Why does H. P. Grice change J. O. Urmson's subtle example of the briber who does not mean?

(Urmson)2 There is a range of examples connected with the provision by U (the utterer) of an inducement, or supposed inducement, so that A (the recipient, or audience) shall perform some action. Suppose a prisoner of war to be thought by his captors to possess some information which they want him to reveal; he knows that they want him to give this information. They subject him to torture by applying thumbscrews. The appropriate analysans for "They meant something by applying the thumbscrews (that he should tell them what they wanted to know)" are fulfilled: (I) They applied the thumbscrews with the intention of producing a certain response on the part of the victim; (2) They intended that he should recognize (know, think) that they applied the thumbscrews with the intention of producing this response; (3) They intended that the prisoner's recognition (thought) that they had the intention mentioned in (2) should be at least part of his reason for producing the response mentioned. 2J. 0. Urmson, in conversation. 152 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS If in general to specify in (i) the nature of an intended response is to specify what was meant, it should be correct not only to say that the torturers meant something by applying the thumbscrews, but also to say that they meant that he should (was to) tell them what they wished to know. But in fact one would not wish to say either of these things; only that they meant him to tell. A similar apparent counterexample can be constructed out of a case of bribery (Urmson's original example). A restriction seems to be required, and one which might serve to eliminate this range of counterexamples can be identified from a comparison of the two following examples: (a) I go into a tobacconist's shop, ask for a packet of my favorite cigarettes, and when the unusually suspicious tobacconist shows that he wants to see the color of my money before he hands over the goods, I put down the price of the cigarettes on the counter. Here nothing has been meant. (b) I go to my regular tobacconist (from whom I also purchase other goods) for a packet of my regular brand X, the price of which is distinctive (say 43 cents). I say nothing, but put down 43 cents. The tobacconist recognizes my need, and hands over the packet. Here, I think, by putting down 43 cents I meant something-namely, that I wanted a packet of brand X. I have at the same time provided an inducement. The distinguishing feature of the second example seems to be that here the tobacconist recognized, and was intended to recognize, what he was intended to do from my "utterance" (my putting down the money), whereas in the first example this was not the case. Nor is it the case with respect to the torture example. So one might propose that the analysis of meaning be amended accordingly (Redefinition I): "U meant something by uttering x" is true if: (i) U intended, by uttering x, to induce a certain response inA (2) U intended A to recognize, at least in partfrom the utterance of x, that U intended to produce that response (3) U intended the fulfillment of the intention mentioned in (2) to be at least in part A's reason for fulfilling the intention mentioned in (i). x53 H. P. GRICE While this might cope with this range of counterexamples, there are others for which it is insufficient. (ii) (Stampc, Strawson, Schiffcr)3 (a) (Stampc) A man is playing bridge