H. P. Grice
St. John's, Oxford
H. P. Grice, M. A. Lit. Hum., F. B. A, Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, St. John's, Oxford.
1938. Negation and privation, negation, 1961, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 4-folders 10-11, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: ‘not,’ negation, privation, verificationism, introspection, sense data, sense datum, logical form, unary operator, knowledge, unary functor, incompatibility, Wiggins. For incompatibility, v. Sheffer, A set of five independent postulates for Boolean algebras, with application to logical constants, Trans. American Mathematical Society, vol. 14. Grice starts with Aristotle's ‘apophasis’ in Int.17a25. The Grice was always lured by the potentiality of a joint philosophical endeavour, and he treasured his collaboration with Strawson that was followed by a collaboration with Austin on Categoriae and De Interpretatione. So what does Aristotle say in ‘De interpretatione’? Surely Aristotle could have started by referring to Plato's ‘Parmenides,’ so aptly analysed by Wiggins. Since Aristotle is more of a don than a poet, he has to give ‘not’ a name. He has: '‘ἀπόφασις ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος ἀπό τινος,' a predication of one thing away from another, i.e. negation of it. This is Grice's reflection, in a verificationist vein, of two types of this or that negative utterance. While he uses a souly verb or predicate for one of them, he'll go back to the primacy of 'potching' at a later stage. A pirot potches that the obble is fang. So it is convenient to introduce this or that souly verb. Grice works mainly with two scenarios. Grice’s first scenario concerns a proposition that implies another proposition involving a first-person. The denotatum of the first person perceives that a thing displays this or that sense-datum. Grice’s second scenario concerns a proposition explicitly mentioning the first person, an introspection, both properly in the first-person ‘I’ with which he is obsessed. Let’s consider the different variants. 'I don't hear a noise.’ 'I do not hear a noise.’ The second variant gets 'not' in full, seeing what some philosophers have said about elided ‘not’ not carrying this or that presupposition. For the autophoric scenario we have another set of variants. 'I do not hear that the bell tolls.’ Grice fears that a simple-present form may again trigger the wrong implicatum. Thus Grice provides a variant in the non-Anglo-Saxon continuous tense variant. 'I am not hearing that the bell tolls.’ Grice plays with compendious variants. 'I am not hearing a noise.' Grice’s scenario involving a proposition featuring a sense datum involves a visual sense datum, a colour. It can thus be expanded appropriately with the corresponding sensory modal predicate. 'I do not see that the pillar box is blue.’ With neg-lowering, Grice gets a paradoxical variant. 'I see that the pillar box is not blue.’ This is contrasted with ‘I am not seeing that the pillar box is blue.’ Again with neg-lowered we get a different variant. 'I am seeing that the pillar box is not red.’ With elided subject, alla Russell, and Bradley we get still a different variant. 'That is not blue.' Cf. Ryle on a symposium on Bradley on internal relations pre-dating Grice’s essay. Ryle is, as Grice, invoking Shefferian incompatibility. Ryle was claiming, and rightly so, that the proposition 'This is red' is incompatible with the proposition 'This is not coloured.' Surely, and this is in part Grice’s point, especially when it comes to the visual sense datum scenario, each variant featuring ‘not’ is co-related to some affirmative counterpart. For Grice's introspection case, whose affirmative variants Grice dismisses, we have various affirmative variants. ‘I hear that the bell is tolls.’ Another variant is with the continuous present tense. ‘I am hearing that the bell tolls.’ For Grice's visual sense datum scenario again the variants are multiple. 'I see that the pillar-box is red.’ And the elided form. ‘That is red.’ Grice associates each variant with an explicit (‘hear’) or implicit (‘see’) lower-level psychological or 'souly' state, attitude, or stance, ψ, which may be rendered generally as ‘sensing that’ or ‘perceiving that.’ We have different formulations of the broader ‘communicative’ scenario. For the ‘autophoric’ scenario. By uttering 'I do not hear that the bell tolls,’ the utterer U means that U does not hear that the bell tolls. The utterer’s source, reason, ground, knowledge, or belief, upon which he bases his uttering his utterance is the absence, or absentia, or privatio, or apophasis, verified by introspection, of the co-relative psychological (or souly) state, stance, or attitude, ψ, which Grice links to affirmative counterpart. ‘I hear that the bell is ringing’ does not feature the 'not' operator. Therefore, it is the proposition Grice is interested in using in the analysans of the negative proposition. For the heterophoric visual sense datum scenario, Grice similarly co-relates the explicitly negative 'I do not see that the pillar box is blue,’ or its elided variant, ‘That is not blue,’ with a slightly similar affirmative counterpart featuring a different colour. The utterer’s ground is not an absence, then, now. Grice invokes the affirmative counterpart proposition itself, featuring ‘red,’ 'I see that the pillar box is red' or the elided 'That is red,' which again does not feature 'not’ and which Grice must use for the analysans. By uttering ‘I do not see that the pillar box is blue,’ the utterer U means that he does not see that the pillar box is blue. Grice alleges it is this affirmative proposition which is the source, reason, ground, knowledge or belief for U to utter 'I do not see that the pillar box is blue,’ or, in the elided variant, 'That is not blue.’ U’s ground is that U sees that the pillar box is red. In the ‘hear’ auditory sense-datum scenario, unlike that the visual sense-datum one, Grice feels he needs not appeal to a different experience, involving a different auditory sense datum, or a sub-modal auditory sense datum (‘I do not hear that the bell tolls in Gb’ vs. ‘I do not hear that the bell tolls in Ab.’ Surely 'I hear that the bell is silent' is illogical. Cf. ‘I hear that the bell does not toll.’ Had Grice started with 'I hear that the bell tolls in Gb' or 'I hear that the bell tolls in Ab' might have done. If ‘The pillar box is red’ is imcompatible with ‘The pillar box is blue,’ so is ‘The bell tolls in Gb’ with ‘The bell tolls in Ab.’ In the lack of a different auditory experience on the utterer’s part, Grice bases the negative utterance on the utterer's felt absence, absentia, or privatio, or apophasis of the experience, which is thereby negated. The utterance featuring 'not' is explained by the aid of (or reductively analysed in terms of) an introspection, ultimately related to the utterer's confronted with the absence or privation of an experience involving an auditory sense datum, 'I hear that the bell is tolls' simpliciter. The hetero-phoric utterance involving a 'colour' term denotating a visual sense datum and featuring 'not, on the other hand, 'I do not see that the pillar box is blue,' is thus explained in terms, not of an absence or privation of the same experience, but of a different experience involving a different colour word denotating a different visual sense datum. Grice’s thus yields two analysans. Surely he can do with a single one. There are parallels and ways of generalising, using the generic ‘perceiving that’ or ‘sensing that,’ that allow for a unified account. Each pair of affirmative and negative utterance involves a perceptual experience in different sensory modes ‒ the auditory sensory mode (U's hearing that …) and the visual sensory mode (U's seeing that …), thus generalisable in terms of U's perceiving or sensing, 'I do not sense or sense that the α is φ1,’ vs. the absence of a possible, potential, but not actualised experience, 'I sense that the α is φ1,’ or the presence of the experience involving a different sense datum, 'I perceive or sense that the α is φ2.' As he would later put it in Pirotese, the pirot potches that the obble is not fang, but feng. The keyword then would be what Oxonian philosophers refer to as the philosophy of perception (a lower branch of philosophical psychology) which will prove to be a long-standing interest of Grice's, and his close collaborator G. J. Warnock. The important distinction, as Grice observes, is that, by uttering 'That is not red,' U does not explicitly convey, but merely implies, that he is having the perceptual experience and which he attaches to the agent-based first person. Grice does not expand on ‘communication-function,’ such as the 'informative' vs. 'indicative' distinction of the utterance here, but surely it is pretty easy to find conversational scenarios for any of the two scenarios Grice provides. Cf. 'sight unseen.' By uttering 'I do not hear that the bell tolls,' the U explicitly conveys the perceptual experience attached to the agent-based first person. The ‘auditory’ utterance seems thus like a more natural utterance to receive a direct introspective analysis. Grice must appeal to Scheffer’s incompatibility in terms of the slightly negative-loaded concept of absence, absentia, privation, privation, or apophasis, of a possible, potential, non-actualised experience. Cf. ‘I open the door. I enter the room. I do not see a sight.’ In relying on introspection as a basis for the utterer's knowledge or belief ‒ 'introspective knowledge,' indeed ‒ Grice is being very Oxonian in the best empiricist tradition. Grice's attempt to 'eliminate' 'not' via a reductionist reductive analysis along verificationist empiricist lines succeeds. 'Someone,’ for surely 'I' can always be replaced by the less informative 'someone,' i.e. U, does not see that the pillar box is blue' is based and uttered on the ground that U sees that the pillar box is red. 'Someone, viz. I, does not hear that the bell tolls' is based and uttered on the absence, absentia, privation, privatio, or apophasis of an introspection, or the absence, absentia, privatio, of a possible, potential, but not actualised experience, arrived by introspection and whose content involves the utterer qua ‘perceiver,’ hearing that the bell is tolls, simpliciter, not in Gb or Ab. Meanwhile, at Corpus, Grice is involved in serious philosophical studies under the tutelage of W. F. R. Hardie. While his philosophical socialising is limited, 'having been born on the wrong side of the tracks,’ first at Corpus, and then at Merton, and ending at St. John's, Grice fails to attend the seminal meetings at All Souls held on Thursday evenings by the play group of the seven: J. L. Austin, A. J. Ayer, I. Berlin, S. N. Hampshire, D. MacDermott, D. MacNabb, and A. D. Woozley. Three of them will join Grice in the ‘new’ play group after the war: Austin, Hampshire, and Woozley. But at St. John’s Grice tutors P. F. Strawson, and learns all about the linguistic botany methodology on his return from the navy. Indeed, his being appointed Strawson as his tutee starts a life-long friendship and collaboration. Grice turns back to the topic of 'not' or negation in seminars later at Oxford in the early 1960s ‒ the MS dated 1961 ‒ in connection with Strawson's cursory treatment of 'not' in ‘Introduction to logical theory’ almost a decade earlier. Grice includes 'not’ as, naturally, the first item, qua unary satisfactory-value-functor (unlike this or that dyadic co-ordinate, ‘and,’ ‘or,’ or the dyadic sub-ordinate ‘if’) in his list of vernacular counterparts to this or that 'formal device,' in this case, ~. Cf. 'Smith has not ceased from eating iron,' in ‘Causal theory.’ In the fourth William James lecture, Grice explores a role for negation along the lines of Cook Wilson's Statement and Inference. Grice's 'Vacuous names' contains Gentzen-type syntactic inference rules for both the introduction (+, ~) and the elimination (-, ~) of ‘not’ or negation, and the correlative value assignation. Grice’s motivation is to qualify 'not' with a subscript scope-indicating device on ‘~' for this or that tricky case like 'The climber of Mt. Everest on hands and knees is not to atttend the party in his honour’. The logical form becomes qualified. ~2(Marmaduke Bloggs is coming)1. ~2(Pegasus flies)1. The generic formula is ~2p1, which indicates that ‘p’ is introduced prior to ‘~.’ In the earlier William James lectures he used the square bracket device. The generic formula being ~[p], where ‘[p]’ reads that ‘p’ is assigned common-ground status. Cancelling the implicata of Grice’s variants in ‘Negation’ may be trickier. ‘That is not blue’ or ‘I am not hearing that the bell tolls’ seems trickier to allow for cancellation, but the task is not impossible. ‘I am not hearing that the bell tolls because I don't exist’ or ‘because there is no me’ is illogical. ‘I do not hear that the bell tolls because it is under reparation’ sounds more natural. ‘That is not blue because that does not exist. Cf. Grice on ‘It is an illusion. What is ‘it’?’. Or ‘That is not blue’ because there is no that.’ Neither seem to eliminate ‘not.’ Cf. 'The king of France is not bald because there is no king of France.' In ‘Presupposition,’ the fourth Urbana lecture, Grice uses square brackets for the subscript scope indicating device. 'Do not arrest [the intruder]!', the device meant to assig common-ground status. In ‘Method in philosophical psychology (from the banal to the bizarre),’ Grice plays with the internalisation of a pre-theoretical concept of 'not' within the scope of a psychological or souly predicate, which may well be the ‘perceiving that’ or ‘sensing that’ that he plays with in ‘Negation,’ denotating a psychological state, stance, or attitude ψ. In the Kant lectures on aspects of reasoning, Grice explores 'not' more seriously within the scope of this or that mode operator, as in the buletic utterance, 'Do not do it!', 'Do not arrest the intruder!’ Grice wonders about the logical form, and implicata, of different variants. Grice offers a choice between ‘!~p,’ where ~ follows the mode operator, and ‘~!p’ where ~ has wider scope. Grice also touches on this or that mixed-mode utterance, and in connection with the minor problem of presupposition within the scope of an operator other than the indicative-mode operator ('Smith has not ceased from eating iron,' because Smith does not exist ‒ cf. Hamlet sees that his father is on the rampants, but the sight is not reciprocated' ‒ 'Macbeth sees that Banquo is near him, but his vision is not reciprocated'). He is having in mind R. M. Hare’s defense of non-doxastic utterance. In his commentary in P. G. R. I. C. E., Grice expands on this metaphysical construction routine of Humeian projection with the pre-intuitive concept of negation, specifying the different stages the intuitive concept undergoes until it becomes fully rationally recostructed, as something like a Fregeian sense. Grice gets most serious in the centerpiece of the William James lecture, as he explores applying Cook Wilson's Statement and inference' to assign a role to 'not,’ and succeeds in finding one. The ‘conversational’ role of ‘not’ is explained in terms of the conversational implicatum. By uttering 'Smith has not been to prison yet,' U implies that some utterer has, somewhere, sometime, expressed an opinion to the contrary. This is connected by Grice with the ability a rational creature has to possess to survive. The creature has to be able, as Sheffer had noted, to deny this or that. Grice’s notable case is the negation of a conjunction. So it may well be that the most rational role for ‘not’ is not primary in that it is realised once less primitive operators are introduced. Is there a strict conceptual distinction, as Grice suggests, between ‘negation’ and ‘privation’? If ‘privation’ involves or presupposes negation, one might appeal to something like Modified Occam’s Razor, do not multiply negations beyond necessity. In his choice of examples, Grice seems to be implicating negation for an empirically verifiable, observational utterance, such as 'U does not see that the pillar box is blue' not because U does not exist, but on the basis of U's knowing, believing and indeed seeing that the pillar box is red. This is a ‘negation, proper, or simpliciter. Privation, on the other hand, would be involved in an utterance arrived via introspection, such as 'U does not hear that the bell is ringing' on the basis of his knowing that he is aware of the absence of an experience to that effect. Aristotle, or some later Aristotelian, may have made the same distinction, within ‘apophasis’ between ‘negation’ (‘negatio’) and ‘privation’ (‘privatio’). Or not! Of course, Grice is ultimately looking for the rationale behind the conversational implicatum in terms of a principle of conversational helpfulness underlying his picture of conversation as rational co-operation. To use his pirotological jargon in 'Method,' in Pirotese. There is the Pirot1, who potches that the obble is not fang, but feng. Pirot1 utters ‘p’ explicitly conveying that p. Pirot2 alternatively feels like negating that. By uttering ‘~p’, P2 explicitly conveys that ~p. Pirot1 volunteers to Pirot2, ‘~p’, explicitly conveying that ~p. 'Not raining!' Or ‘No bull. You are safe.’ Surely a rational creature should be capable to deny this or that, as Grice puts it in 'Indicative conditionals.' Interestingly, Grice does not consider (as G. J. M. Gazdar does, under F. R. Palmer) the other possible unitary functors (three in a standard binary assignation of values) – just negation, which reverses the satisfactory-value of the radix or neustic. In terms of systematics, thus, it is convenient to regard Grice’s view on negation (and privation) as his outlook on the operators as this or that procedure by the utterer that endows him with this or that basic expressive, operative power. In this case, the expressive power is specifically related to his proficiency with 'not.’ The proficiency is co-related with this or that device in general, whose vernacular expression will bear a formal counterpart. Many of Grice's comments addressed to this more general topic of this or that satisfactoriness-preserving operator apply to 'not,' and thus raise the question about the explicitum or explicatum of 'not.' A Griceian should not be confused. The fact that Grice does not explicitly mention 'not' or negation when exploring the concept of a generic ‘formal device’ does not mean that what he says about formal device may not be particularised to apply to 'not' or negation. His big concession is that Whitehead and Russell (and Peano before them) are right about the explicitum or explicatum of 'not' being '~.' This is what Grice calls the ‘identity’ thesis to oppose to Strawson’s ‘divergence’ thesis between ‘not’ and ‘~.’ More formally, by uttering 'Not-p,' U explicitly conveys that ~p. Any divergence is explained via the implicatum.' A 'not' utterance is horribly uninformative, and not each of them is of philosophical interest. Grice joked with F. H. Bradley and J. R. Searle's 'The man in the next table is not lighting the cigarette with a twenty-dollar bill,' the denotatum of the subject being a Texas oilman in his country club. The odd implicatum is usually to the effect that someone thought otherwise. In terms of Cook-Wilson, the role of ‘not’ has more to do with the expressive power of a rational creature to deny a molecular or composite utterance such as 'p and q’ Grice comments that in the case of ‘or,’ the ‘not’ may be addressed, conversationally, to the ‘utterability’ of the disjunction. His example involves the logical form ‘Not (p or q)’. It is not the case that Wilson or Heath will be prime minister. There’s always hope for Nabarro or Thorpe. The utterer is, at the level of the implicatum, not now contradicting what his co-conversationalist has utterered. The utterer is certainly not denying that Wilson will be Prime Minister. It is, rather, that the utterer U wishes not to assert or state, say, what his co-conversant has asserted, but, instead, to substitute a different statement or claim which the utterer U regards as preferable under the circumstances. Grice calls this 'substitutive disagreement.' This was a long-standing interest of Grice’s: an earlier manuscript reads ‘Wilson or MacMillan will be prime minister.’ Let's take a closer look at the way Grice initially rephrases his two scenarios involving 'not' as attached to an auditory and a visual sense datum. ‘I do not hear that the bell is ringing' is rationally justified by the absence (absentia) of the experience of hearing it. ‘I do not see that the pillar box is blue' is rationally justified by U's sensing that the pillar box is red. The latter depends on Kant's concept of the synthetic a priori with which Grice tests with his children's playmates. 'Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed!' Can a pillar box be blue and red all over? Cf. Ryle's symposium on negation with Mabbott, for the Aristotelian Society, a source for Grice's reflexion. Ryle later discussing Bradley’s internal relations, reflects that that the proposition, 'This (pillar box is [only] red' is ‘incompatible’ with 'This (pillar box) is [only] blue.' As bearing this or that conversational implicata, Grice’s two scenarios can be re-phrased, unhelpfully, as 'I am unhearing a noise' and 'That is unred.' The apparently unhelpful point bears however some importance. It shows that 'negation' and ‘not’ are not co-extensive. The variants also demonstrate that the implicatum, qua conversational, rather than conventional, is non-detachable. 'Not' is hardly primtive pure Anglo-Saxon. It is the rather convoluted abbreviation of 'ne-aught.’ It’s 'ne' that counts as the proper, pure, amorphous Anglo-Saxon negation, as in a member of parliament (if not a horse) uttering ‘nay.’ Grice's view of conversation as rational co-operation, as displayed in this or that conversational implicatum necessitates that the implicatum is never attached to this or that expression. Here the favoured, but not exclusive expression, is 'not,' since Strawson uses it. But the vernacular provides a wealth of expressive ways to be negative! Grice possibly chose 'negation' not because, as with this or that 'nihilistic philosopher,' such as Schopenhauer, or indeed Parmenids, he finds the concept a key one. But one may well say that this is the Schopenhauerian or the Parmenidesian [sic] in Griceian. Grice is approaching 'not' in linguistic, empiricist, or conceptual key. He is applying the new Oxonian methodology: the reductive analysis in terms of Russell’s logical construction. Grice’s implied priority is with 'by uttering x (by which U explicitly conveys that ~p), U implicitly conveys that q.’ The essay thus elaborates on this implicated 'q.' For the record, 'nihilism’ was coined by philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, while the more primitive ‘negatio' and 'privatio' is each a time-honoured item in the philosophical lexicon, with which mediaeval this or that 'speculative grammarian' is especially obsessed. 'Negatio’ translates Aristotle's 'apophasis,’ and has a pretty pedigreed history. The philosophical lexicon has 'nĕgātĭo,' f. 'negare,' which Lewis and Short, unhelpfully, render as ‘a denying, denial, negation,’ Cicero, Sull. 13, 39: ‘negatio inficiatioque facti,’ id. Part. 29, 102. Lewis and Short go on to add that ‘negatio’ is predicated of to the expression that denies, a negative. Grice would say that Lewis and Short should realise that it’s the utterer who denies. The source Lewis and Short give is App. Dogm. Plat. 3, p. 32, 38. As for Grice's other word, there is 'prīvātĭo,' f. 'privare,' which again unhelpfully, Lewis and Short render as ‘a taking away, privation of a thing.' ‘doloris,’ Cic. Fin. 1, 11, 37, and 38, or ‘pain-free,’ as Grice might prefer, cf. zero-tolerance. Lewis and Short also cite: ‘2, 9, 28: culpæ,’ Gell. 2, 6, 10. The 'negatio'-'privatio' distinction is perhaps not attested in Grecian The Grecians seem to have felt happy with 'ἀπόφασις, '(A),' from 'ἀπόφημι,' which now Liddell and Scott unhepfully render as 'denial, negation,' adding 'opp. κατάφασις,' for which they cites from Plato's Sophista (263e), to give then the definition '‘ἀπόφασις ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος ἀπό τινος,' a predication of one thing away from another, i.e. negation of it, for which they provide the source that Grice is relying. on: Arist. Int.17a25, cf. APo. 72a14; 'ἀπόφασις τινός,' negation, exclusion of a thing, Pl. Cra. 426d; δύο ἀ. ’μίαν κατάφασιν ἀποτελοῦσι‘ Luc. Gall.11. If he was not the first to explore philosophically 'negation,' Grice may be regarded as a philosopher who most explored negation as occurring in a 'that'-clause followed by a 'propositional complexus' that contains ‘~,’ and as applied to a personal agent, in a lower branch of philosophical psychology. It is also the basis for his ‘linguistic’ botany. He seems to be trying to help other philosopher not to fall in the trap of thinking that ‘not’ has a special sense. The utterer means that ~p. In what ways is that to be interpreted? Grice confessed to never been impressed by Ayer. The crudities and dogmatisms seemed too pervasive. Is Grice being an empiricist and a verificationist? Let us go back to 'This is not red' and I am not hearing a noise.' Grice's suggestion is that the ‘incompatible’ fact offering a solution to this problem is the fact that the utterer of 'Someone, viz. I, does not hear that the bell tolls' is indicating (and informing) that U merely entertains the positive (affirmative) proposition, 'Someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls,' without having an attitude of certainty towards it. More generally, Grice is proposing, like F. H. Bradley and indeed B. Bosanquet, who Grice otherwise regards as a ‘minor’ philosopher, a more basic subject-predicate utterance. 'The α is not β.' The utterer states 'I do not know that α is β’ if and only if every present mental or souly process, of mine, has some characteristic incompatible with the knowledge that α is β.' One may propose a doxastic weaker version, replacing the dogmatic Oxonian 'know' with 'believe'. Grice's view of 'compatibility' is an application of the Sheffer stroke that Grice will later use in accounts of 'not'. ~p iff 'p|p' or ~p ≡df p|p. But then, as Grice points out, Sheffer is hardly Griceian. If Pirotese did not contain a unitary negative device, there would be many things that a pirot should be able to express that the pirot should be unable to express unless Pirotese contained some very artificially-looking dyadic functor like one or other of the strokes, or the pirot put himself to a good deal of trouble to find, more or less case by case, complicated forms of expression, as Plato’s Parmenides does, involving such expressions as ‘other than,’ or ‘incompatible with.’ V. Wiggins on Plato’s Parmenides in a Griceian key. Such a ‘complicated’ form of expression would infringe the principle of conversational helpfulness, notably in its desideratum of conversational clarity, or conversational ‘perspicuity [sic],’ where the ‘sic’ is Grice’s seeing that unsensitive Oxonians sometimes mistake ‘perspicuity’ for the allegedly, cognate ‘perspicacity’ (L. perspicacitas, like perspicuitas, from perspicere). Grice finds the unitary brevity of ‘not-p’ attractive. Then there's the pretty Griceian idea of the pregnant proposition. 'I'm not hearing a nose' is pregnant, as Occam has it, with 'I am hearing a nose.’ A scholastic and mediæval philosopher loves to be figurative. Grice's main proposal may be seen as drawing on this or that verificationist assumption by Ayer, who actually has a later essay on 'not' falsely connecting it with falsity. Grice's proposed better analysis would please Ayer, had Grice been brought on the right side of the tracks, since it can be subjected to a process of verification, on the understanding that either perception through the senses ('It is red') or introspection ('Every present mental or souly process of mine ...') is each an empirical phenomenon. But there are subtleties to be drawn. At Oxford, Grice's view on negation will influence philosophers like D. Wiggins, and in a negative way, L. J. Cohen, who raises the Griceian topic of the occurrence of 'negation' in embedded clauses, found by Grice to be crucial for the rational genitorial justification of ‘not’ as a refutation of the composite ‘p and q’), and motivating R. C. S. Walker with a reply (itself countered by Cohen ‒ 'Can the conversationalist hypothesis be defended?). So problems are not absent, as they should not!
1941. Personal identity, Mind, vol. 50, pp. 330-50, repr. in J. R. Perry, Personal identity, University of California Press, Berkeley, David Hume, Hume's quandary about personal identity, Hume on personal identity, Hume's account of personal identity, personal identity, revisited, the logical-construction theory of personal identity, 1977, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 4-folder 12 and Series V (Topical), carton 7-folders 7-9, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: ‘I,’ personal identity, first person, first personal pronoun, Locke, Hume, someone, somebody. If in 'Negation and privation,' Grice tackles Aristotle, he now tackles Locke. Indeed, seeing that Grice went years later to the topic as motivated by, of all people, J. C. Haugeland, rather than perhaps the more ‘academic’ milieu that Perry offers, Grice became obsessed with Hume’s sceptical doubts! Hume writes in the “Appendix” that when he turns his reflection on himself, Hume never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions. Nor can Hume ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. It is the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self, Hume thinks. Hume grants that one can conceive a thinking being to have either many or few perceptions. Suppose, says Hume, the mind to be reduced even below the life of an oyster. Suppose the oyster to have only one perception, as of thirst or hunger. Consider the oyster in that situation. Does the oyster conceive any thing but merely that perception? Has the oyster any notion of, to use Gallie’s pretentious Aristotelian jargon, self or substance? If not, the addition of this or other perception can never give the oyster that notion. The annihilation, which this or that philosopher, including Grice’s first post-war tutee, A. G. N. Flew, supposes to follow upon death, and which entirely destroys the oyster’s self, is nothing but an extinction of all particular perceptions; love and hatred, pain and pleasure, thought and sensation. These therefore must be the same with self; since the one cannot survive the other. Is self the same with substance? If it be, how can that question have place, concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? If they be distinct, what is the difference betwixt them? For his part, Hume claims, he has a notion of neither, when conceived distinct from this or that particular perception. However extraordinary Hume’s conclusion may seem, it need not surprise us. Most philosophers, such as Locke, seems inclined to think, that ‘personal identity’ arises from consciousness. But consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception, Hume suggests. This is Grice’s quandary about personal identity and its implicata. Some philosophers have taken Grice as trying to provide an exegesis of Locke. However, their approaches surely differ. What works for Grice may not work for Locke. For Grice it is analytically true that it is not the case that Person1 and Person may have the same experience. Grice explicitly states that he thinks that his logical-construction theory is a modification of Locke's theory. Grice does not seem terribly interested to find why it may not, even if the York-based Locke Society might! Rather than introjecting into Locke's shoes, Grice's strategy seems to dismiss Locke, shoes and all. Specifically, it not clear to Grice what Locke's answer in the 'Essay' would be to Grice's question about this or that 'I' utterance that he sets his analysis with. Admittedly, Grice does quote, albeit briefly, directly from Locke’s 'Essay.' As far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action, Locke claims, so far the being is the same personal self. Grice tackles Locke’s claim with four objections. These are important to consider since Grice sees as improving on Locke. A first objection concerns icircularity, with which Grice easily disposes by following Hume and appealing to the experience of memory or introspection. A second objection is Reid's alleged counterexample about the long-term memory of the admiral who cannot remember that he was flogged as a boy. Grice dismisses this as involving too long-term of a memory. A third objection concerns Locke’s vagueness about the 'aboutness' of 'consciousness,’ a point made by Hume in the ‘Appendix.’ A fourth objection concerns again circularity, this time in Locke's use of 'same' in the definiens ‒ cf. Wiggins, 'Sameness and substance.' It’s extraordinary that Wiggins is philosophising on anything Griceian. Grice is concerned with the implicatum involved in the use of the first person singular. 'I will be fighting soon.’ Grice means ‘in body and soul.’ The utterance also indicates that this is Grice’s pre-war days at Oxford. No wonder his choice of an example. What else could he have in his soul? The topic of 'personal identity,’ which label Hume and Austin found pretentious, and preferred to talk about the illocutionary force of 'I,’ has a special Oxonian pedigree, perhaps as motivated by Hume’s challenge, that Grice has occasion to study and explore for his M. A. Lit. Hum. with Locke’s ‘Essay’ as mandatory reading. Locke, a philosopher with whom Oxford identifies most, infamously defends this memory-based account of 'I.’ Up in Scotland, Reid reads it and concocts this alleged counter-example. Hume, or Home, if you must, enjoys it. In fact, while in the 'Mind' essay he is not too specific about Hume, Grice will, due mainly to his joint investigations with J. C. Haugeland, approach, introjecting into the shoes of Hume ‒ who is idolised in The New World ‒ in ways he does not introject into Locke's. But Grice's quandary is Hume's quandary, too. In his own approach to 'I,’ the Cartesian ego, made transcendental and apperceptive by Kant, Grice updates the time-honoured empiricist mnemonic analysis by Locke. The first update is in 'style.' Grice embraces, as he does with ‘negation,’ a logical construction,’ alla Russell, via Broad, of this or that 'I' utterance, ending up with an analysis of a 'someone,’ less informative, utterance. Grice's immediate source is W. P. Gallie's essay on self and substance in the pages of ‘Mind.’ ‘Mind’ was still a 'review of psychology and philosophy,’ so poor Grice had no much choice. In fact, Grice is being heterodoxical or heretic enough to use the Broad’s taxonomy, straight 'from the other place' of ‘I’ utterances. The logical-construction theory is a third proposal, next to the Bradleyian idealist 'pure-ego' theory and the misleading 'covert-description' theory. Grice deals with the Reid's alleged counterexample of the brave officer. Suppose,' Reid says, and Grice quotes verbatim, 'a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life. Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when he2 took the standard, he2 was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that, when made a general, he3 was conscious of his2 taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his1 flogging. These things being supposed, it follows, from Locke's doctrine, that he1 who is flogged at school is the same person as him2 who later takes the standard, and that he2 who later takes the standard is the same person as him3 who is still later made a general. When it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him1 who is flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does emphatically not reach so far back as his1 flogging. Therefore, according to Locke's doctrine, he3 is emphatically not the same person as him1 who is flogged. Therefore, we can say about the general that he3 is, and at the same time, that he3 is not the same person as him1 who was flogged at school. Grice, who’ll later add a temporal suffix to '=t' yielding, by transitivity. The flogged boy =t1 the brave officer. And the brave officer =t2 the admiral. But the admiral ≠t3 the flogged boy. In ‘Mind,’ Grice tackles the basic analysans, and comes up with a rather elaborate analysans for a simple 'I' or ‘Someone’ statement. Grice just turns to a generic affirmative variant of the utterance he had used in 'Negation.' It is now 'Someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls.’ It is the affirmative counterpart of the focus of his earlier essay on negation, 'I do not hear that the bell tolls. Grice dismisses what, ‘in the other place,’ was referred to as privileged-access, and the indexicality of 'I,' an approach that will be made popular by J. R. Perry, who however reprints Grice's essay in his influential collection for the University of California Press. By allowing for ‘someone, viz. I,’ Grice seems to be relying on a piece of reasoning which he’ll later, in his first Locke lecture, refer to as ‘too’ good.' 'I hear that the bell tolls; therefore, someone hears that the bell tolls.' Grice attempts to reduce this or that 'I' utterance ('Someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls’) is in terms of a chain or sequence of mnemonic states. It poses a few quandaries itself. While quoting from this or that recent philosopher such as Gallie and Broad, it is a good thing that Grice has occasion to go back to, or revisit, Locke and contest this or that infamous and alleged counterexample presented by Reid and Hume. Grice adds a methodological note to his proposed logical-construction theory of personal identity. There is some intricacy of his reductive analysis, indeed logical construction, for an apparently simple and harmless utterance (cf. his earlier essay on 'I do not hear that the bell tolls'). But this intricacy does not prove the analysis wrong. Only that Grice is too subtle. If the reductive analysis of ‘not’ is in terms of 'each state which I am experiencing is incompatible with ...'), that should not be a minus, or drawback, but a plus, and an advantage in terms of philosophical progress. The same holds here in terms of the concept of a ‘temporary state.’ Much later, Grice reconsiders, or revisits, indeed, Broad's remark and re-titles his approach as ‘the’ or ‘a’ ‘logical-construction theory of personal identity.’ And, with Haugeland, Grice re-considers Hume's own vagaries, or quandary, with personal identity. Unlike the more conservative Locke that Grice favours in the pages of ‘Mind,’ eliminationist Hume sees 'I' as a conceptual muddle, indeed a metaphysical chimæra. Hume presses the point for an 'empiricist' verificationist account of 'I.' For, as Russell would rhetorically ask, 'What can be more direct that the experience of myself?,' The Hume Society should take notice of Grice's simplification of Hume's implicatum on 'I,’ if The Locke Society won’t. As a matter of fact, Grice calls one of his metaphysical construction routines the 'Humeian projection,' so it is not too adventurous to think that Grice considers 'I' as an intuitive concept that needs to be 'metaphysically re-constructed' and be given a legitimate Fregeian sense. Why that label for a construction routine? Grice calls this metaphysical construction routine 'Humeian projection,' since the 'mind' (or soul) as it were, 'spreads over' its objects. But, by 'mind,' Hume does not necessarily mean the 'I.' Cf. 'The mind's I.' Grice is especially concerned with the poverty and weaknesses of Hume's criticism to Locke's account of personal identity. Grice opts to revisit the Lockeian memory-based of this or that 'someone, viz. I' utterance that Hume rather regards as 'vague,' and 'confusing.' Unlike Hume's, neither Locke's nor Grice's reductive analysis of personal identity is reductionist and eliminationist. The reductive-reductionist distinction Grice draws in Retrospective epilogue as he responds to J. M. Rountree-Jack on this or that alleged ‘wrong’ on ‘meaning that.’ It is only natural that Grice would be sympathetic to Locke. Grice explores these issues with J. C. Haugeland mainly at seminars. One may wonder why Grice spends so much time in a philosopher such as Hume, with whom he agreed almost on nothing! The answer is Hume’s influence in the Third World that forced Grice to focus on this or that philosopher. Surely Locke is less popular in the New World than Hume is. One supposes Grice is trying to save Hume at the implicatum level, at least. The phrase or term of art, 'logical construction' is Russell's and Broad's, but Grice loved it. Rational reconstruction is not too dissimilar. Grice prefers Russell's and Broad's more conservative label. This is more than a terminological point. If Hume is right and there is NO 'intuitive' concept behind 'I,' one cannot strictly re-construct it, only 'construct' it. Ultimately, Grice shows that, if only at the implicatum level, we are able to provide an analysandum for this or that 'someone, viz. I' utterance without using 'I,' by implicating only this or that mnemonic concept, which belongs, naturally, as his theory of ‘negation’ does, in a theory of philosophical psychology, and again a lower branch of it, dealing with ‘memory.’ The topic of personal identity unites various interests of Grice. The first is ‘identity’ (‘=’) simpliciter. Instead of talking of the meaning of 'I,' as, say, Anscombe would, Grice sticks to the traditional category, or keyword, for this, i. e. the theory-laden, personal identity, or even personal sameness. Personal identity is a type of identity, but ‘personal’ adds something to it. Surely Hume was stretching ‘person’ a bit when using the example of a soul ‘with a life lower than an oyster. Since Grice follows Aristotle’s De Anima, he enjoys Hume’s choice, though. It may be argued that ‘personal’ adds Locke’s ‘consciousness,’ and rational agency. Grice plays with the body-soul distinction. 'I, viz someone or somebody, fell from the stairs,’ perhaps differs from ‘I will be fighting soon.’ This or that 'someone, viz. I’ utterance may be purely 'bodily.' Grice would think that the idea that his soul fell from the stairs sounds, as it would to Berkeley, harsh. But then there’s this or that one may be mixed utterance. 'Someone, viz. I, plays cricket,’ where surely your bodily mechanisms require some sort of control by the soul. Finally, this or that may be purely 'souly' ‒ the one Grice ends up analysing, 'Someone, viz. I, hear that the bell tolls.' At the time of his ‘Mind’ essay, Grice may have been unaware of the complications that the concept of a ‘person’ may bring as attached in adjective form to 'identity.’ Ayer did, and Strawson and Wiggins will, and Grice learns much from Strawson. Since Parfit, this has become a common-place topic for analysis at Oxford. A person as a complexum of a body-soul spatio-temporal continuant substance. Ultimately, Grice finds a theoretical counterpart here. A pirot may become a human, which Grice understands ‘physiologically.’ That is not enough. A pirot must aspire, via meteousis, to become a person. Thus, 'person' becomes a technical term in Grice’s grand metaphysical scheme of things. 'Someone, viz. I, hear that the bell is tolls' is analysed as ≡df, or if and only if, a hearing that the bell tolls is a part of a total temporary tn souly state S1 which is one in a series such that any state Sn, given this or that condition, contains as a part a memory Mn of the experience of hearing that the bell tolls, which is a component in some pre-sequent t1n item, or contains an experience of hearing that the bell tolls a memory M of which would, given this or that condition, occur as a component in some sub-sequent t2>tn item, there being no sub-set of items which is independent of the rest. Grice simplifies the reductive analysans. ‘Someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls’ iff ‘a hearing that the bell tolls is a component in an item of an ‘interlocking’ series, with emphasis on ‘lock,’ series of this or that ‘memorable’ and ‘memorative’ total temporary tn state S1. Is Grice’s 'Personal identity' ever referred to in the Oxonian philosophical literature? Indeeed. Parfit mentions, which makes it especially memorable and memorative. P. Edwards includes a reference to Grice's ‘Mind’ essay in the entry for 'Personal identity,' as a reference to Grice et al on ‘Metaphysics,’ is referenced in Edwards's encyclopædia entry for 'metaphysics.' Grice does not attribute privileged access or incorrigibility to 'I' or the first person. He always hastens to add that 'I' can always be substituted, salva veritate (if baffling your addressee A) by 'someone or other,' if not 'some-body or other,’ a colloquialism Grice especially detested. Grice's agency-based approach requires that. I am rational provided thou art, too. If, by explicitly saying he is a Lockeian, Grice surely does not wish us to see him as trying to be original, or the first to consider this or that problem about 'I; i.e. someone.’ Still, Grice is the philosopher who explores most deeply the 'reductive analysis' of 'I, i.e. someone.' Grice needs the reductive analysis because human agency (philosophically, rather than psychologically interpreted) is key for his approach to things. By uttering 'The bell tolls,' U means that someone, viz. himself, hears that the bell tolls, or even, by uttering 'I, hear, viz. someone hears, that the bell tolls,' U means that the experience of a hearing that the bell tolls is a component in a total temporary state which is a member of a series such that each member would, given certain conditions, contain as an component one memory of an experience which is a component in a pre-sequent member, or contains as a component some experience a memory of which would, given certain conditions, occur as a component in a post-sequent member; there being no sub-set of members which is independent of the rest. ‘Thanks,’ the addressee might reply. ‘I didn’t know that! The 'reductive' bit to Grice’s analysis needs to be emphasised. For Grice, a person, and consequently, a ‘someone, viz. I’ utterance, is, simpliciter, a logical construction out of this or that Humeian experience. Whereas in Russell, as Broad notes, a logical construction of this or that philosophical concept, in this case ‘personal identity,’ or cf. Grice’s earlier reductive analysis of ‘not,’ is thought of as an 'improved,' 'rationally reconstructed' conception. Neither Russell nor Broad need maintain that the logical construction 'preserves' the original meaning of the analysandum 'someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls,’ or ‘I do not hear that the bell tolls’ ‒ hence their paradox of reductionist analysis. This ‘change of subject’ does not apply to Grice. Grice emphatically intends to be make explicit, if rationally reconstructed (if that's not an improvement) through reductive (if not reductionist) analysis, the concept Grice already claims to have. One particular development to consider is within Grice’s play group, that of A. M. Quinton. Grice and Quinton seem to have been the only two philosophers in Austin’s play group who showed any interest on ‘someone, viz. I.’ Or not!The fact that Quinton entitled his thing ‘The soul’ didn’t help. Note that Woozley was editing Reid on “Identity” in 1941. Cf. A. E. Duncan-Jones on ‘man’s mortality.’ Note that Quinton’s immediate trigger is Shoemaker. Grice writes that he is not “merely a series of perceptions,” for he is “conscious of a permanent self, an I who experiences these perceptions and who is now identical with the I who experienced perceptions yesterday.” So, leaving aside that he is using ‘I’ with the third person verb, but surely this is no use-mention fallacy, it is this puzzle that provoked his thoughts on temporal-relative “=” later on. As Grice notes, Butler argued that consciousness of experience can contribute to identity but not define it. Grice will use Butler in his elaboration of conversational benevolence versus conversational self-interest. Better than Quinton, it is better to consider A. G. N. Flew in Philosophy, vol. 96, on Locke and the problem of personal identity, obviously suggested as a term paper by Grice! Wiggins cites Flew. Flew actually notes that Berkeley saw Locke’s problem earlier than Reid, which concerns the ‘transitiveness’ of ‘=.’ Recall that Wiggins’s tutor at Oxford was a tutee by Grice, J. L. Ackrill.
1946. The sceptic’s implicatum, common sense and scepticism, repr. in Studies in the way of words, in part II, explorations in semantics and metaphysics, as essay 8, and 'G. E. Moore and Philosopher's Paradoxes,' as essay 9, 1953, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 4-folder 13, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: common sense, scepticism, implicatum, the sceptic's implicature, philosopher's paradox, paradox, G. E. Moore, ordinary language, 'ordinary-language' philosophy, Norman Malcolm. The sceptic’s implicatum. While Grice groups these two essays as dealing with one single theme, strictly, only this or that philosopher's paradox (not all) may count as 'sceptical.' This or that philosopher's paradox may well NOT be 'sceptic' but rather 'dogmatic' at all. In fact, Grice defines 'philosopher's paradox' as anything ‘repugnant to common sense,’ shocking, or extravagant ‒ to Malcolm's ears, that is! While it is, strictly, slightly odd to quote this as ‘(1946)’ just because, by a stroke of the pen, Grice writes that date in the Harvard volume, we will follow his charming practice. This is vintage Grice. Grice always takes the sceptic's challenge seriously, as any serious philosopher should. Grice's takes both the sceptic's explicatum and the sceptics's implicatum as self-defeating, as a very affront to our idea of rationality, conversational or other. V: ‘Conversations with a sceptic: Can he be slightly more conversational helpful?’ Hume's sceptical attack is partial, and targeted only towards practical reason, though. Yet, for Grice, reason is one. You cannot really attack 'practical' or buletic reason without attacking 'theoretical' or doxastic reason. There is such thing as a general 'rational acceptance,' to use Grice's term, that the sceptic is getting at. Grice likes to play with the idea that ultimately every syllogism is buletic or practical. If, say, a syllogism by Eddington looks doxastic, that is because Eddington cares to 'omit the practical tail,' as Grice puts it. And Eddington is not even a philosopher, they say. Grice is here concerned with a Cantabrigian topic popularised by G. E. Moore. As Grice recollects, Some like Witters, but Moore's my man. Unlike Cambridge analysts such as Moore, Grice sees himself as a 'linguistic-turn' Oxonian analyst. So it is only natural that Grice would connect time-honoured scepticism (of Pyrrho's vintage) and common sense with 'ordinary language', so mis-called, the elephant in Grice's room. Liddell and Scott have σκέψις,' from 'σκέπτομαι,' which they render as 'viewing, perception by the senses,' ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ς. Pl. Phd.83a; observation of auguries, Hdn. 8. 3. 7. ', also as 'examination, speculation, consideration,' τὸ εὕρημα πολλῆς σκέψιος‘ Hp. VM4, cf. Pl. Alc. 1.130d; βραχείας ς. Id. Tht. 201a; ϝέμειν ς. take thought of a thing, v. l. in E. Hipp. 1323; ἐνθεὶς τῇ τέχνῃ ς. Ar. Ra. 974; ‘ς. ποιεῖσθαι‘ Pl. Phdr. 237d;’ς. προβέβληκας‘ Id. Phlb. 65d;’ς. λόγων‘ Id. R. 336e; ς. περί τινος inquiry into, speculation on a thing, Id. Grg. 487e, etc.; ‘περί τι‘ Id. Lg. 636d;’ἐπὶ σκέψιν τινὸς ἐλθεῖν‘ X. Oec. 6.13.2. speculation, inquiry,’ταῦτα ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως‘ Arist. Pol. 1254a34; ἔξω τῆς νῦν ς. Id. Ph. 228a20; οὐκ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης ς. Id. EN1155b9, etc. 3. hesitation, doubt, esp. of the Sceptic or Pyrthonic philosophers, AP7. 576 (Jul.); the Sceptic philosophy, S.E.P.1.5; οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ς. the Sceptics, ib. 229. 4. in politics, resolution, decree, ‘συνεδρίον‘ Hdn. 4.3.9, cf. Poll. 6.178. If scepticism attacks common sense and fails, Grice seems to be implicating, that ‘ordinary' language philosophy is a good antidote to scepticism. Since what language other than 'ordinary' language' does common sense speak? Well, strictly, common sense doesn't speak. The man in the street does. Grice addresses this topic in a Mooreian way in a later essay, also repr. in Studies, 'G. E. Moore and philosopher's paradoxes,' repr. in Studies in the Way of Words. As with his earlier 'Common sense and scepticism,' Grice tackles Moore's and Malcolm's claim that 'ordinary' language, so-called, solves a few of 'philosopher''s paradoxes. 'Philosopher' is Grice's witty way to generalise over your common-or-garden, any, philosopher, especially of the type he found eccentric, the sceptic included. Grice finds this or that problem in this overarching Cantabrigian manoeuvre, as over-simplifying a pretty convoluted terrain. While he cherishes Austin's 'Some like Witters, but Moore's MY man!' Grice finds Moore too Cantabrigian to his taste. While an Oxonian thoroughbred, Grice is a bit like Austin, 'Some like Witters, but Moore's my man,' with this or that caveat. Again, as with his treatment of Descartes or Locke, Grice is hardly interested in finding out what Moore really means. He is a philosopher, not a historian of philosophy, and he knows it. While Grice agrees with Austin's implicature that Moore goes well above Witters, if that's the expression ('even if some like him'), we should find the Oxonian equivalent to Moore. Grice would NOT name Ryle, since he sees him, and his followers, almost every day. There is something apostolic about Moore that Grice enjoys, which is just as well, seeing that Moore is one of the 'twelve.' Grice found it amusing that the members of the Conversazione Society would still be nicknamed 'apostles' 'when their number exceeded the initial 12.' Grice spends some time exploring what Malcolm, a follower of Witters, which does not help, as it were, has to say about Moore in connection with that particularly Oxonian turn of phrase, such as ''ordinary' language' is. For Malcolm's Moore, a 'paradox' by a 'philosopher' arises when 'philosopher' fails to abide by the dictates of 'ordinary' language. This infuriates Grice. Surely the ordinary man says ridiculous, or silly, as Russell prefers, things, such as ‘Smith is lucky,’ ‘Departed spirits walk along this road on their way to Paradise,’ ‘I know there are infinite stars,’ and ‘I wish I were Napoleon,’ or ’I wish that I had been Napoleon,’ which does not mean that the utterer wishes that he were like Napoleon, but that he wishes that he had lived not in the his century but in the XVIIIth century. Grice is being specific about this. It is true that an ordinary use of language, as Malcolm suggests, cannot be self-contradictory unless the ‘ordinary use of language’ is defined by stipulation as not self-contradictory, in which case an appeal to ordinary language becomes useless against this or that paradox by Philosopher. 'I wish that I had been Napoleon’ seems to involve nothing but an ordinary use of language by any standard but that of freedom from absurdity. ‘I wish that I had been Napoleon’ is not, as far as Grice can see, ‘philosophical,’ but something which may have been said and meant by numbers of ordinary people. Yet, ‘I wish that I had been Napoleon’ is open to the suspicion of self-contradictoriness, absurdity, or some other kind of meaninglessness. And in this context suspicion is all Grice needs. By uttering ‘I wish that I had been Napoleon’ U hardly means the same as he would if he uttered ‘I wish I were like Napoleon.' 'I wish that I had been Napoleon’ is suspiciously self-contradictory, absurd, or meaningless, if, as uttered by an utterer in a century other than the XVIIIth century, say, the utterer is understood as expressing the proposition that the utterer wishes that he had lived in the XVIIIth century, and not in his century, in which case he-1 wishes that he had not been him-1? But blame it on the buletic. That Moore himself is not too happy with Malcolm's criticism can be witnessed by a cursory glimpse at hi 'reply' to Malcolm. Grice is totally against this view that Malcolm ascribes to Moore as a view that is too broad to even claim to be true. Grice's implicature is that Malcolm is appealing to Oxonian turns of phrase, such as 'ordinary' language,' but not taking proper Oxonian care in clarifying the nuances and stuff in dealing with, admittedly, a non-Oxonian philosopher such as Moore. When dealing with Moore, Grice is not necessarily concerned with scepticism. 'Time is unreal,' e.g. is hardly a sceptic utterance. Yet Grice lists it as one of Philosopher's paradoxes. So, there are various keywords to consider here. Grice would start with ‘common sense.’ That's what he does when he reprints this essay in Studies in the way of words, with his attending note in both the 'Preface' and the 'Retrospective Epilogue' on how he organizes the themes and strands. 'Common sense' is one keyword there. Scepticism is another. It is intriguing that in the first two essays opening Part II, ‘Explorations in semantics and metaphysics’ in Way of Words, it seems it’s Malcolm, rather than the dryer Moore, who interests Grice most. While he would provide exegeses of this or that dictum by Moore, and indeed, Moore’s response to Malcolm, Grice seems to be more concerned with applications of his own views. Notably in ‘Philosopher’s Paradoxes.’ The ‘fatal’ objection Grice finds for the paradox-propounder (not necessarily a sceptic, although a sceptic may be one of the paradox propounders) significantly rests on Grice's reductive analysis of 'meaning that ...' as ascribed to this or that utterer U. Grice elaborates on circumstances that he’ll later take up in the 'Retrospective Epilogue. 'I find myself not understanding what I mean' is dubiously acceptable. If meaning, Grice is saying, is about an utterer U intending to get his addressee A to believe that U ψ-s that p, U must think there is a good chance that A will recognise what he is supposed to believe, by, perhaps, being aware of the U's practice or by a supplementary explanation which might come from U. In which case, U should not be meaning what Malcolm claims he might mean. No utterer should intend his addressee to believe what is ‘conceptually impossible,’ or incoherent, or blatantly false (‘Charles I’s decapitation willed Charles I’s death.’), unless you are Queen in ‘Through the Looking Glass.’ 'I believe five impossible things before breakfast, and I hope you'll soon get the proper training to follow suit ‒ cf. Tertulian, ‘Credo, quia absurdum est.’ Admittedly, Grice edits the ‘Philosopher’s Paradoxes’ essay. It is only Grice's final objection which is reprinted in Studies, even if he provides a good detailed summary of the previous sections. Grice appeals to Moore on later occasions. In ‘Causal Theory,’ Grice lists, as a third philosophical mistake, the opinion by Malcolm that Moore did not know how to use ‘know.’ Grice brings up the same example again in ‘Prolegomena.’ The use of Moore may well be a misuse. While at Madison, Wisconsin, he is lecturing at that a hall eccentrically-built with indirect lighting simulating actual sun rays, Moore infamously utters, ‘I know that there is a window behind that curtain,’ when there was not. In 'Retrospective Epilogue,' Grice uses ‘M’ to abbreviate Moore’s fairy godmother – along with G (Grice’s), A (Austin’s), R (Ryle’s) and Q (Quine’s)! One simple way to approach Grice's quandary with Malcolm's quandary with Moore is then to focus on 'know.' How can Malcolm claim that Moore is guilty of misusing 'know'? The most extensive exploration by Grice on 'know' is in Grice's third William James lecture (but cf. his seminar on 'Knowledge and belief,' and his remarks on 'Some of our beliefs NEED to be true,' in 'Meaning revisited.' The examinee knows that the battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815. Nothing odd about that, nor about Moore's uttering 'I know these are my hands.' Grice is perhaps the only one of the Oxonian philosophers of Austin's play group who took 'common sense' so seriously, if only to crticise Malcom's zeal with it. For Grice, common sense = ordinary language, whereas for the typical Austinian, ‘ordinary language’ = the language of the man in the street. Grice is contesting the usual criticism that Oxford ‘ordinary-language’ philosophers defend common-sense assumptions just because the way non-common-sense philosophers talk is not ‘ordinary’ language. Grice was infuriated by all this unclear chatter, and chooses Malcolm’s mistreatment of Moore as an example. He possible was fearful to consider Austin’s claims directly!
1948. Peirceian reflections, Grice’s rhapsody on a theme by Peirce, intending, intender, agency, meaning, repr. in Studies in the way of words, part II, explorations in semantics and metaphysics, as essay 14, The Oxford Philosophical Society, The Philosophical Review, vol. 66, pp. 377-88, C. S. Peirce's theory of signs, cf. meaning revisited, philosophical psychology, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (The Essays of H. P. Grice), carton 1-folder 16 and carton 4-folder 5, and Series V (Topical), carton 8-folder 29, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keyword: sign, meaning, intention, Peirce, Stevenson, Welby, Ewing, Ogden, Richards. The Peirce in Grice’s soul. ‘Meaning’ provides an excellent springboard to Grice to centre his analysis on 'psychological' or 'soul-y' verbs as involving the agent and the first person: smoke only figuratively 'means' fire, and the expression 'smoke' only figuratively (or metabolically) 'means' that there is fire. It is this or that utterer (say, Grice) who means, say, by uttering ‘Where there's smoke there's fire,’ or ‘ubi fumus, ibi ignis,’ that where there's smoke there's fire. A meantNN something by x is (roughly) equivalent to utterer U intends the utterance of x to produce some effect in his addressee A by means of the recognition of this intention’; and we may add that to ask what U means is to ask for a specification of the intended effect - though, of course, it may not always be possible to get a straight answer involving a 'that'-clause, for example, a belief that ... He does provide a more specific example involving the 'that'-clause at a later stage. By uttering x the utterer U means that-ψb-dp iff (Ǝ.φ).(Ǝ.f).(Ǝ.c): I. U utters x intending x to be such that anyone who has φ will think that (i) x has f (ii) f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p (iii) (Ǝ.φ'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ' will think, via thinking (i) and (ii), that U ψ-s that p (iv) in view of (3), U ψ-s that p; and II (operative only for certain substituends for 'ψb-d'). U utters x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has φ, he will, via thinking (iv), himself ψ that p; and III. It is not the case that, for some inference-element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ will both (i') rely on E in coming to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p and (ii') think that (Ǝ.φ'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ' will come to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p without relying on E. Besides St. John The Baptist, and Salome, Grice cites few names in ‘Meaning.’ But he makes a point about C. L. Stevenson! For Stevenson, smoke 'means' fire. ‘Meaning’ develops out of an interest by Grice on the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. In his essays on Peirce, Grice quotes from many other authors, including, besides Peirce himself (!), C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, and A. C. Ewing, or ‘A. C. 'Virtue is not a fire-shovel' Ewing,’ as Grice called him, and this or that cricketer! Grice had no intention to submit ‘Meaning’ to publication! Bennett, however, guessed that Grice had decided to publish it in 1957, just a year after his ‘Defence of a dogma.’ Bennett's argument is that ‘Defence of a dogma’ pre-supposes some notion of 'meaning.’ However, a different story may be told, not necessarily contradicting Bennett's! It is Strawson who submits the essay by Grice to ‘The Philosophical Review.’ Strawson had attended Grice's talk on Meaning for The Oxford Philosophical Society, and liked it! Since ‘In defence of a dogma’ was co-written with Strawson, the intention Bennett ascribes to Grice may well have been Strawson's. Oddly, Strawson later provides a famous alleged counter-example to Grice on meaning in ‘Intention and convention in speech acts,’ which has Grice dedicating a full William James lecture (No. 5) to it! An interesting fact, that confused a few, is that H. L. A. Hart quotes from Grice's ‘Meaning’ in his critical review of Holloway for The Philosophical Quarterly. Hart quotes Grice pre-dating the publication of ‘Meaning.’ Hart's point is that Holloway should have gone to Oxford! In ‘Meaning,’ Grice may be seen as a practitioner of 'ordinary-language' philosophy: witness his explorations of the factivity or lack thereof of various uses of ‘to mean.’ The second part of the essay, for which he became philosophically especially popular, takes up an intention-based approach to semantic notions. The only authority Grice cites, in typical Oxonian fashion, is Stevenson, who, from The New World (and via Yale, too!) had been defending an emotivist theory of ethics, and making a few remarks on how ‘to mean’ is used, with scare quotes, in something like a 'causal' account (‘Smoke 'means' fire.’). After its publication Grice's account received ‘almost as many alleged counterexamples as rule-utilitarianism’ (B. J. Harrison), but mostly outside Oxford, and in The New World. New-World philosophers seem to have seen Grice's attempt as reductionist and as oversimplifying. At Oxford, the sort of counterexample Grice received, before Strawson, was of the Urmson-type: refined, and subtle. 'I think your account leaves bribery behind.' On the other hand, in the New World ‒ in what Grice calls the ‘Latter-Day School of Nominalism,’ Quine is having troubles with empiricism. ‘Meaning’ was reprinted in various collections, notably in P. F. Strawson's Philosophical Logic (and it should be remembered that it was Strawson who had the thing typed and submitted for publication!). Why ‘Meaning’ should be reprinted in a collection on ‘Philosophical Logic’ only Strawson knows! But Grice does say that his account may help clarify the meaning of '... entails...'! It may be Strawson's implicature that Parkinson should have reprinted (and not merely credited) Grice's Meaning in HIS series for Oxford on ‘The theory of meaning’! The preferred quotation for Griceians is of course Grice 1948, seeing that Grice recalled the exact year when he gave the talk for the Philosophical Society at Oxford! It is however, the publication in The Philosophical Review, rather than the quieter evening at the Oxford Philosophical Society, that occasioned a tirade of alleged counter-examples by New-World philosophers. Granted, one or two Oxonians ‒ Urmson and Strawson ‒ fell in! Urmson criticises the sufficiency of Grice's account, by introducing an alleged counter-example involving bribery. Grice will consider a way out of Urmson's alleged counter-example in his fifth Wiliam James Lecture, rightly crediting and thanking Urmson for this! Strawson's alleged counter-example was perhaps slightly more serious, if regressive. It also involves the sufficiency of Grice's analysis. Strawson's ‘rat-infested house’ alleged counter-example started a chain which required Grice to avoid, ultimately, any 'sneaky' intention by way of a recursive clause to the effect that, for utterer U to have meant that p, all meaning-constitutive intentions should be 'above board.' But why this obsession by Grice with 'mean'? He is being funny. Spots surely don't mean, only ‘mean.’They don't have a mind. Yet Grice opens with a specific sample. Those spots mean, to the doctor, that you, dear, have measles. Mean? Yes, dear, 'mean,' doctor's orders. Those spots 'mean' measles. But how does the doctor know? Can't he be in the wrong? Not really, 'mean' is factive, dear! Or so Peirce thought. Grice is amazed that Peirce thought that some meaning is factive. 'The hole in this piece of cloth 'means' that a bullet went through is' is one of Peirce's examples. Surely, as Grice notes, this is an unhappy example. The hole in the cloth may well have caused by something else, or 'fabricated.' (Or 'the postmark 'means' that the letter went through the post.') Yet, Grice was having Oxonian tutees aware that Peirce was krypto-technical. Grice chose for one of his pre-’Meaning’ seminars (i.e. 1947) on Peirce's 'general' theory of signs, with emphasis on 'general,' and Peirce's correspondence with Lady Welby. Peirce, rather than the Vienna circle, becomes, in vein with Grice's dissenting irreverent rationalism, important as a source for Grice's attempt to 'English' Peirce. Grice's implicature seems to be that Peirce, rather than Ayer, cared for the subtleties of 'meaning' and 'sign', never mind a verificationist theory about them! Peirce ultra-Latinate-cum-Greek taxonomies have Grice very nervous, though. He knew that his students were proficient in the classics, but still! Grice thus proposes to reduce all of Peirceian divisions and sub-divisions (‘one sub-division too many’) to 'mean.' In the proceedings, he quotes from Ogden, Richards, and Ewing. In particular, Grice was fascinated by Peirce's correspondence with Lady Viola Welby, as reprinted by Ogden/Richards in, well, their study on the 'meaning' of meaning! Grice thought 'the science of symbolism' pretentious, but then he almost thought Lady Viola Welby 'slightly pretentious, too, if you've seen her; beautiful lady!' It is via Peirce that Grice explores examples such as those spots 'meaning' measles. Peirce's obsession is with weathercocks almost as Ockham was with circles on wine-barrels. Old-World Grice's use of New-World Peirce is illustrative, thus, of the Oxonian linguistic turn focused on 'ordinary' language. While Peirce's background was not philosophical, Grice thought it comical enough. He would say that Peirce is an 'amateur,' but then he said the same thing about Mill, whom Grice had to study by heart to get his B. A. Lit. Hum.! Plus, as Watson commented, ‘What's wrong with 'amateur'? Give me an amateur philosopher ANY day, if I have to choose from 'professional' Hegel!’ In finding Peirce krypo-technical, Grice is ensuing that his tutees, and indeed any Oxonian philosophy student (he was university lecturer) be aware that 'to mean' should be more of a priority than this or that jargon by this or that (New World?) philosopher!? Partly! Grice wanted his students to think on their own, and draw their own conclusions! Grice cites A. C. Ewing, Ogden/Richards, and many others. Ewing, while Oxford-educated, had ended up at Cambridge (Scruton almost had him as his tutor!) and written some points on ‘Meaninglessness’! ‘Those spots mean measles.’ Grice finds Peirce 'krypto-technical' and proposes to ‘English’ him into an 'ordinary-language' philosopher. Surely it is not 'important' whether we consider a measles spot a 'sign,' a 'symbol,' or an 'icon.' One might just as well find a doctor in London who thinks those spots 'symbolic.' If Grice feels like Englishing Peirce, he does not altogether fail! 1957. Meaning, reprints, of 'Meaning' and other essays, a collection of reprints and offprints of Grice's essays. Meaning becomes a central topic of at least two strands in ‘Retrospective epilogue.’ The first strand concerns the idea of the centrality of the utterer. What Grice there calls ‘meaning BY’ (versus meaning TO), i.e. as he also puts it, ‘active or agent’s meaning.’ Surely he is right in defending an agent-based account to ‘meaning.’ Peirce need not, but Grice must, because he is working with an English root, ‘mean,’ that is only figurative applicable to non-agentive items (‘Smoke ‘means’ rain’). On top, Grice wants to conclude that only RATIONAL creatures (like persons) can meanNN properly. Non-human animals may have a correlate. This is a truly important point for Grice since he surely is seen as promoting a NON-convention-based approach to ‘meaning,’ and also defending from the charge of circularity in the non-semantic account of propositional attitudes. His final picture is a rationalist one. Pirot1 wants to communicate about a danger to Pirot2. This presupposes there IS a danger (item of reality). Then Pirot1 believes there is a danger, and communicates to Pirot2 that there is a danger. This simple view of conversation as rational co-operation underlies Grice’s account of meaning too, now seen as an offshoot of philosophical psychology, and indeed biology, as he puts it. Meaning as yet another survival mechanism. While he would never use a cognate like ‘significance’ in his Oxford Philosophical Society talk, Grice eventually starts to use such Latinate cognates at a later stage of his development. In ‘Meaning,’ Grice does not explain his goal. By sticking with a root that the Oxford curriculum did not necessarily recognised as 'philosophical' (amateur Peirce did!), Grice is implicating that he is starting an 'ordinary-language' botanising on his own repertoire! Grice was amused by Ewing's reliance on very Oxonian examples contra Freddie Ayer: ‘Surely ‘Virtue ain't a fire-shovel’ is perfectly meaningful, and if fact true, if, I'll admit, somewhat misleading and practically purposeless at Cambridge.’ Again, Grice's dismissal of ‘natural’ meaning is due to the fact that ‘natural meaning’ prohibits its use in the first person and followed by a 'that'-clause. ‘I mean-N that p’ sounds absurd, no communication-function seems in the offing. Grice found, with Suppes, all types of primacy (ontological, axiological, psychological) in utterer's meaning. In 'Retrospective epilgoeu,' he goes back to the topic, as he reminisces that it is his suggestion that there are two allegedly distinguishable meaning concepts, even if one is 'metabolical,' which may be called 'natural' meaning and 'non-natural' meaning. There is this or that test (notably factivity-entailment vs. cancelation, but also scare quotes) which may be brought to bear to distinguish one concept from the other. We may, for example, inquire whether a particular occurrence of the predicate 'mean' is factive or non-factive, i. e., whether for it to be true that [so and so] means that p, it does or does not have to be the case that it is true that p. Again, one may ask whether the use of quotation marks to enclose the specification of what is meant would be inappropriate or appropriate. If factivity is present and quotation marks is be inappropriate, we have a case of natural meaning. Otherwise the meaning involved is non-natural meaning. We may now ask whether there is a single overarching idea which lies behind both members of this dichotomy of uses to which the predicate 'meaning that ...' seems to be subject. If there is such a central idea it might help to indicate to us which of the two concepts is in greater need of further analysis and elucidation and in what direction such elucidation should proceed. Grice confesses that he has only fairly recently come to believe that there is such an overarching idea and that it is indeed of some service in the proposed inquiry. The idea behind both uses of 'mean' is that of consequence, or 'consequentia,' as Hobbes has it. If [x] means that p, something which includes p or the idea of p, is a consequence of [x]. In the metabolic 'natural' use of 'meaning that p,' p, this or that consequence, is this or that state of affairs. In the literal, non-metabolic, basic, 'non-natural' use of 'meaning that p,' (as in Smith means that his neighbour's three-year child is an adult), p, this or that consequence is this or that conception or complexus which involves some other conception. This perhaps suggests that of the two concepts it is, as it should, 'non-natural' meaning which is more in need of further elucidation. It seems to be the more specialised of the pair, and it also seems to be the less determinate. We may, e. g., ask how this or that conception enters the picture. Or we may ask whether what enters the picture is the conception itself or its justifiability. On these counts Grice should look favorably on the idea that, if further analysis should be required for one of the pair, the notion of 'non-natural' meaning would be first in line. There are factors which support the suitability of further analysis for the concept of 'non-natural' meaning. 'MeaningNN that p ('non-natural meaning') does not look as if it names an original feature of items in the world, for two reasons which are possibly not mutually independent. One reason is that, given suitable background conditions, meaning, can be changed by fiat. The second reason is that the presence of meaningNN is dependent on a framework provided by 'communication,' if that's not too circular. ‘Communication’ is in the philosophical lexicon, 'commūnĭcātĭo,' from 'communicare,' "(several times in Cic., elsewh. rare),' and as they did with 'negatio' and they will with 'significatio,' Short and Lewis render, unhelpfully, as 'a making common, imparting, communicating.' ‘largitio et communicatio civitatis' (Cic. Balb. 13, 31), 'quaedam societas et communicatio utilitatum,’ id. Fin. 5, 23, 65: ‘consilii,’ id. Fam. 5, 19, 2: ‘sermonis,’ id. Att. 1, 17, 6: criminis cum pluribus, Tiro ap. Gell. 7, 3, 14: ‘nominum,’ i. e. the like appellation of several objects, Plin. 24, 14, 80, § 129: ‘juris,’ Dig. 23, 2, 1: ‘damni,’ ib. 27, 3, 1, § 14. In rhetorics, a figure of speech, translating Grecian 'ἀνακοίνωσις,' in accordance with which one turns to his hearers, and, as it were, allows them to take part in the inquiry, Cic. de Or. 3, 53, 204; Quint. 9, 1, 30; 9, 2, 20 and 23. It seems to Grice, then, at least reasonable and possibly even ephatically mandatory, to treat the claim that a communication vehicle, such as this and that expression 'means' that p, in this transferred, metaphoric, or metabolic use of 'means that ...' as being reductively analysable in terms of this or that feature of this or that utterer, communicator, or user of this or that expression. The use of 'meaning that ...' as applied to this or that expression is posterior to and explicable through the utterer-oriented, or utterer-relativised use, i.e. involving a reference to this or that communicator or user of this or that expression. More specifically, one should license a metaphorical use of 'mean,' where one allows the claim that this or that expression 'means' that p, provided that this or that utterer, in this or that 'standard' fashion, means that p, i.e. in terms of this or that souly statee toward this or that propositional complexus this or that utterer ntends, in a standardly fashion, to produce by his uttering this or that utterance. That this or that expression 'means' (in this metaphorical use) that p is thus explicable either in terms of this or that souly state which is standardly intended to produce in this or that addressee A by this or that utterer of this or that expression, or in this or that souly staken up by this or that utterer toward this or that activity or action of this or that utterer of this or that expression. ‘Meaning’ was in the air in Oxford’s linguistic turn. Everybody was talking ‘meaning.’ Grice manages to quote from R. M. Hare’s early “Mind” essay on the difference between imperatives and indicatives, also A. E. Duncan-Jones on ‘fugitive propositions,’ and of course his beloved P. F. Strawson. Grice was also concerned by the fact that in the typical ‘ordinary-language’ philosopher’s manoeuvre, there is a constant abuse of ‘mean.’ Surely Grice wants to stick with the utterer’s meaning as the primary use. Expressions ‘mean’ only derivatively. To do that, he chose Peirce to see if he could clarify it with ‘meaning that.’ Grice knew that the polemic was even stronger in London, with C. K. Ogden and Lady Viola Welby. In the more academic Oxford ‘milieu,’ Grice knew that a proper examination of ‘meaning,’ would lead him, via Kneale and his researches on the history of ‘semantics,’ to the topic of 'significatio,' that obsessed the 'modistae' (and their 'modus significandi). For what does Lewis and Short say about about this? There is indeed an entry for 'signĭfĭcātĭo,' f. 'significare.' Lewis and Short render it, unhelpfully, as “a pointing out, indicating, denoting, signifying; an expression, indication, mark, sign, token, = indicium, signum, 'ἐπισημασία,' etc., freq. and class. Most likely Grice should go sraight to ‘significo.’ signĭfĭco, also dep. signĭfĭcor (Gell. 18, 12, 10, without an example), significare, from signum-facere, to make sign, 'signum-facio,' I make sign, which Lewis and Short render as 'to signify', which is perhaps not too helpful. Grice (if not the Grecians) knew that. Strictly, Lewis and Short render 'significare' as 'to show by signs; to show, point out, express, publish, make known, indicate; to intimate, notify, signify, etc.' Note that the cognate 'signify' almost comes last, but not least, if not first. Enough to want to coin a word to do duty for them all! Which is what Grice (and the Grecians) can, but the old Romans cannot, with 'mean.' If that above were not enough, Lewis and Short go on, 'also, to betoken, prognosticate, foreshow, portend, MEAN (syn. praedico), as in to betoken a change of weather (post-Aug.): “ventus Africus tempestatem significat, etc.,” Col. 11, 2, 4 sq.: cf. Grice on those dark clouds 'mean' a storm is coming. Short and Lewis go on, to say that 'significare' may be rendered as 'to call, name: To mean, import, signify. Hence, signĭfĭcans, in rhet. lang., of speech, full of meaning, expressive, significant; graphic, distinct, clear: Adv.: signĭfĭcanter , clearly, distinctly, expressly, significantly, graphically: “breviter ac significanter ordinem rei protulisse,” Quint. 11, 1, 53: “rem indicare (with proprie),” id. 12, 10, 52: “dicere (with ornate),” id. 1, 7, 32. Comp.: “apertius, significantius dignitatem alicujus defendere,” Cic. Fam. 3, 12, 3: “narrare,” Quint. 10, 1, 49: “disponere,” id. 3, 6, 65: “appellare aliquid (with consignatius),” Gell. 1, 25, 8: “dicere (with probabilius),” id. 17, 2, 11. Sup., Pseudo Quint. Decl. 247. If perhaps Grice was unhappy about the artificial flavour to saying that a word is a 'sign,' Grice surely should have checked with all the Grecian-Roman cognates of 'mean,' as in his favourite 'memorative-memorable' distinction, and the many Grecian realisations, or with Old Roman ‘mentire’ and ‘mentare.’ mentĭor or mentire, Lewis and Short note, is 'prob. from root 'men-', whence 'mens' and 'memini,' q. v. The original meaning, they say, is 'to invent,' hence, but alla Umberto Eco with 'sign,' 'mentire' comes to mean in later use what Grice (if not the Grecians) holds is the opposite of 'mean'. Short and Lewis render 'mentire' as 'to lie, cheat, deceive, etc., to pretend, to declare falsely: 'mentior nisi' or 'si mentior,' a form of asseveration, I am a liar, if, etc.: But also, animistically (modest mentalism?) of things, as endowed with a mind. Lewis and Short go on: 'to deceive, impose upon, to deceive one's self, mistake, to lie or speak falsely about, to assert falsely, make a false promise about; to feign, counterfeit, imitate a shape, nature, etc.: to devise a falsehood, to assume falsely, to promise falsely, to invent, feign, of a poetical fiction: “ita mentitur (sc. Homerus), Trop., of inanim. grammatical subjects, as in 'Semel fac illud, mentitur tua quod subinde tussis, Do what your cough keeps falsely promising, i. e. die, Mart. 5, 39, 6. 'Do what your cough means!' =imp. die!; hence, mentĭens, a fallacy, sophism: quomodo mentientem, quem ψευδόμενον vocant, dissolvas, Cic. Div. 2, 4, 11, mentītus, imitated, counterfeit, feigned (poet.): “mentita tela,” Verg. A. 2, 422. For “mentior,” indeed, there is a Griceian implicatum involving rational control. The rendition of 'mentire' as 'to lie' stems from a figurative shift from 'to be mindful, or inventive, to have second thoughts" to "to lie, conjure up". But Grice would also have a look at cognate “memini,” since this is also cognate with “mind,” “mens,” and covers subtler instances of ‘mean,’ as in Latinate, “mention,” as in Grice’s “use-mention” distinction. mĕmĭni, cognate with "mean" and German "meinen," to think = Grecian ὑπομένειν, await (cf. Schiffer, "remnants of meaning," if I think, I hesitate, and therefore re-MAIN. Cf. Gr. μεν- in μένω, Μέντωρ; μαν- in μαίνομαι, μάντις; μνᾶ- in μιμνήσκω, etc.; cf.: maneo, or manere, as in ‘remain.' The idea, as Schiffer well knows or means, being that if you think, you hesitate, and therefore, ‘wait’ and ‘remain’], moneo, reminiscor [cf. reminiscence], mens, Minerva, etc. which Lewis and Short render as “to remember, recollect, to think of, be mindful of a thing; not to have forgotten a person or thing, to bear in mind (syn.: reminiscor, recordor).” Surely with a relative clause, and to make mention of, to mention a thing, either in speaking or writing (rare but class.): Hence. mĕmĭnens, mindful And then Grice would have a look at ‘moneo,’ as in ‘adMONish,’ also cognate. mŏnĕo, monere, causative from the root "men;" whence memini, q. v., mens (mind), mentio (mention); lit. to cause to think, to re-mind, put in mind of, bring to one's recollection; to admonish, advise, warn, instruct, teach (syn.: hortor, suadeo, doceo). Lewis and Short are Griceian if not Grecian when they note that 'monere' can be used "without the accessory notion [implicatum or entanglement, that is] of reminding or admonishing, in gen., to teach, instruct, tell, inform, point out; also, to announce, predict, foretell, even if also to punish, chastise (only in Tacitus): “puerili verbere moneri,” Tac. A. 5, 9. And surely, since he loved to re-minisced, Grice would have allowed to just earlier on just ‘minisced.’ Short and Lewis indeed have ‘rĕmĭniscor,’ which, as they point out, features the root men; whence mens, memini; and which they compare to 'comminiscere, v. comminiscor,’ to recall to mind, recollect, remember (syn. recordor), often used by the Old Romans with with Grice's beloved 'that'-clause, for sure. For what is the good of reminiscing or comminiscing, if you cannot reminisce that Austin always reminded Grice that skipping the dictionary was his big mistake! If Grice uses 'mention,' cognate with 'mean,' he loved commenting Aristotle. And 'commentare' is, again, cognate with 'mean.' As opposed to the development of the root in Grecian, or English, in Roman the root for 'mens' is quite represented in many Latinate cognates. But a Roman, if not a Grecian, would perhaps be puzzled by a Grice claiming, by intuition, to retrieve the necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of this or that expression. When the Roman is told that the Griceian did it for fun, he understands, and joins in the fun!
