Why H. P. Grice found C. L. Stevenson fascinating -- and makes him the topic of his Oxford Philosophical Society talk on 'Meaning'

Stevenson studied fo r hi s firs t degree a t Yale between 1926-30. Although he majored i n English Literatur e he attended the "Philosophy B1 course i n hi s thir d year, and i t was during thi s period tha t hi s thoughts on ethic s took shape. He admits tha t he was 'at the time insisting , i n a way more urgent than clear, tha t values must be objective.' (1) However, he came t o rejec t any such attempt t o place ethic s upon an objective footin g whils t stil l a t Yale. This i s revealed i n a paper entitle d 'Essay on the Pragmatic Proof of the Relativit y of Truth', which i s dated March 28th 1929. I n thi s paper Stevenson reject s t he idea tha t moral trut h relate s t o some absolute, invariabl e qualit y which i s capable of objective discovery, Rather, he insist s tha t i t i s a pragmatic notion which stands relativ e t o a particula r practica l situation . As such, he argues tha t i t applies t o those arrangements which best sui t our purposes. Therefore, he says, the pursui t of moral trut h i s a matter of prescribin g what ought t o be done i n the fulfilmen t of those arrangements which 'work' practicall y i n our particula r environment. This type of prescriptio n constitutes , fo r Stevenson, 'the basis of a suggestion', i n tha t i f a man issues a statement and 'exerts sufficien t pressure' upon others t o accept it , then he 'wil l buil d up a general confidence among people tha t hi s statement i s tru e potentially' , and thi s wil l cause them t o change thei r minds. (2) However, Stevenson says tha t thi s achievement i s not a matter of knowing something t o be tru e i n the objective sense, and revealing tha t trut h t o others. Rather, i t i s a matter of persuading others tha t something which i s desired i s evaluativel y worth pursuing, and thi s involves securing an agreement of attitud e i n the minds of others. These notions of desire, prescriptio n and persuasion are furthe r developed i n a paper entitle d 'Arguments fo r Determinism', which i s dated Apri l 22nd 1929. Here Stevenson addresses the question of 'the relationshi p which determinism bears t o al l forms of moral Judgement'. He asserts tha t al l moral decisions t o act are the resul t of a caused desire which predominates over other conflictin g and lesser desires. - 101 - Why then, he asks, do we praise or blame ourselves and others when these caused actions are performed? He suggests tha t our feelin g of remorse, fo r instance, amounts t o the recognitio n tha t although our conduct was originall y thought t o be beneficial , i t i s shown on reflectio n t o be neither beneficia l t o ourselves or others. In other words, our feelin g of remorse involves an acknowledgement tha t we 'ought t o have done otherwise' i n correlatin g self-interes t wit h the interest s of others. Further, he argues, we praise or blame the actions of others because we 'recognise tha t even though everyone's actio n i s caused, nevertheless our self-interes t makes i t imperative tha t we accept and rejec t nonetheless'. (3) That is , we prais e or blame the actio n of others t o the extent tha t our own self-interes t i s being eithe r guaranteed or adversely affected. Stevenson also insist s tha t thi s imperative t o praise or blame takes the form of a persuasion. He write s that ; Both blame and praise... look t o the future , not t o the past... The judged person cannot change hi s features, but hi s conduct he can change i f only sufficien t pressure i s brought t o bear upon him ... And blame on the one hand, plus praise on the other, i s one way, a t least, whereby such change may be brought about. (4) Stevenson argues tha t i t i s thi s prescriptiv e or imperative functio n which i s intrinsi c t o the nature of moral judgement. This i s because, he says, a moral judgement i s 'offered as a means of intensifyin g or cancellin g those causations' which determine ethica l conduct. (5) We can see how Stevenson's ideas i n 1929 indicat e the genesis of a ethica l analysi s which constitute s the framework of an emotivis t position . For the ideas present involve the notion tha t moral actio n implies the reconciliatio n of self-interes t or caused desires wit h the common interest ; the claim tha t the subject-matter of ethic s i s 'nonobjective'; and the suggestion tha t moral judgements possess an intrinsi c prescriptiv e functio n t o persuade others t o change thei r attitude s t o fi t your own. I t i s worth noting tha t thi s collectio n of ideas owes a great deal t o the thought of Ogden and Richards. Stevenson admits thi s when he - 102 - write s tha t "in findin g an explanation of values tha t would take the place of my 'objective' one, I was greatl y influenced by a passage from The Meaning of Meaning, by C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards'. (6) The passage i n question i s the one quoted earlie r a t length. Further, we can see tha t Stevenson's recognitio n of Ogden and Richards' contributio n t o ethica l theory dates back a t leas t as fa r as 1931. This i s evidenced by t he fac t tha t Stevenson provides an assessment of the controversy between Ogden, Richards and Moore i n a paper entitle d 'The Hature of Good', which was dated October 19th 1931. This paper was writte n whils t he was embarking on a two year period of study fo r the Moral Sciences degree a t Cambridge between 1931 and 1933. Stevenson introduces the paper by acknowledging tha t 'Professor Moore's Principl a Ethica i s so exceedingly important a work, i n my opinion, tha t any present day discussion of the 'good' could scarcely do bette r than buil d up around i t as a centre of inspiration' . (7) And yet, he says, ' I fin d tha t my own conclusions, which i t i n par t provoked, a re i n utte r contradictio n wit h it' . (8) Stevenson illustrate s thi s poin t by means of a hypothetica l example. He imagines a man who seeks t he fulfilmen t of hi s desires by takin g 'his place i n the world i n the company of others'. (9) This man, Stevenson argues, recognises tha t i t becomes expedient fo r him t o contro l the resultan t desires of others, eithe r tha t they may profi t by hi s superior knowledge, or tha t he may gain hi s desired objects a t thei r expense . This he find s he can do by suggestion. And the concept of 'good', which i n process of suggestion attain s it s fulles t meaning, i s the means which he employs i n bringin g about hi s end. For he uses the word not merely t o indicat e the object of hi s own resultan t desires, but as though i t indicate d the resultan t of anyone's desires, regardless of how they were constituted . 'Good' thereby comes t o have an imperative force, and t o say 'That i s good' conveys very subtl y the meaning 'Consider tha t thin g good'. <10 -="" ...="" .="" 103="" 104="" 105="" 106="" 1931="" 1932="" 1933.="" 1933="" 1935="" 1937="" 1938="" 1944.="" 26th="" :="" a="" able="" about="" academic="" accept="" accordance="" according="" account="" acknowledge="" activit="" acts="" actual="" adds="" adjective="" adjudication.="" adjudication="" advantage="" advantages="" affec="" agent="" agreement="" al="" all="" alternativ="" alternative="" although="" always="" an="" analyse="" analysi="" analysis="" and="" another.="" another="" anticipat="" any="" apparently="" appear="" appeared="" applied="" appraisement="" appropriate="" approval="" are="" argues="" argument="" arisin="" articles="" as="" asking="" assertin="" attitud="" attitude...="" attitude="" bad="" bargain="" bargaining..="" bargaining.="" bargaining="" based="" basis="" be="" bear="" became="" because="" becomes="" 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