Herbert Paul Grice: Metaphysics

Speranza

Università degli Studi di Padova

Dipartimento di Filosofia, Sociologia, Pedagogia e Psicologia Applicata

Dottorato in Filosofia

Monday 11th of September 2017, h. 4.30 p.m.

Sala Giacon, Piazza Capitaniato 3, Padova

Maria Scarpati

Université de Neuchâtel

Metaphysical Haecceitism and the Individuals Assumption

The issue of metaphysical Haecceitism may be roughly put as the question whether there are fundamental, irreducible facts of the matter concerning the identity of some entities in particular. As a Haecceitist, I answer yes to this and related questions. However, I also think that the debate that such questions raise is yet to receive a detailed, thoroughly satisfying characterization. In particular, I argue that the debate has to this day been dominated by what I shall label “the Individuals Assumption”. The Individuals Assumption has it – wrongly, I contend – that the point about Haecceitism gets its relevance only inasmuch as facts of the matter concerning the identity of individuals are considered. Accordingly, it has commonly been assumed that anti-Haecceitism commits one to denying there to be fundamental individuals, and naturally comes with a fundamental ontology of sole universals instead. 

After introducing the whole debate in some detail, I will focus on the Individuals Assumption and try to prove it wrong. By looking closely at one of the main motivations behind anti-Haecceitism, in particular, it will get clear that assuming a fundamental ontology of universals alone is both too strong and too weak a theoretical move if one’s aim is merely to exclude Haecceitism.

Organisation:

Prof. Pierdaniele Giaretta

Dott. Riccardo Baratella

Further Information:

Dott. Riccardo Baratella: riccardo.baratella@phd.unipd.it