1949. Ryle publishes 'The concept of mind' and Grice writes, or unpublishes, 'Disposition and intention,' citing Ryle, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: disposition, intention. Grice's attitude towards Ryle is difficult to assess. His most favourable assessment comes from ‘Retrospective epilogue,’ but then he is referring to Ryle's fairy godmother. Initially, he mentions Ryle as a philosopher engaged in, and possibly dedicated to the practice of the prevailing Oxonian methodology, i.e. 'ordinary-language' philosophy. Initially, then, Grice enlists Ryle in the regiment of 'ordinary-language' philosophers. After introducing 'Athenian dialectic' and 'Oxonian dialectic,' Grice traces some parallelisms, which should not surprise. It is tempting to suppose that Oxonian dialectic reproduces some ideas of Athenian dialectic. It would actually be surprising if there were no parallels. Ryle was, after all, a skilled and enthusiastic student of Grecian philosophy. Interestingly, Grice then has Ryle's fairy godmother as proposing the idea that, far from being a basis for rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction, opposition that there are initially two distinct bundles of statements, bearing the labels 'analytic' and 'synthetic,' lying around in the world of thought waiting to be noticed, provides us with the key to making the analytic-synthetic distinction acceptable. The essay has a verificationist ring to it. Recall Ayer and the verificationists trying to hold water with concepts like 'fragile' and the problem of counterfactual conditionals vis-a-vis observational and theoretical concepts. Grice's essay has two parts: one on 'disposition' as such, and the second, the application to a type of psychological disposition, which would be 'phenomenalist' in a way, or verificationist, in that it derives from introspection of, shall we say, empirical phenomena. Grice is going to analyse, ‘I want a sandwich.’ One person wrote in his manuscript, 'there is something with the way Grice goes to work,' ... Still. Grice says that 'I want a sandwich' (or 'I will that I eat a sandwich') is problematic, for analysis, in that it seems to refer to experience that is essentially private and unverifiable. An analysis of 'intending that p' in terms of 'being disposed that p is satisfied' solves this. Smith wants a sandwich, or he wills that he eats a sandwich, much as Toby needs nuts, 'if' Smith opens the fridge and gets one. Smith is disposed to act such that p is satisfied. This Grice opposes to the a 'special episode' analysis of 'intending that p.' An utterance like 'I want a sandwich’ iff by uttering the utterance, the utterer is describing this or that private experience, this or that private sensation. This or that sensation may take the form of a highly specific souly sate, like what Grice calls a sandwich-wanting-feeling. But then, if he is not happy with the 'privacy' 'special-episode' analysis, Grice is also dismissive of Ryle's behaviourism in 'The concept of mind,' fresh from the press in 1949, which would describe the utterance in terms purely of this or that observable response, or behavioural output, provided this or that sensory input. Grice became friendlier with 'functionalism' after Lewis taught him how. The problem or crunch is with the first person. Surely, Grice claims, one does not need to wait to 'observe' oneself heading for the fridge before one is in a position to know that he is hungry. Grice poses a problem for the protocol-reporter. You see or observe someone else, Smith, that Smith wants a sandwich, or wills that he eats a sandwich. You ask for evidence. But when it is the agent himself who wants the sandwich, or wills that he eats a sandwich, Grice melodramatically puts it, ’I am not in the audience, not even in the front row of the stalls; I am on the stage.’ Genial, as you will agree. Grice then goes on to offer an analysis of 'intend,' his basic and target attitude, which he has just used to analyse and rephrase Peirce's ‘mean’ and which does relies on this or that piece of dispositional evidence, without divorcing itself completely from the privileged status or access of first-person introspective knowledge. In ‘Intention and uncertainty,’ Grice weakens his reductive analysis of 'intending that,' from neo-Stoutian, based on 'certainty,' or 'assurance,' to neo-Prichardian, based on predicting. All very Oxonian: Stout was the sometime Wilde reader in mental philosophy (a post usually held by a psychologist, rather than a philosopher ‒ Stout's favourite philosopher is psychologist William James! ‒ and Prichard was Cliftonian and the proper White chair of moral philosophy. And while in ‘Intention and uncertainty,’ he allows that 'willing that...' may receive a 'physicalist' treatment, qua state, he'll later turn a 'functionalist' in his Method in philosophical psychology (from the banal to the bizarre).'
1951. A pint of philosophy, Grice on Gordon, a pint of philosophy, by Alfred Brooks Gordon (Dexter, Me.) includes notes by Grice, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 8, folder 27, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Gordon. A pint of philosophy with Grice! Figurative! This is an attempt 'to formulate a philosophy of the minimum fundamental ideas that all people on the earth should come to know.' Reviewed by A. M. Honoré: ‘Short measure.’ There is a note on Gordon, Stanley Plummer scholar, e: Bowdoin and Harvard, in ‘The Eastern Gazette.’Grice would exclaim: ‘I always loved Alfred Brooks Gordon!’ Grice was slightly disapppointed that Gordon had not included the 'fundamental idea' of implicature in his pint. ‘Short measure, indeed!’
1946. The sceptic’s implicatum, common sense and scepticism, repr. in Studies in the way of words, in part II, explorations in semantics and metaphysics, as essay 8, and 'G. E. Moore and Philosopher's Paradoxes,' as essay 9, 1953, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 4-folder 13, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: common sense, scepticism, implicatum, the sceptic's implicature, philosopher's paradox, paradox, G. E. Moore, ordinary language, 'ordinary-language' philosophy, Norman Malcolm. The sceptic’s implicatum. While Grice groups these two essays as dealing with one single theme, strictly, only this or that philosopher's paradox (not all) may count as 'sceptical.' This or that philosopher's paradox may well NOT be 'sceptic' but rather 'dogmatic' at all. In fact, Grice defines 'philosopher's paradox' as anything ‘repugnant to common sense,’ shocking, or extravagant ‒ to Malcolm's ears, that is! While it is, strictly, slightly odd to quote this as ‘(1946)’ just because, by a stroke of the pen, Grice writes that date in the Harvard volume, we will follow his charming practice. This is vintage Grice. Grice always takes the sceptic's challenge seriously, as any serious philosopher should. Grice's takes both the sceptic's explicatum and the sceptics's implicatum as self-defeating, as a very affront to our idea of rationality, conversational or other. V: ‘Conversations with a sceptic: Can he be slightly more conversational helpful?’ Hume's sceptical attack is partial, and targeted only towards practical reason, though. Yet, for Grice, reason is one. You cannot really attack 'practical' or buletic reason without attacking 'theoretical' or doxastic reason. There is such thing as a general 'rational acceptance,' to use Grice's term, that the sceptic is getting at. Grice likes to play with the idea that ultimately every syllogism is buletic or practical. If, say, a syllogism by Eddington looks doxastic, that is because Eddington cares to 'omit the practical tail,' as Grice puts it. And Eddington is not even a philosopher, they say. Grice is here concerned with a Cantabrigian topic popularised by G. E. Moore. As Grice recollects, Some like Witters, but Moore's my man. Unlike Cambridge analysts such as Moore, Grice sees himself as a 'linguistic-turn' Oxonian analyst. So it is only natural that Grice would connect time-honoured scepticism (of Pyrrho's vintage) and common sense with 'ordinary language', so mis-called, the elephant in Grice's room. Liddell and Scott have σκέψις,' from 'σκέπτομαι,' which they render as 'viewing, perception by the senses,' ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ς. Pl. Phd.83a; observation of auguries, Hdn. 8. 3. 7. ', also as 'examination, speculation, consideration,' τὸ εὕρημα πολλῆς σκέψιος‘ Hp. VM4, cf. Pl. Alc. 1.130d; βραχείας ς. Id. Tht. 201a; ϝέμειν ς. take thought of a thing, v. l. in E. Hipp. 1323; ἐνθεὶς τῇ τέχνῃ ς. Ar. Ra. 974; ‘ς. ποιεῖσθαι‘ Pl. Phdr. 237d;’ς. προβέβληκας‘ Id. Phlb. 65d;’ς. λόγων‘ Id. R. 336e; ς. περί τινος inquiry into, speculation on a thing, Id. Grg. 487e, etc.; ‘περί τι‘ Id. Lg. 636d;’ἐπὶ σκέψιν τινὸς ἐλθεῖν‘ X. Oec. 6.13.2. speculation, inquiry,’ταῦτα ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως‘ Arist. Pol. 1254a34; ἔξω τῆς νῦν ς. Id. Ph. 228a20; οὐκ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης ς. Id. EN1155b9, etc. 3. hesitation, doubt, esp. of the Sceptic or Pyrthonic philosophers, AP7. 576 (Jul.); the Sceptic philosophy, S.E.P.1.5; οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ς. the Sceptics, ib. 229. 4. in politics, resolution, decree, ‘συνεδρίον‘ Hdn. 4.3.9, cf. Poll. 6.178. If scepticism attacks common sense and fails, Grice seems to be implicating, that ‘ordinary' language philosophy is a good antidote to scepticism. Since what language other than 'ordinary' language' does common sense speak? Well, strictly, common sense doesn't speak. The man in the street does. Grice addresses this topic in a Mooreian way in a later essay, also repr. in Studies, 'G. E. Moore and philosopher's paradoxes,' repr. in Studies in the Way of Words. As with his earlier 'Common sense and scepticism,' Grice tackles Moore's and Malcolm's claim that 'ordinary' language, so-called, solves a few of 'philosopher''s paradoxes. 'Philosopher' is Grice's witty way to generalise over your common-or-garden, any, philosopher, especially of the type he found eccentric, the sceptic included. Grice finds this or that problem in this overarching Cantabrigian manoeuvre, as over-simplifying a pretty convoluted terrain. While he cherishes Austin's 'Some like Witters, but Moore's MY man!' Grice finds Moore too Cantabrigian to his taste. While an Oxonian thoroughbred, Grice is a bit like Austin, 'Some like Witters, but Moore's my man,' with this or that caveat. Again, as with his treatment of Descartes or Locke, Grice is hardly interested in finding out what Moore really means. He is a philosopher, not a historian of philosophy, and he knows it. While Grice agrees with Austin's implicature that Moore goes well above Witters, if that's the expression ('even if some like him'), we should find the Oxonian equivalent to Moore. Grice would NOT name Ryle, since he sees him, and his followers, almost every day. There is something apostolic about Moore that Grice enjoys, which is just as well, seeing that Moore is one of the 'twelve.' Grice found it amusing that the members of the Conversazione Society would still be nicknamed 'apostles' 'when their number exceeded the initial 12.' Grice spends some time exploring what Malcolm, a follower of Witters, which does not help, as it were, has to say about Moore in connection with that particularly Oxonian turn of phrase, such as ''ordinary' language' is. For Malcolm's Moore, a 'paradox' by a 'philosopher' arises when 'philosopher' fails to abide by the dictates of 'ordinary' language. This infuriates Grice. Surely the ordinary man says ridiculous, or silly, as Russell prefers, things, such as ‘Smith is lucky,’ ‘Departed spirits walk along this road on their way to Paradise,’ ‘I know there are infinite stars,’ and ‘I wish I were Napoleon,’ or ’I wish that I had been Napoleon,’ which does not mean that the utterer wishes that he were like Napoleon, but that he wishes that he had lived not in the his century but in the XVIIIth century. Grice is being specific about this. It is true that an ordinary use of language, as Malcolm suggests, cannot be self-contradictory unless the ‘ordinary use of language’ is defined by stipulation as not self-contradictory, in which case an appeal to ordinary language becomes useless against this or that paradox by Philosopher. 'I wish that I had been Napoleon’ seems to involve nothing but an ordinary use of language by any standard but that of freedom from absurdity. ‘I wish that I had been Napoleon’ is not, as far as Grice can see, ‘philosophical,’ but something which may have been said and meant by numbers of ordinary people. Yet, ‘I wish that I had been Napoleon’ is open to the suspicion of self-contradictoriness, absurdity, or some other kind of meaninglessness. And in this context suspicion is all Grice needs. By uttering ‘I wish that I had been Napoleon’ U hardly means the same as he would if he uttered ‘I wish I were like Napoleon.' 'I wish that I had been Napoleon’ is suspiciously self-contradictory, absurd, or meaningless, if, as uttered by an utterer in a century other than the XVIIIth century, say, the utterer is understood as expressing the proposition that the utterer wishes that he had lived in the XVIIIth century, and not in his century, in which case he-1 wishes that he had not been him-1? But blame it on the buletic. That Moore himself is not too happy with Malcolm's criticism can be witnessed by a cursory glimpse at hi 'reply' to Malcolm. Grice is totally against this view that Malcolm ascribes to Moore as a view that is too broad to even claim to be true. Grice's implicature is that Malcolm is appealing to Oxonian turns of phrase, such as 'ordinary' language,' but not taking proper Oxonian care in clarifying the nuances and stuff in dealing with, admittedly, a non-Oxonian philosopher such as Moore. When dealing with Moore, Grice is not necessarily concerned with scepticism. 'Time is unreal,' e.g. is hardly a sceptic utterance. Yet Grice lists it as one of Philosopher's paradoxes. So, there are various keywords to consider here. Grice would start with ‘common sense.’ That's what he does when he reprints this essay in Studies in the way of words, with his attending note in both the 'Preface' and the 'Retrospective Epilogue' on how he organizes the themes and strands. 'Common sense' is one keyword there. Scepticism is another. It is intriguing that in the first two essays opening Part II, ‘Explorations in semantics and metaphysics’ in Way of Words, it seems it’s Malcolm, rather than the dryer Moore, who interests Grice most. While he would provide exegeses of this or that dictum by Moore, and indeed, Moore’s response to Malcolm, Grice seems to be more concerned with applications of his own views. Notably in ‘Philosopher’s Paradoxes.’ The ‘fatal’ objection Grice finds for the paradox-propounder (not necessarily a sceptic, although a sceptic may be one of the paradox propounders) significantly rests on Grice's reductive analysis of 'meaning that ...' as ascribed to this or that utterer U. Grice elaborates on circumstances that he’ll later take up in the 'Retrospective Epilogue. 'I find myself not understanding what I mean' is dubiously acceptable. If meaning, Grice is saying, is about an utterer U intending to get his addressee A to believe that U ψ-s that p, U must think there is a good chance that A will recognise what he is supposed to believe, by, perhaps, being aware of the U's practice or by a supplementary explanation which might come from U. In which case, U should not be meaning what Malcolm claims he might mean. No utterer should intend his addressee to believe what is ‘conceptually impossible,’ or incoherent, or blatantly false (‘Charles I’s decapitation willed Charles I’s death.’), unless you are Queen in ‘Through the Looking Glass.’ 'I believe five impossible things before breakfast, and I hope you'll soon get the proper training to follow suit ‒ cf. Tertulian, ‘Credo, quia absurdum est.’ Admittedly, Grice edits the ‘Philosopher’s Paradoxes’ essay. It is only Grice's final objection which is reprinted in Studies, even if he provides a good detailed summary of the previous sections. Grice appeals to Moore on later occasions. In ‘Causal Theory,’ Grice lists, as a third philosophical mistake, the opinion by Malcolm that Moore did not know how to use ‘know.’ Grice brings up the same example again in ‘Prolegomena.’ The use of Moore may well be a misuse. While at Madison, Wisconsin, he is lecturing at that a hall eccentrically-built with indirect lighting simulating actual sun rays, Moore infamously utters, ‘I know that there is a window behind that curtain,’ when there was not. In 'Retrospective Epilogue,' Grice uses ‘M’ to abbreviate Moore’s fairy godmother – along with G (Grice’s), A (Austin’s), R (Ryle’s) and Q (Quine’s)! One simple way to approach Grice's quandary with Malcolm's quandary with Moore is then to focus on 'know.' How can Malcolm claim that Moore is guilty of misusing 'know'? The most extensive exploration by Grice on 'know' is in Grice's third William James lecture (but cf. his seminar on 'Knowledge and belief,' and his remarks on 'Some of our beliefs NEED to be true,' in 'Meaning revisited.' The examinee knows that the battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815. Nothing odd about that, nor about Moore's uttering 'I know these are my hands.' Grice is perhaps the only one of the Oxonian philosophers of Austin's play group who took 'common sense' so seriously, if only to crticise Malcom's zeal with it. For Grice, common sense = ordinary language, whereas for the typical Austinian, ‘ordinary language’ = the language of the man in the street. Grice is contesting the usual criticism that Oxford ‘ordinary-language’ philosophers defend common-sense assumptions just because the way non-common-sense philosophers talk is not ‘ordinary’ language. Grice was infuriated by all this unclear chatter, and chooses Malcolm’s mistreatment of Moore as an example. He possible was fearful to consider Austin’s claims directly!
1948. Peirceian reflections, Grice’s rhapsody on a theme by Peirce, intending, intender, agency, meaning, repr. in Studies in the way of words, part II, explorations in semantics and metaphysics, as essay 14, The Oxford Philosophical Society, The Philosophical Review, vol. 66, pp. 377-88, C. S. Peirce's theory of signs, cf. meaning revisited, philosophical psychology, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (The Essays of H. P. Grice), carton 1-folder 16 and carton 4-folder 5, and Series V (Topical), carton 8-folder 29, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keyword: sign, meaning, intention, Peirce, Stevenson, Welby, Ewing, Ogden, Richards. The Peirce in Grice’s soul. ‘Meaning’ provides an excellent springboard to Grice to centre his analysis on 'psychological' or 'soul-y' verbs as involving the agent and the first person: smoke only figuratively 'means' fire, and the expression 'smoke' only figuratively (or metabolically) 'means' that there is fire. It is this or that utterer (say, Grice) who means, say, by uttering ‘Where there's smoke there's fire,’ or ‘ubi fumus, ibi ignis,’ that where there's smoke there's fire. A meantNN something by x is (roughly) equivalent to utterer U intends the utterance of x to produce some effect in his addressee A by means of the recognition of this intention’; and we may add that to ask what U means is to ask for a specification of the intended effect - though, of course, it may not always be possible to get a straight answer involving a 'that'-clause, for example, a belief that ... He does provide a more specific example involving the 'that'-clause at a later stage. By uttering x the utterer U means that-ψb-dp iff (Ǝ.φ).(Ǝ.f).(Ǝ.c): I. U utters x intending x to be such that anyone who has φ will think that (i) x has f (ii) f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p (iii) (Ǝ.φ'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ' will think, via thinking (i) and (ii), that U ψ-s that p (iv) in view of (3), U ψ-s that p; and II (operative only for certain substituends for 'ψb-d'). U utters x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has φ, he will, via thinking (iv), himself ψ that p; and III. It is not the case that, for some inference-element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ will both (i') rely on E in coming to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p and (ii') think that (Ǝ.φ'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ' will come to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p without relying on E. Besides St. John The Baptist, and Salome, Grice cites few names in ‘Meaning.’ But he makes a point about C. L. Stevenson! For Stevenson, smoke 'means' fire. ‘Meaning’ develops out of an interest by Grice on the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. In his essays on Peirce, Grice quotes from many other authors, including, besides Peirce himself (!), C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, and A. C. Ewing, or ‘A. C. 'Virtue is not a fire-shovel' Ewing,’ as Grice called him, and this or that cricketer! Grice had no intention to submit ‘Meaning’ to publication! Bennett, however, guessed that Grice had decided to publish it in 1957, just a year after his ‘Defence of a dogma.’ Bennett's argument is that ‘Defence of a dogma’ pre-supposes some notion of 'meaning.’ However, a different story may be told, not necessarily contradicting Bennett's! It is Strawson who submits the essay by Grice to ‘The Philosophical Review.’ Strawson had attended Grice's talk on Meaning for The Oxford Philosophical Society, and liked it! Since ‘In defence of a dogma’ was co-written with Strawson, the intention Bennett ascribes to Grice may well have been Strawson's. Oddly, Strawson later provides a famous alleged counter-example to Grice on meaning in ‘Intention and convention in speech acts,’ which has Grice dedicating a full William James lecture (No. 5) to it! An interesting fact, that confused a few, is that H. L. A. Hart quotes from Grice's ‘Meaning’ in his critical review of Holloway for The Philosophical Quarterly. Hart quotes Grice pre-dating the publication of ‘Meaning.’ Hart's point is that Holloway should have gone to Oxford! In ‘Meaning,’ Grice may be seen as a practitioner of 'ordinary-language' philosophy: witness his explorations of the factivity or lack thereof of various uses of ‘to mean.’ The second part of the essay, for which he became philosophically especially popular, takes up an intention-based approach to semantic notions. The only authority Grice cites, in typical Oxonian fashion, is Stevenson, who, from The New World (and via Yale, too!) had been defending an emotivist theory of ethics, and making a few remarks on how ‘to mean’ is used, with scare quotes, in something like a 'causal' account (‘Smoke 'means' fire.’). After its publication Grice's account received ‘almost as many alleged counterexamples as rule-utilitarianism’ (B. J. Harrison), but mostly outside Oxford, and in The New World. New-World philosophers seem to have seen Grice's attempt as reductionist and as oversimplifying. At Oxford, the sort of counterexample Grice received, before Strawson, was of the Urmson-type: refined, and subtle. 'I think your account leaves bribery behind.' On the other hand, in the New World ‒ in what Grice calls the ‘Latter-Day School of Nominalism,’ Quine is having troubles with empiricism. ‘Meaning’ was reprinted in various collections, notably in P. F. Strawson's Philosophical Logic (and it should be remembered that it was Strawson who had the thing typed and submitted for publication!). Why ‘Meaning’ should be reprinted in a collection on ‘Philosophical Logic’ only Strawson knows! But Grice does say that his account may help clarify the meaning of '... entails...'! It may be Strawson's implicature that Parkinson should have reprinted (and not merely credited) Grice's Meaning in HIS series for Oxford on ‘The theory of meaning’! The preferred quotation for Griceians is of course Grice 1948, seeing that Grice recalled the exact year when he gave the talk for the Philosophical Society at Oxford! It is however, the publication in The Philosophical Review, rather than the quieter evening at the Oxford Philosophical Society, that occasioned a tirade of alleged counter-examples by New-World philosophers. Granted, one or two Oxonians ‒ Urmson and Strawson ‒ fell in! Urmson criticises the sufficiency of Grice's account, by introducing an alleged counter-example involving bribery. Grice will consider a way out of Urmson's alleged counter-example in his fifth Wiliam James Lecture, rightly crediting and thanking Urmson for this! Strawson's alleged counter-example was perhaps slightly more serious, if regressive. It also involves the sufficiency of Grice's analysis. Strawson's ‘rat-infested house’ alleged counter-example started a chain which required Grice to avoid, ultimately, any 'sneaky' intention by way of a recursive clause to the effect that, for utterer U to have meant that p, all meaning-constitutive intentions should be 'above board.' But why this obsession by Grice with 'mean'? He is being funny. Spots surely don't mean, only ‘mean.’They don't have a mind. Yet Grice opens with a specific sample. Those spots mean, to the doctor, that you, dear, have measles. Mean? Yes, dear, 'mean,' doctor's orders. Those spots 'mean' measles. But how does the doctor know? Can't he be in the wrong? Not really, 'mean' is factive, dear! Or so Peirce thought. Grice is amazed that Peirce thought that some meaning is factive. 'The hole in this piece of cloth 'means' that a bullet went through is' is one of Peirce's examples. Surely, as Grice notes, this is an unhappy example. The hole in the cloth may well have caused by something else, or 'fabricated.' (Or 'the postmark 'means' that the letter went through the post.') Yet, Grice was having Oxonian tutees aware that Peirce was krypto-technical. Grice chose for one of his pre-’Meaning’ seminars (i.e. 1947) on Peirce's 'general' theory of signs, with emphasis on 'general,' and Peirce's correspondence with Lady Welby. Peirce, rather than the Vienna circle, becomes, in vein with Grice's dissenting irreverent rationalism, important as a source for Grice's attempt to 'English' Peirce. Grice's implicature seems to be that Peirce, rather than Ayer, cared for the subtleties of 'meaning' and 'sign', never mind a verificationist theory about them! Peirce ultra-Latinate-cum-Greek taxonomies have Grice very nervous, though. He knew that his students were proficient in the classics, but still! Grice thus proposes to reduce all of Peirceian divisions and sub-divisions (‘one sub-division too many’) to 'mean.' In the proceedings, he quotes from Ogden, Richards, and Ewing. In particular, Grice was fascinated by Peirce's correspondence with Lady Viola Welby, as reprinted by Ogden/Richards in, well, their study on the 'meaning' of meaning! Grice thought 'the science of symbolism' pretentious, but then he almost thought Lady Viola Welby 'slightly pretentious, too, if you've seen her; beautiful lady!' It is via Peirce that Grice explores examples such as those spots 'meaning' measles. Peirce's obsession is with weathercocks almost as Ockham was with circles on wine-barrels. Old-World Grice's use of New-World Peirce is illustrative, thus, of the Oxonian linguistic turn focused on 'ordinary' language. While Peirce's background was not philosophical, Grice thought it comical enough. He would say that Peirce is an 'amateur,' but then he said the same thing about Mill, whom Grice had to study by heart to get his B. A. Lit. Hum.! Plus, as Watson commented, ‘What's wrong with 'amateur'? Give me an amateur philosopher ANY day, if I have to choose from 'professional' Hegel!’ In finding Peirce krypo-technical, Grice is ensuing that his tutees, and indeed any Oxonian philosophy student (he was university lecturer) be aware that 'to mean' should be more of a priority than this or that jargon by this or that (New World?) philosopher!? Partly! Grice wanted his students to think on their own, and draw their own conclusions! Grice cites A. C. Ewing, Ogden/Richards, and many others. Ewing, while Oxford-educated, had ended up at Cambridge (Scruton almost had him as his tutor!) and written some points on ‘Meaninglessness’! ‘Those spots mean measles.’ Grice finds Peirce 'krypto-technical' and proposes to ‘English’ him into an 'ordinary-language' philosopher. Surely it is not 'important' whether we consider a measles spot a 'sign,' a 'symbol,' or an 'icon.' One might just as well find a doctor in London who thinks those spots 'symbolic.' If Grice feels like Englishing Peirce, he does not altogether fail! 1957. Meaning, reprints, of 'Meaning' and other essays, a collection of reprints and offprints of Grice's essays. Meaning becomes a central topic of at least two strands in ‘Retrospective epilogue.’ The first strand concerns the idea of the centrality of the utterer. What Grice there calls ‘meaning BY’ (versus meaning TO), i.e. as he also puts it, ‘active or agent’s meaning.’ Surely he is right in defending an agent-based account to ‘meaning.’ Peirce need not, but Grice must, because he is working with an English root, ‘mean,’ that is only figurative applicable to non-agentive items (‘Smoke ‘means’ rain’). On top, Grice wants to conclude that only RATIONAL creatures (like persons) can meanNN properly. Non-human animals may have a correlate. This is a truly important point for Grice since he surely is seen as promoting a NON-convention-based approach to ‘meaning,’ and also defending from the charge of circularity in the non-semantic account of propositional attitudes. His final picture is a rationalist one. Pirot1 wants to communicate about a danger to Pirot2. This presupposes there IS a danger (item of reality). Then Pirot1 believes there is a danger, and communicates to Pirot2 that there is a danger. This simple view of conversation as rational co-operation underlies Grice’s account of meaning too, now seen as an offshoot of philosophical psychology, and indeed biology, as he puts it. Meaning as yet another survival mechanism. While he would never use a cognate like ‘significance’ in his Oxford Philosophical Society talk, Grice eventually starts to use such Latinate cognates at a later stage of his development. In ‘Meaning,’ Grice does not explain his goal. By sticking with a root that the Oxford curriculum did not necessarily recognised as 'philosophical' (amateur Peirce did!), Grice is implicating that he is starting an 'ordinary-language' botanising on his own repertoire! Grice was amused by Ewing's reliance on very Oxonian examples contra Freddie Ayer: ‘Surely ‘Virtue ain't a fire-shovel’ is perfectly meaningful, and if fact true, if, I'll admit, somewhat misleading and practically purposeless at Cambridge.’ Again, Grice's dismissal of ‘natural’ meaning is due to the fact that ‘natural meaning’ prohibits its use in the first person and followed by a 'that'-clause. ‘I mean-N that p’ sounds absurd, no communication-function seems in the offing. Grice found, with Suppes, all types of primacy (ontological, axiological, psychological) in utterer's meaning. In 'Retrospective epilgoeu,' he goes back to the topic, as he reminisces that it is his suggestion that there are two allegedly distinguishable meaning concepts, even if one is 'metabolical,' which may be called 'natural' meaning and 'non-natural' meaning. There is this or that test (notably factivity-entailment vs. cancelation, but also scare quotes) which may be brought to bear to distinguish one concept from the other. We may, for example, inquire whether a particular occurrence of the predicate 'mean' is factive or non-factive, i. e., whether for it to be true that [so and so] means that p, it does or does not have to be the case that it is true that p. Again, one may ask whether the use of quotation marks to enclose the specification of what is meant would be inappropriate or appropriate. If factivity is present and quotation marks is be inappropriate, we have a case of natural meaning. Otherwise the meaning involved is non-natural meaning. We may now ask whether there is a single overarching idea which lies behind both members of this dichotomy of uses to which the predicate 'meaning that ...' seems to be subject. If there is such a central idea it might help to indicate to us which of the two concepts is in greater need of further analysis and elucidation and in what direction such elucidation should proceed. Grice confesses that he has only fairly recently come to believe that there is such an overarching idea and that it is indeed of some service in the proposed inquiry. The idea behind both uses of 'mean' is that of consequence, or 'consequentia,' as Hobbes has it. If [x] means that p, something which includes p or the idea of p, is a consequence of [x]. In the metabolic 'natural' use of 'meaning that p,' p, this or that consequence, is this or that state of affairs. In the literal, non-metabolic, basic, 'non-natural' use of 'meaning that p,' (as in Smith means that his neighbour's three-year child is an adult), p, this or that consequence is this or that conception or complexus which involves some other conception. This perhaps suggests that of the two concepts it is, as it should, 'non-natural' meaning which is more in need of further elucidation. It seems to be the more specialised of the pair, and it also seems to be the less determinate. We may, e. g., ask how this or that conception enters the picture. Or we may ask whether what enters the picture is the conception itself or its justifiability. On these counts Grice should look favorably on the idea that, if further analysis should be required for one of the pair, the notion of 'non-natural' meaning would be first in line. There are factors which support the suitability of further analysis for the concept of 'non-natural' meaning. 'MeaningNN that p ('non-natural meaning') does not look as if it names an original feature of items in the world, for two reasons which are possibly not mutually independent. One reason is that, given suitable background conditions, meaning, can be changed by fiat. The second reason is that the presence of meaningNN is dependent on a framework provided by 'communication,' if that's not too circular. ‘Communication’ is in the philosophical lexicon, 'commūnĭcātĭo,' from 'communicare,' "(several times in Cic., elsewh. rare),' and as they did with 'negatio' and they will with 'significatio,' Short and Lewis render, unhelpfully, as 'a making common, imparting, communicating.' ‘largitio et communicatio civitatis' (Cic. Balb. 13, 31), 'quaedam societas et communicatio utilitatum,’ id. Fin. 5, 23, 65: ‘consilii,’ id. Fam. 5, 19, 2: ‘sermonis,’ id. Att. 1, 17, 6: criminis cum pluribus, Tiro ap. Gell. 7, 3, 14: ‘nominum,’ i. e. the like appellation of several objects, Plin. 24, 14, 80, § 129: ‘juris,’ Dig. 23, 2, 1: ‘damni,’ ib. 27, 3, 1, § 14. In rhetorics, a figure of speech, translating Grecian 'ἀνακοίνωσις,' in accordance with which one turns to his hearers, and, as it were, allows them to take part in the inquiry, Cic. de Or. 3, 53, 204; Quint. 9, 1, 30; 9, 2, 20 and 23. It seems to Grice, then, at least reasonable and possibly even ephatically mandatory, to treat the claim that a communication vehicle, such as this and that expression 'means' that p, in this transferred, metaphoric, or metabolic use of 'means that ...' as being reductively analysable in terms of this or that feature of this or that utterer, communicator, or user of this or that expression. The use of 'meaning that ...' as applied to this or that expression is posterior to and explicable through the utterer-oriented, or utterer-relativised use, i.e. involving a reference to this or that communicator or user of this or that expression. More specifically, one should license a metaphorical use of 'mean,' where one allows the claim that this or that expression 'means' that p, provided that this or that utterer, in this or that 'standard' fashion, means that p, i.e. in terms of this or that souly statee toward this or that propositional complexus this or that utterer ntends, in a standardly fashion, to produce by his uttering this or that utterance. That this or that expression 'means' (in this metaphorical use) that p is thus explicable either in terms of this or that souly state which is standardly intended to produce in this or that addressee A by this or that utterer of this or that expression, or in this or that souly staken up by this or that utterer toward this or that activity or action of this or that utterer of this or that expression. ‘Meaning’ was in the air in Oxford’s linguistic turn. Everybody was talking ‘meaning.’ Grice manages to quote from R. M. Hare’s early “Mind” essay on the difference between imperatives and indicatives, also A. E. Duncan-Jones on ‘fugitive propositions,’ and of course his beloved P. F. Strawson. Grice was also concerned by the fact that in the typical ‘ordinary-language’ philosopher’s manoeuvre, there is a constant abuse of ‘mean.’ Surely Grice wants to stick with the utterer’s meaning as the primary use. Expressions ‘mean’ only derivatively. To do that, he chose Peirce to see if he could clarify it with ‘meaning that.’ Grice knew that the polemic was even stronger in London, with C. K. Ogden and Lady Viola Welby. In the more academic Oxford ‘milieu,’ Grice knew that a proper examination of ‘meaning,’ would lead him, via Kneale and his researches on the history of ‘semantics,’ to the topic of 'significatio,' that obsessed the 'modistae' (and their 'modus significandi). For what does Lewis and Short say about about this? There is indeed an entry for 'signĭfĭcātĭo,' f. 'significare.' Lewis and Short render it, unhelpfully, as “a pointing out, indicating, denoting, signifying; an expression, indication, mark, sign, token, = indicium, signum, 'ἐπισημασία,' etc., freq. and class. Most likely Grice should go sraight to ‘significo.’ signĭfĭco, also dep. signĭfĭcor (Gell. 18, 12, 10, without an example), significare, from signum-facere, to make sign, 'signum-facio,' I make sign, which Lewis and Short render as 'to signify', which is perhaps not too helpful. Grice (if not the Grecians) knew that. Strictly, Lewis and Short render 'significare' as 'to show by signs; to show, point out, express, publish, make known, indicate; to intimate, notify, signify, etc.' Note that the cognate 'signify' almost comes last, but not least, if not first. Enough to want to coin a word to do duty for them all! Which is what Grice (and the Grecians) can, but the old Romans cannot, with 'mean.' If that above were not enough, Lewis and Short go on, 'also, to betoken, prognosticate, foreshow, portend, MEAN (syn. praedico), as in to betoken a change of weather (post-Aug.): “ventus Africus tempestatem significat, etc.,” Col. 11, 2, 4 sq.: cf. Grice on those dark clouds 'mean' a storm is coming. Short and Lewis go on, to say that 'significare' may be rendered as 'to call, name: To mean, import, signify. Hence, signĭfĭcans, in rhet. lang., of speech, full of meaning, expressive, significant; graphic, distinct, clear: Adv.: signĭfĭcanter , clearly, distinctly, expressly, significantly, graphically: “breviter ac significanter ordinem rei protulisse,” Quint. 11, 1, 53: “rem indicare (with proprie),” id. 12, 10, 52: “dicere (with ornate),” id. 1, 7, 32. Comp.: “apertius, significantius dignitatem alicujus defendere,” Cic. Fam. 3, 12, 3: “narrare,” Quint. 10, 1, 49: “disponere,” id. 3, 6, 65: “appellare aliquid (with consignatius),” Gell. 1, 25, 8: “dicere (with probabilius),” id. 17, 2, 11. Sup., Pseudo Quint. Decl. 247. If perhaps Grice was unhappy about the artificial flavour to saying that a word is a 'sign,' Grice surely should have checked with all the Grecian-Roman cognates of 'mean,' as in his favourite 'memorative-memorable' distinction, and the many Grecian realisations, or with Old Roman ‘mentire’ and ‘mentare.’ mentĭor or mentire, Lewis and Short note, is 'prob. from root 'men-', whence 'mens' and 'memini,' q. v. The original meaning, they say, is 'to invent,' hence, but alla Umberto Eco with 'sign,' 'mentire' comes to mean in later use what Grice (if not the Grecians) holds is the opposite of 'mean'. Short and Lewis render 'mentire' as 'to lie, cheat, deceive, etc., to pretend, to declare falsely: 'mentior nisi' or 'si mentior,' a form of asseveration, I am a liar, if, etc.: But also, animistically (modest mentalism?) of things, as endowed with a mind. Lewis and Short go on: 'to deceive, impose upon, to deceive one's self, mistake, to lie or speak falsely about, to assert falsely, make a false promise about; to feign, counterfeit, imitate a shape, nature, etc.: to devise a falsehood, to assume falsely, to promise falsely, to invent, feign, of a poetical fiction: “ita mentitur (sc. Homerus), Trop., of inanim. grammatical subjects, as in 'Semel fac illud, mentitur tua quod subinde tussis, Do what your cough keeps falsely promising, i. e. die, Mart. 5, 39, 6. 'Do what your cough means!' =imp. die!; hence, mentĭens, a fallacy, sophism: quomodo mentientem, quem ψευδόμενον vocant, dissolvas, Cic. Div. 2, 4, 11, mentītus, imitated, counterfeit, feigned (poet.): “mentita tela,” Verg. A. 2, 422. For “mentior,” indeed, there is a Griceian implicatum involving rational control. The rendition of 'mentire' as 'to lie' stems from a figurative shift from 'to be mindful, or inventive, to have second thoughts" to "to lie, conjure up". But Grice would also have a look at cognate “memini,” since this is also cognate with “mind,” “mens,” and covers subtler instances of ‘mean,’ as in Latinate, “mention,” as in Grice’s “use-mention” distinction. mĕmĭni, cognate with "mean" and German "meinen," to think = Grecian ὑπομένειν, await (cf. Schiffer, "remnants of meaning," if I think, I hesitate, and therefore re-MAIN. Cf. Gr. μεν- in μένω, Μέντωρ; μαν- in μαίνομαι, μάντις; μνᾶ- in μιμνήσκω, etc.; cf.: maneo, or manere, as in ‘remain.' The idea, as Schiffer well knows or means, being that if you think, you hesitate, and therefore, ‘wait’ and ‘remain’], moneo, reminiscor [cf. reminiscence], mens, Minerva, etc. which Lewis and Short render as “to remember, recollect, to think of, be mindful of a thing; not to have forgotten a person or thing, to bear in mind (syn.: reminiscor, recordor).” Surely with a relative clause, and to make mention of, to mention a thing, either in speaking or writing (rare but class.): Hence. mĕmĭnens, mindful And then Grice would have a look at ‘moneo,’ as in ‘adMONish,’ also cognate. mŏnĕo, monere, causative from the root "men;" whence memini, q. v., mens (mind), mentio (mention); lit. to cause to think, to re-mind, put in mind of, bring to one's recollection; to admonish, advise, warn, instruct, teach (syn.: hortor, suadeo, doceo). Lewis and Short are Griceian if not Grecian when they note that 'monere' can be used "without the accessory notion [implicatum or entanglement, that is] of reminding or admonishing, in gen., to teach, instruct, tell, inform, point out; also, to announce, predict, foretell, even if also to punish, chastise (only in Tacitus): “puerili verbere moneri,” Tac. A. 5, 9. And surely, since he loved to re-minisced, Grice would have allowed to just earlier on just ‘minisced.’ Short and Lewis indeed have ‘rĕmĭniscor,’ which, as they point out, features the root men; whence mens, memini; and which they compare to 'comminiscere, v. comminiscor,’ to recall to mind, recollect, remember (syn. recordor), often used by the Old Romans with with Grice's beloved 'that'-clause, for sure. For what is the good of reminiscing or comminiscing, if you cannot reminisce that Austin always reminded Grice that skipping the dictionary was his big mistake! If Grice uses 'mention,' cognate with 'mean,' he loved commenting Aristotle. And 'commentare' is, again, cognate with 'mean.' As opposed to the development of the root in Grecian, or English, in Roman the root for 'mens' is quite represented in many Latinate cognates. But a Roman, if not a Grecian, would perhaps be puzzled by a Grice claiming, by intuition, to retrieve the necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of this or that expression. When the Roman is told that the Griceian did it for fun, he understands, and joins in the fun!
1949. Ryle publishes 'The concept of mind' and Grice writes, or unpublishes, 'Disposition and intention,' citing Ryle, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: disposition, intention. Grice's attitude towards Ryle is difficult to assess. His most favourable assessment comes from ‘Retrospective epilogue,’ but then he is referring to Ryle's fairy godmother. Initially, he mentions Ryle as a philosopher engaged in, and possibly dedicated to the practice of the prevailing Oxonian methodology, i.e. 'ordinary-language' philosophy. Initially, then, Grice enlists Ryle in the regiment of 'ordinary-language' philosophers. After introducing 'Athenian dialectic' and 'Oxonian dialectic,' Grice traces some parallelisms, which should not surprise. It is tempting to suppose that Oxonian dialectic reproduces some ideas of Athenian dialectic. It would actually be surprising if there were no parallels. Ryle was, after all, a skilled and enthusiastic student of Grecian philosophy. Interestingly, Grice then has Ryle's fairy godmother as proposing the idea that, far from being a basis for rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction, opposition that there are initially two distinct bundles of statements, bearing the labels 'analytic' and 'synthetic,' lying around in the world of thought waiting to be noticed, provides us with the key to making the analytic-synthetic distinction acceptable. The essay has a verificationist ring to it. Recall Ayer and the verificationists trying to hold water with concepts like 'fragile' and the problem of counterfactual conditionals vis-a-vis observational and theoretical concepts. Grice's essay has two parts: one on 'disposition' as such, and the second, the application to a type of psychological disposition, which would be 'phenomenalist' in a way, or verificationist, in that it derives from introspection of, shall we say, empirical phenomena. Grice is going to analyse, ‘I want a sandwich.’ One person wrote in his manuscript, 'there is something with the way Grice goes to work,' ... Still. Grice says that 'I want a sandwich' (or 'I will that I eat a sandwich') is problematic, for analysis, in that it seems to refer to experience that is essentially private and unverifiable. An analysis of 'intending that p' in terms of 'being disposed that p is satisfied' solves this. Smith wants a sandwich, or he wills that he eats a sandwich, much as Toby needs nuts, 'if' Smith opens the fridge and gets one. Smith is disposed to act such that p is satisfied. This Grice opposes to the a 'special episode' analysis of 'intending that p.' An utterance like 'I want a sandwich’ iff by uttering the utterance, the utterer is describing this or that private experience, this or that private sensation. This or that sensation may take the form of a highly specific souly sate, like what Grice calls a sandwich-wanting-feeling. But then, if he is not happy with the 'privacy' 'special-episode' analysis, Grice is also dismissive of Ryle's behaviourism in 'The concept of mind,' fresh from the press in 1949, which would describe the utterance in terms purely of this or that observable response, or behavioural output, provided this or that sensory input. Grice became friendlier with 'functionalism' after Lewis taught him how. The problem or crunch is with the first person. Surely, Grice claims, one does not need to wait to 'observe' oneself heading for the fridge before one is in a position to know that he is hungry. Grice poses a problem for the protocol-reporter. You see or observe someone else, Smith, that Smith wants a sandwich, or wills that he eats a sandwich. You ask for evidence. But when it is the agent himself who wants the sandwich, or wills that he eats a sandwich, Grice melodramatically puts it, ’I am not in the audience, not even in the front row of the stalls; I am on the stage.’ Genial, as you will agree. Grice then goes on to offer an analysis of 'intend,' his basic and target attitude, which he has just used to analyse and rephrase Peirce's ‘mean’ and which does relies on this or that piece of dispositional evidence, without divorcing itself completely from the privileged status or access of first-person introspective knowledge. In ‘Intention and uncertainty,’ Grice weakens his reductive analysis of 'intending that,' from neo-Stoutian, based on 'certainty,' or 'assurance,' to neo-Prichardian, based on predicting. All very Oxonian: Stout was the sometime Wilde reader in mental philosophy (a post usually held by a psychologist, rather than a philosopher ‒ Stout's favourite philosopher is psychologist William James! ‒ and Prichard was Cliftonian and the proper White chair of moral philosophy. And while in ‘Intention and uncertainty,’ he allows that 'willing that...' may receive a 'physicalist' treatment, qua state, he'll later turn a 'functionalist' in his Method in philosophical psychology (from the banal to the bizarre).'
1951. A pint of philosophy, Grice on Gordon, a pint of philosophy, by Alfred Brooks Gordon (Dexter, Me.) includes notes by Grice, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 8, folder 27, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Gordon. A pint of philosophy with Grice! Figurative! This is an attempt 'to formulate a philosophy of the minimum fundamental ideas that all people on the earth should come to know.' Reviewed by A. M. Honoré: ‘Short measure.’ There is a note on Gordon, Stanley Plummer scholar, e: Bowdoin and Harvard, in ‘The Eastern Gazette.’Grice would exclaim: ‘I always loved Alfred Brooks Gordon!’ Grice was slightly disapppointed that Gordon had not included the 'fundamental idea' of implicature in his pint. ‘Short measure, indeed!’
1954. Identity, category, predicable, categories: Aristotle and beyond, categories, with J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson, Categoriæ, Aristotle's Categoriæ, 1955, 1956, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice, IA ‒ Code), carton 1-folders 5-6, Series II (Esssays), carton 4-folders 6-7, Series III (The Doctrines), carton 5-folder 22, and Series V (Topical), carton 6-folders 15 and 23, carton 7-folder 10, and carton 9-folder 13, BANC MSS 90/a35c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Grice, Code, izzing, hazzing. category, Aristotle, Strawson, Austin, category shift, Categoriæ, identity, relative identity, the Grice-Myro theory of identity, metaphysics, Myro, Code. Grice’s category shift. If Grice, like Humpty Dumpty, opposes the Establishment with his meaning liberalism ('what a word means is what I mean'), he certainly should be concerned with category shifts! Plus, he was a closet Platonist. 'As Plato once remarked, having the ability to see horses but not horsehood is a mark of stupidity. Grice would give joint seminars at Oxford with J. L. Austin on the first two books of Aristotle's Organon, Categoriae, and De Interpretatione. Grice found Aristotle's use of a 'category,' 'κατηγορία,' a bit of a geniality. Aristotle is using legalese (from 'kata,' against, on, and 'agoreuô' [ἀγορεύω], speak in public), and uses it to designate both the prosecution in a trial and the attribution in a logical proposition — that is, the questions that must be asked with regard to a subject, and the answers that can be given. As a representative of the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy, Grice is attracted to the idea that a category can thus be understood variously, as applying to the realm of reality (ontology), but also to the philosophy of language (category of expression) and to philosophical psychology (category of representation). Grice kept his explorations on categories under two very separate, shall we say, categories: his explorations with J. L. Austin (very serious), and those with P. F. Strawson (more congenial). Where is Smith's altruism? Nowhere to be seen. Should we say it is idle (otiose) to speak of altruism? No, it is just an attribute, which, via category shift, can be made the subject of your sentence, Strawson. It's not spatio-temporal, though, right? Not really. ‒ I don't particularly like your 'trouser words.' The essay is easy to date since Grice notes that Strawson reproduced some of the details in his ‘Individuals,’ dated 1959. Grice thought Aristotle was the best! Or at any rate almost as good as Kantotle! Aristotle saw Categoriæ, along with De Interpretatione as part of his 'Organon.' However, philosophers of language tend to explore these topics without a consideration of the later parts of the Organon dealing with the syllogism, the tropes, and the topics ‒ ‘the boring bits!’ The reason Grice is attracted to the Aristotelian category (as Austin and Strawson equally were) is that 'category' allows for a 'linguistic-turn' reading. Plus, it's a nice, pretentious (in the Oxonian way) piece of philosophical jargon! Aristotle couldn't find 'category' in the 'koine,' so he had to coin it. While meant by Aristotle in a primarily ontological way, Oxonian philosophers hasten to add that a 'category of expression,' as Grice puts it, is just as valid a topic for philosophical exploration. His tutee Strawson will actually publish a book on subject and predicate in grammar! (‘Trivial, Strawson!’). Grice will later add an intermediary category, which is the subject of his philosophical psychology. As such, a category can be construed ontologically, or representationally: the latter involving philosophical psychological concepts, and expressions themselves. For Aristotle, as Grice and Austin, and Grice and Strawson, were well aware as they educated some of the poor at Oxford (‘Only the poor learn at Oxford’ ‒ Arnold), there are (at least ‒ at most?) ten categories. Grice doesn't (really) care about the number. But the first are important. Actually the very first: there's 'substantia prima,' such as Grice. And then there's 'substantia secunda,' such as Grice's rationality. The 'essentia.' Then there are various types of 'attributes.' But, as Grice sharply notes, even 'substantia secunda' may be regarded as an 'attribute.' Grice's favourite game with Strawson was indeed ‘Category Shift,’ or ‘Subject-ification,’ as Strawson preferred. Essence may be introduced as a sub-type of an attribute. We would have 'substantia prima' AND 'attribute,' which in turn gets divided into 'essential' (the izzing) and 'non-essential' (the hazzing). While Austin was not so fun to play with, Strawson is. ‘Banbury is a very altruist person.’ Where is his altruism? Nowhere to be seen, really. Yet we may sensically speak of Banbury's altruism. It's just a matter of a 'category shift'! (Grice scores). Grice was slightly disappointed, but he perfectly understood, that Strawson, who had footnoted Grice as 'the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about logic' in ‘Introduction to Logical Theory,’ fails to acknowledge that most of the research in Strawson's ‘Individuals: an essay in descriptive (not revisionary) metaphysics’ derives from the conclusions reached at his joint philosophical investigations with Grice. Grice will later elaborate on this with A. D. Code ‒ who was keen on Grice's other game, The hazz and the hazz not, the izz. But then 'tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about metaphysics' sounds slightlier clumsier, as far as the implicature goes! Categories, 1973, The Grice-Myro theory of identity, Relative identity, Grice on ‘=,’ The Grice-Myro theory of identity, identity, notes, with G. Myro, metaphysics, philosophy, 1974, 1977, 1980, with A. D. Code, Grice izz Grice – or izz he? The idea that ‘=’ is unqualified requires qualification. Whitehead and Russell ignored this. Grice and Myro didn't! Grice wants to allow for ‘It is the case that a = b /t1’ and ‘ It is not the case that a = b /t2.’ The idea is intuitive, but philosophers of a Leibnizian bent are too accustomed to deal with ‘=‘ as an absolute. Grice applies this to 'human' vs. 'person.' A human may be identical to a person, but cease to be so. Indeed, Grice's earlier attempt to produce a reductive analsysis of 'I' may be seen as remedying a circularity he detected in Locke about 'same.’ Cf. Wiggins, Sameness and substance. Grice makes Peano feel deeply Griceian, as Grice lists his ‘=‘ postulates, here for consideration. And if you wondered why Grice preferred Latinate ‘individuum’ to the Grecian, here’s the Grecian, ἄτομος , ον, Logic, individual, of terms, Pl.Sph.229d; of the εἶδος, Arist. Metaph.1034a8, de An. 414b27.2. individual, Id. APo. 96b11, al.: Subst. ἄτομον, τό, Id. Cat. 1b6, 3a38, Metaph.1058a18 (pl.), Plot.6.2.2, al. subst.: indīvĭdŭum , i, n., an atom, indivisible particle: ‘ex illis individuis, unde omnia Democritus gigni affirmat,’ Cic. Ac. 2, 17 fin.:‘ne individuum quidem, nec quod dirimi distrahive non possit,’ id. N. D. 3, 12, 29. Note the use of alethic modalities for necessity and possibility, starting with (11). 1. ⊢ (α izz α). This would be the principle of non-contradiction or identity. Grice applies it wo 'war': 'War is war,' as yielding 'a most peculiar implicature.' 2. ⊢ (α izz β ∧ β izz γ) ⊃ α izz γ This above is transitivity, which is crucial for Grice's tackling of Reid's counterexample to Locke (and which according to A. G. N. Flew in "Locke on personal identity" was predated by Berkeley. 3. ⊢ α hazz β ⊃ ~(α izz β). Or, what is accidental is not essential. Grice allows that 'what is essential is accidental' is, while misleading, true. 4. ⊢ α hazz β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(α hazz x ∧ x izz β) 5. ⊢ (∀β)(β is a universalium ⊃ β is a forma). This above defines a 'universalium' as a 'forma,' or 'eidos.' 6. ⊢ (α hazz β ∧ α is a particular) ⊃ (∃γ).(γ≠α ∧ α izz β) 7. ⊢ α is predicable of β ⊃⊂ ((β izz α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazz x ∧ x izz α) 8. ⊢ α is essentially predicable of β ⊃⊂ β izz α 9. ⊢ α is non-essentially/accidentally predicable of β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(β hazz x ∧ x izz α) 10. ⊢ α = β ⊃⊂ α izz β ∧ β izz α 11. ⊢ α is an individuum ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(β izz α ⊃ α izz β) 12. ⊢ α is a particular ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(α is predicable of β ⊃ (α izz β ∧ β izz α)) 13. ⊢ α is a universalium ⊃⊂ ◊(∃β)(α is predicable of α ∧ ~(α izz β ∧ β izz α) 14. ⊢ α is some-thing ⊃ α is an individuum15. ⊢ α is a forma ⊃ (α is some-thing ∧ α is a universalium) 16. ⊢ α is predicable of β ⊃⊂ (β izz α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazz x ∧ x izz α) 17. ⊢ α is essentially predicable of α 18. ⊢ α is accidentally predicable of β ⊃ α ≠ β 19. ⊢ ~(α is accidentally predicable of β) ⊃ α ≠ β 20. ⊢ α is a particular ⊃ α is an individuum 21. ⊢ α is a particular ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izz α) 22. ⊢~ (∃x).(x is a particular ∧ x is a forma) 23. ⊢ α is a forma ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izz α) 24. ⊢ x is a particular ⊃ ~(∃β)(α izz β) 25. ⊢ α is a forma ⊃ ((α is predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ β hazz α) 26. ⊢ α is a forma ∧ β is a particular ⊃ (α is predicable of β ⊃⊂ β hazz A) 27. ⊢ (α is a particular ∧ β is a universalium ∧ β is predicable of α) ⊃ (∃γ)(α ≠ γ ∧ γ is essentially predicable of α) 28. ⊢ (∃x) (∃y)(x is a particular ∧ y is a universalium ∧ y is predicable of x ⊃ ~(∀x)(x is a universalium ∧ x is some-thing) 29. ⊢ (∀β)(β is a universalium ⊃ β is some-thing) 30. ⊢ α is a particular) ⊃ ~∃β.(α ≠ β ∧ β is essentially predicable of α) 31. ⊢ (α is predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ α is non-essentially or accidentally predicable of β. The use of this or that doxastic modality, necessity and possibility, starting with (11) above, make this a good place to consider one philosophical mistake Grice mentions in ‘Causal Theory’: 'What is actual is not also possible.' (Cf. 'What is essential is also accidental.' He is criticising a 'contemporary' (if 'dated') form of 'ordinary-language' philosophy, where the philosopher detects a nuance, and embarks risking colliding with the facts, rushing ahead to exploit it before he can clarify it! Grice liked to see his explorations on ‘=‘ as belonging to metaphysics, as the Series on his ‘Doctrines’ at the Grice Collection testifies. While Grice presupposes the use of ‘=‘ in his treatment of 'the' king of France, he also explores a relativisation of ‘=.’ His motivation was an essay by Wiggins, almost Aristotelian in spirit, against Strawson's criterion of space-time continuancy for the identification of the 'substantia prima.' Grice wants to apply '=' to cases were the time continuancy is made explicit. This yields that 'a=b' in scenario S, but that it may not be the case that ‘a = b’ in a second scenario S'. Myro had an occasion to expand on Grice's views in his contribution on the topic for Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends, or P. G. R. I. C. E. for short. Myro mentions his System Ghp, a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of Grice's System Q, ‘in gratitude to’ to Grice. Grice explored also the logic of izzing and hazzing with A. D. Code. Grice and Myro developed a Geach-type of 'qualified identity.' The formal aspects were developed by Myro, and also by Code. Grice discussed Wiggins's Sameness and substance, rather than Geach. Cf. Wiggins and Strawson on Grice for the British Academy. At Oxford, Grice was more or less given free rein to teach what he wanted. He found the New World slightly disconcerting at first. At Oxford, he expected his tutees to be willing to 'read' the classics in the vernacular Greek. His approach to teaching was diagogic, as Socrates's! Even in his details of 'izzing' and 'hazzing.' ‘Greek enough to me!,’ as a student recalled! 1980, correspondence with A. D. Code, Grice sees in Code an excellent Aristotelian. They collaborated on an exploration of Aristotle's underlying logic of essential and non-essential predication, for which they would freely use such verbal forms as 'izzing' and 'hazzing.' 1980, izzing and hazzing, The Grice Papers, A. D. Code on the significance of the middle book in Aristotle's Metaphysics, keywords: Aristotle, metaphysics, the middle book. Very middle. Grice never knew what was middle for Aristotle, but admired Code too much to air this! The organisation of Aristotle's metaphysics was a topic of much concern for Grice. With Code, Grice coined 'izzing' and 'hazzing' to refer to essential and non-essential attribution. Izzing and hazzing, Aristotle on the multiplicity of being, Aristotle on multiplicity, The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1988, posthumously ed. by B. F. Loar, keywords: Aristotle, multiplicity, izzing, hazzing, being, good, Code. Grice offers a thorough discussion of Owen’s treatment of Aristotle as leading us to the 'snares' of ontology. Grice distinguishes between 'izzing' and 'hazzing,' which he thinks help in clarifying, 'more axiomatico,' what Aristotle is getting at with his remarks on 'essential' versus 'non-essential' predication. Surely, for Grice, 'being,' nor indeed 'good,' should not be multiplied beyond necessity, but izzing and hazzing are already multiplied. The Grice Papers contains drafts of the essay eventually submitted for publication by Loar ‘in memoriam’ Grice.' Note that the Grice Papers contains a typically Griceian 'un-publication,' entitled 'Aristotle and multiplicity' simpliciter. Rather than ‘Aristotle on,’ as the title for The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly piece goes. Note also that, since it's 'multiplicity' simpliciter, it refers to Aristotle on two key ideas: being and the good. As Code notes in his contribution to P. G. R. I. C. E., Grice first presents his thoughts on izzing and hazzing publicly at Vancouver. R. B. Jones has developed the axiomatic treatment favoured by Grice. For Grice there is 'multiplicity' in both 'being' and 'good' (ton agathon), both accountable in terms of conversational implicata, of course. If in ‘Prolegomena,’ Grice was interested in criticising himself, in essays of historical nature like these, Grice is seeing Aristotle's ‘Athenian dialectic’ as a foreshadow of the ‘Oxonian dialectic,’ and treating him as an equal. Grice is yielding his razor: senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. But then Aristotle is talking about the 'multiplicity' of '... is ...' and '... is good.' Surely, there are ways to turn Aristotle into the monoguist he has to be! There is a further item in the Grice collection that combines Aristotle on being with Aristotle on good, which is relevant in connection with this. Aristotle on being and good ('ἀγαθόν'). 1970, keywords: Aristotle, being, good (agathon), ‘ἀγαθός.’ As from this folder, the essays are ordered alphabetically, starting with ‘Aristotle,’ Grice will explore Aristotle on 'being' or ‘is’ and ‘good’ (‘ἀγαθός‘) in explorations with A. D. Code. Grice comes up with 'izzing' and 'hazzing' as the two counterparts to Aristotle's views on, respectively, essential and non-essential predication. Grice's views on Aristotle on 'the good' (strictly, there is no need to restrict Arisstotle's use to the neuter form, since he employs ‘ἀγαθός‘) connect with Grice's Aristotelian idea of 'eudaemonia,' that he explores elsewhere. Strictly: Aristotle on being and the good. If that had been Grice's case, he would have used the definite article. Otherwise, 'good' may well translate as masculine, ‘ἀγαθός‘ ‒the agathetic implicatum. He plays with Dodgson, 'cabbages and kings.' For what 'is' a 'good' cabbage as opposed to 'a cabbage'? It does not require very sharp eyes, but only our willingness to use the eyes one has, to see that speech is permeated with the notion of purpose.’ ’To say what a certain kind of thing is is only too frequently partly to say that it is for.’ ’This feature applies to talk of, e. g., ships, shoes, sailing wax, and kings; and, possibly and perhaps most excitingly, it extends even to cabbages!’ Although Grice suspects Urmson might disagree. v. Grice on Urmson's apples. Grice at his jocular best. If he is going to be a Kantian, he will. He uses Kantian jargon to present his theory of conversation. This he does only at Harvard. The implicature being that talking of vaguer assumptions of helpfulness would not sound too convincing. So he has the maxim, the super-maxim, and the sub-maxim. A principle and a maxim is Kantian enough. But when he actually echoes Kant, is when he introduces what he later calls the conversational categories – the keyword here is ‘conversational category,' as 'categoria' is used by Aristotle and Kant ‒ or Kantotle. Grice surely knew that, say, his ‘Category of Conversational Modality’ had nothing to do with the Kantian Category of Modality. Still, he stuck with the idea of four categories (versus Aristotle's 'ten,' 'eight' or 'seven,' as the text you consult may tell you): category of conversational quantity (which at Oxford he had formulated in much vaguer terms like ‘strength’ and informativeness and entailment), the category of conversational quality (keyword: principle of conversational trust), and the category of conversational relation, where again Kant’s ‘relation’ has nothing to do with the maxim Grice associates with this category. In any case, his Kantian joke may be helpful when considering the centrality of the concept ‘category’ simpliciter that Grice had to fight with with his pupils at Oxford – he was lucky to have Austin and Strawson as co-lecturers! Grice was irritated by Liddell and Scott defining 'kategoria' as 'category.' 'I guess I knew that.' He agreed with their second shot, ‘predicable.’ Ultimately, Grice's concern with 'category' is his concern with 'person,' or 'prote ousia,' as used by Aristotle, and as giving a rationale to Grice's agency-based approach to the philosophical enterprise. Aristotle used kategorein in the sense of to predicate, assert something of something, and kategoria. The ‘prote ousia’ is exemplified by 'o tis anthropos.' It is obvious that Grice wants to approach Aristotle's semantics and Aristotle's metaphysics ‘at one fell swoop.’ Grice reads Aristotle's Metaphysics, and finds it 'understandable.' Consider the adjective 'French' (which Aristotle does NOT consider) ‒ as it occurs in phrases such as Michel Foucault is a French citizen. H. P. Grice is not a French citizen. Michel Foucault once wrote a nice French poem. J. O. Urmson once wrote a nice French essay on pragmatics. Michel Foucault was a French professor. Michel Foucault is a French professor. Michel Foucault is a French professor of philosophy. The following features are perhaps significant. The appearance of the adjective 'French,’ or Byzantine, as the case might be ‒ cf. ‘I'm feeling French tonight’) in these phrases is what Grice calls 'adjunctive' rather than 'conjunctive,' or 'attributive.' A French poem is not necessarily something which combines the separate features of being a poem and being French, as a tall philosopher would simply combine the features of being tall and of being a philosopher. 'French' in 'French poem,' occurs adverbially. 'French citizen' _standardly_ means ‘citizen of France.’ 'French poem' _standardly_ means ‘poem in French’. But it is a _mistake_ to suppose that this fact _implies_ that there is this or that meaning, or, worse, this or that Fregeian sense, of the expression 'French'. In any case, only metaphorically or metabolically can we say that 'French' 'means' this or that or has sense. An utterer means. An utterer makes sense. Cf. R. Paul's doubts about capitalizing 'major.' 'French' means, and figuratively at that, only one thing, viz. 'of or pertaining to France.' And 'English' only means 'of or pertaining to England.' 'French' may be what Grice (unfollowing his remarks on ‘The general theory of context’) call 'context-sensitive'. One might indeed say, if you like, that while 'French' means ‒ or 'means' only this or that, or that its only sense is this or that, 'French' still means, again figuratively, a variety of things. 'French' means-in-context ‘of or pertaining to France. Symbolise that as expression E 'means'-in-context that p. Expression E 'means-in-context C2 that p2. Relative to Context C1 'French' means 'of France'; as in the phrase 'French citizen.' Relative to context C2, 'French' means ' in the French language, as in the phrase, 'French poem' ‒ whereas 'history' does not behave, like this. Whether the focal item is a universal or a particular is, contra Aristotle, quite irrelevant to the question of what this or that related adjective ‘means,’ or what its sense is. The medical art is no more what an utterer means when he utters the adjective 'medical', as is 'France' what an utterer means by the adjective 'French'. While the attachment of this or that context may suggest an interpretation in context of this or that expression as uttered by the utterer U, it need not be the case that such a suggestion is indefeasible. It might be e.g. that 'French poem' would have to mean, ‘poem composed in French’, unless there were counter indications, that brings the utterer and the addressee to a different context C3. In which case, perhaps what the utterer means by 'French poem' is 'poem composed by a French competitor' in this or that competition. For 'French professor' there would be two obvious things an utterer might mean. ‘Disambiguation’ will depend on the wider expression-context or in the situational context attaching to the this or that circumstance of utterance.
1955. Please, agreebleness, leasure, Aristotle on pleasure, Aristotle: pleasure, hedonism, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 4, folder 8, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: hedonism, pleasure, Aristotle, agreeableness, happiness, system of ends, ends, end, desire, satisfaction, delight. Griceian pleasures! This is obviously philosophical, especially for the Grecian hedonistic Epicureians made popular by Marius and Walter Pater at Osford. Liddell and Scott have "ἡδονή," Dor. ἁδονά (or in Trag. chorus ἡδονά S. OT1339), from "ἥδομαι," and which they render as 'enjoyment, pleasure,' first in Simon.71, S.l.c., Hdt. 1.24, al.; prop. of sensual pleasures, αἱ τοῦ σώματος or περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡ., X. HG 4.8.22,6.1.4; αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡ. Pl. R. 328d; σωματικαὶ ἡ. Arist. Eth. Nich. 1151a13; αἱ περὶ πότους καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡ. Pl R. 389e; but also ἀκοῆς ἡ. Th.3.38; ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡ. Pl. R. 582b; of malicious pleasure, ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, ἐπὶ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἡ., Id. Phlb. 50a, D. 18. 138; ἡδονῇ ἡσσᾶσθαι, ἡδοναῖς χαρίζεσθαι, to give way to pleasure, Th. l.c., Pl. Lg. 727c; κότερα ἀληθείη χρήσομαι ἢ ἡδονῆ; shall I speak truly or so as to humour you? Hdt. 7.101; εἰ ὑμῖν ἡδονὴ τοῦ ἡγεμονεύειν ib. 160; ἡ. εἰσέρχεταί τιϝι εἰ . . one feels pleasure at the thought that.., Id. 1. 24; ἡδονὴν ἔχειν τινός to be satisfied with, S. OC 1604; ἡδονὴν ἔχει, φέρει, Pherecr. 145. 2, Alex. 263.6; ἡδονὴ ἰδέσθαι (θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι), of a temple, Hdt. 2. 137, ‘δαίμοσιν πρὸς ἡδονήν‘ A. Pr. 494; ὃ μέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡ. D. 18.4; πρὸς ἡ. λέγειν to speak so as to please another, S. El. 921, Th. 2. 65; ‘δημηγορεῖν‘ D. 4.38; ‘οὐ πρὸς ἡ. οἱ ἦν τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα‘ Hdt. 3. 126; ‘πάντα πρὸς ἡ. ἀκούοντας‘ D. 8.34; later ‘πρὸς ἡδονῆς εἶναί τινι‘ Parth. 8.8, Lib. Or. 12.1; ‘καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν κλύειν‘ S. Tr. 197; καθ᾽ ἡδονήν ἐστί μοι c.inf., A. Pr. 263; καθ᾽ ἡ. τι δρᾶν, ποιεῖν, Th.2. 37,53; καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι ib.65; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἐστί τινι, 'it is a pleasure or delight to another,' Hdt. 4.139; E. IT494; Hdt. 7.15; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἔχειν τινάς, 'to take pleasure in them,' Th. 3.9; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, opp. οἱ λυπηροί, Id. 1.99; ‘μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς‘ Id. 4.19; ‘ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς‘ S. Ant. 648, etc.; ὑπὸ τῆς ἡ. Alex.24, 110.23: as dat. modi, ἡδονᾷ with pleasure, S. OT 1339 (lyr.), cf. Hdt. 2. 137 (f.l.), a pleasure, S. El. 873, Ar. Nu.1072 (pl.); ἡδοναὶ τραγημάτων sweetmeats, Sopat. 17. 3. Pl., desires after pleasure, pleasant lusts, X. Mem.1. 2.23, Ep. Tit.3.3, al. II. in Ion. Philosophers, taste, flavour, usu. joined with 'χροιή,' Diog. Apoll. 5, Anaxag. 4, cf. Arist. PA 660b9, Thphr. HP4. 4.7, LXX Nu.11.8, Eudem. ap. Ath. 9. 369f, Mnesith. ap. eund. 8.357f. Note that Aristotle uses ‘somatike hedone.’ As a Lit. Hum. Oxon., and especially as a tutee of Hardie at Corpus, Grice is almost too well aware of the centrality of 'hedone' in Aristotle's system! ‘Pleasure’ is rendered ‘placitum’ (as in ‘ad placitum’) in scholastic philosophy, but that's because scholastic philosophy is not as Hellenic as it should be! Actually, Grice prefers 'agreeable.' One of Grice's requisites for an ascription of 'eudaemonia' ('to have a fairy godmother') precisely has the system of ends an agent chooses to realise to be an 'agreeable' one. One form, or 'mode,' of agreeableness, as Grice notes, is, unless counteracted, automatically attached to the attainment of an object of desire, such attainment being routinely a source of satisfaction. The generation of such a satisfaction thus provides an independent ground for preferring one system of ends to another. However, some other 'mode' of agreeableness, such as being a source of delight, for example, which are _not routinely associated with the fulfilment of this or that desire, could discriminate, independently of other features relevant to such a preference, between one system of ends and another. Further, a system of ends the operation of which is especially agreeable is stable not only vis-à-vis a rival system, but also against the somewhat weakening effect of incontinence, or 'akrasia,' if you mustn’t! A disturbing influence, as Aristotle knew from experience, is more surely met by a principle in consort with a supporting attraction than by the principle alone! Grice's favourite 'hedonistic' implicatum was 'Please!,' as in 'Please, please me!'
1955. Pain, can I have a pain in my tail? The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c. Keywords: pain, tailbone pain. A discussion of a category mistake. Cf. Grice: ‘I may be categorically mistaken but I'm not categorically confused.’ It is only natural that if Grice was interested on Aristotle on 'pleasure' he would be interested on Aristotle on 'pain.' This is very philosophical, as J. O. Urmson will agree -- Is pleasure just the absence of pain? Liddell and Soctt have it: 'λύπη,' which they render as 'pain of body, opp. 'ἡδον'' Id. Phlb. 31c, etc.; also, sad plight or condition, Hdt.7. 152. 2. pain of mind, grief, ib.16. 'ά; δῆγμα δὲ λύπης οὐδὲν ἐφ᾽ ἧπαρ προσικνεῖται‘ A. Ag.791, τί γὰρ καλὸν ζῆν βίοτον, ὃς λύπας φέρει; Id. Fr. 177, cf. S. OC 1217, etc.; ‘ἐρωτικὴ λ.’ Th. 6.59; ‘λύπας προσβάλλειν’ Antipho 2. 2. 2; ‘λ. φέρειν τινί‘ And. 2. 8; opp. χαρά, X. HG7. 1.32. Oddly, Grice went back to pain in Princeton 1972. “Take pain. Surely, Grice tells the Princetonians, “it sounds harsh,” to echo Berkeley, to say that it is Smith’s brain’s being in this or that a state which is justified by insufficient evidence!
1955. Metaphysics, with P. F. Strawson and D. F. Pears, in D. F. Pears, The nature of metaphysics, proceedings of the BBC Third programe lectures, Macmillan, London, Metaphysics, in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, London, Macmillan, Metaphysics, while the Macmillan came out in 1957, the broadcast was in 1955. The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 7-folders 26-27 and carton 8-folder 2, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: metaphysics, presupposition, Aristotle, Kant, Hume, Collingwood. ‘Some like Hegel, but Collingwood's *my* man!’ ‒ Grice. Grice participated in two consecutive evenings of the series of programmes on metaphysics organised by D. F. Pears. Actually, charming Pears felt pretentious enough to label the meetings to be about the 'nature' of metaphysics! Grice ends up discussing, as he should, Collingwood on presupposition. Metaphysics remained a favourite topic for Grice's philosophical explorations, as it is evident from his essay on 'Metaphysics, Philosophical Eschatology, and Plato's Republic,' reprinted in his Studies in the way of words. Possibly Hardie is to blame, since he hardly tutored Grice on metaphysics! Grice's two BBC lectures are typically dated in tone. It was the (‘good ole’) days when philosophers thought they could educate the non-elite by dropping names like Collingwood and stuff! The Third Programme was extremely popular, especially among the ‘uneducated ones at London,’ as Pears almost put it, as it was a way for Londoners to get to know ‘what is going on’ down at Oxford, the only place an uneducated (or educated, for that matter) Londoner at the time was interested in displaying some interest about! I mean, Johnson is right: if a man is tired of the nature of metaphysics, he is tired of life! Since the authorship is Grice/Strawson/Pears, 'Metaphysics,' in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, The BBC Third Programme, it is somewhat difficult to identify what paragraphs were actually read by Grice (and which ones by Pears and which ones by Strawson). But trust the sharp Griceian to detect the correct implicature! There are many (‘too many’) other items covered by these two lectures: Kant, Aristotle, in no particular order. And in The Grice Collection, for that matter, that cover the field of metaphysics. In the New World, as a sort of tutor in the graduate programme, Grice was expected to cover the discipline at various seminars. ‘Only I dislike 'discipline'!’ Perhaps his clearest exposition is in the opening section of his 'Metaphysics, philosophical eschatology, and Plato's Republic,' reprinted in his Studies in the way of words, where he states, bluntly that all you need is ... metaphysics! 1980, metaphysics, Miscellaneous, metaphysics notes, Grice would possible see metaphysics as a class – ‘category’ figuring large. He was concerned with the methodological aspects of the metaphysical enterprise, since he was enough of a relativist to allow for one metaphysical scheme to apply to one area of discourse (one of Eddington’s tables) and another metaphysical scheme to apply to another (Eddington’s other table). In the third programme for the BBC Grice especially enjoyed criticising John Wisdom's innovative look at metaphysics as a bunch of 'self-evident falsehoods' (‘We're all alone’). Grice focuses on Wisdom on the knowledge of other minds. He also discusses Collingwood's presuppositions, and Bradley on the reality-appearance distinction. Grice's reference to Wisdom was due to A. C. Ewing's treatment of Wisdom on metaphysics. Grice's main motivation here is defending metaphysics against Ayer. Ayer thought to win more Oxonian philosophers than he did at Oxford, but he was soon back in London. Post-war Oxford had become conservative and the would stand to the nonsense of Ayer's claiming that metaphysics is nonsense, especially, as Ayer's implicature also was, that philosophy is nonsense! Perhaps the best summary of Griceian metaphysics is his ‘From Genesis to Revelations: a new discourse on metaphysics.’
