning, Object
"1 Geyser, Gp cit p z8 PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a
watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompresso These complexities are
mentioned here to show how vague are most of the terms which are commonly
thought satisfactory in this topic. Such a word as 'understand' is, unless
specially treated, far too vague to serve except provisionally or at levels of
discourse where a real understanding of the matter (in the reference sense) is
not possible. The multiple functions of speech will be classified and discussed
in the following chapter. There it will be seen that the expression of the
speaker's intention is one of the five regular language functions. Grice hated
Austin’s joke, the utteratum, “I use ‘utterance’ only as equivalent to
'utteratum;' for 'utteratio' I use ‘the issue of an utterance,’” so he needed
something for ‘what is said’ in general, not just linguistic, ‘what is
expressed,’ what is explicitly conveyed,’ ex-prĭmo , pressi, pressum, 3, v. a.
premo. express (mostly poet. and in postAug. prose; “freq. in the elder Pliny):
(faber) et ungues exprimet et molles imitabitur aere capillos,” Hor. A. P. 33;
cf.: “alicujus furorem ... verecundiae ruborem,” Plin. 34, 14, 40, § 140:
“expressa in cera ex anulo imago,” Plaut. Ps. 1, 1, 54: “imaginem hominis gypso
e facie ipsa,” Plin. 35, 12, 44, § 153; cf.: “effigiem de signis,” id. ib.:
“optime Herculem Delphis et Alexandrum, etc.,” id. 34, 8, 19, § 66 et saep.:
“vestis stricta et singulos artus exprimens,” exhibiting, showing, Tac. G. 17:
“pulcher aspectu sit athleta, cujus lacertos exercitatio expressit,” has well
developed, made muscular, Quint. 8, 3, 10.
extensionalism: one of the twelve
labours of H. P. Grice -- a family of ontologies and semantic theories
restricted to existent entities. Extensionalist ontology denies that the domain
of any true theory needs to include non-existents, such as fictional,
imaginary, and impossible objects like Pegasus the winged horse or round
squares. Extensionalist semantics reduces meaning and truth to set-theoretical
relations between terms in a language and the existent objects, standardly
spatiotemporal and abstract entities, that belong to the term’s extension. The
extension of a name is the particular existent denoted by the name; the
extension of a predicate is the set of existent objects that have the property
represented by the predicate. The sentence ‘All whales are mammals’ is true in
extensionalist semantics provided there are no whales that are not mammals, no
existent objects in the extension of the predicate ‘whale’ that are not also in
the extension of ‘mammal’. Linguistic contexts are extensional if: i they make
reference only to existent objects; ii they support substitution of
codesignative terms referring to the same thing, or of logically equivalent
propositions, salva veritate without loss of truthvalue; and iii it is
logically valid to existentially quantify conclude that There exists an object
such that . . . etc. objects referred to within the context. Contexts that do
not meet these requirements are intensional, non-extensional, or referentially
opaque. The implications of extensionalism, associated with the work of Frege,
Russell, Quine, and mainstream analytic philosophy, are to limit its
explanations of mind and meaning to existent objects and material-mechanical
properties and relations describable in an exclusively extensional idiom.
Extensionalist semantics must try to analyze away apparent references to nonexistent
objects, or, as in Russell’s extensionalist theory of definite descriptions, to
classify all such predications as false. Extensionalist ontology in the
philosophy of mind must eliminate or reduce propositional attitudes or de dicto
mental states, expressed in an intensional idiom, such as ‘believes that ————’,
‘fears that ————’, and the like, usually in favor of extensional
characterizations of neurophysiological states. Whether extensionalist
philosophy can satisfy these explanatory obligations, as the thesis of
extensionality maintains, is controversial.
stabilitatum – stabilire -- Establishment
– Grice speaks of the Establishment twice. Once re: Gellner: non-Establishment
criticizing the English Establishment. Second: to refute Lewis. Something can
be ‘established’ and not be conventional. “Surely Lewis should know the
Graeco-Roman root of establish to figure that out!” stăbĭlĭo , īvi, ītum (sync.
I.imperf. stabilibat, Enn. Ann. 44), 4, v. a. stabilis, to make firm,
steadfast, or stable; to fix, stay, establish (class.; esp. in the trop.
sense). I. Lit.: semita nulla pedem stabilibat, Enn. ap. Cic. Div. 1, 20, 40
(Ann. v. 44 Vahl.): “eo stabilita magis sunt,” Lucr. 3, 202; cf.: confirmandi
et stabiliendi causā singuli ab infimo solo pedes terrā exculcabantur, * Caes.
B. G. 7, 73: “vineas,” Col. 4, 33, 1: “loligini pedes duo, quibus se velut
ancoris stabiliunt,” Plin. 9, 28, 44, § 83.— II. Trop.: regni stabilita scamna
solumque, Enn. ap. Cic. Div. 1, 48 fin. (Ann. v. 99 Vahl.): “alicui regnum suom,”
Plaut. Am. 1, 1, 39; cf.: libertatem civibus, Att. ap. Cic. Sest. 58, 123: “rem
publicam (opp. evertere),” Cic. Fin. 4, 24, 65; so, “rem publicam,” id. Sest.
68, 143: “leges,” id. Leg. 1, 23, 62: “nisi haec urbs stabilita tuis consiliis
erit,” id. Marcell. 9, 29: “matrimonia firmiter,” id. Rep. 6, 2, 2: pacem,
concordiam, Pseud.-Sall. Rep. Ordin. 1 fin. (p. 267 Gerl.): “res Capuae
stabilitas Romana disciplina,” Liv. 9, 20: “nomen equestre in consulatu
(Cicero),” Plin. 33, 2, 8, § 34: “(aegrum) ad retinendam patientiam,” to
strengthen, fortify him, Gell. 12, 5, 3. While Grice’s play with ‘estaablished’
is in the second metabolical stage of his programme – where ‘means’ applies to
things other than the emissor, surely metaphorically – he is allowing that ‘estabalish’
may be used in the one-off predicament. By drawing a skull, U is establishing a
procedure. Grice notably wants to make ‘established’ a weaker variant of
‘conventional.’ So that x, whatever, may be ‘established’ but not
‘conventional.’ In fact, it can be argued that to establish you have to do it
at least once. Cfr. ‘settled. ‘Greenwich, Conn., settled in 1639.’
‘Established’ Surely it would be obtuse to say that Greenwich, Conn. Was
“conventionalized”.
farquharsonism – Grice enjoyed reading Cook Wilson, and was grateful to A
S L Farquharson for making that possible.
fechner: as a
philosophical psychologist, Grice had to read the boring Fechner! Gustav
Theodor 180187, G. physicist and philosopher whose Elemente der Psychophysik
1860; English translation, 6 inaugurated experimental psychology. Obsessed with
the mindbody problem, Fechner advanced an identity theory in which every object
is both mental and physical, and in support invented psychophysics the “exact science of the functional relations
. . . between mind and body.” Fechner began with the concept of the limen, or
sensory threshold. The absolute threshold is the stimulus strength R, Reiz
needed to create a conscious sensation S, and the relative threshold is the
strength that must be added to a stimulus for a just noticeable difference jnd
to be perceived. E. H. Weber 17951878 had shown that a constant ratio held
between relative threshold and false cause, fallacy of Fechner, Gustav Theodor
304 304 stimulus magnitude, Weber’s
law: DR/R % k. By experimentally determining jnd’s for pairs of stimulus
magnitudes such as weights, Fechner formulated his “functional relation,” S % k
log R, Fechner’s law, an identity equation of mind and matter. Later
psychophysicists replaced it with a power law, R % kSn, where n depends on the
kind of stimulus. The importance of psychophysics to psychology consisted in
its showing that quantification of experience was possible, and its providing a
general paradigm for psychological experimentation in which controlled stimulus
conditions are systematically varied and effects observed. In his later years,
Fechner brought the experimental method to bear on aesthetics Vorschule der
Aesthetik, 1876.
ferguson: a. philosopher. His
main theme was the rise and fall of virtue in individuals and societies. In his
most important work, An Essay on the History of Civil Society Ferguson argues
that human happiness of which virtue is a constituent is found in pursuing
social goods rather than private ends. Ferguson thought that ignoring social
goods not only prevented social progress but led to moral corruption and
political despotism. To support this he used classical texts and travelers’
writings to reconstruct the history of society from “rude nations” through
barbarism to civilization. This allowed him to express his concern for the
danger of corruption inherent in the increasing selfinterest manifested in the
incipient commercial civilization of his day. He attempted to systematize his
moral philosophy in The Principles of Moral and Social Science 1792. J.W.A.
Fermat’s last theorem.
ferrari: essential Italian philosopher.
Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Ferrari," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano,
The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
feuerbach: -- G. materialist
philosopher and critic of religion. He provided the major link between Hegel’s
absolute idealism and such later theories of historical materialism as those of
Marx and other “young or new Hegelians.” Feuerbach was born in Bavaria and
studied theology, first at Heidelberg and then Berlin, where he came under the
philosophical influence of Hegel. He received his doctorate in 1828 and, after
an early publication severely critical of Christianity, retired from official
G. academic life. In the years between 1836 and 1846, he produced some of his
most influential works, which include “Towards a Critique of Hegel’s
Philosophy” 1839, The Essence of Christianity 1841, Principles of the
Philosophy of the Future 1843, and The Essence of Religion 1846. After a brief
collaboration with Marx, he emerged as a popular champion of political
liberalism in the revolutionary period of 1848. During the reaction that
followed, he again left public life and died dependent upon the support of
friends. Feuerbach was pivotal in the intellectual history of the nineteenth
century in several respects. First, after a half-century of metaphysical system
construction by the G. idealists, Feuerbach revived, in a new form, the
original Kantian project of philosophical critique. However, whereas Kant had
tried “to limit reason in order to make room for faith,” Feuerbach sought to
demystify both faith and reason in favor of the concrete and situated existence
of embodied human consciousness. Second, his “method” of “transformatory
criticism” directed, in the first
instance, at Hegel’s philosophical pronouncements was adopted by Marx and has retained its
philosophical appeal. Briefly, it suggested that “Hegel be stood on his feet”
by “inverting” the subject and predicate in Hegel’s idealistic pronouncements.
One should, e.g., rewrite “The individual is a function of the Absolute” as
“The Absolute is a function of the individual.” Third, Feuerbach asserted that
the philosophy of G. idealism was ultimately an extenuation of theology, and
that theology was merely religious consciousness systematized. But since
religion itself proves to be merely a “dream of the human mind,” metaphysics,
theology, and religion can be reduced to “anthropology,” the study of concrete
embodied human consciousness and its cultural products. The philosophical
influence of Feuerbach flows through Marx into virtually all later historical
materialist positions; anticipates the existentialist concern with concrete
embodied human existence; and serves as a paradigm for all later approaches to
religion on the part of the social sciences.
fichte: G. philosopher.
He was a proponent of an uncompromising system of transcendental idealism, the
Wissenschaftslehre, which played a key role in the development of post-Kantian
philosophy. Born in Saxony, Fichte studied at Jena and Leipzig. The writings of
Kant led him to abandon metaphysical determinism and to embrace transcendental
idealism as “the first system of human freedom.” His first book, Versuch einer
Kritik aller Offenbarung “Attempt at a Critique of all Revelations,” 1792,
earned him a reputation as a brilliant exponent of Kantianism, while his early
political writings secured him a reputation as a Jacobin. Inspired by Reinhold,
Jacobi, Maimon, and Schulze, Fichte rejected the “letter” of Kantianism and, in
the lectures and writings he produced at Jena 179499, advanced a new,
rigorously systematic presentation of what he took to be its Ferguson, Adam
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 307 307 “spirit.”
He dispensed with Kant’s things-inthemselves, the original duality of
faculties, and the distinction between the transcendental aesthetic and the
transcendental analytic. By emphasizing the unity of theoretical and practical
reason in a way consistent with “the primacy of practical reason,” Fichte
sought to establish the unity of the critical philosophy as well as of human
experience. In Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre “On the Concept of the
Wissenschaftslehre,” 1794 he explained his conception of philosophy as “the
science of science,” to be presented in a deductive system based on a
self-evident first principle. The basic “foundations” of this system, which
Fichte called Wissenschaftslehre theory of science, were outlined in his
Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre “Foundations of the Entire
Wissenschaftslehre,” 179495 and Grundriß der Eigentümlichen der
Wissenschaftslehre in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen “Outline of the
Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with respect to the Theoretical
Faculty,” 1795 and then, substantially revised, in his lectures on
Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo 179699. The “foundational” portion of the
Wissenschaftslehrelinks our affirmation of freedom to our experience of natural
necessity. Beginning with the former “the I simply posits itself”, it then
demonstrates how a freely self-positing subject must be conscious not only of
itself, but also of “representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity” and
hence of an objective world. Fichte insisted that the essence of selfhood lies
in an active positing of its own self-identity and hence that
self-consciousness is an auto-productive activity: a Tathandlung or “fact/act.”
