Why H. P. Grice never took A. J. Ayer too seriously!

A.J. Ayer's famous work Language. Truth and Logic, published i n 1936, contained a shor t chapter entitle d the 'Critique of Ethics and Theology' which expressed dramaticall y the emotivis t view. I t was the success of thi s publication , more than any other, which popularised the emotive theory and made i t widely accessible t o the public. However, Ayer's expositio n of the emotivis t account of ethic s was not an origina l declaration: hi s analysi s was presented late r than the expressed views of Stevenson, Duncan-Jones and Barnes, and hi s ideas were shaped by other intellectua l influences. Although a t the time of publicatio n he di d not acknowledge any specifi c influences upon him, he has recently admitted tha t he was 'very likel y t o have been unconsciously influenced' by Ogden and Richards. (1) In particular , he recognises the distinc t possibilit y tha t hi s claim tha t the functio n of an ethica l word i s purely emotive was drawn upon the distinctio n between the symbolic and the emotive uses of language which was made by Ogden and Richards i n The Meaning of Meaning. Evidence fo r thi s connection i s clearl y indicated i n the text , where Ayer state s that : The presence of an ethica l symbol i n a propositio n adds nothing t o it s factua l content. Thus i f I say t o someone, 'You acted wrongly i n stealin g tha t money', I am not statin g anything more than i f I had simply sai d 'You stol e tha t money'. In adding tha t thi s actio n i s wrong I am not making any furthe r statement about i t . I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it . (2) This passage i s markedly simila r t o the one quoted earlie r from page 125 of The Meaning of Meaning. Also, Ayer's unoriginalit y i s furthe r confirmed by hi s indicatio n tha t hi s view tha t moral pronouncements are expressions of emotion rathe r than statements of fac t was suggested t o him by Duncan-Jones. (3) What was, however, distinctiv e about Ayer's contributio n t o the development of emotivism was hi s presentation of the theory i n the terms of the philosophica l dictate s of 'logica l positivism'. He - 127 - acknowledges, though, tha t the validit y of the emotive theory does not depend upon the validit y of the positivis t principle s wit h which he seeks t o inform it . He writes , i n the Introductio n to the Second Editio n of Language. Truth and Logic (1946), that : The emotive theory of ethics... has provoked a fai r amount of criticism ; but I fin d tha t thi s criticis m has been directe d more often against the positivisti c principle s on which the theory has been assumed t o depend than against the theory itself . Now I do n ot deny tha t i n puttin g forward thi s theory I was concerned wit h maintaining the general consistency of my position ; but i t i s not t he only ethica l theory tha t would have satisfie d thi s requirement, nor does i t actuall y entai l any of the non-ethical statements which form the remainder of my argument. Consequently, even i f i t could be shown tha t these other statements were invalid , thi s would not i n itsel f refut e the emotive analysi s of ethica l judgements; and i n fac t I believe thi s analysi s t o be vali d on it s own account. (4) Ayer i s correc t t o assert tha t the plausibilit y of the emotivis t analysis does not depend upon the plausibilit y of hi s peculiarl y positivis t criteri a of 'verification' , 'significance', 'litera l meaning' and so forth . The relationshi p between emotivism and logica l positivis m i s contingent rathe r than necessary. This can be seen by the fac t tha t other emotivis t thinker s developed thei r ethica l theories quit e independently of thei r general philosophica l regard fo r the analytica l achievements of the positivis t school. For instance, Stevenson write s i n 1937 tha t hi s studies wit h Wittgenstein i n Cambridge led him t o an interes t i n the Viennese positivist s which was by no means uncritical . This i s because, he says, 'i t seems quit e obvious tha t a great deal of thei r logica l rigou r i s gained a t the expense of side-stepping fundamental and decently human difficulties. ' (5) However, he does acknowledge tha t 'any speculative metaphysics wil l be idl e unless the intellectua l disciplin e and criticis m of these men i s taken seriously* . (6) Likewise, Barnes recall s tha t when pDsitivist s lik e Ayer took over h i s emotivis t suggestion they used i t t o tread paths which he declined - 128 - t o follow . <7 .="" a="" account="" address="" adheres="" al="" also="" an="" analysi="" and="" are="" assumptions="" ayer="" barnes="" broader="" c="" can="" conceptual="" constitute="" context="" contributio="" controversia="" course="" d="" detai="" development="" direc="" discern="" dissertatio="" doctrine="" doctrines="" duncan-jones="" e="" emergence="" emotive="" emotivis="" emotivism="" emotivist="" empiricism.="" establis="" ethica="" ethics="" expression="" font="" form="" g.e="" g="" general="" generally="" h="" had="" having="" he="" hi="" historica="" i="" importance="" influence="" it="" l="" langaugef="" language="" lie="" logic.="" logica="" making="" moore="" more="" n="" nbsp="" necessarily="" necessary="" need="" no="" non-cognitivis="" o="" of="" origina="" ot="" other="" outline="" philosophica="" popularisatio="" positivis="" positivism="" positivist="" preceded="" publicatio="" question="" r="" rathe="" rather="" relate="" s="" see="" specifi="" state="" stevenson="" styl="" t="" tha="" than="" the="" then="" theoretica="" theories.="" theorisin="" theory="" thical="" tradition="" truth="" underpin="" understanding="" upon="" was="" we="" what="" which="" who="" withi="" work="">