The Grice Is Right

By J. L. Speranza

for the Grice Club



"My football boots were bought at
(perhaps) a reasonable price, but
hardly at a _rational_ one, i.e. price."


---

Derek Parfit commented (at Stanford), "Proc. -- Open Discussion to Lecture II: Tape 83-c./4. Grice/Collection:


MODERATOR: Parfit?

PARFIT. Yes. Your five
illustrations of the distinction
between "reasonable" and "rational" are interesting.

But, aside from being an indication of your own
linguistic intuitions on the distinction, I can't
see how your illustrations help clarify the putative difference.
Could you, please, unpack some of the features defining "reasonable"
that are not shared by "rational", or vice versa?


GRICE:


"Sure [PAUSE]. On second thoughts.

I would be inclined to grant you that
indeed, I can NOT give you a *detailed*
_solution_ to the

problem, if problem it is (I doubt it)
of distinguishing between 'rational' and
'reasonable'.

This for mainly two basic reasons.

First, I do not have the time,
and I expect you don't have it, either.

Second, because

I have no idea what to say."
(Cfr. Gr01:24).


LECTURE III

"After some ingenious discussions by some of the most prominent and promising colleagues and students at this august hall of Stanford, I am ready to expand my rather cautionary distinctions I sketched last week between 'the rational price' and the 'reasonable price'. Why is it that it sounds _harsh_ to us to say, 'the rational price?"


Criterion One:


Where appeal is made to
J. L. Austin's important notion
of a _trouser-word_ (in _Sense and Sensibilia_
re: the word 'unreal').

It is 'unreasonable'

(but not 'irrational')


suggests, that is a 'trouser-word',

that is, the word that wears the trousers. And this for a number of reasons.


"To be reasonable", Grice writes, "is to
be relatively free from unreasonableness."


----

Criterion II:


"A second criterion", Grice writes, "is provided by Aristotle".

(Alas in Greek. "Some of you may not know Greek to follow Aristotle, but then he couldn't follow you either, so that's fair, right?" (LAUGHTER FROM THE AUDIENCE).



"In Nichomachean Ethics, 87, bC-342 ad c" Grice notes,

"Aristotle
remarks that both the

'ratiocinative'
and the 'non-ratiocinative' (or 'desiderative')

parts
of the 'soul' may "have reason"."

"The former -- 'the raciocinative part of the soul'
has reason

_INTRINSICALLY_, i.e. as the source of, say,
a rational principle."

"The latter, 'the non-raciocinative part of
the soul' has reason

_EXTRINSICALLY_, i.e. as merely
heeding or listening to such a rational principle as
delivered by the ratiocinative part."

Grice writes: "My idea is to link the first of
Aristotle's interpretations of "having (a) reason"
with 'rational'. And the second with 'reasonable', of course.

"I would use the Greek here, but I'm sure it will be wasted on you."

(He used to say, "They may not know Greek but they are good surfers") (He was referring to Stanford students).


"In application to behaviour, to be _rational_
is, then, to possess (or, on a given occasion, to display)
the capacity to reach a principle relating to
conduct."

"To be _reasonable_, on the other hand, is (in general
or on a particular occasion), merely to be free from
interference, on the part of desire or impulse, in
one's following such a rational principle."
(Gr01:25).

"I wish I could provide some further criteria, but I suppose you have it clear by now?"