However, the I can posit itself only as limited; in order for the originally
posited act of “sheer self-positing” to occur, certain other mental acts must
occur as well, acts through which the I posits for itself an objective,
spatiotemporal world, as well as a moral realm of free, rational beings. The I
first posits its own limited condition in the form of “feeling” occasioned by
an inexplicable Anstob or “check” upon its own practical striving, then as a
“sensation,” then as an “intuition” of a thing, and finally as a “concept.” The
distinction between the I and the not-I arises only in these reiterated acts of
self-positing, a complete description of which thus amounts to a “genetic
deduction” of the necessary conditions of experience. Freedom is thereby shown
to be possible only in the context of natural necessity, where it is limited
and finite. At the same time “our freedom is a theoretical determining
principle of our world.” Though it must posit its freedom “absolutely” i.e., schlechthin or “for no reason” a genuinely free agent can exist only as a
finite individual endlessly striving to overcome its own limits. After
establishing its “foundations,” Fichte extended his Wissenschaftslehre into
social and political philosophy and ethics. Subjectivity itself is essentially
intersubjective, inasmuch as one can be empirically conscious of oneself only
as one individual among many and must thus posit the freedom of others in order
to posit one’s own freedom. But for this to occur, the freedom of each
individual must be limited; indeed, “the concept of right or justice Recht is
nothing other than the concept of the coexistence of the freedom of several
rational/sensuous beings.” The Grundlage des Naturrechts “Foundations of
Natural Right,” 179697 examines how individual freedom must be externally
limited if a community of free individuals is to be possible, and demonstrates
that a just political order is a demand of reason itself, since “the concept of
justice or right is a condition of self-consciousness.” “Natural rights” are
thus entirely independent of moral duties. Unlike political philosophy, which
purely concerns the public realm, ethics, which is the subject of Das System
der Sittenlehre “The System of Ethical Theory,” 1798, concerns the inner realm
of conscience. It views objects not as given to consciousness but as produced
by free action, and concerns not what is, but what ought to be. The task of
ethics is to indicate the particular duties that follow from the general
obligation to determine oneself freely the categorical imperative. Before
Fichte could extend the Wissenschaftslehre into the philosophy of religion, he
was accused of atheism and forced to leave Jena. The celebrated controversy
over his alleged atheism the Atheismusstreit was provoked by “Ueber den Grund
unseres Glaubens in einer göttliche Weltregierung” “On the Basis of our Belief
in a Divine Governance of the World,” 1798, in which he sharply distinguished
between philosophical and religious questions. While defending our right to
posit a “moral world order,” Fichte insisted that this order does not require a
personal deity or “moral lawgiver.” After moving to Berlin, Fichte’s first
concern was to rebut the charge of atheism and to reply to the indictment of
philosophy as “nihilism” advanced in Jacobi’s Open Letter to Fichte 1799. This
was the task of Die Bestimmung des Menschen “The Vocation of Man,” 1800. During
the occupation, he delivered Reden an
die deutsche Nation “Addresses to the G. Nation,” 1808, which proposed a
program of national education and attempted to kindle G. patriotism. The other
publications of his Berlin years include a foray into political economy, Der
geschlossene Handelstaat “The Closed Commercial State,” 1800; a speculative
interpretation of human history, Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtiges Zeitalters
“The Characteristics of the Present Age,” 1806; and a mystically tinged
treatise on salvation, Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben “Guide to the Blessed
Life,” 1806. In unpublished private lectures he continued to develop radically
new versions of the Wissenschaftslehre. Fichte’s substantial influence was not
limited to his well-known influence on Schelling and Hegel both of whom
criticized the “subjectivism” of the early Wissenschaftslehre. He is also
important in the history of G. nationalism and profoundly influenced the early
Romantics, especially Novalis and Schlegel. Recent decades have seen renewed
interest in Fichte’s transcendental philosophy, expecially the later,
unpublished versions of the Wissenschaftslehre. This century’s most significant
contribution to Fichte studies, however, is the ongoing publication of the first
critical edition of his complete works.
Italian philosophy. Grice loved it and
could recite an Italian philosopher for each letter of the alphabet, including
the famous Alessandro Speranza, from Milano! Grice: “Of course there is a
longtitudinal unity between Graeco-Roman philosophy and Italian philosophy;
Italian after all IS Latin. I experienced the ‘inglese italianato, diavolo
incarnato’ at Oxford – especially with the ‘aesthetes.’!”
ficino: one of the most
important Italian philosophers, neoplatonic philosopher who played a leading
role in the cultural life of Florence. Ordained a priest in 1473, he hoped to
draw people to Christ by means of Platonism. It was through Ficino’s
translation and commentaries that the works of Plato first became accessible to
the Latin-speaking West, but the impact of Plato’s work was considerably
affected by Ficino’s other interests. He accepted Neoplatonic interpretations
of Plato, including those of Plotinus, whom he tr.; and he saw Plato as the
heir of Hermes Trismegistus, a mythical Egyptian sage and supposed author of
the hermetic corpus, which he tr. early in his career. He embraced the notion
of a prisca theologia, an ancient wisdom that encapsulated philosophic and
religious truth, was handed on to Plato, and was later validated by the
Christian revelation. The most popular of his original works was Three Books on
Life 1489, which contains the fullest Renaissance exposition of a theory of
magic, based mainly on Neoplatonic sources. He postulated a living cosmos in
which the World-Soul is linked to the world-body by spirit. This relationship
is mirrored in man, whose spirit or astral body links his body and soul, and
the resulting correspondence between microcosm and macrocosm allows both man’s
control of natural objects through magic and his ascent to knowledge of God.
Other popular works were his commentary on Plato’s Symposium 1469, which
presents a theory of Platonic love; and his Platonic Theology 1474, in which he
argues for the immortality of the soul. Refs.: Luigi
Speranza, "Grice e Ficino," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The
Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
fictum: in the widest
usage, whatever contrasts with what is a matter of fact. As applied to works of
fiction, however, this is not the appropriate contrast. For a work of fiction,
such as a historical novel, might turn out to be true regarding its historical
subject, without ceasing to be fiction. The correct contrast of fiction is to
non-fiction. If a work of fiction might turn out to be true, how is ‘fiction’
best defined? According to some philosophers, such as Searle, the writer of
nonfiction performs illocutionary speech acts, such as asserting that
such-and-such occurred, whereas the writer of fiction characteristically only
pretends to perform these illocutionary acts. Others hold that the core idea to
which appeal should be made is that of making-believe or imagining certain
states of affairs. Kendall Walton Mimesis as Make-Believe, 0, for instance,
holds that a work of fiction is to be construed in terms of a prop whose
function is to serve in games of make-believe. Both kinds of theory allow for
the possibility that a work of fiction might turn out to be true.
Fidanza: essential Italian
philosopher, b. Bagnorea, Tuscany, he was educated at Paris, earning a master’s
degree in arts and a doctorate in theology. He joined the Franciscans about
1243, while still a student, and was elected minister general of the order in
1257. Made cardinal bishop of Albano by Pope Gregory X in 1274, Bonaventure
helped organize the Second Ecumenical Council of Lyons, during the course of
which he died, in July 1274. He was canonized in 1482 and named a doctor of the
church in 1587. Bonaventure wrote and preached extensively on the relation
between philosophy and theology, the role of reason in spiritual and religious
life, and the extent to which knowledge in God is obtainable by the “wayfarer.”
His basic position is nicely expressed in De reductione artium ad theologiam
“On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology”: “the manifold wisdom of God, which
is clearly revealed in sacred scripture, lies hidden in all knowledge and in
all nature.” He adds, “all divisions of knowledge are handmaids of theology.”
But he is critical of those theologians who wish to sever the connection
between faith and reason. As he argues in another famous work, Itinerarium
mentis ad deum “The Mind’s Journey unto God,” 1259, “since, relative to our
life on earth, the world is itself a ladder for ascending to God, we find here
certain traces, certain images” of the divine hand, in which God himself is
mirrored. Although Bonaventure’s own philosophical outlook is Augustinian, he
was also influenced by Aristotle, whose newly available works he both read and
appreciated. Thus, while upholdBonaventure, Saint Bonaventure, Saint 94 94 ing the Aristotelian ideas that knowledge
of the external world is based on the senses and that the mind comes into
existence as a tabula rasa, he also contends that divine illumination is
necessary to explain both the acquisition of universal concepts from sense
images, and the certainty of intellectual judgment. His own illuminationist
epistemology seeks a middle ground between, on the one hand, those who maintain
that the eternal light is the sole reason for human knowing, providing the
human intellect with its archetypal and intelligible objects, and, on the
other, those holding that the eternal light merely influences human knowing,
helping guide it toward truth. He holds that our intellect has certain knowledge
when stable; eternal archetypes are “contuited by us [a nobis contuita],”
together with intelligible species produced by its own fallible powers. In
metaphysics, Bonaventure defends exemplarism, the doctrine that all creation is
patterned after exemplar causes or ideas in the mind of God. Like Aquinas, but
unlike Duns Scotus, he argues that it is through such ideas that God knows all
creatures. He also adopts the emanationist principle that creation proceeds
from God’s goodness, which is self-diffusive, but differs from other
emanationists, such as al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, in arguing that
divine emanation is neither necessary nor indirect i.e., accomplished by
secondary agents or intelligences. Indeed, he sees the views of these Islamic
philosophers as typical of the errors bound to follow once Aristotelian
rationalism is taken to its extreme. He is also well known for his
anti-Aristotelian argument that the eternity of the world something even Aquinas following Maimonides
concedes as a theoretical possibility is
demonstrably false. Bonaventure also subscribes to several other doctrines
characteristic of medieval Augustinianism: universal hylomorphism, the thesis,
defended by Ibn Gabirol and Avicenna among others, that everything other than God
is composed of matter and form; the plurality of forms, the view that subjects
and predicates in the category of substance are ordered in terms of their
metaphysical priority; and the ontological view of truth, according to which
truth is a kind of rightness perceived by the mind. In a similar vein,
Bonaventure argues that knowledge ultimately consists in perceiving truth
directly, without argument or demonstration. Bonaventure also wrote several
classic works in the tradition of mystical theology. His bestknown and most
popular mystical work is the aforementioned Itinerarium, written in 1259 on a
pilgrimage to La Verna, during which he beheld the six-winged seraph that had
also appeared to Francis of Assisi when Francis received the stigmata. Bonaventure
outlines a seven-stage spiritual journey, in which our mind moves from first
considering God’s traces in the perfections of irrational creatures, to a final
state of peaceful repose, in which our affections are “transferred and
transformed into God.” Central to his writings on spiritual life is the theme
of the “three ways”: the purgative way, inspired by conscience, which expels
sin; the illuminative way, inspired by the intellect, which imitates Christ;
and the unitive way, inspired by wisdom, which unites us to God through love.
Bonaventure’s writings most immediately influenced the work of other medieval
Augustinians, such as Matthew of Aquasparta and John Peckham, and later,
followers of Duns Scotus. But his modern reputation rests on his profound contributions
to philosophical theology, Franciscan spirituality, and mystical thought, in
all three of which he remains an authoritative source. Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Grice e Fidanza," per Il
Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library, Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
campus -- field theory, a
theory that proceeds by assigning values of physical quantities to the points
of space, or of space-time, and then lays down laws relating these values. For
example, a field theory might suppose a value for matter density, or a
temperature for each space-time point, and then relate these values, usually in
terms of differential equations. In these examples there is at least the tacit
assumption of a physical substance that fills the relevant region of
space-time. But no such assumption need be made. For instance, in Ficino,
Marsilio field theory 309 309 Maxwell’s
theory of the electromagnetic field, each point of space-time carries a value
for an electric and a magnetic field, and these values are then governed by Maxwell’s
equations. In general relativity, the geometry e.g., the curvature of
space-time is itself treated as a field, with lawlike connections with the
distribution of energy and matter. Formulation in terms of a field theory
resolves the problem of action at a distance that so exercised Newton and his
contemporaries. We often take causal connection to require spatial contiguity.
That is, for one entity to act causally on another, the two entities need to be
contiguous. But in Newton’s description gravitational attraction acts across
spatial distances. Similarly, in electrostatics the mutual repulsion of
electric charges is described as acting across spatial distances. In the times
of both Newton and Maxwell numerous efforts to understand such action at a
distance in terms of some space-filling mediating substance produced no viable
theory. Field theories resolve the perplexity. By attributing values of
physical quantities directly to the space-time points one can describe
gravitation, electrical and magnetic forces, and other interactions without
action at a distance or any intervening physical medium. One describes the
values of physical quantities, attributed directly to the space-time points, as
influencing only the values at immediately neighboring points. In this way the
influences propagate through space-time, rather than act instantaneously across
distances or through a medium. Of course there is a metaphysical price: on such
a description the space-time points themselves take on the role of a kind of
dematerialized ether. Indeed, some have argued that the pervasive role of field
theory in contemporary physics and the need for space-time points for a
field-theoretic description constitute a strong argument for the existence of
the space-time points. This conclusion contradicts “relationalism,” which
claims that there are only spatiotemporal relations, but no space-time points
or regions thought of as particulars. Quantum field theory appears to take on a
particularly abstract form of field theory, since it associates a quantum
mechanical operator with each space-time point. However, since operators
correspond to physical magnitudes rather than to values of such magnitudes, it
is better to think of the field-theoretic aspect of quantum field theory in terms
of the quantum mechanical amplitudes that it also associates with the
space-time points.
figura: figure-ground,
the discrimination of an object or figure from the context or background
against which it is set. Even when a connected region is grouped together
properly, as in the famous figure that can be seen either as a pair of faces or
as a vase, it is possible to interpret the region alternately as figure and as
ground. This fact was originally elaborated in 1 by Edgar Rubin 6 1.
