All the fuss they make with Grice's only example of metaphor
You're the cream in my coffee
You're the salt in my stew
all my necessity is YOU.
It is _obvious_ that Grice cared or did not care a hoot for this. Locke didn't. Read Locke on 'metaphor' and have the hoot of your life!
The 'thankyou' thus spelt to honour Kramer. He thinks that words are physical devices, and logical devices are different things.
I am always irritated by the lack of 'I' in "I thank you". It's just not deletional. You _cannot_ use it. It seems to me always as too imperative in form, as:
YOU thank _you_.
For we do drop the 'you' in "Shut up".
Kramer would argue, "Surely you are not arguing that 'shut up' be explained alla 'thankyou.' Don't know. We have discussed with elsewhere in Kramer the otiosity and rudeness of
"You're VERY welcome".
This has the unintended (well, not by my aunt) effect of displaying HOW TERRIFYING it was to comply with the silliness we was (sic) asking from their-selves in the first place.
"You are VERY welcome"
-- Etc.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
Posts
You'd have liked George M. Cohan. When he performed with his family as a child, he would close the act by saying:
ReplyDelete"My mother thanks you. My father thanks you. My sister thanks you. And I thank you."
The Cohans were always very welcome.
Am not sure why the dropped "I" in "thank you" annoys you. (How about whatever it is that gets dropped in "Thanks"?) Dropping without existential ambiguity is the way the current flows.
OK -- so maybe you'd care to expand on your ambiguous, I'd say, use of 'existential' in 'existential ambiguity'.
ReplyDeleteI think you mean 'crucial'. As when someone on another list told me,
"Get a life"
meaning, she later told me, not another life, but one life simpliciter.
I think you'd agree with her that when they tell you to get a life it's like
in Ebonics
get real
But I'm not sure.
I don't think
incidentally
that
(i) I thank you (Cohan)
relates to
(iii) Thanks
in the way that (i) relates to
(iv) thank you.
I had a Greek student once. She told me
"Kharitai"
She meant _gratiae_, i.e. thanks.
I tend to think that 'thanks', sic in plural, derives directly from the Mesoppotamian Greek of the Plains.
Ditto, 'gratiae'.
Thanks are, sort of, cheap, and so, it seems rude to just give _one_, when you can give an unspecified couple them.
Etc.
I use "existential" as opposed to semantic, to get to whether cooperative communication between U and A has in fact occurred. Because Grice's maxims are essentially descriptive, the maxim of clarity is ipso facto satisfied by any unambiguous transmission of information, however semantically ambiguous the words employed might be.
ReplyDeleteI understand "get a life" to mean "you're too obsessed with something" and need to have other concerns and be doing other things.
I see. Yes, that's a good use of 'existential'. Of course, I know what she meant by 'get a life'. She was being _rude_. Literally, she was being _silly_.
ReplyDeleteI should get back to your
'existential' vs. 'semantic'.
I see what you mean. The maxim of clarity that you evoke, or appeal to,
'be perspicuous'
-- not to be confused with 'be perspicacious' -- includes
avoid ambiguity
avoid obscurity
be orderly
be brief
He speaks of them as MODUS, echoing Kant, but wants to say that unlike the Three Other Categories, in Kant (Qualitas, Quantitas, and Relatio), Modus applies to the _how_ rather than the _what_.
I cannot see how it can be existential. It seems that it applies strictly, then, to the 'manner' of speaking -- hence "Maxim of Manner". Or modus. In Kant it is a totally different notion, though.
How can one be clear except in things one says, or utters?
I don't want to sound polemic, though.
If you are saying that even if you are 'flouting' "be ambiguous", you are NOT, because, ULTIMATELY (I think it's the adverb you want?) you are NOT being ambiguous. Ambiguity resolves itself in conversazione as it were. And unless A expresses his exegetical doubts in the next move, undersatanding and unambiguous understanding at that, is postulated as having been achieved.
One minor problem here -- with this idea that maxims may be flouted superficially, but ultimately at least the co-operative principle is not, is that ...
Well, I cannot see how if you have a thing you label:
The Co-Operative Principle
which amounts to 10 maxims -- the 'decalogue' or 'imannuel' of conversation (pun on 'manual', "Jesus" and "Kant"), you can still
honour the Principle if you don't honour the maxims.
It's like a heathen going to Moses and telling him:
"Sir, I strictly adhere to the decalogue".
"But, you kill, you covet your neighbour's wife, you ... " etc etc. It looks like this chap is flouting each of the 10 commandments and yet thinking he is honouring the Tables that Moses brought from Sinai.