1956. Grice defends a topdogma of empiricism. In defence of a 'dogma,' in Studies in the Way of Words, London: Harvard University Press, 1989, with P. F. Strawson, the analytic-synthetic distinction, in defence of a dogma, from The Philosophical Review, vol. 66, pp. 141-58, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 6-folders 13-14, and 31, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: analytic-synthetic distinction. The locus classicus for the 'ordinary-language' philosophical response to Quine in ‘Two dogmas of empiricism.’ Grice and Strawson claim that '... is analytic’ does have an 'ordinary-language' use, as attached two a type of behavioural conversational response. To an analytically false move (such as 'My neighbour's three-year-old son is an adult') the addressee A is bound to utter, ‘I don't understand you! You are not being figurative, are you?’ To a synthetically false move, on the other hand (such as 'My neighbour's three-year-old understands Russell's Theory of Types'), the addressee A will jump with, 'Can't believe it!' The topdogma of 'analyticity' is for Grice very important to defend. Philosophy depends on it! He knows that to many his claim to fame is his ‘In defence of a dogma,’ the topdogma of analyticity, no less. He eventually turns to a 'pragmatist' justification of the distinction. This pragmatist justification is still in accordance with what he sees as the use of 'analytic' in 'ordinary language'. His infamous examples are as follows. My neighbour's three-year old understands Russell's Theory of Types. A: Hard to believe, but I will. ‘My neighbour's three-year old is an adult.’ Metaphorically? No. Then I don't understand you, and what you've just said is, in my scheme of things, analytically false. Ultimately, there are 'conversational' criteria, based on this or that principle of conversational helfpulness. Grice is also circumstantially concerned with the 'synthetic a priori,' and he would ask his children's playmates: ’Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed!’ The distinction is ultimately Kantian, but it had brought to the fore by the 'linguistic turn,' Oxonian and other! In defence of a dogma, 'Two dogmas of empiricism,' Keywords: the analytic-synthetic distinction. For Quine, there are two. Grice is mainly interested in the first one: that there is a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. Grice considers Empiricism as a monster on his way to the Rationalist City of Eternal Truth. Grice came back time and again to explore the analytic-synthetic distinction. But his philosophy remained constant. His sympathy is for the practicality of it, its rationale. He sees it as involving formal calculi, rather than his own theory of conversation as rational co-operation which does not presuppose the analytic-synthetic distinction, even if it explains it! Grice would press the issue here: if one wants to prove that such a theory of conversation as rational co-operation has to be seen as ‘philosophical,’ rather than some other way, some idea of ‘analyticity’ may be needed to justify the philosophical enterprise. Cf. the synthetic a priori, that fascinated Grice most than anything Kantian else! ‘Can a sweater be green and red all over? No stripes allowed.’ With ‘In defence of a dogma,’ Grice and Strawson attack a New-World philosopher. Grice had previously collaborated with Strawson in an essay on 'Metaphysics' (actually a three-part piece, with D. F. Pears as the third author). The example Grice chooses to refute Quine's attack of the top-dogma is the Aristotelian idea of the peritrope, as Aristotle refutes Antiphasis in 'Metaphysics' (v. Ackrill, Burnyeat and Dancy). Grice explores chapter Γ 8 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In Γ 8, Aristotle presents two self-refutation arguments against two theses, and calls the asserter, ‘Antiphasis,’ T1 = Everything is true, and T2 = Everything is false, Metaph. Γ 8, 1012b13–18. Each thesis is exposed to the stock objection that it eliminates itself. An utterer who explicitly conveys that everything is true also makes the thesis opposite to his own true, so that his own is not true (for the opposite thesis denies that his is true), and any utterer U who explicitly conveys that everything is false also belies himself. Aristotle does not seem to be claiming that, if everything is true, it would also be true that it is false that everything is true and, that, therefore, ‘Everything is true’ must be false: the final, crucial inference, from the premise ‘if, p, ~p’ to the conclusion ‘~p’ is missing. But it is this extra inference that seems required to have a formal refutation of Antiphasis’s T1 or T2 by 'consequentia mirabilis.' The nature of the argument as a purely dialectical silencer of Antiphasis is confirmed by the case of T2, ‘Everything is false.’ An utterer who explicitly conveys that everything is false unwittingly concedes, by self-application, that what he is saying must be false too. Again, the further and different conclusion ‘Therefore; it is false that everything is false’ is missing. That proposal is thus self-defeating, self-contradictory (and comparable to Grice's addressee using 'adult' to apply to three-year old, without producing the 'creature'), oxymoronic, and suicidal. This seems all that Aristotle is interested in establishing through the self-refutation stock objection. This is not to suggest that Aristotle did not believe that ‘Everything is true’ or ‘Everything is false’ is false, or that he excludes that he can prove its falsehood. Grice notes that this is not what Aristotle seems to be purporting to establish in 1012b13–18. This holds for a περιτροπή (peritrope) argument, but not for a περιγραφή (perigraphe) argument (‘συμβαίνει δὴ καὶ τὸ θρυλούμενον πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις, αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς ἀναιρεῖν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πάντα ἀληθῆ λέγων καὶ τὸν ἐναντίον αὑτοῦ λόγον ἀληθῆ ποιεῖ, ὥστε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἀληθῆ (ὁ γὰρ ἐναντίος οὔ φησιν αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ), ὁ δὲ πάντα ψευδῆ καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτόν.’) It may be emphasized that Aristotle’s argument does not contain an explicit application of 'consequentia mirabilis.' Indeed, no extant self-refutation argument before Augustine, Grice is told by Mates, contains an explicit application of 'consequentia mirabilis.' This observation is a good and important one, but Grice has doubts about the consequences one may draw from it. One may take the absence of an explicit application of ‘consequentia mirabilis’ to be a sign of the purely dialectical nature of the self-refutation argument. This is questionable. The formulation of a self-refutation argument (as in Grice's addressee, ‘Sorry, I misused 'adult.'‘) is often compressed and elliptical and involves this or that implicatum. One usually assumes that this or that piece in a dialectical context has been omitted and should be supplied (or worked out, as Grice prefers) by the addressee. But in this or that case, it is equally possible to supply some other, non-dialectical piece of reasoning. In Aristotle’s arguments from Γ 8, e.g., the addressee may supply an inference to the effect that the thesis which has been shown to be self-refuting is not true. For if Aristotle takes the argument to establish that the thesis has its own contradictory version as a consequence, it must be obvious to Aristotle that the thesis is not true (since every consequence of a true thesis is true, and two contradictory theses cannot be simultaneously true). On the further assumption (that Grice makes explicit) that the principle of bivalence is applicable, Aristotle may even infer that the thesis is false. It is perfectly plausible to attribute such an inference to Aristotle and to supply it in his argument from Γ 8. On this account, there is no reason to think that the argument is of an intrinsically dialectical nature and cannot be adequately represented as a non-dialectical proof of the non-truth, or even falsity, of the thesis in question. It is indeed difficult to see signs of a dialectical exchange between two parties (of the type of which Grice and Strawson are champions) in Γ8, 1012b13–18. One piece of evidence is Aristotle’s reference to the person, the utterer, as Grice prefers who explicitly conveys or asserts (ὁ λέγων) that T1 or that T2. This reference by the Grecian philosopher to the Griceian utterer or asserter of the thesis that everything is true would be irrelevant if Aristotle's aim is to prove something about T1's or T2's propositional content, independently of the act by the utterer of uttering its expression and thereby explicitly conveying it. However, it is not clear that this reference is essential to Aristotle’s argument. One may even doubt whether the Grecian philosopher is being that Griceian, and actually referring to the asserter of T1 or T2. The *implicit* (or implicated) grammatical subject of Aristotle's ‘ὁ λέγων’ (1012b15) might be λόγος, instead of the utterer qua asserter. ‘λόγος’ is surely the implicit grammatical subject of ‘ὁ λέγων’ shortly after ( 1012b21–22. 8). The passage may be taken to be concerned with λόγοι ‒ this or that statement, this or that thesis ‒ but not with its asserter. In the ‘Prior Analytics,’ Aristotle states that no thesis ('A three-year old is an adult') can necessarily imply its own contradictory (‘A three-year old is not an adult’) (2.4, 57b13–14). One may appeal to this statement in order to argue for Aristotle's claim that a self-refutation argument should NOT be analyzed as involving an implicit application of 'consequentia mirabilis.' Thus, one should deny that Aristotle’s self-refutation argument establishes a necessary implication from the self-refuting thesis to its contradictory. However, this does not explain what other kind of consequence relation Aristotle takes the self-refutation argument to establish between the self-refuting thesis and its contradictory (although dialectical necessity has been suggested). Aristotle’s argument suffices to establish that ‘Everything is false’ is either false or liar-paradoxical. If a thesis is liar-paradoxical (and Grice loved, and overused the expression), the assumption of its falsity leads to contradiction as well as the assumption of its truth. But 'Everything is false' is only liar-paradoxical in the unlikely, for Aristotle perhaps impossible, event that everything distinct from this thesis is false. So, given the additional premise that there is at least one true item distinct from the thesis 'Everything is false,' Aristotle can safely infer that the thesis is false. As for Aristotle's ‘ὁ γὰρ λέγων τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀληθῆ ἀληθής,’, or eliding the ’γὰρ,’ ’ὁ λέγων τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀληθῆ ἀληθής,’ (ho legon ton alethe logon alethe alethes) may be rendered as either: 'The statement which states that the true statement is true is true,' or, more alla Grice, as 'He who says (or explicitly conveys, or indicates) that the true thesis is true says something true.' It may be argued that it is quite baffling (and figurative or analogical or metaphoric) in this context, to take 'ἀληθής' to be predicated of the Griceian utterer, a person ('true' standing for 'truth teller,' 'trustworthy'), to take it to mean that he says something true, rather than his statement stating something true, or his statement being true. But cf. Liddell/Scott: ἀληθής [α^], Dor. ἀλα_θής , ές, (λήθω, of persons, truthful, honest (not in Hom., v. infr.), ‘ἀ. νόος‘ Pi. O.2.92; ‘κατήγορος‘ A. Th. 439; ‘κριτής‘ Th. 3.56; οἶνος ἀ. `in vino veritas', Pl. Smp.217e; ‘ὁ μέσος ἀ. τις‘ Arist. EN 1108a20. Admittedly, this or that non-Griceian passage in which it is 'λόγος,' and not the utterer, which is the implied grammatical subject of 'ὁ λέγων' can be found in Metaph. Γ7, 1012a24–25; Δ6, 1016a33; Int. 14, 23a28–29; De motu an. 10, 703a4; Eth. Nic. 2.6, 1107a6–7. 9. So the topic is controversial. Indeed such a non-Griceian exegesis of the passage is given by Alexander of Aphrodisias (in Metaph. 340. 26–29):9, when Alexander observes that the statement, i.e. not the utterer, that says that everything is false (ὁ δὲ πάντα ψευδῆ εἶναι λέγων λόγος) negates itself, not himself, because if everything is false, this very statement, which, rather than, by which the utterer, says that everything is false, would be false, and how can an utterer be FALSE? So that the statement which, rather than the utterer who, negates it, saying that not everything is false, would be true, and surely an utterer cannot be 'true.' Does Alexander misrepresent Aristotle’s argument by omitting every Griceian reference to the asserter or utterer qua rational personal agent, of the thesis? If the answer is negative, even if the occurrence of 'ὁ λέγων' at 1012b15 refers to the asserter, or utterer, qua rational personal agent, this is merely an accidental feature of Aristotle’s argument that cannot be regarded as an indication of its dialectical nature. None of this is to deny that some self-refutation argument may be of an intrinsically dialectical nature; it is only to deny that every one is This is in line with Burnyeat’s view that a dialectical self-refutation, even if qualified, as Aristotle does, as 'ancient,' is a subspecies of self-refutation, but does not exhaust it. Granted, a dialectical approach may provide a useful interpretive framework for many an ‘ancient’ self-refutation argument. A statement like ‘If proof does not exist, proof exists’ ‒ that occurs in an anti-sceptical self-refutation argument reported by Sextus Empiricus ‒ may receive an attractive 'dialectical' re-interpretation. It may be argued that such a statement should not be understood at the level of what is explicated, but should be regarded as an elliptical reminder of a complex dialectical argument which can be described as follows. Cf. If thou claimest that proof doth not exist, thou must present a proof of what thou assertest, in order to be credible, but thus thou thyself admitest that proof existeth. A similar point can be made for Aristotle’s famous argument in the Protrepticus that one must philosophise. A number of sources state that this argument relies on the implicature, 'If one must not philosophize, one must philosophize.' It may be argued that this implicature is an elliptical reminder of a dialectical argument such as the following. If thy position is that thou must not philosophise, thou must reflect on this choice and argue in its support, but by doing so thou art already choosing to do philosophy, thereby admitting that thou must philosophise. The claim that every instance of an ‘ancient’ self-refutation arguments is of an intrinsically dialectical nature is thus questionable, to put it mildly. V also 340.19–26, and A. Madigan, tcomm., Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’ 4, Ithaca, N.Y., Burnyeat, 'Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Later Greek Philosophy,.' Grice's implicature is that Quine should have learned Greek before refuting Aristotle. 'But then *I* don't speak Greek!' Strawson refuted.
1958. Oxford philosophy and linguistic botanising, rev. 1970, post-war Oxford philosophy, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II: Explorations in semantics and metaphysics, Essay, philosophy and ‘ordinary’ language, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 1-folder 19, carton 3-folder 6, carton 4-folder 15, and Series V (Topical), carton 8-folder 3, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Oxford philosophy, linguistic botanising, 'ordinary language' philosophy. What were Grice's first impressions when arriving at Oxford. He was going to learn. ‘Only the poor learn at Oxford’ was an adage he treasured, since he wasn't one! Let's start with an alphabetical listing of Grice's Play Group companions: J. L. Austin, A. E. Duncan-Jones, A. G. N. Flew, P. L. Gardiner, H. P. Grice, R. M. Hare, H. L. A. Hart, S. N. Hampshire, P. H. Nowell-Smith, D. F. Pears, A. M. Quinton, F. N. Sibley, P. F. Strawson, J. F. Thomson, J. O. Urmson, G. J. Warnock. Grice’s main Oxonian association is St. John's, Oxford. By ‘Oxford Philosophy,’ Grice notably refers to J. L. Austin's Play Group, of which he was a member. But Grice had Oxford associations pre-war, and after the demise of Austin. But back to the Play Group, this, to some, infamous, playgroup, met on Saturday mornings at different venues at Oxford, including Grice's own St. John's ‒ apparently, Austin's favourite venue. Austin regarded himself and his 'kindergarten' as 'linguistic' or 'language' 'botanists.' The idea was to list various 'ordinary' uses of this or that 'philosophical notion.’ Austin: ‘They say philosophy is about language; well, then, let's botanise!’ Grice's involvement with 'Oxford philosophy' of course predated his associations with Austin's play group. He always said he was fortunate of having been a tutee to Hardie at Corpus. Corpus, Oxford. Grice would occasionally refer to the emblematic pelican, so prominently displayed at Corpus. Grice had an interim association with the venue one associates most directly with philosophy, Merton ‒: Grice, Merton, Oxford. While Grice loved to drop Oxonian names, notably his 'rivals,' such as Dummett or Anscombe, he knew when not to. His ‘Post-war Oxford philosophy,’ as opposed to more specific items in The Grice Collection, remains 'general' in tone, and intended as a defense of the 'ordinary-language' approach to philosophy. Surprisingly, or perhaps not (for those who knew Grice), he takes a pretty idiosyncratic characterisation of conceptual analysis. Grice's philosophical problems emerge with Grice's idiosyncratic use of this or that expression. Conceptual analysis is meant to solve HIS problems, not others'! Repr. in Grice, Studies in the Way of Words. Grice finds it important to reprint this since he had updated thoughts on the matter, which he displays in his ‘Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy.’ The topic represents one of the strands he identifies behind the unity of his philosophy. By ‘post-war Oxford philosophy,’ Grice meant the period he was interested in. While he had been at Corpus, Merton, and St. John's in the pre-war days, for some reason, he felt that he had made history in the post-war period. The historical reason Grice gives is understandable enough. In the pre-war days, Grice was the good student and the new fellow of St. John's ‒ the other one was Mabbott. But he had not been able to engage in philosophical discussion much, other than with other tutees of Hardie. After the war, Grice indeed joins Austin's more popular, less secretive 'Saturday mornings.' Indeed, for Grice, 'post-war' means 'all philosophy after the war' (and not just say, the forties!) since he never abandoned the methods he developed under Austin, which were pretty congenial to the ones he had himself displayed in the pre-war days, in essays like 'Negation' and 'Personal Identity.' Grice is a a bit of an expert on Oxonian philosophy. He sees himself as a member of the school of analytic philosophy, rather than the abused term 'ordinary-language' philosophy. This is evident by the fact that he contributed to such polemic ‒ but typically Oxonian ‒ volumes such as Butler, Analytic Philosophy, published by Blackwell (of all publishers). Grice led a very social life at Oxford, and held frequent philosophical discussions with philosophers such again in alphabetical order, as Austin, Gardiner, Hampshire, Hart, Nowell-Smith, Pears, Quinton, Strawson, Thomson, Urmson, Warnock, and many others. Post-war Oxford philosophy, 1958, miscellaneous, Oxford philosophy, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and Metaphysics, Essay. By Oxford philosophy, Grice meant his own! Grice went back to the topic of philosophy and ‘ordinary language,’ as one of his essays is precisely entitled, ‘Philosophy and ‘ordinary language,’ 1970, philosophy and 'ordinary' language,’ keywords: 'ordinary-language' philosophy, linguistic botanising. Grice is not really interested in 'ordinary' language as a philologist might. He spoke 'ordinary' language, he thought. The point had been brought to the fore by Austin. ‘If they think philosophy is a play on words, well then, let's play the game.’ Grice's interest is methodological. Malcolm had been claiming that 'ordinary language' is incorrigible. While Grice agreed that 'language can be clever,' he knew that Aristotle was possibly right when he explored ‘ta legomena' in terms of the 'many' and the selected 'wise,' 1960, philosophy and 'ordinary language,' philosophy and 'ordinary language,' keywords: philosophy, 'ordinary language'. At the time of writing, ''ordinary-language' philosophy' had become, ‘even within Oxford,’ a bit of a term of abuse. Grice tries to defend Austin's approach to it, while suggesting ideas that Austin somewhat ignored, like what an utterer implies by the use of an 'ordinary-language' expression, rather than what the expression itself does. Grice is concerned, contra Austin, in explanation (or 'explanatory adequacy'), not taxonomy (or 'descriptive adequacy'). Grice disregards Austin's piecemeal approach to 'ordinary language,' as Grice searches for 'the big picture of it all.' Grice never used 'ordinary language' seriously. The phrase was used, as he explains, by those who HATED 'ordinary-language' philosophy. There's no such thing as 'ordinary language.' Surely you cannot fairly describe the idiosyncratic linguistic habits of an Old Cliftonian as even 'remotely' 'ordinary.' ‘Extra-ordinary’ more likely! As far as the 'philosophy' bit goes, this is what Bergmann jocularly described as the 'linguistic turn.' But as Grice notes, the linguistic turn involves both the 'ideal language' and the 'ordinary language.' Grice defends Austin's choice of the 'ordinary' seeing that 'it was what he had to hand!' While Grice seems to be in agreement with the tone of his Wellesley talk, his idioms there in. ‘You’re crying for the moon!’ ‘Philosophy need not be grand!’ These seem to contrast with his more grandiose approach to philosophy. His struggle was to defend the minutiæ of linguistic botanising, that had occupied most of his professional life, with a grander view of the discipline. He blamed Oxford for that. Never in the history of philosophy had philosophers shown such an attachment to ordinary language as they did in post-war Oxford, Grice liked to say. Having learned Greek and Latin at Clifton, Grice saw in Oxford a way to go back to English! He never felt the need to explore ‘Continental’ modern languages like German or French. Aristotle was of course cited in Greek, but Descartes is almost not cited, and Kant is cited in the translation available to Oxonians then. Grice is totally right that never has philosophy experienced such a fascination with 'ordinary' use except at Oxford. ‘The ruthless and unswerving association of philosophy with ordinary language has been peculiar to the Oxford scene.’ While many found this attachment to 'ordinary usage' insidious, as Warnock put it, ‘it fit me and Grice to a T,’ implicating you need a sort of innate disposition towards it! Strawson perhaps never had it! And that's why Grice's arguments contra Strawson rest on further minutiæ whose detection by Grice never ceased to amaze his tutee! In this way, Grice felt he WAS Austin's heir! While Grice is associated with, in chronological order, Corpus, Merton, and St. John's, it is only St. John's that counts for the Griceian! For it is at St. John's he was a Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy! And we love him as a philosopher!
1961. The causal theory of perception, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Explorations in semantics and metaphysics, Essay (without the excursus on implication), 1989, repr. from The Aristotelian Society, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 35, no. 1, pp. 121-153. repr. in G. J. Warnock, The philosophy of perception, 1968, Symposium with A. R. White. Chair: R. Braithwaite, Cambridge, with R. O. Warner, 1975, knowledge and belief, 1977, Causation colloquium, causality, cause, Stanford, 1980, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (The Doctrines), carton 5-folder 18, Series IV (Associations), carton 6-folder 7, and Series V (Topical), carton 6-folder 22 and carton 8-folders 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Price, seeming that, perceiving that, sensing that, causal theory of perception, implicature, perception, pirotology, knowledge, belief, doxastic, epistemic, Urmson, entailment. Note that Price is also cited by Grice in 'Personal identity.' Grice: That pillar box seems red to me. The locus classicus in the philosophical literature for Grice's implicatum. Grice introduces a 'dout-or-denial' condition for an utterance of a phenomenalist report (‘That pillar-box seems red to me’). Grice attacks neo-Wittgensteinian approaches that regard the report as _false_. In a long excursus on 'implication,' he compares the phenomenalist report with utterances like ‘He has beautiful handwriting’ (He is hopeless at philosophy), a particularised conversational implicatum; 'My wife is in the kitchen or the garden' (I have non-truth-functional grounds to utter this), a generalised conversational implicatum; 'She was poor but she was honest' (a Great-War witty (her poverty and her honesty contrast), a 'conventional' implicatum; and 'Have you stopped beating your wife?' ‒ an old Oxonian conundrum. 'You have been beating your wife, 'cf. Smith has not ceased from eating iron', a presupposition. More importantly, he considers different tests for each concoction! Those for the conversational implicatum will become crucial: cancellability, calculability, non-detachability, and indeterminacy. In the proceedings he plays with something like the principle of conversational helpfulness, as having a basis on a view of conversation as rational co-operation, and as giving the rationale to the implicatum. Past the excursus, and back to the issue of perception, he holds a conservative view as presented by Price at Oxford. One interesting reprint of Grice's essay is in Davis's volume on 'Causal Theories,' since this is where it belongs! White's response is usually ignored, but shouldn't. White is an interesting Australian philosopher at Oxford who is usually regarded as a practitioner of 'ordinary-language' philosophy. However, in his response, White hardly touches the issue of the 'implicature' with which Grice is primarily concerned. Grice found that a full reprint from the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in a compilation also containing the William James Harvard would be too repetitive. Therefore, he omits the 'excursus' on 'implication.' However, the way Grice re-formulates, in 1987, what that 'excursus' covers is very interesting. There is the conversational implicatum, particularised ('Smith has beautiful handwriting') and generalised ('My wife is in the kitchen or in the garden'). Then there is the præsuppositum, or presupposition (‘You haven't stopped beating your wife’). Finally, there is the CONVENTIONAL implicatum ( 'She was poor, but she was honest'). Even at Oxford, Grice's implicature goes, philosophers ‒ even Oxonian philosophers ‒ use 'imply' for all those 'different animals'! Warnock had attended Austin's ‘Sense and Sensibilia’ (not to be confused with Austen's Sense and Sensibility). But Warnock, for obvious reasons, preferred philosophical investigations with Grice. Warnock reminisces that Grice once tells him, and not on a Saturday morning, either, 'How clever language is'' For they had found that 'ordinary language' does NOT need the concept of a visum. Grice and Warnock spent lovely occasions exploring what Oxford has as ‘the philosophy of perception.’ While Grice later came to see philosophy of perception as a bit or an offshoot of 'philosophical psychology,' 'the philosophy of perception' is concerned with that treasured bit of the Oxonian philosopher's lexicon, the sense-datum, always in the singular! The 'cause' involved is crucial. Grice plays with an ‘evolutionary’ justification of the ‘material’ thing as the denotatum of a perceptual judgement. If a material thing causes the sense-datum of a nut, that is because the squarrel (or squirrel) will not be nourished by the sense datum of the nut; only by the nut! There are many other items in the Grice Collection that address the topic of perception – notably with Warnock, and criticizing members of the Ryle group like Roxbee-Cox (on ‘vision,’ cf. ‘visa’ ‒ ‘taste’, and ‘perception,’ in general – And we should not forget that Grice contributed a splendid essay on the distinction of the senses to Butler’s ‘Analytic philosophy,’ which in a way, redeemed a rather old-fashioned discipline by shifting it to the idiom of the day. 1959. The philosophy of perception: a retrospective, with G. J. Warnock, the philosophy of perception, keywords: perception, the philosophy of perception, visum. Warnock was possibly the only philosopher at Oxford Grice felt congenial enough to engage in different explorations in the so-called 'philosophy of perception.' Their joint adventures involved the disimplicature of a 'visum.' Grice later approached sense data in more 'evolutionary' terms: a material thing is to be vindicated transcendentally, in the sense that it is a material thing (and not a sense datum or collection thereof) that nourishes a creature like a human. Grice was particularly grateful to Warnock. By reprinting the full symposium on ‘The Causal Theory of Perception’ in his influential series of Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Warnock had spread Grice's lore of implicature all over! In some parts of the draft he uses ‘more on visa,’ 1959, vision, 1969, vision, with G. J. Warnock, Keywords: vision. Of the five senses, Grice and Warnock are particularly interested in 'seeing.' As Grice will put it later, 'see' is a factive. It presupposes the existence of the event reported after the 'that'-clause. A 'visum,' however, as an intermediary between the material thing and the perceiver does not seem necessary in 'ordinary' discourse. Warnock will reconsider Grice's views too (‘On what is seen,’ in Sibley). While Grice uses 'vision,' he knows he is interested in Philosopher's paradox concerning 'seeing,' notably Witters on 'seeing as.' 1959, vision, taste and the philosophy of perception, keywords: vision, seeing. As an Oxonian philosopher, Grice was of course more interested in 'seeing' than in 'vision.' He said that Austin would criticise even the use of things like 'sensation' and 'volition'! 1959, taste, The Grice Papers, keyword: taste, the objects of the five senses, the philosophy of perception, perception, the philosophy of perception, keywords: philosophy of perception, vision, taste, perception. Mainly with Warnock. Warnock reprinted Grice's ‘Causal Theory of Perception’ in his influential Reading in Philosophy, ‘The philosophy of perception,’ 1959, perception, with G. J. Warnock, with R. O. Warner, keywords: perception. Warnock learned about perception much more from Grice than from Austin! 1959, taste, 1960, The philosophy of perception, the philosophy of perception, notes with G. J. Warnock on visum, keywords: visum, Warnock, Grice, the philosophy of perception. Grice kept the lecture notes to a view of publishing a retrospective. Warnock recalled Grice saying, ’How clever language is!’ Grice took the offer by Harvard University Press, and it was a good thing he reprinted part of ‘Causal theory.’ However, the relevant bits for his theory of conversation as rational co-operation lie in the excursus which he omitted. What is Grice’s implicature: that one should consider the topic rather than the method here. Keywords being ‘sense datum,’ and ‘causation,’ rather than conversational helpfulness. After all, ‘That pillar box seems red to me,’ does not sound very helpful. But the topic of ‘Causal Theory’ is central for his view of conversation as rational co-operation. Why? Pirot1 gets an impression of danger as caused by the danger out there. He communicates the danger to Pirot1, causing in Pirot2 some behaviour. Without ‘causation,’ or causal links, the very point of offering a theory of conversation as rational co-operation seems minimized. On top, as a metaphysician, he was also concerned with ‘cause’ simpliciter. He was especially proud that Price’s ‘Casual Theory of Perception’ had been reprinted along with his essay in the influential volume by Davis on ‘Causal Theories.’ In ‘Actions and events,’ he further explores ‘cause’ now in connection with Greek ‘aitia’. As Grice notes, the original usage of this very Grecian item is the one we find in ‘rebel without a cause,’ cause-to, rather than cause-because. The two-movement nature of ‘causing’ is reproduced in the conversational exchange: a material thing causes a sense datum which causes an expression which gets communicated, thus causing a psychological state which will cause a behaviour. This ‘causation’ is almost ‘representational’. A material thing or a situation cannot govern our actions and behaviours, but a re-præsentatum of it might. ‘Govern our actions and behaviour’ is Grice’s correlate of what a team of North-Oxfordshire cricketers can do for North-Oxfordshire: what North Oxfordshire cannot do for herself, ‘namely, engage in a game of cricket’! In Retrospective Epilogue he casts doubts on the point of his causal approach. It is a short paragraph that merits much exploration. Basically, Grice is saying his causalist approach is hardly an established thesis. He also proposes a similar serious objection to his view in ‘Some remarks about the senses,’ the other essay in the philosophy of perception in Studies. As he notes, both engage with ‘some fundamental questions in the philosophy of perception,’ which is hardly the same thing as saying that they provide an answer to each question! Grice: The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind. Examples which occur to me are the following. You cannot see a knife as a knife, though you may see what is not a knife as a knife. When Moore said he knew that the objects before him were human hands, he was guilty of misusing the word ‘know’. For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be something abnormal or unusual. For an action to be properly described as one for which the agent is responsible, it must be the sort of action for which people are condemned. What is actual is not also possible. What is known by me to be the case is not also believed by me to be the case. I have no doubt that there will be other candidates besides the six which I have mentioned. I must emphasize that I am not saying that all these examples are importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, they may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre; I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detectcd, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are.’ The causal theory of perception, knowledge and belief, 1977, keywords: knowledge, belief, philosophical psychology. Grice: the doxastic implicatum. ‘I know’ only implicates 'I do not believe.' The following is philosopher’s mistake. 'What is known by me to be the case is not also believed by me to be the case.' The topic had attracted the attention of some Oxonian philosophers such as J. O. Urmson in ‘Parenthetical verbs.’ Urmson speaks of a 'scale': 'I know' can be used parenthetically, as 'I believe' can. For Grice, to utter ‘I believe’ is obviously to make a weaker conversational move than you would if you utter 'I know.' And in this case, an approach to informativeness in terms of entailment is in order, seeing that ‘I know’ entails ‘I believe.’ Addressee A is thus allowed to infer that the utterer is not in a position to make the stronger claim. The mechanism is explained via his principle of conversational helpfulness. Philosophers tend two over-use these two basic psychological states, attitudes, or stances. Grice is concerned with Gettier-type cases, and also the 'factivity' of 'know' versus the non-factivity of 'believe.' Grice follows Hintikka's lexicological innovations: the logic of belief is 'doxastic;' the logic of knowledge is 'epistemic.' The last thesis that Grice lists in ‘Causal Theory’ that he thinks rests on a big mistake he formulates as: ‘What is known by me to be the case is NOT also believed by me to be the case.’ What are his attending remarks? Grice writes: ‘The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one.’ ‘There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind.’ ‘An example which occurs to me is the following: What is known by me to be the case is not also believed by me to be the case.’ ‘I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticising, only that, for all I know, it may be.’ ‘To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing.’ ‘I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre.’ ‘I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts.’ ‘Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what SORT of nuances they are!’ The ætiological implicatum. Grice. ‘For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be something abnormal or unusual.’ This is an example Grice lists in ‘Causal theory’ but not in ‘Prolegomena.’ ‘For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be something abnormal or unusual.’ Similar commentary to his example on 'responsible'/condemnable apply. The objector may stick with the fact that he is only concerned with proper utterances. Surely Grice wants to go to a pre-Humeian account of causation, possible Aristotelian,, keyword: aetiologia. Where everything has a cause, except, for Aristotle, God! What are his attending remarks? Grice writes: ‘The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one.’ ‘There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind. An example which occurs to me is the following: What is known by me to be the case is not also believed by me to be the case. I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be.’ ‘To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophising.’ ‘I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre.’ ‘I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts.’ Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are! Causal theory, cause, causality, causation, conference, colloquium, Stanford, 1980, keywords: cause, metaphysics, the abnormal/unusual implicatum, ætiology, ætiological implicatum. Grice: the ætiological implicatum. Grice's explorations on 'cause' are very rich. He is concerned with some alleged misuse of 'cause' in ordinary language. If as Hume suggests, to cause is to will, one would say that ‘The decapitation of Charles I willed his death,’ which sounds harsh, ‘if not ungrammatical, too!’ Grice later relates 'cause' to the Greek 'aitia,' as he should. He notes collocations like 'rebel without a cause.' For the Greeks, or Grecians, as he called them, and the Griceians, it's a CAUSE TO which one should be involved in elucidating. A ‘cause to...’ connects with the idea of 'freedom.' Grice was constantly aware of the threat of MECHANISM, and his idea was to provide philosophical room for the idea of 'finality,' which is not 'mechanistically derivable.' This leads him to discussion of overlap and priority of, say, a physical-cum-physiological versus a psychological theory explaining this or that piece of rational behaviour. Grice can be Wittgensteinian when citing Anscombe's translation: No psychological concept without the behaviour the concept is brought to explain. It is best to place his later treatment of cause with his earlier one in ‘Causal Theory.’ It’s surprising Grice does not apply his example of a philosopher’s mistake to the ‘causal’ bit of his ‘causal theory.’ Grice states the philosophical mistake as follows: ‘For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be something abnormal or unusual.’ This is an example Grice lists in ‘Causal theory’ but NOT in ‘Prolegomena.' 'For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be something abnormal or unusual.' A similar commentary to his example on 'responsible'/condemnable applies: The objector may stick with the fact that he is only concerned with PROPER utterances. Surely Grice wants to embrace a pre-Humeian account of causation, possible Aristotelian. Keyword: Aitiologia, where everything has a cause, except, for Aristotle, God! What are his attending remarks? Grice writes: ‘The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one.' There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would Grice thinks need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which Grice has been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind. One example which occurs to Grice is the following: 'For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be something abnormal or unusual.' Grice feels he must emphasise that he is not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be.’ ‘To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing.’ ‘I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre.’ ‘I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts.’ ‘Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are!’ Re: responsibility/condemnation. Cf. Mabbott, ‘Flew on punishment,’ Philosophy, 30. And also Hart. At Corpus, Grice enjoys his tutor Hardie’s resourcefulness in the defence of what may be a difficult position, a characteristic illustrated by an incident which Hardie himself once told Grice about himself. Hardie had parked his car and gone to a cinema. Unfortunately, Hardie had parked his car on top of one of the strips on the street by means of which traffic-lights were, at the time, controlled by the passing traffic.’ ‘As a result, the lights are jammed, and it requires four policemen to lift Hardie’s car off the strip. The police decides to prosecute. Grice indicated to Hardie that this hardly surprised him and asked him how he fared. ‘‘Oh,’ Hardie says, ‘I got off.’’ Then Grice asks Hardie how on earth he managed that! ‘Quite simply,’ Hardie answered. ‘I just invoked Mill’s method of difference.’ ‘The police charged me with causing an obstruction at 4 p.m.’ ‘I told the police that, since my car was parked at 2 p.m., it could not have been *my* car which caused the obstruction at *4* p.m.’ This relates to an example in ‘Causal theory’ that he Grice does not discuss in ‘Prolegomena,’ but which may relate to H. L. A. Hart, and closer to Grice, to J. D. Mabbott's essay, ‘A. G. N. Flew on punishment,’ in Philosophy, vol. 30. Grice states the philosophical mistake as follows: ‘For an action to be properly described as one for which the agent is responsible, it must be thc sort of action for which people are condemned.’ As applied to Hardie. Hardie was IRRESPONSIBLE? In any case, while condemnable, he was not! Grice writes: ‘The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one.’ ‘There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind.’ ‘An example which occurs to me is the following: For an action to be properly described as one for which the agent is responsible, it must be the sort of action for which people are condemned.’ ‘I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be.’ ‘To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing.’ ‘I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre.’ ‘I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts.’ ‘Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic NUANCES which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what SORT of nuances they are!’ The modal example (‘What is actual is not also possible’) discussed under ‘Indicative conditonals,’ 1967. Grice on Macbeth’s implicature: seeing a dagger as a dagger. Grice elaborates on this in ‘Prolegomena,’ but the austerity of ‘Causal theory’ is charming, since he does not give a quote or source. OBVIOUSLY: Witters! Grice writes: Witters might say ‘You cannot see a knife as a knife, though you may see what is not a knife as a knife.’ The issue, Grice notes, with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one.’ ‘There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind.’ An example which occurs to Grice is the following: 'You cannot see a knife as a knife, though you may see what is not a knife as a knife. Grice feels that he must emphasise that he is not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be.’ ‘To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing.’ ‘I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre.’ ‘I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts.’ ‘Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are!’ Is this a dagger which I see before me,/The handle toward my hand? Come, let me clutch thee./I have thee not, and yet I see thee still./Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible/To feeling as to sight? or art thou but/A dagger of the mind, a false creation,/Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain?/I see thee yet, in form as palpable/As this which now I draw./Thou marshall'st me the way that I was going;/And such an instrument I was to use./Mine eyes are made the fools o' the other senses,/Or else worth all the rest; I see thee still,/And on thy blade and dudgeon gouts of blood,/Which was not so before. There's no such thing:/It is the bloody business which informs/Thus to mine eyes./Now o'er the one halfworld/Nature seems dead, and wicked dreams abuse/The curtain'd sleep; witchcraft celebrates/Pale Hecate's offerings, and wither'd murder,/Alarum'd by his sentinel, the wolf,/Whose howl's his watch, thus with his stealthy pace./With Tarquin's ravishing strides, towards his design/Moves like a ghost. Thou sure and firm-set earth,/Hear not my steps, which way they walk, for fear/Thy very stones prate of my whereabout,/And take the present horror from the time,/Which now suits with it. Whiles I threat, he lives:/Words to the heat of deeds too cold breath gives.[a bell rings] I go, and it is done; the bell invites me./Hear it not, Duncan; for it is a knell/That summons thee to heaven or to hell. The Moore example is used both in ‘Causal Theory’ and ‘Prolegomena.’ But the use in ‘Causal Theory’ is more austere: Philosopher’s mistake: Malcolm: ‘When Moore said he knew that the objects before him were human hands, he was guilty of misusing the word ‘know’.’ Grice writes: ‘The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one.’ ‘There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind.’ ‘An example which occurs to me is the following: ‘When Moore said he knew that the objects before him were human hands, he was guilty of misusing the word ‘know’. I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be.’ ‘To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing.’ ‘I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre. I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts.’ ‘Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are!’ So surely Grice is meaning: ‘I know that the objects before me are human hands’ as uttered by Moore is possibly true. Grice was amused by the fact that while at Madison, Wisc., Moore gave the example: ‘I know that behind those curtains there is a window.’ Actually he was wrong, as he soon realised when the educated Madisonians corrected him with a roar of unanimous laughter. You see, the lecture hall of the University of Wisconsin at Madison is a rather, shall we say, striking space. The architect designed the lecture hall with a parapet running around the wall just below the ceiling, cleverly rigged with *indirect* lighting to create the illusion that sun light is pouring in through windows from outside. So, G. E. Moore comes to give a lecture one sunny day.’ ‘Attracted as he was to this eccentric architectural detail, Moore gives an illustration of certainty as attached to common sense.’ ‘Pointing to the space below the ceiling, Moore utters.’ ‘We know more things than we think we know.’ ‘I know, for example, that the sunlight shining in from outside proves ...’ ‘At which point he was somewhat startled (in his reserved Irish-English sort of way) when his audience burst out laughing!’ ‘Is that a proof of anything?’ Grice is especially concerned with ‘I seem...’ He needs a paradeigmatic sense-datum utterance, and intentionalist as he was, he finds it in ‘I seem to see a red pillar box before me.’ He is relying on G. A. Paul. Grice would generalise a sense datum by ‘φ’ ‘I seem to perceive that the alpha is phi.’ He agrees that while 'cause' may be too much, any sentence using 'because' will do: At a circus: ‘You seem to be seeing that an elephant is coming down the street because an elephant is coming down the street.’ Grice found the causalist theory of perception particularly attractive since its objection commits ‘one same mistake twice’: he mischaracterises the cancellable implicatum of both ‘seem’ and ‘cause’! While Grice is approaching the philosophical item in the philosophical lexicon, 'perceptio,' he is at this stage more interested in vernacular ‘that-’ clauses such as ‘sensing that’, or even more vernacular ones like ‘seeming that,’ if not seeing that’! This is of course philosophical (cf. aesthetikos vs. noetikos), and Lewis and Short have 'perceptĭo,' f. perceptio, as used by Cicero (Ac. 2, 7, 22) translating ‘catalepsis,’and which they render as 'a taking, receiving; a gathering in, collecting.' Ambros. in Luc. 4, 15: ‘frugum fruetuumque reliquorum,’ Cic. Off. 2, 3, 12: ‘fructuum,’ Col. 1, 3, 2., also as 'perception, comprehension,' 'cf.: ‘notio, cognitio' ): animi perceptiones,’ 'notions, ideas,' Cic. Ac. 2, 7, 22: cognitio aut perceptio, aut si verbum e verbo volumus comprehensio, quam κατάληψιν illi vocant, id. ib. 2, 6, 17, in philosophy, 'direct apprehension of an object by the mind,' Zeno Stoic.1.20, Luc. Par.4, al.; ‘τῶν μετεώρων‘ Philostr. Her.10.9; 'ἀκριβὴς κ. 'certainty,' Herod. Med. ap. Aët.9.37: pl., perceptions, Stoic.2.30, Luc. Herm.81, etc.; introduced into Latin by Cicero, Plu. Cic.40. As for 'causa,' he was even more sure he was exploring a time-honoured philosophical topic. The entry in Lewis and Short is 'causa' (by Cicero, and also a little after him, caussa , Quint. 1, 7, 20; so Fast. Prænest. pp. 321, 322; Inscr. Orell. 3681; 4077; 4698 al.; in Mon. Ancyr. 3, 1 dub.), which they judge to be 'perh. root cav- of caveo, prop. that which is defended or protected; cf. cura, and that they render as, unhelpfully, as 'cause,' 'that by, on account of, or through which any thing takes place or is done; a cause, reason, motive, inducement; also, in gen., an occasion, opportunity (opp. effectis, Quint. 6, 3, 66; 7, 3, 29: ‘factis,’ id. 4, 2, 52; 12, 1, 36 al.; very freq. in all periods, and in all kinds of discourse. In its different usages syn. with 'ratio,' 'principium,' 'fons,' 'origo,' 'caput'; excusatio, defensio; judicium, controversia, lis; partes, actio; condicio, negotium, commodum, al.). Correlated to ‘aition,’ or ‘aitia,’ cause, ‘δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν‘ Hdt. Prooem., cf. Democr.83, Pl. Ti. 68e, Phd.97a sq., etc.; on the four causes of Arist. v. Ph. 194b16, Metaph. 983a26: αἰ. τοῦ γενέσθαι or ‘γεγονέναι‘ Pl. Phd. 97a; ‘τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία ἡ κοινωνία‘ Id.R.464b: αἰτίᾳ 'for the sake of,' ‘κοινοῦ τινος ἀγαθοῦ‘ Th. 4.87, cf. D.H.8.29: αἴτιον (cf. ‘αἴτιος‘ 11.2) is used like ‘αἰτία’ in the sense of cause, not in that of accusation. Grice will go back to perception at a later stage, reminiscing on his 'joint endeavours' with akin G. J. Warnock. 1972. Pirots karulise elatically, potching and cotching obbles, Pirotese, keywords: Pirotese, creature construction, philosophical psychology. Grice was fascinated by Carnap's ‘pirots’ which karulise elatically. Grice adds 'potching' for something like 'perceiving' and 'cotching' for something like 'cognising.'
1962. Some remarks about the senses, in Studies in the Way of Words, in Part II, Explorations in semantics and metaphysics, Essay, 1989, from R. J. Butler, Analytic Philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 133-53, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: the objects of the five senses. The five senses, as Urmson notes, are ‘to see that the sun is shining’, ‘to hear that the car collided’, ‘to feel that her pulse is beating’, ‘to smell that something has been smoking’ and ‘to taste that.’ An interesting piece in that it was commissioned by Butler, who knew Grice from his Oxford days. Grice cites O. P. Wood and R. Albritton. Grice is concerned with a special topic in the philosophy of perception, notably the identification of the traditional 'five' senses: vision, audition, taste, smell, and tact. He introduces what is regarded in the philosophical literature as the first 'thought-experiment,' in terms of the senses that Martians may have. They have two pairs of eyes: are we going to allow that they 'see' with both pairs? Grice introduces a sub-division of seeing: a Martian x-s an object with his upper pair of eyes, but he y-s an object with the lower pair of eyes. In his exploration, he takes a 'realist' stance, which respects the 'ordinary' discursive ways to approach issues of perception. A second interesting point is that in allowing this to be reprinted in Butler's ‘Analytic philosophy,’ Grice is demonstrating that 'analytic philosophers' should NOT be obsessed with 'ordinary language.' Butler's compilation, a rather dry one, is meant as a response to the more linguistic oriented ones by A. G. N. Flew (Grice's first tutee at St. John's, as it happens), also published by Blackwell, and containing pieces by Austin, and company. One philosopher who took Grice very seriously on this was Coady, in his ‘The senses of the Martians.’ Grice provides a serious objection to his own essay in ‘Retrospective Epilogue’ ‘We see with our eyes.’ I.e. ‘eye’ is teleologically defined. He notes that his way of distinguishing the senses is hardly an established thesis. Grice actually advances this topic in his earlier ‘Causal Theory’: ‘I see nothing absurd in the idea that a non-specialist concept should contain, so to speak, a blank space to be filled in by the specialist; that this is so, e.g., in the case of the concept of ‘seeing’ is perhaps indicated by the consideration that if we were in doubt about the correctness of speaking of a certain creature with peculiar sense-organs as ‘seeing’ objects, we might well wish to hear from a specialist a comparative account of the human eye and the relevant sense-organs of the creature in question.’ He returns to the point in ‘Retrospective Epilogue’ with a bit of 'doxastic humility,’ ‘We see with our eyes’ is analytic ‒ but philosophers should take that more seriously. Grice tested the playmates of his children, aged 7 and 9, with ’Nothing can be green and red all over’. Instead, Morley Bunker preferred philosophy undergrads. Ain't that boring? To give examples: ‘Summer follows Spring’ was judged analytic by Morley-Bunker's informants, as cited by Sampson, in ‘Making sense’ (Clarendon) by highly significant majorities in each group of subjects, while ‘We see with our eyes’ was given near-even split votes by each group. Over all, the philosophers were somewhat more consistent with each other than the non-philosophers. But that global finding conceals results for individual sentences that sometimes manifested the opposed tendency. Thus, ‘Thunderstorms are electrical disturbances in the atmosphere’ is judged analytic by a highly significant majority of the non-philosophers, while a (non-significant) majority of the philosophers deemed it non-analytic or synthetic. In this case, it seems, philosophical training (surely not brain-washing) induces the realisation that well-established results of contemporary science are not necessary truths. In other cases, conversely, cliches of current philosophical education impose their own mental blinkers on those who undergo it: ‘Nothing can be completely red and green all over’ is judged analytic by a significant majority of philosophers but only by a non-significant majority of non-philosophers. All in all, Morley-Bunker's results argue strongly against the notion that our inability to decide consistently whether or not some statement is a necessary truth derives from lack of skill in ‘articularing’ our underlying knowledge of the rules of our language. Rather, the inability comes from the fact that the question as posed is unreal. We choose to treat a given statement as open to question or as unchallengeable in the light of the overall structure of beliefs which we have individually evolved in order to make sense of our individual experience. Even the cases which seem clearly analytic or synthetic are cases which individuals judge alike because the relevant experiences are shared by the whole community, but even for such cases one can invent hypothetical or suppositional future experiences which, if they should be realised, would cause us to revise our judgements. This is not intended to call into question the special status of the ‘truths of logic’, such as either ‘Either it is raining or it is not.’ Unlike Katz, I am inclined to accept the traditional view according to which ‘logical particles’ such as ‘not’ and ‘or’ are distinct from the bulk of the vocabulary in that the former really are governed by clear-cut inference rules. Grice does expand on the point.
1962. Grice at Cornell, the Cornell Seminar, Grice's Seminar at Cornell, 1966, The Grice Papers, Series III (Doctrines), carton 5-folder 1, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: philosophy of action. Historically important in that they predate his Harvard William James lectures which made of him a household name in New-World philosophy. Harman cites a seminar by Grice on trying at Brandeis, 1962.
1963. Grice's three lectures on trying at Brandeis. Cf. his later remarks on 'trying' (to cash a cheque) in 'Prolegomena' at Harvard.
1964. Logic and conversation, Oxford, rev. 1967, conversational implicature, 1965, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 1-folders 21-23 and carton 4-folder 9, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: logic, conversation, implicature, principle of conversational helpfulness, desideratum of conversational clarity, desideratum of conversational candour, principle of conversational self-interest, principle of conversational benevolence. Reprinted in revised form as Part I of Studies in the Way of Words. Grice felt the need to go back to his explantion (cf. Fisher, ‘Never contradict. Never explain’) of the nuances about 'seem' and 'cause' (‘Causal theory of perception.’). He had used Smith's ‘My wife is in the kitchen or the bedroom’ as relying on a requirement of discourse. But there must be more to it. Variations on a theme by Grice. ‘Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.’ Variations on a theme by Grice. ’I wish to represent a certain subclass of non-conventional implicaturcs, which I shall call conversational implicaturcs, as being essentially connected with certain general features of discourse; so my next step is to try to say what these features are. The following may provide a first approximation to a general principle. Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the participants (as in a casual conversation). But at each stage, some possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the co-operative principle.’ ’We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: ’Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.’ One might label this the Cooperative Principle.’ Strictly, the principle itself is not co-operative: conversants are. Less literary variant: Make your move such as is required by the accepted goal of the conversation in which you are engaged. But why ‘LOGIC’ and conversation? ’Logica’ had been part of the 'trivium' for ages ‒ ‘Although they called it 'dialectica,' then.’ Grice on the seven liberal arts. Moved by P. F. Strawson's treatment of the 'formal' devices in ‘Introduction to Logical Theory,’ Grice targets these, in their 'ordinary-discourse' counterparts. Strawson indeed characterizes Grice as his ‘logic’ tutor – Strawson was following a P. P. E., and his approach to logic was practical. His ‘philosophy’ tutor was Mabbott. For Grice, with a M. A. Lit. Hum.the situation was different. He knew that the Categoriae and De Interpretatione of his beloved Aristotle were part of the Logical Organon which had been so influential in the history of philosophy. Grice attempts to reconcile Strawson's observations with the idea that the 'formal' devices reproduce some sort of 'explicatum,' or 'explicitum,' as identified by Whitehead and Russell in 'Principia Mathematica.' In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general features of discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation. The alleged divergence between the 'ordinary-language' operators and their 'formal' counterparts is explained in terms of the conversational implicata, then. I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has to ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal device and its alleged 'ordinary-language' counterpart, while still assuming that U is engaged in a co-operative transaction. The utterer and his addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation ‒ the exchange of information and the institution of decisions ‒ and judging that conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and rational) if conducted under some form of principle of 'conversational helpfulness.' ’The observation of a principle of conversational helpfulness is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: anyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participating in a conversation that will be profitable ONLY on the assumption that it is conducted in general accordance with a principle of conversational helpfulness.’ In titling his seminar ‘Logic and Conversation,’ Grice is thinking Strawson. After all, in the seminal ‘Introduction to Logical Theory,’ that every Oxonian student was reading, Strawson had the cheek to admit that he never ceased to learn logic from his tutor, Grice. Yet he elaborates a totally anti Griceian view of things. To be fair to Strawson, the only segment where he acknwoledges Grice's difference of opinion is a brief footnote, concerning the 'strength' or lack thereof, of this or that quantified utterance. Strawson uses an adjective that Grice will seldom do, 'pragmatic'. On top, Strawson attributes the adjective to 'rule.' For Grice, in Strawson's wording, there is this or that 'pragmatic rule' to the effect that one should make a stronger rather than a weaker conversational move. Strawson's Introduction was published before Grice aired his views for the Aristotelian Society. In this seminar then Grice takes the opportunity to correct a few misunderstandings. Important in that it is Grice's occasion to introduce the principle of conversational helpfulness as generating implicata under the assumption of rationality. The lecture makes it obvious that Grice's interest is methodological, and not 'philological.' He is not interest in conversation per se, but only as the source for his principle of conversational helpfulness and the notion of the conversational implicatum, which springs from the distinction between what an utterer implies and what his expression does, a distinction 'apparently denied by Witters and all too frequently ignored by Austin.' 'Logic and conversation,' an Oxford seminar, 1964, keywords: implicatum, principle of conversational helpfulness, eywords: conversational implicature, conversational implicatum. ’Conversational Implicature’ Grice's main invention, one which trades on the distinction between what an utterer implies and what his expression does. ’A distinction apparently denied by Witters, and all too frequently ignored by, of all people, Austin.’ Grice is implicating that Austin's sympathies were for the 'subjectification' of ‘Linguistic Nature.’ Grice remains an obdurate individualist, and never loses sight of the distinction that gives rise to the conversational implicatum, which can very well be hyper-contextualised, idiosyncratic, and perfectly particularized. His gives an Oxonian example. ‘I can very well mean that my tutee is to bring me a philosophical essay next week by uttering ‘It is raining.’’Grice notes that since the object of the present exercise, is to provide a bit of theory which will explain, for a certain family of cases, why is it that a particular implicature is present, I would suggest that the final test of the adequacy and utility of this model should be: can it be used to construct an explanation of the presence of such an implicature, and is it more comprehensive and more economical than any rival? is the no doubt pre-theoretical explanation which one would be prompted to give of such an implicature consistent with, or better still a favourable pointer towards the requirements involved in the model? cf. Sidonius: Far otherwise: whoever disputes with you will find those protagonists of heresy, the Stoics, Cynics, and Peripatetics, shattered with their own arms and their own engines; for their heathen followers, if they resist the doctrine and spirit of Christianity, will, under your teaching, be caught in their own familiar entanglements, and fall headlong into their own toils; the barbed syllogism of your arguments will hook the glib tongues of the casuists, and it is you who will tie up their slippery questions in categorical clews, after the manner of a clever physician, who, when compelled by reasoned thought, prepares antidotes for poison even from a serpent.’’qvin potivs experietvr qvisqve conflixerit stoicos cynicos peripateticos hæresiarchas propriis armis propriis qvoqve concvti machinamentis nam sectatores eorum Christiano dogmati ac sensvi si repvgnaverint mox te magistro ligati vernaculis implicaturis in retia sua præcipites implagabvntur syllogismis tuæ propositionis vncatis volvbilem tergiversantvm lingvam inhamantibvs dum spiris categoricis lubricas qvæstiones tv potivs innodas acrivm more medicorvm qui remedivm contra venena cum ratio compellit et de serpente conficivnt.’ If he lectured on ‘Logic and Conversation’ on implicature, Grice must have thought that Strawson’s area was central. Yet, as he had done in ‘Causal theory’ and as he will at Harvard, Grice kept collecting philosophers’ mistakes. So it’s best to see Grice as a methodologist, and as using ‘logic and conversation’ as an illustration of his favourite manoeuvre, indeed, central philosophical manoeuver that gave him a place in the history of philosophy. Restricting this manoeuvre to just an area minimises it. On the other hand, there has to be a balance: surely ‘logic and conversation’ is a topic of intrinsic interest, and we cannot expect all philosophers – unless they are Griceians! – to keep a broad unitarian view of philosophy as avirtuous whole! Philosophy, like virtue, is entire. Destructive implicature to it: ‘Mr. Puddle is our man in æsthetics’ implicates he is not good at it. What is important to Grice is that the mistakes of these philosophers (notably Strawson!) arise from some ‘linguistic phenomena,’or, since we must use singular expressions this or that ‘linguistic phenomenon.’ Or as Grice puts it, it is this or that ‘linguistic phenomenon’ which provides the material for the philosopher to make his mistake! So, to solve it, his theory of conversation as rational co-operation is posited – technically, as a way to explain (never merely describe, which Grice found boring ‒ if English, cf. never explain, never apologise ‒ Jacky Fisher: 'Never contradict. Never explain.') these phenomena – his principle of conversational helpfulness and the idea of a conversational implicatum. The latter is based not so much on rationality per se, but on the implicit-explicit distinction that he constantly plays with, since his earlier semiotic-oriented explorations of Peirce. But back to this or that linguistic phenomenon, while he would make fun of Searle for providing this or that ‘linguistic phenomenon’ that ‘no philosopher would ever feel excited about,’ Grice himself was a bit of a master in illustrating this a philosophical point with this or that ‘linguistic phenomenon’ that would not be necessarily connected with philosophy. He rarely quotes authors, but surely the section in 'Causal theory' where he lists seven philosophical theses (which are ripe for an implicatum treatment) would be familiar enough for anybody to be able to drop a name to attach to each! At Harvard, almost every example Grice gives of this or that linguistic phenomenon is UN-authored (and sometimes he expands on his own view of them, just to amuse his audience – and show how committed to this or that thesis he was), but some are not unauthored. And they all belong to ‘the linguistic turn’: He quotes from Gilbert Ryle (who thought he knew about ‘ordinary language’), Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin (he quotes him in great detail, from ‘Pretending,’ ‘Plea of excuses,’ and ‘No modification without aberration,’), P. F. Strawson (in ‘Introduction to Logical theory’ and on ‘Truth’ for Analysis), H. L. A. Hart (as ‘I have heard him expand on this’), J. R. Searle, and B. S. Benjamin. He implicates Hare (on ‘good’). Etc. When we mention the ‘explicit’/’implicit’ distinction as source for the implicatum, we are referring to Grice’s own wording in 'Retrospective Epilogue' where he mentions an utterer as conveying in ‘some explicit fashion this or that, as opposed to a ‘gentler,' more (midland or southern) English, way, via implicature, or implIciture, if you mustn’t. Cf. Fowler: As a southern Englishman, I've stopped trying a northern Englishman the distinction between 'ought' and 'shall.'' 'He seems to get it always wrong.' It may be worth exploring how this connects with rationality. His point would be that that an assumption that the rational principle of ‘conversational helpfulness’ is in order allows Pirot-1 not just to convey ‘in a direct explicit fashion’ that p, but ‘in an implicit fashion’ that q. Where ‘q’ is the implicatum. The principle of conversational helpfulness as generator of this or that ‘implicata,’ to use Grice’s word (‘generate’). Surely, ‘He took off his boots and went to bed; I won’t say in which order’ sounds hardly in the vein of conversational helpfulness – but provided Grice does not see it as ‘logically incoherent,’ it is still a rational (if not reasonable) thing to say. The ‘point’ may be difficult to discern, but you never know. The utterer may be conveying, ‘Viva Boole!’ Grice’s point about ‘rationality’ is mentioned in his later ‘Prolegomena,’ on at least two occasions. ‘Rational behaviour’ is the phrase he uses (as applied first to ‘communication’ and then to ‘discourse’) and in stark opposition with a convention-based approach he rightly associates with Austin. Grice is here less interested here as he will be on 'rationality,' but coooperation as such. Helpfulness as a reasonable expecation (normative?), a mutual one ‘between decent chaps,’ as he puts it. His charming ‘decent chap’ is so Oxonian. His tutee would expect no less ‒ and indeed no more!
1966. Certainty, Descartes on clear and distinct perception, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Explorations on semantics and metaphysics, Descartes on 'clear and distinct perception,' in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II: Explorations on Semantics and metaphysics, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 1, folder 20, and Series V (Topical), carton 6-folders 27-28, and carton 8-folder 26, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Descartes, clear and distinct perception, certainty. From Descartes to Stout and back. Stout indeed uses both 'intention' and 'certainty,' and in the same paragraph. Stout notes that, at the outset, performance falls far short of intention. Only a certain series of contractions of certain muscles, in proper proportions and in a proper order, is capable of realising the end aimed at, with the maximum of rapidity and certainty, and the minimum of obstruction and failure, and corresponding effort. At the outset of the process of acquisition, muscles are contracted which are superfluous, and which therefore operate as disturbing conditions. Grice's immediate trigger, however, is Ayer on 'sure that,' and 'having the right to be sure,' as his immediate trigger later will be Hampshire and Hart. Grice had high regard for S. N. Hampshire's brilliant ‘Thought and action.’ He was also concerned with Stout's rather hasty UNphilosophical, but more 'scientifically psychologically-oriented' remarks about 'assurance' in practical concerns. He knew too that he was exploring an item of the philosopher's lexicon (‘certus’) that had been brought to the forum when Anscombe and von Wright translate Witter's German expression ‘Gewißheit’ in ‘Über Gewißheit’ as ‘Certainty.’ The Grecians were never sure about being sure. But the modernist turn brought by Descartes meant that Grice now had to deal with 'incorrigibility' and 'privileged access' to this or that pirot, notably himself (‘When I intend to go, I don't have to observe myself, I'm on the stage, not in the audience,’ or ‘Only I can say ‘I will to London,’ expressing my intention to do so. If you say, ‘You will go’ you are expressing yours!’ Grice found Descartes very funny ‒ in a French way. Grice is interested in contesting A. J. Ayer and other Oxford philosophers, on the topic of a criterion for 'certainty.' In so doing, Grice choses Descartes's time-honoured criterion of 'clarity' and 'distinction,' as applied to perception. Grice does NOT quote Descartes in French! In the proceedings, Grice distinguishes between two 'kinds' of certainty apparently ignored by Descartes: (a) objective certainty: Ordinary-language variant: ‘It is certain that p,’ whatever ‘it’ refers to. cf. Grice, ‘it’s an illusion. What is ‘it’?’ (b) subjective certainty: Ordinary-language variant: ’I am certain that p.’ ’I’ being, of course, Grice, ‘in my bestest days, of course!’ There are further items on Descartes in the Grice Collection, notably in the last series, of topics arranged alphabetically. Grice never cared to publish his views on Descartes until he found an opportunity to do so when compiling his Studies in the Way of Words. Grice is not interested in an exegesis of Descartes's thought. He doesn't care to give a reference to any edition of Descartes's oeuvre. But he plays with 'certain'. ‘It is certain that p’ is objective certainty, apparently. ‘I am certain that p’ is subjective certainty, rather. Oddly, Grice will turn to UNcertainty as it connects with intention in his British Academy lecture. Grice's interest in Descartes connects with Descartes's search for a criterion of 'certainty' in terms of 'clarity' and 'distinction' of this or that perception. Having explored the philosophy of perception with Warnock, it's only natural he wanted to give Descartes's rambles a second and third look! 1966, Descartes on clear and distinct perception, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and Metaphysics, Essay, ‘Descartes on clear and distinct perception and Malcom on dreaming,’ Keyword: perception, Descartes, clear and distinct perception, Malcolm, dreaming. Descartes meets Malcolm, and vice versa. Descartes on 'clear and distinct perception,' in Studies in the Way of Words, ‘Descartes on clear and distinct perception,’ 1966, Descartes on clear and distinct perception, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II, Semantics and Metaphysics, Essay. Grice gives a short overview of Cartesian metaphysics for the BBC third programme. The best example, Grice thinks, of a metaphysical snob is provided by Descartes, about whose idea of certainty Grice had philosophised quite a bit, since it’s in total contrast with Moore’s! Descartes is a very scientifically minded philosopher, with very clear ideas about the proper direction for science. Descartes, whose middle name seems to have been ‘Euclid,’ thinks that mathematics, and in particular geometry, provides the model for a scientific procedure, or method. And this determines all of Descartes’s thinking in two ways. First, Descartes thinks that the fundamental method in science is the axiomatic deductive method of geometry, and this Descartes conceives (as Spinoza morality ‘more geometrico’) of as rigorous reasoning from a self-evident axiom (‘Cogito, ergo sum.’). Second, Descartes thinks that the subject matter of physical science, from mechanics to medicine, must be fundamentally the same as the subject matter of geometry! The only characteristics that the objects studied by geometry poses are spatial characteristics. So from the point of view of science in general, the only important features of things in the physical world were also their spatial characteristics, what he called ‘extensio,’ ‘res extensa.’ Physical science in general is a kind of dynamic, or kinetic, geometry. Here we have an exclusive preference for a certain type of scientific method, and a certain type of scientific explanation: the method is deductive, the type of explanation mechanical. These beliefs about the right way to do science are exactly reflected in Descartes's ‘ontology’ – one of the two branches of metaphysics; the other is philosophical eschatology, or the study of categories), and it is reflected in his doctrine, that is, about what ’really’ exists. Apart from God, the divine substance, Descartes recognises just two kinds of substance, two types of real entity. First, there is material substance, or matter; and the belief that the only scientifically important characteristics of things in the physical world are their spatial characteristics goes over, in the language of ’metaphysics,’into the doctrine that these are their only characteristics. Second, and to Ryle’s horror, Descartes recognizes the mind or soul, or the mental substance, of which the essential characteristic is thinking; and thinking itself, in its pure form at least, is conceived of as simply the intuitive grasping of this or that self-evident axiom and this or that of its deductive consequence. These restrictive doctrines about reality and knowledge naturally call for adjustments elsewhere in our ordinary scheme of things. With the help of thedivine substance, these are duly provided. It is not always obvious that the metaphysician's scheme involves this kind of ’ontological’ preference, or favoritism, or prejudice, or snobbery this tendency, that is, to promoteone or two categories of entity to the rank of the real, or of the ultimately real, to the exclusion of others, Descartes’s ‘entia realissima.’ One is taught at Oxford that epistemology begins with the Moderns such as Descartes, which is not true. Grice was concerned with 'certain,' which was applied in Old Roman times to this or that utterer: the person who is made certain in reference to a thing, certain, sure: ‘certi sumus periisse omnia,’ Cic. Att. 2, 19, 5: ‘num quid nunc es certior?’ Plaut. Am. 1, 1, 191: ‘posteritatis,’ i. e. of posthumous fame, Plin. Ep. 9, 3, 1: ‘sententiæ,’ Quint. 4, 3, 8: ‘judicii,’ Sen. Ep. 45, 9: ‘certus de suā geniturā,’ Suet. Vesp. 25: ‘damnationis,’ id. Tib. 61: ‘exitii,’ Tac. A. 1, 27: ‘spei,’ id. H. 4, 3: ‘matrimonii,’ id. A. 12, 3: ‘certi sumus, etc.,’ Gell. 18, 10, 5. In class. prose mostly in the phrase certiorem facere aliquem (de aliquā re, alicujus rei, with a foll, acc. and inf., with a rel.-clause or absol.), to inform, apprise one of a thing: ‘me certiorem face,’ Ter. Phorm. 4, 3, 69: ‘ut nos facias certiores,’ Plaut. Curc. 5, 2, 32: ‘uti se (sc. Cæsarem) de his rebus certiorem faciant,’ Cæs. B. G. 2, 2: ‘qui certiorem me sui consilii fecit,’ Cic. Att. 9, 2, a, 2: ‘Cæsarem certiorem faciunt, sese non facile ab oppidis vim hostium prohibere,’ Cæs. B. G. 1, 11: ‘faciam te certiorem quid egerim,’ Cic. Att. 3, 11, 1. With subj. only: ‘milites certiores facit, paulisper intermitterent proelium,’ Cæs. B. G. 3, 5 fin.—Pass.: ‘quod crebro certior per me fias de omnibus rebus,’ Cic. Fam. 1, 7, 1; so Cæs. B. G. 1, 7; Sall. J. 104, 1: ‘Cæsar certior factus est, tres jam copiarum partes Helvetios id flumen transduxisse,’ Cæs. B. G. 1, 12; so id. ib. 1, 21; 1, 41; 2, 1; Sall. J. 82, 2; Nep. Att. 12, 3: ‘factus certior, quæ res gererentur,’ Cæs. B. C. 1, 15: ‘non consulibus certioribus factis,’ Liv. 45, 21, 4.—Also in posit., though rarely: ‘fac me certum quid tibi est,’ Plaut. Ps. 1, 1, 16; 4, 6, 35; Verg. A. 3, 179: ‘lacrimæ suorum Tam subitæ matrem certam fecere ruinæ,’ Ov. M. 6, 268.
1966. Eudaimonia, eudæmonia, ‘a philosophy of life,’ happiness, notes, some reflections about ends and happiness, in Aspects of reason, Clarendon, Correspondence with R. O. Warner, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series I (Correspondence), carton 1-folder 9, Series II (Essays), carton 4-folder 16, Series V (Topical), carton 7-folder 6, and carton 8, folder 28, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: ends, 'telos,' happiness, Kantotle, eudaimonia, philosophical biology, philosophical psychology, eudæmon, fairy godmother, Warner. H. P. Grice’s fairy godmother. Grice took 'life' seriously: philosophical biology! ‘Philosophy of life’ is dated 1966 in P. G. R. I. C. E. Grice’s fairy godmother. ‘Much the most plausible conjecture regarding what Greek eudaimonia means, is namely that ‘eudaimonia’ is to be understood as the name for that state or condition which one’s good dæmon would, if he could, ensure for one.’ ‘And my good dæmon is a being motivated, with respect to me, solely by concern for my well-being or happiness.’ ‘To change the idiom, ‘eudæmonia’ is the general characterization of what a full-time and unhampered fairy godmother would secure for you.’ Grice is concerned with the specific system of ends that 'eudaimonia' consists for for both Kant and Aristotle (or Kantotle for short). Grice borrows, but never returns, some reflections by his fomer tuttee at St. John's, J. L. Ackrill. Ackrill's point is about the etymological basis for 'eudaimonia,' from 'eudaimon,' or good dæmon, as Grice prefers. Grice thinks the metaphor should be disimplicated, and taken quite 'literally.' Grice concludes with a set of ends that justify our ascription of 'eudaemonia' to the agent. For Grice, as for Aristotle, and indeed Kant (Kantotle, in short), a 'telos' and 'eudaemonia' are related in subtle ways. For 'eudaemonia' we cannot deal with just ONE end, but a system of ends (Although such a system may be a singleton). Grice specifies a subtle way of characterising 'end' so that a particular ascription of an 'end' may entail an ascription of 'eudaemonia.' Grice follows the textual criticism of his former tutee, J. L. Ackrill, in connection with the Socratic point that 'eudaemonia' IS literally related to the 'eudaemon.' Warner has explored Grice's concept of 'happiness,' notably in P. G. R. I. C. E. Warner was especially helpful with Grice's third difficult Carus lecture, a metaphysical defence of absolute value. Warner also connected with Grice in such topics as the philosophy of perception (seen in an evolutionary light) and the Kantotelian idea of happiness. In response to Warner's overview of Grice's oeuvre for the festschrift (that Warner co-authored with Grandy), Grice refers to the editors by the collective name of ‘Richards.’ While Grice felt he had to use 'happiness,' he is always having Aristotle's 'eudaimonia' in mind! The implicata of ‘Smith is happy’ are more complex than Kantotle thought! Austen knew! (‘You decide if you’re happy!’ — Emma). Ultimately, for Grice, the rational life is the happy life! Grice took 'life' seriously: philosophical biology! Grice is clear when reprinting the Descartes paper in Studies (where he does quote from Descartes sources quite a bit, even if he implicates he is ‘no Cartesian scholar’ – what Oxonian would? ‒: it concerns ‘certainty.’ And certainty was originally Cantabrigian (Moore), but also Oxonian, in parts. Ayer was saying that ‘to know’ is to ‘assure’ that one is certain or sure. So he could connect. Grice will at various stages of his development play and explore this authoritative voice of introspection: incorrigibility and privileged access. He surely wants to say that a declaration of an intention is authoritative. And he plays with ‘meaning,’ too when provoking Malcolm in a don recollection: Grice: I want you to bring me a paper tomorrow. Strawson: You mean a newspaper? Grice: No, a philosophical essay. Strawson: How do you know? Are you certain you mean that? Grice finds not being certain about what one means Strawsonian and otiose! (‘Tutees!’). Grice loved to place himself in the role of the philosophical hack, dealing with his tutee’s inabilities, a whole week long – until he could find refreshment in para-philosophy on the Saturday morning! Now, the logical form of ‘certain’ is a trick. Grice would symbolize it as numbering of operators. If Pirot ψs p, Pirot ψs ψs p, and Pirot ψs ψs ψs p, and so ad infinitum. This is a bit like certainty. But not quite! When he explores trust, Grice considers something like a backing for it. But does conclusive evidence yield certainty? He doesn’t think so. Certainty, for Grice should apply to any psychological attitude, state or stance. And it is just clever of him that when he had to deliver that lecture at London he chose intention and uncertainty as its topic, just to provoke. Not surprisingly, the ‘Intention and Uncertainty’ piece opens with ‘the sceptic’s challenge.’ And he won’t conclude that the intender is certain. Only that there’s some good chance (p greater than 0.5) that what he intends will get through! ‘When there is a will, there is a way,’ ‘When there is a neo-Prichardian will-ing, there is a palæo-Griceian way-ing!’ Perhaps by ‘know’ Moore means ‘certain.’ Grice was amused by the fact that Moore thought that he knew that behind the curtains at the lecture hall at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, there was a window, when there wasn’t. He uses Moore’s misuse of ‘know’ – according to Malcolm – both in ‘Causal theory’ and ‘Prolegomena.’ And of course this relates to the topic of the sceptic’s implicature, 1946 above, with the two essays ‘Scepticism and Common sense’ and ‘Moore and Philosopher’s Paradoxes’ reprinted (one partially) in Studies. With regard to 'certainty,' it is interesting to compare it, as Grice does, not so much with privileged access, but with incorrigibility. Do we not have privileged access to our own beliefs and desires? And, worse still, may it not be true that at least some of our avowals of our beliefs and desires are incorrigible? One of Grice's problems is, as he puts it, ‘how to accommodate privileged access’ and, ‘maybe, incorrigibility.’ This or that a second-order state may be, in some fashion, ‘incorrigible.’ On the contrary, for Grice, this or that lower-order, first-order judging is only a matter for privileged access. Note that while he is happy to allow 'privileged access' to lower-order souly states, only those who are replicated at a higher-order or second-order may, ‘in some fashion,’ be said to count as an 'incorrigible' avowal. ‘It rains.’ Pirot judges it rains (privileged access). Pirot judges that Pirot judges that it rains (incorrigibile). The justification is conversational. ‘It rains’ says the pirot, or expresses the pirot. Grice wants to be able to say that if a pirot expresses that p, the pirot judges2 that p. If the pirot expresses that it rains, the pirot judges that he judges that it rains. In this fashion, his second-order, higher-order judging is incorrigible, only. Although Grice may allow for it to be corrected by a third-order judging. It is not required that we should stick with 'judging' here. ‘Let Smith return the money that he owes to Jones.’ If pirot expresses !p, pirot ψ-s2 that !p. His second-order, higher-order buletic state is incorrigibile (if ceteris paribus is not corrected by a third-order buletic or doxastic state). His first-order buletic state is a matter only of privileged access.
1966. Dreaming, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 8-folder 26, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Malcolm, dreaming, Descartes, implicatum Grice dreaming. Malcolm argues in ‘Dreaming and Skepticism’ and in his ‘Dreaming’ that the notion of a dream qua conscious experience that occurs at a definite time and has definite duration during sleep, is ‘unintelligible.’ This contradicts the views of philosophers like Descartes (and indeed Moore!), who, Malcolm holds, assume that a human being may have a conscious thought and a conscious experience during sleep. Descartes claims that he had been deceived during sleep. Malcolm’s point is that ordinary language contrasts consciousness and sleep. The claim that one is conscious while one is sleep-walking is ‘stretching the use of the term.’ Malcolm rejects the alleged counter-examples based on sleepwalking or sleep-talking, e.g. dreaming that one is climbing stairs while one is actually doing so is not a counter-example because, in such a case, the individual is not sound asleep after all. ‘If a person is in any state of consciousness, it logically follows that he is not sound asleep.’ The concept of dreaming is based on our descriptions of dreams after we have awakened in ‘telling a dream.’ Thus, to have dreamt that one has a thought during sleep is not to have a thought any more than to have dreamt that one has climbed Everest is to have climbed Everest. Since one cannot have an experience during sleep, one cannot have a mistaken experience during sleep, thereby undermining the sort of scepticism based on the idea that our experience might be wrong because we might be dreaming. Malcolm further argues that a report of a conscious state during sleep is unverifiable. If Grice claims that he and Strawson saw a big-foot in charge of the reserve desk at the Bodleian library, one can verify that this took place by talking to Strawson and gathering forensic evidence from the library. However, there is no way to verify Grice’s claim that he dreamed that he and Strawson saw a big-foot working at the Bodleian library. Grice's only basis for his claim that he dreamt this is that Grice says so after he wakes up. How does one distinguish the case where Grice dreamed that he saw a big-foot working at The Bodleian Library and the case in which he dreamed that he saw a person in a big-foot suit working at the library but, after awakening, mis-remembered that person in a big-foot suit as a big-foot proper? If Grice should admit that he had earlier mis-reported his dream and that he had actually dreamed he saw a person in a big-foot suit at The Bodleian, there is no more independent verification for this new claim than there was for the original one. Thus, there is, for Malcolm, no sense to the idea of mis-remembering one’s dreams. Malcolm here applies one of Witter's ideas from his ‘private language argument. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’.’ For a similar reason, Malcolm challenges the idea that one can assign a definite duration or time of occurrence to a dream. If Grice claims that he ran the mile in 3.4 minutes, one could verify this in the usual ways. If, however, Grice says he dreamt that he ran the mile in 3.4 minutes, how is one to measure the duration of his dreamt run? If Grice says he was wearing a stopwatch in the dream and clocked his run at 3.4 minutes, how can one know that the dreamt stopwatch is not running at half speed (so that he really dreamt that he ran the mile in 6.8 minutes)? Grice might argue that a dream report does not carry such a conversational implicata. But Malcolm would say that just admits the point. The ordinary criteria one uses for determining temporal duration do not apply to dreamt events. The problem in both these cases (Grice dreaming one saw a bigfoot working at The Bodleian library and dreaming that he ran the mile in 3.4 minutes) is that there is no way to verify the truth of these dreamt events — no direct way to access that dreamt inner experience, that mysterious glow of consciousness inside the mind of Grice lying comatose on the couch, in order to determine the facts of the matter. This is because, for Malcolm, there are no facts of the matter apart from the dreamer’s report of the dream upon awakening. Malcolm claims that the empirical evidence does not enable one to decide between the view that a dream experience occurs during sleep and the view that they are generated upon the moment of waking up. Dennett agrees with Malcolm that nothing supports the received view that a dream involves a conscious experience while one is asleep but holds that such issues might be settled empirically. Malcolm also argues against the attempt to provide a physiological mark of the duration of a dream, for example, the view that the dream lasted as long as the rapid eye movements. Malcolm replies that ‘there can only be as much precision in that common concept of dreaming as is provided by the common criterion of dreaming.’ These scientific researchers are misled by the assumption that the provision for the duration of a dream ‘is already there, only somewhat obscured and in need of being made more precise.’ However, Malcolm claims, it is not already there (in the ordinary concept of dreaming). These scientific views are making ‘radical conceptual changes’ in the concept of dreaming, not further explaining our ordinary concept of dreaming. Malcolm admits, however, that it might be natural to adopt such scientific views about REM sleep as a convention. Malcolm points out, however, that if REM sleep is adopted as a criterion for the occurrence of a dream, ’people would have to be informed upon waking up that they had dreamed or not.’ As Pears has observed, Malcolm does not mean to deny that people have dreams in favour of the view that they only have waking dream-behaviour. Of course it is no misuse of language to speak of ‘remembering a dream’.’ His point is that since the concept of dreaming is so closely tied to our concept of waking report of a dreams, one cannot form a coherent concept of this alleged inner (private) something that occurs with a definite duration during sleep. Malcolm rejects a certain philosophical conception of dreaming, not the ordinary concept of dreaming, which, he holds, is neither a hidden private something nor mere outward behaviour. Malcolm’s account of dreaming has come in for considerable criticism. Some argue that Malcolm’s claim that occurrences in dreams cannot be verified by others does not require the strict criteria that Malcolm proposes but can be justified by appeal to the simplicity, plausibility, and predictive adequacy of an explanatory system as a whole. Some argue that Malcolm’s account of the sentence ‘I am awake’ is inconsistent. A comprehensive programme in considerable detail has been offered for an empirical scientific investigation of dreaming of the sort that Malcolm rejects. Others have proposed various counterexamples and counter arguments against Malcolm’s account of dreaming. Grice's emphasis is in Malcolm's easy way out with statements to the effect that 'implicata' do or do not operate in dream reports. ‘They do in mine!’ Grice considers, ‘I may be dreaming’ in the two essays opening the Part II: Explorations on semantics and metaphysics in Studies in the Way of Words.
1966. Eudaimonia, eudæmonia, ‘a philosophy of life,’ happiness, notes, some reflections about ends and happiness, in Aspects of reason, Clarendon, Correspondence with R. O. Warner, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series I (Correspondence), carton 1-folder 9, Series II (Essays), carton 4-folder 16, Series V (Topical), carton 7-folder 6, and carton 8, folder 28, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: ends, 'telos,' happiness, Kantotle, eudaimonia, philosophical biology, philosophical psychology, eudæmon, fairy godmother, Warner. H. P. Grice’s fairy godmother. Grice took 'life' seriously: philosophical biology! ‘Philosophy of life’ is dated 1966 in P. G. R. I. C. E. Grice’s fairy godmother. ‘Much the most plausible conjecture regarding what Greek eudaimonia means, is namely that ‘eudaimonia’ is to be understood as the name for that state or condition which one’s good dæmon would, if he could, ensure for one.’ ‘And my good dæmon is a being motivated, with respect to me, solely by concern for my well-being or happiness.’ ‘To change the idiom, ‘eudæmonia’ is the general characterization of what a full-time and unhampered fairy godmother would secure for you.’ Grice is concerned with the specific system of ends that 'eudaimonia' consists for for both Kant and Aristotle (or Kantotle for short). Grice borrows, but never returns, some reflections by his fomer tuttee at St. John's, J. L. Ackrill. Ackrill's point is about the etymological basis for 'eudaimonia,' from 'eudaimon,' or good dæmon, as Grice prefers. Grice thinks the metaphor should be disimplicated, and taken quite 'literally.' Grice concludes with a set of ends that justify our ascription of 'eudaemonia' to the agent. For Grice, as for Aristotle, and indeed Kant (Kantotle, in short), a 'telos' and 'eudaemonia' are related in subtle ways. For 'eudaemonia' we cannot deal with just ONE end, but a system of ends (Although such a system may be a singleton). Grice specifies a subtle way of characterising 'end' so that a particular ascription of an 'end' may entail an ascription of 'eudaemonia.' Grice follows the textual criticism of his former tutee, J. L. Ackrill, in connection with the Socratic point that 'eudaemonia' IS literally related to the 'eudaemon.' Warner has explored Grice's concept of 'happiness,' notably in P. G. R. I. C. E. Warner was especially helpful with Grice's third difficult Carus lecture, a metaphysical defence of absolute value. Warner also connected with Grice in such topics as the philosophy of perception (seen in an evolutionary light) and the Kantotelian idea of happiness. In response to Warner's overview of Grice's oeuvre for the festschrift (that Warner co-authored with Grandy), Grice refers to the editors by the collective name of ‘Richards.’ While Grice felt he had to use 'happiness,' he is always having Aristotle's 'eudaimonia' in mind! The implicata of ‘Smith is happy’ are more complex than Kantotle thought! Austen knew! (‘You decide if you’re happy!’ — Emma). Ultimately, for Grice, the rational life is the happy life! Grice took 'life' seriously: philosophical biology! Grice is clear when reprinting the Descartes paper in Studies (where he does quote from Descartes sources quite a bit, even if he implicates he is ‘no Cartesian scholar’ – what Oxonian would? ‒: it concerns ‘certainty.’ And certainty was originally Cantabrigian (Moore), but also Oxonian, in parts. Ayer was saying that ‘to know’ is to ‘assure’ that one is certain or sure. So he could connect. Grice will at various stages of his development play and explore this authoritative voice of introspection: incorrigibility and privileged access. He surely wants to say that a declaration of an intention is authoritative. And he plays with ‘meaning,’ too when provoking Malcolm in a don recollection: Grice: I want you to bring me a paper tomorrow. Strawson: You mean a newspaper? Grice: No, a philosophical essay. Strawson: How do you know? Are you certain you mean that? Grice finds not being certain about what one means Strawsonian and otiose! (‘Tutees!’). Grice loved to place himself in the role of the philosophical hack, dealing with his tutee’s inabilities, a whole week long – until he could find refreshment in para-philosophy on the Saturday morning! Now, the logical form of ‘certain’ is a trick. Grice would symbolize it as numbering of operators. If Pirot ψs p, Pirot ψs ψs p, and Pirot ψs ψs ψs p, and so ad infinitum. This is a bit like certainty. But not quite! When he explores trust, Grice considers something like a backing for it. But does conclusive evidence yield certainty? He doesn’t think so. Certainty, for Grice should apply to any psychological attitude, state or stance. And it is just clever of him that when he had to deliver that lecture at London he chose intention and uncertainty as its topic, just to provoke. Not surprisingly, the ‘Intention and Uncertainty’ piece opens with ‘the sceptic’s challenge.’ And he won’t conclude that the intender is certain. Only that there’s some good chance (p greater than 0.5) that what he intends will get through! ‘When there is a will, there is a way,’ ‘When there is a neo-Prichardian will-ing, there is a palæo-Griceian way-ing!’ Perhaps by ‘know’ Moore means ‘certain.’ Grice was amused by the fact that Moore thought that he knew that behind the curtains at the lecture hall at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, there was a window, when there wasn’t. He uses Moore’s misuse of ‘know’ – according to Malcolm – both in ‘Causal theory’ and ‘Prolegomena.’ And of course this relates to the topic of the sceptic’s implicature, 1946 above, with the two essays ‘Scepticism and Common sense’ and ‘Moore and Philosopher’s Paradoxes’ reprinted (one partially) in Studies. With regard to 'certainty,' it is interesting to compare it, as Grice does, not so much with privileged access, but with incorrigibility. Do we not have privileged access to our own beliefs and desires? And, worse still, may it not be true that at least some of our avowals of our beliefs and desires are incorrigible? One of Grice's problems is, as he puts it, ‘how to accommodate privileged access’ and, ‘maybe, incorrigibility.’ This or that a second-order state may be, in some fashion, ‘incorrigible.’ On the contrary, for Grice, this or that lower-order, first-order judging is only a matter for privileged access. Note that while he is happy to allow 'privileged access' to lower-order souly states, only those who are replicated at a higher-order or second-order may, ‘in some fashion,’ be said to count as an 'incorrigible' avowal. ‘It rains.’ Pirot judges it rains (privileged access). Pirot judges that Pirot judges that it rains (incorrigibile). The justification is conversational. ‘It rains’ says the pirot, or expresses the pirot. Grice wants to be able to say that if a pirot expresses that p, the pirot judges2 that p. If the pirot expresses that it rains, the pirot judges that he judges that it rains. In this fashion, his second-order, higher-order judging is incorrigible, only. Although Grice may allow for it to be corrected by a third-order judging. It is not required that we should stick with 'judging' here. ‘Let Smith return the money that he owes to Jones.’ If pirot expresses !p, pirot ψ-s2 that !p. His second-order, higher-order buletic state is incorrigibile (if ceteris paribus is not corrected by a third-order buletic or doxastic state). His first-order buletic state is a matter only of privileged access.
