Why H. P. Grice took Russell more seriously than he took Berlin!

 was noted i n the previous section tha t a libera l account of ethica l and politica l lif e i s characteristicall y presented withi n a philosophica l argument. And we have suggested tha t such a depictio n takes the form of an ideologica l understanding which i s expressed i n a philosophica l vocabulary: where the presumed ideologica l portraya l i s t o be understood as being logicall y distinc t from, and standing prio r t o , the philosophica l argument which articulate s it . Further, i t was contended tha t writer s such as A.J. Ayer, C.L. Stevenson, R.M. Hare and J.L. Mackie, who are t o be located i n the non-cognitivis t traditio n of ethica l theorising , have implicitl y expressed and hence presumed the liberal-individualis t ideologica l portraya l of moral agency i n thei r philosophica l analysis. Such expression i s implici t because these philosophers do not understand themselves t o be making, a t leas t i n thei r earlie r writings , an explici t contributio n t o normative ethic s or politica l understanding. (1) However, there are certai n writers , of whom Isaiah Berli n and Bertrand Russell are good examples, who are explicitl y concerned t o advance libera l convictions : convictions which are expressed i n philosophica l arguments which are closely drawn upon t he centra l assumptions of the non-cognitivis t thesis . Isaiah Berlin's notable achievement was t o restat e the libera l positio n i n terms clearl y drawn from the modern analytica l philosophica l traditio n i n which non-cognitivism has a centra l place. His purpose was t o offe r a critiqu e of totalitarianis m and it s metaphysical assumptions. (2) This critiqu e constitute d an attempt t o give liberalis m a coherent and convincing expression withi n a fashionable philosophica l vocabulary. I t i s necessary t o outlin e the nature of thi s achievement. Berlin's thesi s i s grounded upon two purported analyti c truths . The firs t i s the claim tha t i t i s an ineradicable feature of al l human - 149 - experience tha t values are diverse and conflicting ; not only i n the 'non-cognitivist ' sense tha t they stand relativ e t o the expression of individua l attitude s or desires, and thus conflic t i n relatio n t o difference s of feelin g between persons or societies , but also i n the sense tha t there i s a tension between conflictin g values i n one individua l consciousness. (3) For Berlin , i t i s an erro r t o suppose tha t a l l goals, al l virtues , al l ideal s held t o be desirable by an agent can be compatibly ordered or united int o a harmonious whole without loss. The second, relate d claim i s tha t there are no overarching metaphysical standards of rationa l arbitratio n by which t o resolve such conflict s o f values between persons, societies , or withi n our own consciousness. This i s because, Berli n says, questions of value are excluded from the realm of the determinately answerable: they are, i n hi s view, ultimatel y contestable or, i n modern parlance, incommensurable. This conception of value relate s t o the non-cognitivis t thesi s i n two centra l ways. I t i s t o maintain tha t value-ascriptio n constitute s an expression of feelin g which rest s ultimatel y upon an individua l consciousness, and i t i s t o deny the possibilit y of there being any 'objective values' which stand independently from such individua l expression of feeling . Unlike the non-cognitivists , however, Berli n employs thi s conception of value t o make a series of explici t recommendations fo r conduct which have practica l import of a recognisably libera l kind. These recommendations can best be illustrate d by attending t o hi s concluding passage i n the essay 'Two Concepts of Liberty', where he write s tha t I t may be tha t the idea l of freedom t o choose ends without claimin g eterna l validit y fo r them, and the pluralis m of values connected wit h this , i s only the lat e frui t of our declinin g capitalis t civilisation : an idea l which remote ages and primitiv e societie s have not recognised, and one which posterit y wil l regard wit h curiosity , even sympathy, but littl e comprehension. This may be so; but no sceptica l conclusion seems t o me t o follow . Principle s are not less sacred because thei r duration cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, the very desire fo r guarantees tha t our values are eterna l and secure i n some objective heaven i s perhaps only a - 150 - craving fo r the certaintie s of childhood and the absolute values of our primitiv e past. 'To realis e the relativ e validit y of one's own convictions ' sai d an admirable write r of our time, 'and yet stand fo r them unflinchingly , i s what distinguishe s a civilise d man from a barbarian'. To demand more than thi s i s perhaps a deep and incurable metaphysical need; but t o allow i t t o determine one's practic e i s a symptom of an equally deep, and more dangerous, moral and politica l immaturity. (4) This passage reflect s certai n moral ideal s associated wit h liberalism . I t i s buil t upon an ideal pictur e of the subject characterised i n terms of the freedom of the individua l t o choose hi s own purposes without recourse t o any metaphysical justification . For Berlin , the conditio n of moral and politica l immaturity i s characterised as the outcome of an unenlightened, 'childish', 'primitive ' or 'barbarian' dependence upon the notio n of the objective values or eterna l validit y f o r our principles . To recognise the contingency, relativit y and pluralit y of values (relativ e t o diverse individua l attitudes) , and yet not shir k from thi s fact , is , Berli n says, the hallmark of moral adulthood and progress. I t i s what distinguishe s the civilise d man from t he barbarian, or the libera l from the nationalist . These notions of 'freedom' and 'moral maturity ' are particularl y libera l evaluations, and they have thei r place i n the libera l ideologica l understanding. They are also, as we have seen, presumed withi n the non-cognitivis t styl e of ethica l theorising , and generate certai n practica l recommendations which relat e t o moral conduct. For we can see tha t the moral relativis m which Berli n associates wit h moral maturity , and the reactio n against non-libera l moral practice s tha t follow s from it , i s also reflecte d i n W.H.F. Barnes' statement, made i n 1933 and quoted earlier , tha t 'In a world where nationalism threatens t o destroy Civilisatio n a sound convictio n of the relativit y of al l moralit y i s likel y t o be not so much a solvent of moralit y as a salutor y check on it s onesidedness1 . (5) Where, though, Berli n differ s from the non-cognitivist s i s i n hi s explici t insistence tha t libera l politica l practic e i s supported by the arguments of philosophica l value-pluralism. For Berlin , thi s theoretica l - 151 - conception of value i s only practicall y realisabl e withi n libera l society; an arrangement i n which, as John Gray says moral conflict s are openly revealed and commended t o us, not because i t alone satisfie s the demands of human nature, but because i n i t the competition of goods which i s an unalterable feature of the human predicament i s not shirke d or evaded, but activel y embraced. <6 -="" .="" 152="" 153="" 154="" 155="" 156="" 157="" 1935="" 1946="" :="" a="" about="" above="" accept="" acceptence="" according="" accurate="" accurately="" achieved="" acknowledged="" act="" actio="" action.="" actions="" actual="" address="" adhere="" adherence="" adherent="" admiration="" adopt="" adopted="" against="" al="" all="" also="" although="" ambiguity="" among="" amounts="" an="" and="" another.="" any="" apologetic="" apparent="" appeal="" appealed="" appears="" applied="" appropriate="" are="" argue="" argued="" argues="" argument.="" 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