Figureground effects and the existence of other ambiguous figures such as the
Necker cube and the duck-rabbit challenged the prevailing assumption, Vitters
thought, in classical theories of perception
maintained, e.g., by H. P. Grice and J. S. Mill and H. von
Helmholtz that complex perceptions could
be understood in terms of primitive sensations constituting them. The
underdetermination of perception by the visual stimulus, noted by Berkeley in
his Essay of 1709, takes account of the fact that the retinal image is impoverished
with respect to threedimensional information. Identical stimulation at the
retina can result from radically different distal sources. Within Gestalt
psychology, the Gestalt, or pattern, was recognized to be underdetermined by
constituent parts available in proximal stimuli. M. Wertheimer 03 observed in 2
that apparent motion could be induced by viewing a series of still pictures in
rapid succession. He concluded that perception of the whole, as involving
movement, was fundamentally different from the perception of the static images
of which it is composed. W. Köhler An example of visual reversal from Edgar
Rubin: the object depicted can be seen alternately as a vase or as a pair of
faces. The reversal occurs whether there is a black ground and white figure or
white figure and black ground. figure figure
ground 310 310 77 observed that
there was no figure ground articulation in the retinal image, and concluded
that inherently ambiguous stimuli required some autonomous selective principles
of perceptual organization. As subsequently developed by Gestalt psychologists,
form is taken as the primitive unit of perception. In philosophical treatments,
figureground effects are used to enforce the conclusion that interpretation is
central to perception, and that perceptions are no more than hypotheses based
on sensory data. Refs.: Grice, “You can’t see a knife as a knife,” “The Causal
Theory of Perception,” Vitters on ‘seeing-as’”.
filmer: r. English
political writer who produced, most importantly, the posthumous Patriarcha
1680. It is remembered because Locke attacked it in the first of his Two
Treatises of Government 1690. Filmer argued that God gave complete authority
over the world to Adam, and that from him it descended to his eldest son when
he became the head of the family. Thereafter only fathers directly descended
from Adam could properly be rulers. Just as Adam’s rule was not derived from
the consent of his family, so the king’s inherited authority is not dependent
on popular consent. He rightly makes laws and imposes taxes at his own good
pleasure, though like a good father he has the welfare of his subjects in view.
Filmer’s patriarchalism, intended to bolster the absolute power of the king, is
the classic English statement of the doctrine.
find
play
– where Grice’s implicaturum finds play Strawson Wiggins p. 523
floridi: essential Italian philosopher. He
has explored aspects of Grice’s use of the expression ‘inform,’ ‘mis-inform,’
in terms of ‘factivity.’ Refs.: Luigi Speranza, "Informazione ed implicatura:
Grice e Floridi," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano, The Swimming-Pool Library,
Villa Grice, Liguria, Italia.
fludd: r. English
physician and writer. Influenced by Paracelsus, hermetism, and the cabala,
Fludd defended a Neoplatonic worldview on the eve of its supersession by the
new mechanistic philosophy. He produced improvements in the manufacture of
steel and invented a thermometer, though he also used magnets to cure disease
and devised a salve to be applied to a weapon to cure the wound it had inflicted.
He held that science got its ideas from Scripture allegorically interpreted,
when they were of any value. His works combine theology with an occult,
Neoplatonic reading of the Bible, and contain numerous fine diagrams
illustrating the mutual sympathy of human beings, the natural world, and the
supernatural world, each reflecting the others in parallel harmonic structures.
In controversy with Kepler, Fludd claimed to uncover essential natural
processes rooted in natural sympathies and the operation of God’s light, rather
than merely describing the external movements of the heavens. Creation is the
extension of divine light into matter. Evil arises from a darkness in God, his
failure to will. Matter is uncreated, but this poses no problem for orthodoxy,
since matter is nothing, a mere possibility without the least actuality, not
something Filmer, Robert Fludd, Robert 311
311 coeternal with the Creator.
fodor: j. a. – Griceian
philosophical psychologis from the New World (Old World, originally)t, known
for his energetic and often witty defense of intensional realism, a
computationalrepresentational model of thought, and an atomistic, externalist
theory of content determination for mental states. Fodor’s philosophical
writings fall under three headings. First, he has defended the theory of mind
implicit in contemporary cognitive psychology, that the cognitive mind-brain is
both a representational/computational device and, ultimately, physical. He has
taken on behaviorists Ryle, psychologists in the tradition of J. J. Gibson, and
eliminative materialists P. A. Churchland. Second, he has engaged in various
theoretical disputes within cognitive psychology, arguing for the modularity of
the perceptual and language systems roughly, the view that they are domain-specific,
mandatory, limited-access, innately specified, hardwired, and informationally
encapsulated The Modularity of Mind, 3; for a strong form of nativism that
virtually all of our concepts are innate; and for the existence of a “language
of thought” The Language of Thought, 5. The latter has led him to argue against
connectionism as a psychological theory as opposed to an implementation theory.
Finally, he has defended the views of ordinary propositional attitude
psychology that our mental states 1 are semantically evaluable intentional, 2
have causal powers, and 3 are such that the implicit generalizations of folk
psychology are largely true of them. His defense is twofold. Folk psychology is
unsurpassed in explanatory power; furthermore, it is vindicated by contemporary
cognitive psychology insofar as ordinary propositional attitude states can be
identified with information-processing states, those that consist in a
computational relation to a representation. The representational component of
such states allows us to explain the semantic evaluability of the attitudes;
the computational component, their causal efficacy. Both sorts of accounts
raise difficulties. The first is satisfactory only if supplemented by a
naturalistic account of representational content. Here Fodor has argued for an
atomistic, externalist causal theory Psychosemantics, 7 and against holism the
view that no mental representation has content unless many other non-synonymous
mental representations also have content Holism: A Shopper’s Guide, 2, against
conceptual role theories the view that the content of a representation is determined
by its conceptual role N. Block (who quotes Grice’s Method), B. F. Loar (DPhil
Oxon under Grice’s collaborator G. J. Warnock) and against teleofunctional
theories teleofunctionalism is the view that the content of a representation is
determined, at least in part, by the biological functions of the
representations themselves or systems that produce or use those representations
Ruth Millikan, David Papineau. The second sort is satisfactory only if it does
not imply epiphenomenalism with respect to content properties. To avoid such
epiphenomenalism, Fodor has argued that not only strict laws but also ceteris
paribus laws can be causal. In addition, he has sought to reconcile his
externalism vis-à-vis content with the view that causal efficacy requires an
individualistic individuation of states. Two solutions have been explored: the
supplementation of broad externally determined content with narrow content,
where the latter supervenes on what is “in the head” Psychosemantics, 7, and
its supplementation with modes of presentation identical to sentences of the
language of thought The Elm and the Expert, 5.
Grice’s
folksy psychology:
Grice loved Ramsey, “But Ramsey was born before folk-psychology, so his
‘Theories’ is very dense.”” one sense, a putative network of principles
constituting a commonsense theory that allegedly underlies everyday
explanations of human behavior; the theory assigns a central role to mental
states like belief, desire, and intention. Consider an example of an everyday
commonsense psychological explanation: Jane went to the refrigerator because
she wanted a beer and she believed there was beer in the refrigerator. Like
many such explanations, this adverts to a so-called propositional attitude a mental state, expressed by a verb ‘believe’
plus a that-clause, whose intentional content is propositional. It also adverts
to a mental state, expressed by a verb ‘want’ plus a direct-object phrase,
whose intentional content appears not to be propositional. In another, related
sense, folk psychology is a network of social practices that includes ascribing
such mental states to ourselves and others, and proffering explanations of
human behavior that advert to these states. The two senses need distinguishing
because some philosophers who acknowledge the existence of folk psychology in
the second sense hold that commonsense psychological explanations do not employ
empirical generalizations, and hence that there is no such theory as folk
psychology. Henceforth, ‘FP’ will abbreviate ‘folk psychology’ in the first
sense; the unabbreviated phrase will be used in the second sense. Eliminativism
in philosophy of mind asserts that FP is an empirical theory; that FP is
therefore subject to potential scientific falsification; and that mature
science very probably will establish that FP is so radically false that humans
simply do not undergo mental states like beliefs, desires, and intentions. One
kind of eliminativist argument first sets forth certain methodological
strictures about how FP would have to integrate with mature science in order to
be true e.g., being smoothly reducible to neuroscience, or being absorbed into
mature cognitive science, and then contends that these strictures are unlikely
to be met. Another kind of argument first claims that FP embodies certain
strong empirical commitments e.g., to mental representations with languagelike
syntactic structure, and then contends that such empirical presuppositions are
likely to turn out false. One influential version of folk psychological realism
largely agrees with eliminativism about what is required to vindicate folk
psychology, but also holds that mature science is likely to provide such
vindication. Realists of this persuasion typically argue, for instance, that
mature cognitive science will very likely incorporate FP, and also will very
likely treat beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes as states with
languagelike syntactic structure. Other versions of folkpsychological realism
take issue, in one way or another, with either i the eliminativists’ claims
about FP’s empirical commitments, or ii the eliminativists’ strictures about
how FP must mesh with mature science in order to be true, or both. Concerning
i, for instance, some philosophers maintain that FP per se is not committed to
the existence of languagelike mental representations. If mature cognitive
science turns out not to posit a “language of thought,” they contend, this
would not necessarily show that FP is radically false; instead it might only
show that propositional attitudes are subserved in some other way than via
languagelike representational structures. Concerning ii, some philosophers hold
that FP can be true without being as tightly connected to mature scientific
theories as the eliminativists require. For instance, the demand that the
special sciences be smoothly reducible to the fundamental natural sciences is
widely considered an excessively stringent criterion of intertheoretic
compatibility; so perhaps FP could be true without being smoothly reducible to
neuroscience. Similarly, the demand that FP be directly absorbable into
empirical cognitive science is sometimes considered too stringent as a
criterion either of FP’s truth, or of the soundness of its ontology of beliefs,
desires, and other propositional attitudes, or of the legitimacy of FP-based
explanations of behavior. Perhaps FP is a true theory, and explanatorily
legitimate, even if it is not destined to become a part of science. Even if
FP’s ontological categories are not scientific natural kinds, perhaps its
generalizations are like generalizations about clothing: true, explanatorily
usable, and ontologically sound. No one doubts the existence of hats, coats, or
scarves. No one doubts the truth or explanatory utility of generalizations like
‘Coats made of heavy material tend to keep the body warm in cold weather’, even
though these generalizations are not laws of any science. Yet another approach
to folk psychology, often wedded to realism about beliefs and desires although
sometimes wedded to instrumentalism, maintains that folk psychology does not
employ empirical generalizations, and hence is not a theory at all. One variant
denies that folk psychology employs any generalizations, empirical or
otherwise. Another variant concedes that there are folk-psychological
generalizations, but denies that they are empirical; instead they are held to
be analytic truths, or norms of rationality, or both at once. Advocates of non-theory
views typically regard folk psychology as a hermeneutic, or interpretive,
enterprise. They often claim too that the attribution of propositional
attitudes, and also the proffering and grasping of folk-psychological
explanations, is a matter of imaginatively projecting oneself into another
person’s situation, and then experiencing a kind of empathic understanding, or
Verstehen, of the person’s actions and the motives behind them. A more recent,
hi-tech, formulation of this idea is that the interpreter “runs a cognitive
simulation” of the person whose actions are to be explained. Philosophers who
defend folk-psychological realism, in one or another of the ways just
canvassed, also sometimes employ arguments based on the allegedly
self-stultifying nature of eliminativism. One such argument begins from the
premise that the notion of action is folk-psychological that a behavioral event counts as an action
only if it is caused by propositional attitudes that rationalize it under some
suitable actdescription. If so, and if humans never really undergo
propositional attitudes, then they never really act either. In particular, they
never really assert anything, or argue for anything since asserting and arguing
are species of action. So if eliminativism is true, the argument concludes,
then eliminativists can neither assert it nor argue for it an allegedly intolerable pragmatic paradox.
Eliminativists generally react to such arguments with breathtaking equanimity.
A typical reply is that although our present concept of action might well be
folk-psychological, this does not preclude the possibility of a future
successor concept, purged of any commitment to beliefs and desires, that could
inherit much of the role of our current, folk-psychologically tainted, concept
of action.
fondazione Giovanni Gentile
per gli studi filosofici. The foundation was founded [sic] after Gentile was
murdered. Gentile dedicated his life to philosophy. His interests were broad:
from Roman philosophy to idealism, through Leopardi’s poetics.
fonseca: philosopher and
logician. He entered the Jesuit order in 1548. Apart from a period in Rome, he
lived in Portugal, teaching philosophy and theology at the universities of
Evora and Coimbra and performing various administrative duties for his order.