1966. Dreaming, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 8-folder 26, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Malcolm, dreaming, Descartes, implicatum Grice dreaming. Malcolm argues in ‘Dreaming and Skepticism’ and in his ‘Dreaming’ that the notion of a dream qua conscious experience that occurs at a definite time and has definite duration during sleep, is ‘unintelligible.’ This contradicts the views of philosophers like Descartes (and indeed Moore!), who, Malcolm holds, assume that a human being may have a conscious thought and a conscious experience during sleep. Descartes claims that he had been deceived during sleep. Malcolm’s point is that ordinary language contrasts consciousness and sleep. The claim that one is conscious while one is sleep-walking is ‘stretching the use of the term.’ Malcolm rejects the alleged counter-examples based on sleepwalking or sleep-talking, e.g. dreaming that one is climbing stairs while one is actually doing so is not a counter-example because, in such a case, the individual is not sound asleep after all. ‘If a person is in any state of consciousness, it logically follows that he is not sound asleep.’ The concept of dreaming is based on our descriptions of dreams after we have awakened in ‘telling a dream.’ Thus, to have dreamt that one has a thought during sleep is not to have a thought any more than to have dreamt that one has climbed Everest is to have climbed Everest. Since one cannot have an experience during sleep, one cannot have a mistaken experience during sleep, thereby undermining the sort of scepticism based on the idea that our experience might be wrong because we might be dreaming. Malcolm further argues that a report of a conscious state during sleep is unverifiable. If Grice claims that he and Strawson saw a big-foot in charge of the reserve desk at the Bodleian library, one can verify that this took place by talking to Strawson and gathering forensic evidence from the library. However, there is no way to verify Grice’s claim that he dreamed that he and Strawson saw a big-foot working at the Bodleian library. Grice's only basis for his claim that he dreamt this is that Grice says so after he wakes up. How does one distinguish the case where Grice dreamed that he saw a big-foot working at The Bodleian Library and the case in which he dreamed that he saw a person in a big-foot suit working at the library but, after awakening, mis-remembered that person in a big-foot suit as a big-foot proper? If Grice should admit that he had earlier mis-reported his dream and that he had actually dreamed he saw a person in a big-foot suit at The Bodleian, there is no more independent verification for this new claim than there was for the original one. Thus, there is, for Malcolm, no sense to the idea of mis-remembering one’s dreams. Malcolm here applies one of Witter's ideas from his ‘private language argument. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’.’ For a similar reason, Malcolm challenges the idea that one can assign a definite duration or time of occurrence to a dream. If Grice claims that he ran the mile in 3.4 minutes, one could verify this in the usual ways. If, however, Grice says he dreamt that he ran the mile in 3.4 minutes, how is one to measure the duration of his dreamt run? If Grice says he was wearing a stopwatch in the dream and clocked his run at 3.4 minutes, how can one know that the dreamt stopwatch is not running at half speed (so that he really dreamt that he ran the mile in 6.8 minutes)? Grice might argue that a dream report does not carry such a conversational implicata. But Malcolm would say that just admits the point. The ordinary criteria one uses for determining temporal duration do not apply to dreamt events. The problem in both these cases (Grice dreaming one saw a bigfoot working at The Bodleian library and dreaming that he ran the mile in 3.4 minutes) is that there is no way to verify the truth of these dreamt events — no direct way to access that dreamt inner experience, that mysterious glow of consciousness inside the mind of Grice lying comatose on the couch, in order to determine the facts of the matter. This is because, for Malcolm, there are no facts of the matter apart from the dreamer’s report of the dream upon awakening. Malcolm claims that the empirical evidence does not enable one to decide between the view that a dream experience occurs during sleep and the view that they are generated upon the moment of waking up. Dennett agrees with Malcolm that nothing supports the received view that a dream involves a conscious experience while one is asleep but holds that such issues might be settled empirically. Malcolm also argues against the attempt to provide a physiological mark of the duration of a dream, for example, the view that the dream lasted as long as the rapid eye movements. Malcolm replies that ‘there can only be as much precision in that common concept of dreaming as is provided by the common criterion of dreaming.’ These scientific researchers are misled by the assumption that the provision for the duration of a dream ‘is already there, only somewhat obscured and in need of being made more precise.’ However, Malcolm claims, it is not already there (in the ordinary concept of dreaming). These scientific views are making ‘radical conceptual changes’ in the concept of dreaming, not further explaining our ordinary concept of dreaming. Malcolm admits, however, that it might be natural to adopt such scientific views about REM sleep as a convention. Malcolm points out, however, that if REM sleep is adopted as a criterion for the occurrence of a dream, ’people would have to be informed upon waking up that they had dreamed or not.’ As Pears has observed, Malcolm does not mean to deny that people have dreams in favour of the view that they only have waking dream-behaviour. Of course it is no misuse of language to speak of ‘remembering a dream’.’ His point is that since the concept of dreaming is so closely tied to our concept of waking report of a dreams, one cannot form a coherent concept of this alleged inner (private) something that occurs with a definite duration during sleep. Malcolm rejects a certain philosophical conception of dreaming, not the ordinary concept of dreaming, which, he holds, is neither a hidden private something nor mere outward behaviour. Malcolm’s account of dreaming has come in for considerable criticism. Some argue that Malcolm’s claim that occurrences in dreams cannot be verified by others does not require the strict criteria that Malcolm proposes but can be justified by appeal to the simplicity, plausibility, and predictive adequacy of an explanatory system as a whole. Some argue that Malcolm’s account of the sentence ‘I am awake’ is inconsistent. A comprehensive programme in considerable detail has been offered for an empirical scientific investigation of dreaming of the sort that Malcolm rejects. Others have proposed various counterexamples and counter arguments against Malcolm’s account of dreaming. Grice's emphasis is in Malcolm's easy way out with statements to the effect that 'implicata' do or do not operate in dream reports. ‘They do in mine!’ Grice considers, ‘I may be dreaming’ in the two essays opening the Part II: Explorations on semantics and metaphysics in Studies in the Way of Words.
1967. Logic and conversation, repr. in Studies in the Way of Words, Part I, in revised form (1987). The William James Memorial Lectures on Logic and Conversation, Harvard. The William James Memorial Lectures on Logic and Conversation, in Studies in the Way of Words, as Part I, ‘Logic and Conversation,’ The William James lectures on logic and conversation, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 1-folders 24, 25, and 26, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: logic, conversation, implicature. A set of seven lectures, entitled as follows. Lecture 1, 'Prolegomena;' Lecture 2: 'Logic and Conversation;' Lecture 3: 'Further notes on logic and conversation;' Lecture 4: 'Indicative conditionals;' Lecture 5: 'Utterer's meaning and intentions;' Lecture 6: 'Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning;' and Lecture 7: 'Some models for implicature.' ‘I hope they don't expect me to lecture on James!’ Grice admired James, but not vice versa. Grice entitled the set as being ‘Logic and Conversation.’ That is the title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing that it was way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the second lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and Harman, The Logic of Grammar. The content of each lecture is indicated below. In the first, Grice manages to quote from Witters. In the last, he didn't! The original set consisted of seven lectures. To wit: Prolegomena, Logic and conversation, Further notes on logic and conversation, Indicative Conditionals, Utterer's meaning and intentions, Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word meaning, and Some models for implicature. They were pretty successful at Oxford. While the notion of an 'implicatum' had been introduced by Grice at Oxford, even in connection with a principle of conversational helpfulness, he takes the occasion now to explore the type of rationality involved. Observation of the principle of conversational helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who cares about the two central goals to conversation (give/receive information, influence/be influened) is expected to have an interest in participating in a conversation that is only going to be profitable given that it is conducted along the lines set by the principle of conversational helpfulness. In ‘Prolegomena’ he lists J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, R. M. Hare, H. L. A. Hart, and himself, as victims of a disregard for the implicatum. In the third lecture he introduces his razor, ‘Senses are not to be muliplied beyond necessity.’ In ‘Indicative conditionals’ he tackles Strawson on 'if' as not representing the horse-shoe of Whitehead and Russell. The next two lectures, ‘Utterer's meaning and intentions’ and ‘Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning’ refine his earlier, more austere, account of this particularly Peirceian phenomenon. He concludes the lectures with an exploration on the relevance of the implicatum to philosophical psychology. Grice was well aware that many philosophers had become enamoured with the series, and would love to give it a ‘continuous perusal.’ The set is indeed grandiose. It starts with a ‘Prolegomena’ to set the scene: He notably quotes himself in it, which helps, but also Strawson, which sort of justifies the general title. In the second lecture, ‘Logic and Conversation,’ he expands on the principle of conversational helpfulness and the explicitum/implicatum distinction – all very rationalist! The third lecture is otiose in that he makes fun of Ockham: Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The fourth lecture, on ‘Indicative conditionals,’ is indeed on MOST of the formal devices he had mentioned on Lecture II, notably the functors (rather than the quantifiers and the iota operator, with which he deals in ‘Presupposition and conversational implicature,’ since, as he notes, they refer to reference). This lecture is the centrepiece of the set. In the fifth lecture, he plays with ‘mean,’ and discovers that it is attached to the implicatum or the implicitum. In the sixth lecture, he becomes a ‘nominalist,’ to use Bennett’s phrase, as he deals with ‘dog’ and ‘shaggy’ in terms of this or that ‘resultant’ procedure – ‘don’t ask me what they are!’ ‒. Finally, in ‘Some models for implicature,’ he attacks the charge of circularity, and refers to ‘nineteenth-century explorations’ on the idea of ‘thought without language’ alla Wundt. I don’t think a set of William James lectures had even been so comprehensive!
1967. Prolegomena, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part I, ‘Logic and Conversation,’ Essay 1, the first William James lecture, ifs and cans, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays) and Series V (Topical), carton 7-folders 11-12, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: meaning, use, implicatum, Austin, Strawson. A discussion of Oxonian philosophers of Grice's play group, notably J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, H. L. A. Hart, and R. M. Hare. He adds himself for good measure (‘The causal theory of perception’). Philosophers, even at Oxford, have to be careful with the attention that is due to 'general principles of discourse.' Grice quotes philosophers of an earlier generation, such as Ryle, and some interpreters or practitioners of Oxonian analysis, such as Benjamin and Searle. He even manages to quote from Witters's ‘Philosophical investigations,’ on seeing a banana as a banana. There are further items in the Grice collection that address Austin’s manoeuvre, 1970, Austin on ifs and cans, Ifs and cans, keywords: conditional, power. Two of Grice's favourites. He opposed Strawson's view on 'if.' Grice thought that 'if' was the horseshoe of Whitehead and Russell, provided we add an implicatum to an entailment. The 'can' is merely dispositional, if not alla Ryle, alla Grice! 1970. Ifs and cans, keywords: Austin, intention, disposition. Austin had brought the topic to the fore as an exploration of free will. D. F. Pears had noted that 'conversational' implicature may account for the conditional perfection ('if' yields 'iff'). Cf. M. R. Ayers on Austin on 'if' and 'can.' Recall that for Grice the most idiomatic way to express a 'disposition' is with the subjective mode, the 'if', and the 'can' ‒ ‘The ice can break.’ Cf. the mistake: ‘It is not the case that what you must do, you can do.’ The can-may distinction is one Grice played with too. As with 'will' and 'shall,' the attachment of one mode to one of the lexemes is pretty arbitrary and not etymologically justified ‒ pace Fowler on it being a privilege of this or that Southern Englishman as Fowler is. If he calls it ‘Prolegomena,’ he is being jocular. ‘Philosophers’ Mistakes’ would have been too provocative. B. S. Benjamin erred, and so did Gilbert Ryle, and Ludwig Witters, and ‘my friends’, J. L. Austin (the mater that wobbled), and in order of seniority, H. L. A. Hart (‘I heard him defend this about ‘carefully’ – ‘stopping at every door in case a dog comes out at breakneck speed’), R. M. Hare (To say ‘good’ is to approve), and Strawson (Introduction to Logical theory: ‘To utter ‘if p, q’ is to implicate some inferrability’, To say ‘true!’ is to endorse – Analysis). If he ends with Searle, he is being jocular. He quotes Searle from an essay in ‘British philosophy’ in Lecture I, and from an essay in ‘Philosophy in America’ in Lecture V. He loved Searle, and expands on the Texas oilmen’s club example! We may think of Grice as a linguistic botanizer or a ‘meta-linguistic’ botanizer: his hobby was to collect philosophers’ mistakes, and he catalogued them. In ‘Causal theory’ he produces his first list of seven. The pillar box seems red to me. One cannot see a dagger as a dagger. Moore didn’t know that the objects before him were his own hands. What is actual is not also possible. For someone to be called ‘responsible,’ his action should be condemnable. A cause must be given only of something abnormal or unusual (cf. ætiology). If you know it, you don’t believe it. In the Prolegomena, the taxonomy is more complicated. Examples A (the use of an expression, by Ryle, Wittgenstein, Austin, Hart, and Benjamin), Examples B (Strawson on ‘and,’ ‘or,’ and especially ‘if’), and Examples C (Strawson on ‘true’ and Hare on ‘good’ – the ‘performative theories’). But even if his taxonomy is more complicated, he makes it more SO by giving other examples as he goes on to discuss how to assess the philosophical mistake. Cf. his elaboration on ‘trying,’ ‘I saw Mrs. Smith cashing a cheque,’ ‘Trying to cash a cheque, you mean.’ Or cf. his remarks on ‘remember,’ and ‘There is an analogy here with a case by Wittgenstein.’ In summary, he wants to say. It’s the philosopher who makes his big mistake. He has detected, as Grice has it, some conversational nuance. Now he wants to exploit it. But before rushing ahead to exploit the conversational nuance he has detected, or identified, or collected in his exercise of linguistic botanising, the philosopher should let us know with clarity what type of a nuance it is. For Grice wants to know that the nuance depends on a general principle (of goal-directed behaviour in general, and most likely rational) governing discourse – that participants in a conversation should be aware of, and not on some minutiæ that has been identified by the philosopher making the mistake, unsystematically, and merely descriptively, and taxonomically, but without ONE drop of explanatory adequacy. The fact that he directs this to his junior Strawson is the sad thing. The rest are all Grice’s seniors! The point is of philosophical interest, rather than other. And he keeps citing philosophers, Tarski or Ramsey, in the third William James leture, to elaborate the point about ‘true’ in ‘Prolegomena.’ He never seems interested in anything but an item being ‘of philosophical interest,’ even if that means HIS and MINE! On top, he is being Oxonian: ‘Only at Oxford my colleagues were so obsessed, as it has never been seen anywhere else, about the nuances of conversation. Only they were all making a big mistake in having no clue as to what the underlying theory of conversation as rational co-operation would simplify things for them – and how! If I introduce the explicatum as a concession, I shall hope I will be pardoned!’ Is Grice's intention epagogic, or diagogic in ‘Prolegomena’? Is he trying to educate Strawson, or just delighting in proving Strawson wrong? We think the former. The fact that he quotes himself shows that Grice is concerned with something he still sees, and for the rest of his life will see, as a valid philosophical problem. If philosophy generated no problmes it would be dead.
1967. Logic and conversation, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part I, ‘Logic and Conversation,’ Essay 2, from Davidson/Harman, The Logic of Grammar, pp. 64-75, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. An elaboration of his Oxonian seminar on ‘Logic and conversation.’ There's a principle of conversational helpfulness, which includes a desideratum of conversational candour and a desideratum of conversational clarity, and the sub-principle of conversational self-interest clashing with the sub-principle of conversational benevolence. The whole point of the manoeuvre is to provide a rational basis for a conversational 'implicatum,' as his term of art goes. Observation of the principle of conversational helpfulness is rational/reasonable along the following lines: anyone who is interested in the two goals conversation is supposed to serve ‒ give/receive information, influence/be influenced ‒ should only care to enter a conversation that will be only profitable under the assumption that it is conducted in accordance with the principle of conversational helfpulness, and attending desiderata and sub-principles. Grice takes special care in listing tests for the proof that an implicatum is conversational in this rather technical usage: a conversational implicatum is rationally calculable (it is the content of a psychological state, attitude or stance that the addressee assigns to the utterer on condition that he is being helpful), non-detachable, indeterminate, and very cancellable, thus never part of the 'sense' and never an 'entailment' of this or that piece of philosophical vocabulary. Logic and conversation, in Davidson and Harman, The Logic of Grammar, 1975, also in Cole and Morgan, 1975, repr. in a revised form in Grice, 1989, 1967, Logic and conversation, the second William James lecture, keywords: principle of conversational helpfulness, implicatum, cancellability. While the essay was also reprinted by Cole and Morgan, Grice always cited it from the Davidson's and Harman's two-column reprint in The Logic of Grammar. Most people without a philosophical background first encounter Grice through this essay. Philosophers usually get first acquainted with his ‘In defence of a dogma,’ or ‘Meaning.’ In ‘Logic and Conversation,’ Grice re-utilises the notion of an implicatum and the principle of conversational helpfulness that he had introduced at Oxford to a more select audience. Grice's idea is that the observation of the principle of conversational helfpulness is rational (reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who is concerned with the two goals which are central to conversation (to give/receive information, to influence/be influenced) should be interested in participating in a conversation that is only going to be profitable on the assumption that it is conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational helfpulness. Grice's point is methodological. He is not at all interested in conversational exchanges as such. Unfortunately, the essay starts ‘in media res,’ and skips Grice's careful list of Oxonian examples of 'disregard' for the key idea of what a conversant implicates by the conversational move he makes. His concession is that there is an explicatum or explicitum (roughly, the logical form) which is beyond pragmatic constraints. This concession is easily explained in terms of his overarching irreverent, conservative, dissenting rationalism. This lecture alone had been read by a few philosophers leaving them confused. I don’t know what Davidson and Harman were thinking when they reprinted just this in ‘The logic of grammar.’ I mean: it’s obviously ‘in media res.’ Grice starts with the ‘logical devices,’ and never again takes the topic up. Then he explores metaphor, irony, and hyperbole, and surely the philosopher who bought ‘The logic of grammar’ must be left puzzled! He had to wait sometime to see the thing in full completion. Oxonian philosophers would, out of etiquette, hardly quote from ‘unpublished’ material! Cohen had to rely on memory, and that’s why he got all his Grice wrong! And so did Strawson in ‘If and the horseshoe.’ Even Walker responding to Cohen is relying on memory. Few philosophers quote from The logic of grammar. At Oxford, everybody knew what Grice was up to. Hare was talking ‘implicature’ in Mind in 1967, and Pears was talking ‘conversational implicature’ in ‘Ifs and cans.’ And Platts was dedicating a full chapter to ‘Causal Theory of Perception.’ It seems the Oxonian etiquette was to quote from ‘Causal Theory.’ It was obvious that Grice’s implication excursus had to read ‘implicature’! In a few dictionaries of philosophy, such as Hamlyn’s, under ‘implication,’ a reference to Grice’s locus classicus ‘Causal theory’ is made – Passmore quotes from ‘Causal theory’ in ‘Hundred years of philosophy.’ Very few Oxonians would care to buy a volume published in Encino. Not many Oxonian philosophers ever quoted ‘The logic of grammar,’ though. At Oxford, Grice's implicata remained part of the unwritten doctrines of a few. And philosophers would NOT cite a cajoled essay in the references.
1967. Further notes on logic and conversation, in Studies in the Way of Words, published in Peter Cole, Pragmatics, for Academic Press, London, in Part I, Logic and conversation, essay 3, from P. Cole, Pragmatics, pp. 113-27, The H. P Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 2-folder 24, and Series V (Topical), carton 7-folder 13, 'Irony, Stress, and Truth,' BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Modified Occam's razor, implicature. The essay had circulated since the Harvard days, and it was also reprinted by Peter Cole in his Pragmatics for Academic Press. ’Personally, I prefer 'dialectica.'‘ ‒ Grice. This is the third William James lecture at Harvard. It is particularly useful for Grice's introduction of his razor, M. O. R., or Modified Occam's Razor, jocularly expressed by Grice as: ’Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.’ An Englishing of the Ockham's Latinate, ‘Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem.’ But what do we mean 'sense'. Surely Occam was right with his Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem. We need to translate that alla 'linguistic turn.' Grice jokes: ‘Senses are not be multiplied beyond necessity.’ He also considers irony, stress, and truth, which the Grice Papers have under a special folder in the Series V (Topical). Three topics where the implicatum helps. ’He is a scoundrel’ may well be the IMPLICATUM of ‘He is a fine friend.’ But cf. the pretense theory of irony. Grice, being a classicist, loved the etymological connection. With Stress, he was concerned with anti-Gettier uses of emphatic 'know': ‘I KNOW.’ (Implicatum: I do have conclusive evidence’). ’Truth’ (or ‘... is true’) sprang from Grice's attention to that infamous Bristol symposium between Austin and Strawson. Grice wants to defend Austin's correspondence theory against Strawson's 'performative' approach. If ‘... is true’ implicates ‘someone previously affirmed this,’ that does not mean a 'ditto' implicatum is part of the entailment of a ‘... is true’ utterance. 1967, 1978. Further notes on logic and conversation, in Peter Cole (1978), repr. in a revised form in Grice (1989), 1967, further notes on logic and conversation, keywords: Modified Occam's Razor, irony, stress, truth. The preferred citation should be Grice 1967:III. This is originally the third William James lecture, in a revised form. In that lecture, Grice introduced the M. O. R., or Modified Occam's Razor. Senses are not be multiplied beyond necessity. The point is that entailment-cum-implicatum does the job that multiplied senses should not do! The Grice Papers contains in a different folder the concluding section for that lecture, on irony, stress, and truth. Grice went back to the Modified Occam’s razor, but was never able to formalise it! It is, as he concedes, almost a ‘vacuous’ methodological ‘thingy’! It is interesting that the way he defines the alethic value of true alrady cites 'satisfactory.’ ‘I shall use, to name such a property, not 'true' but 'factually satisfactory'.’ Grice's sympathies don't lie with Strawson's Ramsey-based redundance theory of truth, but rather with Tarski's theory of correspondence. He goes on to claim his trust in the feasibility of such a theory. It is, indeed, possible to construct a theory which treats truth as (primarily) a property, not 'true' but 'factually satisfactory'.’ One may see that point above as merely verbal and not involving any serious threat. Let's ALSO assume that it will be a consequence, or theorem, of such a theory that there will be a class C of utterances (utterances of affirmative subject-predicate sentences [such as snow is white or the cat is on the mat of the dog is hairy-coated such that each member of C designates or refers to some item and indicates or predicates some CLASS (these verbs to be explained within the theory), and is factually satisfactory if the item belongs to the class. Let us also assume that there can be a method of introducing a form of expression, 'it is true that ...'/'it is buletic that ...' and linking it with the notion of ‘factually or alethic or doxastic satisfactory,’ a consequence of which will be that to say 'it is true that Smith is happy' will be equivalent to saying that ANY utterance of class C which designates Smith and indicates the class of happy people is factually satisfactory (that is, any utterance which assigns Smith to the class of happy people is factually satisfactory. Mutatis mutandis for Let Smith be happy, and buletic satisfactoriness. The move is Tarskian. The two standard truth definitions are at first glance not definitions of truth at all, but definitions of a more complicated relation involving assignments of objects to variables: ‘a satisfies the formula F,’ (where the symbol ‘F' is a placeholder for a name of a particular formula of the object language). In fact satisfaction reduces to truth in this way: ‘aa’ satisfies the formula ‘FF’ if and only if taking each free variable in ‘FF’ as a name of the object assigned to it by aa makes the formula FF into a true sentence. So it follows that our intuitions about when a sentence is true can guide our intuitions about when an assignment SATISFIES a formula. But none of this can enter into the formal definition of truth, because ‘taking a variable as a name of an object’ is a semantic notion, and Tarski’s truth definition has to be built only on notions from syntax and set theory (together with those in the object-language); In fact Tarski’s reduction goes in the other direction: if the formula FF has no free variables, to say that FF is true is to say that every assignment SATISFIES it. The reason why Tarski defines SATISFACTION directly, and then deduces a definition of truth, is that 'satisfaction obeys recursive conditions in the following way. if FF is a compound formula, to know which assignments satisfy FF, it’s enough to know which assignments satisfy the immediate constituents of FF. Here are two typical examples: The assignment a satisfies the formula ‘ F and GG’ if and only if aa satisfies FF and aa satisfies GG. The assignment aa satisfies the formula ‘For all xx, GG’ if and only if for every individual ii, if bb is the assignment that assigns ii to the variable xx and is otherwise exactly like aa, then bb satisfies GG. We have to use a different approach for atomic formulas. But for these, at least assuming for simplicity that LL has no function symbols, we can use the metalanguage copies #(R)#(R) of the predicate symbols RR of the object language. Thus The assignment aa SATSIFIES the formula R(x,y)R(x,y) if and only if #(R)(a(x),a(y))#(R)(a(x),a(y)). Warning: the expression ## is in the meta-meta-language, not in the meta-language MM. We may or may not be able to find a formula of MM that expresses ## for predicate symbols; it depends on exactly what the language LL is.). Subject to this or that mild reservation, Tarski’s definition of SATISFACTION is compositional, meaning that the class of assignments which satisfy a compound formula FF is determined solely by the syntactic rule used to construct FF from its immediate constituents and the classes of assignments that satisfy these immediate constituents. This is sometimes phrased loosely by saying that 'satisfaction' is defined recursively. But this formulation misses the central point, that the above do not contain any syntactic information about the immediate constituents. Compositionality explains why Tarski switches from 'true' to 'satisfied.' You can’t define whether ‘For all x,Gx,G’ is true in terms of whether GG is true, because in general GG has a free variable xx and so it isn’t either true or false. The reservation is that Tarski’s definition of satisfaction in Tarski's essay doesn’t in fact mention the class of assignments that 'satisfy' a formula FF. Instead, as we saw, he defines the relation ‘aa 'satisfies' FF’, which determines what that class is. This is probably the main reason why some people (including Tarski himself in conversation have preferred NOT to describe the definition as compositional. But the class format, which is compositional on any reckoning, does appear in an early variant of the truth definition in Tarski’s essay on definable sets of real numbers. Tarski had a good reason for preferring the format ‘aa satisfies FF’ in his essay, viz. that it allowed him to reduce the set-theoretic requirements of the truth definition. He spells out these requirements carefully. ‘Compositionality’ first appears in an essay by Putnam. In talking about compositionality, we have moved to thinking of Tarski’s definition as a semantics, i.e. a way of assigning ‘meanings’ to formulas. Here we take the meaning of a sentence to be its truth value. Compositionality means essentially that the meanings assigned to formulas give at least enough information to determine the truth values of sentences containing them. One can ask conversely whether Tarski’s semantics provides only as much information as we need about each formula, in order to reach the truth values of sentences. If the answer is yes, we say that the semantics is fully abstract (for truth). One can show fairly easily, for any of the standard languages of logic, that Tarski’s definition of satisfaction is in fact fully abstract. As it stands, Tarski’s definition of ‘satisfaction’ is not an explicit definition, because ‘satisfaction’ for one formula is defined in terms of ‘satisfaction’ for other formulas. So to show that it is formally correct, we need a way of converting it to an explicit definition. One way to do this is as follows, using either higher order logic or set theory. Suppose we write SS for a binary relation between assignments and formulas. We say that SS is a satisfaction relation if for every formula G, SG, S meets the conditions put for satisfaction of GG by Tarski’s definition. E.g., if GG is ‘G1G1 and G2G2’, SS should satisfy the following condition for every assignment aa: S(a, G) if and only if S(a, G1) and S(a, G2).S (a, G) if and only if S(a, G1) and S(a, G2). We can define ‘satisfaction' relation’ formally, using the recursive clauses and the conditions for atomic formulas in Tarski’s recursive definition. Now we prove, by induction on the complexity of formulas, that there is exactly one satisfaction relation SS. There are some technical subtleties, but it can be done. Finally we define aa satisfies FF if and only if: there is a satisfaction relation SS such that S (a, F) S (a, F). It is then a technical exercise to show that this definition of satisfaction is materially adequate. Actually one must first write out the counterpart of Convention TT for satisfaction of formulas, but I leave this to the reader. The remaining truth definition in Tarski’s essay – the third as they appear in the essay – is really a bundle of related truth definitions, all for the same object-language LL but in different interpretations. The quantifiers of LL are assumed to range over a particular class, call it AA; in fact they are second order quantifiers, so that really they range over the collection of subclasses of AA. The class AA is not named explicitly in the object language, and thus one can give separate truth definitions for different values of AA, as Tarski proceeds to do. So for this section of the paper, Tarski allows one and the same sentence to be given different interpretations; this is the exception to the general claim that his object language sentences are fully interpreted. But Tarski stays on the straight and narrow: he talks about ‘truth’ only in the special case where AA is the class of all individuals. For other values of AA, he speaks not of ‘truth’ but of ‘correctness in the domain AA’. These truth or correctness definitions don’t fall out of a definition of ‘satisfaction.’ In fact they go by a much less direct route, which Tarski describes as a ‘purely accidental’ possibility that relies on the ‘specific peculiarities’ of the particular object language. There is no hope of giving a definition of satisfaction by recursion on the complexity of formulas. The remedy is to note that the explicit form of Tarski’s truth definition in Section 2.1 above didn’t require a recursive definition; it needed only that the conditions on the satisfaction relation SS pin it down uniquely. For Henkin’s first style of language this is still true, though the reason is no longer the well-foundedness of the syntax. For Henkin’s second style of language, at least in Hintikka’s notation (see the entry on independence friendly logic), the syntax is well-founded, but the displacement of the quantifier scopes means that the usual quantifier clauses in the definition of satisfaction no longer work. How can we analyze satisfaction? The answer to this question is in some ways reminiscent to our answer of how to construct a theory of truth for a language with only finitely many sentences. So see how, first suppose that our language has only three names and three predicates, ‘Bob’, ‘Jane’, and ‘Nancy’ and ‘is nice’, ‘is mean,’ and ‘is lazy.’ We can then give the following analysis, indeed, definition, of satisfaction. An item I satisfies predicate p ≡df [(p=‘is nice’ and i is nice) ∨ (n=‘is mean’ and i is mean) ∨ (n=‘is lazy’ and i is lazy)] There is an analogy between the material-adequacy constraint which Tarski set on the theory of truth, and similar constraints which we should expect a definition of satisfaction to meet. Just as a theory of truth should imply every instance of ‘S’ is 1 in L iff S so we should expect our theory of satisfaction to imply every instance of the following schema. I satisfies ‘is F’ in L iff i is F. We arrive at Tarski’s first-order definition as a definition of satisfaction which makes no use of concepts other than those employed in the object-language itself.
1967. Indicative conditionals, the fourth William James lecture, in Studies in the way of words, part I (Logic and conversation), essay 4, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 6-folder 29, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: unary functor, not, binary functor, and, or, if, Cook Wilson. In ‘Prolegomena,’ Grice had quoted verbatim from Strawson's infamous idea that there is a SENSE of inferrability with 'if.' While the lecture covers much more than 'if' (‘He only said 'if';’ ‘Oh, no, he said a great deal more than that!’ the title was never meant to be original. Grice in fact provides a rational justification for the three connectives (‘and,’ ‘or,’ and ‘if’) and before that, the unary functor ‘not.’ Embedding, Indicative conditionals: embedding, 1971, ‘Not’ and ‘If,’ Michæl Sinton on ‘Grice on Denials of Indicative Conditionals,’ keywords: ‘not,’ ‘if.’ Strawson had elaborated on what he felt was a divergence between Whitehead's and Russell's 'horseshoe,' and 'if.' Grice thought Strawson's observations could be understood in terms of entailment + implicatum (‘Robbing Peter to Pay Paul’). But problems, as first noted to Grice, by L. J. Cohen, of Oxford, remain, when it comes to the scope of the implicatum within the operation of, say, 'negation.' Analogous problems arise with implicata for the other earlier dyadic functors, ‘and’ and ‘or,’ and Grice looks for a single explanation of the phenomenon. The qualification 'indicative' is modal. ‘Ordinary language’ allows for 'if' utterances to be in modes other than the imperative. ‘Counter-factual,’ if you need to be philosophical krypto-technical, 'subjective' is you are more of a classicist! Grice took a cavalier to the problem: Surely it won’t do to say ‘You couldn’t have done that, since you were in Seattle,’ to someone who figuratively tells you he’s spend the full summer cleaning the Aegean stables. This, to philosophers, is the centerpiece of the lectures. Grice takes good care of ‘not,’ ‘and,’ ‘or,’ and concludes with the ‘if’ of the ‘title.’ For each, he finds a métier, alla Cook Wilson in ‘Statement and Inference.’ And they all connect with rationality. So he is using material from his Oxford seminars on the principle of conversational helpfulness. Plus Cook Wilson makes more sense at Oxford than at Harvard! The last bit, citing Kripke and Dummett, is meant as jocular. What is important is the ‘teleological’ approach to the operators, where a note should be made about dyadicity. In ‘Prolegomena,’ when he introduces the topic, he omits ‘not’ (about which he was almost obsessed!). He just gives an example for ‘and’ (He went to bed and took off his dirty boots’), one for ‘or’ (the garden becomes Oxford and the kitchen becomes London, and the implicatum is in terms, oddly, of ‘ignorance’: ‘My wife is either in Town OR Country,’making fun of ‘Town AND Country’), and ‘if’. His favourite illustration for ‘if’ is Cock Robin: ‘If the Sparrow did not kill him, the Lark did!’ This is because Grice is serious about the erotetic, i.e. question/answer, format Cook Wilson gives to things, but he manages to bring Philonian and Megarian into the picture, just to impress! Most importantly, he introduces the square brackets! He’ll use them again in ‘Presupposition and Conversational Implicature’ and turns them into subscripts in ‘Vacuous Names.’ This is central. For he wants to impoverish the idea of the implicatum. The explicitum is minimal, and any divergence is syntactic-cum-pragmatic import. The scope devices are syntactic and eliminable, and as he knows: what the eye no longer sees, the heart no longer grieves for! The modal implicatum. Since Grice uses ‘indicative,’ for the title of his third William James lecture (‘Indicative Conditionals’) surely he implicates 'subjunctive' ‒ i.e. that someone might be thinking that he should give an account of indicative*-cum-subjective* 'if.' This relates to an example Grice gives in ‘Causal Theory,’ that he does not reproduce in ‘Prolegomena.’ Grice states the philosophical mistake as follows. What is actual is not also possible.’ Grice seems to be suggesting that a subjective conditional would involve one or other of the modalities, he is not interested in exploring. On the other hand, J. L. Mackie has noted that Grice’s conversationalist hypothesis (Mackie quotes verbatim from Grice’s ‘principle of conversational helpfulness’) allows for an explanation of the subjective ‘if’ that does not involve Kripke-type paradoxes involving possible worlds, or other. In ‘Causal Theory,’ Grice notes that the issue with which he has been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would he thinks need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which Grice has been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind. An examples which occurs to me is the following. What is actual is not also possible. I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by Grice’s objector seems to Grice to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. He is not condemning that kind of manoeuvre. He is merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are. 'If' was also of special interest to Grice for many other reasons. He defends a 'dispositional' account of 'intending that' in terms of 'ifs and cans.' He considers 'akrasia' conditionally. He explored the hypothetical-categorical distinction in the buletic mode. He was concerned with 'therefore' as involved with the 'associated' 'if' of entailment.
1967. Utterer's meaning and intentions, repr. in Studies in the way of words, the fifth William James lecture, part I, Logic and conversation, essay 5, The Philosophical Review, vol. 72 (issue 2), pp. 147-77, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays) carton 1-folders 28-30, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: utterer's meaning, intention. Grice is not an animist. While he allows for natural phenomena to mean (‘smoke means fire’), 'meaning' is best ascribed to some utterer, where this 'meaning' is nothing but the intentions behind his utterance. This is the fifth William James lecture. Grice was careful enough to submit it to ‘The Philosophical Review,’ since it is a strictly philosophical development of the views expressed in ‘Meaning’ which Strawson had submitted on Grice's behalf to the same ‘Review’ and which had had a series of responses by various philosophers. Among these philosophers is Strawson himself in ‘Intention and convention in the the theory of speech acts,’ also in ‘The Philosophical Review.’ Grice quotes from very many other philosophers in this essay, including: J. O. Urmson, D. W. Stampe, P. F. Strawson, S. R. Schiffer, and J. R. Searle. P. F. Strawson is especially relevant since he started a series of alleged counter-examples with his infamous example of the 'rat-infested house.' Grice particularly treasured Stampe's alleged counter-example involving his beloved bridge! Anita Avramides wrote her Oxon D. Phil on that, under Strawson! This is Grice's occasion to address some of the criticisms ‒ in the form of alleged counter-examples, typically, as his later reflections on epagoge versus diagoge note ‒ by J. O. Urmson, P. F. Strawson,and other philosophers associated with Oxford, such as J. R. Searle, D. W. Stampe, and S. R. Schiffer. The final 'analysandum' is pretty complex (of the type that he did find his analysis of ‘I am hearing a sound’ complex in ‘Personal identity’ ‒ hardly an obstacle for adopting it), it became yet another target of attack by especially New-World philosophers in the pages of Mind, Nous, and other journals. 1967. Utterer’s meaning and intentions, The Philosophical Review, repr. in Grice (1989), 1967, utterer's meaning and intentions, The Philosophical Review, keywords: utterer's meaning, intention. This is officially the fifth William James lecture. Grice takes up the analysis of 'meaning' he had presented back in 1948 at the Oxford Philosophical Society. Motivated mainly by J. O. Urmson's and Strawson's attack in ‘Intention and convention in speech acts,’ that offered an alleged counter-example to the sufficiency of Grice's analysis, Grice ends up introducing so many intention that he almost trembled. He ends up seeing 'meaning' as a value-paradeigmatic concept, perhaps never realisable in a sublunary way. But it is the analysis in this particular essay where he is at his formal best. He distinguishes between protreptic and exhibitive utterances, and also modes of correlation (iconic, conventional). He symbolises the utterer and the addressee, and generalises over the type of psychological state, attitude, or stance, ‘meaning’ seems to range (notably indicative vs. imperative). He formalises the 'reflexive' intention, and more importantly, the 'overtness' of communication in terms of a self-referential recursive intention that disallows any 'sneaky' intention to be brought into the picture of meaning-constitutive intentions. By uttering x the utterer U means that ψb-d p iff (Ǝφ) (Ǝf) (Ǝc): I. The utterer U utters x intending x to be such that anyone who has φ will think that (i) x has f (ii) f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p (iii) (Ǝφ'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ' will think, via thinking (i) and (ii), that U ψ-s that p (iv) in view of (3), U ψ-s that p; and II (operative only for certain substituends for ‘ψb-d’) U utters x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has φ, he will, via thinking (iv), himself ψ that p; and III. It is not the case that, for some inference-element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ will both (i') rely on E in coming to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p and (ii') think that (Ǝ φ'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ' will come to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p without relying on E. Grice thought he had dealt with 'Logic and conversation' enough! So he feels of revising his 'Meaning.' After all, Strawson had had the cheek to publish Grice’s Meaning and then go on to criticize it in ‘Intention and convention in speech acts.’ So this is Grice’s revenge, and he wins! He ends with the most elaborate theory of ‘mean’ that an Oxonian could ever hope for. And to provoke the informalists such as Strawson (and his ‘disciples’ at Oxford – ‘led’ by Strawson) he pours existential quantifiers like the plague! He manages to quote from J. O. Urmson, whom he loved! No word on Peirce, though, who had originated all this! His implicature: ‘I’m not going to be reprimanted ‘in informal discussion’ about my misreading Peirce at Harvard!’ The concluding note is about ‘artificial substitutes’ for iconic representation, and meaning as a ‘human institution.’ Very grand.
1967. Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning, repr. in Studies in the way of words, the sixth William James lecture, part I, Logic and conversation, essay 6, The Foundations of Language, pp. 225-42, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 1-folder 27, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, word-meaning. The phrase 'utterer' is meant to provoke. Grice thinks that 'speaker' is too narrow. ‘Surely you can mean by just uttering stuff!’ This is the sixth William James lecture, as published in ‘The Foundations of Language.’ As it happens, it became a popular lecture, seeing that J. R. Searle selected this from the whole set for his Oxford reading in philosophy, ‘The philosophy of language.’ It is also the essay cited by Chomsky in his influential John Locke lectures. Chomsky takes Grice to be a 'behaviourist,' even along Skinner's lines, which provoked a reply by Suppes, later reprinted in P. G. R. I. C. E., or Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends (In The New World, the ‘H. P.’ was often given in a more ‘simplified’ form.). Grice wants to keep on playing. In ‘Meaning,’ he had said ‘x means that p’ is surely reducible to utterer U means that p. In this lecture, he lectures us as to how to proceed. In so doing he invents this or that procedure: some basic, some resultant. When Chomsky reads the reprint in Searle's Philosophy of Language, he cries: ‘Behaviourist! Skinnerian!’ It was Suppes who comes to Grice's defence. ‘Surely the way Grice uses expressions like 'resultant' procedure are never meant in the strict 'behaviourist' way.’ Suppes concludes that it is much fairer to characterise Grice as an 'intentionalist.' Published in The Foundations of Language, ed. by J. F. Staal, Repr.in J. R. Searle, The Philosophy of Language, Oxford, 1967, Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning, the sixth William James Lecture, Foundations of Language, keywords: utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, word-meaning, resultant procedure, basic procedure. Staal asked Grice to publish the sixth William James lecture for a newish periodical publication of whose editorial board he was a member. The fun thing is Grice complied! This is Grice’s shaggy-dog story. He does not seem too concerned about ‘resultant’ procedures. As he’ll later say, ‘Surely I can create Deutero-Esperanto and become its master!’ For Grice, the primacy is the idiosyncratic, particularized utterer in this or that occasion. He knows a philosopher craves for generality, so he provokes the generality-searcher with divisions and sub-divisions of ‘mean.’ But his heart does not seem to be there, and he is just being overformalistic and technical for the sake of it. ‘I am glad that Putnam, of all people, told me in an aside, ‘You’re being too formal, Grice’. I stopped with symbolism since!’
1967. Some models for implicature, in Studies in the way of words, the seventh William James lecture, part I, 'Logic and conversation,' essay 6, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. A rather obscure exploration on the connection of semiotics and philosophical psychology. Grice is aware that there is an allegation in the air about a possible 'vicious' circle in trying to define 'category of expression' in terms of a 'category of representation.' He does not provide a solution to the problem which he'll take up in his ‘Method in philosophical psychology,’ in his role of President of the American Philosophical Association. It is THE IMPLICATURE behind the lecture that matters, since Grice will go back to it, notably in the Retrospective Epilogue. For Grice, it’s all rational enough. There’s a pirot, in a situation, say of danger – a bull ‒. He perceives the bull. The bull’s attack causes this perception. ‘Bull!’ the Pirot1 screams, and causes in Pirot2 a rearguard movement. So where is the circularity? Some pedants would have it that ‘Bull’ cannot be understood in a belief about a bull which is about a bull. Not Grice. It is nice that he brought back ‘implicature,’ which had become obliterated in the lectures, back to ‘title’ position! But it is also noteworthy, that these are not explicitly rationalist models for implicature. He had played with a ‘model,’ and an explanatory one at that, for implicature, in his Oxford seminar, in terms of a principle of conversational helpfulness, a desideratum of conversational clarity, a desideratum of conversational candour, and two sub-principles: a principle of conversational benevolence, and a principle of conversational self-interest! Surely Harvard could be spared of the details!
1969. Identificatory and non-identificatory uses of definite description, Grice on ‘the,’ Grice on ‘not,’ ‘System G,’ Vacuous names, in Davidson and Hintikka, Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 118-45. The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 1-folder 31, and carton 2-folders 1-4, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: vacuous name, identificatory, non-identificatory, definite description. Grice's favourite vacuous name is Bellerophon. This is an essay commissioned by Donald Davison and Jaako Hintikka for ‘Words and objects: essays in the work of W. V. Quine’ for Reidel. ’Words and objects’ had appeared (without Grice's contribution) as a special issue of ‘Synthese.’ Grice's contribution, along with Quine's ‘Reply’ to Grice,’ appeared only in the reprint of that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht. Grice cites from various philosophers (and logicians ‒ this was the time when logic was starting to be taught outside philosophy departments, or 'sub-faculties'), such as D. Mitchell, G. Myro, B. Mates, K. S. Donnellan, P. F. Strawson, Grice was particularly proud to be able to quote Mates ‘by mouth or book.’ Grice takes the opportunity, in his tribute to Quine, to introduce one of two of his syntactical devices to allow for conversational implicata to be given maximal scope. The device in ‘Vacuous Names’ is a subscription device to indicate the ordering of introduction of this or that operation. Grice wants to give room for utterances of a special 'existential' kind be deemed rational/reasonable, provided the principle of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the addressee to be followed by the utterer. ’Someone isn't attending the party organised by the Merseyside Geographical Society.’ ’That is Marmaduke Bloggs, who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees.’ ’But who, as it happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at the Merseyside Newsletter.’ 1969, in Donald Davidson and J. K. K. Hintikka, Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1969, Vacuous names, keywords: identificatory use, non-identificatory use, subscript device. Davidson and Hintikka were well aware of the 'New-World' impact of the 'Old-World' ideas displayed by Grice and Strawson in their attack to Quine. Quine had indeed addressed Grice's and Strawson's 'sophisticated' version of the paradigm-case argument in ‘Word and Object.’ Davidson and Hintikka arranged to publish a special issue for a periodical publication, to which P. F. Strawson had already contributed. It was only natural, when Davidson and Hintikka were informed by Reidel of their interest in turning the special issue into a separate volume, that they would approach the other infamous member of the dynamic duo! Commissioned by Donald Davidson and J. Hintikka for Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine. Grice introduces a subscript device to account for 'implicata' of utterances like ’Marmaduke Bloggs won't be attending the party; he was invented by the journalists.’ In the later section, he explores identificatory and non identificatory uses of 'the' without involving himself in the problems Donnellan did! Some philosophers, notably Ostertag, have found the latter section the most intriguing bit, and thus Ostertag cared to reprint the section on Descriptions for his edited MIT volume on the topic. The essay is structured very systematically with an initial section on a calculus alla Gentzen, followed by implicata of vacuous names such as ‘Marmaduke Bloggs,’ to end with definite descriptions, repr. by Ostertag, and psychological predicates. It’s best to focus on a few things here. First his imaginary dialogues on Marmaduke Bloggs, brilliant! Second, this as a preamble to his ‘Presupposition and conversational implicature.’ There is a quantifier phrase, ‘the,’ and two uses of it: one is an identificatory use (‘the haberdasher is clumsy,’ or ‘THE haberdasher is clumsy,’ as Grice prefers) and then there’s a derived, non-identificatory use: ‘the’ haberdasher (whoever she was! to use Grice’s and Mitchell’s addendum) shows her clumsiness. The use of the numeric subscripts were complicated enough to delay the publication of this. The whole thing was a special issue of a journal. Grice’s contribution came when Reidel turned that into a volume. Grice later replaced his numeric subscript device by square brackets. Perhaps the square brackets are not subtle enough, though. Grice’s contribution, ‘Vacuous Names,’ (later reprinted in part in Ostertag’s volume on Definite descriptions) concludes with an exploration of ‘the’ phrases, and further on, with some intriguing remarks on the subtle issues surrounding the scope of an ascription of a predicate standing for a psychological state or attitude. Grice’s choice of an ascription now notably involves an ‘opaque’ (rather than ‘factive,’ like ‘know’) psychological state or attitude: ‘wanting,’ which he symbolizes as ‘W.’ Grice considers a quartet of utterances: Jack wants someone to marry him; Jack wants someone or other to marry him; Jack wants a particular person to marry him, and There is someone whom Jack wants to marry him.Grice notes that ‘there are clearly at least two possible readings’ of an utterance like our (i): a first reading ‘in which,’ as Grice puts it, (i) might be paraphrased by (ii). A second reading is one ‘in which it might be paraphrased by (iii) or by (iv).’ Grice goes on to symbolize the phenomenon in his own version of a first-order predicate calculus. ‘Ja wants that p’ becomes Wjap where ‘ja’ stands for the individual constant ‘Jack’ as a super-script attached to the predicate standing for Jack’s psychological state or attitude. Grice writes: ‘Using the apparatus of classical predicate logic, we might hope to represent,’ respectively, the external reading and the internal reading (involving an intentio secunda or intentio obliqua) as (Ǝx)WjaFxja and Wja(Ǝx)Fxja. Grice then goes on to discuss a slightly more complex, or oblique, scenario involving this second internal reading, which is the one that interests us, as it involves an ‘intentio seconda.’Grice notes: ‘But suppose that Jack wants a specific individual, Jill, to marry him, and this because Jack has been ‘deceived into thinking that his friend Joe has a highly delectable sister called Jill, though in fact Joe is an only child.’ The Jill Jack eventually goes up the hill with is, coincidentally, another Jill, possibly existent. Let us recall that Grice’s main focus of the whole essay is, as the title goes, ‘emptiness’! ‘In these circumstances, one is inclined to say that (i) is true only on reading (vii),’ where the existential quantifier occurs within the scope of the psychological-state or -attitude verb, ‘but we cannot now represent (ii) or (iii), with ‘Jill’ being vacuous, by (vi),’ where the existential quantifier (Ǝx) occurs outside the scope of the psychological-attitude verb, want, ‘since [well,] Jill does not really exist,’ except as a figment of Jack’s imagination. In a manoeuver that I interpret as ‘purely intentionalist,’ and thus favouring by far Suppes’s over Chomsky’s characterisation of Grice as a mere ‘behaviourist,’ Grice hopes that ‘we should be provided with distinct representations for two familiar readings’ of, now: Jack wants Jill to marry him and Jack wants ‘Jill’ to marry him. It is at this point that Grice applies a syntactic scope notation involving sub-scripted numerals, (ix) and (x), where the numeric values merely indicate the order of introduction of the symbol to which it is attached in a deductive schema for the predicate calculus in question. Only the first formulation represents the internal reading (where ‘ji’ stands for ‘Jill’): W2ja4F1ji3ja4 and W3ja4F2ji1ja4. Note that in the second formulation, the individual constant for ‘Jill,’ ‘ji,’ is introduced prior to ‘want,’ – ‘ji’’s sub-script is 1, while ‘W’’s sub-script is the higher numerical value 3. Grice notes: ‘Given that Jill does not exist,’ only the internal reading ‘can be true,’ or alethically satisfactory. Grice sums up his reflections on the representation of the opaqueness of a verb standing for a psychological state or attitude like that expressed by ‘wanting’ with one observation that further marks him as an intentionalist, almost of a Meinongian type. He is willing to allow for ‘existential’ phrases in cases of ‘vacuous’ designata, provided they occur within opaque psychological-state or attitude verbs, and he thinks that by doing this, he is being faithful to the richness and exuberance of ‘ordinary’ discourse, while keeping Quine happy. As Grice puts it, ‘we should also have available to us also three neutral, yet distinct, (Ǝx)-quantificational forms (together with their isomorphs),’ as a philosopher who thinks that Wittgenstein denies a distinction, craves for a generality! ‘Jill’ now becomes ‘x.’ W4ja5Ǝx3F1x2ja5, Ǝx5W2ja5F1x4ja3, Ǝx5W3ja4F1x2ja4. As Grice notes, since in (xii) the individual variable ‘x’ (ranging over ‘Jill’) ‘does not dominate the segment following the ‘(Ǝx)’ quantifier, the formulation does not display any ‘existential’ or de re, ‘force,’ and is suitable therefore for representing the internal readings (ii) or (iii), ‘if we have to allow, as we do have, if we want to faithfully represent ‘ordinary’ discourse, for the possibility of expressing the fact that a particular person, Jill, does not actually exist.’ At least Grice does not write, ‘really,’ for he knew that Austin detested a ‘trouser word’! Grice concludes that (xi) and (xiii) ‘will be derivable’ from each of (ix) and (x), while (xii) will be ‘derivable only’ from (ix).Grice had been Strawson’s logic tutor at St. John’s (Mabbott was teaching the grand stuff!) and it shows! One topic that especially concerned Grice relates to the introduction and elimination rules, as he later searches for 'generic' satisfactoriness. Grice wonders ’[W]hat should be said of Takeuti's conjecture (roughly) that the nature of the introduction rule determines the character of the elimination rule? There seems to be no particular problem about allowing an introduction rule which tells us that, if it is established in X's 'personalized' system that φ, then 'it is necessary with respect to X that φ ' is true (establishable). The accompanying elimination rule is, however, slightly less promising. If we suppose such a rule to tell us that, if one is committed to the idea that it is necessary with respect to X that φ, then one is also committed to whatever is expressed by φ, we shall be in trouble; for such a rule is not acceptable; φ will be a volitive expression such as ‘let it be that X eats his hat’; and my commitment to the idea that X's system requires him to eat his hat does not ipso facto involve me in accepting (buletically) ‘let X eat his hat’. But if we take the elimination rule rather as telling us that, if it is necessary with respect to X that let X eat his hat, then ‘let X eat his hat’ possesses satisfactoriness-with-respect-to-X, the situation is easier; for this version of the rule seems inoffensive, even for Takeuti, we hope. A very interesting concept Grice introduces in the 'definite-descriptor' section of 'Vacuous names' is that of a conversational dossier, for which he uses the Greek letter delta. The key concept is that of conversational dossier overlap, common ground, or 'conversational pool.' Let us say that an utterer U has a dossier for a definite description D if there is a set of definite descriptions which include D, all the members of which the utterer supposes to be satisfied by one and the same item and the utterer U intends his addressee A to think (via the recognition that A is so intended) that the utterer U has a dossier for the definite description D which the utterer uses, and that the utterer U has specifically selected (or chosen, or picked) this specific D from this dossier at least partly in the hope that his addressee A has his own dossier for D which overlaps the utterer's dossier for D, viz. shares a substantial, or in some way specially favoured, su-bset with the utterer's dossier. It's unfortunate that the idea of a dossier is not better known amog Oxonian philosophers. Unlike approaches to the phenomenon by other Oxonian philosophers like Grice's tutee P. F. Strawson and his three principles (conversational relevance, presumption of conversational knowledge, and presumption of conversational ignorance) or J. O. Urmson and his, apter than Strawson's, principle of conversational appositeness (‘Mrs.Smith's husband just delivered a letter,’ ‘You mean the postman!?’), only Grice took to task the idea of formalising this in terms of set-theory and philosophical psychology ‒ note his charming reference to the utterer's 'hope' (never mind intention) that his choice of ‘d’ from his dossier will overlap with some ‘d'‘ in the dossier of his his addressee. The point of adding ‘whoever he may be’ for the non-identificatory is made by D. Mitchell, of Worcester, in his Griceian textbook for Hutchinson.
1969. A logico-semantic paradox, logico-semantic paradoxes, The Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c. Keywords: logico-semantic paradox. Grice was fascinated by the fact that 'paradox' translates the Grecian neuter 'paradoxon.' Some of the paradoxes of entailment, entailment and paradoxes. This is not the first time Grice uses 'paradox.' As a classicist, he was aware of the nuances between 'paradox' (or 'paradoxon,' as he preferred, via Latin 'paradoxum,' and 'aporia,' for example. He was interested in Strawson's treatment of this or that 'paradox of entailment.' He even called his own paradox involving ‘if’ and probablility ‘Grice's paradox.’ In ‘Grice's paradox,’ Grice invites us to supposes that two chess players, Yog and Zog, play 100 games under the following conditions. (1) Yog is white nine of ten times. (2) There are no draws. And the results are: (1) Yog, when white, won 80 of 90 games. (2) Yog, when black, won zero of ten games. This implies that: (i) 8/9 times, if Yog was white, Yog won. (ii) 1/2 of the time, if Yog lost, Yog was black. (iii) 9/10 that either Yog wasn't white or he won. From these statements, it might appear one could make these deductions by contraposition and conditional disjunction: ([a] from [ii]) If Yog was white, then 1/2 of the time Yog won. ([b] from [iii]) 9/10 times, if Yog was white, then he won. But both (a) and (b) are untrue—they contradict (i). In fact, (ii) and (iii) don't provide enough information to use Bayesian reasoning to reach those conclusions. That might be clearer if (i)-(iii) had instead been stated like so: (i) When Yog was white, Yog won 8/9 times. (No information is given about when Yog was black.) (ii) When Yog lost, Yog was black 1/2 the time. (No information is given about when Yog won.) (iii) 9/10 times, either Yog was black and won, Yog was black and lost, or Yog was white and won. (No information is provided on how the 9/10 is divided among those three situations.) Grice's paradox shows that the exact meaning of statements involving conditionals and probabilities is more complicated than may be obvious on casual examination. Another paradox that Grice examines at length is 'Moore's paradox'. For Grice, unlike Nowell-Smith, an utterer who, by uttering 'The cat is on the mat' explicitly conveys that the cat is on the mat does not thereby implicitly convey that he believes that the cat is on the mat. He, more crucially 'expresses' that he believes that the cat is on the mat ‒ and this is not cancellable. He occasionally refers to Moore's paradox in the buletic mode, 'Close the door even if that's not my desire.' An imperative still expresses someone's desire. The sergeant who orders his soldiers to muster at dawn because he is following the lieutenant's order. Grice's first encounter with 'paradox' remains his studying Malcolm's misleading exegesis of Moore.
1970. Language and reality, The Urbana lectures, the Urbana seminar, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 2-folders 5-8 and folder 25, and Series V (Topical), carton 7-folder 19, carton 8-folder 20, and carton 9-folder 3, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: semantics The Grice Collection also contains a folder for 'Odd ends: Urbana and non-Urbana.' Grice continues with the elaboration of a formal calculus. He originally baptised it ‘System Q’ in honour of Quine. At a later stage, Myro will re-name it System G, in a special version, System GHP, a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of System G, in gratitude to Grice. Odd Ends: Urbana and Not Urbana, Odds and ends: Urbana and not Urbana, or not-Urbana, or Odds and ends: Urbana and non Urbana, or Oddents, urbane and not urbane, keywords: semantics, Urbana lectures. The Urbana lectures were on language and reality. Grice kept revising them, as these items show. Language and reality, The University of Illinois at Urbana, The Urbana Lectures, Language and reference, language and reality, The Urbana lectures, University of Illinois at Urbana, The H. P. Grice Papers Keywords: language, reference, reality Grice favours a transcendental approach to communication. Our beliefs worth communicating have to be true. Our orders worth communicating have to refer to our willings. The fourth lecture is the one Grice dates as ‘1970’ in ‘Studies in the way of words.’1970. ’Smith has not ceased from beating his wife,’ presupposition and conversational implicature, in Peter Cole, Radical pragmatics, Academic Press, London, 1981, pp. 183-97, repr. in a revised form in Grice, Studies in the way of words, in Part II, Explorations in semantics and metaphysics, essay, presupposition and implicature, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: presupposition, conversational implicature, implicature, Strawson. Grice: ‘The loyalty examiner won’t summon you, don’t worry.’ Grice's cancellation could be pretty subtle! ‘Well, the loyalty examiner will not be summoning you at any rate.’ Grice goes back to the issue of 'negation' and 'not.' If, Grice notes, is is a matter of dispute whether the government has a very undercover person who interrogates those whose loyalty is suspect and who, if he existed, could be legitimately referred to as the loyalty examiner; and if, further, I am known to be very sceptical about the existence of such a person, I could perfectly well say to a plainly loyal person, 'Well, the loyalty examiner will not be summoning you at any rate,' without, Grice would think, being taken to imply that such a person exists. Further, if the utterer U is well known to disbelieve in the existence of such a person, though others are inclined to believe in him, when U finds a man who is apprised of U's position, but who is worried in case he is summoned, U may try to reassure him by uttering, 'The loyalty examiner will not summon you, do not worry.' Then it would be clear that U uttered this because U is sure there is no such person. The lecture given in 1970 was variously reprinted, but 1970 should remain the preferred citation. There are divergences in the various drafts, though. The original source of this exploration was a seminar. Grice is interested in re-conceptualising Strawson's manoeuvre regarding 'presupposition' as involving what Grice disregards as a metaphysical concoction: the truth-value gap. In Grice's view, based on a principle of conversational 'tailoring' that falls under his principle of conversational helpfulness ‒ indeed under the desideratum of conversational clarity ('be perspicuous [sic]') ‒ 'The king of France is bald' entails there is a king of France; while 'The king of France ain't bald' merely implicates it. Grice much preferred Collingwood's to Strawson's presuppositions! Grice thought, and rightly, too, that if his notion of the conversational implicatum was to gain Oxonian currency, it should supersede Strawson's idea of the 'præ-suppositum.' Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with Quine's idea of a 'truth-value gap.' Grice shows that neither the metaphysical concoction of a truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the 'præ-suppositum' is needed. The king of France is bald' entails 'There is a king of France.' It is part of what U is logically committed to by what he explicitly conveys. By uttering, 'The king of France is not bald' on the other hand, U merely implicitly conveys or implicates that there is a king of France. A perfectly adequate, or 'impeccable,' as Grice prefers, cancellation, abiding with the principle of conversational helpfulness is in the offing. 'The king of France ain't bald. What made you think he is? For starters, he ain't real!' Grice credits Hans Sluga for having pointed out to him the way to deal with the definite descriptor or definite article or the iota quantifier 'the' formally. One thing Russell discovered is that the variable denoting function is to be deduced from the variable propositional function, and is not to be taken as an indefinable. Russell tries to do without the iota ‘i’ as an indefinable, but fails. Russell's success later, in ‘On Denoting’, is the source of all his subsequent progress. The iota quantifier consists of an inverted iota to be read 'the individuum x,' as in '(℩x).F(x).' Grice opts for the Whiteheadian-Russellian standard rendition, in terms of the iota operator. Grice's take on Strawson is a strong one. 'The king of France is bald; entails there is a king of France, and what the utterer explicitly conveys is doxastically unsatisfactory. 'The king of France ain't bald’ does not. By uttering 'The king of France ain't bald' U only implicates that there is a king of France, and what he explicitly conveys is doxastically satisfactory. Grice knew he was not exactly robbing Peter to pay Paul, or did he? It is worth placing the 1970 lecture in context. Soon after delivering in the New World his exploration on the implicatum, Grice has no better idea than to promote Strawson's philosophy in the New World. Strawson will later reflect on the colder shores of the Old World, so we know what Grice had in mind! Strawson's main claim to fame in the New World (and at least Oxford in the Old World) was his ‘On referring,’ where he had had the cheek to say that by uttering, ‘The king of France is not bald,’ the utterer implies that there is a king of France (if not that, as Grice has it, that what U explicitly conveys is doxastically satisfactory. Strawson later changed that to the utterer presupposes that there is a king of France. So Grice knows what and who he was dealing with. Grice and Strawson had entertained Quine at Oxford, and Strawson was particularly keen on that turn of phrase he learned from Quine, 'the truth-value gap.' Grice, rather, found it pretty repulsive: ‘Tertium exclusum!’ So, Grice goes on to argue that by uttering 'The king of France is bald,' one entailment of what U explicitly conveys is indeed 'There is a king of France.' However, in its negative co-relate, things change. By uttering 'The king of France ain't bald,' the utterer merely implicitly conveys or implicates (in a pretty cancellable format) that there is a king of France. The king of France ain't bald: there's no king of France!' The loyalty examiner is like the King of France, in ways! The piece is crucial for Grice’s re-introduction of the square-bracket device: [The king of France] is bald; [The King of France] ain’t bald. Whatever falls within the scope of the square brackets is to be read as having attained ‘common-ground status’ and therefore, out of the question, to use Collingwood’s jargon! Grice was very familiar with Collingwood on presupposition, meant as an attack on Ayer. Collingwood’s reflections on presuppositions being either relative or absolute may well lie behind Grice’s metaphysical construction of absolute value! The earliest exploration by Grice on this is his infamous, ‘Smith has not ceased from beating his wife,’ discussed by Ewing in ‘Meaninglessness’ for Mind in 1937! Grice goes back to the example in the excursus on ‘implying that’ in ‘Causal Theory,’ and it is best to revisit this source. Note that in the reprint in ‘Studies’ Grice does NOT go, ‘one example of presupposition, which eventually is a type of conversational implicature.’ Grice's antipathy to Strawson's 'presupposition' is 'metaphysical': he dislikes the idea of a 'satisfactory-value-gap,' as he notes in the second paragraph to ‘Logic and Conversation.’ And his antipathy crossed the buletic-doxastic divide! Using 'φ' to represent a sentence in either mode, he stipulate that ‘~φ’ is satisfactory just in case ⌈φ⌉ is unsatisfactory. A 'crunch,' as he puts it, becomes obvious: '~ ⊢The king of France is bald' may perhaps be treated as equivalent to '⊢~(The king of France is bald).' But what about '~!Arrest the intruder'?’ ‘What do we say in cases like, perhaps, ‘Let it be that I now put my hand on my head’ or ‘Let it be that my bicycle faces north’, in which (at least on occasion) it seems to be that neither '!p' nor '!~p' is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory?’ If '!p' is neither satisfactory nor unsatisfactory (if that make sense, which doesn't to me), does the philosopher assign a third buletically satisfactory 'value' (0.5) to '!p' (buletically 'neuter,' or 'indifferent'). Or does the philosopher say that we have a buletically satisfactory value *gap*, as Strawson, following Quine, might prefer? This may require careful consideration; but I cannot see that the problem proves insoluble, any more than the analogous problem connected with Strawson's doxastic presupposition is insoluble. The difficulty is not so much to find a solution as to select the best solution from those which present themselves.’
1970. The 'that'-clause, Davidson on saying that, 'Davidson's 'On saying that,'' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (The Doctrines), carton 6-folder 3, and Series V (Topical), carton 6-folder 26, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: 'that'-clause. Grice had explored 'that'-clauses with Staal. He was concerned about the viability of Davidson's initially appealing etymological approach to the 'that'-clause in terms of 'demonstration.' Grice had presupposed the logic of 'that'-clauses from a much earlier stage, 'Those spots 'mean' that he has measles.'The folder contains a copy of Davidson's essay, ‘On saying that,’ 1980, the 'that'-clause, 1970, the 'that'-clause, with J. F. Staal. Davidson quotes from J. A. H. Murray et al. The Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford. Cf. C. T. Onions, An Advanced English Syntax, and remarks that first learned that 'that' in such contexts evolved from an explicit demonstrative from Hintikka’s Knowledge and Belief. Hintikka remarks that a similar development has taken place in German Davidson owes the reference to the O.E.D. to Eric Stiezel. Indeed Davidson was fascinated by the fact that his conceptual inquiry repeated phylogeny. It should come as no surprise that a 'that'-clause utterance evolves through about the stages our ruminations have just carried us. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the use of ‘that’ in a ‘that’-clause is generally held to have arisen out of the demonstrative pronoun pointing to the clause which it introduces. Cf. 1. 'He once lived here: we all 'know' that.', 2. 'that (now this) we all 'know': he once lived here.' 3. 'We all 'know' THAT (or this): he once lived here.' 4. 'We all 'know' THAT he once lived here.' As Hintikka notes, some pedants trying to display their knowledge of German, use a comma before 'that': ‘We all 'know,' that he once lived here,’ to stand for an earlier ‘:’: 'We all 'know:' that he once lived here.' Just like the English translation ‘that’, ‘dass’ can be omitted in a sentence. Er glaubt, dass die Erde eine Scheibe sei. He believes that the Earth is a disc. Er glaubt, die Erde sei eine Scheibe. He believes the Earth is a disc. The 'that'-clause is brought to the fore by Davidson, who, consulting the Oxford English Dictionary, reminds philosophers that the English 'that' is very cognate with the German idiom. More specifically, 'that' is a demonstrative, even if the syntax, in English, hides this fact in ways which German syntax doesn't. Grice needs to rely on 'that'-clauses for his analysis of 'mean,' 'intend,' and notably 'will.' He finds that Prichard's genial discovery was the license to use 'willing' as pre-facing a 'that'-clause. This allows Grice to deals with 'willing' as applied to a third person ('I will that he'll win the chess match.'). Philosophers who disregard this 'third-person' use may indulge in introspection and subjectivism when they shouldn't! Grice said that Prichard had to be given great credit for seeing that the accurate specification of willing should be ‘willing that’ and not ‘willing to.’ Analogously, following Prichard on 'willing,' Grice does not stipulate that the radix for an 'intentional' (utterer-oriented or exhibitive-autophoric-buletic) incorporate a reference to the utterer (‘be in the first person’), nor that the radix for an 'imperative' (addressee-oriented or hetero-phoric protreptic buletic) or desiderative in general, incorporate a reference of the addressee (‘be in the second person’). ‘They shall not pass’ is a legitimate intentional as is the ‘You shall not get away with it’ (either involves Prichard's 'wills that ...,' rather than 'wills to ...'). ‘And ‘The sergeant is to muster the men at dawn’ (uttered by a captain to a lieutenant) is a perfectly good imperative, again involving Prichard's 'wills that ...,' rather than 'wills to ...'
1970. Intention and subjectivity, perspectivism, 'subjective' conditions and intentions, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 9-folder 15, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: intention, subjective condition. Cf. his dispositional account to 'intending.' A subjective condition takes into account the intender's, rather than the ascriber's, point of view: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt. Everest on hands and knees. Bloggs might reason: Given my present state, I should do what is fun. Given my present state, the best thing for me to do would be to do what is fun. For me in my present state it would make for my well-being, to have fun. Having fun is good (or, a good). Climbing a mountain would be fun. Climbing the Everest would be/make for climbing fun. So, I shall climb the Everest. Even if a critic insisted that a practical syllogism is the way to represent Blogg's finding something to be appealing, and that it should be regarded as a respectable evaluation, the assembled propositions don't do the work of a standard argument. The premises do not support or yield the conclusion as in a standard argument. The premises may be said to yield the conclusion, or directive, for the particular agent whose reasoning process it is, only on the basis of a subjective condition: that the agent is in a certain subjective state, e.g. feels like going out for dinner-fun. Rational beings (the agent at some other time, or other individuals) who do not have that feeling, will not accept the conclusion. They may well accept as true ‘It is fun to climb Everest’, but will not accept it as a directive unless they feel like it now. Someone wondering what to do for the summer might think that if he were to climb Everest he would find it fun or pleasant, but right now she does not feel like it.That is in general the end of the matter. The alleged argument lacks normativity. It is not authoritative or directive unless there is a supportive argument that he needs/ought to do something diverting/pleasant in the summer. A practical argument is different. Even if an agent did not feel like going to the doctor, an agent would think ‘I ought to have a medical check up yearly, now is the time, so I should see my doctor’ to be a directive with some force. It articulates a practical argument. Perhaps the strongest attempt to reconstruct an (acceptable or rational) thought transition as a standard arguments is to treat the subjective condition, ‘I feel like having climbing fun in the summer’, as a premise, for then the premises would support the conclusion. But the individual, whose thought transition we are examining, does not regard a description of his psychological state as a consideration that supports the conclusion. It will be useful to look more closely at a variant of the example to note when it is appropriate to reconstruct thinking in the form of argument. Bloggs, now hiking with a friend in the Everest, comes to a difficult spot and says: ‘I don’t like the look of that, I am frightened. I am going back’. That is usually enough for Bloggs to return, and for the friend to turn back with him. Bloggs’s action of turning back, admittedly motivated by fear, is, while not acting on reasons, nonetheless rational unless we judge his fear to be irrational. Bloggs’s subjective condition can serve as a premise, but only in a very different situation. Bloggs resorts to reasons. Suppose that, while his friend does not think Bloggs’s fear irrational, the friend still attempts to dissuade Bloggs from going back. After listening and reflecting, Bloggs may say ‘I am so frightened it is not worth it. I am not enjoying this climbing anymore’. Or ‘I am too frightened to be able to safely go on’. Or ‘I often climb the Everest and don’t usually get frightened. The fact that I am now is a good indication that this is a dangerous trail and I should turn back’. These are reasons, considerations implicitly backed by principles, and they could be the initial motivations of someone. But in Bloggs’s case they emerged when he was challenged by his friend. They do not express his initial practical reasoning. Bloggs was frightened by the trail ahead, wanted to go back, and didn’t have any reason not to. Note that there is no general rational requirement to always act on reasons, and no general truth that a rational individual would be better off the more often he acted on reasons. Faced with his friend’s objections, however, Bloggs needed justification for acting on his fear. He reflected and found reason(s) to act on his fear. Grice plays with ‘subjectivity’ already in 'Prolegomena.' Consider the use of ‘carefully.’ Surely we must include the agent’s own idea of this. Or consider the use of phi and phi’ – surely we don’t want the addressee to regard himself under the same guise with which the utterer regards him. Or consider ‘Aspects of Reason’: Nixon must be appointed professor of theology at Oxford. Does he feel the need? Grice raises the topic of subjectivity again in the Kant lectures just after his discussion of ‘mode,’ in a sub-section entitled, ‘Modalities: relative and absolute.’ He finds the topic central for his æqui-vocality thesis: subjective conditions seem necessary to both practical and alethic considerations.
1970. Probability and life, the probability/prima-facie distinction, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 9-folder 4, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: life, probability. Evolutionary account of the pirot's adaptability to its changeable environs. Grice borrows the notion of probability from Davidson, whose early claim to fame was to provide the logic of the notion. Grice abbreviates probability by ‘Pr.’ and compares it to a buletic operator 'Pf' (for 'prima facie') attached to ‘De.’ for desirability. A rational agent must calculate both the probability and the desirability of his action. For both probability and desirability, the degree is crucial. Grice symbolises this by 'd': probability in degree d; probability in degree d'. The topic of life Grice relates to that of adaptation and surival, and connects with his genitorial programme of creature construction (‘pirotology.’): life as continued operancy. Grice was fascinated with 'life' (Aristotle, 'bios') because 'bios' is what provides for Aristotle the definition (not by genus) of 'psyche.' 1. Prima-facie (p,!q) or Probably(A,p). 2. Pf (p1 and p2,!q) V pr(p1 and p2,q). 3. Pf (p1 and p2 and p3 and p4,!q) V pr(p1 and p2 and p3 and p4, p). 4. Pf (all things before me, !q) V Pr(all things before me, q). 5. Pf (all things considered, !q) Pr(all things considered, q). 6. !q|- q. 7. R wills !q R judges q. Strictly, Grice avoids using the noun 'probability' (other than for the title of this or that lecture). In his Pirotese, one has to use the sentence-modifier 'probably.' So the specific correlative to the buletic 'prima facie' is the doxastic 'probably.' id. Ep. 5, 6, 9: ‘exceptio, quae prima facie justa videatur,’ at first sight, Gai. Inst. 4, 1: ‘prima facie,’ Dig. 16, 1, 13; Sen. Ep. 87, 1; id. Contr. 5, 10, 15.
1970. Heterological, Russell and heterologicality, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 9-folder 8, BANC, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Russell, heterological, Grelling, J. F. Thomson. Grice and Thomson go ‘heterological.’ Grice was fascinated by Baron Russell's remarks on 'heterological.' And its implicata! Grice was particularly interested in Russell's philosophy because of the usual Oxonian antipathy towards his type of philosophising. Being an irreverent conservative rationalist, Grice found in Russell a good point for dissent! If paradoxes were always sets of propositions or arguments or conclusions, they would always be meaningful. But some paradoxes are semantically flawed and some have answers that are backed by a pseudo-argument employing a defective ‘lemma’ that lacks a truth-value. Grelling’s paradox, for instance, opens with a distinction between autological and heterological words. An autological word describes itself, e.g., ‘polysyllabic’ is polysllabic, ‘English’ is English, ‘noun’ is a noun, etc. A heterological word does not describe itself, e.g., ‘monosyllabic’ is not monosyllabic, ‘Chinese’ is not Chinese, ‘verb’ is not a verb, etc. Now for the riddle: Is ‘heterological’ heterological or autological? If ‘heterological’ is heterological, since it describes itself, it is autological. But if ‘heterological’ is autological, since it is a word that does not describe itself, it is heterological. The common solution to this puzzle is that ‘heterological’, as defined by Grelling, is not what Grice a genuine predicate ‒ ‘‘Gricing’ is!’In other words, ‘Is ‘heterological’ heterological?’ is without meaning. ’That does not mean that an utterer, such as Baron Russell, may implicate that he is being very witty by uttering the Grelling paradox!’ There can be no predicate that applies to all and only those predicates it does not apply to for the same reason that there can be no barber who shaves all and only those people who do not shave themselves. Grice seems to be relying on his friend at Christ Church, J. F. Thomson in ‘On Some Paradoxes’, in the same volume where Grice published his ‘Remarks about the senses,’ Analytical Philosophy, R. J. Butler (ed.), Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 104–119. Grice thought that Thomson was a ‘genius, if ever there is one!’ Plus, Grice thought that, after St. John's, Christ Church was the second most beautiful venue in the 'city' of dreaming spires. ‘On top, it is what makes Oxford a city, and not, as villagers call it, a 'town'!
