Grice and Anscombe

by J. L. Speranza
-- for the Grice Club.

IT WAS GOOD TO LEARN via hist-analytic -- a mailing list run by S. R. Bayne and hosted by R. B. Jones -- that Bayne's book, "Anscombe's Intention" is now out. I have copied from his blog at

http://www.stevenbayne.com

the table of contents, below -- as I propose, in this club, to expand, if we can, on the Grice-Anscombe connection.

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Bayne indeed acknowleges me, and I have to acknowledge him for having allowed me to discuss these issues -- (He is also author and contributor to this blog).

The interfaces between Grice and Anscombe and many and varied, as it were. For the record, besides the ones mentioned by Bayne, and the ones discussed at hist-analytic now deposited at Jones's website -- I should mention a folder at the Grice Collection -- (the specific contents of the collection had been mentioned and discussed elsewhere in the club -- in a couple of posts more or less successive -- with the keyword "Papers" in the header, if I recollect alright) --.

This folder just, reads, "Anscombe". So that's ANOTHER overlap, or interface, no?

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JL

Bayne's book starts with an intro which comprises three sections. Just to browse the marvel of his analytic skills in even organising the thing is a thing to behold and admire -- Not our browing: what is to admire is his skill, but you KNEW that.

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I may discuss particular collocations of some particular sections in other posts to the club -- always vis a vis you know who (Grice) (Herbert Paul, not Geoffrey Russell).

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Cheers,

JL

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Bayne writes:

"Introduction.
a) Logical Positivism and the Humanist Response
b) Private Languages before Wittgenstein (circa 1940)
c) Acts of Will and Willful Acts


PART 1: INTENTION AND KNOWLEDGE

1: 'Prediction', 'Intention', and 'Intentional'
2: Prediction, Commands and the Falsity of Expressions of Intention.
3: Expressions of Intention, Prediction and Talking Leaves.
4: The Agent as Sole Authority in Knowledge of Intentions


PART 2: REASONS, INTENTIONS, AND KNOWLEDGE

5: 'A Certain Sense of the Question 'Why''
a. Some Gricean Points
6: Intentional 'Under a Description'
a. Anscombe's Later Discussion of 'Under a Descriptio'n
b. Davidson's Use of 'Under a Description'
c. The Intentionality of Sensation
d. Anscombe's Criticism of Davidson on Agency
e. Davidson on Tying One's Shoes 'Under a Description'
7: The Involuntary
8: Non-Observational Knowledge
a. Donnellan on 'Knowing What I Am Doing'
9: A Difficult Distinction Based on Causation
10: Introducing Mental Causes
11: Mental Causes are neither Intentions nor Desires
13: Backward Looking Motives and Motives-In-General
14: Mental Causes and Backward-Looking Motives
15: Mental Causes or Reasons?


PART 3: ACTING WITHOUT REASON

16: 'I Don't Know Why I Did It'
17: 'I Don't Know Why I Did It '(Continued)
18: When the Answer to the Question ''Why'' Makes No Sense
19: What Makes an Action Intentional?
20: Non-Forward Looking Intentional Actions
21: Chains Consisting of Actions


PART 4: SERIES OF INTENTIONAL ACTIONS

22: Acting 'with the Intention That' 23: Whether an Intentional Action has a Unique Description as Such
24: Individuating Actions
25: Identifying Intentional Actions
26: How Many Actions are There?
27: Acts of Intending and Efficacy
a. Intentional Acts of Creation
28: Observational Knowledge of Intentions, Again
29: I Do What Happens
30: Against the Idea of Intentions as Initiating Causes of Action
31: Knowledge of Intention is not Like Our Knowledge of Commands
32: Lists and Two Kinds of Error: Introducing Practical Wisdom


PART 5: PRACTICAL WISDOM

33: Aristotle's Practical Syllogism
a. R. M. Hare and 'Insane Premises'
b. Davidson and 'nsane Premises'
34: Wants and Practical Reasoning
35: Wanting as the Starting Point of a Practical Syllogism
a. Actions as processes
b. Wants not Included in a Practical Syllogism
c. Incontinence and the Division of Responsibility
d. The Difference between Theoretical and Practical Syllogisms
36: Wanting and Its Place in Reasoning
37: Desirability Characterizations
38: How We Arrive at Desirability Characterizations
39: The Non-necessity of any Particular Desirability Characterization
in Relation to Wanting
40: The Similarity of the Relations of Wanting to Good and Judgment
to Truth.
a. Ryle on Pleasure
b. Choice, Volition, and Intention
41: Ethics and Philosophical Psychology
a. 'Ought' and the Divine Law
c. Speculative Remarks on Volition and Intention
42: Practical Reasoning and Mental Processes
43: The Complexity of 'Doing'
44: Acting with an Idea of an End
45: The Problem of Practical Knowledge
46: Interest and the Why-Question
47: 'Intentional' and the Form of Description
a. Animal Intentions
48: Practical Knowledge and 'Knowledges'
49: The Meaning of 'Voluntary'
a. Davidson on Voluntary Action without Intention
b. Observation and Voluntary Movement
50. Intentions and Predictions
51. Wanting and the Future
52: 'I am Going to but I Won't'


PART 6: SINGULAR CAUSATION

a. Hume, Popper, and Regularity
b. Russell and the Idea of Lawlikeness
c. Singularity vs. Regularity
d. Anscombe on Hume
e. Russell's Anticipation of Davidson/Ducasse
f. Anscombe on the Singularity of Causation
g. Applying Kripke to Singular Causation
h. Calling into Question the Necessary A Posteriori
i. The Singularist View and Knowledge of Actions
j. Feynman, Bohm, and the 'Magic' Box
k. Anscombe, Bohm and Mechanistic Determinism
l. Reconciling Singularity and Regularity Theories


PART 7: CAUSATION AND AGENCY

a. The Causes of Action
b. Anscombe and Chisholm
c. Chisholm's 1966 Position on Agent Causation
d. Melden's Problem(s) with Volition
e. Anscombe Critique of Chisholm
f. Davidson and Anscombe on Agent Causation
g. James, Volition, and Anomalous Monism"

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