He was responsible for the idea of a published course on Aristotelian
philosophy, and the resulting series of Coimbra commentaries, the Cursus
Conimbricensis, was widely used in the seventeenth century. His own logic text,
the Institutes of Dialectic 1564, went into many editions. It is a good example
of Renaissance Aristotelianism, with its emphasis on Aristotle’s syllogistic,
but it retains some material on medieval developments, notably consequences,
exponibles, and supposition theory. Fonseca also wrote a commentary on
Aristotle’s Metaphysics published in parts from 1577 on, which contains the
Grecian text, a corrected Latin translation, comments on textual matters, and
an extensive exploration of selected philosophical problems. He cites a wide
range of medieval philosophers, both Christian and Arab, as well as the newly
published Grecian commentators on Aristotle. His own position is sympathetic to
Aquinas, but generally independent. Fonseca is important not so much for any
particular doctrines, though he did hold original views on such matters as
analogy, but for his provision of fully documented, carefully written and
carefully argued books that, along with others in the same tradition, were read
at universities, both Catholic and Protestant, well into the seventeenth
century. He represents what is often called the Second Scholasticism.
fontanelle: writer who
heralded the age of the philosophes. A product of Jesuit education, he was a
versatile freethinker with skeptical inclinations. Dialogues of the Dead 1683
showed off his analytical mind and elegant style. In 1699, he was appointed
secretary of the Academy of Sciences. He composed famous eulogies of
scientists; defended the superiority of modern science over tradition in
Digression on Ancients and Moderns 1688; popularized Copernican astronomy in
Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds 1686
famous for postulating the inhabitation of planets; stigmatized
superstition and credulity in History of Oracles 1687 and The Origin of Fables
1724; promoted Cartesian physics in The Theory of Cartesian Vortices 1752; and
wrote Elements of Infinitesimal Calculus 1727 in the wake of Newton and
Leibniz. J.-L.S. Foot, Philippa b.0, British philosopher who exerted a lasting
influence on the development of moral philosophy in the second half of the
twentieth century. Her persisting, intertwined themes are opposition to all
forms of subjectivism in ethics, the significance of the virtues and vices, and
the connection between morality and rationality. In her earlier papers,
particularly “Moral Beliefs” 8 and “Goodness and Choice” 1, reprinted in
Virtues and Vices 8, she undermines the subjectivist accounts of moral
“judgment” derived from C. L. Stevenson and Hare by arguing for many logical or
conceptual connections between evaluations and the factual statements on which
they must be based. Lately she has developed this kind of thought into the
naturalistic claim that moral evaluations are determined by facts about our
life and our nature, as evaluations of features of plants and animals as good
or defective specimens of their kind are determined by facts about their nature
and their life. Foot’s opposition to subjectivism has remained constant, but
her views on the virtues in relation to rationality have undergone several
changes. In “Moral Beliefs” she relates them to self-interest, maintaining that
a virtue must benefit its possessor; in the subsequently repudiated “Morality
as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives” 2 she went as far as to deny that
there was necessarily anything contrary to reason in being uncharitable or
unjust. In “Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?” Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies, 5 the virtues themselves appear as forms of practical rationality. Her
most recent work, soon to be published as The Grammar of Goodness, preserves
and develops the latter claim and reinstates ancient connections between
virtue, rationality, and happiness.
forcing: a method
introduced by Paul J. Cohen see his Set
Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis 6 to
prove independence results in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF. Cohen proved the
independence of the axiom of choice AC from ZF, and of the continuum hypothesis
CH from ZF ! AC. The consistency of AC with ZF and of CH with ZF ! AC had
previously been proved by Gödel by the method of constructible sets. A model of
ZF consists of layers, with the elements of a set at one layer always belonging
to lower layers. Starting with a model M, Cohen’s method produces an “outer
model” N with no more levels but with more sets at each level whereas Gödel’s
method produces an ‘inner model’ L: much of what will become true in N can be
“forced” from within M. The method is applicable only to hypotheses in the more
“abstract” branches of mathematics infinitary combinatorics, general topology,
measure theory, universal algebra, model theory, etc.; but there it is
ubiquitous. Applications include the proof by Robert M. Solovay of the
consistency of the measurability of all sets of all projective sets with ZF
with ZF ! AC; also the proof by Solovay and Donald A. Martin of the consistency
of Martin’s axiom MA plus the negation of the continuum hypothesis -CH with ZF
! AC. CH implies MA; and of known consequences of CH about half are implied by
MA, about half refutable by MA ! -CH. Numerous simplifications, extensions, and
variants e.g. Boolean-valued models of Cohen’s method have been
introduced.
fordyce: d., philosopher
and educational theorist whose writings were influential in the eighteenth
century. His lectures formed the basis of his Elements of Moral Philosophy,
written originally for The Preceptor 1748, later tr. into G. and , and abridged
for the articles on moral philosophy in the first Encylopaedia Britannica 1771.
Fordyce combines the preacher’s appeal to the heart in the advocacy of virtue
with a moral “scientist’s” appraisal of human psychology. He claims to derive
our duties experimentally from a study of the prerequisites of human happiness.
M.A.St. foreknowledge, divine.
forma: form, in
metaphysics, especially Plato’s and Aristotle’s, the structure or essence of a
thing as contrasted with its matter. Plato’s theory of Forms is a realistic
ontology of universals. In his elenchus, Socrates sought what is common to,
e.g., all chairs. Plato believed there must be an essence or Form
common to everything falling under one concept, which makes anything
what it is. A chair is a chair because it “participates in” the Form of Chair.
The Forms are ideal “patterns,” unchanging, timeless, and perfect. They exist
in a world of their own cf. the Kantian noumenal realm. Plato speaks of them as
self-predicating: the Form of Beauty is perfectly beautiful. This led, as he
realized, to the Third Man argument that there must be an infinite number of
Forms. The only true understanding is of the Forms. This we attain through
anamnesis, “recollection.” 2 Aristotle agreed that forms are closely tied to
intelligibility, but denied their separate existence. Aristotle explains change
and generation through a distinction between the form and matter of substances.
A lump of bronze matter becomes a statue through its being molded into a
certain shape form. In his earlier metaphysics, Aristotle identified primary
substance with the composite of matter and form, e.g. Socrates. Later, he
suggests that primary substance is form
what makes Socrates what he is the form here is his soul. This notion of
forms as essences has obvious similarities with the Platonic view. They became
the “substantial forms” of Scholasticism, accepted until the seventeenth century.
Kant saw form as the a priori aspect of experience. We are presented with
phenomenological “matter,” which has no meaning until the mind imposes some
form upon it. Grice finds the ‘logical’ in ‘logical form’ otiose. “Unless we
contrast it with logical matter.” Refs.: Grice, “Form: logical and other.” A
formal fallacy is an invalid inference pattern that is described in terms of a
formal logic. There are three main cases: 1 an invalid or otherwise
unacceptable argument identified solely by its form or structure, with no
reference to the content of the premises and conclusion such as equivocation or
to other features, generally of a pragmatic character, of the argumentative
discourse such as unsuitability of the argument for the purposes for which it is
given, failure to satisfy inductive standards for acceptable argument, etc.;
the latter conditions of argument evaluation fall into the purview of informal
fallacy; 2 a formal rule of inference, or an argument form, that is not valid
in the logical system on which the evaluation is made, instances of which are
sufficiently frequent, familiar, or deceptive to merit giving a name to the
rule or form; ad 3 an argument that is an instance of a fallacious rule of
inference or of a fallacious argument form and that is not itself valid. The
criterion of satisfactory argument typically taken as relevant in discussing
formal fallacies is validity. In this regard, it is important to observe that
rules of inference and argument forms that are not valid may have instances
which may be another rule or argument form, or may be a specific argument that
are valid. Thus, whereas the argument form i P, Q; therefore R a form that
every argument, including every valid argument, consisting of two premises
shares is not valid, the argument form ii, obtained from i by substituting
P&Q for R, is a valid instance of i: ii P, Q; therefore P&Q. Since ii
is not invalid, ii is not a formal fallacy though it is an instance of i. Thus,
some instances of formally fallacious rules of inference or argument-forms may
be valid and therefore not be formal fallacies. Examples of formal fallacies
follow below, presented according to the system of logic appropriate to the
level of description of the fallacy. There are no standard names for some of the
fallacies listed below. Fallacies of sentential propositional logic. Affirming
the consequent: If p then q; q / , p. ‘If Richard had his nephews murdered,
then Richard was an evil man; Richard was an evil man. Therefore, Richard had
his nephews murdered.’ Denying the antecedent: If p then q; not-p / , not-q.
‘If North was found guilty by the courts, then North committed the crimes
charged of him; North was not found guilty by the courts. Therefore, North did
not commit the crimes charged of him.’ Commutation of conditionals: If p then q
/ , If q then p. ‘If Reagan was a great leader, then so was Thatcher.
Therefore, if Thatcher was a great leader, then so was Reagan.” Improper
transposition: If p then q / , If not-p then not-q. ‘If the nations of the Middle
East disarm, there will be peace in the region. Therefore, if the nations of
the Middle East do not disarm, there will not be peace in the region.’ Improper
disjunctive syllogism affirming one disjunct: p or q; p / ,, not-q. ‘Either
John is an alderman or a ward committeeman; John is an alderman. Therefore,
John is not a ward committeeman.’ This rule of inference would be valid if ‘or’
were interpreted exclusively, where ‘p or EXq’ is true if exactly one
constituent is true and is false otherwise. In standard systems of logic,
however, ‘or’ is interpreted inclusively. Fallacies of syllogistic logic.
Fallacies of distribution where M is the middle term, P is the major term, and
S is the minor term. Undistributed middle term: the middle term is not distributed
in either premise roughly, nothing is said of all members of the class it
designates, as in form, grammatical formal fallacy 316 316 Some P are M ‘Some politicians are
crooks. Some M are S Some crooks are thieves. ,Some S are P. ,Some politicians
are thieves.’ Illicit major undistributed major term: the major term is
distributed in the conclusion but not in the major premise, as in All M are P
‘All radicals are communists. No S are M No socialists are radicals. ,Some S
are ,Some socialists are not not P. communists.’ Illicit minor undistributed
minor term: the minor term is distributed in the conclusion but not in the
minor premise, as in All P are M ‘All neo-Nazis are radicals. All M are S All
radicals are terrorists. ,All S are P. ,All terrorists are neoNazis.’ Fallacies
of negation. Two negative premises exclusive premises: the syllogism has two
negative premises, as in No M are P ‘No racist is just. Some M are not S Some
racists are not police. ,Some S are not P. ,Some police are not just. Illicit negative/affirmative:
the syllogism has a negative premise conclusion but no negative conclusion
premise, as in All M are P ‘All liars are deceivers. Some M are not S Some
liars are not aldermen. ,Some S are P. ,Some aldermen are deceivers.’ and All P
are M ‘All vampires are monsters. All M are S All monsters are creatures. ,Some
S are not P. ,Some creatures are not vampires.’ Fallacy of existential import:
the syllogism has two universal premises and a particular conclusion, as in All
P are M ‘All horses are animals. No S are M No unicorns are animals. ,Some S
are not P. ,Some unicorns are not horses.’ A syllogism can commit more than one
fallacy. For example, the syllogism Some P are M Some M are S ,No S are P
commits the fallacies of undistributed middle, illicit minor, illicit major,
and illicit negative/affirmative. Fallacies of predicate logic. Illicit
quantifier shift: inferring from a universally quantified existential
proposition to an existentially quantified universal proposition, as in Ex Dy
Fxy / , Dy Ex Fxy ‘Everyone is irrational at some time or other /, At some
time, everyone is irrational.’ Some are/some are not unwarranted contrast:
inferring from ‘Some S are P’ that ‘Some S are not P’ or inferring from ‘Some S
are not P’ that ‘Some S are P’, as in Dx Sx & Px / , Dx Sx & -Px ‘Some
people are left-handed / , Some people are not left-handed.’ Illicit
substitution of identicals: where f is an opaque oblique context and a and b
are singular terms, to infer from fa; a = b / , fb, as in ‘The Inspector
believes Hyde is Hyde; Hyde is Jekyll / , The Inspector believes Hyde is
Jekyll.’ Forma gives rise to formalism
(or the formalists), which Grice contrasts with Ryle and Strawson’s informalism
(the informalists). Formalism is described by Grice as the the view that
mathematics concerns manipulations of symbols according to prescribed
structural rules. It is cousin to nominalism, the older and more general
metaphysical view that denies the existence of all abstract objects and is
often contrasted with Platonism, which takes mathematics to be the study of a
special class of non-linguistic, non-mental objects, and intuitionism, which
takes it to be the study of certain mental constructions. In sophisticated
versions, mathematical activity can comprise the study of possible formal
manipulations within a system as well as the manipulations themselves, and the
“symbols” need not be regarded as either linguistic or concrete. Formalism is
often associated with the mathematician formalism formalism 317 317 David Hilbert. But Hilbert held that the
“finitary” part of mathematics, including, for example, simple truths of
arithmetic, describes indubitable facts about real objects and that the “ideal”
objects that feature elsewhere in mathematics are introduced to facilitate
research about the real objects. Hilbert’s formalism is the view that the
foundations of mathematics can be secured by proving the consistency of formal
systems to which mathematical theories are reduced. Gödel’s two incompleteness
theorems establish important limitations on the success of such a project. And
then there’s “formalization,” an abstract representation of a theory that must
satisfy requirements sharper than those imposed on the structure of theories by
the axiomatic-deductive method. That method can be traced back to Euclid’s
Elements. The crucial additional requirement is the regimentation of
inferential steps in proofs: not only do axioms have to be given in advance,
but the rules representing argumentative steps must also be taken from a
predetermined list. To avoid a regress in the definition of proof and to
achieve intersubjectivity on a minimal basis, the rules are to be “formal” or
“mechanical” and must take into account only the form of statements. Thus, to
exclude any ambiguity, a precise and effectively described language is needed
to formalize particular theories. The general kind of requirements was clear to
Aristotle and explicit in Leibniz; but it was only Frege who, in his
Begriffsschrift 1879, presented, in addition to an expressively rich language
with relations and quantifiers, an adequate logical calculus. Indeed, Frege’s
calculus, when restricted to the language of predicate logic, turned out to be
semantically complete. He provided for the first time the means to formalize
mathematical proofs. Frege pursued a clear philosophical aim, namely, to
recognize the “epistemological nature” of theorems. In the introduction to his
Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 3, Frege wrote: “By insisting that the chains of
inference do not have any gaps we succeed in bringing to light every axiom,
assumption, hypothesis or whatever else you want to call it on which a proof
rests; in this way we obtain a basis for judging the epistemological nature of
the theorem.” The Fregean frame was used in the later development of
mathematical logic, in particular, in proof theory. Gödel established through
his incompleteness theorems fundamental limits of formalizations of particular
theories, like the system of Principia Mathematica or axiomatic set theories. The
general notion of formal theory emerged from the subsequent investigations of
Church and Turing clarifying the concept of ‘mechanical procedure’ or
‘algorithm.’ Only then was it possible to state and prove the incompleteness
theorems for all formal theories satisfying certain very basic representability
and derivability conditions. Gödel emphasized repeatedly that these results do
not establish “any bounds for the powers of human reason, but rather for the
potentialities of pure formalism in mathematics.” As Grice notes, to ormalize: narrowly
construed, to formulate a subject as a theory in first-order predicate logic;
broadly construed, to describe the essentials of the subject in some formal
language for which a notion of consequence is defined. For Hilbert, formalizing
mathematics requires at least that there be finite means of checking purported
proofs. The formalists speak of a
‘formal’ language, “but is it a language?” – Grice. formal language: H. P.