1970. Grice's Frege, Frege: words and sentences, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 7-folder 2,
BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Frege, Fregean sense, Fregeian sense, Farbung, aber, ‘She was poor but she was honest.’ Freges Farbung, Grices Implikatur. Frege was the topic of Dummett's explorations. A tutee of Grice's once brought Dummett's ‘Frege’ to a tutorial and told Grice that he intended to explore this. ’Have you read it?’ ‘No I haven't,’ Grice answered. And after a pause, he went on: ‘And I hope I won't.’ ‘Hardly promising,’ the tutee thought. Some authors, including Grice, but alas, not Frege, have noted some similarities between Grice's notion of a 'conventional' implicature and Frege's schematic and genial rambles on 'colouring.' ‘Aber Farbung,’ as Frege would state! Grice was more interested in the idea of a ‘Fregeian’ sense, but he felt that if he had to play with Frege's 'aber' he should! One of Grice's metaphysical construction-routines (Humeian projection) is aimed at the generation of concepts, in most cases the 'rational reconstruction' of an intuitive concept displayed in 'ordinary discourse.' ‘We arrive at something like a Fregeian sense!’ Grice exclaimed, with an intonation of ‘Eureka!’ almost. And then he went back to Frege. Grice's German was good, so he could read Frege, ‘in the vernacular.’ For fun, he read Frege to his children (Grice's, not Frege's): ‘In einem obliquen Kontext,’ Frege says,’ Grice says, ‘kann ja z. B. die Ersetzung eines „aber’ durch ein „und’, die in einem direkten Kontext keinen Unterschied des Wahrheitswerts ergibt, einen solchen Unterschied bewirken.’ ‘I'll make that easy for you, darlings: 'und' is 'and,' and 'aber' is 'but.' ‘But surely, Papa, 'aber' is not cognate with 'but'!’ ‘It's not. That's Anglo-Saxon, for you. 'But' is strictly Anglo-Saxon short for 'by-out;' we lost 'aber' when we sailed the North Sea.’ Grice went on: ‘Damit wird eine Abgrenzung von Sinn und Färbung (oder Konnotationen) eines Satzes fragwürdig.’ ‘I. e. he is saying that ‘She was poor but she was honest’ only conventionally implicates that there is a contrast between her poverty and her honesty.’ ‘I guess he heard the ditty during the War?’ Grice ignored that remark, and went on: ‘Appell und Kundgabe wären ferner von Sinn und Färbung genauer zu unterscheiden. Ich weiß so auf interessante Bedeutungs Komponenten hin, bemüht sich aber nicht, sie genauer zu differenzieren, da er letztlich nur betonen will, daß sie in der Sprache der Logik keine Rolle spielen.’ ‘They play a role in the lingo,’ that is!’ ‘What do?’ ‘Stuff like 'but'.’ ‘But surely they are not RATIONAL conversational implicata!?’ ‘No, dear, just conventional tricks you can ignore on a nice summer day!’ Grice however was NEVER interested in the CONVENTIONAL implicatum. He identifies it because he felt he must! Surely, the way English speakers learn to use stuff like, ‘on the one hand,’ and ‘on the other,’ (or how Grice learned how to use ‘men’ and ‘de’ in Greek), or ‘so,’ or ‘therefore,’ or ‘but’ versus ‘and,’ is just to allow that he would STILL use the verb ‘imply’ in such cases – but surely he wants ‘conversational’ to stick with ‘rationality’: ‘conversational maxim’ and ‘converational implicatum’ ONLY apply to things which can be justified transcendentally, and not idiosyncrasies of usage! Grice follows Alonzo Church in noting that Russell misreads Frege as being guilty of ignoring the use-mention distinction, when he doesn’t. One thing that Grice minimises is that Frege's ‘assertion sign’ is composite. That's why G. P. Baker prefers to use the dot '.' as the doxastic correlative for the buletic sign ‘!’ which is NOT composite. The sign „├‟ is composite. Frege explains his ‘Urteilstrich’ ‒ the vertical component of his sign ‘├’ as ‘conveying assertoric force.’ The principal role of the *horizontal* component as such is to prevent the appearance of assertoric force belonging to a token of what does not express a thought (e.g. the expression ‘22’). ‘─p’ expresses a thought even if ‘p’ does not.) cf. Hare's four sub-atomic particles: phrastic (dictum), neustic (dictor), tropic, and clistic, and cf. Grice on the 'radix' controversy: ‘We don't want the '.' in 'p' to become a 'vanishing' sign!’ 1980. Grice's Frege, Frege, Words, and Sentences, Keywords: Frege, Farbung, aber. Frege was one of Grice's obsessions. A Fregeian sense is an explicatum, or implicitum, a concession to get his principle of conversational helpfulness working in the generation of conversational implicata, that can only mean progress for philosophy! ‘Fregeian senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.’ The employment of the routine of Humeian projection may be expected to deliver for us, as its result, a concept – the concept(ion) of value, say, in something like a Fregeian ‘sense,’ rather than an object. There is also a strong affinity between Frege's treatment of 'colouring' (of the German particle ‘aber,’ say) and Grice's idea of a convetional implicatum (‘She was poor, BUT she was honest,/and her parents were the same,/till she met a city feller,/and she lost her honest name,’ as the vulgar Great War ditty went). Grice does not seem interested in providing a philosophical exploration of conventional implicata, and there is a reason for this. Conventional implicata are NOT essentially connected, as conversational implicata are, with rationality. Conventional implicata cannot be 'calculable.' They have less of a philosophical interest, too, in that they are NOT cancellable. Grice sees cancellability as a way to prove some (contemporary to him, if dated) ‘ordinary-language’ philosophers who analyse an expression in terms of 'sense' and 'entailment,' where a cancellable conversational implicatum is all there is (to it). He mentions B. S. Benjamin in ‘Prolegomena’ (and is very careful in noting how Benjamin misuses a Fregeian sense. In his ‘Causal Theory,’ Grice lists another mistake: ‘What is known to be the case is not believed to be the case.’ Grice gives pretty few example of a conventional implicatum: 'therefore,' as in Jill's utterance: ‘Jack is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.’ This is interesting because ‘therefore’ compares to ‘so’ which P. F. Strawson, in P. G. R. I. C. E., claims is the ASSERTED counterpart to ‘if.’ But Strawson was never associated with the type of linguistic botany that Grice was. Grice also mentions the idiom, ‘on the one hand/on the other hand,’ in some detail in ‘Retrospective Epilogue’: ‘My aunt was a nurse in the Great War; my sister, on the other hand, lives on a peak at Darien.’ Grice thought that Frege had misused the use-mention distinction between Russell corrected that (Grice bases this on Alonzo Church). And of course he was obsessed with Frege's assertion sign, which Grice thought had ‘one stroke tooo many.’
1971. Grice delivers the lecture he owed the Academy since 1966. Intention and uncertainty, Proceedings of The British Academy, vol. 57, pp. 263-79, also published separately as an offprint, Intention and disposition, 1946, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 2-folders 9-10, and Series V (Topical), carton 6-folder 30,, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: intention, uncertainty, Prichard, willing, willing to vs. willing that, D. F. Pears, Davidson, disimplicature, Hart, Hampshire, certainty, decision, Ansombe, Kenny, disposition, Ryle. I shan’t but I’m not certain I won’t – Grice. How uncertain can Grice be? This is the Henriette Herz British Academy lecture, and as such published in The Proceedings of the British Academy. Grice calls himself a neo-Prichardian (after the Oxford philosopher) and cares to quote from a few other philosophers ‒ some of whom he was not necessarily associated with: such as Kenny and Anscombe, and some of whom he was, notably D. F. Pears. Grice's motto: ‘Where there is a neo-Prichardian willing, there is a palæo-Griceian way!’ Grice quotes Pears, of Christ Church, as the philosopher he found especially congenial to explore areas in what both called 'philosophical psychology,' notably the tricky use of 'intending' as displayed by a few philosophers even in their own circle, such as Hampshire and Hart in ‘Intention, decision, and certainty.’ The title of Grice's lecture is meant to provoke that pair of Oxonian philosophers Grice knew so well and who were too ready to bring in 'certainty' in an area that requires deep philosophical exploration. This is the Henriette Herz Trust annual lecture. It means it's delivered annually by different philosophers, not always Grice! Grice had been appointed a FBA in 1966, but he took his time to deliver his lecture. With your lecture, you implicate, ‘Hi!’ Grice, and indeed Pears, were motivated by Hampshire's and Hart's essay on intention and certainty in ‘Mind.’ Grice knew Hampshire well, and had actually enjoyed his ‘Thought and Action.’ He preferred Hampshire's ‘Thought and action’ to Anscombe's ‘Intention.’ ‘Trust Oxford being what it is that TWO volumes on intending are published in the same year! Which one shall I read first?’ Eventually, neither ‒ immediately. Rather, Grice managed to unearth some sketchy notes by Prichard (he calls himself a neo-Prichardian) that Urmson had made available for the Clarendon Press ‒ notably Prichard's essay on 'willing THAT.' ‘Only a genius like Prichard will distinguish 'will to' (almost unnecessary) from 'will that' (so crucial).’ For Grice, '... wills that ...', unlike '... wills to...', is properly generic, in that ‘p,’ that follows the 'that'-clause, need NOT refer to the subject of the sentence. ‘Surely I can will that Smith wins the match!’ But Grice also quotes Anscombe (whom otherwise would not count, although they did share a discussion panel at the American Philosophical Association) and Kenny, besides Pears. Of Anscombe, Grice borrows (but never returns) the 'direction-of-fit' term of art (actually Austinian). From A. J. P. Kenny, Grice borrows (AND returns) the concept of 'voliting.' His most congenial approach was Pears's. Grice had of course occasion to explore ‘disposition’ and ‘intention’ on earlier occasions. Grice is especially concerned with a 'dispositional' analysis to 'intending.' He will later reject it in ‘Intention and uncertainty.’ But that was Grice for you! Grice is especially interested in distinguishing his views from RYLE's over-estimated dispositional account of intention, which Grice sees as 'reductionist,' and indeed 'eliminationist,' ‘if not boringly 'behaviourist,' even in analytic key!’ The logic of 'dispositions' is tricky, as Grice will later explore in connection with 'rationality' (rational propension or propensity) and metaphysics (the 'as if' operator). While Grice focuses on UNcertainty, he is being funny! He knew that Oxonians like Hart and Hampshire were OBSESSED with ‘certainty’. ’I was so surprised that Hampshire and Hart were claiming decision and intention are psychological states about which the agent is 'certain,' that I decided on the spot that that could certainly be a nice topic for my British Academy lecture!’ Grice granted that in some cases, a declaration of an intention can be authorative in a certain ‘certain’ way (‘i.e. as implicating ‘certainty’’). But Grice wants us to consider: ‘Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt. Everest.’ ’Surely he can’t be certain he’ll succeed.’ Grice used the same example at the American Philosophical Association, of all places. To amuse Grice, Davidson, who was present, said: ’Surely that’s just an implicature!’ ’Just?!' Grice was almost furious in his British guarded sort of way. ’Surely not just!’ D. F. Pears, who was also present, tried to reconcile: ’If I may, Davidson, I think Grice would take it that, if ‘certainty’ is implicated, the whole thing becomes too social to be true.’ They kept discussing implicature versus entailment. ’Is ‘certainty’ entailed then?’ Davidson asked. ’No, disimplicated!’ is Grice’s curt reply. The next day, he explained to Davidson that he had invented the concept of ‘disimplicature’ just to tease him, and just one night before, while musing in the hotel room! Talk of ‘UNcertainty’ was thus for Grice intimately associated with his concern about the misuse of ‘know’ to mean ‘certain, especially in the exegeses that Malcolm made popular about, of all people, G. E. Moore! V. ‘Scepticism and common sense’ and ‘Moore and philosopher’s paradoxes’ above, and ‘Causal Theory’ and ‘Prolegomena’ for a summary of Malcom’s misunderstanding Moore! Grice manages to quote from Stout’s Voluntary action’ and Brecht. And he notes that not all speakers are as sensitive as they should be (e.g. distinguishing modes, as realised by ‘shall’ vs. ‘will’). He emphasizes the fact that Prichard has to be given great credit for seeing that the accurate specification of willing should be ‘willing that’ and not ‘willing to.’ Grice is especially interested in proving Stoutians (like Hampshire and Hart) wrong by drawing from Aristotle's prohairesis-doxa distinction, or in his parlance, the buletic-doxastic distinction. Grice quotes from Aristotle. Prohairesis cannot be opinion/doxa. For opinion is thought to relate to all kinds of things, no less to eternal things and impossible things than to things in our own power; and it is distinguished by its falsity or truth, not by its badness or goodness, while choice is distinguished rather by these. Now with opinion in general perhaps no one even says it is identical. But it is not identical even with any kind of opinion; for by choosing or deciding (prohairesis) what is good or bad we are men of a certain character, which we are not by holding this or that opinion (doxa). And we choose to get or avoid something good or bad, but we have opinions about what a thing is or whom it is good for or how it is good for him; we can hardly be said to opine to get or avoid anything. And choice is praised for being related to the right object rather than for being rightly related to it, opinion for being truly related to its object. And we choose what we best know to be good, but we opine what we do not quite know; and it is not the same people that are thought to make the best choices and to have the best opinions, but some are thought to have fairly good opinions, but by reason of vice to choose what they should not. If opinion precedes choice or accompanies it, that makes no difference; for it is not this that we are considering, but whether it is identical with some kind of opinion. What, then, or what kind of thing is it, since it is none of the things we have mentioned? It seems to be voluntary, but not all that is voluntary to be an object of choice. Is it, then, what has been decided on by previous deliberation? At any rate choice involves a rational principle and thought. Even the name seems to suggest that it is what is chosen before other things.’ His final analysis of ‘A intends that p’ is in terms of (1) a buletic condition (‘A wills that p’), and (2) an attending doxastic condition (‘A judges that (1) causes p’). Grice ends this essay with a nod to D. F. Pears and an open point about the justifiability (other than evidential) for the acceptability of the agent's deciding and intending versus the evidential justifiability of the agent's predicting that what he intends will be satisfied. It is important to note that in his earlier ‘Disposition and intention,’ Grice dedicates the first part to 'counterfactual' ‘if’ general. This is a logical point. THEN as an account for a 'psychological' concept (‘ψ’): ‘If A does A [sensory input], A does B [behavioural output’ (No ‘ψ’ without the behavioural output that ‘ψ’ is meant to explain). His problem is with the first person: the functionalist ‘I’ does not need a 'black box.' The keywords here would be both incorrigibility and privileged access. Pirotology only explains their 'evolutionary' import.
1971. Entailment, The American Philosophical Association, joint symposium held by the American Philosophical Association and the Association for Symbolic Logic, symposium with Dana Scott and Robert K. Meyer. Dec. 27, 1971, Sixty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Statler Hilton Hotel, New York, and P. F. Strawson, on G. E. Moore’s entailment. Grice takes a look at Strawson's unpublication. 1971. Entailment, Paradoxes of entailment, Entailment and paradoxes, Joint symposium held by The Association for Symbolic Logic and the American Philosophical Association, The Statler Hilton, New York, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series IV (Associations), carton 6-folder 4, and Series V (Topical), carton 6-folder 33, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keyword: entailment, paradoxes of entailment, paradox. The symposium was held in New York with Dana Scott and R. K. Meyer. The notion had been ‘mis-introduced’ (according to Strawson) in the philosophical literature by G. E. Moore. Grice is especially interested in the entailment + implicatum pair. A philosophical expression may be said to be co-related to an entailment (which is rendered in terms of a reductive analysis). However, the use of the expression may co-relate to this or that implicatum which is rendered 'reasonable' in the light of the addressee's assumption that the utterer is ultimately abiding by a principle of conversational helfpulness. Grice thinks many philosophers take an implicatum as an entailment when they surely shouldn't! Grice was more interested than Strawson was in G. E. Moore's coinage of 'entailment' for logical consequence. As an analyst, Grice knew that a true conceptual analysis needs to be reductive (if not reductionist). The prongs the analyst lists are thus 'entailments' of the concept in question. Philosophers, however, may misidentify what is an entailment for an implicature, or vice versa. Initially, Grice was interested in the second family of cases. With his coinage of 'disimplicature,' Grice expands his interest to cover the first family of cases, too. Grice remains a philosophical methodologist. He is not so much concerned with any area or discipline or philosophical concept per se (unless it's rationality), but with the misuses of some tools in the philosophy of language as committed by some of his colleagues at Oxford. While 'entailment,' was, for Strawson 'mis-introduced' in the philosophical literature by Moore, 'entailment' seems to be less involved in paradoxes than 'if' is. Grice connects the two, as indeed his tutee Strawson did! As it happens, Strawson's ‘Necessary propositions and entailment statements’ is his very first published essay, with ‘Mind,’ a re-write of an unpublication unwritten elsewhere, and which Grice read. The relation of 'consequence' may be considered a meta-conditional, where paradoxes arise. Grice's Bootstrap is a principle designed to impoverish the metalanguage so that the philosopher can succeed in the business of pulling himself up by his own! Grice then takes a look at Strawson’s very first ‘publication’ (an unpublication he had written elsewhere). Grice finds Strawson thought he could ‘provide a simple solution to the so-called ‘paradoxes of entailment.’ At the time, Grice and Strawson were pretty sure that nobody then accepted, ‘if indeed anyone ever did and did make,’ the identification of the relation symbolised by the horseshoe with the relation which G. E. Moore calls ‘entailment,’ p⊃q, i. e. ~(pΛ~q)’ is rejected as an analysis of ‘p entails q’ because it involves this or that allegedly paradoxical implicatum, as that any false proposition entails any proposition and any true proposition is entailed by any proposition. It is a commonplace that Lewis's amendment had consequences scarcely less paradoxical in terms of the implicata! For if ‘p’ is impossible (i.e. self-contradictory), it is impossible that p and ~q. And if q is necessary, ~q is impossible and it is impossible that p and ~q; i. e., if ‘p entails q’ means ‘it is impossible that p and ~q’ *any* necessary proposition is entailed by any proposition and any self-contradictory proposition entails any proposition. On the other hand, Lewis's definition of entailment (i.e. of the relation which holds from p to q whenever q is deducible from p) obviously commends itself in some respects. Now, it is clear that the emphasis laid on the ‘expression-mentioning’ character of the intensional contingent statement by writing ‘pΛ~q’ is impossible instead of ‘It is impossible that p and ~q’ does not avoid the alleged paradoxes of entailment. But it is equally clear that the addition of some provision does avoid them: Strawson proposes that one should use ‘... entails ...’ such that no necessary statement and no negation of a necessary statement can significantly be said to entail or be entailed by any statement; i. e. the function ‘p entails q’ cannot take necessary or self-contradictory statements as arguments. The expression ‘p entails q’ is to be used to mean ‘‘p⊃q’ is necessary, and neither ‘p’ nor ‘q’ is either necessary or self-contradictory,’ or ‘‘pΛ~q’ is impossible and neither ‘p’ nor ‘q,’ nor either of their contradictories, is necessary.’ Thus, the paradoxes are avoided. For let us assume that ‘p1’ expresses a contingent, and ‘q1’ a necessary, proposition. ‘p1 and ~q1’ is now impossible because ‘~q1’ is impossible. But ‘q1’ is necessary. So, by that provision, ‘p1’ does NOT entail ‘q1.’ We may avoid the paradoxical assertion that p1 entails q2 as merely falling into the equally paradoxical assertion that ‘‘p1’ entails ‘q1’ is necessary.’ For: If q is necessary, ‘‘q’ is necessary’ is, though true, not necessary, but a *contingent* *intensional* statement. Hence:‘~(‘q’ is necessary)’ is, though false, possible. Hence ‘p1Λ~(‘q1’ is necessary)’ is, though false, possible. Hence ‘p1’ does NOT entail ‘’q1’ is necessary.’ Thus, by adopting the view that an ‘entailment’ statement (and other intensional statements) are non-necessary, and that no necessary statement or its contradictory can entail or be entailed by any statement, Strawson thinks he can avoid the paradox that a necessary proposition is entailed by any proposition, and indeed all the other associated paradoxes of entailment. Grice objected that Strawson’s cure was worse than Moore’s disease! The denial that a necessary proposition can entail or be entailed by any proposition (and, therefore, that necessary propositions can be related to each other by the entailment-relation) is too high a price to pay for the solution of the paradoxes. And here is where Grice’s implicature is meant to do the trick! Or not! When Levinson proposed ‘+’ for conversationally implicature, he is thinking of contrasting it with ‘⊢’. But things ain't that easy. Even the grammar is more complicated: ‘By uttering ‘He is an adult,’ U explicitly conveys that he is an adult. What U explicitly conveys ENTAILS that he is not a child. What U implies is that he should be treated accordingly.
1971. Formal semantics, Summer institute on philosophy of language, UC/Irvine, formal semantics.
1972. Type-progression in pirotology, method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre, in The Conception of Value, Clarendon, the Princeton lectures, March 1972, 1975, Presidential address to the American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division), Proceedings and addresses of the American Philosophical Association, pp. 23-53, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 2-folders 19-21, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: philosophical psychology, pirotology, immanuel. It's best to date this March 1972, as the footnote in ‘Conception of value’ reads, when Grice presents the idea in the Princeton lectures. He notes in a footnote he delivered this as an earlier lecture. Grice's ‘Method’ is reprinted in The Conception of Value. Grice was forever grateful to Carnap for having coined 'pirot.' 1974 ‘Or having thought to have coined. Apparently, someone had used the expression before him to mean some sort of exotic fish.’ He starts by listing this or thata 'focal problem' (4). One problem is circularity. He refers to Ryle's ‘dispositional behaviouristic’ analysis. A second focal problem is the alleged analytic status of a psychological law. A third problem concerns some respect for Grice's own privileged access to this or that state and this or that 'avowal' of this or that state being 'incorrigible'. A fourth problem concerns the law-selection. He refers to 'pessimism.' He talks of 'folk-science.' B and D are is each predicate-constant in some law L in some psychological theory T. This or that instantiable of B or D may well be a set or a property ‘or neither.’ Way of Ramsified naming and way of Ramsified definition. Grice’s way of Ramsified naming: There is just one predicate-constant boule and just one predicate-consant doxa such that nomological generalization L introducing this or that predicate constant via implicit definition in theory T obtains and let boule be named ‘buletic ‘ and doxa be named ‘doxastic’.Uniqueness is essential since the buletic and the doxastic are assigned as this or that names for this or that particular instantiable. But one can dispense with uniqueness. Grice’s way of Ramsified description. x holds a buletic attitude just in case there is a predicate-constant boule introduced via implicit definition by nomological generalisation L of theory T such that nomological generalization L obtains and x instantiates the boule and x holds a doxastic attitude just in case there is a doxa introduced by implicit definition by nomological generalisation L in theory T such that nomological generalization L obtains and x instantiates the doxa. I’m trusting I’m not overstretching Ramsey’s original intention.’He applies RN and RD to 'pain.' 'He who hollers is in pain.' Or rather, 'He who is in pain hollers.' (Sufficient but not necessary). He rejects disjunctional physicalism on it sounding 'harsh' (as Berkeley puts it) to say that Smith's brain's being in such and such a state is a case of, say, judging something to be true on insufficient evidence. He criticises the body-soul identity thesis on dismissing ‘=‘'s main purpose, ‘to license predicate transfers.’ Grice wasn't sure what his presidential address to the American Philosophical Association will be about. He chose ‘the banal’ (i.e. the 'ordinary-language' counterpart of something like a 'need' we ascribe to a squirrel to gobble nuts) and the 'bizarre': the philosopher's construction of 'need' and other 'psychological,' now theoretical terms. In the proceedings, Grice creates the discipline of 'pirotology.' He cares to mention very many philosophers: Aristotle, D. K. Lewis, G. Myro, L. Witters, F. R. Ramsey, G. Ryle, and a few others! The essay became popular when, of all people, N. Block, cited it as a programme in 'functionalism,' which it is! Grice's method in functionalist philosophical psychology. Introduces pirotology as a creature-construction discipline. Repr. in The Conception of Value, it reached a wider audience. The essay is highly subdivided, and covers a lot of ground. Grice starts by noting that, contra Ryle, he wants to see psychological predicates as theoretical concepts. The kind of theory he is having in mind is 'folksy.' The first creature he introduces to apply his method is Toby, a squarrel, that is a reconstructed squirrel. Grice gives some principles of pirotology. Maxims of rational behaviour compound to form what he calls an immanuel, of which The Conversational Immanuel is a part. Grice concludes with a warning against the Devil of Scientism, but acknowledges perhaps he was giving much too credit to Myro's influence on this! 1975. Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre, in The Conception of Value, Clarendon, repr. from The Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, keywords: philosophical psychology, pirotology. The Immanuel section is perhaps the most important from the point of view of conversation as rational co-operation. For he identifies THREE types of generality: formal, applicational, and content-based. Also, he allows for there being different types of ‘imannuels.’ Surely one should be the conversational immanuel. Ryle would say that one can have a manual, yet now know how to use it! And there’s also the Wittgenstein-type problem: how do we say that the conversationalist is following the immanuel? Perhaps the statement is too strong – cf. ‘following a rule’ – and Grice’s problems with resultant and basic procedures, and how the former derive from the latter! This connects with Chomsky, and in general with Grice’s antipathy towards ‘constitutive’ rules! In Intention and Uncertainty Grice had warned that his interpretation of Prichard's ‘willing that ...’ as a ‘state’ should NOT preculde a ‘physicalist’ analysis, but in ‘Method’ it's all AGAINST physicalism. Grice's concern is with every-day psychological explanation, an explanation which employs this or that every-day psychological principle. By such a principle Grice means a relatively stable body of generally-accepted principles, of which the following are examples. If a person desires p, and believes (if p, q) other things being equal the person desires q. If a person desires p and desires q, other things being equal, the person acts on the stronger of the two desires if the person acts on either. If a person stares at a coloured surface and subsequently stares at a white surface, other things being equal-the person will have an after-image. Grice do not intend to suggest that every-day principle is as simple and easy to formulate as these examples. As Grice repeatedly emphasises, the principles we explicitly or implicitly employ are many, varied, rich, and subtle. Take desire. In every-day explanation we exploit 'an immense richness in the family of expressions that might be thought of as the ‘wanting family’; this family includes expressions like ‘want’, ‘desire’, ‘would like to ‘, ‘is eager to’, ‘is anxious to’, ‘would mind not ... ‘, ‘the idea of ... appeals to me’, ‘is thinking of’, etc.'‘ Grice remarks that 'the likeness and differences within this family demand careful attention'. The systematic exposition of these likenesses and differences is itself an important (and not unpleasant) philosophical task. But we are concerned with Grice's overall view of psychological explanation, and, to see what Grice thinks, it will be useful first to consider how we would explain the behaviour of a certain sort of robot. Suppose we are presented with a rather peculiar robot, and a diagram that we can use to predict and explain its behaviour. The robot is peculiar in that it has a panel of lights on its forehead ‒ say sixty-four small lights in an eight-by-eight pattern. Each square represents a possible configuration of lights, and the diagram correlates possible configurations with each other. Some squares are correlated with more than one other square. For example, ClcC2 means that configuration C is followed by C1 or C2. The diagram describes a finite, non-deterministic automaton. No transition probabilities are given. We can use the diagram to predict and explain the configurations that appear on the robot's forehead because the robot is so constructed that the configurations succeed one another in the ways represented in the diagram. So, if we observe configuration C, we can predict that C1 or C2 will follow. If we observe Cl, we can explain its occurrence by pointing out that C must have preceded it. All we can explain so far are configurations of lights. Can we explain behaviour ‒ e.g., the robot's raising its left arm? Suppose we are provided with a table which has entries like: if configuraton C occurs at t, the robot raises its arm at t+1. We succeed in predicting and explaining the robot's behaviour, except that occasionally our predictions are falsified. The robot does not always work according to the diagram. Temporary electronic defects and vagaries account for the falsified predications. The diagram and table represent the way the robot is designed to work, not the way it always does work. Apart from the infrequent electronically-explained lapses, explanation and prediction proceed untroubled until one day a large number of our predictions are falsified. Suspecting a massive electronic disorder, we return the robot. The manufacturer explains that the robot was programmed to be self-regulating. The robot has an internal representation of the diagram and table we were given, and it was also programmed to use this or that ‘evaluative’ principle to determine whether to operate in accord with the diagram and table. E.g., suppose the robot is in configuration C and that the immediate successor of C is C 1. The robot determines by this or that ‘evaluative’ principle not to move into Cl, but to arrive at C2 instead. The robot was engineered so that it will in certain situations employ this or that ‘evaluative’ principle, and so its states will change, in accord with the results of its evaluations. When we ask for the ‘evaluative’ principle, it is given to us, but it does not improve our predictive power as much as we may have hoped. The robot has the power to formulate a new subsidiary evaluative principle. It formulates this new principle using its original evaluative principle plus information about the environment and the consequences of its past actions. We may simply not know, at any given time, exactly what subsidiary principle the robot is employing. The robot may ‒ to some extent ‒ revise or replace its original evaluative principle, i.e., it may, in the light of a principles ‒ original or subsidiary ‒ plus information about its environment and past actions, revise or replace its original principle. So we may not know exactly what original principles the robot is using. When we complain that we have lost our ability to predict and explain the robot's behaviour, we are told that the situation is not so bad. First, in programming the robot, an evaluative principle is made immune to revision and replacement, so we can always count on the robot's operating with this principle. Second, we are not at a total loss to determine what evaluative principle-subsidiary or otherwise-the robot employs. We possess the diagram and table as well as knowledge of the original evaluative principle. The robot uses the diagram, table, and principles to arrive at a new principle, and we can replicate this process. We can replicate the processes that lead the robot to deviate from the diagram and table. To the extent that we have identified the robot's evaluative procedure, we can use it just as the robot does to determine whether it will act in accord with the diagram and table. Of course, there is the problem of determining when the robot will employ its evaluative principle, but we might be provided with a new table with entries like: if C occurs at t, the robot will employ its evaluative principle at t+1. We can often predict and explain the robot's behaviour just as we did before the evaluative principle complicated the picture, for the robot does not always employ its evaluative principle to diverge from the diagram and table. On the contrary, it was designed to minimize the use of the principle since their use requires significant time and energy. An important part of Grice's view of everyday psychological explanation can be put this way. Such explanation is similar to the explanation and prediction of the robot's behaviour. There are a few points to note here. Aan every-day psychological principle plays a role in explanation and prediction that is similar to the role of the diagram and table. Think of the robot's lights as representing a psychological state. Then the diagram and table express relations among complexes consisting of a psychological state and behaviour. An everyday psychological principle clearly expresses such a relations (although this is not all it does). People use an 'evaluative principle' in ways analogous to the use the robot makes of his. This point is an essential part of Grice's view of rationality. Grice holds that the picture of rationality given us by Kantotle as something which essentially functions to regulate, direct, and control a pre-rational impulse, an inclination, and a disposition, is the right picture. One of the things an everyday psychological principle give us is a specification of how a pre-rational impulse, inclination, or disposition operates, just as the diagram and table represent how the robot operates apart from employing its evaluative principle. People can, through deliberation, rationally regulate, direct, control and monitor a pre-rational pattern of thought or action just as the robot can regulate, direct, control and monitor its operation in accord with the diagram and table. So what is this 'evaluative principle' people employ? It is included among what we have been calling an everyday psychological principle, for it does not merely specify how our pre-rational part operates. Consider e.g: if a pirot believes p and that (if p, q) and the pirot believes ~q, the pirot should stop believing p or stop believing q. Conformity to this principle is a criterion of rationality, although this is not to say that the principle may not have exceptions in quite special circumstances. One important 'evaluative' principle is the conception of 'eudæmonia.' Grice suggests that 'eudæmonia' consists in having a set of ends meeting certain conditions ‒ where an important necessary condition is that the set of ends be 'suitable for the direction of life', and much of 'Some reflections' is devoted to explaining this condition. Grice suggests that if an individual asks what it is for him to be happy, the answer consists in identifying a system of ends which is a specific and personalized derivative, determined by that individual's character, abilities, and situation in the world, of the system constitutive of eudæmonia in general. This specific and personalized derivative figures prominently in deliberation, for a person may use it to regulate, direct, control, and monitor his pre-rational inclination. Third, recall that we imagined that the robot could replace and revise its evaluative principle. Analogously, a person may change his conception of what it is for him to be happy. But we also imagined that the robot had some evaluative principles it could not change. On Grice's view, a person has this 'evaluative principle' that cannot change. Not because a person programmed in; rather, it is a principle a person cannot abandon if he is to count as rational. E. g. it is plausible to suggest that a person must, to count as rational, have and employ in deliberation at least some minimal conception of what it is for him to be happy. Also it is plausible to suggest that this conception counts as a conception of happiness only if it is a 'specific and personalized derivative' of a conception of eudæmonia in general. So to count as happy, a person would have to have and employ such a conception. These examples do not, of course, exhaust the range of things one might hope to show necessary to counting as rational. We should note here that our use of 'rational' may be a looser use than Grice himself would indulge in. Grice regards 'rational' as a label for a cluster of notions he would distinguish. Our looseness is an expositional convenience. Fourth, everday psychological predictions and explanations are sometimes falsified-like the prediction and explanations of the robot's behaviour. And, just as in the case of the robot, this reveals no defect in everyday psychological explanation. How can this be? In the robot example, the diagram and table specify how the robot is designed to function; obviously, minor deviations from the design do not justify regarding the information in the diagram and table as either false or useless. Can anything similar be true of people? Something somewhat similar is true, according to Grice, and this because everyday psychology has special status. Grice argues that the psychological theory which I envisage would be deficient as a theory to explain behaviour if it did not contain provision for interests in the ascription of psychological states otherwise than as tools for explaining and predicting behaviour, interests (e.g.) on the part of one creature to be able to ascribe these rather than those psychological states to another creature because of a concern for the other creature. Within such a theory it should be possible to derive a strong motivation on the part of the creature subject to the theory against the abandonment of the central concepts of the theory (and so of the theory itself), a motivation which the creature would (or should) regard as justified. Indeed, only from within the framework of such a theory Girce think that matters of evaluation, and so, of the evaluation of modes of explanation, can be raised at all. If he conjectures aright, the entrenched system contains the materials needed to justify its own entrenchment; whereas no rival system contains a basis for the justification of anything at all. Suppose the entrenched system contains the materials needed to justify its own entrenchment; whereas no rival system contains a basis for the justification of anything at all. Then while everyday psychology (or some preferred part of it) may not specify how we are designed to think and act, it does specify how we ought to think and act; for there can be no justification for failure to conform to (the preferred part) of everyday psychology. There is another point which it is worth noting here in passing. If everyday psychology is uniquely self-justifying in the way Grice suggests, we must reject the suggestion that everyday psychology is just a rough and ready theory that we will or could eventually abandon without loss in favour of a more accurate and complete 'scientific' theory of behaviour. Grice remarks that we must be ever watchful against the Devil of Scientism, who would lead us into myopic over-concentration on the nature and importance of knowledge, and of 'scientific' knowledge in particular; the Devil who is even so audacious as to tempt us to call in question the very system of ideas required to make intelligible the idea of calling in question anything at all; and who would even prompt us, in effect, to suggest that since we do not really think but only think that we think, we had better change our minds without undue delay. Now let us turn to meaning. In 'Meaning revisited', Grice sets out to put one or two of the thoughts he had at various times into some kind of focus, so that there might emerge some sort of sense about not merely what kind of views about the nature of meaning he is inclined to endorse, but also why it should be antecedently plausible to accept this kind of view. When Grice says 'antecedently plausible', he means plausible for some reasons other than that the view in question offers some prospects of dealing with the intuitive data: the facts about how I use 'mean', and so on. So I will be digging just a little bit into the background of the study of meaning and its roots in such things as philosophical psychology. It is worth emphasizing the point that the study has its roots in philosophical psychology, for one trend in contemporary philosophy has been to regard the study of meaning as 'first philosophy' (M. A. E. Dummett), as providing the framework and the tools for any other philosophical investigation. This is clearly not Grice's view. How can the roots of the study of meaning be in philosophical psychology? Consider the utterer's meaning. Grice employs his conception of everyday psychological explanation to provide a certain kind of rationale for his account of utterer's meaning. The rationale consists essentially of three claims. First, given our general psychological make-up (specified by everyday psychology) and given our environment, it is frequently highly conducive to realizing our ends that we be able to produce beliefs in each other. E. g. suppose I need your help to escape the riptide that is carrying me out to sea. You will help me if you believe I am caught in the riptide. How can I ensure that you will believe that? Second, an especially effective way to produce this belief is to do something m-intending thereby that I am caught in the riptide. Consider what might happen if I do not have such an m-intention. Suppose I just thrash about in the water. I intend you to see that my swimming is ineffective, and to infer therefrom that I am caught. But you might think that I was simply having a good time splashing about, or that I was just pretending to be in trouble. If I can get you to realise that I intend by what I am doing to produce in you the belief that I am caught, that realization will give you a decisive reason to believe that I need help. So I do have a good and decisive reason to m-intend that I am caught. And ‒ and this is the third claim ‒ I have the ability to m-intend that I am caught. It is an everday psychological fact that we can perform actions with the intention (1) that the addressee A believe p; (2) that the audience recognize the intention (1); (3) that this recognition be part of the audience's reason for believing p. This is a fact about our pre-rational part, analogous to the facts about the robot's behaviour which we can read off solely from the diagram and table without any appeal to its evaluative procedures. We are just so designed that we M-intend things at various times. E. g., in the riptide case, I would utter 'I am caught in the riptide, m-intending you to think that I am caught. These three points show that it is rational for us to be so 'designed'. That is, it is rational for us to be pre-rationally structured so as to employ m-intentions. To see why, consider what we are doing in working through the three claims in question. We note that we have a certain pre-rational structure involving an m-intention, and we ask what can be said in favour of it. Given our ends and our environment, there is a good decisive reason to have such a pre-rational structure. So we discover that the m-intending structure passes rational muster. It does not have to be inhibited. Rather it should be reinforced and guided. The air of paradox in a pre-rational structure's being rational is easily dispelled. To label a structure pre-rational is merely to see it as present and operative independently of any attempt to evaluate whether and how it should be regulated, directed, and controlled. To call such a structure rational is to say that on evaluation one finds a good decisive reason to allow the structure to remain operative instead of trying to inhibit or eliminate it. Grice sometimes expresses the fact that a pre-rational structure is rational by saying that it has a genitorial justification. Suppose we are demi-gods, genitors, as Grice says, designing creatures. We are constructing them out of animal stuff, so we are making creatures that will perceive, desire, hope, fear, think, feel, and so on. The question before us is: exactly what psychological principles should our creatures obey? We want, so to speak, to decide on a specific diagram and table for them. As we work on this problem, we discover that we have a good and decisive reason to make them such that they employ an m-intention, for we have built into them a desire for eudæmonia, and as we survey their environment and their physical powers, it is clear that they have little chance for eudæmonia (or even survival) unless they employ an m-intention. And, as benevolent genitors, we want them to have every chance of eudæmonia. In appealing to happiness in this way we have departed somewhat from Grice's treatment of creature construction. This deviation, which is expositionally convenient here, is corrected in the section on ethics. So as genitors we have a good and decisive reason to make our creatures M-intend. Grice infers from this genitorial myth that it really is rational ‒ or, if one likes, that we really have a good reason-to be so pre-rationally structured that we M-intend. And the inference is a good one, for the technique of genitorial creature construction is a more picturesque way of establishing that M-intending passes rational muster. Grice sometimes uses this creature construction technique to discover what aspects of our pre-rational structure are rational. The idea is that the question 'What should we as genitors build into creatures with human psychological capacities living in a human environment?' is easier to answer than the question 'What aspects of our pre-rational structure are rational?' As we have seen, M-intending is, for example, one structure that we can cite in answer to both questions. Consider how surprising it would be if language had no word that stood for M-intending. Our considerations reveal it not only as a rational, but as a very important, prerational structure. Of course, Grice does think we have an expression here: viz., 'mean'. This linguistic thesis combined with the identification of M-intending as a rational pre-rational structure provides a justification of Grice's account of utterer's meaning. The concluding section of Grice's 'Meaning revisited' is relevant here, as it further illuminates the rational aspect of M-intending (or speaker meaning as Grice calls it in 'Meaning Revisited'). Grice begins by saying that the general idea that he wants to explore, and which seems to me to have some plausibility, is that something has been left out, by me and perhaps by others too, in the analyses, definitions, expansions and so on, of semantic notions, and particularly various notions of meaning. What has been left out has in fact been left out because it is something which everyone regards with horror, at least when in a scientific or theoretical frame of mind: the notion of value. Though I think that in general we want to keep value notions out of our philosophical and scientific enquiries-and some would say out of everything else-we might consider what would happen if we relaxed this prohibition to some extent. If we did, there is a whole range of different kinds of value predicates or expressions which might be admitted in different types of case. To avoid having to choose between them, I am just going to use as a predicate the word 'optimal' the meaning of which could of course be more precisely characterized later. Applying this idea to speaker-meaning (utterer's meaning, as we have been saying), Grice makes two suggestions. As a first approximation, what we mean by saying that a speaker, by something he says, on a particular occasion, means that p, is that he is in the optimal state with respect to communicating, or if you like, to communicating that p. The optimal state, the state in which he has an infinite set of intentions, is in principle unrealisable, so that the utterer U does not strictly speaking ‘mean’ that p, he is deemed to mean that p. However, he is in a situation which is such that it is legitimate, or perhaps even mandatory, for us to deem him to satisfy the unfulfillable condition. The optimal state is what the analysis of speaker meaning specifies. Counter-examples advanced by Schiffer in Meaning suggest that this state is one in which a speaker has an infinite number of intentions. We will not discuss the counter-examples; we want to consider why it is reasonable to respond to them by granting that the analysis of speaker meaning specifies an unrealizable-but none the less ideal or optimal-state involving having an infinite number of intentions. Consider an analogy. There is in sailing an optimal setting for the sails-a setting that maximizes forward thrust. Any reasonably complete text on sailing will explain at least some of the relevant ærodynamic theory. Now this optimal setting is difficult if not impossible to achieve while actually sailing-given continual shifts in wind direction, the sudden changes of direction caused by waves, and the difficulty in determining airflow patterns by sight. To deal with these practical difficulties, the text supplies numerous rules of thumb which are relatively easy to apply while sailing. Why not just drop the ærodynamic theory altogether and just provide the reader/sailor with the rules of thumb? Because they are rules of thumb. They hold at best other things being equal. To spot exceptions and resolve conflicts as well as to handle situations not covered by the rules, one needs to know what the ærodynamic optimum is. This optimum plays a crucial role in guiding the use of the rules of thumb. Why should common sense psychology not avail itself of various optima in this way? It is plausible to think that it does given Grice's view of rationality as something that plays an evaluative and guiding role with respect to pre-rational inclinations and dispositions. Various optima would be especially suited to such a role. And why should utterer's meaning not be such an optimum? Indeed, there is some reason to think it is. Resultant procedures: What can we say about sentence meaning? Is it possible to provide a rationale for the treatment of sentence meaning in the context of Grice's philosophical psychology? The account of sentence meaning has an explanatory role. Consider that a speaker of this or that language can M-intend an extremely wide range of things, and typically his audience will know what he M-in tends as soon as the audience hears what is uttered. Attributing resultant procedures to language-users explains these facts. There are a few points to note. Suppose U has the procedure of uttering 'I know the route' if U wants A to think U thinks U knows the route. What does it mean to suppose this? We can understand it as an everday psychological principle. More precisely, the proposed principle is: if a competent communicator wants his addressee A to think the utterer U knows the route, other things being equal, utterer U utters 'I know the route'. This qualifies as an every-day psychological principle and, perhaps most important-like (at least some) other everyday psychological principles, this principle has a normative aspect. Both knowledge of and conformity to this principle are required if one is to count as a competent speaker. Turning from utterers to audiences, it is, for similar reasons, plausible to suggest that it is an everyday psychological fact that if a competent English speaker hears 'I know the route', then he will-other things being equal-think the utterer thinks he knows the route. This principle could be derived from the first plus the assumption that speakers are, about certain things, trustworthy. There is nothing mysterious about such everyday psychological principles. They specify part of our psychological make-up, the way we are 'designed' -part of our pre-rational structure, and the fact that we are so 'designed', certainly explains the range of things we can m-intend and the ease with which we employ such m-intentions. But-and this is the second point-we might have hoped for much more by way of explanation, for there are mysteries here. In particular, what is it for a person to have a resultant procedure? To see what the question asks, imagine having an answer of the form. The utterer U has a resultant procedure P if and only if where the dots are filled out by specification of certain psychological and behavioural features. This would provide us with an informative characterization of the psychological and behavioural capacities underlying language use. Since there are infinitely many resultant procedures, a reasonable way to provide answers would be (given any natural language) to specify a finite set of basic procedures (for that language), from which the infinitely many resultant procedures could be derived (in some suitable sense of 'derived'). Then we would provide a finite set of conditions of the form: Utterer U has basic procedure Pb if and only if where the dots are replaced by a suitable condition. But what counts as a suitable condition? What psychological, behavioural, or other properties does one have to have to count as possessing a certain basic procedure P? As we said, Grice regards this as an open question. Of course, this is not to say that the question is unimportant; on the contrary, it is of fundamental importance if we want to know what capacities underlie language use. One problem about Grice's account of meaning still remains: does the appeal to propositions not vitiate the whole project? (Consider section on ethics). One crucial point to consider is the primacy (to use Suppes's qualification) of the buletic over the doxastic. Grice was playing with this for some time (Journal of Philosophy). In Method, from the mundane to the recondite, he is playful enough to say that primacy is 'no big deal,' and that, if properly motivated, he might give a reductive analysis of the buletic in terms of the doxastic. But his reductive analysis of the doxastic in terms of the buletic runs as follows: ‘Pirot judges that p’ iff ‘Pirot wills as follows: given any situation in which pirot wills some end E and here are two non-empty classes K1 and K2 of action types, such that: the performance by pirot of an action-type belonging to K1 realises E1 just in case p obtains, and the performance by the pirot of an action type belonging to of K2 will realise E just in case p does not obtain, and here is no third non-empty class K3 of action types such that the performance by the pirot of an action type belonging to will realise E whether p is true or p is false, in such situation, the pirot is to will that the pirot performs some action type belonging to K1. Creature construction allows for an account of freedom that will metaphysically justify absolute value. Philosopher H. Frankfurt has become famous for his second-order and higher-order desires. Grice is exploring similar grounds in what comes out as his ‘Method in philosophical psychology’ (originally American Philosophical Association presidential address, now reprinted in ‘The conception of value’). M. J. Bratman, of Stanford, much influenced by Grice (at Berkeley then) thanks to their ‘Hands-Across-the-Bay’ programme, helps us to understand this 'pirotological' progression towards the idea of strong autonomy or freedom. Recall that Grice's 'pirots' combine Locke's ‘very intelligent parrots’ with Russell's and Carnap's nonsensical 'pirots' of which nothing we are told other than they 'karulise elatically'. Grice’s purpose is to give a little thought to a question. What are the general principles exemplified, in creature-construction, in progressing from one type of pirot to a higher type? What kinds of steps are being made? The kinds of step with which Grice deals are those which culminate in a licence to include, within the specification of the content of the psychological state of this or that type of pirot, a range of expressions which would be inappropriate with respect to this lower-type pirot. Such expressions include this or that connective, this or that quantifier, this or that temporal modifier, this or that mode indicator, this or that modal operator, and (importantly) this or that expression to refer to this or that ‘souly’ state like ‘ … judges that …’ and ‘… will that …’ This or that expression, that is, the availability of which leads to the structural enrichment of the specification of content. In general, these steps will be ones by which this or that item or idea which has, initially, a legitimate place outside the scope of this or that souly instantiable (or, if you will, the expressions for which occur legitimately outside the scope of this or that souly predicate) come to have a legitimate place within the scope of such an instantiable, a step by which, one might say, this or that item or ideas comes to be internalised. Grice is disposed to regard as prototypical the sort of natural disposition or propension which Hume attributes to a person, and which is very important to Hume, viz. the tendency of the soul 'to spread itself upon objects,’ i.e. to project into the world items which, properly or primitively considered, is a feature of this or that souly state. Grice sets out in stages the application of aspects of the genitorial programme. We then start with a zero-order, with a pirot equipped to satisfy unnested, or logically amorphous, judging and willing, i.e. whose contents do not involve judging or willing. We soon reach our first pirot, P1. It would be advantageous to a pirot0 if it could have this or that judging and this or that willing, which relate to its own judging or willing. Such pirot1 could be equipped to control or regulate its own judgings and willings. It will presumably be already constituted so as to conform to the law that, cæteris paribus, if it wills that p and judge that ~p, if it can, it makes it the case that p in its soul To give it some control over its judgings and willings, we need only extend the application of this law to the pirot’s judging and willing. We equip the pirot so that, cæteris paribus, if it wills that it is not the case that it wills that p and it judges that they do will that p, if it can, it makes it the case that it does not will that p. And we somehow ensure that sometimes it can do this. It may be that the installation of this kind of control would go hand in had with the installation of the capacity for evaluation. Now, unlike it is the case with a pirot-1, a pirot-2's intentional effort depends on the motivational strength of its considered desire at the time of action. There is a process by which this or that conflicting considered desire motivates action as a broadly causal process, a process that reveals motivational strength. But a pirot-2 might itself try to weigh considerations provided by such a a conflicting desire B1 and B2 in deliberation about this or that pro and this or that con of various alternatives. In the simplest case, such weighing treats each of the things desired as a prima facie justifying end. In the face of conflict, it weighs this and that desired end, where the weights correspond to the motivational strength of the associated considered desire. The outcome of such deliberation, Aristotle’s prohairesis, matches the outcome of the causal motivational process envisioned in the description of Pirot2. But, since the weights it invokes in such deliberation correspond to the motivational strength of this or that relevant considered desire (though perhaps not to the motivational strength of this or that relevant considered desire), the resultant activitiy matches those of a corresponding pirot2 (each of whose desires, we are assuming, are considered). To be more realistic, we might limit ourselves to saying that a pirot2 has the capacity to make the transition from this or that unconsidered desire to this or that considered desire, but does not always do this. But it will keep the discussion more manageable to simplify and to suppose that each desire is considered. We shall not want this pirot-2 to depend, in each will and act in ways that reveal the motivational strength of this or that considered desire at the time of action, but for a pirot3 it will also be the case that in this or that, though not each) case, it acts on the basis of how it weights this or that end favoured by this or that conflicting considered desire. This or that considered desire will concern matters that cannot be achieved simply by action at a single time. E. g. pirot-3 may want to nurture a vegetable garden, or build a house. Such matters will require organized and coordinated action that extends over time. What the pirot-3 does now will depend not only on what it now desires but also on what it now expects it will do later given what it does now. It needs a way of settling now what it will do later given what it does now. The point is even clearer when we remind ourselves that pirot-3 is not alone. It is, we may assume, one of some number of pirots-3; and in many cases it needs to coordinate what it does with what other pirots-3 do so as to achieve ends desired by all participants, itself included. Pirots4. These costs are magnified for a pirot-4 whose various plans are interwoven so that a change in one element can have significant ripple effects that will need to be considered. Let us suppose that the general strategies pirot-4 has for responding to new information about its circumstances are sensitive to these kinds of costs. Promoting in the long run the satisfaction of its considered desires and preferences. Pirot4 is a somewhat sophisticated planning agent but it has a problem. It can expect that its desires and preferences may well change over time and undermine its efforts at organizing and coordinating its activities over time. Perhaps in many cases this is due to the kind of temporal discounting. So for example pirot-4 may have a plan to exercise every day but may tend to prefer a sequence of not exercising on the present day but exercising all days in the future, to a uniform sequence the present day included. At the end of the day it returns to its earlier considered preference in favour of exercising on each and every day. Though pirot4, unlike pirot-3, has the capacity to settle on prior plans or plaices concerning exercise, this capacity does not yet help in such a case. A creature whose plans were stable in ways in part shaped by such a no-regret principle would be more likely than pirot-4 to resist temporary temptations. Pirot5. So let us build such a principle into the stability of the plans of a pirot-5, whose plans and policies are not derived solely from facts about its limits of time, attention, and the like. It is also grounded in the central concerns of a planning agent with its own future, concerns that lend special significance to anticipated future regret. So let us add to pirot-5 the capacity and disposition to arrive at such hierarchies of higher-order desires concerning its ‘will’. Pirot6. This gives us a new creature, pirot-6. There is a problem with pirot-6, one that has been much discussed. It is not clear why a higher-order desire ‒ even a higher-order desire that a certain desire be one's ‘will’ ‒ is not simply one more desire in the pool of desires (Berkeley God's will problem). Why does it have the authority to constitute or ensure the agent's (that is, the creature's) endorsement or rejection of a first-order desire? Applied to pirot-6 this is the question of whether, by virtue solely of its hierarchies of desires, it really does succeed in taking its own stand of endorsement or rejection of various first-order desires. Since it was the ability to take its own stand that we are trying to provide in the move to pirot6, we need some response to this challenge. The basic point is that pirot6 is not merely a time-slice agent. It is, rather, and understands itself to be, a temporally persisting planning agent, one who begins, and continues, and completes temporally extended projects. On a broadly Lockean view, its persistence over time consists in relevant psychological continuities (e.g., the persistence of attitudes of belief and intention) and connections (e.g., memory of a past event, or the later intentional execution of an intention formed earlier). Certain attitudes have as a primary role the constitution and support of such Lockean continuities and connections. In particular, policies that favour or reject various desires have it as their role to constitute and support various continuities both of ordinary desires and of the politicos themselves. For this reason such policies are not merely additional wiggles in the psychic stew. Instead, these policies have a claim to help determine where the agent ‒ i.e., the temporally persisting agent ‒ stands with respect to its desires. Or so it seems to me reasonable to say. Pirot7. So the psychology of pirot-7 continues to have the hierarchical structure of pro-attitudes introduced with pirot-6. The difference is that the higher-order pro-attitudes of pirot-6 were simply characterized as desires in a broad, generic sense, and no appeal was made to the distinctive species of pro-attitude constituted by plan-like attitudes. That is the sense in which the psychology of pirot-7 is an extension of the psychology of pirot-6. Let us then give pirot-7 such higher-order policies with the capacity to take a stand with respect to its desires by arriving at relevant higher-order policies concerning the functioning of those desires over time. Pirot7 exhibits a merger of hierarchical and planning structures. Appealing to planning theory and ground in connection to the temporally extended structure of agency to be one's ‘will’. Pirot-7 has higher-order policies that favour or challenge motivational roles of its considered desires. When Pirot-7 engages in deliberative weighing of conflicting, desired ends it seems that the assigned weights should reflect the policies that determine where it stands with respect to relevant desires. But the policies we have so far appealed to ‒ policies concerning what desires are to be one's will ‒ do not quite address this concern. The problem is that one can in certain cases have policies concerning which desires are to motivate and yet these not be policies that accord what those desires are for a corresponding justifying role in deliberation. Pirots-8. A solution is to give our creature ‒ call it pirot8 ‒ the capacity to arrive at policies that express its commitment to be motivated by a desire by way of its treatment of that desire as providing, in deliberation, a justifying end for action. Pirot8 has policies for treating (or not treating) certain desires as providing justifying ends ‒ as, in this way, reason-providing ‒ in motivationally effective deliberation. Let us call such policies self-governing policies. We will suppose that these policies are mutually compatible and do not challenge each other. In this way pirot-8 involves an extension of structures already present in pirot-7. The grounds on which pirot-8 arrives at (and on occasion revises) such self-governing policies will be many and varied. We can see these policies as crystallizing complex pressures and concerns, some of which are grounded in other policies or desires. These self-governing policies may be tentative and will normally not be immune to change. If we ask what pirot-8 values in this case, the answer seems to be: what it values is constituted in part by its higher-order self-governing policies. In particular, it values exercise over nonexercise even right now, and even given that it has a considered (though temporary) preference to the contrary. Unlike lower pirots, what pirot8 now values is not simply a matter of its present, considered desires and preferences. Now this model of pirot-8 seems in relevant aspects to be a (partial) model of us (in our better moments, of course. So we arrive at the conjecture that one important kind of valuing of which we are capable involves, in the cited ways, both our first-order desires and our higher order self-governing policies. In an important sub-class of cases our valuing involves reflexive polices that are both first-order policies of action and higher-order policies to treat the first-order policy as reason providing in motivationally effective deliberation. This may seem odd. Valuing seems normally to be a first-order attitude. One values honesty, say. The proposal is that an important kind of valuing involves higher-order policies. Does this mean that, strictly speaking, what one values (in this sense) is itself a desire ‒ not honesty, say, but a desire for honesty? No, it does not. What I value in the present case is honesty; but, on the theory, my valuing honesty in art consists in certain higher-order self-governing policies. An agent's reflective valuing involves a kind of higher-order willing.
1972. Reply to G. E. M. Anscombe, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 4-folder 26, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: intention, Anscombe. Irish-born Anscombe's views are often discussed by Oxonian philosophers. She had brought Witters to the ‘Dreaming Spires,’ as it were. Grice was especially connected with Anscombe's reflections on 'intention.' While Grice favoured an approach such as Hampshire, in ‘Thought and Action,’ he borrows a few points from Anscombe, notably that of 'direction of fit' (originally Austin's). Grice explicitly refers to Anscombe in ‘Intention and uncertainty,’ and in his reminiscences he hastens to add that Anscombe would never attend any of Austin's Saturday mornings, as neither would Dummett. Ryle's view is standardly characterised as a weaker or ‘softer’ version of behaviourism (Smith and Jones, 144). According to this standard interpretation, Ryle's view is that statements containing psychological terms can be translated, without loss of meaning, into subjunctive conditionals about what the individual will do in various circumstances. So Ryle (on this account) is to be construed as offering a dispositional analysis of psychological statements into behavioural ones. It is conceded that Ryle does not confine his descriptions of what the agent will do (under the circumstances) to purely physical behaviour—in terms, say, of skeletal or muscular descriptions—but is happy to speak of full-bodied actions like scoring a goal or paying a debt. But the ‘soft’ behaviourism attributed to Ryle still attempts an analysis (or translation) of psychological statements into a series of dispositional statements which are themselves construed as subjunctive ‘if’ describing what the agent will do (albeit under the relevant action description) under various circumstances. Even this ‘soft’ behaviourism is bound to fail, however, since psychological vocabulary is not analysable or translatable into behavioural statements even if these are allowed to include descriptions of actions. For the list of conditions and possible behaviour will be infinite since any one proffered translation can be defeated by slight alteration of the circumstances; and the defeating conditions in any particular case may involve a reference to facts about the agent's mind, thereby rendering the analysis circular. In sum, the standard interpretation of Ryle construes him as offering a somewhat weakened form of reductive behaviourism whose reductivist ambitions, however weakened, are nonetheless futile. But this characterisation of Ryle's programme is simply wrong. Although it is true that Ryle was keen to point out the dispositional nature of many psychological concepts, it would be wrong to construe him as offering a programme of analysis of psychological predicates into a series of subjunctive conditionals. The relationship between psychological predicates and the ‘if’ sentences with which we can ‘unpack’ them is other than that required by this kind of analysis. It will be helpful to keep in mind that Ryle's target is the official doctrine with its attendant ontological, epistemological, and semantic commitments. His arguments serve to remind us that we have in a large number of cases ways of telling or settling disputes, for example, about someone's character or intellect. If you dispute my characterisation of someone as believing or wanting something, I will point to what he says and does in defending my particular attribution (as well as to features of the circumstances). But our practice of giving reasons of this kind to defend or to challenge ascriptions of mental predicates would be put under substantial pressure if the Official Doctrine were correct. For Ryle to remind us that we do, as a matter of fact, have a way of settling disputes about whether someone is vain or whether she is in pain is much weaker than saying that a concept is meaningless unless it is verifiable; or even that the successful application of mental predicates requires that we have a way of settling disputes in all cases. Showing that a concept is one for which, in a large number of cases, we have agreement-reaching procedures (even if these do not always guarantee success) captures an important point, however: it counts against any theory, say, of vanity or pain that would render it unknowable in principle or in practice whether or not the concept is correctly applied in every case. And this was precisely the problem with the official doctrine (and is still a problem, as I suggested earlier, with some of its contemporary progeny). Ryle points out in a later essay that there is a form of dilemma that pits the reductionist against the duplicationis: those whose battle cry is ‘Nothing but…’ and those who insist on ‘Something else as Well…’. Ryle attempts a dissolution of these types of dilemma by rejecting the two horns; not by taking sides with either one, though part of what dissolution requires in this case, as in others, is a description of how both sides are to be commended for seeing what the other side does not, and criticised for failing to see what the other side does. The attraction of behaviourism, he reminds us, is simply that it does not insist on occult happenings as the basis upon which all mental terms are given meaning, and points to the perfectly observable criteria that are by and large employed when we are called upon to defend or correct our employment of these mental terms. The problem with behaviourism is that it has a too-narrow view both of what counts as behaviour and of what counts as observable. Grice plays with 'meaning' in 1972 when he allows for THIS or THAT avowal of THIS or THAT souly state may be deemed in some fashion, 'incorrigible.' For Grice, an utterer has 'privileged access' to every souly state. But only his or that 'avowal' of this or that souly state may be said or deemed to be 'incorrigible.' And this concerns 'communication' (and meaning). He'll go back to this at Brighton. In 1972 he plays with 'P judges that it is raining,' 'P judges that P judges that it is raining' ('P judges2 that it is raining'). If P EXPRESSES that it is raining, P judges2 that it is raining. This second-order 'avowal' may be deemed 'incorrigible.'
1973. Mode, modality, probability (doxastic), and desirability (buletic), probability, desirability, and mode operators, conference on implicature, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II, carton 2-folder 11, and Series V (Topical), carton 8-folders 14-15, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: modality, probability, desirability, direction of fit, the buletic-doxastic distinction, mode-marker, modal, acceptance, acceptability, imperative, intentional, interrogative, indicative, informational, inquisitive. Grice had been freely using the very English 'mood' until J. M. E Moravcsik, of all people, corrected him: ’What you mean ain't a 'mood.'‘ ’I shall call it 'mode' just to please you, J. M. E.’ ‘The sergeant is to muster the men at dawn’ is a perfect 'imperative.' ‘They shall not pass’ is a perfect 'intentional.' A version of this essay was presented in a conference whose proceedings were published, except for Grice's essay, due to 'technical complications,' viz. his idiosyncratic use of idiosyncratic symbology! By 'mode' Grice means indicative or imperative. Following Davidson, Grice attaches probability to the indicative, via the doxastic, and desirability to the indicative, via the boulomaic or buletic. He also allows for mixed utterances. Probability is qualified with a suboperator indicating a degree d; ditto for desirability, degree d'. In some of the drafts, Grice kept using 'mode' until Moravsik suggested to him that 'mode' was a better choice, seeing that Grice's 'modality' had little to do with what other authors were referring to as 'mood.' Probability, desirability, and modality, 1977, modality, desirability, and probability, keywords: modality, probability, desirability He would use 'mode operator.' Modality is the more correct term, for things like 'should,' 'ought,' and 'must,' in that order. One sense. The doxastic modals are correlated to probability. The buletic or boulomaic modals are correlated to desirability. There is probability to a degree d. But there is also desirability to a degree d. They both combine in Grice's attempt to show how Kant's categorical imperative reduces to the hypothetical or suppositional. Kant uses 'modality' in a way that Grice disfavours, preferring 'modus.' Grice is aware that Kant's use of 'modality' is qua category (Kant's reduction to four of Aristotle's original ten categories). ’Probability, desirability, and mode operators’ is Grice at his formal best. It predates the Kant lectures and it got into so much detail that Grice had to leave it at that. So abstract it hurts. Going further than Davidson, Grice argues that structures expressing probability and desirability are not merely analogous. They can both be replaced by more complex structures containing a common element. Generalising over attitudes using the symbol 'ψ,' which he had used in 1967 ‒ repr. WoW:v, Grice proposes ‘X ψ (that) p.’ Further, Grice uses 'i' as a dummy for sub-divisions of psychological attitudes. Grice uses ‘‘Op supra i sub α,’ read: ‘operation supra i sub alpha,’ as Grice was fastidious enough to provide 'reading' versions for these, and where 'α' is a dummy taking the place of either ‘A’ or ‘B,’ i. e. Davidson's ‘prima facie’ and ‘probably’. In all this, Grice keeps using the 'primitive' ‘!,’ where a more detailed symbolism would have it correspond exactly to Frege's composite turnstile (horizontal stroke of 'thought' and vertical stroke of 'assertoric force,' 'Urteilstrich') that Grice of course also uses, and for which it is proposed, then: !─p. There are generalising movements here but also merely specificatory ones. ‘α’ is not generalised. ‘α’ is a dummy to serve as a blanket for this or that specifications. On the other hand, ψ is indeed generalised. As for ‘i,’ is it generalising or specificatory? ‘i’ is a dummy for specifications, so it is not really 'generalising'. But Grice generalises over specifications. Grice wants to find ‘buletic,’ 'boulomaic' or 'volitive' as he prefers (I prefer the Greek root) for both his 'protreptic' and exhibitive versions (operator supra exhibitive, autophoric, and operator supra protreptic, or hetero-phoric). Note that Grice (WoW:110) had used the asterisk * as a dummy for either 'assertoric,' i.e., Frege's turnstile, and 'non-assertoric, the ‘!─’ 'imperative turnstile', if you wish. The operators A are not mode operators; they are such that they represent some 'degree' (d) or measure of acceptability or justification. Grice prefer 'acceptability' because it connects with ‘accepting that...’ which IS a psychological or souly attitude (if a general one). Thus, Grice wants to have ‘It is desirable that p’ and ‘It is believable that p’ as understood, each, by the concatenation of three elements. The first element is the A-type operator. The second element is the protreptic-type operator. The third element is the phrastic, root, content, or proposition itself. ‘It is desirable that p’ and ‘It is believable that p’ share the utterer-oriented-type operator and the neustic or proposition. They only differ at the protreptic-type operator (buletic/volitive/boulomaic or judicative/doxastic). Grice uses ‘+’ for concatenation’, but it is best to use ‘^’, just to echo who knows who. Grice speaks in that mimeo (which he delivers in Texas, and is known as Grice's ‘Performadillo’ talk ‒ Armadillo + Performative) of various things. Grice speaks, transparently enough, of ‘acceptance’: V-acceptance’ and 'J-acceptance. 'V' not for ‘Victory’ but for 'volitional', and J for judicative. The fact that both end with ‘-acceptance’ would accept you to believe that both *are* forms of 'acceptance'. Grice irritatingly uses ‘1’ to mean the doxastic, and ‘2’ to mean the bulematic. At Princeton in 1972, ‘Method’, he defines the doxastic in terms of the buletic and CARES NOT to do otherwise ‒ i. e. define the buletic in terms of the doxastic. So whenever he wrote buletic in 1973, read doxastic, and vice versa. One may omits this arithmetic when reporting on Grice's use. Grice uses two further numerals, though: 3 and 4. These, one may decipher – one finds oneself as an archeologist in Tutankamon's burial ground, as this or that 'relexive' attitude. Thus, 3, i. e. ψ3, where we need the general operator ψ, not just specificatory dummy, but the idea that we accept something simpliciter. ψ3 stands for the attitude of buletically accepting an ‘or’ utterance: doxastically accepting that p or doxastically accepting that ~p. Why we should be concerned with ‘~p’ is something to consider. The pirot wants to decide whether to believe p or not. I find that very Griceian. Suppose I am told that there is a volcano in Iceland. Why would I not want to believe it? It seems that one may want to decide whether to believe p or not when p involves a tacit appeal to value. But, as Grice notes, even when it does not involve value, Grice still needs trust and volition to reign supreme. On the other hand, there's 4, as attached to an attitude, ψ4. This stands for an attitude of buletically accepting an ‘or’ utterance: buletically accepting that p, or the pirot buletically accepting that ~p, i. e. the pirot wants to decide whether to will, now that p or not. This indeed is crucial, since, for Grice, morality, as with Kantotle, does cash in desire, the buletic. Grice smokes. He wills to smoke. But does he will to will to smoke? Possibly yes. Does he will to will to will to smoke? Regardless of what Grice wills, one may claim this holds for a serious imperatives (not ‘Thou shalt not reek,’ but ‘Though shalt not kill,’ say) or for any ‘p’ if you must (because if you know that 'p' causes cancer ('p' stands for a proposition involving cigarette) you should know you are killing yourself. But then Time also kills us, so what gives? So I would submit that, for Kant, the categorial imperative is one which allows for an indefinite chain, not of chain-smokers, but of good-willers. If, for some p, we find that at some stage, the pirot does not will that he wills that he wills that he wills that...', 'p' can NOT be universalisable. This is proposed in an essay referred to in ‘The Philosopher's Index’ but Marlboro Cigarettes took no notice. One may go on to note Grice's obsession on 'make believe'. If I say, I utter expression ‘e’ because the utterer wants his addressee to believe that the utterer believes that p, there is utterer and addresse, i. e. there are TWO people here ‒ or things ‒ for my cat means things to me (he even implicates: the other day he miaowed to me while I was in bed ‒ He utters 'miaow'. He means that he is hungry, he means (via implicatum) that he wants food (as provided by me). On another occasion he miaowes explicating, ‘The door is closed’, and implicating ‘Open it, idiot’. On the other hand, an Andy-Capp's cartoon read: ‘When budgies get sarcastic’ ‘Wild-life programmes are repeating’ One may note that one can want some other person to hold an attitude. Grice uses U for utterer and A for addressee. These are merely roles. The important formalism is indeed x and y. x is one person; y is the OTHER person. Grice dislikes a menages a trois, apparently, for he seldom symbolises a 'third' party, z. So, ‘X ψ-3-A that p’ is 1 just in case ‘X ψ2 [X ψ1 that p] or X ψ1 that ~p’ is 1. And here the utterer’s addressee, 'y,’ features: ‘the pirot ψ³protreptically that p’ is 1 just in case ‘X buletically accepts ψ² (X buletically accepts ψ² (X doxastically accepts ψ1 that p, or X doxastically accepts ψ1 that ~p)))’ is 1. Grice seems to be happy with having reached four sets of operators, corresponding to four sets of propositional attitudes, and for which Grice provides the paraphrases. The first set is the doxastic proper. It is what Grice calls 'doxastic', and which is, strictly, either ‘indicative’ (of the utterer’s doxastic, exhibitive state, as it were) or properly ‘informative,’ if addressed to the addressee A, which is different from U himself, for surely one rarely informs oneself. The second is the buletic proper. What Grice dubs 'volitive,' but sometimes he prefers the Grecian root. This is again either self- or utterer-addressed, or utterer-oriented, or autophoric, and it is intentional, or it is other-addressed, or addressee-addressed, or addressee- oriented, or heterophoric, and it is imperative, for surely one may not always say to oneself, ‘Don't smoke, idiot!’. The third is the doxastic-interrogative, or doxastic-erotetic. One may expand on ‘?’ here is minimal compared to the vagaries of what I called the ‘!─’ (non-doxastic or buletic turnstile), and which may be symbolised by ‘?─p’, where ‘?─’ stands for the 'erotetic turnstile'. Geach's and Altham's ‘erotetic’ somehow Grice ignores, as he more often uses the Latinate ‘interrogative.’ interrŏgātĭo , ōnis, f. id., I.a questioning, inquiry, examination, interrogation (class.).I. In gen.: ‘sententia per interrogationem,’ Quint. 8, 5, 5: ‘instare interrogatione,’ id. 6, 3, 38: ‘testium,’ Tac. A. 6, 47: ‘insidiosa,’ Plin. Ep. 1, 5, 7: ‘litteris inclusæ,’ Dig. 48, 3, 6, § 1.—Absol., Cic. Fam. 1, 9, 7; Quint. 5, 7, 3: ‘verbis obligatio fit ex interrogatione et responsione,’ Gai. Inst. 2, 92. II. In partic. A. As rhet. fig., Quint. 9, 2, 15; 9, 3, 98. B. A syllogism: ‘recte genus hoc interrogationis ignavum ac iners nominatum est,’ Cic. Fat. 13; Sen. Ep. 87 med. Surely more people know what 'interrogative' means what 'erotetic' means’, he would not say ‒ but he would. This attitude comes again in two varieties: self-addressed or utterer-oriented, 'reflective' (‘Should I go?’) or again, addresee-addressed, or addressee-oriented, 'imperative,’ as in ‘Should YOU go?,’ with a strong hint that the utterer is expecting is addressee to make up his mind in the proceeding, not just inform the utterer. Last but not least, there is the fourth kind, the buletic-cum-erotetic. Here again, there is one varietiy which is reflective, autophoric, as Grice prefers, utterer-addressed, or utterer-oriented, or 'inquisitive' (for which I'll think of a Greek pantomime), or 'addressee-addressed,’ or addressee-oriented. Grice regrets that Greek (and Latin, of which he had ‘less’ ‒ cfr. Shakespeare who had none) fares better in this respect the Oxonian that would please Austen (if not Austin) or Maucalay. Cf. the quessertive, or quessertion, possibly iterable, that Grice cherished. But then you can't have everything. Where would you put it? Grice: The modal implicatum. Grice sees two different, though connected questions about mode. First, there is the obvious demand for a characterisation, or partial characterisation, of this or that mode as it emerges in this or that conversational move (which is plausible to regard as mode's primary habitat) both at the level of the explicatum or the implicatum (for surely an 'indicative' conversational move may be the vehicle of an 'imperatival' implicatum. A second, question is how, and to what extent, the representation of mode (Hare's 'neustic') which is suitable for application to this or that conversational move may be legitimately exported into philosophical psychology, or rather, may be GROUNDED on questions of philosophical psychology, matters of this or that psychological state, stance, or attitude (notably desire and belief, and their sub-specifications). We need to consider the second question, the 'philosophico- psychological' question, since, if the general 'rationality' operator is to read as something like ‘acceptability’ (as in Utterer accepts, or Addressee accepts), the appearance of this or that mode within its scope of ‘accepting’ is proper only if it may properly occur within the scope of a generic psychological verb ‘I accept that...’. The easiest way Grice finds to expound his ideas on the first question is by reference to a schematic table or diagram (‘Some have complained that I seldom use a board, but I will today.’ Grice at this point reiterates his temporary contempt for the use/mention distinction, which which Strawson is obsessed (Perhaps my contempt is due to his obsession!). Grice's exposition would make the hair stand on end in the soul of a person especially sensitive in this area. ‘And I'm talking to YOU, Sir Peter!’ (He is on the second row). But Grice's guess is that the only historical philosophical mistake properly attributable to use/mention confusion is Russell's argument against Frege in ‘On Denoting’, and that there is virtually always an acceptable way of eliminating disregard of the use-mention distinction in a particular case, though the substitutes are usually lengthy, obscure, and tedious. Grice makes three initial assumptions. He avails himself of two SPECIES of acceptance, namely, volitive acceptance and judicative acceptance, which he, on occasion, calls respectively ‘willing that p’ and ‘willing that p.’ These are to be thought of as technical or semi-technical, theoretical or semi-theoretical, though each is a state which approximates to what we vulgarly call ‘thinking that p’ and ‘wanting that p’, especially in the way in which we can speak of a beast such as a little squarrel as thinking or wanting something ‒ a nut, poor darling little thing. Grice here treats each 'will' and 'judge' (and 'accept') as a primitive. The proper interpretation would be determined by the role of each in a folk-psychological theory (or sequence of folk-psychological theories), of the type the Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy favours at Oxford, designed to account for the behaviours of members of the animal kingdom, at different levels of psychological complexity (some classes of creatures being more complex than others, of course). As Grice suggests in ‘Utterer's meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning,’ at least at the point at which (Schema Of Procedure-Specifiers For Mood-Operators) in one's syntactico-semantical theory of Pirotese, one is introducing this or that mode (and possibly earlier), the proper form to use is a specifier for this or that ‘resultant’ procedure. Such a specifier would be of the general form, ’For the utterer U to utter ‘x’ if ...,’ where the blank is replaced by the appropriate condition. Since in the preceding scheme 'x' represents an utterance (or expression), and not a sentence or open sentence, there is no guarantee that this or that actual sentence in Pirotese will contain a perspicuous and unambiguous modal representation. A sentence may correspond to more than one modal structure. The sentence will then be structurally ambiguous (‘multiplex’ in meaning ‒ under the proviso that senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity) and will have more than one reading, or parsing, as every schoolboy at Clifton knows when translating viva voce from Greek or Latin, as the case might be! The general form of a procedure-specifier for a modal operator involves a main clause and an ‘antecedent’ clause, which follows ‘if’. In the schematic representation of the main clause, ‘U’ represents an utterer, ‘A’ his addressee, ‘p’ the radix or neustic; and ‘Op-i ‘represents that operator whose number is i (1, 2, 3, or 4), e.g g., ’Op-3A’ represents Operator 3A, which, since '?⊢' appears in the Operator column for 3A) would be ‘? A ⊢ p’ (This reminds one of Grandy's quessertions, for he did think they were iterable (‘possibly’)). The antecedent clause consists of a sequence whose elements are a preamble, as it were, or preface, or prefix, a supplement to a differential (which is present only in a B-type, or addressee-oriented case), a differential, and a radix. The preamble, which is always present, is invariant, and reads: ’The Utterer U wills (that) Addressee A judges (that) U ...’ (For surely ‘meaning’ is a species of ‘intending’ is a species of ‘willing that,’ alla Prichard). The supplement, if present, is also invariant. And the idea behind its varying presence or absence is connected, in the first instance, with the volitive mode. The difference between an ordinary expression of intention ‒ such as ’I shall not fail,’ or ‘They shall not pass’ ‒ and an ordinary imperative (Like 'Be a little kinder to him') is accommodated by treating each as a sub-mode of the volitive mode, relates to ‘willing that p’) In the 'intentional' case (‘I shall not fail’), the utterer U is concerned to reveal to his addressee A that he (the utterer U) wills that p. In the imperative case (‘They shall not pass’), the utterer U is concerned to reveal to his addressee A that the utterer U wills that the addresee A will that p. In each case, of course, it is to be presumed that willing that p will have its standard outcome, viz., the actualization, or realisation, or direction of fit, of the radix (from expression to world, downwards). There is a corresponding distinction between two ‘uses’ of an indicative. The utterer U may be declaring or affirming that p, in an exhibitive way, with the primary intention to get his addressee A to judge that the utterer judges that p. Or the Utterer is telling (in a protreptic way) one's addressee that p, that is to say, hoping to get his addressee to judge that p. In the case of an indicative, unlike that of a volitive, there is no explicit pair of devices which would ordinarily be thought of as ‘sub-mode’ marker. The recognition of the sub-mode is implicated, and comes from context, from the vocative use of the name of the addressee, from the presence of a speech-act verb, or from a sentence-adverbial phrase (like ‘for your information,’ ‘so that you know,’ etc.). But Grice has already, in his initial assumptions, allowed for such a situation. The exhibitive-protreptic distinction or autophoric-heterophoric distinction, seems to Grice to be also discernible in the interrogative mode (‘?’). Each differentials is associated with, and serve to distinguish, each of the two basic modes (volitive or judicative) and, apart from one detail in the case of the interrogative mode, is invariant between autophoric-exhibitive) and heterophoric-protreptic sub-modes of any of the two basic modes. They are merely unsupplemented or supplemented, the former for an exhibitive sub-mode and the latter for a protreptic sub-mode. The radix needs (one hopes) no further explanation, except that it might be useful to bear in mind that Grice does not stipulated that the radix for an 'intentional' (buletic exhibitive utterer-based) incorporate a reference to the utterer, or be in the first person, nor that the radix for an 'imperative' (buletic protreptic addressee-based) incorporate a reference of the addresee, and be in the second person. ’They shall not pass’ is a legitimate 'intentional,' as is ‘You shall not get away with it’; and ‘The sergeant is to muster the men at dawn,’ as uttered said by the captain to the lieutenant) is a perfectly good imperative. Grice gives in full specifiers derived from the schema. (1) Utterer U to utter to Addressee A autophoric-exhibitive ‘⊢ p’ if U wills that A judges that U judges p. (2) U to utter to Addressee A ‘! heterophoric-protreptic p’ if U wills that Addressee A judges that U wills that Addressee A wills that p. Since, of the states denoted by each differential, only willing that p and judging that p are strictly cases of accepting that p, and Grice's ultimate purpose of his introducing this characterization of mode is to reach a general account of expressions which are to be conjoined, according to his proposal, with an 'acceptability' operator, the first two numbered rows of the figure are (at most) what he has a direct use for. But since it is of some importance to Grice that his treatment of mode should be (and should be thought to be) on the right lines, he adds a partial account of the interrogative mode. There are two varieties of interrogatives, a 'yes/no' interrogatives (e. g. ‘Is his face clean?’ ‘Is the king of France bald?’ ‘Is virtue a fire-shovel?’) and 'W' or x-interrogatives (‘Who killed Cock Robin?’, ‘Where has my beloved gone?’, ‘How did he fix it?’). The specifiers derivable from the schema provide only for 'yes/no' interrogatives, though the figure could be quite easily amended so as to yield a restricted but very large class of 'W' interrogatives. Grice indicates how this could be done. The distinction between a buletic and a doxastic interrogative corresponds with the difference between a case in which the utterer U indicates that he is, in one way or another, concerned to obtain information ('Is he at home?'), and a case in which the utterer U indicates that he is concerned to settle a problem about what he is to do ‒ 'Am I to leave the door open?,' 'Shall I go on reading?' or, with an heterophoric subject, 'Is the prisoner to be released?' This difference is fairly well represented in grammar, and much better represented in the grammars of some other languages. The hetero-phoric-cum-protreptic/auto-phoric-cum- exhibitive difference may not marked at all in this or that grammar, but it should be marked in Pirotese. This or that sub-mode is, however, often quite easily detectable. There is usually a recognizable difference between a case in which the utterer A says, musingly or reflectively, 'Is he to be trusted?' ‒ a case in which the utterer might say that he is just wondering ‒ and a case in which he utters a token of the same sentence as an enquiry. Similarly, one can usually tell whether an utterer A who utters 'Shall I accept the invitation?' is just trying to make up his mind, or is trying to get advice or instruction from his addressee. The employment of the variable 'α' needs to be explained. Grice borrows a little from an obscure branch of logic, once (but maybe no longer) practised, called, Grice thinks, proto-thetic’ ‒ Why? Because it deals with this or that first principle or axiom, or thesis), the main rite in which is to quantify over, or through, this or that connective. 'α' is to have as its two substituents ‘positively’ and ‘negatively’, which may modify either 'will' or 'judge,' negatively willing or negatively judging that p is judging or willing that ~p. The quantifier (∃1α) . . . has to be treated substitutionally. If, for example, I ask someone whether John killed Cock Robin (protreptic case), I do not want the addressee merely to will that I have a particular ‘logical quality’ in mind which I believe to apply. I want the addressee to have one of the ‘Qualities’ in mind which he wants me to believe to apply. To meet this demand, supplementation must 'drag back' the quantifier. To extend the schema so as to provide specifiers for a 'single' W-interrogative (i. e., a question like ‘What did the butler see?’ rather than a question like ‘Who went where with whom at 4 o'clock yesterday afternoon?’), we need just a little extra apparatus. We need to be able to superscribe a 'W' in each interrogative operator e.g., together with the proviso that a radix which follows a superscribed operator must be an open radix, which contains one or more occurrences of just one free variable. And we need a chameleon variable λ, to occur only in this or that quantifier. ‘(∃λ).Fx’ is to be regarded as a way of writing ‘(∃x)Fx.’ ‘(∃λ)Fy’ is a way of writing ‘(∃y)Fy.’ To provide a specifier for a x-superscribed operator, we simply delete the appearances of 'α' in the specifier for the corresponding un-superscribed operator, inserting instead the quantifier ‘(∃1λ) (...)’ at the position previously occupied by (∃1α) (...). E.g. the specifiers for ‘Who killed Cock Robin?,’ used as an enquiry, would be: U to utter to A ' killed Cock Robin' if U wills A to judge U to will that (∃1λ) (A should will that U judges (x killed Cock Robin))’; in which (∃1λ) takes on the shape (∃1x) since x is the free variable within its scope. Grice compares his buletic-doxastic distinction to Aristotle's prohairesis/doxa distinction in ‘Ethica Nichomachea.’ Perhaps his simplest formalisation is via subscripts: ‘I will-b but will-d not.’