"Oh, but _ULTIMATELY_ I _am_ honouring the tablets, sir"
"How"
"Well, when I killed, this was because it was a _fair_, just war, so I'm sure you meant the "Thou shalt not kill" as a Gricean ceteris paribus flouteable thing"
"Well, yes" (The Jewish people has been seen to have been belicose in parts, so "Thou shalt not kill" seems either hyperbolic or otiose).
"But what about", Moses continues, "about not coveting thy neighbour's wife?"
"I didn't know he was my neighbour".
Etc.
I offered on "get a life" because I don't think it equates to "get real," which means that at least one of us does not understand at least one of those locutions. I bet on "JL does not understand 'get a life.'" Sorry.
ReplyDeleteAs between "existentially" and "ultimately," I don't know which is better. I do believe, however, that you understood me, and that'll have to do.
On clarity, I'm not sure where you're going with the decalogue. You seem ok with the "kill" means murder dodge, less so with "I thought his house was in the villge, though." (Oh wait, that's coveting the neighbor's burning bush, er, woods...)
I will agree that if we are to take flouting of the maxims as a signal of conversational implicature, then we have to apply the maxims strictly, at least for that purpose.
Using my tiring dichotomy, we can apply the physical device of the strictly applied maxim as one step in determining whether the utterance has observed the logical preachment of the maxims, which in turn will ipso facto have been observed if the resulting communication is in fact effectively achieved.
I'll answer your question with a question: How can the Cooperative Principle, and its maxims, be deemed adequately descriptive if there is no sense in which they can be said to be satisfied by every effective utterance, including those that flout one or more maxims applied in some other sense? I am simply proposing that the maxims can be applied both with and without regard to the implicatures created by flouting the "without" test.
I don't think it's adequately descriptive? (? is a Valley-Girlism that gets A+s for you because you are not _asserting_ anything). When MJ Palacios invited me to to lecture at Salta on Grice I called my thing,
ReplyDelete"3 steps towards an answering of Grice's fundamental question regarding the Conversational Immanuel, or the critique of conversational reason -- with a twist". I remember the applause! Anyway, I proposed, alla Grice, three steps. The first Grice calls "dull" -- I was lecturing in the vernacular, so Had to find the Latin for 'dull'. It is the level where you TEACH your son well. Do not lie. This is NOT enough. Surely it is a truism that we follow the maxims because our parents have taught us to and it would amount to a big waste of energy if we didn't, Grice says. The second step is 'look for the reason behind the rule'. We find, honesty's the best policy, says I. The maxims are not things people decriptively adequately follow (there are at leat two types of adequacy: descriptive/observational, and theoretical or explanatory). They are things people SHOULD follow, even if they don't. So I'm not going to commit suicide if it is found out that nobody ever followed a Gricean maxim! And then there's the 3rd step. This step, I lectured in Salta -- and the thing DID get published in the proceedings and it's available through Inter-Library Loan, "M. J. Palacios, University of Salta -- "will not suffice for the fun of pragmatics" for it can justify the REASONABLENESS, rather than RATIONALITY of the maxim. But it cannot go on and explain or justify the reasonableness of the FLOUTING of the maxim. So this third level is not about the impossibility of a conversational move, it is about the impossibility of an APPROPRIATE conversational move. It is a Weak rather than Strong Transcendental Justification. I relied on Grice's 3 criteria for the UNIVERSALISABILITY of the maxim (common Kantian parlance): applicational adequacy: everyone is expected to tell the truth; not everyone is expected, nor should be expected to, be ironic. Formal adequacy. We need general terms. We cannot provide a maxim, "Take off your shoes before uttering a conversational move". This may do in JAPAN, but not in Oxford. And Oxford is the centre. Etc. The third adequacy is ... I forget, but VERY important too. It was repr. in Grice, Conception of Value. It may be 'conceptual adequacy'. The maxims have to be formulated in psychological terms: it's about things you will to do, or believe you may will to do, rather than in terms of algebra, for example. So the question of the operationability of the Cooperative Principle is a _trick_. But more later.
No. When I meant, 'get a life' or brought the thing to the forum is to actually (split) analyse any potential literal use. Yes, the implicature I'm never sure about. Thanks. I thought it was somewhat serious than what I propose, "Stop collecting butterflies -- start collecting beer cans". Or something.
ReplyDeleteBut we should go back to the existential thing, as you label it. I get your point that if the message was transmitted ok, then the CP and its attendant maxims were _in play_. I am inclined to think that Grice sometimes was having in mind a 'maxim', as 'be orderly' just because Strawson had focused on the oddity of "Jill had a child and got married" when what did happen is that, well, she did have a child and got married, but NOT in that order. I.e. some of the maxims look pretty ad-hoc, and meant to explain away some philosophical colloquialism in vogue by what Grice calls the A-philosophers (that the logic of ordinary language is NOT formal logic (Strawson), that to say x is good is to commend it (Hare), that to add 'carefully' or intentionally to our reports of actions is otiose (Austin, Hare)).