Grice, “Bergmann on ideal language versus ordinary language,” a language in
which an expression’s grammaticality and interpretation if any are determined
by precisely defined rules that appeal only to the form or shape of the symbols
that constitute it rather than, for example, to the intention of the speaker.
It is usually understood that the rules are finite and effective so that there
is an algorithm for determining whether an expression is a formula and that the
grammatical expressions are uniquely readable, i.e., they are generated by the
rules in only one way. A paradigm example is the language of firstorder
predicate logic, deriving principally from the Begriffsschrift of Frege. The
grammatical formulas of this language can be delineated by an inductive
definition: 1 a capital letter ‘F’, ‘G’, or ‘H’, with or without a numerical
subscript, folformalism, aesthetic formal language 318 318 lowed by a string of lowercase letters
‘a’, ‘b’, or ‘c’, with or without numerical subscripts, is a formula; 2 if A is
a formula, so is -A; 3 if A and B are formulas, so are A & B, A P B, and A
7 B; 4 if A is a formula and v is a lowercase letter ‘x’, ‘y’, or ‘z’, with or
without numerical subscripts, then DvA' and EvA' are formulas where A' is
obtained by replacing one or more occurrences of some lowercase letter in A
together with its subscripts if any by v; 5 nothing is a formula unless it can
be shown to be one by finitely many applications of the clauses 14. The
definition uses the device of metalinguistic variables: clauses with ‘A’ and
‘B’ are to be regarded as abbreviations of all the clauses that would result by
replacing these letters uniformly by names of expressions. It also uses several
naming conventions: a string of symbols is named by enclosing it within single
quotes and also by replacing each symbol in the string by its name; the symbols
‘7’, ‘‘,’’, ‘&’, ‘P’, ‘-’ are considered names of themselves. The
interpretation of predicate logic is spelled out by a similar inductive
definition of truth in a model. With appropriate conventions and stipulations, alternative
definitions of formulas can be given that make expressions like ‘P 7 Q’ the
names of formulas rather than formulas themselves. On this approach, formulas
need not be written symbols at all and form cannot be identified with shape in
any narrow sense. For Tarski, Carnap, and others a formal language also
included rules of “transformation” specifying when one expression can be
regarded as a consequence of others. Today it is more common to view the
language and its consequence relation as distinct. Formal languages are often
contrasted with natural languages, like English or Swahili. Richard Montague,
however, has tried to show that English is itself a formal language, whose
rules of grammar and interpretation are similar to though much more complex than predicate logic. Then there’s formal learnability theory, the
study of human language learning through explicit formal models typically
employing artifical languages and simplified learning strategies. The
fundamental problem is how a learner is able to arrive at a grammar of a
language on the basis of a finite sample of presented sentences and perhaps
other kinds of information as well. The seminal work is by E. Gold 7, who
showed, roughly, that learnability of certain types of grammars from the Chomsky
hierarchy by an unbiased learner required the presentation of ungrammatical
strings, identified as such, along with grammatical strings. Recent studies
have concentrated on other types of grammar e.g., generative transformational
grammars, modes of presentation, and assumptions about learning strategies in
an attempt to approximate the actual situation more closely. If Strawson and
Ryle are into ‘informal logic,’ Hilbert isn’t. Formal logic, versus ‘material
logic,’ is the science of correct reasoning, going back to Aristotle’s Prior
Analytics, based upon the premise that the validity of an argument is a
function of its structure or logical form. The modern embodiment of formal
logic is symbolic mathematical logic. This is the study of valid inference in
artificial, precisely formulated languages, the grammatical structure of whose
sentences or well-formed formulas is intended to mirror, or be a regimentation
of, the logical forms of their natural language counterparts. These formal
languages can thus be viewed as mathematical models of fragments of natural
language. Like models generally, these models are idealizations, typically
leaving out of account such phenomena as vagueness, ambiguity, and tense. But
the idea underlying symbolic logic is that to the extent that they reflect
certain structural features of natural language arguments, the study of valid
inference in formal languages can yield insight into the workings of those
arguments. The standard course of study for anyone interested in symbolic logic
begins with the classical propositional calculus sentential calculus, or PC.
Here one constructs a theory of valid inference for a formal language built up
from a stock of propositional variables sentence letters and an expressively
complete set of connectives. In the propositional calculus, one is therefore
concerned with arguments whose validity turns upon the presence of two-valued
truth-functional sentence-forming operators on sentences such as classical
negation, conjunction, disjunction, and the like. The next step is the
predicate calculus lower functional calculus, first-order logic, elementary
quantification theory, the study of valid inference in first-order languages.
These are languages built up from an expressively complete set of connectives,
first-order universal or existential quantifiers, individual variables, names,
predicates relational symbols, and perhaps function symbols. Further, and more
specialized, work in symbolic logic might involve looking at fragments of the
language of the propositional or predicate calculus, changing the semantics
that the language is standardly given e.g., by allowing truth-value gaps or
more than two truth-values, further embellishing the language e.g., by adding
modal or other non-truth-functional connectives, or higher-order quantifiers,
or liberalizing the grammar or syntax of the language e.g., by permitting
infinitely long well-formed formulas. In some of these cases, of course,
symbolic logic remains only marginally connected with natural language arguments
as the interest shades off into one in formal languages for their own sake, a
mark of the most advanced work being done in formal logic today. Some philosophers (“me included” – Grice)
speak of “formal semantics,” as opposed to Austin’s informal linguistic
botanising -- the study of the interpretations of formal languages. A formal
language can be defined apart from any interpretation of it. This is done by
specifying a set of its symbols and a set of formation rules that determine
which strings of symbols are grammatical or well formed. When rules of
inference transformation rules are added and/or certain sentences are
designated as axioms a logical system also known as a logistic system is
formed. An interpretation of a formal language is roughly an assignment of
meanings to its symbols and truth conditions to its sentences. Typically a
distinction is made between a standard interpretation of a formal language and
a non-standard interpretation. Consider a formal language in which arithmetic
is formulable. In addition to the symbols of logic variables, quantifiers,
brackets, and connectives, this language will contain ‘0’, ‘!’, ‘•’, and ‘s’. A
standard interpretation of it assigns the set of natural numbers as the domain
of discourse, zero to ‘0’, addition to ‘!’, multiplication to ‘•’, and the
successor function to ‘s’. Other standard interpretations are isomorphic to the
one just given. In particular, standard interpretations are numeral-complete in
that they correlate the numerals one-to-one with the domain elements. A result
due to Gödel and Rosser is that there are universal quantifications xAx that
are not deducible from the Peano axioms if those axioms are consistent even
though each An is provable. The Peano axioms if consistent are true on each
standard interpretation. Thus each An is true on such an interpretation. Thus
xAx is true on such an interpretation since a standard interpretation is
numeral-complete. However, there are non-standard interpretations that do not
correlate the numerals one-to-one with domain elements. On some of these
interpretations each An is true but xAx is false. In constructing and
interpreting a formal language we use a language already known to us, say,
English. English then becomes our metalanguage, which we use to talk about the
formal language, which is our object language. Theorems proven within the
object language must be distinguished from those proven in the metalanguage.
The latter are metatheorems. One goal of a semantical theory of a formal
language is to characterize the consequence relation as expressed in that
language and prove semantical metatheorems about that relation. A sentence S is
said to be a consequence of a set of sentences K provided S is true on every
interpretation on which each sentence in K is true. This notion has to be kept
distinct from the notion of deduction. The latter concept can be defined only
by reference to a logical system associated with a formal language.
Consequence, however, can be characterized independently of a logical system,
as was just done.
foucault: m., philosopher
and historian of thought. Foucault’s earliest writings e.g., Maladie mentale et
personnalité [“Mental Illness and Personality”], 4 focused on psychology and
developed within the frameworks of Marxism and existential phenomenology. He
soon moved beyond these frameworks, in directions suggested by two fundamental
influences: formal mode Foucault, Michel 320
320 history and philosophy of science, as practiced by Bachelard and
especially Canguilhem, and the modernist literature of, e.g., Raymond Roussel,
Bataille, and Maurice Blanchot. In studies of psychiatry Histoire de la folie
[“History of Madness in the Classical Age”], 1, clinical medicine The Birth of
the Clinic, 3, and the social sciences The Order of Things, 6, Foucault
developed an approach to intellectual history, “the archaeology of knowledge,”
that treated systems of thought as “discursive formations” independent of the
beliefs and intentions of individual thinkers. Like Canguilhem’s history of
science and like modernist literature, Foucault’s archaeology displaced the
human subject from the central role it played in the humanism dominant in our
culture since Kant. He reflected on the historical and philosophical
significance of his archaeological method in The Archaeology of Knowledge 9.
Foucault recognized that archaeology provided no account of transitions from
one system to another. Accordingly, he introduced a “genealogical” approach,
which does not replace archaeology but goes beyond it to explain changes in
systems of discourse by connecting them to changes in the non-discursive
practices of social power structures. Foucault’s genealogy admitted the
standard economic, social, and political causes but, in a non-standard,
Nietzschean vein, refused any unified teleological explanatory scheme e.g.,
Whig or Marxist histories. New systems of thought are seen as contingent
products of many small, unrelated causes, not fulfillments of grand historical
designs. Foucault’s geneaological studies emphasize the essential connection of
knowledge and power. Bodies of knowledge are not autonomous intellectual
structures that happen to be employed as Baconian instruments of power. Rather,
precisely as bodies of knowledge, they are tied but not reducible to systems of
social control. This essential connection of power and knowledge reflects
Foucault’s later view that power is not merely repressive but a creative, if
always dangerous, source of positive values. Discipline and Punish 5 showed how
prisons constitute criminals as objects of disciplinary knowledge. The first
volume of the History of Sexuality 6 sketched a project for seeing how, through
modern biological and psychological sciences of sexuality, individuals are
controlled by their own knowledge as self-scrutinizing and self-forming
subjects. The second volume was projected as a study of the origins of the
modern notion of a subject in practices of Christian confession. Foucault wrote
such a study The Confessions of the Flesh but did not publish it because he
decided that a proper understanding of the Christian development required a
comparison with ancient conceptions of the ethical self. This led to two
volumes 4 on Grecian and Roman sexuality: The Use of Pleasure and The Care of
the Self. These final writings make explicit the ethical project that in fact
informs all of Foucault’s work: the liberation of human beings from contingent
conceptual constraints masked as unsurpassable a priori limits and the
adumbration of alternative forms of existence.
