Primacy of Substantials

Speranza

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In "Notes for categories with Strawson", The Grice Papers, Grice suggests that our use of language very often presupposes the existence of substantial objects.

Furthermore, substances are in a sense the basic, or primary objects of reference.

Cfr. Strawson on 'individual' qua spatio-temporal continuant, and Strawson, "Subject and Predicate in logic and grammar" (Irvine lectures, with Grice).

Grice and Strawson admit that they have no conclusive proof of this latter claim (that substantials are baisc) but they offer their own intuitions in support, presumably drawn from their experiments with substantial subjects ("Socrates", "Grice") and non-substantial subjects ("Mercy").

Further, substances (like Grice) are, in general, what we are most interested in talking about, asking about, issuing orders about.

"Indeed the primacy of substance
is deeply embedded in our
language", Grice and Strawson write,
in a note as if to provoke Hume.

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Grice will later suggest that the closes echoes of this joint work ("Notes for categories with Strawson", the Grice Papers) in published writing were in Strawson's "Individuals".

But there are also resonances of the joint project with Strawson in various aspects of Grice's own work.

Two points from the end of the manuscript fragment, one a non-linguistic parallel, and one a consequence of their position, indicate these.


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The non-linguistic parallel comes from a consideration
of the basic needs for survival and the attainment of
satisfaction people experience as living creatures.

Processes such as 'eating', 'drinking', 'being hurt by', 'using', 'finding', are ENTIRELY dependent on transactions with substances.

Cfr.

"I found a sense datum."

"I was hurt by red".

"I drank mercy".

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Grice and Strawson suggest that it is not entirely fanciful to consider that the structure of language has developed to reflect the structure of these most basic interactions with the world.

As Palmer said it: one caveman to another: "Remember when all we had to care about was nouns and verbs?"

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The relevant consequence of Grice's and Strawson's position relates to a familar target for ordinary language philosophers: the theory of sense data, as practiced by verificationists like Berlin, and Ayer.

Grice's and Strawson's argument is in essence a PCA.

If substances are a primary focus of interest, and if this fact is reflected in the language, then this offers good evidence that the world must indeed be substantial in character.

If the proponents of sense data were correct, if al we can accurately discuss are the individual sensations we receive though our sense, then

"SUBSTANTIAL TERMINOLOGY
WOULD HAVE NO APPLICATION".

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And so on.

For Griceness Sake

Speranza

We see that in "Notes for Categories with Strawson" (The H P Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, University of California, Berkeley), Grice plays with language.

He uses the examples of

"Socrates" as a proper name so-called, "nomen proprium"

and

"mercy" as an abstract name, so called.

The notes explore the difference in grammatical distribution, shall we say, between substantial nouns (like "Socrates") and non-substantial nouns (like "mercy"). The idioms suggest that 'mercy' can be both referred to and predicated, whereas 'Socrates' can only be referred to.

In Latin, the distribution is subtler.

In Greek, we need the article, say, "to agathon", bonum, the good.

The house is clean.
Domus pulchrum.
Cleanliness is good. Pulchrum bonum est.

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It would seem that, although both substantials and non-substantials can occupy subject position, substantials must be seen as the primary occupiers of the subject slot because they CANNOT occur as predicates.

But cfr. Snydd, "predicating proper names".

"He is no Socrates".

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Robbing Peter to Pay Paul.

Paul ---> Paulness
Peter ---> Peterness
Grice ---- Griceanity.

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To demonstrante this point, Grice goes on to distinguish between establishing existence by referring to, and by predicating expressions. (Recall that Searle's DPhil Oxon, under Strawson, was on "Reference and predication").

The distinction between establishing existence by referring to and by predicating expressions is established by means of a comparison between two short dialogues.

CONVERSATION I.

Conversation I is perfectly acceptable. Evidence is successfully offered for the EXISTENCE OF A UNIVERSAL ("Disinterestedness") by predicating it of a particular ("Banbury"):

A: Banbury is really disinterested.
B: Disinterested people do not exist; real disinterestedness does not exist.
A: Yes, they do. Yes, it does. Bunbury is really didisinterested.

In second-order predicate calculus:

(F)GF

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CONVERSATION II.

In contrast, descriptive statements do not guarantee the existence of their subjects, but rather stand in a "special relation" (expression Grice's) to statements of existence.

This "special relation" is, Grice and Strawson note, elsewhere called 'presupposition'. It seems that at this stage, at least, Grice is prepared to endorse Strawson's response to Russell. The following conversation is thus 'NOT LINGUISTICALLY IN ORDER' (expression Grice's):

A: Bunbury is really disinterested.
B: There is no such person as Bunbury.
A: Yes, there is. He is really disinterested.

Producing a sentence in which something ('disinterested') is predicated of a substantial subject ('Bunbury') is NOT enough to guarantee the existence of that subject.

Grice and Strawson note at this point that the situation would be quite different if 'in the next room' were substituted into A's response.

A: Bunbury is really disinterested.
B: There is no such person as Bunbury.
A: Yes, there is. He is in the next room.

Here, A's choice of predicate ("in the next room") does MORE than just offer a description of Bunbury. The choice of the predicate points to a way of verifying Bunbury's existence.

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And so on.