1973. The power structure of the soul, with Judith Baker, The H. P. Grice Papers. Keywords: soul, power structure. Grice preferred 'soul' to 'mind,' since it was truer to his 'philosophical PSYCHO-logy! The idea is Platonic. Keyword: tripartite soul. Freud challenged the ‘power structure’ of Plato’s soul: it’s the libido that takes control, not the ‘logos.’ Grice takes up this polemic. Aristotle takes up Plato's challenge, each type of 'soul' is united to the next by the idea of 'life.' The animal soul, between the vegetative and the rational, is not detachable.
1973. The power structure of the soul, with Judith Baker, The H. P. Grice Papers. Keywords: soul, power structure. Grice preferred 'soul' to 'mind,' since it was truer to his 'philosophical PSYCHO-logy! The idea is Platonic. Keyword: tripartite soul. Freud challenged the ‘power structure’ of Plato’s soul: it’s the libido that takes control, not the ‘logos.’ Grice takes up this polemic. Aristotle takes up Plato's challenge, each type of 'soul' is united to the next by the idea of 'life.' The animal soul, between the vegetative and the rational, is not detachable.
1974. April. The John Dewey lecture, a version of Princeton lectures [note plural] March 1972.
1974. Yet more misunderstanding, towards an analysis of 'intending,' Davidson on intending, reply to Donald Davidson on 'Intending,' The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 2-folders 17-18, BANC MSS 92/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California at Berkeley. Keywords: intention, intending, believing, implicature, disimplicature, Davidson. In the William James lectures, Grice mentions the use of ‘is’ to mean ‘seem’ (The tie is red in this light), and ‘see’ to mean ‘hallucinate.’ The reductive analyses of being and seeing hold. We have here two cases of 'loose' use (or disimplicature). Same now with his example in ‘Intention and uncertainty’: ‘Smith intends to climb Mt. Everest’ + [common-ground status: this is difficult]. Grice's response to Davidson's pretty unfair use of Grice's notion of conversational implicature in Davidson's analysis of intention caught a lot of interest. D. F. Pears loved Grice's reply. Implicatum here is out of the question ‒ disimplicatum may not. Grice just saw that his theory of conversation is too social to be true when applied to 'intending.' The doxastic condition is one of the entailments in an ascription of an intending. It cannot be cancelled as an implicatum can. If it can be cancelled, it is best seen as a disimplicatum, or a loose use by an utterer meaning less than what he says or explicitly conveys to more careful conversants. Grice and Davidson were members of ‘The Grice and Davidson Mutual Admiration Society.’ Davidson, not being Oxonian, was perhaps not acquainted with Grice's polemics at Oxford with Hart and Hampshire (where Grice sided with Pears, rather). Grice and Pears hold a 'minimalist' approach to 'intending.' On the other hand, Davidson makes what Grice sees as 'the same mistake' again of building 'certainty' into the concept. Grice finds that to apply the idea of a conversational implicatum at this point is 'too social to be true.' Rather, Grice prefers to coin the conversational disimplicatum: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt Everest on hands and knees. The utterance above, if merely reporting what Bloggs thinks, may involve a 'loose' use of ‘intends.’ The certainty on the agent's part on the success of his enterprise is thus cast with doubt. Davidson was claiming that the agent's belief in the probability of the object of the agent's intention was a mere conversational implicatum on the utterer's part. Grice responds that the ascription of such a belief is an entailment of a strict use of 'intend,' even if, in cases where the utterer aims at a conversational disimplicatum, it can be 'dropped.' The addressee will still regard the utterer as abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness. D. F. Pears was especially interested in the Davidson-Grice polemic on intending. 1974. Disimplicature. Disimplicature, keywords: disimplicature. Strictly, a section of his reply to Davidson. If Grice's claim to fame is 'implicature,' he finds 'disimplicature' an intriguing notion to capture those occasions when an utterer means LESS than he says. His examples include: a loose use of 'intending' (without the entailment of the doxastic condition), the uses of 'see' in Shakespeareian contexts (‘Macbeth saw Banquo,’ ‘Hamlet saw his father on the ramparts of Elsinore’) and the use of ‘is’ to mean ‘seems’ (‘That tie is blue under this light, but green otherwise,’ when both conversants know that a change of colour is out of the question. He plays with ‘You're the cream in my coffee’ being an utterance where the disimplicature (i.e. entailment dropping) is total. ‘Disimplicature’ does not appeal to a new principle of conversational rationality. It is perfectly accountable by the principle of conversational helpfulness, in particular, the desideratum of conversational candour. In everyday explanation we exploit, as Grice notes, ‘an immense richness in the family of expressions that might be thought of as the ‘wanting family.’ This ‘wanting’ family includes expressions like ‘want,’ ‘desire,’ ‘would like to,’ ‘is eager to,’ ‘is anxious to,’ ‘would mind not…,’ ‘the idea of ... appeals to me,’ is thinking of,’ etc.' As Grice remarks, ‘The likeness and differences within this ‘wanting’ family demand careful attention.’ In commenting on Davidson's treatment of wanting in 'Intending', Grice notes: It seems to Grice that the picture of the 'soul' suggested by Davidson's treatment of wanting is remarkably tranquil and, one might almost say, computerized. It is the picture of an ideally decorous board meeting, at which the various heads of sections advance, from the standpoint of their particular provinces, the case for or against some proposed course of action. In the end the chairman passes judgement, effective for action; normally judiciously, though sometimes he is for one reason or another over-impressed with the presentation made by some particular member. Grice's soul doesn't seem to him, a lot of the time, to be like that at all. It is more like a particularly unpleasant department meeting, in which some members shout, won't listen, and suborn other members to lie on their behalf; while the chairman, who is often himself under suspicion of cheating, endeavours to impose some kind of order; frequently to no effect, since sometimes the meeting breaks up in disorder, sometimes, though it appears to end comfortably, in reality all sorts of enduring lesions are set up, and sometimes, whatever the outcome of the meeting, individual members go off and do things unilaterally. Could it be that Davidson, of the New World, and Grice, of the Old World, have different ‘idiolects’ regarding ‘intend’? Could well be! It is said that the New World is prone to hyperbole, so perhaps in Grice’s more cautious use, ‘intend’ is restricted to the conditions HE wants it to restrict it too! Odd that for all the generosity he displays in ‘Post-war Oxford philosophy’ (‘Surely I can help you analyse YOUR concept of this or that, even if my use of the corresponding expression does not agree with yours’), he goes to attack Davidson, and just for trying to be nice and apply the ‘conversational implicatum’ to ‘intend’! Genial Grice! It is natural Davidson, with his naturalistic tendencies, would like to see 'intending' as merely invoking in a weak fashion the idea of a strong psychological state as 'belief.' And it's natural that Grice hated that!
1975. March 28. Grice delivers the APA. Vide 1972.
1975. Super-relation, super-relatives, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 9-folder 16, BANC MSS 90/135c. The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: super-relative. Very Super.
1975. The criteria of intelligence, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (The Doctrines), carton 5-folder 29, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: intelligence, criteria. In ‘Aspects of reason,’ he mentions 'flat' rationality, and certain other 'talents' that are more difficult for the philosopher to conceptualise, such as 'nose' (i.e. intuitiveness), acumen, tenacity, and such. Grice's approach is 'pirotological.' If Locke had used 'intelligent' to refer to Prince Maurice's parrot, Grice wants to find criteria for 'intelligent' as applied to his favourite type of 'pirot,' rather (‘intelligent, indeed rational.’)
1976. Meaning, revisited, in Studies in the Way of Words, Part II: Explorations in semantics and metaphysics, Essay, from N. V. Smith, Mutual knowledge, Croom Helm, London, pp. 223-43, Remnants of meaning, Meaning revisited, revisited, notes on Schiffer, philosophical psychology and meaning, meaning and philosophical psychology, semantics, language semantics, 1980, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 1-folders 17-18, and Series V (Topical), carton 7-foler 20, and carton 9-folder 9 BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: philosophical psychology, meaning, semantics, Tarski. Language semantics alla Tarski. Grice know sees his former self. If he was obsessed, after Ayer, with ‘mean,’ he now wants to see if his explnation of it (then based on his pre-theoretic intuition) is theoretically advisable in terms other than dealing with those pre-theoretical facts, i.e. how he deals with a lexeme like ‘mean.’ This is a bit like Grice: implicatum, revisited. An axiological approach to meaning. Strictly a reprint of Grice (1976), which should be the preferred citation. The date 1976 is given by Grice himself, and he knew! Grice also composed some notes on Remnants on meaning, by Schiffer. This is a bit like Grice's meaning re-revisited. S. R. Schiffer had been Strawson's tutee at Oxford as a Rhode Scholar in the completion of his D. Phil. on 'Meaning' (later published by Clarendon). Eventually, Schiffer grew sceptic, and let Grice know about it! Grice did not find Schiffer's arguments totally destructive, but saw the positive side to them. Schiffer's arguments should remind any philosopher that the issues he is dealing are profound and bound to involve much elucidation before they are solved. This is a bit like Grice: implicatum, revisited. ‘Meaning revisited’ (an ovious nod to Evelyn Waugh's Yorkshire-set novel) is the title Grice chose for a contribution to a symposium at Brighton organised by N. V. Smith. ‘Meaning revisited’ (although Grice has earlier drafts entitled ‘Meaning and philosophical psychology’) comprises three sections. In the first section, Grice is concerned with the application of his ‘M. O. R.,’ or ‘Modified Occam's Razor’ now to the very lexeme, ‘mean.’ Cf. How many 'senses' does 'sense' have? Cohen: The ‘Senses’ of Senses. In the second part, Grice explores an 'evolutionary' model of creature construction reaching a stage of non-iconic representation. Finally, in the third section, motivated to solve what he calls a 'major' problem ‒ versus the 'minor' problem concerning the transition from 'utterer's meaning' to 'expression meaning' ‒ Grice attempts to construct 'meaning' as a 'value-paradeigmatic' notion. A version was indeed published in the proceedings of the Brighton symposium, by Croom Helm, London. Grice has a couple of other drafts with variants on this title: philosophical psychology and meaning, psychology and meaning. He kept, meaningfully, changing the order! It is not arbitrary that Grice's fascinating exploration is in three parts. In the first, where he applies his Modified Occam's razor to ‘mean,’ he is revisiting Stevenson. ‘Smoke means fire’ and ‘I mean love,’ don't need different 'senses' of 'mean.' And Stevenson was right when using 'scare' quotes for the ‘Smoke 'means' fire’ utterance. Grice was very much aware that that, the rather obtuse terminology of 'senses', was exactly the terminology he had adopted in both ‘Meaning’ and the relevant William James lectures (V and VI) at Harvard! Now, it's time to revisit and to echo Graves, say, 'goodbye to all that'! In the second part he applies pirotology. While he knows his audience is not philosophical ‒ it's not Oxford ‒ he thinks they still may get some entertainment! We have a pirot feeling pain, simulating it, and finally uttering, ‘I am in pain.’ In the concluding section, Grice becomes Plato. He sees 'meaning' as an 'optimum,' i.e. a value-paradeigmatic notion introducing 'value' in its guise of 'optimality.' Much like Plato thought 'circle' works in his idiolect. Grice played with various titles, in the Grice Collection. There's 'philosophical psychology and meaning.' The reason is obvious. The lecture is strictly divided in sections, and it's only natural that Grice kept drafts of this or that section in his collection. In Studies in the Way of Words, Grice notes that he re-visited his ‘Meaning re-visited’ in 1980, too! And he meant it! Surely, there is no way to understand at least the FOUR stages of Grice’s development of his ideas about meaning (1948, 1967, 1976 and 1987) without Peirce! It is obvious here that Grice thought that 'mean' TWO figurative extensions of 'use.' Smoke 'means' fire AND ‘'Smoke' means smoke.’ The latter is a transferred use in that 'impenetrability' ‘means’ 'let's change the topic if Dumpty m-intends that it and Alice are to change the topic.
1976. The categorical imperative, Paton, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 6-folder 24, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keyword: categorical imperative. An exploration of the logical form of Kant's concoction. „Handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, dass sie ein allgemeines Gesetz werde.’ – Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 421„Handle nach der Maxime, die sich selbst zugleich zum allgemeinen Gesetze machen kann.’ AA IV, 436 „Handle so, daß die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne.’ AA V, 30 „Handle so, daß der Wille durch seine Maxime sich selbst zugleich als allgemein gesetzgebend betrachten könne.’ AA IV, 434 „Handle so, dass du die Menschheit sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person eines jeden anderen jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchst.’ AA IV, 429 „Denn vernünftige Wesen stehen alle unter dem Gesetz, dass jedes derselben sich selbst und alle andere niemals bloß als Mittel, sondern jederzeit zugleich als Zweck an sich selbst behandeln solle.’ AA IV, 433, Naturgesetzformel Reich-der-Zwecke-Formel „Handle so, als ob die Maxime deiner Handlung durch deinen Willen zum allgemeinen Naturgesetze werden sollte.’ AA IV, 421 „Handle nach Maximen, die sich selbst zugleich als allgemeine Naturgesetze zum Gegenstande haben können.’ AA IV, 437, „Demnach muß ein jedes vernünftige Wesen so handeln, als ob es durch seine Maximen jederzeit ein gesetzgebendes Glied im allgemeinen Reiche der Zwecke wäre.’ AA IV, 438. Grice is interested in its conceptual connection with the 'hypothetical or suppositional ' imperative, in terms of the type of connection between the protasis and the apodosis. Grice spends the full second Paul Carus lecture on the conception of value on this. Grice is aware that the topic is central for Oxonian philosophers such as R. M. Hare (a member of Austin's Play Group, too), who will regard the universability of an imperative as a mark of its categorial, indeed, moral status. He would refer to conversational maxims as contributing to a conversational immanuel, if it can be shown that, qua items under an overarching principle of conversational helpfulness, each displays qualities associated with conceptual, formal, and applicational generality. Grice never understood what Kant meant by the 'categoric imperative.' But FOR GRICE, from the acceptability of the the immanuel you can deduce the acceptability of this or that maxim, and from the acceptability of the conversational immanuel (‘Be conversational helpful’) you can deduce the acceptability of this or that convesational maxim. Grice hardly considered Kant’s approach to the categoric imperative other than via the universability of this or that maxim. This or that ‘conversational maxim,’ provided by Grice, may be said to be universalisable if and only if it displays what Grice sees as these three types of generality: conceptual, formal, and applicational. He does the same for general ‘maxims’ of conduct. The results are compiled in a manual of universalisable maxims, the conversational immanuel, an appendix to the general immanuel. The other justification by Kant of the categoric imperative involve an approach other than the ‘genitorial justification,’ and an invocation of ‘autonomy’ and ‘freedom.’ It is Paton’s use of ‘imperative’ as per ‘categoric imperative’ that has Grice expanding on modes other than the doxastic, to bring in the ‘buletic,’ where the categoric imperative resides. Note that in the end Kant DOES formulate the ‘categoric’ imperative, as Grice notes, as a ‘real’ imperative, rather than a ‘command,’ etc. Grice loved Kant, but he loved Kantotle best. In the last Kant lecture, he proposes to define the ‘categorical imperative’ as a ‘counsel of prudence,’ with a protasis ‘Let Grice be happy.’ The derivation involves eight stages! Grice found out that out of his play-group activities with this or that linguistic nuance he had arrived at the ‘principle,’ or ‘imperative’ of ‘conversational helpfulness,’ indeed formulated as an ‘imperative’: ‘Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose of the conversation in which you are engaged.’ He notes that the rationality behind the idea of conversation as rational co-operation does not preclude seeing rationality in conversation as other than cooperation. The fact that he chooses ‘maxim,’ and explicitly ‘echoes’ Kant, indicates where Grice is leading!
1977. The buletic-doxastic divide, practical reason, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 9-folder 1, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. ‘Practical Reason.’ Keyword: reason, practical reason. With 'practical' Grice means 'buletic.' ‘Praxis’ involves 'acting,' and surely Grice presupposes acting. ‘By uttering, i. e. by the act of uttering, expression x, U m-intends that p.’ He occasionally refers to 'action' and 'behaviour' as the thing which an ascription of a psychological state EXPLAINS. Grice prefers the idiom of 'soul.' There's the ratiocinative soul. Within the ratiocinative, there's the executive soul and the merely administrative soul. Cicero had to translate Aristotle into 'prudentia,' every time Aristotle talked of 'phronesis.' Grice was aware that Kant's terminology can be confusing. Kant had used ‘pure’ reason for reason in the doxastic realm. Kant's critique of practical reason is HARDLY symmetrical to his critique of 'doxastic' reason. Grice, with his 'æqui-vocality' thesis of 'must' (‘must’ crosses the buletic-boulomaic/doxastic divide), Grice is being more of a symmetricalist.
1977. Epagoge, epagogic, Mill's induction, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical) carton 7-folder 31, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Mill, induction. Grice loved to reminisce an anecdote concerning his tutor Hardie at Corpus when Hardie invoked Mill's principles to prove that Hardie was not responsible for a traffic jam. In drafts on word play, Grice would speak of not bringing ‘more Grice to your Mill.’ Mill's System of Logic was part of the reading material for his degree in Lit. Hum.at Oxford, so he was very familiar with it. Mill represents the best of the English empiricist tradition. Grice kept an interest on inductive methodology. In his ’Life and opinions’ he mentions some obscure essays by Kneale and Keynes on the topic. Grice was interested in Kneale's 'secondary induction,' since Grice saw this as an application of a construction routine. He was also interested in Keynes's notion of a 'generator property,' which he found metaphysically intriguing. Induction. Induction ‒ Mill's Induction, keywords: induction, deduction, abduction, Mill. More Grice to the Mill. Grice loved Hardie's playing with Mill's Method of Difference with an Oxford copper. He also quotes Kneale and Keynes on induction. Note that his seven-step derivation of 'akrasia' relies on an 'inductive' step! Grice was fortunate to associate with Davidson, whose initial work is on porbability. Grice borrows from Davidson the idea that inductive 'probability,' or 'probable,' attaches to the doxastic, while 'prima facie' attaches to 'desirably,' or 'desirability.'
1977. The Immanuel Kant Memorial Lectures, Aspects of reason, Clarendon, Stanford, redelivered as The John Locke lectures, repr. in Aspects of Reason, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, The Grice Collection contains previous drafts of this, Aspects of Reason, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays) carton 2-folders 29-30, Series III (The Doctrines), carton 5-folders 10-13, Series IV (Associations), carton 6-folders 5-6, and Series V (Topical), carton 7-folders 21-22, and carton 9-folder 6, carton 5-folders 10-13, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keyword: reasoning. While each of the four lectures credits their own entry below, it may do to reflect on Grice's overall aim. Grice structures the lectures in the form of a philosophical dialogue with his audience. The first lecture is intended to provide a bit of 'linguistic botanising' for 'reasonable,' and 'rational.' In later lectures, Grice tackles 'reason' qua noun. The remaining lectures are meant to explore what he calls the ‘Aequi-vocality’ thesis: ‘must’ has only one Fregeian that crosses what he calls the buletic-doxastic divide. He is especially concerned ‒ this being the Kant lectures ‒ with Kant's attempt to reduce the categorical imperative to a 'counsel of prudence' ('Ratschlag der Klugheit'), where Kant's 'prudence' is 'Klugheit,' versus 'skill,' as in 'rule of 'skill,' and even if Kant defines 'Klugheit' as a skill to attain what is good for oneself ‒ itself divided into privatKlugheit and Weltklugheit. Kant re-introduces the Aristotelian idea of 'eudaimonia.' While a further lecture on 'happiness' as the pursuit of a system of ends is NOT strictly part of the either the Kant or the Locke lectures, it relates, since eudaimonia may be regarded as the goal involved in the relevant imperative. Aspects of reason, Clarendon, Stanford, The Immanuel Kant Memorial Lectures, Aspects of reason, Clarendon, ‘Some aspects of reason,’ The Immanuel Kant Memorial Lectures, Stanford, keywords: reason, reasoning, reasons. The lectures were also delivered as the John Locke lectures. Grice is concerned with the reduction of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical or suppositional imperative. His main thesis he calls the ‘AEQUI-vocality’ thesis: ’must’ has only ONE sense, that crossed the 'buletic-boulomaic/doxastic' divide. Aspects of reason, Clarendon, Grice, Aspects of reason, Clarendon, John Locke lecture notes, keywords: reason. On aspects of reason. Including extensive language botany on 'rational', 'reasonable,' and indeed 'reason' (justificatory, explanatory, and mixed). At this point, Grice notes that linguistic botany is INDISPENSABLE towards the construction of a more systematic explanatory theory. It is an exploration of a range of uses of 'reason' that leads him to his ‘Aequi-vocality’ thesis that 'must' has only one sense! 1977, Aspects of reason, Stanford, The Kant Lectures, Stanford, 1977. Aspects of reason and reasoning, in Grice, Aspects of Reason, Clarendon, The John Locke Lectures, Aspects of Reason, Grice, Aspects of reason, The Kant Lectures, Stanford, Clarendon, keywords: reason, happiness. While Locke hardly mentions 'reason,' his friend Burthogge does, and profusely! It was slightly ironic that Grice had delivered these lectures as the Rationalist Kant lectures at Stanford. He was honoured to be invited to Oxford. Officially, to be a John Locke lecture you have to be *visiting* Oxford. While Grice was a fellow of St. John's, he was still most welcome to give his set of lectures on reasoning at the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy. He quotes very many authors, including Locke! In his ‘proemium,’ Grice notes that while he was rejected the Locke scholarship back in the day, he was extremely happy to be under Locke's ægis now! When preparing for his second lecture, he had occasion to revise some earlier drafts dated 1966, 1966, reasons, Grice, Aspects of reason, Clarendon, Reasons, keywords: reason, reasons. Linguistic analysis on 'justificatory,' 'explanatory' and 'mixed' uses of 'reason.' While Grice knows that the basic use of 'reason' is qua verb (reasoner reasons from premise P to conclusion C), he spends some time in exploring 'reason' as noun. Grice found it a bit of a roundabout way to approach rationality. However, his distinction between 'justificatory' and 'explanatory' 'reason' is built upon his linguistic botany on the use of 'reason' qua noun. Explanatory reason seems more basic for Grice than 'justificatory' reason. Explanatory reason EXPLAINS the rational agent's behaviour. Grice is aware of Freud and his 'rationalizations.' An agent may invoke some 'reason' for his acting which is not 'legitimate.' An agent may convince himself that he wants to move to Bournemouth because of the weather; when in fact, his reason to move to Bournemouth is to be closer to Cowes and join the yacht club there.
1977. Reason and reasoning, the first Kant lecture, Stanford, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: reason, reasoning. Grice’s enthymeme. Grice, the implicit reasoner! As the title of the lecture implies, Grice takes the verb, ‘to reason,’ as conceptually prior. A reasoner reasons, briefly, from a premise to a conclusion. There are types of reason: flat reason and gradual reason. He famously reports Shropshire, another tutee with Hardie, and his proof on the immortality of the human soul. Grice makes some remarks on 'akrasia' as key, too. The first lecture is then dedicated to an elucidation, and indeed attempt at a 'conceptual' analysis in terms of intentions and doxastic conditions reasoner R intends that premise P yields conclusion C and believes his intention will cause his entertaining of the conclusion from his entertaining the premise. One example of particular interest for a study of the use of 'conversational reason' in Grice is that of the connection between implicatum and reasoning. Grice entitles the sub-section of the lecture as ‘Too good to be reasoning,’ which is of course a joke. Cf. ‘too much love will kill you,’ and ‘There's no such thing as too much of a good thing’ (Shakespeare, As you like it). Grice notes: ‘I have so far been considering difficulties which may arise from the attempt to find, for all cases of actual reasoning, reconstructions of sequences of utterances or explicit thoughts which the reasoner might plausibly be supposed to think of as conforming to some set of canonical patterns of inference. Grice then turns to a different class of examples, with regard to which the problem is not that it is difficult to know how to connect them with canonical patterns, but rather that it is only too easy (or shall I say 'trivial') to make the connection. Like some children (not many), some cases of reasoning are too well behaved for their own good. Suppose someone says to Grice, and It is very interesting that Grice gives 'conversational examples.’ ‘Jack has arrived,’ Grice replies, ‘I conclude from that that Jack has arrived.’ Or he says ‘Jack has arrived AND Jill has *also* arrived,’ And Grice replies, ‘I conclude that Jill has arrived.’(via Gentzen's conjunction-elimination). Or he says, ‘My wife is at home.’ And Grice replies, ‘I reason from that that someone (viz. your wife) is at home. Is there not something very strange about the presence in my three replies of the verb ‘conclude’ (in example I and II) and the verb ‘reason’ (in the third example)?’ misleading, but doxastically fine, professor! It is true, of course, that if instead of my first reply I had said (vii) vii. So Jack has arrived, has he?’ the strangeness would have been removed. But here ‘so’ serves not to indicate that an inference is being made, but rather as part of a not that otiose way of expressing surprise.’ ‘One might just as well have said (viii).’ viii. Well, fancy that! Now, having spent a sizeable part of his life exploiting it, Grice is not unaware of the truly fine distinction between a statement's being false (or axiologically satisfactory), and its being true (or axiologically satisfactory) but otherwise conversationally or pragmatically misleading or inappropriate or pointless, and, on that account and by such a fine distinction, a statement, or an utterance, or conversational move which it would be improper (in terms of the reasonable/rational principle of conversational helfpulness) in one way or another, to make.’ It is worth considering Grice’s reaction to his own distinction. Entailment is in sight! But Grice does not find himself lured by the idea of using that distinction here! Because Moore’s entailment, rather than Grice’s implicatum is entailed. Or because explicatu, rather than implicatum is involved. Suppose, again, that I were to break off the chapter at this point, and switch suddenly to this argument.’ ix. I have two hands (here is one hand and here is another). If had three more hands, I would have five. If I were to have double that number I would have ten, and if four of them were removed six would remain. So I would have four more hands than I have now. ‘Is one happy to describe this performance as reasoning?’ Depends who's one and what's happy!? ‘There is, however, little doubt that I have produced a canonically acceptable chain of statements.’ So surely that's reasoning, if only conversationally misleadingly called so! ‘Or suppose that, instead of writing in my customary free and easy style, I had framed my remarks (or at least the argumentative portions of my remarks) as a verbal realization, so to speak, of sequences of steps in strict conformity with the rules of a natural-deduction system of first-order predicate logic. I give, that is to say, an updated analogue of a medieval disputation.’ Implicature: Gentzen is Ockham! ‘Would those brave souls who continued to read be likely to think of my performance as the production of reasoning, or would they rather think of it as a crazy formalisation of reasoning conducted at some previous time? Depends on 'crazy' or 'formalisation.' One is reminded of Grice telling Strawson, If you cannot formalise, don't say it; Strawson: Oh, no! If I can formalise it, I shan't say it! The points suggested by this stream of rhetorical questions may be summarized as follows. Whether the samples presented FAIL to achieve the title of ‘reasoning’, and thus be deemed 'reasoning,' or whether the samples achieve the title, as we may figuratively put it, by the skin of their teeth, perhaps does not very greatly matter. For whichever way it is, the samples seem to offend against something (different things in different cases, I'm sure) very central to our conception of reasoning. So central that Moore would call it entailment! A mechanical application of a ground rule of inference, or a concatenation thereof, is reluctantly (if at all) called reasoning. Such a mechanical application may perhaps legitimately enter into (i.e. form individual steps in) authentic reasonings, but they are not themselves reasonings, nor is a string of them. There is a demand that a reasoner should be, to a greater or lesser degree, the author of his reasonings. Parroted sequences are not reasonings when parroted, though the very same sequences might be reasoning if not parroted. Piroted sequences are another matter. Some of the examples Grice gives are deficient because they are aimless or pointless. Reasoning is characteristically addressed to this or that problem: a small problem, a large problem, a problem within a problem, a clear problem, a hazy problem, a practical problem, an intellectual problem; but a problem! A mere flow of ideas minimally qualifies (or can be deemed) as reasoning, even if it happens to be logically respectable.’ ‘But if it is directed, or even monitored (with intervention should it go astray, not only into fallacy or mistake, but also into such things as conversational irrelevance or otiosity!), that is another matter! Finicky over-elaboration of intervening steps is frowned upon, and in extreme cases runs the risk of forfeiting the title of reasoning. In conversation, such over-elaboration will offend against this or that conversational maxim, against (presumably) some suitably formulated maxim conjoining informativeness. As Grice noted with regard to ix. That pillar box seems red to me. That would be 'baffling' if the addressee fails to detect the 'communication-point.' An utterance is supposed to inform, and what is (IX) meant to inform its addressee? ‘In thought, it will be branded as pedantry or neurotic caution! If a distinction between brooding and conversing is to be made! ‘At first sight, perhaps, one would have been inclined to say that greater rather than lesser explicitnessness is a merit. Not that inexplicitness, or implicatum-status, as it were ‒ is bad, but that, other things being equal, the more explicitness the better. But now it looks as if proper explicitness (or explicatum-status) is an Aristotelian mean, or mesotes, and it would be good some time to enquire what determines where that mean lies. The burden of the foregoing observations seems to me to be that the provisional account of reasoning, which has been before us, leaves out something which is crucially important.’ ‘What it leaves out is the conception of reasoning, as I like to see conversation, as a purposive activity, as something with goals and purposes.’ ‘The account or picture leaves out, in short, the connection of reasoning with the will! Moreover, once we avail ourselves of the great family of additional ideas which the importation of this conception would give us, we shall be able to deal with the quandary which I laid before you a few minutes ago.’ ‘For we could say (for example) that R reasons (informally) from p to c just in case R thinks that p and intends that, in thinking c, he should be thinking something which would be the conclusion of a formally valid argument the premisses of which are a supplementation of p. This will differ from merely thinking that there exists some formally valid supplementation of a transition from p to c, which I felt inclined NOT to count as (or deem) reasoning. I have some hopes that this appeal to the purposiveness or goal-oriented character of authentic reasoning or good reasoning might be sufficient to dispose of the quandary on which I have directed it. But I am by no means entirely confident that this is the case, and so I offer a second possible method of handling the quandary, one to which I shall return later when I shall attempt to place it in a larger context. We have available to us (let us suppose) what I might call a 'hard way' of making inferential moves. We in fact employ this laborious, step-by-step procedure at least when we are in difficulties, when the course is not clear, when we have an awkward (or philosophical) audience, and so forth. An inferential judgement, however, is a normally desirable undertaking for us only because of its actual or hoped for destinations, and is therefore not desirable for its own sake (a respect in which, possibly, it may differ from an inferential capacity). Following the hard way consumes time and energy. These are in limited supply and it would, therefore, be desirable if occasions for employing the hard way were minimized. A substitute for the hard way, the quick way, which is made possible by habituation and intention, is available to us, and the capacity for it (which is sometimes called intelligence, and is known to be variable in degree) is a desirable quality. The possibility of making a good inferential step (there being one to be made), together with such items as a particular inferer's reputation for inferential ability, may determine whether on a particular occasion we suppose a particular transition to be inferential (and so to be a case of reasoning) or not. On this account, it is not essential that there should be a single supplementation of an informal reasoning which is supposed to be what is overtly in the inferer's mind, though quite often there may be special reasons for supposing this to be the case. So Botvinnik is properly credited with a case of reasoning, while Shropshire is not.
1977. Reason and reasons, Aspects of reason, Clarendon, the second Kant lecture, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California. Keywords: reason, reasons, justificatory reason, explanatory reason, justificatory-cum-explanatory reason. Drawing from his recollections of an earlier linguistic botany on 'reason' (Grice, 1966), Grice distinguishes between 'justificatory' reason and 'explanatory' reason. There is a special case of 'mixed' reason, 'explanatory-cum-justificatory.' The lecture can be seen as the way an exercise that Austin took as 'taxonomic' can lead to explanatory adequacy, too!
1977. The buletic-doxastic divide, the boulomaic-doxastic divide, practical and alethic reasons, Aspects of reason, Clarendon, the third Kant lecture, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library. Keywords: practical reason, alethic reason, protrepic, exhibitive. The buletic, boulomaic, or volitive, is a part of the soul; so is the doxatic (or judicative). Grice plays with co-relative operators: desirability versus probability. Grice invokes the 'exhibitive'/'protreptic' distinction he had introduced in the fifth William James lecture, now applied to psychological attitudes themselves.
1977. The buletic-doxastic divide, the boulomaic-doxastic divide, further remarks on practical and alethic reasons, Aspects of reason, Clarendon, the fourth Kant lecture, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: practical reason, alethic reason, counsel of prudence, categorical imperative, happiness, probability, desirability, modality, eudaemonia. Grice's attempt is to tackle the Kantian problem in the Grundlegung: how to derive the categorical imperative from a counsel of prudence. Under the assumption that the protasis is ‘Let the agent be happy,’ Grice does not find it obtuse at all to construct a universalisable imperative out of a mere 'motive'-based counsel of prudence. Grice has an earlier paper on 'pleasure' which relates. The derivation involves seven steps. Grice proposes seven steps in the derivation. 1. It is a fundamental law of psychology that, ceteris paribus, for any creature R, for any P and Q, if R wills P Λ judges if P, P as a result of Q, R wills Q. 2. Place this law within the scope of a "willing" operator: R wills for any P Λ Q, if R wills P Λ judges that if P, P as a result of Q, R wills Q. 3. 'wills' turns to 'should.' If rational, R will have to block unsatisfactory (literally) attitudes. R should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory to will that P Λ it is satisfactory to judge that if P, P as a result of Q, it is sastisfactory to will that Q. 4. Marking the mode: R should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory that !P Λ that if it .P, .P only as a result of Q, it is satisfactory that !Q. 5. via (p & q -> r) -> (p -> (q -> r)): R should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory that if .P, .P only because Q, i is satisfactory that, if let it be that P, let it be that Q. 6. R should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if P, P only because p yields if let it be that P, let it be that Q. 7. For any P Λ Q if P, P only because Q yields if let it be that P, let it be that Q.
1977. The type-token distinction, form, type, and implication, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 7-folder 1, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keyword: type-token distinction. Grice uses 'X (utterance-type) (WoW, p. 118). Grice gets engaged in a metabolical debate concerning the reductive analysis of what an utterance-type 'means' in terms of a claim to the effect that, by uttering x, an utterance-token of utterance-type X, the utterer means that p. The implicature is 'x (utterance-token).' Grice was not enamoured with the 'type'/'token' or 'token'/'type' distinction. His thoughts on 'logical form' were provocative: ‘If you can't put it in logical form, it's not worth saying.’ Strawson infamously reacted, but with a smile: ‘Oh, no! If you CAN put it in logical form, it's not worth saying.’ Grice refers to the type-token distinction when he uses ‘x’ for ‘token’ and ‘X’ for type. Since J. F. Bennett cared to call Grice a ‘meaning-nominalist’ we shouldn’t CARE about ‘Xs’ anyway! He expands on this in ‘Retrospective Epilogue.’ Grice should have payed more attention to the distinction seeing that it was Ogdenian. A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a printed book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty 'thes' on a page, and, of course, they count as twenty words. In another use of the word 'word,' however, there is but one word 'the' in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page, or be heard in any voice. Such a Form, Peirce proposes to term a Type. A Single Object such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, Peirce ventures to call a Token. In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies." – Peirce 1906, Ogden-Richards, 1923: 280-1.
1977. Philosophy, carton 5-folders 14-15, Philosophy, miscellaneous, with J. Baker, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 8, folder 1, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: philosophy, Baker. Grice would give joint seminars on philosophy with J. Baker. Oddly, Grice gives a nice example of ‘philosopher’ in 1967, ‘Addicted to general reflections about life.’ In the context where it occurs, Grice’s implicature is Stevensonian. If Stevenson had said that an athlete is usually tall, a philosopher WILL occasionally be inclined to reflect about life in general – a birrelist -! His other definition: ‘Engaged in philosophical studies’ seems circular. At least the previous one defines philosophy by other than itself! Cfr. Quixote to Sancho: ‘You are quite a philosopher’ meaning ‘stoic,’ actually! Grice's idea of philosophy was based on the the idea of philosophy that Lit. Hum. instills. It's a unique experience! (unknown in the New World, our actually outside Oxford, or post-Grice, where a 'classicist' is not seen as a serious philosopher! Becoming a 'tutorial fellow in philosophy' and later 'university lecturer in philosophy,' stressed his attachment. He had to been by this or that pupil as a philosopher simpliciter (as oppoosed to a prof: the Waynflete is seen as a metaphysician, the White is seen as moralist, the Wykeham is seen as a logician, and the Wilde is seen as a philosophical psychologist! For Heidegger ("the greatest living philosopher," for Grice), the wisdom of love, 'φιλοσοφία,' love of knowledge, pursuit thereof, speculation, Isoc.12. 209, Pl. Phd. 61a, Grg. 484c, al.; ‘ἡ φ. κτῆσις ἐπιστήμης‘ Id. Euthd. 288d; defined as ἄσκησις ἐπιτηδείου τέχνης, Stoic. in Placit. 1 Prooem. 2. 2. systematic, methodical treatment of a subject, ‘ἐμπειρίᾳ μέτιθι καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ‘ Isoc. 2. 35; ἡ περὶ τὰς ἔριδας φ. scientific treatment of argumentation, Id. 10. 6; ἡ περὶ τοὺς λόγους φ. the study of oratory, Id. 4.10: pl., ‘οἱ ἐν ταῖς φ. πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες‘ Pl. Tht. 172c; ‘τέχναι καὶ φ.’ Isoc. 10.67. 3. philosophy, Id. 11.22, Pl. Def. 414b, etc.; ‘ἱστορία φ. ἐστὶν ἐκ παραδειγμάτων‘ D.H.Rh.11.2: Isoc. usu. prefixes the Art., 2.51, 5.84, 7.45 but cf. 2.35 supr.; sts. also in Pl. and Arist., as Pl. Grg. 482a, Arist. Metaph. 993b20, EN 1177a25, and so later, ‘διὰ τῆς φ. καὶ κενῆς ἀπάτης‘ Ep. Col. 2.8; but more freq. without Art., ‘τοῖς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν‘ Pl. Phd. 68c, al., cf. Arist. Pol. 1341b28, al., cf. ‘Πλάτων καὶ φ.’ Plu. 2.176d); exc. when an Adj. or some qualifying word is added to ‘ἡ θεία φ.’ Pl. Phdr. 239b; ‘ἐκείνου τῇ φ.’ Id. Ly.213d; ‘ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φ.’ Arist. EN 1181b15; ‘ἡ τῶν Ἰταλικῶν φ.’ Id. Metaph. 987a31 (and pl., αἱ εἰρημέναι φ. ib. 29); so later ‘ἡ Ἰωνικὴ φ.’ D. L. 1.122; ‘ἡ δογματική, Ἀκαδημαϊκή, σκεπτικὴ φ.’ S. E. P.1.4, etc.; ‘ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς φ.’ Plu. 2.607c, etc.; esp. ‘ἡ πρώτη φ.’ metaphysic, Arist. Metaph. 1026a24, cf. 18. Just one sense, but various ambiguities remain in ‘philosopher,’ as per Grice's example ‘Grice is addicted to general speculations about life,’ and ‘Grice is a member of The Oxford Philosophical Society.
1977. Autonomy, freedom, teleology, and ethics, Hart on liberty, Kantian, 1980, Kant's ethics, Aristotle's ethics, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 2, folders 26, 27, and 28, Series III (The Doctrines), carton 5-folder 5-6, folders 8-9, folders 16-17, folders 27-28, and Series V (Topical), carton 8-folders 16-17, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Kant. In the New World, Grice had to engage in the 'great figures': Kantotle. At Oxford, there was no such need, and he could play wtih Duncan-Jones's fugitive propositions. P. G. R. I. C. E. cites ‘Kant’s ethics,’ and it is under this that most of Grice’s material on Kant should be placed ‒ with a caveat to the occasional reference to Kant’s epistemology, elsewhere. 1980. Aristotle's ethics, 1980, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics’ and ‘Aristotle's Ethics,’ keywords: Aristotle, ethics. From Hardie. 1980. Freedom in Kant's Grundlegung, freedom and morality in Kant's Grundlegung, 'Freedom and Morality in Kant's Foundations,' Keywords: Grundlegung, freedom, autonomy, Kant, ethics. Why was Grice attracted to Kant's theory? First, the logical analysis of the imperatives. Second, as he explored the Grundlegung, the metaphysical foundation of freedom, and finality. While teleology is usually NOT associated with Kant, Grice did! Grice would refer to this, as Kantians do, as the Grundlegung. Grice was never happy with 'eleutheria,' qua Greek philosophical notion. ‘To literal to be true? By ‘Foundations,’ Grice obviously means Kant's essay.Grice preferred to quote Kant in English. The reason being that Grice was practising ‘ordinary-language’ philosophy; and you cannot expect much 'linguistic botany' in a language other than your own! Kant was not too 'ordinary' in his use of German, either! The English translations that Grice used captured, in a way, all that Grice thought was worth capturing in Kant's philosophy. Kant was not your 'standard' philosopher in the programme Grice was familiar with: Lit. Hum. Oxon. However, Kant was popular in The New World, where Grice lectured profusely. 1980. Kant's ethics, Kant's Ethical Theory. An exploration of the categorial imperative and its reduction to the hypothetical or suppositional one. 1980. Kant's ethics, Philosophy, Kant, With J. Baker. Notably the categorical imperative. Cf. ‘Kant's Ethics.’ The crucial belief about a thing in itself that Kant thinks only practical reason can justify concerns freedom. Freedom is crucial because, on Kant’s view, any moral appraisal presupposes that a human is free in that he has the ability to do otherwise. To see why, consider Kant’s example of a man who commits a theft. Kant holds that for this man’s action to be morally wrong and condemnable) it must have been within his voluntary control (he is deemed responsible) in a way that it was within his power at the time not to have committed the theft. If it is NOT within his control at the time, while it may be useful to punish him in order to shape his behaviour or to influence others, it nevertheless would be incorrect to say that his action is morally wrong. Moral rightness and wrongness apply only to a free agent who controls his action and has it in his power, at the time of his action, either to act rightly or not. According to Kant and Grice, this is just common sense. On these grounds, Kant rejects a type of compatibilism, which he calls the ‘comparative concept of freedom’ and associates with Leibniz. Kant has a specific type of compatibilism in mind. There may be types of compatibilism that do not fit Kant’s characterization of that view. On the compatibilist view, as Kant understands it, an agent is free whenever the cause of his action is within him. So an agent is not free only when something external to him pushes or moves him, but he is free whenever the proximate cause of his body’s movement is internal to him as an ‘acting being.' If we distinguish between an involuntary convulsion and a voluntary bodily movement, a free action is just a voluntary bodily movement. Kant and Grice ridicule this view as a ‘wretched subterfuge’ that tries to solve an ancient philosophical problem ‘with a little quibbling about words.’ This view, Kant and Grice say, assimilates freedom to ‘the freedom of a turnspit,’ or a projectile in flight, or the motion of a clock’s hands. Grice's favourite phrase was the otiose English 'free fall.' And he knew all the Grecian he needed to recognise the figurative concept of 'eleutheria' as applied to 'ill' as ‘VERY FIGURATIVE, almost implicatural!’ The proximate cause of this movement is internal to the turnspit, the projectile, and the clock at the time of the movement. This cannot be sufficient for moral, rational responsibility. Why not? The reason, Kant and Grice say, is ultimately that the cause of this movement occurs in time. Return to the theft example. A compatibilist would say that the thief’s action is free because its proximate cause is inside him, and because the theft is not an involuntary convulsion but a voluntary action. The thief decides to commit the theft, and his action flows from this decision. According to Kant, however, if the thief’s decision is a natural, and thus predictable, phenomenon that occurs in time, it must be the effect of some cause that occurred in a previous time. This is an essential part of Kant’s (if not Grice's ‒ Grice quotes Eddington) Newtonian worldview and is grounded in the a priori laws (specifically, the category of cause and effect) in accordance with which our understanding constructs experience. Every event has a cause that begins in an earlier time. If that cause too is an event occurring in time, it must also have a cause beginning in a still earlier time, etc. Every natural event occurs in time and is thoroughly determined by a causal chain that stretches backwards into the distant past. So there is no room for freedom in nature, which is deterministic in a strong way. The root of the problem, for Kant, if not Grice, is time. For Grice it's SPACE and time! Again, if the thief’s choice to commit the theft is a natural event in time, it is the effect of a causal chain extending into the distant past. But the past is out of his control now, in the present. Once the past is past, he cannot change it. On Kant’s view, that is why his action would not be in his control in the present if it is determined by events in the past. Even if he could control those past events in the past, he cannot control them now. But in fact past events were not in his control in the past either if they too were determined by events in the more distant past, because eventually the causal antecedents of his action stretch back before his birth, and obviously events that occurred before his birth are not in his control. So if the thief’s choice to commit the theft is a natural event in time, it is not now and never was in his control, and he could not have done otherwise than to commit the theft. In that case, it would be a mistake to hold him morally responsible for it. Compatibilism, as Kant and Grice understand it, therefore locates the issue in the wrong place. Even if the cause of the action is internal to the agent, if it is in the past – e. g., if the action today is determined by a decision the agent made yesterday, or from the character I developed in childhood, it is not within the agent's control now. The real issue is not whether the cause of the action is internal or external to the agent, but whether it is in the agent's control now. For Kant, however, the cause of action can be within the agent's control now only if it is not in time. This is why Kant and Grice think that transcendental idealism is the only way to make sense of the kind of freedom that morality requires. For transcendental idealism allows that the cause of a action may be a ‘thing in itself’ outside of time: namely, the agetn's noumenal self, which is free because it is not part of nature. No matter what kind of character the agent have developed or what external influences act on him, on Kant’s view every intentional, voluntary action is an immediate effect of the agent's noumenal self, which is causally undetermined (5:97–98). The agent's noumenal self is an uncaused cause outside of time, which therefore is not subject to the deterministic laws of nature in accordance with which understanding and pure reason constructs experience. Many puzzles arise on this picture that Kant does not resolve, and Grice tries. E.g. if understanding constructs every appearance in the experience of nature, not only an appearance of an action, why is the agent responsible only for his action but not for everything that happens in the natural world? Moreover, if I am not alone in the world but there is another noumenal self acting freely and incorporating his free action into the experience he constructs, how do two transcendentally free agents interact? How do you integrate one's free action into the experience that the other's understanding constructs? In spite of these unsolved puzzles, Kant holds that we can make sense of moral appraisal and responsibility only by thinking about human freedom in this way, because it is the only way to prevent natural necessity from undermining both. Since Kant invokes transcendental idealism to make sense of freedom, interpreting his thinking about freedom leads us back to disputes between the two-objects and two-aspects interpretations of transcendental idealism. On the face of it, the two-*objects* interpretation seems to make better sense of Kant’s view of transcendental freedom than the two-aspects interpretation. If morality requires that the agent be transcendentally free, it seems that his true self, and not just an aspect of his self, must be outside of time, according to Kant’s argument. But applying the two-*objects* interpretation to freedom raises problems of its own, since it involves making a distinction between the noumenal self and the phenomenal self that does not arise on the two-aspects view. If only one noumenal self is free, and freedom is required for moral responsibility, one's *phenomenal* self is not morally responsible. But how are the noumenal self and the phenomenal self related, and why is punishment inflicted on the phenomenal self? It is unclear whether and to what extent appealing to Kant’s theory of freedom can help to settle disputes about the proper interpretation of transcendental idealism, since there are serious questions about the coherence of Kant’s theory on either interpretation! ‘Which is good,’ Grice would end his lecture with!
1977. Autonomy, freedom, teleology, and ethics, Hart on liberty, Kantian, 1980, Kant's ethics, Aristotle's ethics, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 2, folders 26, 27, and 28, Series III (The Doctrines), carton 5-folder 5-6, folders 8-9, folders 16-17, folders 27-28, and Series V (Topical), carton 8-folders 16-17, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Kant. In the New World, Grice had to engage in the 'great figures': Kantotle. At Oxford, there was no such need, and he could play wtih Duncan-Jones's fugitive propositions. P. G. R. I. C. E. cites ‘Kant’s ethics,’ and it is under this that most of Grice’s material on Kant should be placed ‒ with a caveat to the occasional reference to Kant’s epistemology, elsewhere. 1980. Aristotle's ethics, 1980, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics’ and ‘Aristotle's Ethics,’ keywords: Aristotle, ethics. From Hardie. 1980. Freedom in Kant's Grundlegung, freedom and morality in Kant's Grundlegung, 'Freedom and Morality in Kant's Foundations,' Keywords: Grundlegung, freedom, autonomy, Kant, ethics. Why was Grice attracted to Kant's theory? First, the logical analysis of the imperatives. Second, as he explored the Grundlegung, the metaphysical foundation of freedom, and finality. While teleology is usually NOT associated with Kant, Grice did! Grice would refer to this, as Kantians do, as the Grundlegung. Grice was never happy with 'eleutheria,' qua Greek philosophical notion. ‘To literal to be true? By ‘Foundations,’ Grice obviously means Kant's essay.Grice preferred to quote Kant in English. The reason being that Grice was practising ‘ordinary-language’ philosophy; and you cannot expect much 'linguistic botany' in a language other than your own! Kant was not too 'ordinary' in his use of German, either! The English translations that Grice used captured, in a way, all that Grice thought was worth capturing in Kant's philosophy. Kant was not your 'standard' philosopher in the programme Grice was familiar with: Lit. Hum. Oxon. However, Kant was popular in The New World, where Grice lectured profusely. 1980. Kant's ethics, Kant's Ethical Theory. An exploration of the categorial imperative and its reduction to the hypothetical or suppositional one. 1980. Kant's ethics, Philosophy, Kant, With J. Baker. Notably the categorical imperative. Cf. ‘Kant's Ethics.’ The crucial belief about a thing in itself that Kant thinks only practical reason can justify concerns freedom. Freedom is crucial because, on Kant’s view, any moral appraisal presupposes that a human is free in that he has the ability to do otherwise. To see why, consider Kant’s example of a man who commits a theft. Kant holds that for this man’s action to be morally wrong and condemnable) it must have been within his voluntary control (he is deemed responsible) in a way that it was within his power at the time not to have committed the theft. If it is NOT within his control at the time, while it may be useful to punish him in order to shape his behaviour or to influence others, it nevertheless would be incorrect to say that his action is morally wrong. Moral rightness and wrongness apply only to a free agent who controls his action and has it in his power, at the time of his action, either to act rightly or not. According to Kant and Grice, this is just common sense. On these grounds, Kant rejects a type of compatibilism, which he calls the ‘comparative concept of freedom’ and associates with Leibniz. Kant has a specific type of compatibilism in mind. There may be types of compatibilism that do not fit Kant’s characterization of that view. On the compatibilist view, as Kant understands it, an agent is free whenever the cause of his action is within him. So an agent is not free only when something external to him pushes or moves him, but he is free whenever the proximate cause of his body’s movement is internal to him as an ‘acting being.' If we distinguish between an involuntary convulsion and a voluntary bodily movement, a free action is just a voluntary bodily movement. Kant and Grice ridicule this view as a ‘wretched subterfuge’ that tries to solve an ancient philosophical problem ‘with a little quibbling about words.’ This view, Kant and Grice say, assimilates freedom to ‘the freedom of a turnspit,’ or a projectile in flight, or the motion of a clock’s hands. Grice's favourite phrase was the otiose English 'free fall.' And he knew all the Grecian he needed to recognise the figurative concept of 'eleutheria' as applied to 'ill' as ‘VERY FIGURATIVE, almost implicatural!’ The proximate cause of this movement is internal to the turnspit, the projectile, and the clock at the time of the movement. This cannot be sufficient for moral, rational responsibility. Why not? The reason, Kant and Grice say, is ultimately that the cause of this movement occurs in time. Return to the theft example. A compatibilist would say that the thief’s action is free because its proximate cause is inside him, and because the theft is not an involuntary convulsion but a voluntary action. The thief decides to commit the theft, and his action flows from this decision. According to Kant, however, if the thief’s decision is a natural, and thus predictable, phenomenon that occurs in time, it must be the effect of some cause that occurred in a previous time. This is an essential part of Kant’s (if not Grice's ‒ Grice quotes Eddington) Newtonian worldview and is grounded in the a priori laws (specifically, the category of cause and effect) in accordance with which our understanding constructs experience. Every event has a cause that begins in an earlier time. If that cause too is an event occurring in time, it must also have a cause beginning in a still earlier time, etc. Every natural event occurs in time and is thoroughly determined by a causal chain that stretches backwards into the distant past. So there is no room for freedom in nature, which is deterministic in a strong way. The root of the problem, for Kant, if not Grice, is time. For Grice it's SPACE and time! Again, if the thief’s choice to commit the theft is a natural event in time, it is the effect of a causal chain extending into the distant past. But the past is out of his control now, in the present. Once the past is past, he cannot change it. On Kant’s view, that is why his action would not be in his control in the present if it is determined by events in the past. Even if he could control those past events in the past, he cannot control them now. But in fact past events were not in his control in the past either if they too were determined by events in the more distant past, because eventually the causal antecedents of his action stretch back before his birth, and obviously events that occurred before his birth are not in his control. So if the thief’s choice to commit the theft is a natural event in time, it is not now and never was in his control, and he could not have done otherwise than to commit the theft. In that case, it would be a mistake to hold him morally responsible for it. Compatibilism, as Kant and Grice understand it, therefore locates the issue in the wrong place. Even if the cause of the action is internal to the agent, if it is in the past – e. g., if the action today is determined by a decision the agent made yesterday, or from the character I developed in childhood, it is not within the agent's control now. The real issue is not whether the cause of the action is internal or external to the agent, but whether it is in the agent's control now. For Kant, however, the cause of action can be within the agent's control now only if it is not in time. This is why Kant and Grice think that transcendental idealism is the only way to make sense of the kind of freedom that morality requires. For transcendental idealism allows that the cause of a action may be a ‘thing in itself’ outside of time: namely, the agetn's noumenal self, which is free because it is not part of nature. No matter what kind of character the agent have developed or what external influences act on him, on Kant’s view every intentional, voluntary action is an immediate effect of the agent's noumenal self, which is causally undetermined (5:97–98). The agent's noumenal self is an uncaused cause outside of time, which therefore is not subject to the deterministic laws of nature in accordance with which understanding and pure reason constructs experience. Many puzzles arise on this picture that Kant does not resolve, and Grice tries. E.g. if understanding constructs every appearance in the experience of nature, not only an appearance of an action, why is the agent responsible only for his action but not for everything that happens in the natural world? Moreover, if I am not alone in the world but there is another noumenal self acting freely and incorporating his free action into the experience he constructs, how do two transcendentally free agents interact? How do you integrate one's free action into the experience that the other's understanding constructs? In spite of these unsolved puzzles, Kant holds that we can make sense of moral appraisal and responsibility only by thinking about human freedom in this way, because it is the only way to prevent natural necessity from undermining both. Since Kant invokes transcendental idealism to make sense of freedom, interpreting his thinking about freedom leads us back to disputes between the two-objects and two-aspects interpretations of transcendental idealism. On the face of it, the two-*objects* interpretation seems to make better sense of Kant’s view of transcendental freedom than the two-aspects interpretation. If morality requires that the agent be transcendentally free, it seems that his true self, and not just an aspect of his self, must be outside of time, according to Kant’s argument. But applying the two-*objects* interpretation to freedom raises problems of its own, since it involves making a distinction between the noumenal self and the phenomenal self that does not arise on the two-aspects view. If only one noumenal self is free, and freedom is required for moral responsibility, one's *phenomenal* self is not morally responsible. But how are the noumenal self and the phenomenal self related, and why is punishment inflicted on the phenomenal self? It is unclear whether and to what extent appealing to Kant’s theory of freedom can help to settle disputes about the proper interpretation of transcendental idealism, since there are serious questions about the coherence of Kant’s theory on either interpretation! ‘Which is good,’ Grice would end his lecture with!
1978. Ethics of virtue, arête, virtus, vitium, Aristotle, virtue, Philippa Foot on virtues and vices, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 9-folder 29. Keywords: Philippa Foot, virtue, vice, virtue ethics, virtus, vitium, arete, kakon, flourishing. Unlike R. M. Hare's and H. P. Grice's 'meta-ethical' sensitivities (as members of the Oxonian school of 'ordinary-language' philosophy), , Foot suggests a different approach to ethics. Grice admired Foot's ability to make the right conceptual distinction. Foot is following a very Oxonian tradition best represented by the work of G. J. Warnock. Of course, Grice was over-familiar with the 'virtue' vs. 'vice' distinction, since Hardie had instilled it on him at Corpus! For Grice, 'virtue' and 'vice' (and the mesotes), display an interesting 'logical' grammar, though. Grice would say that 'rationality' is a virtue; fallacious reasoning is a vice. Some things Grice takes more of a moral standpoint about. To cheat is neither irrational nor unreasonble: just plain 'repulsive.' As such, it would be a 'vice' ‒ mind not getting caught in its grip! Grice is concerned with 'vice' in his account of 'akrasia' or 'incontinentia.' If agent A KNOWS that doing x is 'virtuous,' yet decides to do ~x, which is 'vicious,' A is being 'akratic.' For Grice, akratic behaviour applies both in the buletic or boulomaic realm and in the doxastic realm. And it is part of the philosopher's job to elucidate the conceptual intricacies attached to it. 1. prima-facie (if A,!p) V probably (if A, p). 2. prima-facie (if (A and B), !p) V probably (if (A and B), p). 3. prima-facie (if (A and B and C), !p) V probably (if (A and B and C,), p). 4. prima-facie (if all things before pirot, !p) V probably (if (all things before pirot), p). 5. prima-facie (if all things are considered, !p) V probably (if all things are considered, p). 6. !p V |- p. 7. Acc. Reasoning pirot wills that !p V Acc. Reasoning pirot that judges p.
1978. Onto-genesis, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 9-folder 10, semantics of children's language, BANC MSS 90/135c, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: semantics, children's language, ontogenesis, ontology, phylogeny, developmental pragmatics, learning, acquisition. Interesting in that he was always enquiring his children's playmates: ‘Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed!’ One found a developmental account of the princile of conversational helpfulness boring, or as he said, "dull."
1979. Proem to the John Locke Lectures, aspects of reason, Clarendon, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Locke, Locke scholarship, Locke lecture, Oxford, town and gown. Grice’s Town and Gown. A special note, or rather, a very moving proem, on Grice's occasion of delivering his lectures on 'Aspects of reason and reasoning' at Oxford as the John Locke Memorial Lectures at Merton. Particularly apt in mentioning, with humility, his having failed, *thrice* [sic] to obtain the John Locke lectureship (Strawson did, at once!), but feeling safe under the ægis of ‘that great English philosopher’ (viz. Locke! always implicated, never explicited) now. Grice starts the proem in a very moving, shall we say, emotional, way: ‘I find it difficult to convey to you just how happy I am, and how honoured I feel, in being invited to give these lectures.’ Difficult, but not impossible. ‘I think of this university and this city [it has a cathedral], which were my home for thirty-six years, as my spiritual and intellectual parents.’ The almost majestic plural is Grice's implicature to the 'town and gown'! ‘[W]hatever I am was originally fashioned here;’ I never left Oxford, Oxford made me, ‘and I find it a moving experience to be, within these splendid and none too ancient walls, once more engaged in my old occupation of rendering what is clear obscure,’ by flouting the desideratum of conversational clarity and the conversational maxim, 'avoid obscurity of expression,' under 'be perspicuous [sic]!'. Grice's implicature on ‘none too ancient’ seems to be addressed to the TRULY ancient walls that saw ‘Athenian dialectic’! On the other hand, Grice's funny variant on the 'obscurum per obscurius' ‒ what G. P. Baker found as Grice’s skill in rendering an orthodoxy into a heterodoxy! Almost! By 'clear' Grice implicates Lewis and his 'clarity is not enough!' ‘I am, at the same time, proud of my mid-Atlantic [two-world] status, and am, therefore, delighted that the Old World should have called me in, or rather recalled me, to redress, for once, the balance of my having left her for the New.’ His implicature seems to be: ‘Strictly, I never left?’ Grice concludes his proem: ‘I am, finally, greatly heartened by my consciousness of the fact that that great English philosopher, under whose ægis I am now speaking, has in the late afternoon of my days extended to me his Lectureship as a gracious consolation for a record threefold denied to me, in my early morning, of his Prize. I pray that my present offerings may find greater favour in his sight than did those of long ago.’ They did! Even if Locke surely might have found favour to Grice’s former offerings, too, I'm sure!
1980. Correspondence with R. Wyatt, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice), carton 1-folders 10-12, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Grice, Wyatt.
1980. Mentalism, modest mentalism, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (Doctrines), carton 5-folder 30, BANC, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: mentalism, philosophical psychology. Short and Lewis have "mens" ( I. nom. sing. mentis: terra corpus est, at mentis ignis est, Enn. ap. Prisc. p. 764 P.; so too, istic est de sole sumptus; isque totus mentis est, Enn. ap. Varr. L. L. 5, § 59 Müll.; cf. Enn. p. 168, v. 6 and 7 Vahl.), f. from the root 'men,' whence 'memini,' q. v., and 'comminiscor,' the mind, disposition; the heart, soul (class.). com-mĭniscor (con-m- ), mentus, 3,I.v. a. dep. [miniscor, whence also reminiscor, stem men, whence mens, memini; cf. Varr. L. L. 6, § 44] (lit. to ponder carefully, to reflect upon; hence, as a result of reflection; cf. 1. commentor, II.), to devise something by careful thought, to contrive, invent, feign. Myro was perhaps unaware of the implicatures of 'mental' when he qualified his -ism with 'modest.' Grice would seldom use 'mind' (Grecian 'nous') or 'mental' (Grecian 'noetikos' vs. 'æsthetikos'). His sympathies go for more over-arching Grecian terms like the very Aristotelian 'soul,' (anima), i. e. the psyche and the psychological. A discussion by Grice of G. Myro's essay, ‘In defence of a modal mentalism,’ with attending commentary by R. Albritton and S. Cavell. Grice himself would hardly use 'mental,' 'mentalist,' or 'mentalism' himself, but perhaps 'psychologism.' Grice would use 'mental,' on occasion, but his Grecianism was deeply rooted, unlike Myro's. At Clifton and under Hardie (let's recall he came up to Oxford under a 'classics' scholarship to enrol in the Lit. Hum.) he knew that 'mental' translates 'mentalis' translates 'nous,' only ONE part of the soul.
1980. From Zeno to Socrates, topics for pursuit, Zeno, Socrates, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series III (The Doctrines), carton 5-folder 31, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Zeno, Socrates. Grice's review of the history of philosophy (‘Philosophy is but footnotes to Zeno.’). Grice enjoyed Zeno's answer, 'What is a friend?' 'Alter ego,' 'All'ego.' ("Only it was the other Zeno." Grice tried to apply the Socratic method during his tutorials. "Nothing like a heartfelt dedication to the Socratic art of mid-wifery, seeking to bring forth error and to strangle it at birth.” μαι-εύομαι , ( A.“μαῖα” 1.3) serve as a midwife, act as one, D.S.19.34; “ἡ Ἄρτεμις μ.” Luc.DDeor.26.2. 2. cause delivery to take place, “ἱκανὴ ἔκπληξις μαιεύσασθαι πρὸ τῆς ὥρας” Philostr.VA1.5. 3. c. acc., bring to the birth, Marin.Procl.6; ὄρνιθας μ. hatch chickens, Anon. ap. Suid.; αἰετὸν κάνθαρος μαιεύσομαι, prov. of taking vengeance on a powerful enemy, Ar.Lys.695 (cf. Sch.). 4. deliver a woman, esp. metaph. in Pl. of the Socratic method, Tht.149b. II. Act., Poll. 4.208, Sch.Opp.H.4.506:—Pass., τὰ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα brought into the world by me, Pl.Tht.150e, cf. Philostr.VA5.13.
1980. Deutero-Esperanto, squarrel, izzing and hazzing, fing, fang and fid, potching and cotching, Pirotese, Pirots, basic Pirotese, sentence semantics and syntax, pirots and obbles, methodology, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 8-folders 30-33, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: pirot, pirotese, pirotology, semantics, syntax, obble, creature construction, the genitorial programme. Urquhart promises twelve parts of speech: each declinable in eleven cases, four numbers, eleven genders (including god, goddess, man, woman, animal, etc.); and conjugable in eleven tenses, seven moods, and four voices. The language will translate any idiom in any other language, without any alteration of the literal sense, but fully representing the intention. Later, one day, while lying in his bath, Grice designed Deutero-Esperanto. 'The obble is fang' may be current only for Griceian members of the class of utterers. It is only this or that philosopher's practice to utter 'The obble is fang' in such-and-such circumstances. In this case, the utterer U does have a readiness to utter 'The obble is feng' in such-and-such circumstances. There is also the scenario in which 'The obble is fang' is may be conceived by the philosopher not to be 'deemed' 'current' at all, but the utterance of 'The obble is feng' in such-and-such circumstances is part of some 'system of communication' which the utterer U (Lockwith,, Urquart, Wilkins, Edmonds, Grice) has devised but which has never been put into operation, like the highway code which Grice invent another day again while lying in his bath. In that case, U does this or that basic or resultant procedure for 'The obble is feng' in an attenuated but philosophically legitimate fashion. U has envisaged a possible system of practices which involve a readiness to utter Example by Grice that does NOT involve a 'convention' in this 'usage.' Surely Grice can as he indeed did, INVENT a language, call it Deutero-Esperanto, Griceish, or Pirotese, which nobody at Oxford ever uses to communicat. That makes Grice the authority - cf. 'arkhe,' authority, government (in plural), "authorities" - and Grice can lay down, while lying in the tub, no doubt - what is PROPER. A pirot can be said to potch of some obble o as fang or as feng. Also to cotch of some obble o, as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o' as being fid to one another.” In symbols: (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ POTCH(x, y, fang) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ POTCH(x, y, feng) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ COTCH(x, y, fang) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Ox ^ COTCH(x, y, feng) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oz ^ Oy ^ COTCH(x, FID(y,z)). Let's say that pirots (as Russell and Carnap conceived them) inhabit a world of obbles, material objects, or things. To potch is something like to perceive; to cotch something like to think. ‘Feng' and 'fang' are possible descriptions, much like our adjectives. ‘Fid’ is a possible relation between obbles." Grice provides a symbolisation for 'content' internalisation. The perceiver or cognitive subject perceives or cognises two objects, x, y, as holding a 'relation' of some type. There is a higher level that pirots can reach when the object of their potchings and cotchings is not so much objects but states of affairs. It's then that the truth-functional operators will be brougth to existence “^”: cotching (p ^ q) “V”: cotching (p v q) “)”: )-cotching (p ) q) A pirot will be able to reject a content, refuse-thinking: ~. cotching (~p) When Pirot1 perceives Pirot2, the reciprocals get more complicated. Pirot2 cotches that Pirot1!-judges that p. Grice uses ψ1 for potching and ψ2 for cotching. If Pirot2 is co-operative, and abides by "The Pirot's Immanuel," Pirot2 will honour, in a Kantian benevolent way, his partner's goal by adopting temporarily his partner’s goal POTCH (x (Potch (y, !p)) --> POTCH (x, !p). But by then, it's hardly 'simpler' ways. Especially when the pirots outdo their progenitor Carnap as metaphysicians. 1. ⊢ (α izzes α). This would be the principle of non-contradiction or identity. Pirot1 applies it 'war,' and utters 'War is war' which yields 'a most peculiar implicature.' 2. ⊢ (α izzes β ∧ β izzes γ) ⊃ α izz γ This is transitivity, which is crucial for pirots to overcome Berkeley's counterexample to Locke, and define their identity over time. 3. ⊢ α hazzes β ⊃ ~(α izzes β). Or, what is accidental is not essential. A pirot may allow that 'what is essential is accidental' while misleading, is boringly true. 4. ⊢ α hazzes β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(α hazzes x ∧ x izzes β) 5. ⊢ (∀β)(β is a kath'olou or universalium ⊃ β is an eidos or forma). For surely pirots need not be stupid to fail to see squarrelhood. 6. ⊢ (α hazzes β ∧ α izzes a particular) ⊃ (∃γ).(γ≠α ∧ α izz β) 7. ⊢ α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ ((β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α) 8. ⊢ α izzes essentially predicable of β ⊃⊂ β izzes α 9. ⊢ α izzes non-essentially/accidentally predicable of β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α) 10. ⊢ α = β ⊃⊂ α izzes β ∧ β izzes α 11. ⊢ α izzes an atomon, or individuum ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(β izzes α ⊃ α izzes β) 12. ⊢ α izzes a particular ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(α izzes predicable of β ⊃ (α izzes β ∧ β izzes α)) 13. ⊢ α izzes a universalium ⊃⊂ ◊(∃β)(α izzes predicable of α ∧ ~(α izzes β ∧ β izzes α) 14. ⊢ α izzes some-thing ⊃ α izzes an individuum. 15. ⊢ α izzes an eidos or forma ⊃ (α izzes some-thing ∧ α izzes a universalium) 16. ⊢ α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ (β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α) 17. ⊢ α izzes essentially predicable of α 18. ⊢ α izzes accidentally predicable of β ⊃ α ≠ β 19. ⊢ ~(α izzes accidentally predicable of β) ⊃ α ≠ β 20. ⊢ α izzes an 'kath'ekaston or particular ⊃ α izzes an individuum 21. ⊢ α izz a particular ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izz α) 22. ⊢~(∃x).(x izzes a particular ∧ x izzes a forma) 23. ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α) 24. ⊢ x izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃β)(α izzes β) 25. ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ ((α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ β hazzes α) 26. ⊢ α izzes a forma ∧ β izzes a particular ⊃ (α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ β hazzes A) 27. ⊢ (α izzes a particular ∧ β izzes a universalium ∧ β izzes predicable of α) ⊃ (∃γ)(α ≠ γ ∧ γ izzes essentially predicable of α) 28. ⊢ (∃x) (∃y)(x izzes a particular ∧ y izzes a universalium ∧ y izzes predicable of x ⊃ ~(∀x)(x izzes a universalium ∧ x izzes some-thing) 29. ⊢ (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes some-thing) 30. ⊢ α izzes a particular) ⊃ ~∃β.(α ≠ β ∧ β izzes essentially predicable of α) 31. ⊢ (α is predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ α izzes non-essentially or accidentally predicable of β. Grice is following a Leibnizian tradition. A philosophical language is any constructed language that is constructed from first principles or certain ideologies. It is considered a type of engineered language. Philosophical languages were popular in Early Modern times, partly motivated by the goal of recovering the lost Adamic or Divine language. The term “ideal language” is sometimes used near-synonymously, though more modern philosophical languages such as “Toki Pona” are less likely to involve such an exalted claim of perfection. It may be known as a language of pure ideology. The axioms and grammars of the languages together differ from commonly spoken languages today. In most older philosophical languages, and some newer ones, words are constructed from a limited set of morphemes that are treated as "elemental" or fundamental. "Philosophical language" is sometimes used synonymously with "taxonomic language", though more recently there have been several conlangs constructed on philosophical principles which are not taxonomic. Vocabularies of oligo-synthetic languages are made of compound words, which are coined from a small (theoretically minimal) set of morphemes; oligo-isolating languages, such as Toki Pona, similarly use a limited set of root words but produce phrases which remain series of distinct words. Toki Pona is based on minimalistic simplicity, incorporating elements of Taoism. Láadan is designed to lexicalize and grammaticalise the concepts and distinctions important to women, based on muted group theory. A priori languages are constructed languages where the vocabulary is invented directly, rather than being derived from other existing languages (as with Esperanto, or Grice's Deutero-Esperanto, or Pirotese or Ido). Philosophical languages are almost all a priori languages, but most a priori languages are not philosophical languages. For example, Quenya, Sindarin, and Klingon are all a priori but not philosophical languages: they are meant to seem like natural languages, even though they have no genetic relation to any natural languages. Work on a philosophical language was pioneered by Francis Lodwick (A Common Writing, The Groundwork or Foundation laid (or So Intended) for the Framing of a New Perfect Language and a Universal Common Writing), Sir Thomas Urquhart (Logopandecteision, in six parts: Neaudethaumata, Chrestasebeia, Cleronomaporia, Chryseomysters, Neleodicastes, and Philoponauxesis), George Dalgarno (Ars signorum), and John Wilkins (An Essay towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language). Those were systems of hierarchical classification that were intended to result in both spoken and written expression. George Edmonds modified Wilkins' system, leaving its taxonomy intact, but changing the grammar of the language in an effort to make it easier. Gottfried Leibniz created lingua generalis (or lingua universalis), aiming to create a lexicon of characters upon which the user might perform calculations that would yield true propositions automatically; as a side effect he developed binary calculus. These projects aimed not only to reduce or model grammar, but also to arrange all human knowledge into "characters" or hierarchies. This idea ultimately led to the Encyclopédie, in the Age of Enlightenment. Under the entry Charactère, D'Alembert critically reviewed the projects of philosophical languages of the preceding century. After the Encyclopédie, projects for a priori languages moved more and more to the fringe. Individual authors, typically unaware of the history of the idea, continued to propose taxonomic philosophical languages until the early 20th century (for example, Ro). More recent philosophical languages have usually moved away from taxonomic schemata, such as Ithkuil See also Engineered language Linguistic philosophy Natural semantic metalanguage References Edmonds, George. A Universal Alphabet, Grammar, and Language. Richard Griffin and Company, London and Glasgow, 1855. ^ history-computer.com Bibliography Edit Umberto Eco, The Search for the Perfect Language, 1993. Alan Libert, A Priori Artificial Languages. Munich, Lincom Europa, 2000. ISBN 3-89586-667-9 Last edited 5 days ago by LesVisages RELATED ARTICLES International auxiliary language Language meant for communication between people from different nations who do not share a common first language Engineered language constructed languages devised to test or prove how languages work. Cf. Grice's Deutero-Esperanto. It all started when Carnap claimed to know that pirots karulise elatically. Grice as engineer. Pirotese is the philosopher's engaging in pirotology. Actually, pirotese is the lingo the pirots parrot. ‘Pirots karulise elatically.’ But not all of them. Grice finds that the pirotological talk allows to start from zero. He is constructing a language, ‘(basic) Pirotese,’ and the philosophical psychology and world that that language is supposed to represent or denote. An obble is a pirot's object. Grice introduces potching and cotching. To potch, in Pirotese, is what a pirot does with an obble: he perceives it. To cotch is Pirotese for what a pirot can further do with an obble: know or cognise it. Cotching, unlike potching, is factive. Pirotese would not be the first language invented by a philosopher.