Grice’s
foundationalism:
the view that knowledge and epistemic knowledge-relevant justification have a
two-tier structure: some instances of knowledge and justification are
non-inferential, or foundational; and all other instances thereof are
inferential, or non-foundational, in that they derive ultimately from
foundational knowledge or justification. This structural view originates in
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics at least regarding knowledge, receives an
extreme formulation in Descartes’s Meditations, and flourishes, with varying
details, in the works of such twentieth-century philosophers as Russell, C. I.
Lewis, and Chisholm. Versions of foundationalism differ on two main projects: a
the precise explanation of the nature of non-inferential, or foundational,
knowledge and justification, and b the specific explanation of how foundational
knowledge and justification can be transmitted to non-foundational beliefs.
Foundationalism allows for differences on these projects, since it is
essentially a view about the structure of knowledge and epistemic
justification. The question whether knowledge has foundations is essentially
the question whether the sort of justification pertinent to knowledge has a
twotier structure. Some philosophers have construed the former question as
asking whether knowledge depends on beliefs that are certain in some sense
e.g., indubitable or infallible. This construal bears, however, on only one
species of foundationalism: radical foundationalism. Such foundationalism,
represented primarily by Descartes, requires that foundational beliefs be
certain and able to guarantee the certainty of the non-foundational beliefs
they support. Radical foundationalism is currently unpopular for two main
reasons. First, very few, if any, of our perceptual beliefs are certain i.e.,
indubitable; and, second, those of our beliefs that might be candidates for
certainty e.g., the belief that I am thinking lack sufficient substance to
guarantee the certainty of our rich, highly inferential knowledge of the external
world e.g., our knowledge of physics, chemistry, and biology. Contemporary
foundationalists typically endorse modest foundationalism, the view that
non-inferentially justified, foundational beliefs need not possess or provide
certainty and need not deductively support justified non-foundational beliefs.
Foundational beliefs or statements are often called basic beliefs or
statements, but the precise understanding of ‘basic’ here is controversial
among foundationalists. Foundationalists agree, however, in their general
understanding of non-inferentially justified, foundational beliefs as beliefs
whose justification does not derive from other beliefs, although they leave
open whether the causal basis of foundational beliefs includes other beliefs.
Epistemic justification comes in degrees, but for simplicity we can restrict
discussion to justification sufficient for satisfaction of the justification
condition for knowledge; we can also restrict discussion to what it takes for a
belief to have justification, omitting issues of what it takes to show that a
belief has it. Three prominent accounts of non-inferential justification are
available to modest foundationalists: a self-justification, b justification by
non-belief, non-propositional experiences, and c justification by a non-belief
reliable origin of a belief. Proponents of self-justification including, at one
time, Ducasse and Chisholm contend that foundational beliefs can justify
themselves, with no evidential support elsewhere. Proponents of foundational
justification by non-belief experiences shun literal self-justification; they
hold, following C. I. Lewis, that foundational perceptual beliefs can be
justified by non-belief sensory or perceptual experiences e.g., seeming to see
a dictionary that make true, are best explained by, or otherwise support, those
beliefs e.g., the belief that there is, or at least appears to be, a dictionary
here. Proponents of foundational justification by reliable origins find the
basis of non-inferential justification in belief-forming processes e.g.,
perception, memory, introspection that are truth-conducive, i.e., that tend to
produce true rather than false beliefs. This view thus appeals to the
reliability of a belief’s nonbelief origin, whereas the previous view appeals
to the particular sensory or perceptual experiences that correspond to e.g.,
make true or are best explained by a foundational belief. Despite disagreements
over the basis of foundational justification, modest foundationalists typically
agree that foundational justification is characterized by defeasibility, i.e.,
can be defeated, undermined, or overridden by a certain sort of expansion of
one’s evidence or justified beliefs. For instance, your belief that there is a
blue dictionary before you could lose its justification e.g., the justification
from your current perceptual experiences if you acquired new evidence that
there is a blue light shining on the dictionary before you. Foundational
justification, therefore, can vary over time if accompanied by relevant changes
in one’s perceptual evidence. It does not follow, however, that foundational
justification positively depends, i.e., is based, on grounds for denying that
there are defeaters. The relevant dependence can be regarded as negative in
that there need only be an absence of genuine defeaters. Critics of
foundationalism sometimes neglect that latter distinction regarding epistemic
dependence. The second big task for foundationalists is to explain how
justification transmits from foundational beliefs to inferentially justified,
non-foundational beliefs. Radical foundationalists insist, for such
transmission, on entailment relations that guarantee the truth or the certainty
of nonfoundational beliefs. Modest foundationalists are more flexible, allowing
for merely probabilistic inferential connections that transmit justification.
For instance, a modest foundationalist can appeal to explanatory inferential
connections, as when a foundational belief e.g., I seem to feel wet is best
explained for a person by a particular physical-object belief e.g., the belief
that the air conditioner overhead is leaking on me. Various other forms of
probabilistic inference are available to modest foundationalists; and nothing
in principle requires that they restrict foundational beliefs to what one
“seems” to sense or to perceive. The traditional motivation for foundationalism
comes largely from an eliminative regress argument, outlined originally
regarding knowledge in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. The argument, in shortest
form, is that foundationalism is a correct account of the structure of
justification since the alternative accounts all fail. Inferential
justification is justification wherein one belief, B1, is justified on the
basis of another belief, B2. How, if at all, is B2, the supporting belief,
itself justified? Obviously, Aristotle suggests, we cannot have a circle here,
where B2 is justified by B1; nor can we allow the chain of support to extend
endlessly, with no ultimate basis for justification. We cannot, moreover, allow
B2 to remain unjustified, foundationalism foundationalism 322 322 lest it lack what it takes to support
B1. If this is right, the structure of justification does not involve circles,
endless regresses, or unjustified starter-beliefs. That is, this structure is
evidently foundationalist. This is, in skeletal form, the regress argument for
foundationalism. Given appropriate flesh, and due attention to skepticism about
justification, this argument poses a serious challenge to non-foundationalist
accounts of the structure of epistemic justification, such as epistemic
coherentism. More significantly, foundationalism will then show forth as one of
the most compelling accounts of the structure of knowledge and justification.
This explains, at least in part, why foundationalism has been very prominent
historically and is still widely held in contemporary epistemology.
fourier: f.-m.-c. social
theorist and radical critic, often called a utopian socialist. His main works
were The Theory of Universal Unity 1822 and The New Industrial and Societal
World 1829. He argued that since each person has, not an integral soul but only
a partial one, personal integrity is possible only in unity with others.
Fourier thought that all existing societies were antagonistic. Following
Edenism, he believed societies developed through stages of savagery,
patriarchalism, barbarianism, and civilization. He believed this antagonism
could be transcended only in Harmony. It would be based on twelve kinds of
passions. Five were sensual, four affective, and three distributive; and these
in turn encouraged the passion for unity. The basic social unit would be a
phalanx containing 300 400 families about 1,6001,800 people of scientifically
blended characters. As a place of production but also of maximal satisfaction
of the passions of every member, Harmony should make labor attractive and
pleasurable. The main occupations of its members should be gastronomy, opera,
and horticulture. It should also establish a new world of love a form of
polygamy where men and women would be equal in rights. Fourier believed that
phalanxes would attract members of all other social systems, even the less
civilized, and bring about this new world system. Fourier’s vision of
cooperation both in theory and experimental practice influenced some
anarchists, syndicalists, and the cooperationist movement. His radical social
critique was important for the development of political and social thought in
France, Europe, and North America.
frankena: w. philosopher
who wrote a series of influential articles and a text, Ethics 3, which was tr.
into eight languages and remains in use today. Frankena taught at the of Michigan 778, where he and his colleagues
C. L. Stevenson 879, a leading noncognitivist, and Richard Brandt, an important
ethical naturalist, formed for many years one of the most formidable faculties
in moral philosophy in the world. Frankena was known for analytical rigor and
sharp insight, qualities already evident in his first essay, “The Naturalistic
Fallacy” 9, which refuted Moore’s influential claim that ethical naturalism or
any other reductionist ethical theory could be convicted of logical error. At
best, Frankena showed, reductionists could be said to conflate or misidentify
ethical properties with properties of some other kind. Even put this way, such
assertions were question-begging, Frankena argued. Where Moore claimed to see
properties of two different kinds, naturalists and other reductionists claimed
to be able to see only one. Many of Frankena’s most important papers concerned
similarly fundamental issues about value and normative judgment. “Obligation
and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy” 8, for example, is a classic
treatment of the debate between internalism, which holds that motivation is
essential to obligation or to the belief or perception that one is obligated,
and externalism, which holds that motivation is only contingently related to
these. In addition to metaethics, Frankena’s published works ranged broadly
over normative ethical theory, virtue ethics, moral psychology, religious
ethics, moral education, and the philosophy of education. Although relatively
few of his works were devoted exclusively to the area, Frankena was also known
as the preeminent historian of ethics of his day. More usually, Frankena used
the history of ethics as a framework within which to discuss issues of
perennial interest. It was, however, for Ethics, one of the most widely used
and frequently cited philosophical ethics textbooks of the twentieth century,
that Frankena was perhaps best known. Ethics continues to provide an
unparalleled introduction to the subject, as useful in a first undergraduate
course as it is to graduate students and professional philosophers looking for
perspicuous ways to frame issues and categorize alternative solutions. For
example, when in the 0s philosophers came to systematically investigate
normative ethical theories, it was Frankena’s distinction in Ethics between
deontological and teleological theories to which they referred.
frankfurt
school:
a group of philosophers, cultural critics, and social scientists associated
with the Institute for Social Research, which was founded in Frankfurt. Its
prominent members included, among others, the philosophers Horkheimer, Adorno,
and Marcuse, as well as the psychoanalyst Erich Fromm and the literary critic
Walter Benjamin. Habermas is the leading representative of its second
generation. The Frankfurt School is less known for particular theories or
doctrines than for its program of a “critical theory of society.” Critical
theory represents a sophisticated effort to continue Marx’s transformation of
moral philosophy into social and political critique, while rejecting orthodox
Marxism as a dogma. Critical theory is primarily a way of doing philosophy,
integrating the normative aspects of philosophical reflection with the
explanatory achievements of the social sciences. The ultimate goal of its
program is to link theory and practice, to provide insight, and to empower
subjects to change their oppressive circumstances and achieve human
emancipation, a rational society that satisfies human needs and powers. The
first generation of the Frankfurt School went through three phases of
development. The first, lasting from the beginning of the Institute until the
end of the 0s, can be called “interdisciplinary historical materialism” and is
best represented in Horkheimer’s programmatic writings. Horkheimer argued that
a revised version of historical materialism could organize the results of social
research and give it a critical perspective. The second, “critical theory”
phase saw the abandonment of Marxism for a more generalized notion of critique.
However, with the near-victory of the Nazis in the early 0s, Horkheimer and
Adorno entered the third phase of the School, “the critique of instrumental
reason.” In their Dialectic of Enlightenment 1 as well as in Marcuse’s One
Dimensional Man 4, the process of instrumentally dominating nature leads to
dehumanization and the domination of human beings. In their writings after
World War II, Adorno and Horkheimer became increasingly pessimistic, seeing
around them a “totally administered society” and a manipulated, commodity
culture. Horkheimer’s most important essays are from the first phase and focus
on the relation of philosophy and social science. Besides providing a clear
definition and program for critical social science, he proposes that the
normative orientation of philosophy should be combined with the empirical
research in the social sciences. This metaphilosophical orientation
distinguishes a “critical,” as opposed to “traditional,” theory. For example,
such a program demands rethinking the relation of epistemology to the sociology
of science. A critical theory seeks to show how the norm of truth is historical
and practical, without falling into the skepticism or relativism of traditional
sociologies of knowledge such as Mannheim’s. Adorno’s major writings belong
primarily to the second and third phases of the development of the Frankfurt
School. As the possibilities for criticism appeared to him increasingly narrow,
Adorno sought to discover them in aesthetic experience and the mimetic relation
to nature. Adorno’s approach was motivated by his view that modern society is a
“false totality.” His diagnosis of the causes traced this trend back to the
spread of a one-sided, instrumental reason, based on the domination of nature
and other human beings. For this reason, he sought a noninstrumental and
non-dominating relation to nature and to others, and found it in diverse and
fragmentary experiences. Primarily, it is art that preserves this possibility
in contemporary society, since in art there is a possibility of mimesis, or the
“non-identical” relation to the object. Adorno’s influential attempt to avoid
“the logic of identity” gives his posthumous Aesthetic Theory 0 and other later
works a paradoxical character. It was in reaction to the third phase that the
second generation of the Frankfurt School recast the idea of a critical theory.
