H. P. Grice, "Concretum implicatum"

CONCRETUM -- “The standpoint of the concrete other, by contrast, requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional constitution.” Benhabib, in Kittay and Meyers (eds.), Women and Moral Theory -- concreta, see abstracta concrete/abstract, see abstract/concrete concrete concept, another expression for concrete universal concrete essence Modern European philosophy Merleau-Ponty’s term for the meaning or sense of a thing or its non-sensory presence. According to his account of our existential hold on things, a thing is given or acquired through contact. As a consequence, essence can be grasped only through its actualization within the world. Hence essence must be concrete, and pure essence is impossible. This account stands in opposition to Husserl’s notion of essence (eidos). “The concrete essence of the triangle . . . is not an essence of objective ‘properties’, but the formula of an attitude, a certain modality of my hold on the world, a structure.” Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la Perception -- concrete other Ethics, political philosophy In the self–other relationship, a standpoint from which to understand others as concrete, historical, and emotional individuals, with their own needs, capacities, and life plans. Such a view pays attention to the private sphere of life and emphasizes complementary reciprocity in one’s relations with others. In contrast, we treat individuals from the standpoint of the generalized other by dealing with them as abstract and rational entities with a set of rights and duties. According to feminist critics, the standpoint of the generalized other has dominated the history of Western moral and political theory, with the consequence of focusing ethics on the public sphere of justice and ignoring the private sphere of care. Hence, the experience of women has been excluded from the consideration of moral theory. According to these critics, the remedy for this prejudice is to establish a new type of ethics that recognizes the concrete as well as the generalized other. -- concrete universal Metaphysics A term introduced by Hegel to correct the traditional view that a universal is abstract through referring to the common nature of a kind of entity by abstraction. Hegel held that a universal is concrete rather than an abstract form. A true universal is not a mere sum of features common to several things, but is self-particularizing or self-specifying. A universal is not isolated from particulars, nor does it transcend them. Rather it inheres in particulars as their essential determination. Hegel even claimed that particulars are nothing but dialectical relations among universal concepts. Further, a universal concept is not isolated from other universals, but can be derived from them and, hence, is one item in a system. In Hegel’s logic, each category contains its contrary and develops into that contrary. Together, the category and its contrary are synthesized into a third category, which becomes a member of a new triad. The absolute idea is the culmination of this development as the largest concrete universal. “End . . . is the concrete universal, which possesses in its own self the moment of particularity and externality and is therefore active and the urge to repel itself from itself.” Hegel, Science of Logic concretism, another term for reism