System G-HP

System G-HP

This "HP" should be supbscripted. But apparently, this blog does not allow that (unlike, say, a Word document) so bear with it, or teach if it does!

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This to comment a passage by Chapman (Ch06:122), when she writes, rather loosely, but I love her (I say loosely because it may raise a doubt as to interpretation).

She is commenting on Carnap.

I am elsewhere commenting with R. B. Jones on various Carnap/Grice interfaces.

Chapman writes about 'system', 'formal system', 'syntactics', 'semantics', etc.

Consider System G -- HP -- and System C -- (or System C-R, as I propose System C, with the proper re-elaborations).

Chapman writes:

"In the first lecture by Grice on this, he launches into an elaboratedly coded account of language, based on a PSEUDO-SENTENCE invented by Rudolf Carnap".

And translated by Countess Zeppelin, bless her.

"In the introduction to "The Logical Syntax of Language" (1937), Carnap presents a typically logical positivist accont of the philosopher's rason for taking language seriously".

But failing, I add, since all this pirot talk cannot but amuse _me_.

Chapman continues:

"A suitably rigorous language will provide the
necessary tools for logical and scientific
exposition."

So far so good.

"This alnguage is to be a FORMAL SYSTEM."

So far so good.

"Concerned with types and orders of symbols"

-- So far so good.

"but paying no attention to meaning".

It is here where people may protest.

Carnap was Hilbertian, and Grice was Russellian. But there _is_ such a thing as "Formal Semantics" (I owe this reflection to R. B. Jones).

We are discussing this elsewhere, but I thought I'd drop the actual wording of the Chapman reference for good measure here.

So, I am proposing that Carnap and Grice be seen as furthering Morris's distinction


a. syntactics.
SEMIOSIS b. semantics.
c. pragmatics.

A system like System G may be _formal_ and yet include a (b) component and a (c) component (the latter is more dubious, though).

On the other hand, room should be given to an approach to a system, say System G, which disposes of (b) altogether, and aims at what we may call (again I'm echoing R. B. Jones, and he'll forgive if I'm misinterpreting his view) 'syntactising the semantic'.

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More strictly

(Argument A)


A pirot karulises elatically (Carnap's "Pirots karulise elatically")
A is a pirot -- or "a is a pirot" in Grice's transcribed tape.
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A (or a) karulises elatically.

Note that the major premise is best seen as universally quantified. We do say, "A man laughs" when we do mean, "Every man laughs", etc.

The challenge, not really but something like it, is for non-truth-functional contexts (and quantified formulae are not seen as truth-functional, ceteris paribus) that allows for a reconstruction of the validity of argument (A) above, that does not realy at all on a semantic module within the system.

Etc.