H. P. Grice, "Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy"

CONCEPTUM -- concept and object Logic, philosophy of language A distinction based by Frege on an analogy between functional expressions in mathematics and subject-predicate propositions, according to which such propositions can be analyzed in terms of argument and function. Concepts are given through the functional aspect or the predicate part of a proposition. Predicate expressions are concept words. The argument of the function or the subject part of a proposition stands for an individual object. In the subjectpredicate formula, predicates are taken formally, referring not to an individual but to a form or essence. In mathematics, each function is incomplete -- conceptual role theory and contains an empty space to be filled by the argument. Similarly, in propositions a concept is unsaturated, and can be completed by various objects picked out by subject terms. For Frege, this combination of predicate and subject terms to introduce concepts and to pick out objects to complete them is the way that language works. Frege also distinguished between first-order concepts (under which objects fall) and second-order concepts (under which concepts fall) and derived a corresponding distinction between first-order and second-order predicates. Frege claimed that the major fault in the ontological argument for the existence of God is that it treats existence as a first-order concept when it is actually a secondorder concept. The distinction between concepts and objects suggests that predicates correspond to concepts rather than to objects and that the abstract objects expressed by the concept are parasitic upon concrete objects. This position can claim to correct Aristotle’s view that predicates correspond to objects. Aristotle’s ten categories (ten forms of predication) can be regarded as ten kinds of concepts under which concrete objects fall. The notions of concept and object reflect more precisely the roles performed in language by predicates and subjects. But they also create a paradox that “the concept horse” is not a concept, but an object for it is a definite entity that is not incomplete and that can be referred to. This paradox leads Wittgenstein to distinguish formal concepts from ordinary concepts. “The concept (as I understand the word) is predicative. On the other hand, a name of an object, a proper name, is quite incapable of being used as a grammatical predicate.” Frege, Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege -- concepts reflection of -- reflection, see -- conceptual analysis: The activity of attempting to clarify the meanings of concepts or ideas by employing logical devices. It tries to discover what elements a concept is composed of and how these elements are related. It also states the relations between certain concepts and the necessary and sufficient conditions of the application of given concepts. Conceptual analysis is the basis for propositional analysis. Only when we understand the meaning of a word can we employ it in formulating precise questions and thus provide correct solutions. For analytical philosophy, this activity of reaching the understanding of a given concept is vital. In its early period, conceptual analysis was taken as a synonym of philosophy. “So his (i.e., the analytical philosopher’s) selfawarded title of ‘analytical philosopher’ suggests ‘conceptual analysis’ as the favoured description of his favoured activity.” Strawson, Analysis and Metaphysics -- conceptual content, see judgeable content conceptual polarity, another expression for polarrelated concept pair conceptual relativism Metaphysics, epistemology, ethics The claim that truth is relative to a conceptual scheme, and that there are different conceptual schemes in different cultures and traditions. Different people can and sometimes do adopt and use different specific notions of being true, being moral, and being right. Each of these different notions has its own rationality, and there is no common measurement among them. The position does not entail that the fact that one believes something automatically makes it true, but it advocates a pluralist attitude. “Conceptual relativism . . . apparently implies that conceptual variability admits of no rational assessment.” Moser, Philosophy after Objectivity – transcendental -- concepts of the understanding, pure, another Kantian term for categories -- conceptual role theory Philosophy of language, philosophy of mind A semantic theory that claims that the meaning of a linguistic expression is determined by its role in a language or theory. What a person means by an utterance depends on the network of associated beliefs that the person has. There are various ways of understanding the notion of conceptual role, and hence there are a number of versions of the theory. It is called variously the cognitive role theory, the causal role theory, the functional role theory, and the network theory of meaning. The general idea concerns the way an expression associates with other expressions in a language. The theory originated with Wilfrid Sellars and has been developed by Ned Block, Paul Churchland, Devitt, Harman, and Lycan. It criticizes the traditional view that the meaning of an expression involves a word–world relation and argues that the same word can mean a number of different things because it has a number of linguistic roles although it has the same reference. The theory contributes to the understanding of the meaning of some expressions such as logical constants. Applied to mental representations, it suggests that something is a representation and has the content it does in virtue of its cognitive role. Hence one can locate a mental representation in a cognitive network by considering the possible cognitive consequences of occurrences of that mental representation in the system. Its main problem, according to Fodor, is that the conceptual role theory cannot account for truth and reference conditions. Furthermore, an expression that belongs to different languages will be different in meaning and this leads to linguistic relativism. “The meaning of an expression for an individual is a function of the role that expression plays in his internal representational economy – that is, of how it is related to sensory input and behavioural output and of its inferential/computational role within the internal economy. Sparing the niceties, this is the network theory of meaning, otherwise known as the holistic theory or the conceptualrole theory.” Churchland, Neurophilosophy conceptual scheme Metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science A scheme itself has a structure. It contains some basic concepts that can explain anything else, but that are not explained by others. A conceptual scheme, also called a “conceptual framework,” is a network of concepts and propositions by which we organize, describe, and explain our experience. Each discipline has its own conceptual scheme, and it changes along with the development of the science. A conceptual scheme is the backbone of a language. Philosophers such as Aristotle, Kant, and Strawson believe that reality is represented in our conceptual scheme, and to understand what there is we must understand our conceptual scheme. Strawson therefore characterizes descriptive metaphysics as a study of conceptual schemes, believing that it is an instrument of conceptual change and a means of furthering new directions or styles of thought. However, each of these three philosophers believes that at the deepest level human beings all share one common conceptual scheme. Belief in the existence of a global conceptual scheme is in contrast to “conceptual relativism,” which claims that truth is relative to a conceptual scheme, and that there are different conceptual schemes in different cultures and traditions. Davidson claims that although there appear to be many conceptual schemes, if we are to understand an alternative conceptual scheme, we must translate it, at least partially, into our present conceptual scheme. The availability of such a translation suggests that the translated scheme might not be a genuine alternative. “Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures or periods survey the passing scene.” Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation -- conceptualism Metaphysics A theory of universals that claims that universals exist as thoughts or concepts formed by the knowing mind. It is one of the three positions about the nature of universals mentioned in Porphyry’s Introduction to Aristotle’s Categories. The other two are nominalism, which claims that universals are merely common names, and realism, which claims that universals exist in some mindindependent fashion. Conceptualism holds a position midway between realism and nominalism and argues that universals neither exist merely as names nor exist in their own right. A universal is a predicate, but predicates can be truly or falsely predicated of things only because they stand for concepts. As a product of mind, universals can be instantiated by many particulars at the same time. They are mental representations or ideas, conceptualized out of the particular things to which they apply. Their main function is to serve as principles of classification -- “Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made.” Quine, From a Logical Point of View