H. P. Grice on Gilbert Ryle's meta-philosophy

To clarify the nature of philosophy was one of Ryle’s major concerns. Logical positivism had dethroned philosophy from its position of priority regarding the sciences, and Ryle tried to show what is left for philosophy to do. He held that philosophy does not have its own domain and is not concerned with the problem of entities. It is a meta-occupation and an activity with the role of laying bare the logical categories that underlie the surface grammar of our ordinary or scientific language. This is necessary because these logical structures are often hidden or distorted by surface grammar. Philosophy has the function of mapping and comparing the logical geography of concepts and clarifying the connections between concepts. In brief, the task of philosophy is not to discover truth about the world but to rearrange and analyze language in order to reveal its correct logical form or real meaning. It is not an empirical science, but is closely associated with the logic of diverse categories or forms. Ryle’s work was a major example of the linguistic turn taken by English-speaking philosophy in the twentieth century. “Science talks about the world, while philosophy talks about talk about the world.” Ryle, Collected Papers.