Grice was fair enough to include his-self as an A-philosopher; his claim of fame having been that
The pillar box seems red to me
is impeccable even when you bloody see it's bloody red! (I don't mean rudeness directed to you, but blood is red, too!). Etc
I'm afraid your last two comments are too difficult for me. Let me just free-associate and see if we are communicating.
ReplyDeleteI start with the notion that the CP and the maxims are derivatives of descriptive statements. All effective utterances are true, relevant, clear, appropriately informative, etc.. Therefore, to produce effective utterances, make them all those things.
If your purpose is to understand how implicature arises and is used, then you will apply the maxims strictly to see how flouting them provides information. That's a useful exercise. But it does not change the fact that, if the utterance, aided by implicature, is effective, then it must ipso facto conform to the CP and the maxims appropriately applied, because a rule for forming effective utterances cannot be a maxim unless it can be derived from a statement that is true of every effective utterance. (That's what I mean by "adequately" descriptive. Perhaps I should have said "always" descriptive.)
But I sense that I am retreading ground here, and I don't want to wear either of us out...
No. Sure. Yes, re-reading does the trick. I sin sometimes of using my jargon. I see what you mean. You take the imperative mode (or mood) of the maxims as 'irrelevant'. They are descriptions which are on the whole TRUE of ... communicators. While I love your U and A (who taught you that? :)) beware that nobody will understand your krypto-jargon! Perhaps it's best to use Jack and Jill or A and B. I use Jack and Jill a lot. Also when I was formalising things, I found that sticking to U and A is confusing seeing that their roles alternate so often. In my thesis (PhD) for example, I would NOT count an instance for analysis unless it was in dialogical form:
ReplyDeleteA: p
B: q
--- This was a trick since I had to find conversational scenery for stupid things like "The cat is on the mat".
--- So, 'be truthful' recall it's NOT universal. These moves can be imperative, and how 'true' can "Shut the door!" be?
So I'm not sure which maxim you hold as real basic ('real basic' is a colloquiallism for 'really basic'). Suppose it's something like
strong rather than weak
-- this is a scale discovered early enough by Grice:
"it seems to me that you are slightly intoxicated"
when your addressee is known to have 'destoyed bits of furniture', Grice adds. Surely a stronger, "You're under the influence" seems more appropriate than the beloved-by-Brits understatement ('meiosis', litotes, etc. -- we covered this ground when you detected a misuse of litotes in the American press).
So suppose there's something like a conjoint of the Maxim 1 of quantity and maxim 2 of quantity to the effect that
a stronger claim is more appropriate
when you are finding yourself in
a position to make it.
(I never do -- but that's neither here nor there).
So, -- what gives? You seem to be wanting to say that
A uttered 'x'
thereby meaning that p.
B uttered 'y'
thereby meaning that q.
the recovery of 'p' follows from the maxims, true. "p" is, in a defeasible sort of way, or may be, alleged to have been communicated.
Recall that ALL implicatures of this type are CANCELLABLE. They are NOT part of what is said.
"I don't mean to suggest that the pillar
box is NOT red".
E.g. is a perfectly acceptable utterance to follow, "The pillar box seems red" (Grice 1961). So it cannot be strictly have been effectively communicated if the next thing you have is U cancelling it out. These are sublter types of communication. Indirect forms of communication.
There are two sides to Grice.
ReplyDeleteWhen reading the obit of Strawson in the Times I came across an apocryphal adage ascribed to Grice:
"If you cannot put it in symbols, it's not worth saying" (I did not then pay much attention to it, since it's in the obit to have Strawson shine with his retort: "If you CAN put it in symbols, it's not worth saying").
But Grice's point seems to be, Consider "AND"
p & q. This is like "+" in algebra: it's commutative. To use Kant's favourite example
7 + 5 = 12 5 + 7 = 12
-- the order of the addenda is irrelevant to the additio. "And" works like "+". You say, "Jill had a baby and got married. I don't mean to imply _in that order_." So what effective communication are we talking about?
Communication is seldom effective. For a start, communication sounds too much like communion, which I dislike (I'm an Anglican -- we don't believe in a few things). This, I would argue, was the early Grice. Sure enough, when he sees his theories made famous like that, or infamous like that, he feels compelled to keep on harping on the _rationale_ behind the maxims. But in the beginning, they were sort of ad-hoc procedures which 'rational' or 'reasonable' conversationalists may be said to _abide_ with -- but which they are not even descriptively in most scenarios -- meant to abide by. Grice's examples: we can always OPT out. Or we can say "My lips are sealed". Etc.