1980. A philosopher's prospectus, a philosophy seminar with Grice, seminar, a philosophical talk, philosophy, with J. Baker, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 4-folder 14, series IV (associations), carton 5-folders 3-4, series IV (doctrines), carton 5-folders 2 and 8, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: prospectus.
1980. Emotion, aporia, ‘amicus,’ Kantotle, friendship, Aristotle, Aristotle's Ethica Nichomachæa, Aristotle's ethics, Aristotle on friendship, aporia, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 5- folder 7, and carton 6-folder 16-18, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Aristotle, ethics, philia, emotion, alter ego, tu. Diog. Laert. of Zeno of Citium. 'πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, "πολλοί σου καταγελῶσιν," "ἀλλ' ἐγώ," ἔφη, "οὐ κατα- γελῶμαι." "To the question "Who is a friend?" his answer was, "A second self (alter ego)."" One direct way to approach 'friend' is via 'emotion,' as Aristotle did, and found it aporetic as did Grice. Aristotle discusses 'philia' in Eth. Nich. but it is in Rhet. where he allows for phulia to be an emotion. Grice was 'very fortunate' to have Hardie as his tutor. He overused Hardie's lectures on Aristotle, too, and instilled them on his own tutees! Keywords: Aristotle, friendship. Grice is concerned with Aristotle's rather cryptic view of the friend (philos, amicus) as the 'alter ego.' In Grice's cooperative, concerted, view of things, a friend in need is a friend indeed! Grice is interested in Aristotle finding himself in an aporia. In Nicomachean Ethics IX.ix, Aristotle poses the question whether the happy man will need friends or not. Kosman correctly identifies this question as asking not whether friends are necessary in order to achieve eudæmonia, but ‘why we require friends even when we are happy.’ The question is not why we need friends to become happy, but why we need friends when we are happy, since the eudæmon must be self-sufficient. Philia is required for the flourishing of the life of practical virtue. Aristotle’s solution to the aporia here, however, points to the requirement of friendships even for the philosopher, in his life of theoretical virtue. Aristotle’s solution to the aporia in Nicomachean Ethics IX.ix is opaque, and the corresponding passage in Eudeiman Ethics VII.xii is scarcely better. Aristotle thinks he has found the solution to this aporia. ‘We must take two things into consideration, that life is desirable and also that the good is, and thence that it is desirable that such a nature should belong to oneself as it belongs to them. If then, of such a pair of corresponding series there is always one series of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are in general constituted by their participation in the nature of the determined, so that to wish to perceive one’s self is to wish oneself to be of a certain definite character,—since, then we are not in ourselves possessed of each such characters, but only in participation in these qualities in perceiving and knowing—for the perceiver becomes perceived in that way in respect in which he first perceives, and according to the way in which and the object which he perceives; and the knower becomes known in the same way— therefore it is for this reason that one always desires to live, because one always desires to know; and this is because he himself wishes to be the object known.’
1967. The desideratum of conversational candour, trust and rationality, rationality and trust, trust, trust, metaphysics, and value, with J. Baker, trustworthiness, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 9-folders 5 and 20, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Urmson, Warnock, trust, rationality. It's all about confidence, you know. Utterer U expects his addressee A will find him confident. con-fīdo , fĭsus sum, 3, I.v. n., to trust confidently in something, confide in, rely firmly upon, to believe, be assured of (as an enhancing of sperare, Cic. Att. 6, 9, 1; Nep. Milt. 1, 1; freq. and class. in prose and poetry); constr. with abl., acc. and inf., with dat., rarely with de, ut, or absol. Trust and rationality are pre-requisites of conversation. Urmson had developed this. Urmson's key phrase is "implied claim." Whenever an utterer makes a conversational contribution in a standard context, there is an implied claim to the utterer being trustworthy and reasonable. What do Grice and Urmson mean by an "implied claim"? It's obvious enough, but they both loved to expand. Whenever an utterer U utters a sentence which can be used to convey truth or falsehood there is an implied claim to trustworthiness by the utterer, unless the situation shows that this is not so. The utterer is acting or reciting or incredulously echoing the remark of another, or flouting the expectation. This, Urmson thinks, may need an explanation. Suppose that an utterer utters the sentence 'It will rain tomorrow' or 'It rained yesterday,' or 'It's raining' in ordinary circumstances. This act carries with it the claim that the utterer should be trusted and that it will rain tomorrow. By this is meant that just as it is understood that no utterer will give an order unless he is entitled to give orders, so it is understood that no utterer will utter a sentence of a kind which can be used to make a statement unless he is willing to claim that that statement is true, and hence one would be acting in a misleading manner if one uttered the sentence if he was not willing to make that claim. The predicate 'implies that ...', Grice and Urmson hasten to add, as Nowell-Smith, and D. K. Grant do, is being used in such a way that, if there is a an expectation that a thing ks be done in Circumstance C, the utterer 'implies' that C holds if he does the thing. The point has often been made before, though not always in these terms, and it is, Urmson and Grice believe, in substance uncontroversial. Grice and Urmson wish to make the point that, when an utterer U deploys a 'hedge' with an indicative sentence, there is not merely an implied claim that the whole statement is true but also that is true. This is surely obvious in some cases. 'I believe it will rain.' 'He is, I regret, too fast.' 'You intend, I gather, to refuse.' But Grice and Urmson think that a little thought shows that it is also true in the case of, say, 'I hear that he is ill in bed,' 'He is, I hear, ill in bed. An utterer would not say these things if he did not accept the report on which the statement is based, and by saying it the utterer implies that he can be claimed to be trustworthy. Grice is more careful than Urmson here in that the primary buletic or doxastic claim is more crucially (even in a NON ceteris paribus way), 'expressed' than merely implied, though. Vide, Way of Words, iii, on Moore's paradox. The utterer's implied or expressed claim to trustworthiness need not be very strong. The whole point of a hedge is to modify or to weaken (if not, as Grice would have it, flout) the utterer's claim to full trustworthiness which would be implied by the assertion. But even if the utterer utters 'He is, I suppose, at home' or 'I guess that the penny will come down heads" the utterer 'expresses,' or for Urmson plainly 'implies,' with however little reason, that this is what he accept as worth his addressee's trust, We our statements In con as well as logical. E.g. the utterer often have an emotional attitude to the fact he states, or it is likely to arouse emotion in his addresee. To some extent, both by accident and by design our manner, intonation and choice of words betray the utterer's attitude and prepares his addressee. But this is imprecise and uncertain, and ? in writing, is difficult to get right for all but the great stylist. Again, content and manner give some clue to the addressee of how he is to understand the statement in relation to its logical context, but not infallibly. Further, the utterer makes his statement sometimes with good, sometimes with moderate, sometimes with poor evidence. Which of these situations the utterer is in need not be obvious to the addressee, and it would be cumbersome always to convey explicitly. It is Grice's and Urmson's contention that a hedge is one of the sets of devices that an utterer uses in order to deal with these matters, though not the only set. By them the utterer primes his addressee to see the emotional significance, the logical relevance, and the reliability of his statement. This the utterer does not by telling the addressee how he is moved or how he should be moved by the statement, nor by telling him how the utterer's statement fits into the context, nor by describing the evidential situation, but by the use of warning, priming or orientating signals. The utterer shows rather than states. This is the contention which will now be somewhat elaborated, Suppose that an utterer goes to a mother in wartime as a messenger to inform her of the death of her son. The utterer can, no doubt, merely say 'Madam, your son is dead'. But this would be abrupt and harsh, and the utterer would more probably say 'Madam, I regret that your son is dead.' For anyone other than a great actor it is easier to steer a course between callousness and false sentiment as a stranger bearing news by the use of a hedge in this way than by means of intonation. Clearly the utterer is mainly bearing news, and the addition of "I regret" (not necessarily at the beginning of the sentence) shows without it being actually explicitly conveyed that it is being offered, and will be received as, sad news. The utterer is not being a hypocrite, even within the excusable, conventional, limits of hypocrisy, if he personally has no feelings on the matter at all. Messengers of that sort can rarely have much feeling in wartime about each case. If, for the moment we turn to a less purely parenthetical use of the same verity we shall find that the essential point remains the same. If, as a friend of the family, the utterer goes to the mother when the death is well known and says 'I much regret that your son is dead. He was a dear friend,' then, no doubt, I am no longer mainly bearing news. But I am still NOT describing my feelings. It is rather that the signal is being made for its own sake as an act of sympathy, the indicative clause giving the occasion of my sympathy. Regret and rejoice are two of the most obvious examples of verbs which give emotional orientation when used parenthetically,. Another set of these hedges is used to signal how the statement is to be taken as fitting logically into the discussion. 'I admit that he is able' assigns the statement that he is able to the logical position of being support for the opposed position, or a part of the opposed position which will not be assailed one shows while saying that he is able that this is to be treated as an admission. Grice refers to this as a second-order meta-conversational device in 'Retrospective Epilogue' in 'Way of Words,' a non-central speech act ('opposing', 'objecting', 'adding', 'contrasting' central speech acts are stating and ordering, only. One is forestalling a possible misapprehension. But don't you see, that is part of my point. One is not reporting the occurrence of "a bit of admitting", whatever that may be supposed to be. The hedge in 'Smith was, I conclude, the murderer' assigns to the statement the status of following from what has been said before, preventing it from being taken as, say, an additional fact to be taken into account. Cf. Grice, 'Smith is, therefore, the murderer' and the 'conventional implicature' of "therefore". There is no specific activity of "concluding". Other hedges which fulfil approximately similar tasks are 'deduce, 'infer,' 'presume,' 'presuppose,' 'confess,' 'concede,' 'maintain, ' and 'assume.' Another rough group is constituted by such hedges as 'know,' 'believe,' 'guess,' suppos,' 'suspect,' estimate, and, in a metaphorical use, 'feel.' Never 'sense' but metaphorical USE. Cf. Grice's modified Occam's razor, do not multiply senses beyond necessity, and Urmson's having learned the lesson (his earlier, 'On the two senses of 'probable'"). This group is probably more controversial than the previous ones, and will require more explanation. This, the 'belief and knowledge,' the group which is used to indicate the evidential situation in which the statement is made (though not to describe that situation), and hence to signal degree of reliability is claimed for, and should be accorded to, the statement to which the hedged is conjoined. Thus 'I think that this is the right road to take' is a weaker way of saying that this is the right road, indicating that one is just plumping and has no adequate evidence, so that the statement will be received with the right amount of caution. 'I know,' on the other hand, shows that there is all the adequate evidence one could need. Some of these hedges can clearly be arranged in a scalar set showing the reliability of the conjoined statement according to the wealth of evidence,: 'know" "believe" "suspect" "guess," so that "I believe," being on the weak side of the scale, impliese "I do not know." An adverb can make the situation even plainer. 'I strongly believe,' 'I rather suspect' and so on. The utterer is, in fact, in a position where he can either make our statements 'neat', and leave it to the context and the general probabilities to show to the addressee how much credence he should give to the statement ; or, in addition to making the statement we can actually describe the evidential situation in more or less detail ; or give a warning such as, 'Don't rely on this too implicitly, but ...' or the utterer can employ the warning device of a parenthetical verb "I believe it will rain." If this is insufficient for any reason (perhaps it is an important matter), the addressee can ask why and get the description of the evidential situation. More will have to be said about these verbs, but it will be convenient first to introduce another topic, and that is the one of adverbs corresponding to parenthetical verbs. Grice and Urmson mention that parenthetical verbs are not the only device that an utterer has for warning his addressee how his statement is to be taken while making it. It will perhaps make it clearer how a parenthetical verb is used if one of these other devices is briefly outlined. We were taught at school that an adverb modifies a verb. But this is inaccurate, for some adverbs are quite as loosely attached to whole sentences as are parenthetical verbs. Examples are 'luckily,' 'happily unfortunately consequently presumably admittedly certainly undoubtedly probably possibly otiosely and Speranza's favourite hopefully (Speranza _means_ hope). Note that the position of these adverbs is variable in relation to the sentence as in the case of a parenthetical verbs. We can say Unfortunately he Is ill ' or He is, unfortunately, ill'. If the word 'modify' is to be used the adverbs can perhaps be said to modify the whole statement to which it are attached. But how does it modify them? Surely by giving a warning how they are to be understood, Luckily ! , happily and unfortunately indicate the appropriate attitude to the statement, for example. Admittedly, consequently and presumably, among others, Indicate how to take the statement in regard to the context. Certainly, probably and possibly ', among others, show how much reliability is to be ascribed to the statement. Perhaps it is worth saying, though the matter should be sufficiently obvious, that no importance should be attached to the grouping of verbs and adverbs into three sets which has been adopted. It has been done purely for convenience in an outline exposition. There are differences between the members of each of my groups and the groups are not sharply divided. It is easy to think of verbs which might with equal reason be placed In either of two groups. Once again it must be said that our aim is to lay down general lines for the interpretation of parenthetical verbs, not to do full justice to any of them. Provided that it is not construed as a list of synonyms, we can couple these adverbs with parenthetical verbs as follows. 'happily I rejoice 'unfortunately I regret' 'consequently I deduce I infer' 'presumably I presume' admittedly I admit -"Certainly" compares to "I know,' cf.. "knowingly.' Probably I believe,' cf. 'Unbelievably, "believably.' This is not, Grice and Urmson repeat, a list of synonyms. Apart from questions of nuance of meaning the adverbs are more impersonal. "Admittedly" suggests that what is said would be regarded by anyone as an admission whereas "I admit" shows only the way that the statement is to be regarded here, by the utterer. Also it is not possible to say that every adverb has a verb corresponding to it which has more or less the same import, or vice versa. But it does seem that these adverbs and parenthetical play much the same role and have much the same grammatical relation to the statements which they accompany, and that, therefore, the comparison is illuminating in both directions. Now Grice and Urmson meet an objection which will certainly be made by some philosophers to this comparison. Grice and Urmson intend to meet the objection by a fairly detailed examination of the example which they themselves would most likely choose. In doing this Grice and Urmson further explain the use of a parenthetical verbs. The adverb is "Probably" and the verb is 'I believe.' To say, that something is probable, my imaginary objector will say, is to imply that it is reasonable to believe, that the evidence justifies a guarded claim for the utterer's trust or trustworthiness and the truth of the statement. But to say that someone believes something does not imply that it is 'reasonable' for the utterer to believe it, nor that the evidence justifies the guarded or implied claim to factivity or truth which he makes. Therefore, the objector will continue, the difference between the use of t' believe' and 'probably' is not, as Grice and Urmson suggest, merely one of nuance and degree of impersonality. In one case reasonableness is implied' in the other it is not. This objection is met by Grice and Urmson. They do so by making a general point. There is the utterer's implied claim to reasonableness. There is an implied claim to trust whenever a sentence is uttered in a standard context, and the meaning of this is explained. Now Grice and Urmson add, to meet the sceptical objection about the contrast between 'probably' and 'I believe' that, whenever an utterer makes a statement in a standard context there is an implied claim to reasonableness. This contention must be explained alla Kant. Cf. Strawson on the presumption of conversational relevance, and Nowell-Smith, and Grant. and Warnock. And Austin. Grice on 'rational' and 'reasonable' in "Aspects of reason". Unless we are acting or story-telling, or preface our remarks with some such phrase as "I know I'm being silly, but ..." or, "I admit it is unreasonable, but ..." it is, Grice and Urmson think, a presupposition or expectation of communication or conversation that a communicator will not make a statement, thereby implying this trust, unless he has some ground, however tenuous, for the statement. To utter 'The King is visiting Oxford tomorrow' or 'The President of the British Academy has a corkscrew in his pocket,' and then, when asked why the utterer is uttering that, to answer 'Oh, for no reason at all' would be to sin, theologically, against the basic conventions governing the use of discourse. Grice goes on to provide a Kantian justification for that, hence his amusing talk of maxims and stuff. Therefore, Urmson and Grice think there is an implied or expressed claim to reasonableness which goes with all our statements, i.e. there is a mutual expectation that a communicator will not make a statement unless he is prepared to claim and defend its reasonablenesss. Cf. Grice on 'reasonable' and 'rational', in "Aspects of reason" (the John Locke Lectures, Oxford). They can return to the defence of their account of belief and probability. We can now say, with less risk of being misunderstood, that when an utterer utterer "I believe, not know, that he is at home" or "Smith is, I believe (but not know), at home" the utterer both implies (or 'expresses' as Grice may prefer -- since 'implicate' is too strong) a guarded claim of his being trustworthy and reasonable re: the statement that Smith is at home. Thus, if our sceptical objector points out that 'Probably he is at home,' unlike 'I believe he is at home,' implies, in the view of the utterer, the reasonableness and justifiability of the statement, we may answer that this is equally true of 'believe' in the first person present. In such a form as 'I believe that Smith is at home'. What our objector fails to do is to notice the vast array of situations in which 'believe* is used. We will now single out some, but only some, of these uses. Jones says, 'Smith is, I believe, at home.' Here Jones makes an implied guarded claim (that is the effect of adding 'I believe') to his being trustworthy and also an implied claim to his being reasonable re the statement 'Smith Is at home*. This is the case already examined. Williams, reports Jones, says 'Smith is, Jones believes, at home.' This is oratio obliqua, reporting Jones' parenthetical use of the verb. Williams, by uttering the sentence, implies his and Jones's being trustworthy and reasonable re: the statement that Jones has made the statement that Smith is at home. Jones thereby implying its truth and reasonableness with the conventional warning signal about the evidential situation. A third scenario is Smith, who has discovered that there has been a sudden railway stoppage, sees Jones making his habitual morning dash to the station, and says 'Jones believes that the trains are working.' This is a new, and, however important, derivative, use of 'believe.' Note that in this context Smith could NOT say, 'The trains, Jones believes, are working.' But we can say, 'The trains, if Jones is to be believed, are working.' who has probably not considered the matter at all is behaving in the way that someone who prepared to say either 'The trains are running' or 'I believe that the trains are running' would behave (no doubt he would be prepared to say one or other of these things if he considered the matter. We thus in a perfectly intelligible way, extend our use of 'believe' to those situations in which a person behaves as a person who has considered the evidence and was willing to say 'I believe' would consistently behave. In this case, but in this case alone, there is some point in saying that 'believe' is used dispositionally. But note that it is so used with reference to another use of 'believe'. It is also noteworthy that the verb cannot be so used in the first person present. To say ' I believe' in this way is no more possible than to say 'I am under the delusion that ...' 'I believe' is always used parenthetically, though not always purely so. If one does recognizes that a belief that one has held is unreasonable, one either gives it up or is driven to saying 'I can't help believing.' This is psychological history, and carries with it no claim to truth or reasonableness. Thus we see that "Jones believes that p" does not imply the reasonableness of "p" any more than 'It seems probable to Jones that p" does. On the other hand, both "Probably p" and "I believe that p" do imply utterer's reasonableness re: p. Thus, so far at least as we are concerned with the well-known objection about reasonableness, the parallel between 'probably' (or certainly) and 'I believe' (or I know) has stood the test without difficulty. At the risk of digression we may pause to comment on the history of the analysis of knowledge and belief. Of old, since Plato, philosophers have tried to find a primary occurrent use of 'believe' as a psychological description. But since Austin, the impossibility of this has been amply demonstrated, and philosophers have resorted to a Ryle-inspired dispositional analysis, assuming that if the verb does not describe an occurrence it must describe a tendency to an occurrence. There is some point in the traditionalist reply to this that belief is here analysed as being the behaviour, if any, which would consistently accompany itself. A recognition that in the analysis of belief the non-descriptive parenthetical use is primary seems to illuminate and resolve this dispute. This is all that can here be said about belief. It far from exhausts even all the relevant considerations, but Grice's and Urmson's aim is not to examine any one parenthetical verb exhaustively; rather it is to shed new light on them all by presenting them as a group. I want to say the main things which may be said about a set of verbs which are not normally considered together as an aid to the thorough examination of each which Grice or Urmson not undertake. Individually, none of these verbs can be exhaustively treated in their capacity as parenthetical verbs and Grice and Urmson must not be taken as suggesting that they can. Further consideration of the third group. "I guess" has nowadays a colloquial use in which its significance is, at the best, very indeterminate -- or as Speranza would prefer, "otiose". But in a stricter use it serves to warn that what is being said is a guess. Suppose that one is asked 'Do you know who called this afternoon?' One may answer "No, but I guess that it was Mrs. Jones." Even here one is making an implied claim that it was Mr. Jones who called and that this is a reasonable thing to say. If one had said "I guess that it was Mr. Stalin" one would have been making a clumsy joke and not really guessing at all. It seems to Urmson and Grice to be quite impossible that anyone should think that here 'I guess ' reports a psychological state or a tendency or disposition o behave in any special way. It is put in to show that one is making one's statement without any specific evidence, that it is, in fact, a guess. What makes it a guess is not a psychological state nor a disposition to behave in any way, but, if it is a genuine guess, its being said without any specific evidence, and its being potentially silly or lucky, not well-based or ill- supported. Grice and Urmson cannot see that there is any essential difference between guess on the one hand and know, opine, and suspect, for example, on the other.specially The epistemological situation is more complicated in the latter set of cases, and some of them have special quirks in their use, 'know' being a notorious example, but that Is all. Each is essentially the same sort of verb. It might be worth while to compare this view of knowledge with what J. L. Austin said in 'Other Minds, P.A.S. Supp. Vol. XX (reprinted in L. L., II). Much of Grice's and Urmson's approach is suggested by this paper by Austin. Among other, less immediately relevant, things, Austin distinguishes a class of performatory verbs and compares our use of 'know' with our use of these verbs. In particular, Austin compares it with 'guarantee.' But Austin is careful not to say that 'know' is a performatory verb. He also points out Important differences between the 'guarantee' and 'know.'. Grice and Urmson agree that the comparison which Austin makes between 'know' and performatory verbs is just and illuminating. Parenthetical and performatory verbs have much in common as against ordinary descriptive verbs. Grice and Urmson are not therefore disagreeing with Austin, but trying to locate the verb to in a class which it was not his purpose to consider. Grice and Urmson distinguish a set of parenthetical verbs and make some points about their parenthetical use in the first person of the present tense. Each occurs in the present perfect, not the continuous tense, though its use is different from that of the present perfect tense of verbs which have a present continuous tense. Though, in a wide sense, a psychological verb, each is not psychologically descriptive. Each functions rather like a certain class of adverbs to orient the addressee aright towards the statements with which each is associated. The ways in which they do this may be roughly indicated as being aids to placing the statements aright against the emotional, social, logical, and evidential background. There is, as when the conjoined statements are used alone, an implied claim for the trustworthiness and reasonableness of the utterer re these associated statements. But parenthetical verbs are not always used parenthetically. In the first person present, to which use we have so far confined practically all our attention. We must now say something about their other uses. We may consider the positive analogy. In connexion with the point above, there Is a positive analogy, though not a very tidy one. The analogy seems to hold completely in the case of some verbs ; one cannot say f ' I was believing ', * he is believing ', c I was knowing ', *he was knowing', *I was suspecting* or 'he was suspecting'. In the case of some other parenthetical verbs, we find a rare and anomalous imperfect tense. For example, we can say that you were admitting something if you were interrupted in the middle of a statement which you were making as an admission ; or again, we can say that someone is deducing the consequences of a set of premisses, while he is stating a succession of things as deductions. But these are not genuine exceptions. In the case of another set of these verbs an imperfect is not so strange. At the end of an argument which have been put forth someone might say, for example, "All the while you were assuming (presupposing, accepting) that so and so." But this is not like the imperfect tense of ordinary verbs which report the continuance throughout a period of some occurrence. I was not throughout the period continuously doing an act of assumption which I carefully refrained from mentioning. Rather I was arguing as a man would reasonably argue who was prepared to say, ' I assume that so-and-so' ; that is to say, I was arguing in a way that required so and so as a premiss if the argument was to be valid. I ought, therefore, to be willing to state so-and-so as a premiss. Thus here, too, the other use has to be understood In the light of the parenthetical use. We must also note that, in general, these verbs can throughout be used in parenthesis. We can say "Jones was, Smith admitted, able." This seems to be so whenever the use is either definite oratio obliqua or, at any rate, a fair paraphrase. Some verbs, such as deduce and admit, seem always to be used in this way. But others, including, as we have already seen^ assume, prsuppse s and are used, not of a man who has said, (I assume (believe, presuppose) ', or words to that effect, but of a man who as a man reasonably would who was prepared to say that. In such a use, which is a genuine descriptive use, the parenthetical Insertion (in a grammatical sense) of the verb seems to be impossible. Continuing with the positive analogy, it seems to follow from the above that, except in some derivative uses, parenthetical verbs are not used as psychological descriptions in other parts of their conjugation any more than in the first person present. And even in these derivative uses ? they seem to describe general behaviour rather than to be specifically mental. The obvious negative analogy is, first, that the adverbs can only be used to correspond to the first person. But this negative analogy is only so in a very limited way. If the adverbs did correspond exactly to the whole conjugation of the verb, then the conjugation would appear to be otiose. But the adverbs can be systematically correlated with the whole conjugation of the parenthetical verbs with the aid of the verb to seem. Cf. Grice's desideratum of conversational candour, subsumed under the over-arching principle of conversational helpfulness (formerly 'conversational benevolence-cum-self-interest'). Grice thinks that the principle of conversational benevolence has to be weighed against the principle of conversational self-interest. The result is the overarching principle of conversational helpfulness. Clarity gets in the picture. The desideratum of conversational clarity is a reasonable requirement for conversants to abide by. Grice follows some of Warnock's observations. The logical grammar of 'trust' (and indeed 'candour') is subtle, especially when we are considering the two sub-goals of conversation: giving and receiving information/influencing and being influenced by others. In both sub-goals, trust is paramount. The explorations of trust had become an Oxonian hobby, with authors not such like Warnock, but B. A. O. Williams, and others. Keywords: trust, metaphysics, value. Trust as a corollary of the principle of conversational helpfulness. The logical grammar of 'trust' is an interesting one. Grice used to speak of 'candour.' In a given conversational setting, assuming the principle of conversational helpfulness is operating, the utterer U is assumed by the addressee A to be 'trustworthy.' There are two dimensions for trust, which relate to the TWO goals which Grice assumes the principle of conversational helpfulness captures: ‒ giving and receiving information, and influencing and being influenced by others. In both sub-goals, trust is key. In the doxastic realm, trust has to do, not so much with 'truth' (with which the expression is cognate) but 'evidence.' In the boulomaic realm, 'evidence' becomes less crucial. Grice mentions attitudes of the boulomaic type that are not usually judged in terms of evidential support. However, in the 'boulomaic' realm, utterer will be assumed as 'trustworthy' if the conative attitudes he displays are 'sincere.' Cf. 'decency.' A cheater for Grice is not 'irrational,' just repugnant!
1980. Philosophical psychology, needing, wanting, willing, intending, wants and needs, emotion, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 9-folders 30-31, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: want, need, wanting, needing, philosophical psychology, soul, emotion, Aristotle. Grice was interested in 'emotion' in his 'power structure of the soul.' A need and a want may count as an emotion. Grice was never too interested in 'needing' and 'wanting'' because they do not take a 'that'-clause. He congratulated Urmson for having introduced him to Prichard's brilliant 'willing that ...' Why is it, Grice wonders, that many ascriptions of buletic states take 'to'-clause, rather than a 'that'-clause? Even 'mean'! In this he was quite different from Austin, who avoided the 'that'-clause. My explanation is very obscure, like those of all grammar books on‘that’ clauses we see that the ‘that’ of oratio obliqua is not in all ways similar to the ‘that* in our explicit performative formulas : here I am not reporting my own speech in the first person singular present indicative active. Incidentally, of course, it is not in the least necessary that an explicit performative verb should be followed by ‘that’ : in important classes of cases it is followed by ‘to . . .’ or nothing, for example, ‘I apologize (for . . .)’, ‘I salute you.'‘ Now many of these verbs appear to be quite satisfactory pure performatives. (Irritating though it is to have them as such, linked with clauses that look like ‘statements’, true or false, we have mentioned this before and will return to it again.) For example, when I say ‘I prophesy that , . .’, ‘I concede that . . .’, ‘I postulate that . . the clause following will normally look just like a statement, but the verbs themselves seem to be pure performatives. we could distinguish the performative opening part (I state that) which makes clear how the utterance is to be taken, that it is a statement (as distinct from a prediction, &c.), from the bit in the that-clause which is required to be true or false. However, there are many cases which, as language stands at present, we are not able to split into two parts in this way, even though the utterance seems to have a sort of explicit performative in it: thus ‘I liken x to y\ ‘I analyse x as y\ Here we both do the likening and assert that there is a likeness by means of one compendious phrase of at least a quasi-performative character. Just to spur us on our way: we may also mention ‘I know that’, ‘I believe that’, etc. How complicated are these examples? We cannot assume that they are purely descriptive.’Want’ etymologically means ‘absence;’ ‘need’ should be preferred. The squarrel (squirrel) Toby NEEDS intake of nuts, and you'll soon see gobbling them! There is not much philosophical bibliography on these two 'psychological states' Grice is analysing. Their logic is interesting. Smith wants to play cricket. Smith NEEDS to play cricket. Grice is concerned with the propositional content attached to the 'want' and 'need' predicate. ’Wants that’ sounds harsh; so does ‘need that.’ Still, there are propositional attached to the pair above. ‘Smith plays cricket.’ Grice took a very cavalier attitude to what linguists spend their lives analysing. He thought it was surely NOT the job of the philosopher, especially from a prestigious university such as Oxford, to deal with the arbitrariness of grammatical knots attached to this or that English verb. He rarely used ‘English,’ but stuck with 'ordinary language.' Surely, he saw himself in the tradition of Kantotle, and so, aiming at grand philosophical truths: not conventions of usage, even his own! 1. Squarrel Toby has a nut, N, in front of him. 2. Toby is short on squarrel food (observed or assumed), so, 3. Toby wills squarrel food (by postulate of Folk Pyschological Theory θ connecting willing with intake of N). 4. Toby prehends a nut as in front (from (1) by Postulate of Folk Psychological Theory θ, if it is assumed that ‘nut’ and ‘in front’ are familiar to Toby). 5. Toby joins squarrel food with gobbling, nut, and in front (i.e. Toby judges gobbling, on nut in front, for squarrel food (by Postulate of Folk Psychological Theory θ with the aid of prior observation. So, from 3, 4 and 5, 6. Tobby gobbles; and since a nut *is* in front of him, gobbles the nut in front of him.
1980. Diagoge/epagoge, Grice's audio-files, the audio-files, audio-files of various lectures and conferences, some seminars with R. O. Warner and J. Baker, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series IV (Associations), Audio files of various lectures and conferences, carton 10 ‒ No folders ‒ BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: epagoge, diagoge. A previous folder in the collection contains the transcripts. These are the audio-tapes themselves, obviously not in folders. The kind of metaphysical argument which I have in mind might be said, perhaps, to exemplify a dia-gogic or trans-ductive as opposed to epa-gogic or in-ductive approach to philosophical argumentation. Trādūco (TRANSDVCO, Inscr. Orell. 750; Cic. Sest. 42, 91; Sall. J. 11, 4; Liv. 10, 37, 1; and so always in Cæs.; v. Neue, Formenl. 1, 734), xi, ctum, 3. Now, the more emphasis is placed on justification by elimination of the rival, the greater is the impetus given to refutation, whether of theses or of people. And perhaps a greater emphasis on a dia-gogic procedure, if it could be shown to be justifiable, would have an eirenic effect. Cf. Aristotle on diagoge, schole, otium. δια^γωγή, literally carrying across, “τριήρων” Polyaen.5.2.6. carrying through: hence fig., ἡ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν δ. taking a person through a subject by instruction, Pl. Ep.343e; so, course of instruction, lectures, ἐν τῇ ἐνεστώσῃ δ. prob. in Phld. Piet.25. Also passing of life, way or course of life, “δ. βίου” Pl. R.344e: abs., Id. Tht.177a, etc., way of passing time, amusement, “δ. μετὰ παιδιᾶς” Arist. EN1127b34, cf. 1177a27; “δ. ἐλευθέριος” Id. Pol.1339b5; διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν public pastimes, ib.1280b37, cf. Plu.126b (pl.). also delay, D.C. 57.3. management, τῶν πραγμάτων δ. dispatch of business, Id.48.5. IV. station for ships, f. l. in Hdn.4.2.8. V. διαγωγάν: διαίρεσιν, διανομήν, διέλευσιν, Hsch. Grice knew what he was talking about!
1980. Semantics, sentence semantics, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 9-folder 11, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Truth-conditional, constructivist. While Grice is NOT concerned about the 'semantics' of utterer's meaning (how could he, when he analyses '... means ...' in terms of '... intends ...', he is about the semantics of sentence-meaning. Grice's second stage ('expression' meaing) of his programme about meaning begins with specifications of 'means' as applied to 'x,' a token of 'X.' He is having Tarski's and Davidson's elaborations of schemata like ’’p’ means that p.’ ’Snow is white’ means that snow is white, and stuff! Grice was especially concerned with combinatories, for both unary and dyadic operators, and with multiple quantifications within a first-order predicate calculus with identity.
1980. A proposition as a class of propositional complexa, the proposition and the propositional complexum, sentence semantics and propositional complexa, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 9-folder 12, BANC MSS 90/135c, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: propositional complex, propositional complexum, propositional complexa, propositional complexes. Grice's propositional complexum. Grice was keen on the concept of a 'propositional complexum' which allowed him not to commit to the abstract entity of a 'proposition,' if the latter is regarded as an extensional family of 'propositional complexa' (Paul saw Peter; Peter was seen by Paul). The topic of a propositional complex was one that Grice regarded as Oxonian in nature. C. A. B. Peacocke had struggled with the same type of problems, in his various essays on the theory of content. Only a perception-based account of content in terms of 'qualia' gets the philosopher out of the vicious circle of introducing linguistic entities to clarify psychological entities and vice versa. One way to discharge the obligation to give an account of a proposition is would involve, as its central idea, focusing on a primitive range of ‘simple’ statements, the formulation of which would involve no connective or quantifier, and treating each of these as ‘expressing’ a ‘propositional complexum’ which in such cases would consist of a sequence two simplicia, simplex-1 and simplex- whose elements would be, first, for the first simplex, a general item (a set or an attribute, according to preference) and, the second 'simplex', an ordered sequence of this or that simplissimum, object, or individuum which might, or might not, instantiate or belong to the first item. The propositional complexum associated with ‘Grice is wise' may be thought of consisting of a complex sequence whose first 'general' member would be the set of wise persons, or alternatively the attribute or property of wisdom, and whose second ('instantial' or 'particular') member or individuum would be Grice or the singleton of Grice. 'Strawson loves Grice', may be represented as expressing a propositional complexum which is a complex sequence whose first element is love (considered either extensionally as a set or non-extensionally as an attribute or property, denoted by a two-place predicate) and whose second element is a sequence or ordered pair composed of the simplex individuum Strawson and the simplex individuum Grice, in that order. We can define a property of doxastic satisfactoriness’ which will be closely allied to the notion of truth. A 'simple,' or primary propositional complexum is factive or alethically satisfactory just in case its two elements (the general element and the instantial element) are related by the appropriate predication relation, just in case e.g. the second element is a member of the set (or possesses the attribute) in which the first element consists. A 'proposition' ('propositio') simpliciter may now, alla Chomsky, be represented as each consisting of a family of propositional complexa. The conditions for family unity may be thought of either as fixed or as variable in accordance with the context. Grice's ontological views are-at least-liberal. As Grice says when commenting on the mind-body problem in 'Method in philosophical psychology', I am not greatly enamoured of some of the motivations which prompt the advocacy of psychophysical identifications; I have in mind a concern to exclude such 'queer' or 'mysterious' entities as souls, purely mental events, purely mental properties and so forth. My taste is for keeping open house for all sorts of conditions of entities, just so long as when they come in they help with the housework. Provided that I can see them work, and provided that they are not detected in illicit logical behaviour (within which I do not include a certain degree of indeterminacy, not even of numerical indeterminacy), I do not find them queer or mysterious at all. To fangle a new ontological Marxism, they work therefore they exist, even though only some, perhaps those who come on the recommendation of some form of transcendental argument, may qualify for the specially favoured status of entia realissima. To exclude honest working entities seems to me like metaphysical snobbery, a reluctance to be seen in the company of any but the best objects. One way entities can work is by playing a role in the explanation of what a proposition is. What would such an explanation look like? And, what sorts of entities would it put to work? Answering these questions will illustrate Grice's 'ontological Marxism' while clarifying the notion of a proposition. What work do the entities in a theory of propositions do? They are to produce a theory meeting three constraints. First, there are systematic relations between sentences and propositions. For example, the sentence 'Socrates runs' is correlated with the proposition that Socrates runs; the sentence 'snow is white' with the proposition that snow is white, and so on. There are two determinants of the proposition (or propositions) to which a sentence is related. One is the syntactic form of the sentence. The sentences 'Clearly, John spoke' and 'John spoke clearly' are related to different propositions by virtue of the different syntactic relations among their respective parts. The other determinant is the meaning of the parts of the sentence. The sentence 'snow is white' is correlated with the propositions that snow is white in part because 'snow' means what it does. On Grice's theory this correlation between sentences and propositions is effected by language-users resultant procedures. An adequate theory of propositions should explicitly characterize this systematic relation between this or that sentence and this or that 'proposition.' Since there are infinitely many sentences, one would presumably give such a characterization recursively. The second constraint is that an account of what a 'proposition' is should yield an adequate account of the relation of logical consequence that we exploit in everyday psychological explanation. E. g., if an utterer U, by uttering an appropriate sentence, means that U knows the route and that Smith does as well, the utterer U's addressee A may conclude that Smith knows the route. The conclusion, the 'proposition' that Jones knows the route, is a logical consequence of the conjunctive 'proposition' that the utterer U knows the route and that Smith does as well. Given the assumption that the utterer U is trustworthy, his addressee A is entitled to the conclusion precisely because it is a logical consequence of the proposition that the utterer means. We frequently exploit such a relation of logical consequence in every-day psychological explanation, and an adequate theory of what a proposition is should provide us with an adequate characterisation of this relation. One may think (as Grice does) that this task is not really distinct from exhibiting the systematic relations between this or that sentences and this or that proposition, but it is worth stating the second constraint separately to emphasize the role of logical consequence in psychological explanation, and hence the relation of a theory of propositions to such explanation. A third constraint is that a theory of what a proposition is should provide the basis, at least, for an adequate account of the relation between thought, action, and language on the one hand, and reality on the other. E. g., one perceives the desk, walks over to sit at it, and utters sentences to mean things about it. Since a proposition is the item we specify in specifying the content of a thought, perception, intention, act of meaning, and so on, an account of what a proposition is should at least provide the basis for an account of the relation between mind and reality. Since Quine is the philosopher most generally associated with the rejection of the idea of a proposition, it may be helpful briefly to compare Quine's views with Grice's. Quine has two main arguments against the idea of a propositions. The first is based on Quine's arguments that synonymy is not a well-defined equivalence relation, the identity conditions for this or that proposition are unclear and there is 'no entity without identity.' V e. g., W. V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic. On this issue, Grice is not committed to an equivalence relation of synonymy, thus his remark about indeterminacy, but he parts company with Quine over whether clear identity conditions are required for a kind of entity. If they work they exist, whether we can always tell them apart or count them ‒ or not. There are many respectable entities for which we do not have criteria of identity. Suppose Grice's favourite restaurant moves. Is it a new restaurant with the same name? Or suppose it changes owners and names but nothing else. Or that it changes menu entirely? Or that it changes chefs? It would be foolish to look for a single criterion to answer these questions ‒ the answers go different ways in different contexts. But surely the concept of a restaurant is a useful one and restaurants do exist. Quine's second objection is that the idea of a proposition does not work. Grice denies this allegation. The main reason for disagreement is perhaps due to Quine's attitude that a concept such as desire and belief is of, at most, secondary importance in the unified canonical science that is his standard for ontology. Grice does not believe that every-day psychological discourse is a temporary pre-scientific expedient to be done away with as soon as possible. On the contrary, Grice believes that at least some psychological concepts and explanations play a fundamental role in both semantics and ethics. To quote the relevant passage a second time. The psychological theory which I envisage would be deficient as a theory to explain behaviour if it did not contain provision for interests in the ascription of psychological states otherwise than as tools for explaining and predicting behaviour, interests e. g. on the part of one creature to be able to ascribe these rather than those psychological states to another creature because of a concern for the other creature. Within such a theory it should be possible to derive strong motivations on the part of the creatures subject to the theory against the abandonment of the central concepts of the theory and so of the theory itself, motivations which the creatures would or should regard as justified. Indeed, only from within the framework of such a theory, I think, can matters of evaluation, and so, of the evaluation of modes of explanation, be raised at all. If I conjecture aright, then, the entrenched system contains the materials needed to justify its own entrenchment; whereas no rival system contains a basis for the justification of anything at all. Now suppose, as Grice thinks, certain ways of thinking, certain categories, are part of what is entrenched. There are certain concepts or categories that we cannot avoid applying to reality. The entities in these categories are entia realissima. We discover these categories by discovering what parts of everyday psychology are entrenched. The idea that there are necessary categories plays a role in Grice's views about ethics; in discussing this views we see why certain principles or laws of everyday psychology are self-justifying, principles connected with the evaluation of ends. If these same principles play a role in determining what we count as entia realissima, metaphysics would be grounded in part in considerations about value (a not unpleasant project).
1980. Rationality and akrasia, emotion and akrasia, emotions and incontinence, Urmson on the emotive theory of ethics, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 6-folder 32, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: akrasia, emotion, Urmson, the emotive theory of ethics. Grice was never too interested in emotion (or feeling) because while we do say ‘I feel that the cat is hungry’, we also say, 'I'm feeling byzantine.' The concept of 'emotion' needs a philosophical elucidation. Grice was curious about a linguistic botany for that! Akrasia for Grice covers both buletic-boulomaic and doxastic versions. The buletic-boulomaic version may be closer to the concept of an emotion. Grice quotes from A. J. P. Kenny's essay on ‘emotion.’ But Grice is looking for more of a linguistic botany. As it happens, Kenny's essay has Griceian implicata. One problem Grice finds with emotion is that 'feel that ...' sometimes behaves like 'thinks that ...' Another is that there is no good Grecian word for 'emotio.' Kenny, of St. Benet's, completed his essay on emotion under A. M. Quinton (who would occasionally give seminars with Grice), and examined by two members of Grice's Play Group: D. F. Pears and P. L. Gardiner. Kenny connects an emotion to a 'feeling,' which brings us to Grice on 'feeling boringly byzantine'! Grice proposes a derivation of akrasia in conditional steps for both buletic-boulomaic and doxastic akrasia. ἐπιθυ_μ-ία , Ion. -ιη, ἡ, A.desire, yearning, “ἐ. ἐκτελέσαι” Hdt.1.32; ἐπιθυμίᾳ by passion, opp. προνοίᾳ, Th.6.13: generally, appetite, Pl.Cra.419d, etc.; αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐ. Id.Phd.82c; esp. sexual desire, lust, Democr.234 (pl.), Pl.Phdr.232b, etc.; αἱ πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας ἐ. X.Lac.2.14. 2.. c. gen., longing after a thing, desire of or for it, ὕδατος, τοῦ πιεῖν, Th.2.52, 7.84, etc.; “τοῦ πλέονος” Democr. 224; “τῆς τιμωρίας” Antipho 2.1.7; “τῆς μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν πολιτείας” And.2.10; “τῆς παρθενίας” Pl.Cra.406b; “εἰς ἐ. τινὸς ἐλθεῖν” Id.Criti.113d; ἐν ἐ. “τινὸς εἶναι” Id.Prt.318a, Tht.143e; “γεγονέναι” Id.Lg.841c; εἰς ἐ. τινὸς “ἀφικέσθαι θεάσασθαι” Id.Ti.19b; “ἐ. τινὸς ἐμβαλεῖν τινί” X.Cyr.1.1.5; ἐ. ἐμποιεῖν ἔς τινα an inclination towards . ., Th.4.81. II.. = ἐπιθύμημα, object of desire, ἐπιθυμίας τυχεῖν Thalesap.Stob.3.1.172, cf. Lync. ap. Ath.7.295a; ἀνδρὸς ἐ., of woman, Secund.Sent.8; πενήτων ἐ., of sleep, prob. in ib.13. There must be more to emotion, such as 'philia,' than epithumia! cf. Grice on Aristotle on 'philos.' What is an emotion? Aristotle, Rhetoric II.1; David Konstan “Pathos and Passion” Robert C. Roberts, “Emotion”; W.W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion; Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Aristotle, Rhetoric II.2-12; Selections from De Anima, Nicomachean Ethics, and Topics (Nexus); Price, Anthony W. "Emotions in Plato and Aristotle." The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion Stephen Leighton, “Aristotle and the Emotions” De Anima II.12 and III 1-3; De Memoria 1; Rhetoric II.5; Scheiter, “Images, Imagination, and Appearances” Caston, Victor, “Why Aristotle Needs Imagination” Martha Nussbaum, “Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion” John Cooper, “An Aristotelian Theory of Emotion” Striker, Gisela. "Emotions in Context: Aristotle’s Treatment of the Passions in the Rhetoric and his Moral Psychology." Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Dow, Jamie. "Aristotle’s Theory of the Emotions’." Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle PLATO. Aristotle, Rhetoric I.10-11; Plato Philebus 31b-50e and Republic IV (Nexus) Recommended: Frede, Dorothea. "Mixed feelings in Aristotle’s Rhetoric." Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric Jessica Moss, “Pictures and Passions in Plato”; Protagoras 352b-c, Phaedo 83b-84a, Timaeus 69c STOICS A. A. Long & D.N. Sedley, The Tad Brennan, “The Old Stoic Theory of Emotion” The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. by J. Sihvola, T. Engberg-Pedersen Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation Sorabji, Richard. Chrysippus Posidonius Seneca: A High-Level Debate on Emotion. Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics Margaret Graver, Preface and Introduction to Cicero on Emotion: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4 Graver, Margaret R. Stoicism and emotion. Tusculan Disputations 3 Recommended: Graver, Margaret. "Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic Προπάθειαι." Phronesis. Tusculan Disputations 4 Frede, Michael. "The Stoic doctrine of the affections of the soul." Schofield and Striker, Brennan, T. 'The Stoic life: Emotions, duties, and fate”; A. C. Lloyd, 'Emotion and decision in stoic psychology,' The stoics, individual emotions: anger, friendly feeling, and hatred. Aristotle Rhetoric II.2-3; Nicomachean Ethics IV.5; Topics 2.7 and 4.5; Konstan, “Anger” Giles Pearson, Aristotle on Desire; Scheiter, Review of Pearson’s Aristotle on Desire; Leighton, Stephen. "Aristotle's Account of Anger: Narcissism and Illusions of Self‐Sufficiency." Ratio 15 Stocker, Michael. “The Complex Evaluative World of Aristotle’s Angry Man,” Valuing emotions. Cambridge University Press, 1996. Aristotle Rhetoric II. 4; Konstan, “Hatred” Konstan, David. "Aristotle on Anger and the Emotions: the Strategies of Status." Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen, C. Rapp, 'The emotional dimension of friendship: notes on Aristotle's account of 'philia' in 'Rhetoric' II 4” Grice endeavours to give an answer to the question whether and to what extent 'philia' (friendship), as it is treated by Aristotle in Rhetoric II.4, can be considered a genuine emotion as, for example, fear and anger are. Three anomalies are identified in the definition and the account of philia (and of the associated verb 'philein'), which suggest a negative response to the question. However, these anomalies are analysed and explained in terms of the specific notes of 'philia' in order to show that Rhetoric II4 does allow for a consideration of friendship as a genuine emotion. Seneca, On Anger (De Ira) Seneca, On Anger Seneca, On Anger (pp. 62-96); Katja Vogt, “Anger, Present Injustice, and Future Revenge in Seneca’s De Ira” FEAR Aristotle, Rhetoric II.5; Nicomachean Ethics III.6-9 Stephen Leighton, “Aristotle’s Courageous Passions” Plato’s Laws I, Susan Sauvé Meyer, “Pleasure, Pain, and ‘Anticipation’ in Plato’s Laws, Book I” Konstan, “Fear” PITY Aristotle, Rhetoric II. 8-9; Poetics, chs. 6, 9-19 ; Konstan, “Pity” Belfiore, Elizabeth S. Tragic pleasures: Aristotle on plot and emotion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton university press, Konstan, David. "Aristotle on the Tragic Emotions." The Soul of Tragedy: Essays on Athenian Drama SHAME Aristotle, Rhetoric II.6; Nicomachean Ethics IV.9 Konstan, “Shame” Jessica Moss, “Shame, Pleasure, and the Divided Soul” Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity
1980. Trust, decency, and rationality, Rationality, trust, and decency, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 6-folder 18, BANC, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library. Keywords: trust, decency, rationality. Grice found the etymology of 'decent' too obscure. dĕcet , cuit, 2, I.v. impers. [Sanscr. dacas, fame; Gr. δοκέω, to seem, think; Lat. decus, dignus]. It is seemly, comely, becoming,; it beseems, behooves, is fitting, suitable, proper (for syn. v. debeo init.): ‘decere quasi aptum esse consentaneumque tempori et personae,’ Cic. Or. 22, 74; cf. also nunc quid aptum sit, hoc est, quid maxime deceat in oratione videamus, id. de Or. 3, 55, 210 (very freq. and class.; not in Caes.). Constr., with nom. or inf. of the thing, and with acc.; less freq. with dat. of the pers.; sometimes absol.Grice's idea of 'decency' is connected to his explorations on 'rational' and 'reasonable'. To cheat may be neither unreasonable nor rational. It's just repulsive! Indecent, in other words. In all this, Grice is concerned with 'ordinary language,' and treasures Austin's question to Warnock (when Warnock was looking for a fellowship at Austin's college): ’Warnock: what would you say the difference is between (i) and (ii)?’ i. Smith plays cricket rather properly. ii. Smith plays cricket rather incorrectly. ’They spent the whole dinner over such subtleties!’ ’And Warnock fell in love with Austin.’ Grice's explorations on 'trust' are Warnockian in character too. For Warnock, in ‘Object of morality,’ trust is key, indeed, the very object of morality. Grice started to focus on trust in his Oxford seminars on the implicatum. There is a desideratum of conversational candour. And a subgoal of the principle of conversational helpfulness is that of giving and receiving 'information.' ‘False 'information' is just no information.’ Grice loved that Latin dictum, ‘tuus candor.’ He makes an early defence of this in his 'fatal' objection to Malcolm. The philosopher cannot intentionally instill a falsehood in his tutee. There is a transcendental justification, not just utilitarian (honesty as the best policy). We trust ourselves that some of our belifes have to be true, and we are equally trusted by our conversational partners. What would otherwise be the point of holding that conversation is rational co-operation? What would be the point of conversation simpliciter?
1980. Autonomy, freedom, in the tradition of Kantotle, Kantotle, Immanuel Kant, Kant, Kant's ethics, Kant, mid-sentences, freedom, The H. P. Grice Papers, series III (The Doctrines), carton 5-folders 14-18, and Series V (Topical), carton 7-folders 14-18, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Kant, freedom, ethics. Grice was especially concerned with Kant's having brought back the old Greek idea of 'eleutheria' for philosophical discussion.
1980. Philosophy, lectures, Berkeley group, team notes, The H. P. Grice Papers, series III (The doctrines), carton 5-folder 26, and series V (Topical), carton 6-folder 21, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: philosophy
1980. Kant's ethics, Kant, The H. P. Grice Papers, aeries III (The Doctrines), carton 5-folders 19-21, and folder 23, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Kant, ethics. Grice knew how to teach ethics. He taught Kant as if he were teaching Aristotle, and vice versa. His students would say, ‘Here come [sic] Kantotle!’ Grice was obsessed with Kantotle. He would teach one or the other as an ethics requirement. Back at Oxford, the emphasis was of course Aristotle, but he was aware of some trends to introduce Kant in the Lit.Hum. curriculum, not with much success! Strawson had done his share with Kant's ‘pure’ reason in ‘The bounds of sense,’ but White professors of moral philosophy were usually not too keen on Kant's ‘pratical’ reason!
1980. From Genesis to Revelations: a new discourse on metaphysics. Metaphysics and the language of philosophy, The H. P. Grice Papers, series III (Doctrines), carton 5-folder 24, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: metaphysics, philosophical method. Grice had been interested in the methodology of 'metaphysics' since his Oxford days. He counts as one memorable experience in the area his participation in two episodes for the BBC Third Programme on ‘The nature of metaphysics’ with the organiser, D. F. Pears, and his former tutee, P. F. Strawson on the panel. Grice was particularly keen on Collingwood's views on metaphysical presuppositions, ‘both absolute and relative!’ Grice also considers John Wisdom’s view of the metaphysical proposition as a ‘blatant falsehood.’ Grice considers Bradley’s Hegelian metaphysics of the absolute, in ‘Appearance and reality.’
1980. Autonomy, freedom, implicature-free, unweighted rationality, The H. P. Grice Papers, series III (The Doctrines), carton 5-folder 25, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library. Keywords: freedom, Kant, implicature'free. The topic of 'freedom' fascinated Grice, because it merged the practical with the theoretical. Grice sees the conception of freedom as crucial in his elucidation of a rational being. ‘Conditions of freedom’ are necessary for the very idea, as Kant was well aware. ‘A thief who is forced to steal is just a 'thief'.’ Grice would engage in a bit of language botany, when exploring the ways the adjective 'free' is used, 'freely,' in 'ordinary language': 'free fall,' 'alcohol-free,' 'sugar-free,' and his favourite: 'implicature-free.' Grice's more systematic reflections deal with 'pirotology, or 'creature construction'. A vegetals, for example is less free than an animal, but more free than a stone! And Humans are more free than non-human. Grice wants to deal with some of the paradoxes identified by Kant about freedom, and he succeeds in solving some of them. There is a section on freedom in ‘Action and events’ for The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly where he expands on 'eleutheria' and notes the idiocy of a phrase like 'free fall.' Grice was irritated by the fact that his friend H. L. A. Hart wrote an essay on liberty and not on freedom.
1980. Autonomy, freedom, Kant's Grundlegung, Kant's Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics, Kant's foundation of the metaphysics of morals, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 7, folders 3-4, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keyword: Grundlegung. While Grice can't read Kant in German, he uses the English vernacular. Note the archaic 'metaphysic' sic in singular. More Kant.
1980. Semantics, grammar and semantics, with R. O. Warner, The H. P. Grice Papers, series V (Topical), carton 7-folder 5, BANC MSS 90/135c The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Truth-conditional semantics and implicata.
1980. Autonomy, causa finalis, to telos, finis, Teleology and unified science, teleology, the unity of science and teleology, unity of science and teleology, Hands Across the Bay and Beanfest, value, metaphysics, and teleology, finality, final cause (telos-aitia), with A. D. Code, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series IV (Associations), carton 6-folder 9, and Series V (Topical), carton 6-folder 38 and carton 9-folder 23, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: unity of science, teleology, unified science, value, metaphysics, telos, finality, mechanism, final cause (telos-aitia), Code. Grice’s métier. ‘Unity of science’ was a very ‘New-World’ expression that Grice did not quite buy. Grice was brought up in a world, the ‘Old World,’ indeed, as he calls it in his ‘Proem’ to the John Locke lectures, of C. P. Snow's 'two cultures.' At the time of Grice's philosophising, philosophers such as Peter Winch (who indeed quotes fro Grice) were contesting the idea that science is unitary, when it comes to the explanation of rational behaviour. Since a philosophical approach to the explanation of rational behaviour, including conversational behaviour (to account for the conversational implicata) is his priority, Grice needs to distinguish himself from those who propose a 'unified' science, which Grice regards as eliminationist and reductionist. Grice is ambivalent about 'science' and also playful (‘philosophia regina scientiarum’). Grice seems to presuppose, or implicate, that, since there is the devil of scientism, science cannot get at teleology. The devil is in the physiological details, which are irrelevant. The language Grice uses to describe his pirots as goal-oriented, aimed at survival and reproduction, seems 'teleological' and somewhat 'scientific,' though. But he means that ironically! As the scholastics use it, 'teleology' is a science, the science of 'telos,' or finality (cf. Aristotle on 'telos aitia,' causa finalis. The unity of science is threatened by teleology, and vice versa. Unified science seeks for a 'mechanistically derivable' teleology. But Grice's sympathies lie for 'detached' finality. Grice is obsessed with the Greek idea of a 'telos,' as ‘slightly overused’ by Aristotle. Grice thinks that some actions are 'for their own sake.' ‘What is the telos of Oscar Wilde?’ ‘Can we speak of Oscar Wilde's métier?’ If a tiger is to tigerise, a human is to humanise, and a person is to personise. Grice thought that teleology is a key philosophical way to contest mechanism, so popular in The New World. Strictly, and Grice knew this, 'teleology' is constituted as a 'discipline.' ‘One term that Cicero was unable to translate!’ For the philosopher, 'teleology' is that part of philosophy that studies the realm of the 'telos.' Informally, 'teleological' is opposed to 'mechanistic'. Grice is interested in the mechanism/teleology debate, indeed jumps into it, with a goal in mind! Grice finds some New-World philosophers too mechanistic-oriented, in contrast with the more 'two-culture' atmosphere he was familiar with at Oxford! Code is the Aristotelian, and he and Grice are especially concerned in the idea of 'causa finalis.' For Grice only detached finality poses a threat to Mechanism, as it should!
1980. Benevolentia, malevolentia, metaphysics and ill-will, beneficentia, maleficentia, The H. P. Grice Papers, series V (Topical), carton 7-folder 28. Keyword: ill-will, goodwilll, kingdom of ends. A conceptual elucidation. Interesting from a historical point of view seeing that Grice had introduced a principle of conversational benevolence (i.e. conversational goodwill) as early as 1964! Malevolentia was over-used by Cicero, translating the Grecian. Grice judges that if Jones fails to get the job that benevolent Smith promised, Smith may still be deemed, for Kant, if not Aristotle, to have given him the job.
1980. Myth, method and myth, The H. P. Grice Papers, series V (topical), carton 7-folder 30, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: myth, method. A philosopher should be allowed, as Plato was, to use a myth, if he thinks his tutee will thank him for that! Grice loved to compare his ‘Oxonian dialectic’ with Plato's ‘Athenian’ (strictly, ‘Academic’) ‘dialectic.’ Indeed, there is some resemblance between Plato's and Grice's use of 'myth' for philosophical methodological purposes. Grice especially enjoyed a 'myth' in his programme in philosophical psychology. In this, he was very much being a philosopher. Non-philosophers usually criticise this methodological use of a 'myth,' but they would, wouldn't they? Grice suggests that a myth has diagogic relevance. Creature construction (the philosopher as demi-god) if mythical, is an easier way for a philosophy don to instil his ideas on his tutee than, say, privileged access and incorrigibility
1980. Philosophy, conferences, discussion, The American Philosophical Association, transcripts by Randall Parker, from the audio-tapes contained in carton 10 within the same series IV (Associations), miscellaneous, Beanfest, transcripts and audio-cassettes, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series IV (Associations), carton 6-folder 8, and folder 10, and Series V (Topical), carton 8-folders 4-8, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Unfortunately, Parker typed ‘carulise’ for ‘karulise.’ Or not.
1980. Theory-theory, metaphysics and theorising, The H. P. Grice Papers, series II (The essays), carton 4-folders 3-4, series III (The doctrines), carton 5-folder 31, and series V (topical), carton 7-folder 29, and carton 9-folder 14, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: metaphysics, theorising, theory-theory, eschatology, Plato, Socrates, Thrasymachus. Grice realised that there is no way to refer to things like intending except with 'psychological,' which he takes to mean, 'belonging to a pscyhological theory. Grice was keen to theorise on theorising. He thought that Aristotle's 'first philosophy' (prote philosophia) is best rendered as ‘Theory-theory’! Grice kept using Oxonian English spelling, 'theorising,' except when he did not! Grice calls himself 'folksy': his theories, even if subject to various types of Ramseyfication, are 'popular' in kind! And ceteris paribus! Metaphysical construction is disciplined and the best theorising the philosopher can hope for! The way Grice conceives of his ‘Theory-theory’ is interesting to revisit. A route by which Grice hopes to show the centrality of metaphysics (as 'prote philosophia') involves taking seriously a few ideas. If any region of enquiry is to be successful as a rational enterprise, its deliverance must be expressable in the shape of one or another of the possibly different types of theory. A characterisation of the nature and range of a possible kind of theory θ is needed. Such a body of characterisation must itself be the outcome of rational enquiry, and so must itself exemplify whatever requirement it lays down for any theory θ in general. The characterisation must itself be expressible as a theory θ, to be called (‘if you like,’ Grice politely puts it!) ‘theory-theory,’ or meta-theory, θ2. Now, the specification and justification of the ideas and material presupposed by any theory θ, whether such account falls within the bounds of Theory-theory, θ2 would be properly called 'prote philosophia' ('first philosophy') and may turn out to relate to what is generally accepted as belonging to the subject matter of metaphysics. It might, for example, turn out to be establishable that any theory θ has to relate to a certain range of this or that subject item, has to attribute to each item this or that predicate or attribute, which in turn has to fall within one or another of the range of types or categories. In this way, the enquiry might lead to recognised metaphysical topics, such as the nature of being, its range of application, the nature of predication and a systematic account of categories. 1980. Metaphysics, philosophical eschatology, and Plato's Republic, Thrasymachus, social justice, Socrates, along with notes on Zeno, and topics for pursuit, repr.in Part II, Explorations in semantics and metaphysics to Studies in the Way of Words. Keywords: metaphysics, philosophical eschatology, Plato's Republic, Socrates, Thrasymachus, justice, moral right, legal right, Athenian dialectic. Philosophical eschatology is a sub-discipline of metaphysics concerned with what Grice calls a 'category shift.' Grice, having applied such a technique to Aristotle's aporia on 'philos' ('friend') as alter ego, uses it now to tackle Socrates's view, against Thrasymachus, that 'right' applies primarily to 'morality,' and secondarily to 'legality.' Grice has a specific reason to include this in his ‘Studies in the Way of Words.’ Grice’s exegesis of Plato on justice displays Grice's take on the fact that metaphysics needs to be subdivided into ontology proper and what he calls 'philosophical eschatology,' for the study of things like 'category shift’ and other construction routines. The exploration of Plato’s ‘Politeia’ thus becomes an application of Grice’s philosophically eschatological approach to the item 'just,' as used by Socrates ('morally just') and Thrasymachus ('legally just'). Grice has one specific essay on Aristotle (published in The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly). So he thought Plato merited his own essay, too! Grice's focus is on Plato's exploration of 'dike.' Grice is concerned with a neo-Socratic (versus neo-Thrasymachean) account of 'moral' justice as conceptually (or axiologically) prior to 'legal' justice. In the proceeding, he creates 'philosophical eschatology' as the OTHER branch to metaphysics, along with good ol' ontology. To say that 'just' crosses a categorial barrier (from the moral to the legal) is to make a metaphysical, strictly eschatological, pronouncement. The Grice Papers locate the Plato essay in Series II, the Socrates essay in Series III, and the Thrasymachus essay, under 'social justice,' in Series V. Grice is well aware that in his account of 'fairness,' Rawls makes use of his ideas on 'personal identity.' The philosophical elucidation of 'fairness' is of great concern for Grice. He had been in touch with such explorations as Nozick’s and Nagel’s along anti-Rawlsian lines. Grice's ideas on rationality guide his exploration of 'social justice.' Grice keeps revising the 'Socrates' notes. The Plato essay he actually dates 1988. As it happens, Grice's most extensive published account of Socrates is in this commentary on Plato's Republic: an 'eschatological' commentary, as he puts it. In an entertaining fashion, Grice has Socrates, and neo-Socrates, exploring the logic and grammar of 'just' against the attack by Thrasymachus and neo-Thrasymachus. Grice's point is that, while the legal 'just' may be conceptually prior to the moral 'just,' the moral 'just' is evaluationally or axiologically prior.
1980. The idea of a value system, value systems, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 9-folders 25-27, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: value system. The idea of a system of values (cf. 'system of ends') is meant to unify the goals of the agent in terms of the pursuit of 'eudæmonia.' Cf. Foot, morality as a system of conditional and suppositional imperatives.
1980. Semantic theory, semantics, syntax and semantics, The H. P. Grice Papers, series V (Topical), carton 9-folders 17-18, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: syntax, semantics. Especially the former. Grice loved two devices of the syntactic kind: subscripts and square brackets (for the assignment of 'common-ground status'). Grice is a conservative (dissenting rationalist) when it comes to syntax and semantics. He hardly uses 'pragmatics' albeit in a loose way ('pragmatic import,' 'pragmatic inference'), but was aware of Morris's triangle. Syntax is presented along the lines of Gentzen, i.e. a system of 'natural deduction' in terms of inference rules of introduction and elimination for each formal device. Semantics pertains rather to Witters's truth-values, i.e. the assignment of a satisfactory-valuation: the true and the good.
1980. Philosophical explanation, the why, the 'that' and the 'why,' metaphysics, description/taxonomy vs. theoretical explanation, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 9-folder 19, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: explanation, description, 'why,' 'what'. Oddly, Grice had spent some time on x-questions in the Kant lectures. And why is an x-question. A philosophical explanation of conversation. A philosophical explanation of implicature. Description vs. explanation. Grice quotes from Fisher, ‘Never contradict. Never explain.’ Taxonomy, is worse than explanation, always. Grice is exploring the 'taxonomy-description' vs. explanation dichotomy. He would often criticise 'ordinary-language' philosopher Austin for spending too much valuable time on linguistic botany, 'without an aim in his head.' Instead, his inclination, a dissenting one, is to look for the 'big picture of it all,' and disregard a piece-meal analysis. Conversation is a good example. While Austin would subjectify 'Language' (Linguistic Nature), Grice rather places rationality squarely on the behaviour displayed by utterers as they make conversational moves that their addressees will judge as 'rational' along specific lines. Observation of the principle of conversational helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who cares about the two goals which are central to conversation, viz. giving and receiving information, and influencing and being influenced by others, is expected to have an interest in taking part in a conversation which will only be profitable (if not possible) under the assumption that it is conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational helpfulness. Grice is not interested in conversation per se, but as a basis for a theory that explains the mistakes 'ordinary-language' philosophers are making. The case of ‘What is known to be the case is not believed to be the case.’
1981. Philosophy, miscellaneous, topics, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 8-folders 9-13, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: philosophy. Grice was a 'meta-linguistic botanist.' His point was to criticise 'ordinary-language' philosophers criticising philosophers. Say: Plato and Ayer say that 'episteme' is a kind of 'doxa.' The 'contemporary,' if 'dated,' ordinary-language philosopher detects a nuance, and embarks risking collision with the conversational 'facts' or data: rushes ahead to exploit the nuance without clarifying it, with wrong dicta like: ‘What I known to be the case I don't believe to be the case.’ Surely, a cancellable implicatum generated by the rational principle of conversational helpfulness is all there is to the nuance. Grice knew that unlike the 'ordinary-language' philosopher, he was not providing a taxonomy or description, but a theoretical explanation.
1982. Reflections on morals, meta-ethics, ethics, with J. Baker, ethics, North Carolina notes, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), carton 4-folders 17-25, and Series V (Topical), carton 6-folders 34-36, and carton 9-folder 7, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: morals, meta-ethics. Grice's explorations on morals are language based. With a substantial knowledge of the classical languages (‘that are so good at verb systems and modes like the optative, that English lacks’), Grice explores modals like ’should,’ (Hampshire) ‘ought to’ (Hare) and, ’must’ (Grice ‒ 'necessity'). Grice is well aware of R. M. Hare's reflections on the 'neustic' qualifications on the 'phrastic.' The ‘imperative’ has usually been one source for the philosopher's concern with the language of morals. Grice attempts to balance this with a similar exploration on 'good,' now regarded as the 'value-paradeigmatic' notion par excellence. We cannot understand, to echo Strawson, 'the concept of a person' unless we understand the concept of a good person, i.e. the philosopher's conception of a good person. Morals is very Oxonian. There were in Grice's time only three chairs of philosophy at Oxford: the three W: the Waynflete chair of metaphysical philosophy, the Wykeham chair of logic (not philosophy, really), and the White chair of moral philosophy. Later, the Wilde chair of philosophical psychology was created. Grice was familiar with Austin's cavalier attitude to morals as White's professor of moral philosophy, succeeding Kneale. When R. M. Hare succeeds Austin, Grice knows that it is time to play with the neustic implicatum! Grice's approach to morals is very 'meta-ethical' and starts with a fastidious (to use Blackburn's characterisation, not mine!) exploration of 'modes' related to propositional phrases involving 'should,' 'ought to,' and 'must.' For Hampshire, 'should' is the moral word par excellence. For Hare, it is 'ought.' For Grice, it is only ‘must’ that preserves that sort of necessity that, as a Kantian rationalist, he is looking for. However, Grice hastens to add that whatever he'll say about the buletic, 'practical' or boulomaic ‘must’ must also apply to the 'doxastic' ‘must,’ as in ‘What goes up must come down.’ That he did not hesitate to use 'necessity' operators is clear from his axiomatic treatment, undertaken with A. D. Code, on Aristotelian categories of izzing and hazzing. To understand Grice's view on ethics, we should return to the idea of creature construction in more detail. Suppose we are genitors-demigods-designing living creatures, creatures Grice calls pirots. To design a type of pirot is to specify a diagram and table for that type plus evaluative procedures, if any. The design is implemented in animal stuff-flesh and bones typically. Let us focus on one type of pirot-a very sophisticated type that Grice, borrowing from Locke, calls 'very intelligent rational pirots'. Think of them very roughly as creatures with the capacities for thought and action characteristic of persons. Being benevolent genitors, we want to design these pirots so as to maximize their chances for survival. As Grice recently pointed out in conversation-by talk of survival, he does not, in the case of very intelligent rational pirots, mean simply staying alive. A full explanation of what Grice has in mind here would require an account of his views on teleology; however, for our purposes a full explanation is unnecessary. We need note only the following points. First, in constructing pirots we build in certain ends, and for our purposes we may imagine ourselves as having a fairly free hand in deciding what ends to select. To build in an end is to construct the diagram and table so that the pirots have that end as a standing, constant end-an end where they strive to realize in all appropriate circumstances. The restriction to appropriate circumstances is necessary for two reasons. First, we will want to endow the pirots with a variety of ends, and we will not want a pirot to try to realize each end at each moment of time. We want them to schedule their pursuit of ends in a way that maximizes the realization of the whole array in the long run. Second, we will, in the case of very intelligent rational pirots, want to give them the (limited) ability to eliminate (or inhibit for a long time the pursuit of) built-in ends should circumstances prove especially inappropriate. Now we can explain what, for present purposes, we mean by 'survival': to maximize chances for survival is to maximize chances for the realization of built-in ends. How are we to design the pirots so as to maximize their chances for realizing the built-in ends? The answer would be easy if we could take as given a very detailed specification of the environment in which the pirots live. Then we could tailor the diagram and table to that specific environment by building in exactly the responses that the environment demands. But we cannot assume such a specific description of the environment; on the contrary, we know that the pirots will face a variety of changing environments. So we need to design the pirots to function effectively in the widest possible range of environments. We could, of course, avoid this if we were willing to descend periodically from Olympus in order to redesign the pirots in response to each significant change in the environment. But there is a more efficient way to achieve the same result: we give the pirots the ability to redesign themselves. There are two aspects to this ability. First among the ends we build in is the end of being an end-setter. To be an end-setter requires that one have the (limited) ability to adopt new ends and to eliminate ends one already has. To have the end of being an end-setter is to have the end of employing this ability to adopt and eliminate ends. This is not, as we will see, a complete specification of what it is to be an end-setter, but it will suffice for the moment. By making the pirots end-setters we will enable them to redesign themselves by altering what they aim at. Second, to enable pirots to determine when to use their end-setting ability, we have given them an appropriate set of evaluative principles. These principles incorporate in the pirots some of our wisdom as genitors. We do not need to descend periodically to redesign them because in a sense we are always present-having endowed them with some of our divine knowledge. What does this have to do with ethics? Grice answers this question in 'Method in Philosophical Psychology'. To interpret the reference to 'rational capacities and dispositions' in the following passage, recall that, given the connection between evaluative principles and rationality Grice spells it out, we have, in giving the pirots evaluative principles, given them a capacity for rational evaluation. Let me be a little more explicit, and a great deal more speculative, about the possible relation to ethics of my programme for philosophical psychology. I shall suppose that the genitorial programme has been realized to the point at which we have designed a class of pirots which, nearly following Locke, I might call 'very intelligent rational pirots'. These pirots will be capable of putting themselves in the genitorial position, of asking how, if they were constructing themselves with a view to their own survival, they would execute this task; and, if we have done our work aright, their answer will be the same as ours .... We might, indeed, envisage the contents of a highly general practical manual, which these pirots would be in a position to compile. The contents of the initial manual would have various kinds of generality which are connected with familiar discussions of universalizability. The pirots have, so far, been endowed only with the characteristics which belong to the genitorial justified psychological theory; so the manual will have to be formulated in terms of that theory, together with the concepts involved in the very general description of livingconditions which have been used to set up that theory; the manual will therefore have conceptual generality. There will be no way of singling out a special subclass of addressees, so the injunctions of the manual will have to be addressed, indifferently, to any very intelligent rational pirot, and will thus have generality of form. And since the manual can be thought of as being composed by each of the so far indistinguishable pirots, no pirot would include in the manual injunctions prescribing a certain line of conduct in circumstances to which he was not likely to be subject; nor indeed could he do so even if he would. So the circumstances for which conduct is prescribed could be presumed to be such as to be satisfied, from time to time, by any addressee; the manual, then, will have generality of application. Such a manual might, perhaps, without ineptitude be called an immanuel; and the very intelligent rational pirots, each of whom both composes it and from time to time heeds it, might indeed be ourselves (in our better moments, of course). We can both explain and motivate this approach to ethics by considering three objections. First, one may complain that the above remarks are extremely vague. In particular, what are the evaluative principles-the rational capacities and dispositions-with which we endow the pirots? These principles play a central role in compiling the manual (Immanuel). How can we evaluate the suggested approach to ethics until we are told what these evaluative principles are? This complaint is somewhat unjust-in the context of 'Method in Philosophical Psychology' at least, for there Grice labels his remarks as speculative. But, more importantly, Grice has done a considerable amount of work directed toward providing this objection with the information it demands; this work includes investigations of happiness, freedom, reasoning, and teleology. While the examination of these projects is unfortunately beyond the scope of our introduction, we should comment briefly on Grice's work on happiness. In 'Some Reflections about Ends and Happiness', Grice develops an account of happiness, and on this account it is clear that the conception of happiness could certainly function as a central 'evaluative principle' in endsetting. It is also worth remarking here that Grice's views on happiness are very Aristotelian; Grice emphasizes the Kantian aspect of his view in the passage quoted, but when the views are worked out, one finds a blend of Kantian and Aristotelian themes. The second objection is that Grice's approach makes it too easy to escape the demands of morality. What can Grice say to a personor pirot-who rejects the manual, rejects moral demands and constraints? Suppose, for example, that a person reasons as follows: If I continue to heed the voice of morality, I will continue on occasion to sacrifice my welfare and interests in favor of another's welfare and interests. Why should I be such a fool? After all, what am I after except getting as much as I can of what I want. Thorough-going egoism is the path to take; I'll have to resist these impulses to help others, in the way I resist sweets when I am dieting. Perhaps I will be able to condition such impulses out of myself in time. Does Grice's approach have a reply to the consistent thorough-going egoist? It does-as Grice pointed out in a recent conversation; the considerations which follow are based on that conversation. First we need to provide a more detailed account of end-setting. When we give our pirots the end of end-setting we have a good reason for giving them each of the evaluative principles in order to build in the capacity to redesign themselves, and we build in that capacity in order to maximize their chances of realizing their ends over the widest possible range of environments. So we have a good reason for giving them each of the end-setting evaluative principles: namely, each one contributes to the capacity of redesigning in a way that maximizes the chances of realizing endls. The pirots themselves are capable of recognizing that the evaluative principles make such a contribution, so each pirot has (or can have) a reason for having the evaluative principles. (We are assuming that contributing to the maximization of the realization of ends constitutes a good reason; a defence of this assumption would require an examination of Grice's view on teleology.) A second essential point is that we design the pirots so that they do not simply adopt or eliminate ends at will; rather, they do so only when they have good reasons to do so-good reasons derived from the evaluative principles that govern end-setting. We design them this way in order to maximize their chances for the realization of their ends. We want them to use their ability for end-setting only when the evaluative principles we have built in determine that a change of ends is called for in order to maximize the overall realization of ends. (In the typical case at least, an end-setter will only alter some of his ends as to maximize the realization of all his (remaining and newly adopted) ends.) An end-setter then has the end of adopting or eliminating ends when he has good reasons to do so-where these reasons are provided by evaluative principles; and these evaluative principles are such that he has a good reason for having each of those principles. Let us call such an end-setter a Griceian end-setter. Returning now to egoism, we can distinguish three different situations in which one might try to reject the 'demands of morality'. Before going on, one may insist on knowing what we mean by the 'demands of morality', but it is enough for present purposes that we agree that morality demands at least that one does not always treat others purely as means to one's own ends. It is this demand that the egoist described earlier rejects. First, if the egoist is a Griceian end-setter who wishes to remain a Griceian end-setter, then he cannot abandon the non-egotistical principles since they are self-justifying and do not depend on other premisses. Second, if the egoist envisioned is one who would cease to be a Griceian end-setter, this too is impossible for a rational agent. Being a Griceian end-setter is itself one of the self-justifying ends, and thus it can be abandoned only if one abandons reasoning. Finally, there is the question of whether an agent who is not a Griceian end-setter can be an egoist. Again the answer appears to be 'no', if the agent is rational and considers the question. For being a Griceian end-setter can be seen on reflection to be a self-justifying end, and thus must be adopted by any reflective rational agent. Let this suffice as a brief indication of Grice's approach to the second objection, and let us turn to the third and last objection. This objection concerns what we have been calling 'the demands of morality'; the objection is that the notion of demand is vague. What do we mean by 'demand' when we talk of the 'demands of morality'? What kind of demand is this? What sort of claim is it that morality has on us? Grice has done a considerable amount of work relevant to this question including 'Probability, Desirability, and Mood Operators', the John Locke Lectures, and recent work on Kant. In explaining the claim morality has on us, Grice employs distinctions and notation provided by his theory of meaning. We can begin with the sentence 'Pay Jones the money!' Grice assigns this sentence the following structure: !+I pay Jones the money where '!' is the imperative mood operator and 'I pay Jones the money' is a moodless sentence radical. This structure is embeddable in other sentences. In particular, it occurs in both 'I should pay Jones the money' and 'I should not pay Jones the money'. Grice assigns these the following structures: Acc+!+I pay Jones the money; Not+ Acc+! +I pay Jones the money, where 'Ace' may be read as 'it is acceptable that'. So if we read '!' as 'let it be the case that', the whole string, 'Acc+! I pay Jones the money' may be read as: 'It is acceptable that (let) it be the case that I pay Jones the money' (whole 'Not+ Acc.+! +I pay Jones the money' may be read as 'It is not the case that it is acceptable that (let) it be the case that I pay Jones the money'). In 'Probability, Desirability, and Mood Operators' Grice motivates this assignment of structures by arguing, in effect, that the sentence 'I should pay Jones the money' means-on the central and important reading-that it is acceptable that (let) it be the case that I pay Jones the money. The argument rests on an analysis of practical reasoning and on the analysis of sentence meaning. Actually, Grice does not say that 'I should pay Jones the money' means what we just said it means. In 'Probability, Desirability, and Mood Operators' he is much more circumspect. After discussing probability inferences, Grice notes that, bearing in mind the variety of interpretations to which sentences containing 'ought' and 'should' are susceptible, he finds it natural to take, as practical analogues to sentences like 'an invalid is likely to be in retirement', sentences like 'it is desirable for an invalid to keep in touch with his doctor'. For expositional purposes, he uses 'should-sentences' since the interpretation we want these sentences to bear is clear, and the use of 'should-sentences' highlights the connections with ordinary moral reasoning. Suppose morality demands that I pay Jones the money; that is, I act morally only if I pay Jones the money. Grice holds that this is true only if an appropriate sentence (or thought) is derivable from my evaluative principles-a sentence (or thought) whose underlying structure is 'Acc+!+I pay Jones the money'. I can, that is, derive that it is acceptable that (let) it be the case that I pay Jones the money; in other words, that I should pay Jones the money. Grice holds that since I derive this from evaluative principles, it is necessary; that is, it is necessary that I should pay Jones the money. There are two points to note in order to explain the claim morality has on us. First, Grice holds that the self-justifying evaluative principles are necessarily true, and he holds that I can show, e.g. that it is necessarily true that I should pay Jones the money, by constructing a suitable derivation of 'I should pay Jones the money' from my self-justifying evaluative principles. These claims follow from a general view Grice has of the nature of necessity, a view that he considers elsewhere. To be more precise, what I derive from my evaluative principles is a sentence with the underlying structure: Acc+!I pay Jones the money, which we read as 'It is acceptable that (let) it be the case that I pay Jones the money'. Since it is possible to construct an appropriate derivation it is necessary that it is acceptable that (let) it be the case that I pay Jones the money. This is how we should understand attaching 'necessary' to a 'should-statement'. The sentence 'Necessarily, I should pay Jones the money' expresses the necessary acceptability of the imperative 'Pay Jones the money!' (Since my derivation will involve contingent information about the circumstances C, we should represent what I derive as 'I should in these circumstances C pay Jones the money'; this will be what is necessary. We ignore this detail.) Second, it does not follow from the fact that it is necessary that I should pay Jones the money that I will pay him the money. Even if it is necessary that it is acceptable that (let) it be the case that I pay Jones the money, and even if I derive this, I may not act on it. It is true that I cannot have a good reason not to act on it; after all, I have derived the necessity of accepting the imperative, 'Pay Jones the money!'; and as a Griceian end-setter I am committed to acting on such reasons; but this does not mean I will. A person is capable of irrationality-even in the face of acknowledged necessity. Now we are in a position to explain what we mean by talk of the demands of morality. The demands of morality are expressed by necessary 'should-statements'. Or perhaps we may want to say that they are expressed by a special subset of such statements. We need not investigate this possibility since it would not alter the point we are making here-which is that the demands of morality express the necessity of rational agents accepting and acting on certain imperatives (in so far as they act rationally). Consider the role elements of Grice's theory of meaning play in the above discussion of ethics, we have in a way returned to the startingpoint of our exposition of Grice's views. And it is certainly high time we let the discoverer of M-intentions formulate some in response to what we have written. High time but not quite time. For one thing, we should note that the discussion of ethics resolves an issue we suppressed when discussing psychological explanation. At one point in that section, we wrote, with respect to M-intending, 'Given our ends and our environment, there is good and decisive reason to have such a pre-rational structure.' We did not raise the question of what makes those considerations into a reason; we tacitly assumed that relations to happiness and survival secured that the considerations counted as reasons. The ethics discussion points the way to detailed and informative treatment of this issue. Not that the discussion suggests that we were wrong to appeal tacitly to happiness and survival; on the contrary, it indicates that we should explain the reason-giving force of such considerations by examining the role they play for a Griceian-end-setter.