Habermas argued for a new emphasis on normative foundations as well as a return
to an interdisciplinary research program in the social sciences. After first
developing such a foundation in a theory of cognitive interests technical,
practical, and emancipatory, Habermas turned to a theory of the unavoidable
presuppositions of communicative action and an ethics of discourse. The
potential for emancipatory change lies in communicative, or discursive,
rationality and practices that embody it, such as the democratic public sphere.
Habermas’s analysis of communication seeks to provide norms for non-dominating
relations to others and a broader notion of reason.
liberum
arbitrium -- free:
“ “Free” is one of the trickiest adjectives in English. My favourite is
‘alcohol-free’. And then there’s ‘free logic.”” Free logic, a system of
quantification theory, with or without identity, that allows for non-denoting
singular terms. In classical quantification theory, all singular terms free
variables and individual constants are assigned a denotation in all models. But
this condition appears counterintuitive when such systems are applied to
natural language, where many singular terms seem to be non-denoting ‘Pegasus’,
‘Sherlock Holmes’, and the like. Various solutions of this problem have been
proposed, ranging from Frege’s chosen object theory assign an arbitrary
denotation to each non-denoting singular term to Russell’s description theory
deny singular term status to most expressions used as such in natural language,
and eliminate them from the “logical form” of that language to a weakening of
the quantifiers’ “existential import,” which allows for denotations to be
possible, but not necessarily actual, objects. All these solutions preserve the
structure of classical quantification theory and make adjustments at the level
of application. Free logic is a more radical solution: it allows for legitimate
singular terms to be denotationless, maintains the quantifiers’ existential
import, but modifies both the proof theory and the semantics of first-order
logic. Within proof theory, the main modification consists of eliminating the
rule of existential generalization, which allows one to infer ‘There exists a
flying horse’ from ‘Pegasus is a flying horse’. Within semantics, the main
problem is giving truth conditions for sentences containing non-denoting
singular terms, and there are various ways of accomplishing this. Conventional
semantics assigns truth-values to atomic sentences containing non-denoting
singular terms by convention, and then determines the truth-values of complex
sentences as usual. Outer domain semantics divides the domain of interpretation
into an inner and an outer part, using the inner part as the range of
quantifiers and the outer part to provide for “denotations” for non-denoting
singular terms which are then not literally denotationless, but rather left
without an existing denotation. Supervaluational semantics, when considering a
sentence A, assigns all possible combinations of truth-values to the atomic
components of A containing non-denoting singular terms, evaluates A on the
basis of each of those combinations, and then assigns to A the logical product
of all such evaluations. Thus both ‘Pegasus flies’ and ‘Pegasus does not fly’
turn out truth-valueless, but ‘Pegasus flies or Pegasus does not fly’ turns out
true since whatever truth-value is assigned to its atomic component ‘Pegasus
flies’ the truth-value for the whole sentence is true. A free logic is
inclusive if it allows for the possibility that the range of quantifiers be
empty that there exists nothing at all; it is exclusive otherwise. Then there’s the free rider, a person who
benefits from a social arrangement without bearing an appropriate share of the
burdens of maintaining that arrangement, e.g. one who benefits from government
services without paying one’s taxes that support them. The arrangements from
which a free rider benefits may be either formal or informal. Cooperative
arrangements that permit free riders are likely to be unstable; parties to the
arrangement are unlikely to continue to bear the burdens of maintaining it if
others are able to benefit without doing their part. As a result, it is common
for cooperative arrangements to include mechanisms to discourage free riders,
e.g. legal punishment, or in cases of informal conventions the mere disapproval
of one’s peers. It is a matter of some controversy as to whether it is always
morally wrong to benefit from an arrangement without contributing to its
maintenance. Then there’s the free will problem, the problem of the nature of
free agency and its relation to the origins and conditions of responsible
behavior. For those who contrast ‘free’ with ‘determined’, a central question
is whether humans are free in what they do or determined by external events
beyond their control. A related concern is whether an agent’s responsibility
for an action requires that the agent, the act, or the relevant decision be
free. This, in turn, directs attention to action, motivation, deliberation,
choice, and intention, and to the exact sense, if any, in which our actions are
under our control. Use of ‘free will’ is a matter of traditional nomenclature;
it is debated whether freedom is properly ascribed to the will or the agent, or
to actions, choices, deliberations, etc. Controversy over conditions of
responsible behavior forms the predominant historical and conceptual background
of the free will problem. Most who ascribe moral responsibility acknowledge
some sense in which agents must be free in acting as they do; we are not responsible
for what we were forced to do or were unable to avoid no matter how hard we
tried. But there are differing accounts of moral responsibility and
disagreements about the nature and extent of such practical freedom a notion
also important in Kant. Accordingly, the free will problem centers on these
questions: Does moral responsibility require any sort of practical freedom? If
so, what sort? Are people practically free? Is practical freedom consistent
with the antecedent determination of actions, thoughts, and character? There is
vivid debate about this last question. Consider a woman deliberating about whom
to vote for. From her first-person perspective, she feels free to vote for any
candidate and is convinced that the selection is up to her regardless of prior
influences. But viewing her eventual behavior as a segment of larger natural
and historical processes, many would argue that there are underlying causes
determining her choice. With this contrast of intuitions, any attempt to decide
whether the voter is free depends on the precise meanings associated with terms
like ‘free’, ‘determine’, and ‘up to her’. One thing event, situation
determines another if the latter is a consequence of it, or necessitated by it,
e.g., the voter’s hand movements by her intention. As usually understood,
determinism holds that whatever happens is determined by antecedent conditions,
where determination is standardly conceived as causation by antecedent events
and circumstances. So construed, determinism implies that at any time the
future is already fixed and unique, with no possibility of alternative
development. Logical versions of determinism declare each future event to be
determined by what is already true, specifically, by the truth that it will
occur then. Typical theological variants accept the predestination of all
circumstances and events inasmuch as a divine being knows in advance or even
from eternity that they will obtain. Two elements are common to most
interpretations of ‘free’. First, freedom requires an absence of determination
or certain sorts of determination, and second, one acts and chooses freely only
if these endeavors are, properly speaking, one’s own. From here, accounts
diverge. Some take freedom liberty of indifference or the contingency of
alternative courses of action to be critical. Thus, for the woman deliberating
about which candidate to select, each choice is an open alternative inasmuch as
it is possible but not yet necessitated. Indifference is also construed as
motivational equilibrium, a condition some find essential to the idea that a
free choice must be rational. Others focus on freedom liberty of spontaneity,
where the voter is free if she votes as she chooses or desires, a reading that
reflects the popular equation of freedom with “doing what you want.” Associated
with both analyses is a third by which the woman acts freely if she exercises
her control, implying responsiveness to free rider free will problem 326 326 intent as well as both abilities to
perform an act and to refrain. A fourth view identifies freedom with autonomy,
the voter being autonomous to the extent that her selection is self-determined,
e.g., by her character, deeper self, higher values, or informed reason. Though
distinct, these conceptions are not incompatible, and many accounts of
practical freedom include elements of each. Determinism poses problems if
practical freedom requires contingency alternate possibilities of action.
Incompatibilism maintains that determinism precludes freedom, though
incompatibilists differ whether everything is determined. Those who accept
determinism thereby endorse hard determinism associated with eighteenthcentury
thinkers like d’Holbach and, recently, certain behaviorists, according to which
freedom is an illusion since behavior is brought about by environmental and
genetic factors. Some hard determinists also deny the existence of moral
responsibility. At the opposite extreme, metaphysical libertarianism asserts
that people are free and responsible and, a fortiori, that the past does not
determine a unique future a position
some find enhanced by developments in quantum physics. Among adherents of this
sort of incompatibilism are those who advocate a freedom of indifference by
describing responsible choices as those that are undetermined by antecedent
circumstances Epicureans. To rebut the charge that choices, so construed, are
random and not really one’s “own,” it has been suggested that several elements,
including an agent’s reasons, delimit the range of possibilities and influence
choices without necessitating them a view held by Leibniz and, recently, by
Robert Kane. Libertarians who espouse agency causation, on the other hand,
blend contingency with autonomy in characterizing a free choice as one that is
determined by the agent who, in turn, is not caused to make it a view found in
Carneades and Reid. Unwilling to abandon practical freedom yet unable to
understand how a lack of determination could be either necessary or desirable
for responsibility, many philosophers take practical freedom and responsibility
to be consistent with determinism, thereby endorsing compatibilism. Those who
also accept determinism advocate what James called soft determinism. Its
supporters include some who identify freedom with autonomy the Stoics, Spinoza
and others who champion freedom of spontaneity Hobbes, Locke, Hume. The latter
speak of liberty as the power of doing or refraining from an action according
to what one wills, so that by choosing otherwise one would have done otherwise.
An agent fails to have liberty when constrained, that is, when either prevented
from acting as one chooses or compelled to act in a manner contrary to what one
wills. Extending this model, liberty is also diminished when one is caused to
act in a way one would not otherwise prefer, either to avoid a greater danger
coercion or because there is deliberate interference with the envisioning of
alternatives manipulation. Compatibilists have shown considerable ingenuity in
responding to criticisms that they have ignored freedom of choice or the need
for open alternatives. Some apply the spontaneity, control, or autonomy models
to decisions, so that the voter chooses freely if her decision accords with her
desires, is under her control, or conforms to her higher values, deeper character,
or informed reason. Others challenge the idea that responsibility requires
alternative possibilities of action. The so-called Frankfurt-style cases
developed by Harry G. Frankfurt are situations where an agent acts in accord
with his desires and choices, but because of the presence of a counterfactual
intervener a mechanism that would have
prevented the agent from doing any alternative action had he shown signs of
acting differently the agent could not
have done otherwise. Frankfurt’s intuition is that the agent is as responsible
as he would have been if there were no intervener, and thus that responsible
action does not require alternative possibilities. Critics have challenged the
details of the Frankfurt-style cases in attempting to undermine the appeal of
the intuition. A different compatibilist tactic recognizes the need for open
alternatives and employs versions of the indifference model in describing
practical freedom. Choices are free if they are contingent relative to certain
subsets of circumstances, e.g. those the agent is or claims to be cognizant of,
with the openness of alternatives grounded in what one can choose “for all one
knows.” Opponents of compatibilism charge that since these refinements leave
agents subject to external determination, even by hidden controllers,
compatibilism continues to face an insurmountable challenge. Their objections
are sometimes summarized by the consequence argument so called by Peter van
Inwagen, who has prominently defended it: if everything were determined by
factors beyond one’s control, then one’s acts, choices, and character would
also be beyond one’s control, and consequently, agents would never be free and
there would be nothing free will problem free will problem 327 327 for which they are responsible. Such
reasoning usually employs principles asserting the closure of the practical
modalities ability, control, avoidability, inevitability, etc. under
consequence relations. However, there is a reason to suppose that the sort of
ability and control required by responsibility involve the agent’s sense of
what can be accomplished. Since cognitive states are typically not closed under
consequence, the closure principles underlying the consequence argument are
disputable.
freges
sättigung.
Grice: “I doubt it, because he wasn’t really a philosopher – and neither was
Frege, but Waismann’s porosity may well be a pun on Frege’s saturation!” -- Frege’s
original Sinn. Fregeian saturation. Grice was once at the Bodleian assisting
Austin in his translation of Frege’s Grundlegung – and browsing through the
old-style library fiches, Grice exclaims: “All these essays in German journals
about Fregeian saturation can surely saturate one!’ Austin was not amused. Neben
mathematischen und physikalischen Vorlesungen sowie einer in Philosophie hat
Frege in Jena Vorlesungen in Chemie besucht und in diesem Fach auch an einem
einsemestrigen Praktikum teilgenommen. In seiner wohlbekannten Rede über
Bindung und Sättigung von Ausdrücken klingt davon noch etwas nach.Betrachten wir
nun die Konsequenzen der Fregeschen Auffassung der prädikativen Natur der
Begriffe. Hierfür ist es zunächst erforderlich, abschließend einige
Besonderheiten anzumerken, die daraus folgen, daß auch Begriffsausdrücke
bedeutungsvoll sein sollen. Zunächst hatten wir ja mit Hilfe der Analogie
festgestellt, daß in einem Satz dasjenige, was Begriffsausdrücke bedeuten,
denselben ontologischen Status haben muß wie das, was Eigennamen bedeuten.
Insofern scheinen sowohl Eigennamen als auch Begriffsausdrücke jeweils bestimmte
(wenn auch hinsichtlich ihrer Sättigung oder Bindungsfähigkeit unterschiedene)
Entitäten als Bedeutung zu haben. Und Frege erklärt auch explizit „Begriff ist
Bedeutung eines Prädikates“ [BG, 198]. Frege’s distinction between saturated expressions and
unsaturated expressions corresponds to the distinction between objects and
concepts. A saturated expression refers to an object or argument and has a
complete sense in itself, while an unsaturated expression refers to a concept
or function and does not have a complete sense. For example, in the sentence
“Socrates is the teacher of Plato,” “Socrates” and “Plato” are proper names and
are saturated, while “. . . is the teacher of . . .” is unsaturated, for it has
empty spaces that must
be filled with saturated expressions before it gains a complete sense.