It's once the game is being played, and a degree of mutual trust is agreed on, that we just say,
"He rode away and jumped on his horse"
when we do mean that the Lone Ranger did that, but in the natural order (of events). Etc.
>how 'true' can "Shut the door!" be?
ReplyDeleteAs true as "I want the door closed and I have the power to order you to close it and I am ordering you to do it."
Imagine that you say "Shut the door!" and I shut the door, and you say "Why did you do that? I want the door open?" You don't do that, because "Shut the door!" was true (and relevant and informative and clear).
To a topologist, a teacup is a doughnut. Logical devices rule.
This just arrived in my inbox and I thought it a propos:
ReplyDeleteJob Interview Question
You are driving along in your car on a wild, stormy night. You pass by a bus stop, and you see three people waiting for the bus:
1. An old lady who looks as if she is about to die.
2. An old friend who once saved your life.
3. The perfect man (or) woman you have been dreaming about.
Which one would you choose to offer a ride to, knowing that there could only be one passenger in your car?
Think before you continue reading. This is a moral/ethical dilemma that was once actually used as part of a job application.
You could pick up the old lady, because she is going to die, and thus you should save her first; or you could take the old friend because he once saved your life, and this would be the perfect chance to pay him back. However, you may never be able to find your perfect dream lover again.
The candidate who was hired (out of 200 applicants) had no trouble coming up with his answer:
"I would give the car keys to my old friend, and let him take the lady to the hospital. I would stay behind and wait for the bus with the woman of my dreams."
Never forget to "Think Outside of the Box."
I hope he won't be found _redundant_. I don't like job interviews -- I don't like jobs _simpliciter_. Intervista mabbe (I'm listening to Track 6 of "Tutto Fellini" and find that I like the sound to his film with Anita Ekberg so called, Intervista). But more on that later -- it's a good article. Thanks for sharing.
ReplyDeleteI see what you mean. ("You have eyes better than most", the Mad Hatter commented (to Alice)). (Actually, it was Humpty Dumpty).
----
You utter 'x' thereby meaning that p (as per Grice's analysis which we should expand on on a longer day).
Thus, you write, 'x' is, eo ipso:
1. quantitous -- i.e abides with quantity
2. qualified -- abides with quality
3. related -- abides with relatio.
4. mannered -- abides with modus
(I Have to keep using the original Kantian latin terms, because you won't hear about them too often in Gricean Secondary Literature).
I wrote my thesis on that. The other day (well, ...) L. Horn was forwarding to me, 'as the world's Gricean expert', or words, a query by a friend of his, on "please tell me all about Gricean authors who have generalised his rather narrow set of maxims, obviously and self-confessedly, or unashamedly, meant to apply to moves of 'indicative' force.
I replied to him and cc-ing her: "Bach and Harnish", inter alii. For these authors had generalised the maxims.
Myself, I used, before sticking to the Kantian Latinisms, 'quantitaet', 'qualitaet', 'relation' and 'modus', would, say, play with _traeo_.
_Traeo_ is an Anglo-Saxon word. It features in
trust
but it also, less crucially, in
true.
So, I wanted to say that 'try to make your conversational contribution one that is true' (Not a qualified one -- 'cfr. an unqualified yes'. What can be less in need of the 'forthright negotiator' principle than that? -- (cfr. 'a horse says neigh')) be generalised as:
be trusty.
I then found
trustworthy.
And I was wedded to the idea of the 'conversational category' being, while of Quantity, of Trustworthiness.
So, this should perhaps do as well as the examination of the root-canal for
"Shut the door".
Where I come from, people say
"We are not gypsies"
implicating thereby, "Shut the door, will you, please?". I.e. "we don't live in tents".
I often find that slightly derogatory towards the Romany. Personally, I think it is a sad comment on western civilisation. I would LOVE to live in a tent. But that's neither here nor there.
Another way to generalise here, -- or reductionise, I love your speranza -- is,
go for the psychological attitude.
"Shut the door!" does not display a belief -- not even about my ordering being legal and all that --, but more like it displays a _desire_. It's a volitive (as Grice has it) or 'boulemaic', not 'doxastic', as I prefer.
When Grice is considering the 'fundamental QUAESTIO" of the cooperative principle, i.e. the nature of the common shared goal, he opts for:
influencing, mutually.
This has the disadvantage of being too vague. Surely if the purpose of conversation were simply, to mutually influence (sic with the split), we wouldn't be caring to utter "Shut the door!" to display our desire that the door be shut.
We seem to want to influence mutually regarding things that matter, or, to use your jargon, which I like, things with existential import.
But this commentary then, just to let you know that perhaps you will care to reconsider 'true' in the context of "Shut the door!"?
Etc.