Cogito, Ergo Implico

not_ show.

'Was der Solipsismus naemlich _meint_, ist ganz richtig, nur laesst es sich
nicht _sagen_, sondern es zeigt sich,' -- What irritates of this grand
Wittersian claim is that he (Witters) does not care to explain to us what
exactly it is that the Solipsismus "means", only that what he (Solipsisms)
means is fine (spot on, "ganz richting, natuerlich").

Witters's point, if I can find one, is that the UTTERANCE, as uttered by,
say, Mrs Ladd Franlkin,

"I am a Solipsist"

is a self-defeater. I can, however, _SHOW_ you how solipstist I am
(feeling, today). It all connects with what Grice says of Descartes's
"methodological solispsism" (which he got via the Wesleyan protestant
movement in Belgium), which j. ferguson thinks it's "b.s", and Erin Holder
separates from METAPHYSICAL solipsism proper.

Grice writes:



Cartesian Solipsism in Gricean Key

by J. L. Speranza

for the Grice Circle, &c.



Descartes's famous dictum


I think; therefore, I am


intrigued Grice on a number of fronts.

"Crucially," Grice notes, "the crux of the argument is in Descartes's choice of the key concept involved: 'therefore'"

"'Therefore' has what I call", Grice notes, "a silly ring to it."

"There-For. For what, one is inclined to ask."

"Surely, the conversational implicature of the cogito seems like a self-defeating enterprise."

"But not quite."

"For one, while it is true to say that the Cogito does not seem especially qualified
for the purpose of generating a conversational implicature, the fact that he granted the existence of a malignant daemon should be enough reason for us to proceed with the implicature, if not the conversation."

"In other words, since the certainty of my own existence, Descartes seems to be suggesting to us (or his malignant demon) seems to depend NOT, notably, on neither too clear nor too distinct perception, one wonders."

"And one wonders because the certainty of the Cogito, rather, seems to depend on, rather."

"On the one hand,(i) the fact that it is
immune to the hypothesis of a malignant demon,"

-- if not to the malignant demon itself. (The distinction is not otiose here, for surely the hypothesis is _true_ even if the malignant daemon turns to be, as it were, a 'truth-value gap'"

"But, most notably, and on the other hand, the cogito's certainty seems to depend on (ii) the obvious fact that

'I exist'

-- 'sum', in Descartes, --

"is one of a special
case of propositions
(statements)

to which 'I am awake' also belongs."

"Now, the truth and relevancy, and indeed 'point' of this special case of propositions seems to be _required_ as posited, in order that
their very expression should, in the first place, COUNT as the making of an assertion."

"In other words, an utterance of Descartes' cogito. To wit,

"I exist" is

either true or not a statement-making utterance at all".

"Whether Descartes had this in his mind, if he had any -- vide "Res extensae in Med. Met. ad iiB--23 (Guthier-Flammarion, xi) -- when he wrote what he wrote should not concern us _in the least_" (Gr89:190).