H. P. Grice on H. L. A. Hart and F. Waismann

open texture Philosophy of language, philosophy of law A term introduced by Friedrich Waismann in“Verifiability” for an unavoidable feature of empirical terms or statements. An empirical term, no matter how precise its core meaning, faces unlimited uncertainties of meaning when its dominant reference is extended or when it is employed in different contexts. The number of possible conditions in which it may be used is infinite. In the face of such open texture, Waismann concluded that no final verifiability is available for empirical statements. Open texture is the possibility of vagueness, because vagueness arises when a word is actually used in a fluctuating way while open texture exists because there are always possible gaps in determining the meaning of a term. The term is used widely in legal philosophy for the particular cases in which a legal rule, although having a core of settled meaning, is unclear regarding what it prescribes or prohibits. No clean-cut conceptual boundary is provided in these cases, and consequently general legal rules are limited in their capacity to determine decisions and must be supplemented by judicial discretion. H. L. A. Hart took this feature of legal rules as an instrument for the criticism of legal formalism. The notion of an open concept, which is derived from open texture, is a concept that has an incomplete intension and needs to be modified in order to deal with unforeseen situations. It does not admit of a precise definition. The necessary and sufficient conditions of its application are not fixed. An open concept is not a vague concept but is the basis of the possibility of vagueness. Such concepts can be extended or modified, but they cannot be replaced by concepts that are not open. All concepts displaying what Wittgenstein called family resemblance are open concepts. “Open texture, then, is something like possibility of vagueness.” Waismann, in Flew (ed.), Logic and Language (first series)