1982. Correspondence with J. Baker, The Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice, IA), carton 1-folder 2, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Grice, Baker. Grice collaborated with Baker mainly on work on ethics seen as an offspring, alla Kant, of philosophical psychology. Akrasia was one such topic. Baker contributes to P. G. R. I. C. E. (‘Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends’), a festschrift for Grice, with an essay on the purity, and alleged lack thereof, of morally evaluable motives. Do one's motives have to be pure? For Grice morality cashes out in 'interest,' or desire. Baker also contributes to a volume on Grice's honour published by Palgrave, Meaning and analysis: essays on H. P. Grice. Baker is the organiser of a symposium on the thought of Grice for the American Philosophical Association, the proceedings of which are published in The Journal of Philosophy, with J. F. Bennett as chair, and contributions by Baker, R. Grandy, and comments by R. Stalnaker and R. Warner.
1982. The buletic-doxastic divide, the alethic-practical divide, The Kantian problem, miscellaneous, value sub-systems, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 9-folders 25-27, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Kant's problem, the power structure of the soul. More than a value may co-ordinate in a system. One such is 'eudæmonia' (cf. 'system of ends'). Kant's problem is the reduction of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical or suppositional imperative. For Kant, a value tends towards the subjective. Grice, rather, wants to offer a 'metaphysical' defence of 'objective' value. Grice called the manual of conversational maxims the Conversational Immanuel.
1982. Axiology, value and rationalism, values and rationalism, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 9-folder 28, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: value, rationalism, axiology. Grice arrives at value (optimum, deeming) via Peirce's meaning. But then there's the 'truth-value.' The sorry story, as Grice calls it, of Deontic logic faces Jørgensen's dilemma. Jørgensen's dilemma is best seen as a trilemma,’ Grice says. The following three claims are incompatible: An inference requires that each element (the premise and the conclusion) has what Boole, Peirce, and Frege call a truth ‘value.’But an ‘imperative’ dos not have a truth-value. It is alleged that there may be an inference between this or that imperative. Responses to this problem involve rejecting one of the three premises. The input-output logics reject the first premise. They provide inference mechanism on elements without presupposing that these elements have a truth value. Alternatively, one can deny the second premise. One way to do this is to distinguish between the buletic itself and a doxastic about it. According to this response, only the doxastic about the buletic has a satisfactory, indeed doxastically satisfactory, value. Finally, one can deny the third premise. But this is to deny that there is a logic of imperatives worth investigating. Grice preferred to define 'value' =df. satisfactoriness. Thus, '.p' can be 0 or 1, '!p' can be 0 or 1. ’The form of the utterance will guide you as to how to read 'satisfactoriness,' which is my jargon for 'value' applicable both to an indicative and an imperative.’ With satisfactoriness, Grice offers a variant to Hofstadter and McKinsey's satisfaction. In their ‘On the Logic of Imperatives,’ a syntax is elaborated for the imperative mode, using 'satisfaction.'' ‘We understand an imperative to be satisfied (as 'The door is closed' may also be said to be satisfied iff the door is closed) iff what is commanded is the case. Thus the fiat ‘Let the door be closed!’ is satisfied if the door is closed. We shall thus refer to the satisfaction of an imperative.’ According to Hofstadter and McKinsey, the function is a satisfaction-function. This or that unary operator and this or that dyadic operator become this or that satisfaction-function. As Grice puts it, ‘an inferential rule, which flat rationality is the capacity to apply, is not an arbitrary rule. An inferential rule picks out this or that transitions of acceptance in which transmission of the predicate ‘satisfactory’ (buletic/doxastic) is guaranteed or (in this or that non-deductive case) to be expected.’ As Grice notes, since the sentential form will indicate what species of value is involved, he uses the generic 'satisfactory'. He imports into the object-language the phrase 'It is buletically satisfactory that' and 'It is doxastically satisfactory that ...' '!p is buletically satisfactory' just in case '!p' is buletically satisfactory. '⊢p is doxastically satisfactory just in case '⊢ p' is doxastically satisfactory.' As Grice introduces 'it is acceptable that' (with the syntactical provisions which he is using); on the buletic side, 'It is acceptable that !p' is doxastically satisfactory just in case ''!p' is buletically satisfactory' is doxastically satisfactory. Grice goes on to provide this or that generic or generalized versions of this or that 'satisfactoriness-functor,' using 'φ' and 'ψ' to represent sentences (in either mode). Using 1-b/d for satisfactory and 0-b/d for unsatisfactory Grice stipulates. ‘φ and ψ’ is 1-b/d just in case ‘φ’ 1-b/d and ‘ψ’ is 1-b/d. ‘φ or ψ’ is 1-b/d just in case one of the pair, ‘φ and ψ’, is 1-b/d. ‘'if φ, ψ’ is satisfactory just in case either ‘φ’ is 0-b/d or ‘ψ’ is 0-b/d. There are, however, a number of points to be made. It is not fully clear to Grice just how strong the motivation would be for introducing this or that mode-neutral connective ‒ co-ordinators ‘and,’ ‘or,’ and sub-ordinator ‘if’ ‒ nor whether, if this or that connective is introduced, this or that restriction should not be imposed. The problematic examples are be, of course, the mixed-mode ones (those in which one clause is buletic and the other doxastic). Grice, an Austinian at heart, finds it natural to look for guidance from 'ordinary' language. ‘The beast is filthy and don't touch it’ (.p and ~!p) and ‘The beast is filthy and I shan't touch it’ (.p and ~!p) seem all right to Grice. But the commutated ‘Don't touch the beast and it is filthy’ (~!q and .p) seems dubious. ‘Touch the beast and it will bite you’ (!p and .q), while idiomatic, is not, at the implicatum level, a 'conjunction,' nor a genuine invitation to touch the beast. ‘Smith is taking a bath or leave the bath-room door open’ (.p or !q) is, perhaps, intelligible. But the commutated ‘Leave the bath-room door open or Smith is taking a bath’ (!q or .p) seems considerably less so. It is perhaps worth noting that, in this or that non-mixed case, satisfactoriness is specifiable as buletic satisfactoriness or doxastic satisfactoriness. But, for this or that mixed case, no such specification would be available unless we make a special case, as Grice does in ‘Method,’ for the buletic mode to be dominant over the doxastic mode. The crunch comes, however, with ‘NOT’, or negation, one of the four possible unary satisfactoriness-functor, which Grice has been carefully ignoring. ‘'not'⊢p' (~⊢p) might, perhaps, be treated as satisfactoriness-functional/conditional equivalent to '⊢ not-p' (⊢~p). But what about ''not'!p' (~!p)? Should we treat is as buletically-satisfactoriness-functionally/conditionally equivalent to ‘!'not'p’ (!~p)? And what do we say in a case like, perhaps, ‘Let it be that I now put my hand on my head’ (!p) or ‘Let it be that my bicycle faces north’ (!p), in which, at least on occasion, it seems to be that neither '!p' nor '!~p' is either buletically satisfactory or buletically unsatisfactory? And what buletic satisfactory value do we assign to '~!p' (how do we now introduce 'not'?) and to '~!~p' (how do we go on to eliminate 'not')? Do we proscribe this or that form altogether, for every cases? But that would seem to be a pity, since '~ ! ~p' seems to be quite promising as a representation for 'you may (permissive) do alpha that satisfies p'; i.e., the utterer explicitly conveys his refusal to prohibit his addressee A doing alpha. Do we disallow embedding of (or iterating) this or that form? But that (again if we use ‘~!p’ and ‘~!~p’ to represent 'may') seems too restrictive. Again, if '!p' is neither buletically satisfactory nor buletically unsatisfactory (the utterer could care less) do we assign a 'value' other than 1 or 0 to '!p' ('buletically neuter,' 0.5). Or do we say, echoing Quine, that we have a buletically satisfactoriness value 'gap'? These and other such problems would require careful consideration. Yet Grice cannot see that those problems would prove insoluble, any more than this or that analogous problem connected with Strawson's presupposition (‘Don't arrest the intruder!’) are insoluble. In Strawson's case, the difficulty is not so much to find a solution as to select the best solution from those which present themselves. Grice takes up the topic of a calculus in connection with the introduction rule and the elimination rule of a 'modal' such as ‘must.’ We might hope to find, for each member of a certain family of modalities, an introduction rule and an elimination rule which would be analogous to the rules available for classical logical constants. Suggestions are not hard to come by. Let us suppose that we are seeking to provide such a pair of rules for the particular modality of necessity ‒ 'necessary,' symbolised by □. For an introduction rule (□, +) Grice considers the following (Grice thinks equivalent) forms: if 'φ' is demonstrable, '□φ' is demonstrable. Provided 'φ' is dependent on no assumptions, derive 'φ' from 'φ '‘. For an elimination rule (□, -), Grice considers ‘From '□φ' derive 'φ'‘. It is to be understood, of course, that the values of the syntactical variable 'φ' would contain either a buletic or a doxastic mode markers. Both ‘!p’ and ‘.p’ would be proper substitutes for 'φ' but ‘p’ would not. Grice wonders: ‘[W]hat should be said of Takeuti's conjecture (roughly) that the nature of the introduction rule determines the character of the elimination rule? There seems to be no particular problem about allowing an introduction rule which tells us that, if it is established in P's 'PERSONalised' system that φ, 'it is necessary, with respect to P, that φ' is doxastically satisfactory (establishable). The accompanying elimination rule is, however, slightly less promising. If we suppose such a rule to tell us that, if one is committed to the idea that it is necessary, with respect to P, that φ, one is also committed to whatever is expressed by φ, we shall be in trouble. For such a rule is not acceptable. φ will be a buletic expression such as 'Let it be that Smith eats his hat.' And my commitment to the idea that Smith's system requires him to eat his hat does not ipso facto involve me in accepting (volitively) ‘Let Smith eat his hat’. But if we take the elimination rule rather as telling us that, if it is necessary, with respect to X, that let X eat his hat, then ‘let X eat his hat’ possesses satisfactoriness-with-respect-to-X, the situation is easier. For this person-relativised version of the rule seems inoffensive, even for Takeuti, we hope. Grice, following Mackie, uses 'absolutism,' as opposed to 'relativism,' which denies the rational basis to attitude ascriptions (but cf. Hare on 'subjectivism'). Grice is concerned with the absence of a thorough discussion of 'value' by English philosophers, other than Hare (and he is only responding to Mackie!). Continental philosophers, by comparison, have a special discipline, 'axiology,' for it! Similarly, a continental-oriented tradition Grice finds in The New World in philosophers of a pragmatist bent, such as Carus. Grice wants to say that 'rationality' is a value, because it is a faculty that a creature (human) displays to adapt and survive to his changing environments. The implicature of the title is that values have been considered in the English philosophical tradition, almost alla Nietzsche, to belong to the realm 'irrational.' Grice grants that axiological implicatum rests on a PRE-rational propension.
1982. Rationality and akrasia, incontinentia, in M. Hintikka and B. Vermazen, Actions and events: essays on the work of Donald Davidson, Clarendon, with a reply by Davidson, 1985, Davidson on weakness of the will, akrasia, incontinence, the paradox of akrasia, The H. P. Grice Papers, series II (essays), carton 2-folders 22-23, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: akrasia, incontinence, incontinentia, philosophical psychology, rationality. Grice allows that 'benevolentia' may be deemed 'beneficentia.' If Smith has the good will to give Jones a job, he may be deemed to have given Jones the job, even if Jones never get it. In buletic akrasia we must consider the conclusion to be 'desiring what is not best for the agent's own good,' never mind if he refrains from DOING what is not best for his own good. ‘Video meliora proboque deteriora sequor.’ ‘We shouldn't be saying this, but we are saying it!’ Grice prefers 'akrasia,' but he is happy to use Cicero's translation, also negative, of this: 'incontinentia,' ‘as if 'continentia' were a virtue!’ For Grice, the alleged paradox of 'akrasia,' both alethic and practical, has to be accounted for by a theory of rationality from the start, and not be deemed a 'stumbling block.' Grice is interested in both the common-or-garden buletic-boulomaic version of akrasia, involving the volitive soul ‒ in term of desirability ‒ and doxastic akrasia, involing the judicative soul proper ‒ in terms of probability. Grice considers buletic akrasia and doxastic akrasia ‒ the latter yet distinct from Moore's paradox, ‘p but I don't want to believe that p,’ in symbols ‘p 'AND' ~ψb-dp.’
1982. Axiology, objective value, the conception of value, Clarendon, objectivity and value, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 8-folder 18, BANC MSS 1990/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: relative value, objective value. Some background for his third Carus lecture. He tries to find out what J. L. Mackie means when he says that a value is ultimately 'subjective'. What about inter-subjective, and constructively 'objective'? Grice constructs absolute value out of relative value. But once a rational pirot constructs value, the pirot assigns absolute status to 'rationality' qua value. The pirot cannot then choose not to be rational at the risk of ceasing to exist (qua person, or essentially rationally human agent). A human, as opposed to a person, assigns relative value to his rationality. A human is accidentally rational. A person is necessarily so. ‘A distinction seldom made by Aristotle and some of his dumbest followers obsessed with the modal-free adage, ‘Homo rationale animal.’ hūmānus (old form: hemona humana et hemonem hominem dicebant, Paul. ex Fest. p. 100 Müll.; cf. homo I.init.), a, um, adj. homo, of or belonging to man, human. persōna , ae, I.f [acc. to Gabius Bassus ap. Gell. 5, 7, 1 sq., from per-sŏno, to sound through, with the second syllable lengthened]. 'Falsa est (finitio), si dicas, Equus est animal rationale: nam est equus animal, sed irrationale,’ Quint.7,3,24:‘homo est animal rationale,’ id. 5, 10, 56; cf. id. 5, 8, 7; and: ‘nec si mutis finis voluptas, rationalibus quoque: quin immo ex contrario, quia mutis, ideo non rationalibus,’ id. 5, 11, 35; so without a subst.:‘a rationali ad rationale (translatio),’ id.8,6,13. ’τὸ λογικόν ζῷον‘ ‒ ’τὸ λ. ζῷον‘ Chrysipp. Stoic.3.95; ἀρεταὶ λ., = διανοητικαί, opp. ἠθικαί, Arist. EN1108b9.λογικός, ή, όν, (λόγος), ζῶον λόγον ἔχον NE, 1098a3-5. ’λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων,’ man alone of all animals possesses speech, from the Politics!
1982. Axiology, the rational motivation for objective value, the conception of value, Clarendon, objective value, rational motivation, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 8-folder 19, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: value, axiology, rationality, objective value. As a matter of history, Grice reaches value (in its guises of 'optimum' and 'deeming') via his analysis of Peirce's meaning. Many notions are value-paradeigmatic. The most important of all philosophical notions, that of 'rationality,' presupposes objective value as one of its motivations. For Grice, 'ratio' can be understood 'cognoscendi' but also 'essendi.' ‘Rational motivation’ involves both types of 'ratio.' While it's practical to restore 'axis' for Grice's 'value,' it's not easy to find Grecianisms for 'absolute’ (L. absolutus, from absolvere, In rhet. lang., unrestricted, unconditional, absolute ’hoc mihi videor videre, esse quasdam cum adjunctione necessitudines, quasdam simplices et absolutas,’ Cic. Inv. 2, 57, 170. 'objective' (L. objectum, from obicio ‒ objectus , ūs, m. obicio, I. a casting before, a putting against, in the way, or opposite, an opposing; or, neutr., a lying before or opposite (mostly poet. and in postAug. prose): dare objectum parmaï, the opposing of the shield, Lucr. 4, 847: ‘vestis,’ Col. 3, 19: ‘insula portum Efficit objectu laterum,’ by the opposition, Verg. A.1,160:‘cum terga flumine, latera objectu paludis tegerentur,’ Tac. H. 3,9: ‘molis,’ id.ib.5,14:‘regiones, quæ Tauri montis objectu separantur,’ Gell. 12, 13, 27: ‘solem interventu lunæ occultari, lunamque terræ objectu,’ the interposition, Plin. 2, 10, 7, § 47; cf.: eademque (terra) objectu suo umbram noctemque efficiat, Cic. Fragm. ap. Non. 243, 13 dub. (al. objecta soli): ‘hi molium objectus (i. e. moles objectas) scandere,’ the projection, Tac. A. 14, 8. II. Transf., that which presents itself to the sight, an object, appearance, sight, spectacle, Nep. Hann. 5, 2 (al. objecto)) and if not 'categoric.' (This is analogous to Grice's overuse of psychoLOGICAL when he just means 'souly.' It is perhaps his use of 'psychological' for 'souly' that leads to take any souly concept as a theoretical concept within a folksy psychoLOGICAL theory.
1982. Axiology, the rational motivation for objective value, the conception of value, Clarendon, objective value, rational motivation, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Topical), carton 8-folder 19, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: value, axiology, rationality, objective value. As a matter of history, Grice reaches value (in its guises of 'optimum' and 'deeming') via his analysis of Peirce's meaning. Many notions are value-paradeigmatic. The most important of all philosophical notions, that of 'rationality,' presupposes objective value as one of its motivations. For Grice, 'ratio' can be understood 'cognoscendi' but also 'essendi.' ‘Rational motivation’ involves both types of 'ratio.' While it's practical to restore 'axis' for Grice's 'value,' it's not easy to find Grecianisms for 'absolute’ (L. absolutus, from absolvere, In rhet. lang., unrestricted, unconditional, absolute ’hoc mihi videor videre, esse quasdam cum adjunctione necessitudines, quasdam simplices et absolutas,’ Cic. Inv. 2, 57, 170. 'objective' (L. objectum, from obicio ‒ objectus , ūs, m. obicio, I. a casting before, a putting against, in the way, or opposite, an opposing; or, neutr., a lying before or opposite (mostly poet. and in postAug. prose): dare objectum parmaï, the opposing of the shield, Lucr. 4, 847: ‘vestis,’ Col. 3, 19: ‘insula portum Efficit objectu laterum,’ by the opposition, Verg. A.1,160:‘cum terga flumine, latera objectu paludis tegerentur,’ Tac. H. 3,9: ‘molis,’ id.ib.5,14:‘regiones, quæ Tauri montis objectu separantur,’ Gell. 12, 13, 27: ‘solem interventu lunæ occultari, lunamque terræ objectu,’ the interposition, Plin. 2, 10, 7, § 47; cf.: eademque (terra) objectu suo umbram noctemque efficiat, Cic. Fragm. ap. Non. 243, 13 dub. (al. objecta soli): ‘hi molium objectus (i. e. moles objectas) scandere,’ the projection, Tac. A. 14, 8. II. Transf., that which presents itself to the sight, an object, appearance, sight, spectacle, Nep. Hann. 5, 2 (al. objecto)) and if not 'categoric.' (This is analogous to Grice's overuse of psychoLOGICAL when he just means 'souly.' It is perhaps his use of 'psychological' for 'souly' that leads to take any souly concept as a theoretical concept within a folksy psychoLOGICAL theory.
1983. Axiology, the conception of value, Clarendon, the Paul Carus lectures, Clarendon, Oxford, The H. P. Grice Papers, series II (Essays), carton 2-folders 12-16, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: objectivity, value, relative value, absolute value, metaphysics, relative and absolute value, categorical imperative, the axiological implicatum. Grice reaches the notion of value through that of 'meaning.' If Peirce was simplistic, Grice ain't! But his ultra-sophisticated analysis ends up being 'deemed' to hold in this or that utterer. And 'deeming' is 'valuing,' as is 'optimum.' While Grice rarely used 'axiology,' he should! A set of three lectures, which are individually identified below. ‘I love Carus!’ Grice was undecided as to what his Paul Carus lectures were be on. He explores 'meaning' under its 'value' ‘optimality’ guise in ‘Meaning revisited.’ Grice thinks that a 'value-paradeigmatic' notion allows him to respond in a more apt way to what some critics were raising as a possible 'vicious circle' in his approach to 'semantic' and 'psychological' notions. The Carus lectures are then dedicated to the 'construction,' alla Hume, of a 'value-paradeigmatic' notion in general, and value itself. Grice starts by quoting Austin and J. L. Mackie, of Oxford. The lectures are intended to a general audience, provided it is a philosophical general audience. Most of the second lecture is Grice's subtle exploration of Kant's categorical imperative, with which he had struggled in the last John Locke lecture on aspects of reasoning, notably the 'reduction' of the categorical imperative to this or that 'counsel of prudence' with an implicated protasis to the effect that the agent is aiming at ‘eudæmonia.’ The three Paul Carus Lectures, Objectivity and value, Relative and absolute value, and Metaphysics and value. There were three Paul Carus lectures. The first lecture, ‘Objectivity and value,’ is a review of J. L. Mackie's Inventing right and wrong; the second lecture, ‘Relative and absolute value,’ is an exploration on the categorical imperative, and its connection with a prior hypothetical or suppositional imperative; the third lecture, ‘Metaphysics and value,’ is a metaphysical defence of absolute value. The collective citation should be identified by each lecture separately, and this is done below.
1983. Objectivity and value, the first Paul Carus lecture, The conception of value, Clarendon, value and objectivity, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series II (Essays), BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: objectivity, value, axiology, J. L. Mackie. Grice starts with 'subjectivity.' Objectivity can be constructed as non-relativised subjectivity. A discussion of J. L. Mackie's Inventing right and wrong. In the proceedings, Grice quotes the 'artless sexism' of J. L. Austin in talking about the 'trouser words' in Sense and Sensibilia. Grice tackles all the distinctions Mackie had played with: objective/subjective, absolute/relative, categorical/hypothetical or suppositional. Grice quotes directly from R. M. Hare: ‘Think of one world into whose fabric values are objectively built; and think of another in which those values have been annihilated. And remember that in both worlds the people in them go on being concerned about the same things—there is no difference in the subjective value. Now I ask, what is the difference between the states of affairs in these two worlds? Can any answer be given except, none whatever?’ Grice uses the Latinate 'objective' (from 'objectum'). Cf. Hare on what he thinks the oxymoronic 'sub-jective value.'
1983. Axiology, relative and absolute value, the second Paul Carus lecture, in The Conception of Value, Clarendon, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: relative value, absolute value. An exploration on Paton on the categorical imperative. Grice had previously explored the logical form of hypothetical or suppositional imperatives in the Kant (and later Locke) lectures, notably in Lecture IV, ‘Further remarks on practical and alethic reasons.’ Here he considers topics related to Hare's tropic-clistic neustic-phrastic quartet. What does it mean to say that a command is conditional? The two successors of Grice's post as Tutorial Fellow at St. John's, G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, will tackle the same issue with humour, in ‘Sense and nonsense,’ published by Blackwell (too irreverent to be published by the Clarendon). Is the logical form of a maxim, if p, !q, or !(if p, q), etc. Kant thought that there is a special sub-class of hypothetical or suppositional imperative (which he called a ‘counsels of prudence’) which is like his class of technical imperative, except in that the end specified in a full specfication of the imperative is the special end of eudæmonia (the agent's eudæmonia). For Grice, understanding Kant's first version of the categorical imperative involves understanding what a maxim is supposed to be. Grice explores at some length four alternative interpretations of an iffy buletic (as opposed to a non-iffy buletic): three formal, one material. The first interpretation is the horseshoe interpretation. A blind logical nose might lead us or be led to the assumption of a link between a buletically iffy utterance and a doxastically iffy utterance. Such a link no doubt exists, but the most obvious version of it is plainly inadequate. At least one other philosopher besides Grice has noticed that ‘If he torments the cat, have him arrested!’ is unlikely to express an buletically iffy utterance, and that even if one restricts oneself to this or that case in which the protasis specifies a will, we find pairs of examples like ‘If you will to go to Oxford, travel by AA via Richmond!’ or ‘If you will to go to Cambridge, see a psychiatrist!’ where it is plain that one is, and the other is not, the expression of a buletically iffy utterance. For fun, Grice does not tell which! A less easily eliminable suggestion, yet one which would still interprets the notion of a buletically iffy utterance in terms of that particular logical form to which ‘if’, 'hypothetical or suppositional ' and 'conditional' attach, would be the following. Let us assume that it is established, or conceded, as legitimate to formulate an 'if' utterance in which not only the apodosis is couched in some mode other than the doxastic, as in this or that conditional command. ‘If you see the whites of their eyes, shoot fire!’ but also the protasis or some part (clause) of them. In which case all of the following might be admissible conditionals. Thus, we might have a doxastic protasis (‘If the cat is sick, take it to the vet’), or a mixed (buletic-cum-doxastic protasis (‘If you are to take the cat to the vet AND there's no cage available, put it on Martha's lap!), and buletic protasis (‘If you are to take the cat to the vet, put it in a cage!’). If this suggestion seems rebarbative, think of this or that quaint ‘if’ utterance (when it is quaint) as conditionalised versions of this or that ‘therefore’-sequence, such as: buletic-cum-doxastic premises (‘Take the cat to the vet! There isn't a cage. Therefore; Put the cat on Martha's lap!’), buletic premise (‘Take the cat to the vet! Put it in a cage!’). And then, maybe, the discomfort is reduced. Grice next considers a second formal interpretation or approach to the buletically iffy/non-iffy utterance. Among 'if' utterances with a buletic apodosis some will have, then, a 'mixed’ doxastic-cum buletic protasis (‘partly doxastic, partly buletic’), and some will have a purely doxastic protasis (‘If the cat is sick, take him to the vet!). Grice proposes a definition of the iffy/non-iffy distinction. A buletically iffy utterance is an iffy utterance the apodosis of which is buletic and the protasis of which is buletic or mixed (buletic-cum-dxastic) or it is an elliptical version of such an iffy utterance. A buletically non-iffy utterance is a buletic utterance which is not iffy or else, if it is iffy, has a purely doxastic protasis. Grice makes three 'quick comments' on this second interpretation. First, re: a real imperative. The structures which are being offered as a way of interpreting an iffy and a non-iffy imperative do not, as they stand, offer any room for the appearance this or that buletic modality like 'ought' and 'should' which are so prominently visible in the standard examples of those kinds of imperatives. The imperatives suggested by Grice are explicit imperatives. An explicit buletic utterance is ‘Do such-and-such!’ and not 'You ought to do such and such’ or, worse, ‘One ought to do such and such'. Grice thinks, however, that one can modify this suggestion to meet the demand for the appearance or occurrence of 'ought' (etc) if such occurrence is needed. Second, it would remain to be decided how close the preferred reading of Grice’s 'deviant' conditional imperatives would be to the accepted interpretation of standard hypothetical or suppositional imperatives. But even if there were some divergence that might be acceptable if the 'new' interpretation turns out to embody a more precise notion than the standard conception. Third, NEUSTICAL vs TROPICAL protases. There are, Grice thinks, serious doubts of the admissibility of conditionals with a NON-doxastic protasis, which are for Grice connected with the very difficult question whether the doxastic and the buletic modes are co-ordinate or whether the doxastic mode is in some crucial fashion (but not in other) _prior_ (to use Suppes’s qualification) to the buletic. Grice confesses he does not know the answer to that question. A third formal interpretation links the iffy/non-iffy distinction to the absolute-relative value distinction. An iffy imperatives would be end-relative and might be analogous to an evidence-relative probability. A non-iffy imperatives would not be end-relative. Finally, a fourth Interpretation is not formal, but material. This is close to part of what Kant says on the topic. It is a distinction between an imperative being escapable (iffy), through the absence of a particular will and its not being escapable (non-iffy). If we understand the idea of escabability sufficiently widely, the following imperatives are all escapable, even though their logical form is not in every case the same: ‘Give up popcorn!,’ ‘To get slim, give up popcorn!’, ‘If you will to get slim, give up popcorn!’ Suppose Grice has no will to get slim. One might say that the first imperative (‘Give up popcorn!’) is 'escaped', provided giving up popcorn has nothing else to recommend it, by falsifying ‘You should give up popcorn.’ The second and the third imperatives (‘To get slim, give up pocorn!’ and ‘If you will to get slim, give up popcorn!’) would not, perhaps, involve _falsification_ but they would, in the circumstances, be inapplicable to Grice – and inapplicability, too, counts, as escape. A non-iffy imperative however, is in no way escapable. Re: the Dynamics of Imperatives in Discourse, Grice then gives three examples which he had discussed in ‘Aspects of Reason,’ which concern _arguments_ (or ‘therefore’-chains). This we may see as an elucidation to grasp the logical form of buletically iffy utterance (elided by the ‘therefore’, which is an ‘if’ in the metalanguage) in its dynamics in argumentation. We should, Grice suggests, consider not merely imperatives of each sort, together with the range of possible characterisations, but also the possible forms of _argument_ into which_particular_ hypothetical or suppositional imperatives might enter. Consider: ‘Defend the Philosophy Department! If you are to defend the philosophy department, learn to use bows and arrows! Therefore, learn to use bows and arrows!’ Grice says he is using the dichotomy of original-derived value. In this example, in the first premise, it is not specified whether the will is original or derived, the second premise specifies 'conducive to' (means), and the conclusion would involve a 'derived' will, provided the second premise is doxastically satisfactory. Another example would be: ‘Fight for your country! If you're to fight for your country, join up (one of the services)! Therefore, join up!’ Here, the first premise and the conclusion do not specify the protasis. If the conclusion did, it would repeat the second premise. Then there’s ‘Increase your holdings in oil shares! If you visit your father, he'll give you some oil shares. Therefore, visit your father!’ This argument (purportedly) transmits value. Let us explore these characterisations by Grice with the aid of R. M. Hare's distinctions. For Hare in a hypothetical or suppositional imperative, the protasis contains a neustic-cum-tropic. A distinction may be made between this or that 'hypothetical or suppositional imperative' and a term used by Grice in his first interpretation of the hypothetical or suppositional imperative, that of 'conditional command ('If you see the whites of their eyes, shoot fire!’). A hypothetical or suppositional imperative can be distinguished from a conditional imperative (‘If you want to make bread, use yeast!’, ‘If you see anything suspicious, telephone the police!’) by the fact that modus ponens is not valid for it. One may use hypothetical, suppositional or conditional ‘imperative' for a buletic utterance which features ‘if,’ and reserve 'conditional command' for a command which is expressed by an imperative, and which is conditional on the satisfaction of the protasis. Thus, on this view, treating the major premise of an argument as a hypothetical or suppositional imperative turns the ‘therefore’-chain invalid. Consider the sequence with the major premise as a hypothetical or suppositional imperative. ‘If you will to make someone mad, give him drug D! You will to make Peter mad; therefore, give Peter drug D!’ By uttering this hypothetical or suppositional imperative, the utterer tells his addressee A only what means to adopt to achieve a given end in a way which does not necessarily endorse the adoption of that end, and hence of the means to it. Someone might similarly say, ’If you will to make someone mad, give him drug D! But, of course, even if you will to do that, you must not try to do so.’ On the other hand, the following is arguably valid because the major premise is a 'conditional' imperative and not a mere hypothetical or suppositional one. We have a case of major premise as a conditional imperative: ‘You will to make someone mad, give him drug D! Make Peter mad! Therefore, give Peter drug D!’. We can explain this in terms of the presence of the neustic in the antecedent of the imperative working as the major premise. The supposition that the protasis of a hypothetical or suppositional imperative contains a clause in the buletic mode neatly explains why the argument with the major premise as a hypothetical or suppositional imperative is not valid. But the argument with the major premise as a conditional imperative is, as well as helping to differentiate a suppositional or hypothetical or suppositional iffy imperative from a conditional iffy imperative. For, if the protasis of the major premise in the hypothetical or suppositional imperative is volitival, the mere fact that you will to make Peter mad does not license the inference of the imperative to give him the drug; but this _can_ be inferred from the major premise of the hypothetical or suppositional imperative together with an imperative, the minor premise in the conditional imperative, to make Peter mad. Whether the subordinate clause contains a neustic thus does have have a consequence as to the validity of inferences into which the complex sentence enters. The Principle of Mode Constancy in Buletic and Doxastic Inference. One may tries to elucidate Grice's ideas on the logical form of the hypothetical or suppositional imperative proper. His suggestion is, admittedly, rather tentative. But it might be argued, in the spirit of it, that an iffy imperative is of the form ‘If !p, !q, .p; therefore, !q’ But this violates a principle of MODE CONSTANCY. A phrastic must remain _in the same mode_ (within the scope of the same _tropic_) throughout an argument. A conditional imperative does not violate the principle of Modal Constancy, since it is of the form ‘If p, !q, !p; therefore, !q’ The question of the logical form of the hypothetical or suppositional imperative is too obscure to base much on arguments concerning it. There is an alternative to Grice’s account of the validity of an argument featuring a conditional imperative. This is to treat the major premise of a conditional imperative, as some have urged it should be as a doxastic utterance tantamount to ‘In order to make someone mad, you have to give him drug D’. Then an utterer who EXPLICITLY conveys or asserts the major premise of a conditional imperative and _commands_ the second premise is in consistency committed to commanding the conclusion. ’If’ does not always connect phrastic with phrastic but sometimes connects two expressions consisting of a phrastic and a tropic. Consider: ’If you walk past the post office, post the letter!’ The antecedent of this imperative states, it seems, the *condition* under which the imperative expressed becomes operative, and so can _not_ be construed buletically, since by uttering a buletic utterance, an utterer cannot *explicitly convey* or assert that a condition obtains. Hence, the protasis ought not be within the scope of the buletic ‘!’, and whatever we take to represent the form of the utterance above we must not take ‘!(if p, q)’ to do so. One way out. On certain interpretation of the isomorphism or æqui-vocality Thesis between Indicative and Imperative Inference the utterance has to be construed as an imperative (in the generic reading) to make the doxasatic conditional ‘If you will walk past the post office, you will post the letter’ satisfactory. Leaving aside issues of the implicature of ‘if’, that the utterance can _not_ be so construed seems to be shown by the fact that the imperative to make the associated doxastically ‘iffy’ utterance satisfactory is conformed with by one who does not walk past the post office. But it seems strange at best to say that the utterance is conformed with in the same circumstances. This 'strangeness’ or ‘bafflingliness,’ as Grice prefers, is aptly explained away in terms of the implicatum. At Oxford, Dummett was endorsing this idea that a conditional imperative be construed as an imperative to make an indicative ’if’ utterance true. Dummett urges to divide conditional imperatives into those whose antecedent is ‘within the power of the addressee,’ like the utterance in question, and those in which it is not. Consider: ‘If you go out, wear your coat!’ One may be not so much concerned with how to *escape* this, as Grice is, but how to *conform* it. A child may choose not to go out in order to comply with the imperative. For an imperative whose protasis is_not_ within the power of the addressee (‘If anyone tries to escape, shoot him!’) it is indifferent whether we treat it as a conditional imperative or not, so why bother. A small caveat here. If no one tries to escape, the imperative is *not violated*. One might ask, might there not be an important practical difference bewteen saying that an imperative has not been violated and that it has been complied with? Dummett ignores this distinction. One may feel think there is much of a practical difference there. Is Grice an intuitionist? Suppose that you are a frontier guard and the antecedent has remained unfulfilled. Then, whether we say that you complied with it, or simply did not *violate* it will make a great deal of difference if you appear before a war crimes tribunal. For Dummett, the fact that in the case of an imperative expressed by a conditional imperative in which the antecedent is not within the agent's power, we should *not* say that the agent had obeyed just on the ground that the protassi is false, is no ground for construing an imperative as expressing a conditional command: for there is no question of fixing what shall constitute obedience independently of the determination of what shall constitute disobedience. This complicates the issues. One may with Grice (and Hare, and Edgley) defend imperative inference against other Oxonian philosophers, such as A. J. P. Kenny or B. A. O. Williams. What is questioned by the sceptics about imperative inference is whether if each one of a set of imperatives is used with the force of a command, one can infer a _further_ imperative with that force from them. Cf. Wiggins on Aristotle on the practical syllogism. One may be more conservative than Hare, if not Grice. Consider ‘If you stand by Jane, don't look at her! You stand by Jane; therefore, don't look at her!’ This is valid. However, the following, obtained by anti-logism, is not: ‘If you stand by Jane, don't look at her! Look at her! Therefore, you don't stand by Jane.’ It may seem more reasonable to some to deny Kant’s thesis, and maintain that anti-logism is valid in imperative inference than it is to hold onto Kant’s thesis and deny that antilogism is valid in the case in question. Then there’s the question of the implicata involved in the ordering of modes. Consider: ‘Varnish every piece of furniture you make! You are going to make a table; therefore, varnish it! This is prima facie valid. The following, however, switching the order of the modes in the premises is not. ‘You are going to varnish every piece of furniture that you make. Make a table! Therefore; varnish it!’ The connection between the ‘if’ and the ‘therefore’ is metalinguistic, obviously – the validity of the ‘therefore’ chain is proved by the ‘associated’ ‘if’ that takes the premise as, literally, the protasis and the consequence as the apodosis. Conversational Implicature at the Rescue. Problems with ‘or’: Consider Ross's infamous example: ‘Post the letter! Therefore, post the letter or burn it!’ as 'invalid,’ Ross 1944:38 – and endorsed at Oxford by B. A. O. Williams. To permit to do p or q is to permit to do p and to permit to do q. Similarly, to give permission to do something is to lift a prohibition against doing it. Admittedly, Williams does not need this so we are stating his claim more strongly than he does. One may review Grice’s way out (defense of the validity of the utterance above in terms of the implicatum. Grice claims that in Ross’s infamous example (valid, for Grice), whilst (to state it roughly) the premise's ‘permissive presupposition’ (to use the rather clumsy term introduced by Williams) is entailed by it, the conclusion's is only *conversationally implicated*. Typically for an isomorphist, Grice says this is something shared by indicative inferences. If, being absent-minded, Grice asks his wife, ‘What have I done with the letter?' and she replies, ‘You have posted it or burnt it,’ she conversationally implicates that she is not in a position to say which Grice has done. She also conversationally implicates that Grice may not have post it, so long as he has burnt it. Similarly, the future tense indicative, ‘You are going to post the letter’ has the conversational implicature ‘You may be not going to post the letter so long as you are going to burn it’. But this surely does not validate the introduction rule for ‘OR,’ to wit: ‘p; therefore, p or q’’ One _can_ similarly, say: ‘Eclipse will win. He may not, of course, if it rains. And I *know* it will *not* rain’. Problems with ‘and.’ Consider: ‘Put on your parachute AND jump out! Therefore, jump out!’ Someone who _only_ jumps out of an æroplane does not fulfil 'Put on your parachute and jump out!' He has done only what is necessary, but not sufficient to fulfil it. Imperatives do not differ from indicatives in this respect, except that fulfilment takes the place of belief or ‘doxa’, which is the form of acceptance apprpriate to a doxasatic utterance, as the name implies. Someone who is told ‘Smith put on his parachute AND jumped out’ is entitled to believe that Smith jumped out. But if he believes that this is _all_ Smith did he is in error’ (Cf. R. Edgley). One may discuss Grice’s test of cancellability in the case of the transport officer who says: ‘Go via Coldstream or Berwick!’ It seems the transport officer's way of expressing himself is extremely eccentric, or ‘conversationally baffling,’ as Grice prefers – yet ‘validly.’ If the transport officer is not sure if a storm may block one of the routes, what he should say is ‘_Prepare_ to go via Coldstream or Berwick!’ As for the application of Grice's test of explicit cancellation here, it yield, in the circumstances, the transport officer uttering ‘Go either via Coldstream or Berwick! But you may not go via Coldstream if you do not go via Berwick, and you may not go via Berwick if you do not go via Coldstream.’ Such qualifications ‒ what Grice calls ‘explicit cancellation of the implicature’ ‒ seem to the addressee to empty the buletic mode of utterance of all content and is thus reminiscent of Henry Ford's utterance to the effect that people can choose what colour car they like provided it is black. But then Grice doesn’t think Ford is being illogical, only Griceian and implicatural!
1983. Axiology, metaphysics and value, the third and last Paul Carus lecture, in The Conception of Value, Clarendon, The H. P. Grice Papers, series II (Essays), BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: metaphysics, axiology, value. A metaphysical defence of absolute value. The topic fascinates Grice, and he invents a few routines to cope with it. Humeian projection rationally reconstructs the intuitive concept 'being of value.' Category shift allows to put a value such as Smith's disinterestedness in grammatical subject position, thus avoiding to answer that his disinterestedness is in the next room ‒ since it's not a spatio-temporal continuan 'prote ousia' as Smith is. But the most important routine is that of trans-substantatio, or ‘metousiosis.’ A human reconstructs as a rational personal being, and alla Kantotle, whatever he judges is therefore 'of absolute value.' The issue involves for Grice the introduction of a 'telos' qua 'aition,' 'causa finalis' (final cause), role, or métier. The final cause of a tiger is 'to tigerise,' the final cause of a reasoner is to reason, the final cause of a person is to personise. And this entails absolute value, now metaphysically defended. The justification involves the ideas of end-setting, unweighed rationality, autonomy, and freedom. In something like a shopping list that Grice provides for issues on 'free.' Attention to freedom calls for formidably difficult undertakings’ including the search for a justification for the adoption or abandonment of an ultimate end. The point is to secure that freedom does not dissolve into compulsion or chance. Grice proposes four items for this shopping list.' A first point is that full action calls for strong' freedom. Here one has to be careful that since Grice abides by what he calls the Modified Occam's Razor in the third William James lecture on ‘Some remarks about logic and conversation,’ he would not like to think of this two ('strong freedom' and 'weak freedom') as being different senses of 'free'. Again, his 'calls for' is best understood as 'presupposes'. It may connect with, say, Kane's full-blown examples of decisions in practical settings that call for or presuppose libertarianism. A second point is that the buletic-doxastic justification of action has to accomodate for the fact that we need freedom which is strong. Strong or serious autonomy or freedom ensures that this or that action is represented as directed to this or that end E which are is not merely the agent’s, but which is also freely or autonomously adopted or pursued by the agent. Grice discusses the case of the gym instructor commanding, ‘Raise your left arm!’ The serious point then involves this 'free adoption' or 'free pursuit'. Note Grice's use of this or that 'personal-identity' pronoun: 'not merely mine,’ i.e. not merely the agent’s, but in privileged-access position. This connects with what Aristotle says of action as being 'up to me,’ and Kant's idea of the transcendental ego. An end is the agent’s in that the agent adopts it with 'liberum arbitrium.' This or that ground-level desire may be circumstantial. A 'weak’ autonomy or freedom satisfactorily accounts for this or that action as directed to an end which is mine. However, a strong autonomy or freedom, and a strong autonomy or freedom only, accounts for this or that action as directed to an end which is mine, but, unlike, say, some ground-level circumstantial desire which may have sprung out of some circumstantial adaptability to a given scenario, is, first, autonomously or freely adopted by the agent, and, second, autonomously or freely pursued by the agent. The use of the disjunctive particle 'or' in the above is of some interest. An agent may autonomously or freely adopt an end, yet not care to pursue it autonomously or freely, even in this strong connotation that ‘autonomous’ or 'free' sometimes has. A further point relates to causal indeterminacy. Any attempt to remedy this situation by resorting to causal indeterminacy or chance will only infuriate the scientist without aiding the philosopher. This remark by Grice has to be understood casually. For, as it can be shown, this or that scientist may well have resorted to precisely that introduction and in any case have not self-infuriated. The professional tag that is connoted by 'philosopher' should also be seen as best implicated than entailed. A scientist who does resort to the introduction of causal indeterminacy may be eo ipso be putting forward a serious consideration regarding ethics or meta-ethics. In other words, a cursory examination of the views of a scientist like Eddington, beloved by Grice, or this or that moral philosopher like Kane should be born in mind when considering this third point by Grice. Grice’s reference to chance, random, and causal indeterminacy, should best be understood vis-à-vis Aristotle's emphasis on 'tykhe' (fatum) to the effect that this or that event may just happen just 'by accident', which may well open a can of worms for the naive Griceian, but surely not the sophisticated one (cf. his remarks on ‘accidentally,’ in Prolegomena). A further item in Grice's shopping list involves the idea of ‘autonomous’ or ‘free’ as a value, or optimum. The specific character of what Grice has as strong autonomy or freedom may well turn out to consist, Grice hopes, in the idea of this or that action as the outcome of a certain kind of strong valuation ‒ where this would include the rational selection, as per e.g. rational-decision theory, of this or that ultimate end. What Grice elsewhere calls out-weighed or extrinsically weighed rationality, where ‘rational’ includes the ‘buletic,' of the end and not the means to it. This or that full human action calls for the presence of this or that reason, which require that the this or that full human action for which this or that reason accounts should be the outcome of a strong rational valuation. Like a more constructivist approach, this line suggests that this or that action may require, besides strong autonomy or freedom, now also strong valuation. Grice sets to consider how to adapt the buletic-doxastic ‘soul’ progression to reach these goals. In the case of this or that ultimate end E, justification should be thought of as lying, directly, at least, in this or that outcome, not on the actual phenomenal fulfilment of this or that end, but rather of the, perhaps noumenal, presence qua end. Grice relates to Kant’s views on the benevolentia or goodwill and malevolentia, or evil will, or illwill. Considers Smith’s action of 'giving Jones a job.’ Smith may be deemed to have given Jones a job, whether or not Jones actually gets the job. It is Smith’s benevolentia, or goodwill, not his beneficentia, that matters. Hence in Short and Lewis, bĕnĕfĭcentĭa, from 'beneficus,' like magnificentia, munificentia, from magnificus, munificus; cf. Beier and Gernh. upon Cic. Off. 1, 7, 20, the quality of beneficus, kindness, beneficence, an honorable and kind treatment of others (opp. 'maleficentia,' Lact. Ira Dei, 1, 1; several times in the philos. writings of Cic.; “elsewh. rare): quid praestantius bonitate et beneficentiā?” Cic. N.D. 1, 43, 121: “beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet,” id. Off. 1, 7, 20; 1, 14, 42 sq.; “2, 15, 52 and 53: comitas ac beneficentia,” id. de Or. 2, 84, 343: “uti beneficentiā adversus supplices,” Tac. A. 12, 20: “beneficentia augebat ornabatque subjectos,” Sen. Ep. 90, 5; Vulg. Heb. 13, 16. In a more general fashion then, it is the mere presence of an end qua end of a given action that provides the justification of the end, and not its phenomenal satisfaction or fulfilment. Furthermore, the agent’s having such and such an end, E1, or such and such a combination of ends, E1 and E2, would be justified by showing that the agent’s having this end exhibits some desirable feature, such as this or that combo being harmonious. For how can one combine one's desire to smoke with one's desire to lead a healthy life? Harmony is one of Grice’s six requirements for an application of 'happy’ to Smith’s ‘life.’ The buletic-doxastic souly ascription is back in business at a higher level. The suggestion would involve an appeal, in the justification of this or that end, to this or that higher-order end which would be realised by having this or that lower, or first-order end of a certain sort. Such valuation of this or that lower-order end lies within reach of a buletic-doxastic souly ascription. Grice has an important caveat at this point. This or that higher-order end involved in the defense would itself stand in need of justification, and the regress might well turn out to be vicious. One is reminded of Watson's requirement for a thing like freedom or personal identity to overcome this or that alleged counterexample to freewill provided by H. Frankfurt. It is after the laying of a shopping list, as it were, and considerations such as those above that Grice concludes his reflection with a defense of a noumenon, complete with the inner conflict that it brings. Attention to the idea of ‘autonomous’ and ‘free’ leads the philosopher to the need to resolve if not dissolve the most important unsolved problem of philosophy, viz. how an agent can be, at the same time, a member of both the phenomenal world and the noumenal world, or, to settle the internal conflict between one part of our rational nature, the doxastic, even scientific, part which seems to call for the universal reign of a deterministic law and the other buletic part which insists that not merely moral responsibility but every variety of rational belief demands exemption from just such a reign. In this lecture, Grice explores freedom and value from a privileged-access incorrigible perspective rather than the creature construction genitorial justification.
1983. Relative and absolute value, absolute value, values, morals, absolutes, and the metaphysical, The H. P. Grice Papers, series V (topical), carton 9-folder 24, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: relative and absolute value, metaphysics, axiology. Grice uses 'relative' variously. His 'utterer's meaning,' e. g. is relative. It is meaning-qua utterer-relativised, as he puts it. The absolute, versus the relative, is constructed out of the relative, though. There is hardly a realm of un-constructed reality. Grice is especially concerned with J. L. Mackie's and R. M. Hare's rather cavalier ('Oxford pinko') attitude towards the relative and the absolute. Surely the 'absolute' IS a construction out of the 'relative.' Grice takes a Kantotelian attitude. We designate, in the 'power structure' of the soul, a proper judge, the ratiocinative part of the soul of a personal being. Whatever is 'relative' to this particular creature attains, ipso facto, 'absolute value.' Grice proposes a reduction of what is valuable-absolute to what is valuable-relative, and succeeds. He was possibly irritated by Julie Andrews in Noël Coward's Relative values.
1984. Reply to Richards, in Philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions, categories, ends, Clarendon, ed. R. E. Grandy and R. Warner, pp. 45-108, prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of H. P. Grice, festschrift and Warner notes, The H. P. Grice Papers, series II (essays), carton 4-folders 27-30, and series V (topical), carton 6-folder 37, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: autobiography. ‘The life and opinions of H. P. Grice,’ by H. P. Grice! P. G. R. I. C. E. had been in the works for awhile. Knowing this, Grice is able to start his auto-biography, or memoir, to which he later adds a specific 'reply' to this or that objection by the editors. The 'Reply' is divided in neat sections. After a preamble displaying his gratitude for the volume in his honour, Grice turns to his 'prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of H. P. Grice.' The third section is a reply to the editors's overview of his work. This reply itself is itself subdivided into questions of meaning and rationality, and questions of ‘Metaphysics, philosophical psychology, and value.’ As the latter is reprinted in ‘The conception of value,’ Clarendon, it is possible to cite this sub-section from the 'Reply' as a separate piece. Grice originally entitles his essay in a brilliant manner, echoing the style of an English non-conformist, almost: ‘Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of H. P. Grice.’ With his ‘Richards,’ a nice Welsh surname, Grice is punning on the first name of both Grandy and Warner. Grice is especially concerned with what 'Richards' see as an ontological commitment on Grice's part to the abstract, yet poorly individuated entity of a 'proposition.' Grice also deals with the alleged insufficiency in his conceptual analysis of 'reasoning.' He brings for good measure a point about a potential 'regressus ad infinitum' in his account of a chain of intentions involved in meaning that p and communicating that p. Even if one of the drafts is titled 'Festschrift,' not by himself, this is not strictly a festschrift in that Grice's name is hidden behind the acronym: P(hilosophical) G(rounds of) R (ationality:) I(ntentions,) C(ategories,) E(nds). Notably on the philosophy of perception. Also on the conception of value, especially that tricky third lecture on a metaphysical foundation for objective value. Grice is supposed to reply to the individual contributors, who include Strawson, but does not. ‘I cancelled the implicatum!’ However, we may identify in his oeuvre points of contacts of his own views with the philosophers who contributed, notably Strawson. Most of this material is reproduced verbatim, indeed, as the second part of his ‘Reply to Richards,’ and it is a philosophical memoir of which Grice is rightly proud. The life and opinions are, almost in a joke on Witters, distinctly separated. Under 'Life,' Grice convers his conservative, irreverent rationalism making his early initial appearance at Harborne under the influence of his non-conformist father, and fermented at his tutorials with Hardie at Corpus, and his associations with J. L. Austin's play group on Saturday mornings, and some of whose members he lists alphabetically: J. L. Austin, P. L. Gardiner, H. P. Grice, S. N. Hampshire, R. M. Hare, H. L. A. Hart, P. H. Nowell-Smith, G. A. Paul, D. F. Pears, P. F. Strawson, J. F. Thomson, J. O. Urmson, and G. J. Warnock. Also, his joint philosophising with J. L. Austin, D. F. Pears, P. F. Strawson, J. F. Thomson, and G. J. Warnock. Under 'Opinions,' Grice expands mainly on 'ordinary-language' philosophy and his Bunyanesque way to the City of Eternal Truth. ’Metaphysics, Philosophical Psychology, and Value, in The conception of value, is thus part of his ‘Prejudices and predilections.’ The philosophers Grice quotes are many and varied, such as Bosanquet and Kneale, and from the other place, J. M. Keynes. Grice spends some delightful time criticising the critics of 'ordinary-language' philosophy such as Bergmann (who needs an English futilitarian?) and Gellner. He also quotes from Jespersen, who was "not a philosopher but wrote a philosophy of grammar!" And Grice includes a reminiscence of the bombshells brought from Vienna by the enfant terrible of Oxford philosophy Freddie Ayer, after being sent to the Continent by Ryle. He recalls an air marshal at a dinner with Strawson at Magdalen relishing on Cook Wilson's adage, 'What we know we know.' And more besides! After reminiscing for Clarendon, Grice will go on to reminisce for Harvard University Press in the closing section of the Retrospective epilogue.
1983. The individuum-universalium distinction, concept of a universalium, Aristole on ‘to kath’holou,’ universalia, universals, with M. Friedman, Group, Partial Working, Copy, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series V (Associations), carton 6-folder 11-12, and Series V (Topical), carton 9-folder 21-22, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: universalia, universalium, universalium ante re, universalium in re. Grice introduces atomon, individuum, individual in terms of izzing and hazzing. x is an atomon, individuum, individual iff nothing other than x izz x. Strawson is Strawson, or Austin is Austin. x is a proton atomon, individuum primum, primary individual iff x is an atomon, individuum, individual, and nothing hazz x. There is a stark contrast between an atomon, individuum, individual, singular, and a particular (kath'ekaston, particulare) proper. (Ax). x is individual, atomon, individuum) iff Nec. (y) if (y is x), (x is y). (Ax) x is particular ('kath'ekaston,' particulare) iff Nec. (y). if (x is predicable of y), (x is y and y is x. (x) if (x is 'tode ti, 'a this somewhat', singulare), x is individual, atomon, individuum. (Ax)if (x is a particular (kath'ekaston, particulare), x is individual, atomon, individuum). But the converse is not a theorem. Not every individuum is a "kath'ekaston." It is important, at Oxford, never to confuse 'individual' with 'particular.' An individual is an item that cannot be truly 'izz'-predicated of another item. An individual (e.g. an individual white ("to ti leukon", Cat. 2.1a27)) may be 'hazz'-predicable of another thing. A particular ('kath'ekaston') on the other hand, cannot be neither 'izz'-predicated nor 'hazz-'predicated of any other item. While every particular is an individual, the converse implication does not hold. A particular cannot receive a property unless the particular is something essentially. A particular must be something or other definable in order to _have_ a property. A particular must be 'tode ti,' a 'this some_what_', where the 'ti' is the something definable that 'tode'. 'Tode ti' is sometimes used so that 'ti' is the 'something' that 'tode' picks out. It may also involve quantification over an essence (essential property) of the 'tode.' 'Tode' may pick out the essence, and the 'ti' range over this or that singular or particular endowed with that essence. 'Austin is tode ti' may thus generalise either 'Austin is this man' or 'Austin is a man'. In Aristotle's Categoriae, a primary substance, 'prote ousia,' 'substantia prima' is an individual 'tode ti' (Cat. 1b6-9 3b10-15). The 'substantia prima,' indeed, the 'tode ti,' is the particular or singular (e.g. a particular or singular man), which is not predicable of anything further. Only a 'substantia prima' is a 'this', i.e. a, a singular, a singleton, a particular. A particular man is a 'this.' No 'this' is predicable of this 'this'. For Aristotle, however, matter (hyle, materia) is not 'tode ti,' and hence matter is not a primary substance (substantia prima). The matter of which a particular is made is not a 'this'. Grice knew of M. Cohen through Code. Grice was obsessed with this or that. Consider, Grice notes, an utterance, out of the blue, of such a sentence as, 'The philosopher in the conference is intelligent'. As there are, obviously, many philosophers at many conferences in the great big world, if the addressee is to treat such a sentence as being of the form 'The S is P' and as being, on that account, ripe for Russellian expansion, the addressee might do well to treat it as exemplifying a more specific quasi-demonstrative form, 'The A which is phi is P', where 'phi' represents an epithet to be identified in a particular context of utterance, 'phi' being a sort of quasi-demonstrative. Standardly, to identify the reference of 'phi' for a particular utterance of 'The philosopher in the conference is sarcastic', the addressee would proceed via the identification of a particular philosopher as being a good candidate for being the philosopher meant, and would identify the candidate of "phi" by finding in the candidate a feature, e. g., that of _being in this city, Oxford, which could be used to yield a composite epithet ('philosopher at the conference at Oxford'), which would in turn fill the bill of being the epithet which the utterer has in mind as being uniquely satisfied by the philosopher selected as candidate. Determining the reference of 'phi' would, standardly, involve determining what feature the utterer might have in mind as being uniquely instantiated by an actual object, or philosopher, and this in turn would standardly involve satisfying oneself that some particular feature actually is uniquely satisfied by a particular actual object (e. g. a particular philosopher). Grice distinguishes individuum, particulare, and universalium. As Short and Lewis have it, 'partĭcŭlāris , e, adj. particula, is 'of or concerning a part, partial, particular.' 'Propositiones aliae universales, aliae particulares,' App. Dogm. Plat. 3, p. 35, 34: 'partĭcŭlārĭter' is 'particularly,' App. Dogm. Plat. 3, p. 33, 32; so opp. generaliter, Firm. Math. 1, 5 fin.; “opp. universaliter,” Aug. Retract. 1, 5 fin. A universalium is an abstratum. Grice's concern with 'universalia' can be traced back to his reading of Aristotle's ‘Categoriæ.’ Other than the 'substantia prima,' it may be said that anything else ‒ attribute, etc. ‒ belongs in the realm of 'universalia' qua predicable. As such, a univeralium is not a spatio-temporal continuant. However, Grice's category shift allows a 'universalium' as a subject of discourse. The topic is approached formally by means of the notion of 'order.' First-order predicate calculus' ranges over this or that spatio-temporal continuant individual, in Strawson's use of the term. A higher-order predicate calculus ranges over this or that 'predicate' and beyond ‒ as such, a 'universalium' can only be 'referred to' in a second-order calculus. This is Grice's attempt to approach the Aristotelian and mediæval problem in pragmatic key. A higher category (anything but 'prote ousia' is a universalium. This is Grice doing history of philosophy. His main concern is with a 'universalium in re' as an abstract entity. He proposes an exploration of 'universalium in re' as a response to Extensionalism, so fashionable, he thinks, in the New World, within what he calls ‘The School of Latter-Day Nominalists.’ (He is aware that Bennett has called him a 'meaning'-nominalist!)
1985. Correspondence with P. Suppes, The H. P. Grice Papers, series I (The correspondence of H. P. Grice, Sub-Series A), carton 1-folders 7-8, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Grice, Suppes, utterer's meaning. Suppes was involved in the P. G. R. I. C. E., and contributes an excellent ‘The primacy of utterer's meaning,’ where he addresses what he rightly sees as an unfair characterisations of Grice as a behaviourist by three philosophers: Yu, Biro, and Chomsky. Biro is able to respond to Suppes's commentary on Grice as proposing a reductive but not reductionist analysis of meaning. Suppes rightly characterises Grice as an 'intentionalist,' rather, and using such jargon as 'basic procedure in one's repertoire' as 'informal' and 'colloquial,' rather than 'behaviouristically,' as Ryle would. Grice was very happy that Suppes taught him how to use 'primacy' with a straight face!
1980. The Philosophy of Bealer, Bealer, Correspondence with G. P. Bealer, The H. P. Grice Papers, series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice, 1A), carton 1-folder 4, and series V (Topical), carton 6-folder 20, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Grice, Bealer, content. G. P. Bealer is one of Grice's most brilliant tutees! The Grice collection contains a full folder of correspondence with Bealer. Bealer refers to Grice in his influential Clarendon essay on content. Bealer is concerned with how 'pragmatic inference' may intrude in the ascription of a psychological state, attitude, or stance. Bealer loves to quote from Grice on definite descriptions ‘in Russell and in the vernacular,’ the implicature being that Russell is impenetrable! Bealer's mentor is Grice's collaborator G. Myro.
1986. The that-clause, Actions and events, The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 67, pp. 1-35, semantics, phonetics, syntax, and semantics, with J. F. Staal, The H. P. Grice Papers, series II (essays), carton 3-folders 1-5, series III (the doctrines), carton 6-folders 1-2, and series V (topical), carton 7-folders 23 and 32, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Staal is particularly good at this type of 'formalistic' philosophy, which was still adequate to reflect the subtleties of 'ordinary language. Keywords: semantics, Staal, action, event, Davidson, logical form, freedom, cause, Reichenbach, von Wright, Robinson, Eddington, Broad, 'you name it.' How do we define a Griceian action? How do we define a Griceian event? This is Grice's examination and criticism of Davidson, as a 'scientific' realist, followed by a Kantian approach to freedom and causation. Grice is especially interested in 'the logical form,' or explicitum, so that he can play with the implicatum. One of his favourite examples: ‘He fell on his sword,’ having tripped as he crossed the Galliæ. Grice manages to quote from many and varied authors (some of which you would not expect him to quote) such as Reichenbach, but also Robinson (of Oriel), of 'You name it' fame (for any x, if you can name it, x exists) von Wright and Eddington. Grice offers a 'linguistic botanic' survey of autonomy and 'free' (‘sugar-free,’ ‘free fall’, ‘implicature-free’) which some have found inspirational. His favourite is Finnegan's ‘alcohol-free.’ Finnegan's obvious implicature is that everything is alcohol-laden. Grice kept a copy of Davidson's 'The logical form of action sentences,' since surely Davidson, Grice thought, is making a primary philosophical point. Horses run fast; therefore, horses run. A Davidsonian problem, and there are more to come! Smith went fishing. Grice's category shift allows us to take Smith's fishing as the grammatical subject of an 'action sentence.' Cf. indeed the way to cope with entailment in 'The horse runs fast; therefore, the horse runs.' Grice's ‘Actions and events’ is Davidsonian in motivation, but Kantian in method, one of those actions by Grice to promote a Griceian event! Davidson had published, Grice thought, some pretty influential (and provocative, anti-Quineian) stuff on 'actions' and 'events,' or 'events and actions,' actually, and, worse, he was being discussed at Oxford, too, over which Grice always keeps an eye! Davidson's point, tersely put, is that while ‘p.q’ (e.g. ‘It is raining, and it is pouring’) denotes a concatenation of events. ‘Smith is fishing’ denotes an 'action,' which is a kind of 'event,' if you are following him (Davidson, not Smith). However, Davidson is fighting against the intuition, if you are a follower of Whitehead and Russell, to symbolise the ‘Smith is fishing’ as ‘Fs,’ where 's' stands for Smith and F for 'fishing.' The logical form of a report of an 'event' or an 'action' seems to be slightly more complicated. Davidson's point specifically involves 'adverbs,' or adverbial modifiers, and how to play with them in terms of entailment. ‘The horse runs fast; therefore, the horse runs.’ ‘Symbolise that!’ as Davidson told Benson Mates! But Mates had gone to the restroom. Grice explores all these and other topics and submits the thing to ‘The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.’ Grice quotes, as isn't his wont, from many and various philosophers, not just Davidson, whom he saw every Wednesday, but others he didn't, like Reichenbach, Robinson, Kant, and, again even a physicist like Eddington. Grice remarks that Davidson is into 'hypothesis,' or 'suppositio,' while he is, as he should, into 'hypostasis,' or ‘substantia.’ Grice then expands on the apparent otiosity of uttering, ‘It is a fact that grass is green.’ Grice goes on to summarise what he ironically dubs an ‘ingenious argument.’ Let 'σ' abbreviate the operator ‘... consists in the fact that ...,’ which, when prefixed to a sentence, produces a predicate or epithet. Let 'S' abbreviate 'Snow is white,’ and let 'G' abbreviate 'Grass is green.' In that case, ‘xσS’ is 1 just in case 'xσ(y(y=y and S) = y(y=y)' is 1, since the first part of the sub-sentence which follows σ in the main sentence is logically equivalent logically equivalent to the second part. And 'xσ(y(y=y and S) = y(y=y)' is 1 just in case 'xσ(y(if y=y, G) = y(y=y)' is 1, since 'y(if y=y, S)' and 'y(if y=y, G) are each a singular term, which, if S and G are both true, each refers to y(y=y), and are therefore co-referential and inter-substitutable. And 'xσ(y(if y=y, G) = y(y=y)' is true just in case 'xσG' is 1, since 'G' is logically equivalent to the sub-sentence which follows σ. So, this fallacy goes, provided that 'S' and 'G' are both 1, regardless of what an utterer explicitly conveys by uttering a token of it, any event which consists of the otiose fact that S also consists of the otiose fact that G, and vice versa, i. e. this randomly chosen event is identical to any other randomly chosen event. Grice hastens to criticise this slingshot fallacy licensing the inter-substitution of this or that co-referential singular term and this or that logically equivalent sub-sentence as officially demanded because it is needed to license a patently valid (if baffling) inference. But, if in addition to providing this benefit, the fallacy saddles the philosopher with a commitment to a 'hideous consequence', the rational course is to endeavour to find a way of retaining the benefit while eliminating the disastrous accompaniment, much as in set theory it seems rational to seek as generous a comprehension axiom as the need to escape this or that paradox permits. Grice proposes to retain the principle of co-reference, but prohibit is use after the principle of logical equivalence has been used. Grice finds such a measure to have some intuitive appeal. In the fallacy, the initial deployment of the principle of logical equivalence seems tailored to the production of a sentence which provides opportunity for trouble-raising application of the principle of co-referentiality. And if that is what the game is, why not stop it? On the assumption that this or that problem which originally prompts this or that analysis is at least on their way towards independent solution, Grice turns his attention to the possibility of providing a constructivist treatment of things which might perhaps have more intuitive appeal than a naïve realist approach. Grice begins with a class of happenstance attributions, which is divided into this or that basic happenstance attribution, i.e. ascriptions to a subject-item of an attribute which is metabolically expressible, and this or that non-basic resultant happenstance attribution, in which the attribute ascribed, though not itself metabolically expressible, is such that its possession by a subject item is suitably related to the possession by that or by some other subject item, of this or that attribute which is metabolically expressible. Any member of the class of happenstance attributions may be used to say what happens, or happens to be the case, without talking about any special entity belonging to a class of a happening or a happenstance. A next stage involves the introduction of the operator ‘... consists of the fact that ...’ This operator, when prefixed to a sentence S that makes a happen-stance attribution to a subject-item, yields a predicate which is satisfied by an entity which is a happenstance, provided that sntence S is doxastically satisfactory, i. e. 1, and that some further metaphysical condition obtains, which ensures the metaphysical necessity of the introduction into reality of the category of a happenstance, thereby ensuring that this new category is not just a class of this or that fiction. As far as the slingshot fallacy, and the 'hideous consequence' that all facts become identical to one Great Big Fact, in the light of a defence of Reichenbach against the realist attack, Grice is reasonably confident that a metaphysical extension of reality will not saddle him with an intolerable paradox, pace the caveat that, to some, the slingshot is not contradictory in the way a paradox is, but merely an unexpected consequence ‒ not seriously hideous, at that. What this metaphysical condition would be which would justify the metaphysical extension remains, alas, to be determined. It is tempting to think that the metaphysical condition is connected with a theoretical need to have this or that happenstance as this or that item in, say, a causal relation. Grice goes on to provide a progression of linguistic botanising including ‘free.’ Grice distinguishes four elements or stages in the step-by-step development of freedom. First stage: ’transeunt’ causation: in inanimate objects. Hume's realm ‒ the atomists's realm. This is external or transeunt' casuation, when an object is affected by processes in other objects. A second stage is internal or immanent causation, where a process in an object is the outcome of previous stages in that process, as in a freely moving' body. A third stage is nternal causation of living beings, in which changes are generated in a creature by internal features of the creature which are not earlier stages of the same change, but independent items, the function or finality of which is to provide for the good of the creature in question. A fourth stage is a culminating stage at which the conception of a certain mode by a human of something as being for that creature's good is sufficient to initiate the doing of that thing. Grice expands on this interesting last stage. At this stage, it is the case that the creature is liberated from every factive cause. There is also a discussion of von Wright's table of adverbial modifiers (Grice's pentagram). Also an exploration of specificity: Jack buttering a parsnip in the bathroom in the presence of Jill.
1987. Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy, Studies in the way of words, part II: Explorations in semantics and metaphysics, The H. P. Grice Papers, series II (essays), BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: conceptual analysis, philosophy. Since his ‘Negation’ and ‘Personal identity’ Grice is concerned with reductive analysis. How many angels can dance on a needle’s point? A needless point? This is Grice's update to his ‘Post-war Oxford philosophy.’ More generally concerned with the province of philosophy in general and conceptual analysis beyond 'ordinary language.' It can become pretty technical. Note the Roman overtone of 'province.' Grice is implicating that the other province is perhaps science, even 'folk science,' and the claims and 'ta legomena' of the man in the street. He also likes to play with the idea that a conceptual enquiry need not be philosophical. Witness the very opening to ‘Logic and conversation,’ ‘Prolegomena.’ Surely not all inquiries need be philosophical. In fact, a ‘claim to infame’ of Grice at the Play Group is having once raised the infamous, most subtle, question: what is it that makes a conceptual enquiry philosophically interesting or important? As a result, Austin and his 'kindergarten' spend three weeks analysing the distinct inappropriate implicata of adverbial collocations like ‘highly depressed’ to no avail. Grice's moralising implicature, by retelling the story, is that he has since realised (as he hoped Austin knew) that there is no way he or any philosopher can dictate to any other philosopher, or himself, what is it that makes a conceptual enquiry philosophically interesting or important. Whether it is fun is all that matters.
1987. Retrospective epilogue, to Studies in the way of words, Harvard University Press, London, The H. P. Grice Papers, series II (essays), carton 3-folders 22-26 and carton 4-folders 1-2, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: latitudinal unity, meaning, conversational implicata, conversation as rational co-operation. Grice takes the opportunity of the compilation by Harvard of his 'studies in the way of words,’ ‘representative of the mid-60s,’ to review the idea of philosophical progress in terms of eight different 'strands' which display, however, a consistent and distinctive unity. Grice keeps playing with 'valediction,' 'valedictory', 'prospective' and 'retrospective,' and the different drafts are all kept in The Grice Papers. In the 'Retrospective epilogue,' divided into two sections, he provides input for his eight strands. The concluding section involves a fairy tale about his fairy godmother, G*. As he notes, Grice had dropped a few words in the 'preface' explaining the ordering of essays in the compilation. He mentions that he hesitated to follow Bennett's suggestion that the ordering of the essays be thematic and chronological. Rather, Grice chooses to publish the whole set of seven William James lectures as part I. Part II is organised more or less thematically, though. In the ‘Retrospective epilogue,’ Grice takes up this observation in the ‘Preface’ that two ideas (theme A and theme B) underlie his Studies: that of meaning, and assertion vs. implication, and philosophical methodology. The ‘Retrospective epilogue’ is thus an exploration on eight 'strands' he identifies in his own philosophy. Grice’s choice of ‘strand' should not mislead. For Grice, philosophy, like virtue, is entire. All the strands therefore display some 'latitudinal,' and, he hopes, 'longitudinal' unity. By these two types of 'unity,' Grice means the obvious fact that all branches of philosophy (philosophy of language, philosophy of perception, philosophical psychology, metaphysics, axiology, etc.) interact and overlap, and that a historical regard for one's philosophical predecessors is a must.
1987. 'Preface' to Studies in the Way of Words, foreword, preliminary valediction, The H. P. Grice Papers, series II (essays), carton 9-folder 2, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Grice quotes from J. F. Bennett. More importantly, Grice focuses on the 'assertion'/'non-assertion' distinction. He overlooks the fact that for this or that beloved 'imperative utterance,' asserting is out of the question, but explicitly conveying that p is not. He needs a dummy to stand for a psychological or souly state, stance, or attitude of either boule or doxa, as in 'conveying explicitly' that the addressee A is to entertain that p. The explicatum or explicitum sometimes does the trick; sometimes it doesn't. Grice in fact subdivides his theme A into 'assertion' vs. 'implication': By uttering x, the utterer explicitly conveys that p vs. 'by uttering x (thereby explicitly conveying that p), the utterer U conversationally implies that q’ ‒ and meaning that p simpliciter: by uttering x, the utterer means that p.
1988. Studies in the way of words, Harvard University Press, London, The H. P. Grice Papers, series II (essays), carton 3-folders 7-21, BANC, MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: implicature, rationality. The title Grice eventually chooses for his compilation of essays is a tribute to Locke, who, although obsessed with his ‘new way of ideas,’ leaves room for both the scientist's 'way of things,' and, more to the point, for this or that philosophical semiotician to offer this or that study in 'the way of words.' The 'studies' are organised in two parts: ‘Logic and conversation’ and ‘Explorations in semantics and metaphysics.’ It also includes a 'Preface' and a very rich ‘Retrospective epilogue.’ From part I, the William James lectures, only three had not been previously published: ‘Prolegomena,’ ‘Indicative conditionals,’ and ‘Some models for implicature.’ From Part II, a few essays had not been published before, but Grice, nodding to the longitudinal unity of philosophy, is very careful and proud to date them.
1988. Rationality and linguistic behaviour, correspondence with J. F. Bennett, of Oxford, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice ‒ IA), carton 1-folder 1, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: Grice, Bennett, linguistic behaviour. Oxford don, Christchurh, NZ-born Bennett, of Magdalen, B. Phil. Oxon. (essay, 'The interpretation of formal systems' under Austin -- with Bennett attending Grice's seminars -- "He is my favourite philosopher"), quotes Grice in his ‘Linguistic behaviour.’ Grice quotes Bennett in the ‘Preface’ to Studies in the Way of Words. Bennett has an earlier essay on rationality, which evidences that the topic is key in Grice's Oxford. Bennett has studied better than anyone the way Locke is Griceian. A word or expression does not just stand for idea, but for the utterer's intention to stand for it!
1988. General correspondence, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice, IB: General), carton 1-folders 10-14, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keywords: philosophical correspondence Grice was not precisely a good, or reliable, as The British Academy puts it, correspondent. In the Oxford manner, Grice prefers a face-to-face interaction, any day. He treasures his Saturday mornings under Austin's guidance, and he himself leads the Play Group after Austin's demise, which, as Owen reminisced, attained a kind of cult status.
1988. Grice on Grice, essays on Grice, Griceiana, Griceiana, The H. P. Grice Papers, Series I (The Correspondence of H. P. Grice, IB: General), carton 1-folder 15, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley. Keyword: secondary literature. As one might expect, even on the cold shores of Oxford, as one of Grice's tutees put it, Grice is cited by various Oxford philosophers. Perhaps the first to cite Grice in print is his tutee, P. F. Strawson, in Introduction to Logical Theory. Early on, H. L. A. Hart quotes Grice on meaning in his review in ‘The Philosophical Quarterly’ of John Holloway's ‘Language and Intelligence’ before Grice's ‘Meaning’ had been published. Obviously, once Grice's and Strawson's ‘In defense of a dogma’ and Grice's ’Meaning’ are published by The Philosophical Review, Grice is discussed profusely. References to his 'implicature' start to appear in the literature at Oxford in the mid-1960s. It is particularly intriguing to explore those philosophers Grice picks up for dialogue, too, and perhaps arrange them alphabetically, from Austin to Warnocok, say. And Griceian philosophical references, Oxonian or other, as they should, keep counting!
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