“Statements in general . . . can be imagined to be split up into two parts; one
complete in itself, and the other in need of supplementation, or
‘unsaturated’.” Frege, “Function and Concept,” Philosophical Writings of
Gottlob Frege. -- frege,
G., philosopher. A founder of modern mathematical logic, an advocate of
logicism, and a major source of twentieth-century analytic philosophy, he
directly influenced Russell, Vitters, and Carnap. Frege’s distinction between
the sense and the reference of linguistic expressions continues to be debated.
His first publication in logic was his strikingly original 1879 Begriffsschrift
Concept-notation. Here he devised a formal language whose central innovation is
the quantifier-variable notation to express generality; he set forth in this
language a version of second-order quantificational logic that he used to
develop a logical definition of the ancestral of a relation. Frege invented his
Begriffsschrift in order to circumvent drawbacks of the use of colloquial
language to state proofs. Colloquial language is irregular, unperspicuous, and
ambiguous in its expression of logical relationships. Moreover, logically
crucial features of the content of statements may remain tacit and unspoken. It
is thus impossible to determine exhaustively the premises on which the
conclusion of any proof conducted within ordinary language depends. Frege’s
Begriffsschrift is to force the explicit statement of the logically relevant
features of any assertion. Proofs in the system are limited to what can be
obtained from a body of evidently true logical axioms by means of a small
number of truth-preserving notational manipulations inference rules. Here is
the first hallmark of Frege’s view of logic: his formulation of logic as a
formal system and the ideal of explicitness and rigor that this presentation
subserves. Although the formal exactitude with which he formulates logic makes
possible the metamathematical investigation of formalized theories, he showed
almost no interest in metamathematical questions. He intended the
Begriffsschrift to be used. How though does Frege conceive of the subject
matter of logic? His orientation in logic is shaped by his anti-psychologism,
his conviction that psychology has nothing to do with logic. He took his
notation to be a full-fledged language in its own right. The logical axioms do
not mention objects or properties whose investigation pertains to some special
science; and Frege’s quantifiers are unrestricted. Laws of logic are, as he
says, the laws of truth, and these are the most general truths. He envisioned
the supplementation of the logical vocabulary of the Begriffsschrift with the
basic vocabulary of the special sciences. In this way the Begriffsschrift
affords a framework for the completely rigorous deductive development of any
science whatsoever. This resolutely nonpsychological universalist view of logic
as the most general science is the second hallmark of Frege’s view of logic.
This universalist view distinguishes his approach sharply from the coeval
algebra of logic approach of George Boole and Ernst Schröder. Vitters, both in
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 1 and in later writings, is very critical of
Frege’s universalist view. Logical positivism
most notably Carnap in The Logical Syntax of Language 4 rejected it as well. Frege’s universalist
view is also distinct from more contemporary views. With his view of
quantifiers as intrinsically unrestricted, he saw little point in talking of
varying interpretations of a language, believing that such talk is a confused
way of getting at what is properly said by means of second-order
generalizations. In particular, the semantical conception of logical
consequences that becomes prominent in logic after Kurt Gödel’s and Tarski’s
work is foreign to Frege. Frege’s work in logic was prompted by an inquiry
after the ultimate foundation for arithmetic truths. He criticized J. S. Mill’s
empiricist attempt to ground knowledge of the arithmetic of the positive
integers inductively in our manipulations of small collections of things. He
also rejected crudely formalist views that take pure mathematics to be a sort
of notational game. In contrast to these views and Kant’s, he hoped to use his
Begriffsschrift to define explicitly the basic notions of arithmetic in logical
terms and to deduce the basic principles of arithmetic from logical axioms and
these definitions. The explicitness and rigor of his formulation of logic will
guarantee that there are no implicit extralogical premises on which the
arithmetical conclusions depend. Such proofs, he believed, would show
arithmetic to be analytic, not synthetic as Kant had claimed. However, Frege
redefined ‘analytic’ to mean ‘provable from
logical laws’ in his rather un-Kantian sense of ‘logic’ and definitions.
Frege’s strategy for these proofs rests on an analysis of the concept of
cardinal number that he presented in his nontechnical 4 book, The Foundations
of Arithmetic. Frege, attending to the use of numerals in statements like ‘Mars
has two moons’, argued that it contains an assertion about a concept, that it
asserts that there are exactly two things falling under the concept ‘Martian
moon’. He also noted that both numerals in these statements and those of pure
arithmetic play the logical role of singular terms, his proper names. He
concluded that numbers are objects so that a definition of the concept of
number must then specify what objects numbers are. He observed that 1 the
number of F % the number of G just in case there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the objects that are F and those that are G. The right-hand side of 1
is statable in purely logical terms. As Frege recognized, thanks to the
definition of the ancestral of a relation, 1 suffices in the second-order setting
of the Begriffsschrift for the derivation of elementary arithmetic. The
vindication of his logicism requires, however, the logical definition of the
expression ‘the number of’. He sharply criticized the use in mathematics of any
notion of set or collection that views a set as built up from its elements.
However, he assumed that, corresponding to each concept, there is an object,
the extension of the concept. He took the notion of an extension to be a
logical one, although one to which the notion of a concept is prior. He adopted
as a fundamental logical principle the ill-fated biconditional: the extension
of F % the extension of G just in case every F is G, and vice versa. If this
principle were valid, he could exploit the equivalence relation over concepts
that figures in the right-hand side of 1 to identify the number of F with a
certain extension and thus obtain 1 as a theorem. In The Basic Laws of
Arithmetic vol. 1, 3; vol. 2, 3 he formalized putative proofs of basic
arithmetical laws within a modified version of the Begriffsschrift that
included a generalization of the law of extensions. However, Frege’s law of
extensions, in the context of his logic, is inconsistent, leading to Russell’s
paradox, as Russell communicated to Frege in 2. Frege’s attempt to establish
logicism was thus, on its own terms, unsuccessful. In Begriffsschrift Frege
rejected the thesis that every uncompound sentence is logically segmented into
a subject and a predicate. Subsequently, he said that his approach in logic was
distinctive in starting not from the synthesis of concepts into judgments, but
with the notion of truth and that to which this notion is applicable, the
judgeable contents or thoughts that are expressed by statements. Although he
said that truth is the goal of logic, he did not think that we have a grasp of
the notion of truth that is independent of logic. He eschewed a correspondence
theory of truth, embracing instead a redundancy view of the truth-predicate.
For Frege, to call truth the goal of logic points toward logic’s concern with
inference, with the recognition-of-thetruth judging of one thought on the basis
of the recognition-of-the-truth of another. This recognition-of-the-truth-of is
not verbally expressed by a predicate, but rather in the assertive force with
which a sentence is uttered. The starting point for logic is then reflection on
elementary inference patterns that analyze thoughts and reveal a logical
segmentation in language. This starting point, and the fusion of logical and
ontological categories it engenders, is arguably what Frege is pointing toward
by his enigmatic context principle in Foundations: only in the context of a
sentence does a word have a meaning. He views sentences as having a
function-argument segmentation like that manifest in the terms of arithmetic,
e.g., 3 $ 4 ! 2. Truth-functional inference patterns, like modus ponens,
isolate sentences as logical units in compound sentences. Leibniz’s law the substitution of one name for another in a
sentence on the basis of an equation isolates
proper names. Proper names designate objects. Predicates, obtainable by
removing proper names from sentences, designate concepts. The removal of a
predicate from a sentence leaves a higher level predicate that signifies a
second-level concept under which first-level concepts fall. An example is the
universal quantifier over objects: it designates a second-level concept under
which a first-level concept falls, if every object falls under it. Frege takes
each first-level concept to be determinately true or false of each object.
Vague predicates, like ‘is bald’, thus fail to signify concepts. This
requirement of concept determinacy is a product of Frege’s construal of
quantification over objects as intrinsically unrestricted. Thus, concept
determinacy is simply a form of the law of the excluded middle: for any concept
F and any object x, either x is F or x is not F. Frege elaborates and modifies
his basic logical ideas in three seminal papers from , “Function and Concept,”
“On Concept and Frege, Gottlob Frege, Gottlob 329 329 Object,” and “On Sense and Meaning.” In
“Function and Concept,” Frege sharpens his conception of the function-argument
structure of language. He introduces the two truth-values, the True and the
False, and maintains that sentences are proper names of these objects. Concepts
become functions that map objects to either the True or the False. The
course-of-values of a function is introduced as a generalization of the notion
of an extension. Generally then, an object is anything that might be designated
by a proper name. There is nothing more basic to be said by way of elucidating
what an object is. Similarly, first-level functions are what are designated by
the expressions that result from removing names from compound proper names.
Frege calls functions unsaturated or incomplete, in contrast to objects, which
are saturated. Proper names and function names are not intersubstitutable so
that the distinction between objects and functions is a type-theoretic,
categorial distinction. No function is an object; no function name designates
an object; there are no quantifiers that simultaneously generalize over both
functions and concepts. Just here Frege’s exposition of his views, if not the
views themselves, encounter a difficulty. In explaining his views, he uses
proper names of the form ‘the concept F’ to talk about concepts; and in
contrasting unsaturated functions with saturated objects, apepars to generalize
over both with a single quantifier. Benno Kerry, a contemporary of Frege,
charged Frege’s views with inconsistency. Since the phrase ‘the concept horse’
is a proper name, it must designate an object. On Frege’s view, it follows that
the concept ‘horse’ is not a concept, but an object, an apparent inconsistency.
Frege responded to Kerry’s criticism in “On Concept and Object.” He embraced
Kerry’s paradox, denying that it represents a genuine inconsistency, while
admitting that his remarks about the functionobject distinction are, as the
result of an unavoidable awkwardness of language, misleading. Frege maintained
that the distinction between function and object is logically simple and so
cannot be properly defined. His remarks on the distinction are informal
handwaving designed to elucidate what is captured within the Begriffsschrift by
the difference between proper names and function names together with their
associated distinct quantifiers. Frege’s handling of the function object
distinction is a likely source for Vitters’s sayshow distinction in the
Tractatus. At the beginning of “On Sense and Meaning,” Frege distinguishes
between the reference or meaning Bedeutung of a proper name and its sense Sinn.
He observes that the sentence ‘The Morning Star is identical with the Morning
Star’ is a trivial instance of the principle of identity. In contrast, the
sentence ‘The Morning Star is identical with the Evening Star’ expresses a
substantive astronomical discovery. The two sentences thus differ in what Frege
called their cognitive value: someone who understood both might believe the
first and doubt the second. This difference cannot be explained in terms of any
difference in reference between names in these sentences. Frege explained it in
terms of a difference between the senses expressed by ‘the Morning Star’ and
‘the Evening Star’. In posthumously published writings, he indicated that the
sensereference distinction extends to function names as well. In this
distinction, Frege extends to names the notion of the judgeable content
expressed by a sentence: the sense of a name is the contribution that the name
makes to the thought expressed by sentences in which it occurs. Simultaneously,
in classifying sentences as proper names of truth-values, he applies to
sentences the notion of a name’s referring to something. Frege’s
function-argument view of logical segmentation constrains his view of both the
meaning and the sense of compound names: the substitution for any name
occurring in a compound expression of a name with the same reference sense
yields a new compound expression with the same reference sense as the original.
Frege advances several theses about sense that individually and collectively
have been a source of debate in philosophy of language. First, the sense of an
expression is what is grasped by anyone who understands it. Despite the connection
between understanding and sense, Frege provides no account of synonymy, no
identity criteria for senses. Second, the sense of an expression is not
something psychological. Senses are objective. They exist independently of
anyone’s grasping them; their availability to different thinkers is a
presupposition for communication in science. Third, the sense expressed by a
name is a mode of presentation of the name’s reference. Here Frege’s views
contrast with Russell’s. Corresponding to Frege’s thoughts are Russell’s
propositions. In The Principles of Mathematics 3, Russell maintained that the
meaningful words in a sentence designate things, properties, and relations that
are themselves constituents of the proposition expressed by the sentence. For
Frege, our access through judgment to objects and functions is via Frege,
Gottlob Frege, Gottlob 330 330 the
senses that are expressed by names that mean these items. These senses, not the
items they present, occur in thoughts. Names expressing different senses may refer
to the same item; and some names, while expressing a sense, refer to nothing.
Any compound name containing a name that has a sense, but lacks a reference,
itself lacks a meaning. A person may fully understand an expression without
knowing whether it means anything and without knowing whether it designates
what another understood name does. Fourth, the sense ordinarily expressed by a
name is the reference of the name, when the name occurs in indirect discourse.
Although the Morning Star is identical with the Evening Star, the inference
from the sentence ‘Smith believes that the Morning Star is a planet’ to ‘Smith
believes that the Evening Star is a planet’ is not sound. Frege, however,
accepts Leibniz’s law without restriction. He accordingly takes such seeming
failures of Leibniz’s law to expose a pervasive ambiguity in colloquial
language: names in indirect discourse do not designate what they designate
outside of indirect discourse. The fourth thesis is offered as an explanation
of this ambiguity.
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